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THE MILITARY OPERATIONS
OF
GENERAL BEAUREGARD
IN THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES
1861 to 1865

INCLUDING A BRIEF PERSONAL SKETCH AND A
NARRATIVE OP HIS SERVICES IN THE
"WAR WITH MEXICO, 1846-8

Br ALFEED EOMAN

FORMERLY COLONEL OF THE 18TH LOUISIANA VOLUNTEERS, AFTERWARDS AIDE-DE-CAMP
AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL ON TIIE STAFF OF GENERAL BEAUREGARD

IN TWO VOLUMES.— Vol. I.

" Tlwse generals only who Jiave never commanded
armies in the field lutve not committed errors'1''
Napoleon at St. Helena

NEW YORK
HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE
1834

2-7 A . 4 C>
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1883, by
HARPER & BROTHERS,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

All rights reserved.

PREFACE.

This work, written from notes and documents authenticated
by me, furnishes a correct account of my military services and
conduct prior to and during the recent war between the States.
It is offered as a guide to the future historian of that momentous
period. In developing tlie truth of history, and fortifying it with evi
dence beyond dispute, I desire to express my appreciation of the
earnest, able, and judicial manner in which the author has per
formed his arduous undertaking; and I fully endorse all his
statements and comments, excepting only such encomiums as he
has thought proper to bestow upon me.
To General Thomas Jordan, formerly my Chief of Staff, and
to Mr. W. J. Marrin, of New York, I am indebted for valuable
assistance in the obtaining of many facts and data; also to Lieu
tenant-Colonel R. N". Scott, IT. S. A., in charge, at "Washington, of
the publication office of the War Records of 1861-65, and to Gen
eral Marcus J. Wright, agent of the War Department in the col
lection of Confederate Records, for copies of important papers
furnished by them.
G. T. Beaukegakd.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

Biographical Sketch of General Beauregard  Page 1
CHAPTER I.
Major Beauregard appointed Superintendent of the United States Military
Academy. — His Determination to Resign should Louisiana Withdraw
from the Union. — Takes Command at West Point, but is immediately Re
lieved. — Returns to New Orleans. — Is Offered the Rank of Colonel of
Engineers and Artillery in the Louisiana State Forces. — Declines. — Plan
to Obstruct River near Forts. — Floating Rooms. — Is Summoned to Mont
gomery by President Davis. — Ordered to Charleston, S. O, to Assume
Command and Direct Operations against Fort Sumter  13
CHAPTER II.
Description of Charleston. — General Beauregard's Arrival. — Cursory Sketch of
the Condition of the Public Mind in the South. — The Hon. Robert Barn
well Rhett. — One Sentiment and One Resolve animating South Carolin
ians. — South Carolina Commissioners to Washington. — Failure of Nego
tiations. — Major Anderson Evacuates Fort Moultrie and Occupies Fort
• ' Sumter. — Hoisting of Palmetto Flags. — Steamer Star of the West. — Gov
ernor Pickens Summons Major Anderson to Surrender the Fort. — He De
clines, but Refers the Matter to Washington. — Mr. Buchanan Refuses to
Withdraw Federal Garrison. — All Eyes Centred on South Carolina. —
System and Plan of Operations Adopted by General Beauregard.— More
Troops Volunteer than are Needed  23
CHAPTER III.
The Confederate States Commissioners. — Their Correspondence with Mr. Sew
ard. — How they were Deceived. — Mr. Lincoln's Sectional Views. — Letter
of Major Anderson to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army. —
On Whom must Rest the Responsibility for the War. — Mr. Buchanan's
Wavering Policy. — General Beauregard Distrusts the Good Faith of the
Federal Authorities. — His Plan to Reduce Fort Sumter. — Detached Bat
teries. — Floating and Iron-clad Batteries. — Fort Sumter's Supplies Cut

viii CONTENTS.
Off. — Drummond Lights. — Steam Harbor-boats. — Enfilade or Masked
Battery. — Mr. Chew. — His Message to General Beauregard. — Secretary of
War Apprised of Same. — His Answer to Telegram. — Blakely Rifled Gun.
— By Whom Sent. — General Beauregard Demands the Surrender of Fort
Sumter. — Major Anderson Declines. — Fire Opened on the Fort April
12th  Page 31
CHAPTER IV.
General Beauregard Makes no Material Changes in the Distribution of Forces
in Charleston. — Brigadier-General Simons in Command of Morris Island.
— Brigadier -General Dunovant of Sullivan's Island. — Tone of Troops. —
The First Shell Fired from Fort Johnson. — The Only Motive Actuating
the South.— At 5 a. m., April 12th, every Battery in Full Play. — Sumter
Responds at 7 o'clock. — How our Guns were Served. — Engagement Con
tinued until Nightfall. — Firing Kept up all Night by our Batteries. —
No Response from Sumter. — Conduct of the Federal Fleet. — Fort Re-opens
Fire on the Morning of the 13th. — Burning of Barracks. — Sumter still
Firing. — Our Troops Cheer the Garrison. — General Beauregard Offers As
sistance to Major Anderson, who Declines. — Hoisting of the White Flag.
— Terms of Surrender. — Accident during the Salute of the Flag. — Evac
uation. — Our Troops Enter the Fort, April 14th. — Hoisting of Confederate
and Palmetto Flags  41
CHAPTER V.'
Condition of Fort Sumter after the Bombardment. — Repairs Begun at Once. —
Mustering of South Carolina Volunteers. — Bonham's Brigade. — General
Beauregard makes a Reconnoissance of the South Carolina Coast. — Rec
ommends Works at Stono, the Two Edistos, and Georgetown. — Declines
Advising Plan of Defence for Port Royal Harbor. — Yields under Pressure,
but Predicts the Result. — Receives Congratulations upon the Reduction
of Sumter. — Vote of Thanks of Congress. — Resolutions of the General
Assembly of South Carolina. — General Beauregard is Called to Montgom
ery. — The President Wishes him to Assist General Bragg at Pensacola. — Ho
Declines. — His Reasons therefor.— Deputation from New Orleans Asking
his Transfer to Louisiana. — The President Sends him Back to Charleston.
— Propositions of the House of John Frazer & Co., relative to Purchase
of Steamers. — Comments thereon. — General Beauregard Advocates the
Plan. — Government Declines Moving in the Matter. — Silence of Mr.
Davis's Book about it. — General Beauregard Ordered to Richmond. — Re-
grets of Carolinians at his Departure. — Letter of Governor Pickens.... 49
CHAPTER VI.
Secession of Virginia. — Confederate Troops Sent to her Assistance. — Arrival of
General Beauregard in Richmond. — He Assumes Command at Manassas. —

.CONTENTS. jx
Position of our Forces. — His Proclamation and the Reasons for it. — Site of
" Camp Pickens." — His Letter to President Davis. — Our Deficiencies. —
Mismanagement in Quartermaster's and Commissary's Departments. — How
he could have Procured Transportation. — Manufacture of Cartridges. — Se
cret Service with Washington  Page 65

CHAPTER VII.
Position of Troops in Northern Virginia. — General Beauregard Advocates
Concentration, June 12th. — Letter to that Effect to President Davis. — An
swer Declining. — General Beauregard Suggests a Junction with General
Holmes. — Again Refused. — Division of General Beauregard's Forces into
Brigades, 20th June. — Begins Forward Movement. — Instructions to Brig
ade Commanders. — Reconnoissauces Made at the End of June. — McDow
ell's Strength. — General Beauregard's Anxieties. — His Letter to Senator
Wigfall. — Submits another Plan of Operations to the President, July
11th  70

CHAPTER VIII.
General Beauregard again Urging Concentration. — Colonels Preston and Chest
nut sent to Richmond, to Explain Plan. — Report of Colonel Chestnut. —
The President Disapproves the Proposed Campaign. — Letter of General
Beauregard to General Johnston. — Comments upon Mr. Davis's Refusal. —
General McDowell Ordered to Advance. — Strong Demonstration against
General Bonham. — General Beauregard's Telegram to the President. —
General Johnston Ordered to Make Junction if Practicable. — Action of
Bull Run. — What Major Barnard, U. S. E., Says of It. — Repulse of the
Enemy. — War Department Inclined to Withdraw Order to General John
ston.— General Beauregard Disregards the Suggestion  84

CHAPTER IX.
Battle of Manassas. — General J. E. Johnston Assumes Command, but General
Beauregard Directs Operations and Fights the Battle. — Superiority of
Numbers Against us. — Deeds of Heroism. — Enemy Completely Routed. —
Ordnance and Supplies Captured.— Ours and Enemy's Losses. — Strength
of General McDowell's Army.— The Verdict of History  96
CHAPTER X.
President Davis and Generals Johnston and Beauregard Discuss the Propriety
of Pursuing the Enemy during the Night following the Battle. — Error of
Mr. Davis as to the Order he Wrote. — On the 22d General Beauregard As
signs his Troops to New Positions. — The President Confers the Rank of
General on General Beauregard, subject to the Approval of Congress. — On

CONTENTS.
the 25th, Address Issued to Troops by Generals Johnston and Beauregard.
—Organization of General Beauregard's Army into Brigades.— Impossi
bility of any Military Movement of Importance, and Why.— Army With
out Transportation and Without Subsistence.— Colonel Northrop Appoints
Major W. B. Blair as Chief Commissary of the Army.— General Beauregard
Informs the President of the Actual State of Affairs.— Colonel Lee to the
President.— General Beauregard to Colonels Chestnut and Miles. — His
Telegram to Colonel Myers. — Answer of President Davis.— General Beau
regard's Reply.— Colonel Myers alleges Ignorance of Want of Transporta
tion in the Army of the Potomac— General Beauregard's Answer.— Cause
of the Failure of the Campaign.— Effect of General Beauregard's Letter
upon Congress. — An Apparent Improvement in Commissary and Quarter
master Departments. — General Beauregard Complains again on the 23d
of August.— No Action Taken.— Suggests Removal of Colonel Northrop.
—The President believes in his Efficiency, and Upholds him.— Fifteen
and Twenty Days' Rations asked for by General Beauregard  Page 114

CHAPTER XI.
General Beauregard Suggests a Forward Movement. — Not Approved by Gen
eral Johnston.— Sanitary Measures. — Deficiency in Light Artillery. — In
structions to Colonel Stuart. — Mason's and Munson's Hills. — General
Beauregard Proposes to Hold Them. — General Johnston of a Different
Opinion. — Popularity of General Beauregard. — He Establishes His Head
quarters at Fairfax Court-House. — Proposes Another Plan Involving De
cisive Battle. — General Johnston Deems it Better not to Hazard the
Movement. — Organization of the Forces into Divisions. — General Beaure
gard Advises that the Army be Placed Under One Head. — President
Davis Invited to a Conference at Fairfax Court-House. — Scheme of Oper
ations Submitted. — Generals Johnston and G. W. Smith Approve it. —
Troops in Splendid Fighting Condition. — The President Objects. — No
Reinforcements can be Furnished, and no Arms in the Country. — Review
of Mr. Davis's Remarks on the Subject.— He Proposes a Plan for Opera
tions Across the Potomac. — The Commanding Generals do not Consider
it Feasible  131

CHAPTER XII.
Signal Rockets and Signal Telegraph. — General Beauregard Advises Coast
Defenses at New Orleans, Mobile, Galveston, and Berwick Bay, and Calls
Attention to the Exposure of Port Royal. — Counsels General Lovell Con
cerning River Obstructions between Forts St. Philip and Jackson. — General
Johnston Orders the Troops into Winter Quarters. — Our Lines Formed at
Centreville. — Drainsville and Ball's Bluff. — General Beauregard Proposes
to Intercept General Stone's Retreat, and also Suggests Resolute Attack '
against McClellan's Right. — Unfriendly Correspondence Between War

CONTENTS. xi
Department and General Beauregard. — Uncourteous Language of Mr.
Benjamin. — General Beauregard Exposes the Ignorance of the Acting
Secretary of War. — Controversy in the Press about General Beauregard's
Report of Battle of Manassas. — His Letter to the Editors of Richmond
Whig. — The President Accuses General Beauregard of Attempting to Ex
alt Himself at His Expense. — He Upholds Mr. Benjamin and Condemns
General Beauregard. — Dignity and Forbearance of the Latter.. ..Page 152
CHAPTER XIII.
Creation of the Department of Northern Virginia. — Distribution of New
Confederate Battle Flags. — Debate in Congress about the Action of the
President with Regard to General Beauregard's Report of the Battle
of Manassas. — Telegram of the Hon. James L. Kemper Concerning it. —
General Beauregard's Answer. — Letter of Colonel Pryor on the Same
Subject. — Commentaries on the Executive Endorsement. — Governor Moore
Forwards Resolutions of Louisiana Legislature, Congratulating General
Beauregard. — Circular to Division Commanders about Leaves of Absence.
— Congress Passes an Act in Regard to the Matter. — Its Effect. — General
Beauregard's Plan of Recruitment  170
CHAPTER XIV.
The Part taken by General Johnston in the Battle of Manassas. — He Assumes
no Direct Responsibility, and, though Superior in Rank, desires General
Beauregard to Exercise Full Command. — President Davis did not Plan
the Campaign; Ordered Concentration at the Last Moment; Arrived on
the Battle-field after the Enemy had been Routed. — Pursuit Ordered and
Begun, but Checked in Consequence of False Alarm. — Advance on Wash
ington made Impossible by Want of Transportation and Subsistence. . 191
CHAPTER XV.
Colonel Pryor, of the Military Committee of Congress, Visits General Beaure
gard at Centreville, to Propose his Transfer to the West. — General Beau
regard finally Yields to the Wishes of Congress and the Executive. —
He Parts with his Army on the 2d of February, and on the 4th Arrives
at Bowling Green. — Interview with General A. S. Johnston. — Succinct
Review of the Latter's Situation. — Ignorance of the War Department with
Reference to his Forces. — General Beauregard Desires to go Back to his
Army in Virginia. — General Johnston urges Him to Stay and Assume
Command at Columbus. — Inspection of the Works at Bowling Green. —
What General Beauregard Thinks of Them. — He Suggests Concentration
at Henry and Donelson to Force a Battle upon Grant. — General Johnston
Fears the Risk of such a Movement, and Adheres to his own Plan of Op
erations. — Fall of Fort Henry. — Conference at Bowling Green. — Memo
randum of General Johnston's Plan of the Campaign. — His and General

xii .CONTENTS.
Polk's Army to Operate on Divergent Lines.— Evacuation of Bowling
Green. — General Beauregard Asks for Specific Instructions.— Letter to
Colonel Pryor.— Fall of Fort Donelson. — Its Effect upon the Country. —
Criticism of General Johnston's Strategy  Page 210

CHAPTER XVI.
General Beauregard Telegraphs for Instructions after the Fall of Donelson. —
General Johnston's Answer. — Colonel Jordan's Report of the Situation at
Columbus. — General Beauregard Calls General Polk to Jackson, Tennessee,
for Conference. — Opinion of the Latter as to the Strength of Columbus.—
He Concurs, however, in General Beauregard's Views. — Evacuation of Co
lumbus Authorized by the War Department. — General Beauregard's De
tailed Instructions to that Effect. — Defects in River Defences at Columbus.
— Governor Harris of Tennessee. — General Johnston Retreating towards
Stevenson, along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. — His Letter of
February 18th to the War Department. — Depression of the People. — Gent
eral Beauregard Resolves to Replenish the Army. — Makes Use of the Dis
cretion given him by General Johnston. — His Plan of Operations. — Be
lieves Success Depends upon Offensive Movement on Our Part. — Calls
upon the Governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee ;
and also upon Generals Van Dorn, Bragg, and Lovell, for Immediate As
sistance. — Sixty and Ninety Days Troops. — The War Department not
Favorable to the Method Proposed, but Finally Gives its Assent. — General
Johnston Requested by General Beauregard to Change his Line of Retreat
and Turn towards Decatur, so as to Co-operate with him. — General John
ston Accedes to his Request  232

CHAPTER XVII.
Evacuation of Columbus. — How the Enemy Discovered It. — Loss of Ordnance
Stores, Anchors, and Torpedoes. — Island No. 10. — Difficulty in Placing
Guns in Position. — Federal Gunboats might have Passed Unhindered.--
Small Garrison under Colonel Gantt Reinforced by General McCown with
Part of the Garrison of Columbus. — Defences at New Madrid to be held un
til the Completion of the Works at Fort Pillow. — Remainder of General
Polk's Forces Assembled upon Humboldt. — Preparations for an Offensive
Movement by the Enemy. — Danger of Isolation for General Johnston. —
General Beauregard's Letter to him.— -The Great Battle of the Controversy
to be Fought at or near Corinth. — General Johnston accedes to General
Beauregard's request, and Begins a Movement to Join him. — General
Beauregard Assumes Command. — Arrival of General Bragg's Forces at
Corinth.— Corinth the Chief Point of Concentration, as Originally De
cided upon. — General Beauregard Appeals to the War Department for
the General Officers Promised him.— Their Services Greatly Needed. —
Unwillingness and Apathy of the War Department  245

CONTENTS. xiii
CHAPTER XVIH.
General Beauregard Orders the Collection of Grain and Provisions, and Es
tablishes Depots of Supplies. — His Appeal to the People to Procure Met
al for the Casting of Cannon. — Warning Preparations of the Enemy. —
Arrival of Federal Divisions at Savannah. — General Sherman's Attempt
ed Raid to Destroy the Railroad. — Burning of Small Bridge near Bethel
Station. — General Pope Before New Madrid. — The Place Abandoned. —
General Beauregard's Instructions to General McCown. — General Mackall
Relieves him. — Bombardment of Island No. 10. — What might have been
the Result had the Enemy Disembarked at once at Pittsburg Landing. — ¦
Tlie Troops we had to Oppose Them. — What General Johnston Thought
of Bolivar as a Base of Operation. — Recommends it as more Advanta
geous than Corinth. — Why General Beauregard Preferred Corinth. — He
Presses Concentration there, as soon as the Intentions of the Enemy be
come Sufficiently Developed. — Success of his Plan. — Co-operation of the
Governors of Adjacent States. — Troops Poorly Armed and Equipped. —
The Enemy begins Landing at Pittsburg. — Arrival of Hurlbut's, Prentiss's,
McClernand's, and the Two Wallaces' Divisions. — Force of the Army Op
posing us. — General Buell. — His Slow Advance on Nashville. — Is at Last
Aroused by Order to Unite his Forces with those of General Grant. —
Aggregate of Buell's Forces in Tennessee and Kentucky. — Our only Hope
for Success was to Strike a Sudden Blow before the Junction of Buell
and Grant  Page 254
CHAPTER XIX.
Arrival of General Johnston at Corinth. — Position of his Troops on the 27th
of March.— Offers to Turn Over Command of the Army to General Beau
regard, who Declines. — General Beauregard Urges an Early Offensive
Movement against the Enemy, and Gives his Views as to Plan of Organ
izing the Forces. — General Johnston Authorizes him to Complete the
Organization already Begun. — General Orders of March 29th. — Reasons
why the Army was Formed into Small Corps. — General Beauregard De
sirous of Moving against the Enemy on the 1st of April. — Why it was
not done. — On the 2d, General Cheatham Reports a Strong Federal
Force Threatening his Front.— General Beauregard Advises an Immedi
ate Advance. — General Johnston Yields. — General Jordan's Statement of
his Interview with General Johnston on that Occasion. — Special Orders
No. 8, otherwise called " Order of March and Battle." — By Whom Sug
gested and by Whom Written. — General Beauregard Explains the Order
to Corps Commanders. — Tardiness of the First Corps in Marching from
Corinth. — Our Forces in Position for Battle on the Afternoon of the 5th ;
Too Late to Commence Action on that Day. — Generals Hardee and Bragg
Request General Beauregard to Ride in Front of their Lines. — General
Johnston Calls General Beauregard and the Corps Commanders in an In
formal Council. — General Beauregard Believes the Object of the Movement

xiv CONTENTS.
Foiled by the Tardiness of Troops in Arriving on the Battle-field. — Al
ludes to Noisy Demonstrations on the March, and to the Probability of
Buell's Junction, and Advises to Change Aggressive Movement into a Re
connoissance in Force. — General Johnston Decides Otherwise, and Orders
Preparations for an Attack at Dawn next Day.— Description of the Field
of Shiloh.— Strength of the Federal Forces.— What General Sherman Tes
tified to.— We Form into Three Lines of Battle.— Our Effective Strength.
— Carelessness and Oversight of the Federal Commanders. — They are
not Aroused by the many Sounds in their Front, and are Taken by Sur
prise  Page2Q5
CIIAPTER XX.
Battle of Shiloh.— Varied Incidents and Events of the First Day.— Enemy
Taken by Surprise. — His Lines Driven in. — Entire Forces Engaged on Both
Sides. — Triumphant Advance of our Troops. — General Johnston in Com
mand of the Right and Centre. — General Beauregard of the Left and Re
serves. — Allurements of the Enemy's Camps. — Straggling Begins among
our Troops. — Death of the Commander-in-Chief. — General Beauregard As
sumes Command and Renews the Attack all along the Line. — Enemy again
Forced to Fall Back and Abandon other Camps. — Evidence of Exhaustion
among the Troops. — Straggling Increasing. — General Beauregard's Efforts
to Check it. — Collects Stragglers and Pushes them Forward. — Battle still
Raging. — Capture of General Prentiss and of his Command. — Our Troops
Reach the Tennessee River. — Colonel Webster's Batteries. — Arrival of
Ammen's Brigade, Nelson's Division, of Buell's Army. — Its Inspiriting
Effect upon the Enemy. — The Gunboats. — Intrepidity of our Troops. —
Their Brilliant but Ineffectual Charges. — Firing Gradually Slackens, as
the Day Declines. — At Dusk General Beauregard Orders Arrest of Conflict.
— Troops Ordered to Bivouac for the Night, and be in Readiness for
Offensive Movement next Day. — Storm during the Night. — Arrival of the
Whole of Buell's Army. — Gunboats Keep up an Incessant Shelling. ... 283
CHAPTER XXI.
Difficulty of Collecting and Organizing Commands during Night of the 6th. —
Firing Resumed Early next Morning. — Nelson's Brigades Cross the Ten
nessee. — Positions Taken by the Federals.— Chalmers's Brigade and a
Mixed Command Force Back Nelson's Advance. — At 8 a. m. tlie Confed
erates are Driven Back with the Loss of a Battery. — They Regain the
Position and Battery at 9. — Critical Situation of Ammen's Brigade. —
New Position Assumed by the Confederates. — Crittenden's Division En
gaged. — Absence of General Polk from the Field. — His Timely Arrival at
10.30. — His Charge with Cheatham's Brigade. — Organization of Federal
Army during the Night of the 6th.— Inaction of General Sherman on the
Morning of the 7th. — General Breckinridge Ordered Forward. — Enemy
Driven Back on our Whole Line. — Advance of Federal Right Win"-. —

CONTENTS. XV
Its Repulse. — At 1 p. m. Enemy on our Left Reinforced.— General Bragg
Calls for Assistance. — General Beauregard in Person Leads the 18th
Louisiana and Other Troops to his Aid. — Predetermination of General
Beauregard to Withdraw from the Battle-field. — Couriers sent to Corinth
to Inquire about General Van Dorn. — Preparations for Retreat. — Guns and
Colors Captured by Confederates on the 6th. — Slow and Orderly With
drawal of Confederate Forces. — Inability of the Enemy to Follow. —
Reconnoissance of General Sherman on the Morning of the 8th. — Con
federates not Disorganized. — Their Loss During the Battle. — Computa
tion of Numbers Engaged on Both Sides. — Federal Loss  Page 308
CHAPTER XXII.
Commentaries on the Battle of Shiloh : I. Why Generals Johnston and Beau
regard did not Sooner Move the Army from Corinth. — II. Their Reasons
for Forming their Lines of Battle as they did. — III. Why the Con
federate Attack was Made Chiefly on the Enemy's Right, and not on
his Entire Front. — IV. Demonstration of the Fact that the Confederate
Attack took the Enemy Completely by Surprise. — V. General Beau
regard's Opinion and Criticism of General Sherman's Tactics during the
Battle. — VI. Refutation of the Charge that the Confederate Troops were
Withdrawn too soon from the Battle-field on the Evening of the 6th. —
Comparison Drawn by Mr. Davis between General A. S. Johnston and
Marshal Turenne. — VII. General Beauregard's Opinion as to the Fight
ing of the Confederates during the Battle of the 7th. — VIII. Correction
of the Absurd Story that General Beauregard did not Leave his Am
bulance during the First Day of the Battle, and, when Informed of Gen
eral Johnston's Death, " Quietly Remained where he was, Waiting the
Issue of Events"  326
CHAPTER XXIII.
General Beauregard's Insistance on the Evacuation of Columbus. — Docu
ments Relating to the Matter. — General McCown to be put in Command
of Madrid Bend. — He is Called by General Beauregard to Jackson for
Instructions. — He Repairs to Madrid Bend. — Dispositions Made for
its Defence. — Commodore Hollins to Co-operate with Land Forces. —
Number of Troops under General McCown. — Arrival of General Pope on
the 28th of February in Front of New Madrid. — Colonel Plummer Estab
lishes a Battery on the River. — Apprehensions of General McCown. — Gen
eral Beauregard's Despatch to General Cooper. — General McCown Exhib
its still Greater Anxiety. — General Beauregard Doubts General McCown's
Capacity.  Successful Evacuation of Columbus. — Attack Commenced on
New Madrid March 12th. — Conference of General McCown with Commo
dore Hollins on the 13th, and Evacuation of Forts. — General Beauregard
Applies for General Mackall. — Garrison of New Madrid Transferred to
Opposite Bank of River and Island No. 10.— General Beauregard Orders

xvi CONTENTS.
all Surplus Guns, Supplies, and Boats to Fort Pillow. — Fall of Island No.
10 on the 7th of April. — General Pope's Forces Transported to Vicinity
of Fort Pillow.— General Pope Ordered to Pittsburg Landing. — Want of
Capacity of Commodore Hollins.— General Beauregard's Various Tele
grams and Orders.— He Detains General Villepigue in Command of Fort
Pillow. — Instructions to Captain Harris. — Surrender of New Orleans. —
Bombardment of Fort Pillow. — The Montgomery Rams. — General Beau
regard has Steam Ram Arkansas Completed, Equipped, and Manned. —
History of the Arkansas. — Tribute to Captain Isaac Brown and Crew. —
Prisoners with Smallpox Sent to Fort Pillow. — What Became of Them. —
Letter to General Villepigue, May 28th. — He is Directed by General
Beauregard to Prepare for Withdrawing his Troops from Fort Pillow. —
Fort Evacuated 1st of June. — Responsibility of Various Movements Left
to General Beauregard  Page 352

CHAPTER XXIV.
Troops Resume their Former Positions after the Battle of Shiloh. — General
Breckinridge Forms the Rear Guard. — General Beauregard Recommends
General Bragg for Promotion. — Preliminary Report Sent by General Beau
regard, April 11th, to the War Department. — Difficulty of Obtaining Re
ports of Corps Commanders. — Their Reports sent Directly to the War De
partment. — Inaccuracies Resulting Therefrom. — General Beauregard Pro
poses an Exchange ofPrisoners. — General Pope Gives no Satisfactory An
swer. — General Van Dorn's Forces Reach Memphis on the 11th. — Despatch
of the 12th to General Smith. — A Diversion Movement Determined upon
by General Beauregard. — Captain John Morgan. — He is Sent by General
Beauregard into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky. — Efforts to Force
Buell's Return to those States. — Location of General Van Dorn's Forces
at Corinth ; of Generals Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckinridge's. — Bad Wa
ter. — Mismanagement of Commissary Department. — Necessity of With
drawing from Corinth. — Tupelo Selected for next Defensive Position. —
General Beauregard Resolves to Construct Defensive Works Around
Vicksburg. — General Pope Takes Farmington. — Confederate Attack. 
Federal Retreat. — On the 25th General Beauregard Calls a Council of
War.— Evacuation of Corinth Resolved Upon. — General Beauregard's In
structions to his Corps Commanders. — Dispositions Taken to Deceive
the Enemy.— Retreat Successfully Accomplished. — False Despatches of
the Enemy. — Correct Account by Correspondents. — General Force in
Error. — Retreat Considered Masterly. — Dissatisfaction of the War Depart
ment. — Interrogatories Sent by President Davis. — General Beauregard's
Answer  37Q
CHAPTER XXV.
General Beauregard is at Tupelo on the 7th of June.— The Main Body of his
Army Arrives on the 9th.— Telegrams Sent by him to Various Points.— His

CONTENTS. xvii
Communication to General Cooper. — He Places Colonel Forrest in Com
mand of the Cavalry Regiments in Middle Tennessee. — General Beaure
gard's Ill-health. — He is urged by his Physicians to Take a Short Rest. — He
Finally Consents. — Order Sent to General Bragg from Richmond. — General
Beauregard's Despatch to General Cooper, June 14th. — His Letter to the
War Department, June 15th. — General Beauregard gives Temporary Com
mand of his Department to General Bragg, and Leaves Tupelo on the
17th. — General Bragg Notifies the Government of the Fact. — President
Davis Removes General Beauregard, and Gives Permanent Command of
his Army and Department to General Bragg. — Comments on President
Davis. — General Bragg's Despatch to General Beauregard. — His Reply. —
Mr. Randolph's Telegram. — General Beauregard's Letter to General Coop
er. — Misstatements Contained in President Davis's Book. — Public Sympa
thy with General Beauregard. — General Bragg's Letter to Mr. Forsyth. —
His Letter to General Beauregard. — Answer to the Same. — General Beau
regard's Plan of Operations in Tennessee and Kentucky. — Interview of
the Hon. Thomas J. Semmes and Edward Sparrow with President Davis,
September 13th. — Petition of Senators and Representatives for General
Beauregard's Restoration to his Command. — President Davis's Refusal. —
Notes of the Interview, by Mr. Semmes. — Comments upon President Davis
in Connection with these Events. — Successful Result of Military Opera
tions from Bowling Green to the Retreat to Tupelo  Page 400
APPENDICES  421
I.— B

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

OF

GENERAL BEAUREGARD

BIOGEAPHICAL SKETCH
OF
GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

The greatest boon that can be bestowed upon, a people is the
adequate setting forth of the history of their illustrious men.
The achievements of these, duly recorded, stand forth as beacon-
lights to guide coming generations ; and as a just appreciation of
greatness indicates worth in a people, and points to future ad
vancement on their part, so surely does indifference to merited
renown denote popular degeneracy and decay.
We therefore welcome every honestly meant publication con
cerning the struggle of the South for independence — a struggle
replete with acts of heroic valor, and resplendent with examples
of self-sacrifice, fortitude, and virtue.
Few, even now, are the remaining leaders of the great contest
through which we have passed ; and, as time goes on, gradually
diminishing their number, the day approaches when nothing will
be left of them except a memory. They must die, but the grand
principles they strove, at so great cost, to maintain must not be
buried with them. The Southern people, shackled by years of
poverty and political helplessness, and circumscribed as they are
in their sphere of action, cannot forget the teachings which, to
them and to their posterity, embody the true meaning of onr
institutions. In recording the causes for which the South armed and sent to
the field her manhood and her youth, and in holding up before
the public mind the great ability of some of her leaders, the
devotion of all, we not only perform a sacred duty to onr coun
try and those who will come after us, but mark out the way for
them to that peace, liberty, and prosperity which we failed to at
tain for ourselves.
I.— 1

2 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF
It is in furtherance of these views that the following biograph
ical sketch is offered, of one of the most patriotic, skilful, far-
seeing and heroic chieftains of the Confederate army; whose
military career and successes have called forth the admiration of
Europe as well as of America, and of whom Louisiana, his native
State, is — and well may be — fondly proud.
Pierre Gnstave Toutant-Beauregard was born in the parish of
St. Bernard, near the city of New Orleans, State of Louisiana,
on the 28th of May, 1818.
The earliest authentic records of his family, one of the oldest
and most illustrious of Louisiana, go back to the year 1290, or
about that time, when Tider, snrnamed the Young, at the early age
of eighteen, headed a party of Welsh in revolt against Edward I.,
then King of England. Overcome, and his followers dispersed,
Tider took refuge in France, where he was presented to Philip
IV., surnamed the Fair, and cordially welcomed to his court. He
there married Mademoiselle de Lafayette, maid of honor to Ma
dame Marguerite, sister of Philip.
War was then raging between France and England, and was
only appeased by the marriage of King Edward with Marguerite
of France.
Tider and his wife followed the new queen to England ; but
never were the suspicions and animosity of Edward against his
former rebellious subject allayed. By the queen's entreaties Ed
ward was induced to assign Tider to a government post in Sain-
tonge, then part of the British possessions on the Continent; but
/Soon afterwards he revoked his royal favor, and Tider was again
compelled to seek shelter in France, where he lived, with his wife
and children, on a pension left them by the dead queen. He died
in the neighborhood of Tours, at the age of forty-one.
His eldest son, Marc, returned to Saintonge, and there endeav
ored to recover 6ome of his father's property, in which he only
partially succeeded. Having, through powerful influences, ob
tained a position under the English crown, and being desirous
of propitiating the king, to whom the name of Tider was still
odious, he changed it into Toutanh. Gradually the letter "k"
was dropped, and the letter " t " substituted in its place ; thus
transforming the old Celtic "Toutank" into the Gallic "Toutant."
During three centuries, the family bore, unaltered, the name
of Toutant.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 3
Towards the close of the sixteenth century the last male de
scendant of the Toutants died, leaving an only daughter, who
married Sieur Paix de Beauregard — hence the family name of
Toutant de Beauregard.* At what time the particle " de " was
abandoned and the hyphen resorted to instead, is not known.
Jacques Toutant-Beau regard was the first of the name who
came from France to Louisiana, under Louis XIV, as " Com
mandant " of a flotilla, the purpose of which was to bring assist
ance to the colony, and carry back timber for naval constructions.
So thoroughly did he succeed in his enterprise in this connection
that he was, on his return to France, decorated with the Cross
of Saint Louis.
He finally settled in Louisiana ; and there married Miss MagT
deleine Cartier. Three sons were born to them, one of whom,
Louis Toutant-Beauregard, was, in his turn, united to Miss Vic
toire Ducros, the daughter of a respected planter of the parish of
St. Bernard, hear New Orleans, who had honorably filled several
offices of trust under the French and Spanish governments of
Louisiana. They had one daughter and two sons, the younger
of whom, Jacques Toutant-Beauregard, married, in 1808, Miss
Helene Judith de Reggio. Several children were the issue of
their union; the third being Pierre Gustave Toutant-Beaure
gard, the Confederate general and Southern patriot, whose biog
raphy forms the subject of this memoir.
General Beauregard's maternal ancestry is even more illustri
ous, he being a descendant of the Dukes of Reggio and Modena,
and, consequently, of the House of Este. His great-grandfather,
Francois Marie, Chevalier de Beggio (akin to the reigning duke)
accompanied his friend, the Duke of Richelieu, to the siege of
Bergen-op-Zoom, and there so distinguished himself that he was
given a captaincy in the French army by Louis XV., and was,
shortly thereafter, sent to the colony of Louisiana, with his com
mand. When Louisiana became part of the Spanish possessions,
the Chevalier de Reggio was made Alferez Real, or, in other
words, Royal Standard-bearer, and First Justiciary of the estates
and property of the crown. He was nearly related to the Mar
quis de Vaudreuil, seventh Colonial Governor of Louisiana. Of
his marriage with Miss Fleuriau, two sons were born, the younger
* From records still extant in the Beauregard family.

4 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF
of whom, Louis Emmanuel, Chevalier de Reggio, married Miss
Louise Judith Olivier de Vezin. The mother of General Beau
regard — Helene Judith de Reggio — was the issue of this last mar
riage. When scarcely more than eight years of age, young Beauregard
was sent to a primary school kept by Mr. V. Debouchel, near New
Orleans, where could then be found many of the sons of the best
families of Louisiana. Being of studious habits, modest in his
demeanor, ever fair in his dealings with comrades as well as with
teachers, he soon became very popular with both, and always
merited and obtained the highest marks of approbation. He was
of a retiring disposition, but, withal, of great firmness and decision
of character. His dominant trait, even at that early age, was a
passion for all that pertained to the military life — a forecast of
his future career. The sight of a passing soldier, the beating
of a drum, would so excite and carry him away, that for the
pleasure of following either or both he would forget everything
— parental admonitions, boyish playmates, and even hunger ; and
many a long day was thus spent, to the great anxiety of all at
home. Several curious anecdotes of his childhood, illustrative of his
independent daring, are preserved in his family, and are well
worth recording. We mention two of them.
When a little boy about nine years old, he was spending a day
at the house of one of his aunts, in the neighborhood of his fa
ther's estate, where had assembled several relatives and many com
rades of his own age. Among the gentlemen present was one
noted for his raillery and love of teasing. On that occasion he
had taken young Beauregard to task, and was attempting to make
a target of him for the amusement of the others. While this gen
tleman was in the full enjoyment of his practical jokes, young
Beauregard, his patience being thoroughly exhausted, suddenly
seized a stick that lay near at hand, and so violently and rapidly
assaulted his tormentor, that he forced him in self-defence to make
an inglorious retreat to an outhouse close by. His little enemy
at once mounted guard over the building, refusing to release his
prisoner until the latter had fully apologized to him.
The other incident is still more peculiar, and relates to Beaure
gard's uncommon — perhaps uncontrollable — taste for military
things.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 5
A resident teacher of the household, attracted by the boy's
steady, orderly habits, and most earnest attention during family
prayers, had taken charge of his spiritual training, and had so well
succeeded in her pleasing task, that, at the early age of ten and a
half years, he was considered sufficiently prepared to go through
that most beautiful and touching ceremony, in the Catholic Church,
the children's First Communion. The appointed day had arrived.
Young Beauregard, his mother, his elder brother, and the teacher
were seated in one of the front pews of the old St. Louis Cathe
dral, awaiting the solemn moment when the young communicant
was to approach and kneel at the altar. That moment at last came.
His mother touched him on the shoulder, to admonish him that it
was time to walk up the aisle. The child obediently rose, deeply
imbued with the solemnity of the scene, and stepped reverently
forward as directed. Just then, and when he had already walked
half-way to the altar, the roll of a drum, as a perverse fate would
have it, resounded through the cathedral. Young Beauregard
stopped, hesitated, looked toward the family pew, where anxious
eyes kept urging him forward. Again the roll of the drum was
heard, more distinct and prolonged. Hesitation vanished at once.
The little boy, fairly turning his back on the altar, dashed through
the church and disappeared at the door, to the utter horror and
dismay of his loving relatives. No stronger proof than this could
be given of the bent of his character. His calling for a military
career was there clearly manifested. It may not be considered out
of place to add that he made his First Communion two years later,
no drum then beating to interrupt the ceremony.
At the age of eleven he was taken to the city of New York,
where he remained four years, under the firm and wise tuition of
the Messieurs Peugnet, retired officers of the French army, who
had both seen service under Napoleon I. — the elder as Captain
of Cavalry, the younger as Captain of Engineers. They were ex
iles from France, on account of the active part taken by them \n
the " Carbonari " trouble, so much commented upon at the time.
Then and there it was that, under quasi - military training, his
taste for a soldier's career was confirmed, and that, living amidst
an English-speaking population, he grew so thoroughly familiar
with the English language as to make of it, so to speak, his adop
ted mother-tongue.
Though he knows the French language and speaks it perfectly,

6 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF
as do all Louisianians of his origin and time of life, still, most of
his correspondence is conducted, and all his private as well as
official writings are made, in English.
At sixteen he entered, as a cadet, the United States Military
Academy at West Point. His parents, who had for several years
persistently opposed his wish to obtain an appointment there, had
finally yielded, overcome by his pertinacious entreaties. Here
really began his brilliant career. Highly impressed with the no
bleness and importance of the profession he had embraced, he de
voted himself with ardent zeal and untiring perseverance to his
multitudinous studies, and went through his four years' course
with no less distinction than success. He was graduated July 1st,
1838, being second in a class of forty-five, and on July 7th of the
same year was appointed Second Lieutenant in the United States
Engineers. Generals Hardee, Wayne, Ed. Johnson, Reynolds,
Stevenson, Trapier, and Sibley, of the Confederate army, and Mc
Dowell, A. T. Smith, Granger, Barney, and McKinstry, of the Fed
eral army, were classmates of his, and were graduated at the same
time. His life was uneventful from that date to the year 1846-4:7, when,
according to plans drawn up by Captain J. G. Barnard, U. S. En
gineers, and himself, he directed the fortification works at the city
of Tampico. In the month of March, 1847, he joined the expedi
tion under Major-General Scott, against the city of Mexico. He
distinguished himself at the siege of Vera Cruz, in several bold
reconnoissances before the battle of Cerro Gordo, and also in
most of the engagements in the valley of Mexico.
The strongest proof of his merit — one that gave a forecast of
his great strategic and engineering powers — was exhibited during
the Mexican war, at a council of general officers, held at Piedad,
September 11th, 1847, after the disastrous assault on the fortified
positions of Molino del Rey. The attack on the city of Mexico,
afcd the best mode of effecting its capture, were the main subjects
under discussion. Lieutenant Beauregard, in opposition to most
of the general officers there present, and contrary to the views of
all his comrades of the engineer corps, advocated an attack by
the western approaches of Mexico. His suggestion, though very
much combated at first and nearly discarded, was finally adopted,
with what successful result is now a matter of history. Soon
after this episode — on September 13th — Beauregard was twice

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 7
wounded in the brilliant assault on the Garita de Belen, where
so much dash was displayed by the American troops.
On the expiration of the Mexican war, when Major Beauregard
returned to his home in New Orleans, General Totten, as chief of
the Engineer Department, forwarded him the following copy of Gen
eral Orders, publishing the brevets he had won on the field of battle :
1. " For gallant and meritorious behavior in the battles of Oontreras and
Churudusco, Mexico, August 20th, 1847, to be Captain by brevet. To date from
August 20th, 1847."
2. " For gallant and meritorious conduct in the battle of OhapuUepec, Mex
ico, September 13th, 1847, to be Major by brevet. To date from September
13th, 1847."
And General Totten added :
" It affords the department high satisfaction to communicate to you the well-
earned reward of your efforts on the fields of Mexico."
In order to show the high estimation in which Major Beaure
gard was held, and the impression his eminent services had pro
duced upon his superior officers and comrades in arms, we here
insert the following letters, written with a view to dissuade him
from his reported intention of resigning from the service, in the
year 1856, during the lull in military affairs which followed the
close of the Mexican war : " New York, Dee. 9th, 1850.
" Major G. T. Beauregard, U. S. Engineers :
" My dear Sir, — I am much concerned to learn that you think of leaving
the army, after acquiring, at an early age, so much distinction in it, .for sci
ence and high gallantry in the field. Your brilliant services in Mexico, no
body who witnessed them can ever forget. They bind the affections of the
army to you, and ought, perhaps, to bind you to us. If you go abroad, you
give up that connection at some hazard. My best wishes, however, will ever
accompany my gallant young friend wherever he may go. "Winpield Scott."
The second letter is from General Persifer F. Smith, under whom
Major Beauregard had often served in Mexico. We extract fram
it the following passage :
" I assure you, my dear Beauregard, that I look upon your quitting our ser
vice as the greatest calamity that can befall the army and the country. Let
me assure you with sincerity, that I know no officer left behind who can re
place you if we get into an important war."
Whether it was owing to these remonstrances, or for some other
cause, that Major Beauregard altered his determination, we are un-

8 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF
able to state; but he did not leave the service ; and from 1853 to
the latter part of 1861 remained in charge of what was then called
" the Mississippi and Lake Defences in Louisiana." He was also
at that time superintending the building of the United States cus
tom-house at New Orleans.
On the 20th of November, 1860, he was appointed to the high
position of Superintendent of the Military Academy at West Point,
but, owing to complicated events then darkening more and more
our political horizon', and of which it is not now our purpose to
speak, he only filled the position during a few days. He resigned
his commission in the army of the United States in February,
1861; and on the 1st of March of that year entered the Confed
erate service, with the rank of brigadier-general.
From that eventful period to the close of the war he was ever
in the van — active, self-sacrificing, vigilant, and bold. He displayed
great forethought in his extensive views. He was masterly in his
manner of handling troops and of leading them on to victory on
the battle-field ; and his record of strategic ability and engineering
skill has made him immortal in the annals of war. Had more
of his farsighted suggestions been heeded, the cause for which he
fought would not, perhaps, be known to-day under the mournful
— though, to us, erroneous — appellation of " the Lost Cause."
His defense of the city and harbor of Charleston — unquestion
ably the most scientific, complete, and perfect of all defences de
vised during the war — has been partially comprehended and ap
preciated among military engineers in Europe and at the North.
When we consider with what scant and utterly inadequate re
sources General Beauregard held, for nearly two years, over three
hundred miles of most vulnerable coast, against formidable and
always menacing land and naval forces ; when we bear in mind
the repulse from Charleston on April 7th, 1863, of Admiral Du-
pont's fleet of ironclads and monitors, supported by General Hunt
er's army ; when we mark the prolonged resistance made by a
handful of men, in the works on Morris Island, against the com
bined land and naval batteries of General Gillmore and Admiral
Dahlgren ; the assault and repulse of June 10th, 1863 ; the defeat
of the former's forces in an attack on the lines of James Island, on
July 16th, 1863 ; the masterly and really wonderful evacuation of
Battery Wagner and Morris Island, after the enemy's approaches
had reached the ditch of the former work ; when we remember

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 9
the holding of Fort Sumter, in August, 1863, under the most ter
rible bombardment on record, while its guns were all dismounted
and the work was battered into a mass of ruins ; the successful re
moval during that period of all the heavy artillery, of 30,000
pounds of powder, and hundreds of loaded shells, from the endan
gered magazines ; then the permanent holding of the dismantled
wreck with an infantry guard, and the guns of James' and Sulli
van's Islands covering the approach by boats ; the defiant, un-
hushed boom, morning and evening, of the gallant little gun — the
only one — purposely left in the fort to salute its unconquered flag ;
we are struck with wonder and admiration, and we cannot but rec
ognize the rare ability of the commander, the unsurpassed forti
tude and gallantry of the troops under him.
Our object is not, at present, to mention at any length General
Beauregard's many military services and victories. This interest
ing, important, and instructive part of the history of his military
career is contained in the following pages, written from authen
ticated notes and documents, vouched for and furnished by
General Beauregard himself, and to which this is but an intro
duction. When, after voluntarily assisting General J. E. Johnston, dur
ing the last days of the war, he surrendered with that distinguished
officer, in April, 1865, at Greensboro', North Carolina, he addressed
the following touching note to the members of his staff:
" Headquarters, etc., etc.,
Greensboro', N. C, April 27th, 1865.
"To my Personal and General Staff, — Events having brought to an end the
struggle for the independence of our country, in which we have been engaged
together, now for four years, my relations with my staff must also terminate.
The hour is at hand when I must bid each and all of you farewell, and a God
speed to your homes.
" The day was, when I was confident that this parting would be under far
different and the most auspicious circumstances — at a moment when a happy
and independent people would be ready, on all sides, to welcome you to your
respective communities — but circumstances, which neither the courage, the
endurance, nor the patriotism of our armies could overcome, have turned my
brightest anticipations, my highest hopes, into bitter disappointment, in which
you must all share.
" You have served me, personally, with unvarying zeal, and, officially, with
intelligence, and advantage to the public service.
" I go from among you with profound regret. My good wishes will ever
attend you, and your future careers will always be of interest to me."

10 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OE
In 1866, war being imminent between Turkey and the Danu-
bian principalities, the chief command of the Roumanian Army
was offered to General Beauregard ; and in 1869, a similar position
in the army of the Khedive of Egypt was also tendered him.
He declined both offers.
Since the war he has resided permanently in his native State,
where he has been the president of two iinportaut railroad com
panies. He is now Adjutant-General of the State of Louisiana.
Wherever met — in the streets of New Orleans or elsewhere,
in his native State or out of it — General Beauregard is always
greeted with great cordiality and marks of the highest regard.
Louisiana, as we have said, is proud of him. She knows that none
of her sons has loved her more, or has done so much to protect
her from the far-reaching grasp of centralized despotism which at
one time seemed to threaten her. He is now the identical con
stitutional State-rights Democrat he was before the war, and
though he takes no active part in politics, never neglects the per
formance of any of his civic duties when circumstances require it.
General Beauregard has been twice married. By his first wife,
Miss Laure Marie ViUere", great-granddaughter of the Chevalier
de Villere", he had two sons and one daughter — all three living
and residing with or near him in the State of Louisiana. He was
but shortly married to his second wife, Miss Caroline Deslondes,
daughter of one of the prominent planters of the state, when he
was unexpectedly ordered to the command of Charleston, South
Carolina, at the very outbreak of the war. On his return home,
in 1865, he was for the second time a widower, and had been for
more than a year. He had borne his affliction not only like a
Christian but with all the fortitude of a soldier, none but his own
military family being able to detect any sign of grief in the
countenance of the bereaved husband.
General Beauregard is now (1883) sixty-five years of age, but
few men of forty are so active as he, so alert, so full of life and
vigor. Those who note his elastic military step, upright bearing,
and quick yet thoughtful eye, feel well assured that, should occa
sion require it, he could again serve his country with energy and
capacity equal, if not superior, to that displayed in the past. The
only effect upon him of additional years since the war seems to
have been further to develop and strengthen his powers by bring
ing to him additional knowledge and experience.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. H
He appears to us now to be precisely the same as when, on
the second day of the battle of Shiloh, he led, flag in hand, one
of the charges of the 18th Louisiana regiment. A hail-storm of
minie- balls was then pouring into that gallant corps. One of
his staff, expostulating with him, and almost rebuking his too-rash
exposure of his person, he said : " At such moments as these, the
order must not be ' go,' but 'follow /' " And he still tightly
grasped the battle-flag. The whole man is portrayed in this brief
sentence. His words were ever few at headquarters or on the
field, but terse and to the point. One could read, by the flash of
his eyes, that he meant what he said.
If, as we firmly believe, traits of character, scope of mind, even
tastes and prejudices, can be transmitted from generation to gene
ration, we can understand how and why Pierre Gustave Toutant
Beauregard displayed the capacity for command and the inspiring
influence which so distinguished him during our four years' war,
when we glance back over the long line of his ancestors, where
love of liberty and soldierly qualities were so conspicuous. We
very much mistake, or there is still a goodly current of the Celtic
Tider's blood running througli General Beauregard's veins, and
the high-toned chivalric courtesy, coupled with irreproachable in
tegrity, so remarkable in him, must certainly be derived from the
stately old Dukes of Reggio and Modena, the. heads of the House
of Este.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
GENERAL BEAUREGARD

MILITARY OPERATIONS
OF
GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

CHAPTER I.
Major Beauregard appointed Superintendent of the United States Military
Academy. — His Determination to Resign should Louisiana Withdraw
from the Union. — Takes Command at West Point, but is immediately Re
lieved. — Returns to New Orleans. — Is Offered the Rank of Colonel of
Engineers and Artillery in the Louisiana State Forces. — Declines. — Plan
to Obstruct River near Forts. — Floating Booms. — Is Summoned to Mont
gomery by President Davis. — Ordered to Charleston, S. C, to Assume
Command and Direct Operations against Fort Sumter.
While in charge of the military defences of Louisiana, and of
the construction of the New Orleans custom-house, in the fall of
1860, General Beauregard, then brevet Major of United States
Engineers, received the following order from Washington :
" Special Order, No. 238. " War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, November 8th, 1860.
" By direction of the President, brevet Major Peter G. T. Beauregard, Corps
of Engineers, is appointed superintendent of the Military Academy, and will
relieve the present superintendent at the close of the approaching semi-annual
examination of cadets.
" By order of the Secretary of War. " S. Cooper, Adjutant-General."
This was not only an honorable position, much coveted, and
justly so, in the army, but it was also a highly responsible one, to
which none but officers of the Engineer Corps of acknowledged
merit had, up to that time, been appointed. Yet, under existing
circumstances, to Major Beauregard it had more than one objec
tion. Mr. Lincoln had just been elected President of the United

14 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
States, and would, four months later, be duly inaugurated as such.
Rumors and speculations as to the inevitable disruption of the
Union and its probable consequences prevailed everywhere, and
kept the public mind in a state of feverish suspense and anxiety.
Flattering, therefore, as was to Major Beauregard the appointment
thus tendered him by the War Department, it was with no feigned
reluctance that he began closing his official accounts, preparatory
to transferring the works under him to his successor in office.
Though never taking a very active part in politics, he was strongly
imbued with the constitutional doctrine of States' Rights and
State Sovereignty, and considered, as did the great mass of his
Southern countrymen, that his allegiance was primarily due to his
own State. With these views, and under such circumstances, it
was but natural he should feel anxious in leaving Louisiana,
while public opinion had not yet established its level, and the
South was still uncertain as to the proper step to pursue in vin
dication of its imperilled rights. However — and happen what
might — there was but one course open to him, and his deter
mination was taken at once: to stand by his State, and share its
destiny, for weal or woe.
Towards the latter part of December of that year he left New
Orleans for West Point, stopping on his way in Washington, to
ascertain, if he could, what shape future events would probably
assume. Several Southern States had already called their people in con
ventions, to determine what measures should be adopted in view
of the exigencies of the hour. South Carolina had passed her Or
dinance of Secession. Mississippi soon followed. So did Florida
and Alabama. Louisiana, it was thought by her congressional
delegation, would not hesitate much longer. Deeply convinced
that such would be the result, Major Beauregard made it a point
at once to apprise General Totten, chief of the Engineer Corps at
Washington, of his resolution to resign his commission in the
United States army should his State retire from the Union, thus
giving the department full opportunity to rescind the order as
signing him to West Point, and to take such other step in the mat
ter as might be thought proper. He repaired to General Totten's
office, and, by a strange coincidence, found him busily engaged in
examining fortification drawings, which were no other than those
of the defences of Charleston. He was studying and endeavoring

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 15
to describe the circles of fire of Forts Sumter and Moultrie. At
Major Beauregard's avowal, General Totten expressed both sur
prise and pain, and used every endeavor to dissuade him — we need
not add, without success. Major Beauregard then went to the
headquarters of General Scott, to inform him also of his intended
resignation ; but failed to find the general, as he was temporarily
absent from Washington.
Major Beauregard had been authorized by General Totten, so
anxious was the latter to retain him in the service, to defer assum
ing command at West Point until after the close of the January
examinations ; and, in the meantime, having nothing to detain
him in Washington, he left for New York, to await further devel
opments. In New York he met several army friends, among others, Cap
tain G. W. Smith, ex-officer of Engineers, then acting as Street
Commissioner of the great northern metropolis, and Captain
Mansfield Lovell. The absorbing topic of the day was necessarily
brought forward and earnestly discussed. Major Beauregard in
formed them of his intention to follow his State should it secede.
They approved of his proposed course, and declared that they
would act in the same manner, were they similarly situated.
Major Beauregard had been only a few days in command at
West Point, when the new Secretary of War, Mr. Holt, through
animosity to Mr. Slidell, it was said, and perhaps because he had
no faith in Major Beauregard's Union sympathies, •peremptorily
remanded him to his former station in New Orleans. No order
could have been more acceptable to him, and he hastened to obey it.
Passing through the city of New York, on his way South, he
received a telegram from Governor Moore, of Louisiana, inform
ing him of the withdrawal of the State from the Union, and re
questing his immediate return. He readily complied, and took
passage on a steamer leaving the next day for New Orleans. Upon
reaching her wharf he found it crowded with people, very much
excited, who had collected there to see the steamer Star of the
West, just returned from off Charleston, with two or three shot-
holes in her hull and chimney-stack. He went on board and was
entertained by her captain with a graphic account of the hot re
ception the South Carolina authorities had given him. Major
Beauregard had little idea, then, that in less than two months he
would be constructing additional batteries in the harbor of

IQ MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Charleston, to protect it more effectually from access by vessels at
tempting to carry reinforcements and supplies to Fort Sumter.
Upon his arrival at New Orleans, Governor Moore furnished
him with a copy of the Ordinance of Secession, and informed him
that his services were required to complete the defences to the ap
proaches of the city, which were already in full possession of the
State authorities. His answer was that he could not do so until he had
formally resigned his commission in the United States service. This
he did that day, and then joined, as a private, the battalion of Or
leans Guards, composed of the elite of the Creole population of
the city of New Orleans. This command had just been organized
by Colonel Numa Augustin, than whom no better citizen soldier
was known, in the volunteer service of the State.
The excitement and enthusiasm of the people of Louisiana and
of New Orleans, especially, were intense. The shrill sound of the
fife, the beating of drums, squad drills at street corners and in pub
lic avenues, and an ever-increasing military spirit greeted one at
every step. New Orleans had been transformed into a garrison
town. All who met Major Beauregard on the streets, friends and even
strangers, would shake him warmly by the hand, expressing the
hope that he would be with them in the hour of trial, should such
hour ever come.
The general impression appeared to be that the ruling party of
the Northern States would not oppose the peaceable withdrawal
of the Southern States from the Union, by making war on them.
During his short sojourn at the North Major Beauregard had
seen and heard enough to make him doubt that such would be the
result, and it became a matter of conscience for him to dispel the
illusions of his too-hopeful fellow-citizens.
The people of the State of Louisiana, in convention assembled,
after full discussion by their ablest and best men, reached the con
clusion that secession had become a necessity and was the only
course to be pursued. The State called upon her sons for assist
ance, and, as one of them, Major Beauregard responded; though,
after having been twenty-two years in the United States army, two
of these spent in a short but glorious foreign war, where friendships
had been created and cemented with blood, it was not to be ex
pected that he should, without reluctance, dissever ties that had
thus lasted through youth to mature manhood.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 17
Shortly after his return to New Orleans, the General Assembly
passed a law organizing the Louisiana State forces. General Brax
ton Bragg was appointed Brigadier-General, and Major Beaure
gard was offered the position of Colonel of Engineers and Artil
lery. This he declined, notwithstanding urgent appeals from
many friends. He felt — and rightly so — that some injustice had
been done him in assigning him to a secondary position. He was
a native of the State, who had just resigned an important position
in the United States army, while General Bragg had been out of
the service for several years, and had but recently become a resi
dent of Louisiana. His object, however, being to aid in the de
fence of his country, he openly declared his readiness to serve with
or under General Bragg, and to put at his disposal whatever of
professional knowledge and experience he might possess. But he
refused all military rank in the State army.
Major Beauregard was convinced that the most important of all
the avenues of approach to New Orleans was the Mississippi
River; and that, to guard it properly against invasion, must be
the one grand object in view on the part of the State authorities.
He therefore advised Governor Moore and the Military Board to
arm Forts Jackson and St. Philip with the heaviest guns procura
ble, and suggested the following plan for so doing : 1st, to remove
the largest pieces already there, from the rear to the front or river
faces of the forts ; 2d, to transfer to them the heavy guns of both
Fort Pike, on the Rigolets, and Fort Macomb, on the Chef Men-
teur — which were works of inferior order, not likely to be put in
action at all against a fleet threatening the city.
Major Beauregard also drew up, and furnished to the State au
thorities, the plans and estimates for two distinct river obstruc
tions, to be placed between Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and to be
there used, together or separately, according to tlie exigency of the
case. The first was a floating boom consisting of two parts, formed
of long timbers twelve inches square, solidly bound together in
sections of four timbers, each section to be connected with another
by means of strong iron chains. One half of the boom was to be
well anchored in the river, from the shore at Fort Jackson, and in
clined downward as it reached the middle of the stream. The
other half was to be anchored from the opposite bank of the river
near Fort St. Philip, and in such a manner as to have its shore ex
tremity made fast. To its outer, and movable end was to be at-
L— 2

18 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
tached a strong wire rope connected with a steam-engine, rendered
secure by a bombproof, on the Fort Jackson side. The rope,
worked by the engine, would close or open the boom, as circum
stances might require, for the passage of friendly vessels or of ac
cumulated drift-wood.
The second boom was to consist of about five barges or flat-
boats, properly constructed so as to support one or more heavy
chains or wire-ropes, stretched from shore to shore, between the
two forts, and above the floating boom. The estimate for this
obstruction was about $90,000, and for the other about one half
less. Both were to be illuminated at night with Drummond
lights, placed in bombproofs on each side of the river, and the
stream was to be patrolled by boats as far down as prudence
would permit.
Had these floating booms been constructed and kept in work
ing order until required for effectual use it is beyond all doubt
that they would have obstructed the passage of the Federal fleet
in April, 1862. Detaining the vessels under the fire of the forts,
they would have afforded sufficient time to them to do their
work, and to the city to prepare for a vigorous defence, if not
for a triumphant resistance.
Somewhat later, Major Beauregard had occasion to offer a few
suggestions to the Military Board, in a short memoir, wherein, after
giving his general views as to the defence of the different ap
proaches to New Orleans, he again directed attention to the para
mount necessity of the floating booms already spoken of. He
received the thanks of Governor Moore for his valuable infor
mation, of the importance of which the governor was well aware,
but the Military Board, to whom all such matters were specially
referred, and on whose knowledge of them the State Executive so
fully relied, failed to see the extent of the result aimed at, and,
as was often the case during the war, the opportunity was
allowed to slip by ; and the consequences, which might have been
averted, advanced unhindered to their calamitous end.
On the 22d of February, 1861, Major Beauregard received a
despatch from the Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War of the
Confederate government, informing him that his immediate
presence at Montgomery was requested by President Davis. He
made all possible haste to leave New Orleans, thinking he might
be away for two or three weeks at the utmost — he was absent

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 19
more than four years. The hope of Major Beauregard was,
that he might be permanently stationed in Louisiana, with all
the sea-coast of which, and the approaches to the city of New
Orleans, he was known to be so thoroughly familiar ; irrespective
of his very natural wish to be able, in case of need, to fight in and
for his native State.
It must be admitted, however, that, just at that time, few per
sons in either section of the country really believed that the
issues would be settled by force of arms. The South " will not
be rash enough to attempt to retire from the Union," was the
general opinion entertained at the North. The North " will not
make war to drag the Southern States unwillingly back," was the
prevailing sentiment in the South.
This delusion is easily accounted for when we consider, not
merely the principles set forth in the Declaration of Indepen
dence, and the voluntary formation of the Union, by the States,
but also the views expressed by many of the most prominent men
of the North. We do not allude to the extravagant expressions
repeated for many years by leaders in the abolition phalanx, pro
fessing hatred of the Union; nor even to the sentiments of dis
regard for it, uttered, during the same period, by influential mem
bers in the Republican party, even on the floor of Congress ; but
to the immediate declarations of that time, such as the sober
statement in the New York Tribune, then the principal organ of
the dominant party at the North, that the revolution of the
Colonies was a precedent for the secession of the States, and that
both stood equally on the same principle of the right of a people
to self-government. Even General Scott, as one of the alterna
tives of action, had counselled the mild measure of allowing " the
erring sisters " to " go in peace."
It was not surprising, therefore, that many persons could not be
made to believe in such a war, until, after their eyes had seen the
flashes and their ears had heard the sounds of the guns fired at
Sumter, the United States government called for 75,000 troops
with which to reduce the Southern people to obedience.
Major Beauregard arrived at Montgomery on the 26th of Feb
ruary, and on the same day called on the Secretary of War.
"Just in time," said the latter, while courteously extending his
hand, " to assist me out of a great dilemma." He was estimating
the weight and cost of pieces of ordnance of different calibers.

20 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Major Beauregard cheerfully gave him what assistance he could,
and took the liberty to suggest the advisability of procuring, as
soon as possible, the different heads of bureaus whom the secre
tary needed, to relieve him of all such annoying details. Mr.
Walker thereupon authorized Major Beauregard to telegraph at
once to several of his friends of the old service, who in his opin
ion might be fitted for these positions. Thus it was that the as
sistance of Colonel Gorgas, as Chief of Ordnance, was eventually
procured. Though a Northern man by birth, Colonel Gorgas had
married in the South, and was entirely identified in feeling and
interest with that section. He proved to be a meritorious officer,
whose services were of value to the cause. Messages were also
sent to Captains G. W. Smith and Mansfield Lovell, then in New
York, advising them to repair immediately to Montgomery, where
their presence was needed. Owing to circumstances beyond their
control, those officers did not arrive and report for duty until after
the battle of Manassas.
Major Beauregard then presented himself to Mr. Davis, who
received him with great kindness, and asked him many questions
as to the temper of the people and the condition of affairs, at
JSfew Orleans and Mobile. His answer was, that now that seces
sion was an accomplished fact on the part of Louisiana as well as
of Alabama, their people were fast becoming unanimous as to the
measure, which, at first, had been looked upon with hesitation and
apprehension; that business was mostly suspended in the cities
of New Orleans and Mobile, but that everybody seemed hopeful
of the future, whether we should remain permanently separated,
or should re-enter the Union with sufficient guarantees against
further encroachments on our rights!
The President then asked him what knowledge he had of the
defences around Charleston, and of the best mode of taking Fort
Sumter, in the event of its being necessary to resort to force
against it. He read to Major Beauregard a letter he had just
received from Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, describing
the condition of affairs there, and asking that an officer of experi
ence should be sent to take charge of the operations then going
on, and, if necessary, to assume command of the State troops
there assembled. The president showed him also a communica
tion from Major W. H. C. Whiting, an ex-officer of United States
Engineers, then in the service of the State of Georgia, who had

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 21
been sent to Charleston to inspect the works being constructed
against Fort Sumter, and advise such changes and improvements
as his professional experience might suggest. Major Whiting, in
this paper, expressed his disapproval of almost all that had been
done in the way of locating and constructing batteries, and gave
an alarming description of the condition of affairs there.
Major Beauregard having with him a map of Charleston, given
him that day by Major W. H. Chase, ex-officer of Engineers, ex
plained to the President what should, in his opinion, be done to
prevent assistance by sea to Fort Sumter, and to force its sur
render, if necessary. The matter was thoroughly examined and
discussed until a late hour in the night.
The next afternoon Major Beauregard was accosted by some
members of the convention from South Carolina and Georgia,
who informed him that he had just been appointed first Brigadier-
General in the provisional army of the Confederate States; and
that he would be sent to assume command at Charleston, and di
rect operations there against Fort Sumter. This news took Ma
jor Beauregard completely by surprise. He neither desired nor
expected such an honor. He feared it might keep him away for
an indefinite period from New Orleans, whither he was anxious
to return, for private as well as public reasons. He knew little
of the defences of Charleston, and was not familiar with its peo
ple; whereas he was thoroughly acquainted with those of New
Orleans ; and, although perfectly willing to serve the Confeder
acy to the utmost of his ability, wherever sent, he thought his
services were first dueto the defence and protection of his own
State. There was another impediment, though, under the circum
stances, of much less gravity. His resignation from the United
States army, dated and forwarded February 8th, 1861, had not yet
been, to his knowledge, accepted ; and still regardful of the strict
observance of rules and regulations to which he had been trained,
he was disinclined to take up arms against the United States flag
until officially relieved from his fealty to it. This he explained
to President Davis, who, after urging his acceptance of the po
sition offered, and promising that he should if necessary, be sent
back to New Orleans, suggested that he should at once telegraph
to the War Department in Washington, and be set at rest on this
point. He did so — for communications between all sections of
the country were still free — and the next day received formal in-

22 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
f 1
formation of the acceptance of his resignation by President Bu
chanan. Upon his informing Mr. Davis of the fact, the latter instructed
him to repair at once to Charleston, there to report to Governor
Pickens, and to take command of the State troops, should the
South Carolina authorities so desire — the troops then assembled at
or near Charleston not having yet regularly entered the Confed
erate service.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 23

CIIAPTER II.
Description of Charleston. — General Beauregard's Arrival. — Cursory Sketch of
the Condition of the Public Mind in the South. — The Hon. Robert Barn
well Rhett. — One Sentiment and One Resolve animating South Carolin
ians. — South Carolina Commissioners to Washington. — Failure of Nego
tiations. — Major Anderson Evacuates Fort Moultrie and Occupies Fort
Sumter. — Hoisting of Palmetto Flags. — Steamer Star of the West. — Gov
ernor Pickens Summons Major Anderson to Surrender the Fort. — He De*
clines, but Refers the Matter to Washington. — Mr. Buchanan Refuses to
Withdraw Federal Garrison. — All Eyes Centred on South Carolina. —
System- and Plan of Operations Adopted by General Beauregard. — More
Troops Volunteer than are Needed.
Seven miles from the Atlantic Ocean, and looking out upon it
to the southeast, stands the city of Charleston, built at the conflu
ence of the Ashley and Cooper rivers. It is on a tongue of the
mainland, consisting of gray sandy soil, and extends southward,
tapering in width from two miles to half a mile. Here the Ash
ley turns from the west and sweeps around, to mingle its waters
with those of the Cooper, whose principal current passes close
along the east or sea -front of the city. A marshy mud -flat,
called Shute's Folly Island, rises east of Charleston on the farther
side of this branch of Cooper River, and beyond it is the sand-strip
and beach of Sullivan's Island. The lesser stream of Cooper River,
flowing to the north and east of Shute's Folly, passes the main
land at Haddrell's Point and Mount Pleasant, and off the western
extremity of Sullivan's Island unites with the other waters of the
bay. South of Charleston, across the water, lies James Island,
with its uplands extending about two and a half miles down the
harbor. It is separated by a marsh and creek from the low white
sand-bank of Morris Island. On account of the flatness of the
country, the waters ebb and flow many miles up the Ashley and
Cooper rivers, with a mean tide of seven feet at the city. Thus
constituted, the harbor of Charleston averages two miles in width,
and forms a beautiful sheet of water.
Ont in the bay, three miles from the city, stands Fort Sumter.
It is built on a shoal just south of the main channel, which it is

24 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
intended to command, and is a mile from Fort Moultrie, which
lies to the northeast, across the entrance, on Sullivan's Island. It
is thirteen hundred yards from Morris Island, which lies to the
south-southeast; fifteen hundred yards from Fort Johnson, which
stands to the southwest, on James Island, and two miles from
Castle Pinckney, on Shute's Folly, which lies to the northwest.
Fort Sumter is — or was, at the time of which we are writing — a
pentagonal work of formidable strength, built for mounting one
hundred and forty pieces. The height of its walls, from the
water's edge to the parapets, is sixty feet ; the fort was divided
into three tiers, two of which — the lower ones — were casemated,
and the upper en barbette. With its commodious officers' quarters,
its barracks, mess-rooms, magazines, and hot-shot furnaces, it had
been considered one of the best-built forts under the control of
the United States government, and did honor to the ability of the
engineers who designed and executed its construction.
Fort Moultrie was a low brick work, without casemates, but
with terre-fleins for batteries en barbette, the principal of which
were " the sea battery," facing southeast, and " the Sumter bat
tery," facing southwest.
Fort Johnson was an antiquated and dilapidated work, that had
been abandoned. Castle Pinckney, opposite the city, across Coop
er River, was an old-fashioned, half-moon fortification of brick, with
one row of casemates for small ordnance and a terre-plein above.
In 1860, Charleston contained about fifty thousand inhabitants.
Besides its commercial importance, it was the residence of many
intelligent and educated planters, cultivating rice in the malarial
tide-swamps, and sea-island cotton along the rich coast region of
the "low country." It was the centre of the factorage business
of the State, of the supply market, of banking and exchange. It
was also headquarters in matters of church and school, society and
politics. The town was old and respectable -looking, evidently
built for personal convenience, not for show ; and its people spent
their money in substantial good -living within doors, rather than
in outward display. With many churches and public schools, no
private palaces and few brown-stone fronts were visible ; but its
separate dwellings of brick and of wood, with their enclosed
gardens and luxuriant shrubbery, unique rows of rooms accessible
to the sea breeze, with tiers of spacious piazzas, gave it an air of
exclusive individuality and solid comfort.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 25
General Beauregard arrived in Charleston on the 1st of March,
1861, and immediately repaired to Governor Pickens's headquar
ters, which were then established at the Charleston Hotel. Gover
nor Pickens was found in earnest consultation with eminent citizens
of the Palmetto State. A hearty welcome was extended to the
Confederate commander, whose arrival from Montgomery had
been announced in advance of time, and was anxiously awaited
by all.
Governor Pickens proposed to put General Beauregard in com
mand without delay, but his offer was declined ; General Beaure
gard preferring first to acquaint himself thoroughly with the
forces collected in and around Charleston, the sites of the various
batteries then in course of erection, and the available resources in
ordnance. A retrospective glance over tlie causes which induced the course
adopted by South Carolina and the Southern States, and a cursory
sketch of the condition of the public mind at that juncture, can
not fail to be of interest to the reader.
The State of South Carolina was the first to dissever the ties
that bound her to the Union. She was actuated, in so doing, not
by motives of profit, of ambition, or love of strife, but by princi
ple, and a sense of right to control her own destiny, and escape the
ruin she foresaw in falling under the rule of a hostile sectional
party, regardless of the limitations of the Constitution, which alone
gave security to the minority in the South.
Time and again had the South, in a spirit of unwise concilia
tion, yielded to unconstitutional encroachments, knowing them to
be such, but with no better result than to increase this aggression
upon her rights.
The bond of union— namely, the Constitution — was virtually
broken. The antagonistic relations of the two sections had culmi
nated in the election of a President believed to be unfriendly to
the States of the South. It was thought that, as a speedy sequel,
the South would be excluded from the common territory ; that
the guarantees of the Constitution would no longer exist ; that the
Southern States would lose the power of self-government, and Fed
eral authority predominate over all.
To have acquiesced passively in such a new order of things,
whereby tlie Government of the United States was no longer the
government of confederated republics, but of a consolidated De-

26 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
mocracy, would have been lending a hand to despotism. This,
South Carolina would not do. By such an act she would have be
lied her past history, and condemned that noble struggle for lib
erty, as a result of which the American colonies had been acknowl
edged by Great Britain and the world to be " free, sovereign, and
independent States."
Whatever may have been the hopes of South Carolina, when,
on the 20th of December, 1860, she dissolved her connection with
the Union, she had no certainty that her Southern sister States
would follow the course she had thought proper to adopt. She
acted alone, impelled by her own sense of duty, of independence
and self-respect, as a sovereign.
Her example, and the tone of her leading men, foremost among
whom stood that profound statesman, the late Robert Barnwell
Rhett — the friend and successor of John C. Calhoun — had no small
influence in determining the subsequent withdrawal of the other
States of the South. The weight of Northern hostility had been
felt by each and all ; and the decisive action of any one of them
was more than sufficient to kindle the latent fires of self-preserva
tion by disunion.
At the time of which we are now writing, and no matter what
may have been the previous divergence of opinions among the
leaders of that gallant State, there was but one feeling, one senti
ment, and one resolve animating every South Carolina heart : to
retake possession, at any cost, of the arsenals, forts, and other pub
lic property then in the hands of the Federal authorities, and to
assume and exercise all the rights appertaining to a free and inde
pendent commonwealth.
The object of her Commissioners in Washington, as shown by
their official correspondence with President Buchanan, was to ob-
taiu a just, honorable, and peaceable settlement of the question at
issue between South Carolina and the Federal Government.
" We have the honor to transmit to you," wrote these Commis
sioners to the President, "a copy of the full powers from the con
vention of the people of South Carolina, under which we are au
thorized to treat with the government of the United States for the
delivery of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate,
with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and
also for the apportionment of the public debt, and for a division
of all other property held by the government of the United States

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 27
as agent of the confederated States, of which South Carolina was
recently a member ; and generally to negotiate as to all other
measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the
existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace
and amity between this commonwealth and the government at
Washington." *
These negotiations failed. '
The removal of the United States garrison, on the 25th of De^
cember, 1860, from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter — the gun car
riages of the former work having been fired and the guns injured
by the retiring troops — whatever may have been its cause, or by
whomsoever suggested, was the first overt act of war, and the real
beginning of hostilities between the two sections. That it was
due to the action of a United States officer and representative of
tlie Federal government, is beyond doubt. The question, whether
he obeyed orders or acted on his own responsibility, in nowise af
fects the fact.
All hesitation and all illusions, on the part of the South Carolina
authorities, were, from that moment, swept aside ; and, as a logical
sequence, on the day following, the Palmetto State flag was raised
over smoking Moultrie, and over the other defences of the harbor,
Sumter excepted. The South Carolina Commissioners retired from
Washington and returned home, having had the full assurance
from President Buchanan that he would not remand Major An
derson to Fort Moultrie, withdraw the United States troops from
Fort Sumter, or give up the latter to the State authorities.
Vigorous preparations for the coming struggle were now begun
by the State of South Carolina, with entire unanimity and a most
admirable spirit among her people. Works were thrown up, and
batteries constructed, at various points of the harbor, where it was
thought they could best defend the city, and cut off outside com
munications with Fort Sumter.
These precautionary measures were taken none too soon. At
dawn on the 9th of January, the steamer Star of the West, with
a reinforcement of several hundred men, and supplies of food
and ammunition for Sumter, appeared off the bar of Charleston
* See letter dated Washington, Dec. 28th, 1860, of Messrs. R. W. Barnwell,
J. H. Adams, and James L. Orr, South Carolina Commissioners, to President
Buchanan.

28 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
harbor. She entered Ship Channel, and was rapidly approaching
when a shot was fired across her bow from a battery on Morris
Island, as a signal to heave to. Disregarding this warning, she
hoisted the United States flag and boldly continued her course.
Five rounds were then fired at her in quick succession, two of
which took effect. At the sixth discharge she rounded to, low
ered her flag, and steamed out of the harbor. Fort Moultrie had
also opened fire on her.
Events now followed one another in rapid succession. Major
Anderson, demanding to know of Governor Pickens whether or
not he had authorized the firing on a transport bearing the United
States flag, was answered in the affirmative. Soon afterwards Gov
ernor Pickens formally summoned Major Anderson to surrender
Fort Sumter to the State authorities. This Major Anderson re
fused to do, but offered to refer the matter to his government, at
Washington. As a proof of the conciliatory spirit still animating both the peo
ple and the authorities of South Carolina, Governor Pickens ac
ceded to this request, and the Honorable Isaac W. Hayne was ac
cordingly sent to Washington, with power to act in the premises.
Protracted negotiations ensued, but brought about no satisfactory
result, the answer of Mr. Holt, the new Secretary of War, leaving
but little hope of an amicable settlement.
Thus, under these perplexing circumstances, with an earnest
desire for peace, but with insufficient courage to avow and pro
mote it, Mr. Buchanan's administration came to a close. Congress
had been as irresolute as the President himself, and had taken no
step to avoid the impending danger of collision.
In the meantime, other Southern States, to wit, Mississippi,
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, had severed their
connection with the Federal Government, and linking their des
tinies with that of South Carolina, had regularly organized, at
Montgomery, the Provisional Government of the Confederate
States of America.
All eyes were now fixed upon the Palmetto State, the pivot
around which turned the fortunes of the South, in this grand ef
fort for constitutional liberty which was about to be made. To
her honor be it said, she proved worthy of the leadership which
fate had confided to her hands. Her State troops and volunteers
answered with more than alacrity to the call of the constituted

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 29
authorities, and poured in from every district, eager to be counted
among the first to strike a blow in defence of the cause in which
their lives — and more than their lives— were now enlisted. The
difficulty among the officers was, not to elevate the morale of these
patriotic freemen, or prepare them for the dangers they were about
to encounter, but to restrain their ardor, and maintain them within
the bounds of" prudence and moderation.
Such was the condition of affairs in South Carolina, and such the
tone of the public mind in the city of Charleston, when General
Beauregard arrived there.
Having made a thorough inspection of all the works, he came to
the conclusion that a great deal still remained to be done by way
of preparation for active measures against Fort Sumter.
The system and plan of operations which had been adopted
seemed to be to concentrate all the available guns and mortars at
two points, namely : Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, and
Cumming's Point, on Morris Island, where a few guns and about
half a dozen mortars of heavy caliber were being put in position.
Battery "Star of the West" — so called, from its repulse of the
steamer of that name — contained four 24-pounders, which enfiladed
the main south channel, known as the Morris Island Channel.
General Beauregard determined to alter that system, but gradu
ally and cautiously, so as not to dampen the ardor, or touch the
pride, of the gallant and sensitive gentlemen who had left their
comfortable homes, at the call of their State, to vindicate its honor
and assert its rights. They had endured, for weeks, the privations
and exposures of a soldier's life, on bleak islands, where it was
impossible, at times, to see objects at a greater distance than a few
yards, because of the sand drifts created by the northers, prevalent
on the coast at that season of the year.
General Beauregard noted, with feelings of admiration, an old
gentleman, standing sentry at one of the camps on the island, who
had organized, armed, and equipped a whole company of infantry
at his own expense, and had placed it under the command of his
youngest brother. This had been his contribution to his country's
cause ; and, deeming it insufficient, he had also offered his services
and his life, as a private in his own company.
Among the privates there assembled for duty were planters and
sons of planters, some of them the wealthiest men of South Caro
lina, diligently working, side by side with their slaves. Not a

30 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
word of complaint from any of them did General Beauregard hear
during his inspection tour, except, perhaps, against the long delay
in attacking Fort Sumter. Numerous were the plans — each " infal
lible " — suggested by these high-spirited gentlemen, for taking the
formidable work which loomed up majestic and defiant in the dis
tance, like a mountain risen from the sea, its barbette guns grimly
crowning its summit.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 31

CHAPTER III.
The Confederate States Commissioners. — Their Correspondence with Mr. Sew
ard. — How they were Deceived. — Mr. Lincoln's Sectional Views. — Letter
of Major Anderson to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army. —
On Whom must Rest the Responsibility for the War. — Mr. Buchanan's
Wavering Policy. — General Beauregard Distrusts the Good Faith of the
Federal Authorities. — His Plan to Reduce Fort Sumter. — Detached Bat
teries. — Floating and Iron-clad Batteries.— Fort Sumter's Supplies Cut
Off. — Drummond Lights. — Steam Harbor-boats. — Enfilade or Masked
Battery. — Mr. Chew. — His Message to General Beauregard. — Secretary of
War Apprised of Same. — His Answer to Telegram. — Blakely Rifled Gun.
— By Whom Sent. — General Beauregard Demands the Surrender of Fort
Sumter. — Major Anderson Declines. — Fire Opened on the Fort April 12th.
The Confederate States Commissioners — Messrs. John Forsyth
of Alabama, M. T. Crawford of Georgia, and A. B. Roman of Lou
isiana — with proposals from their government, were sent to Wash
ington after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln as President. They
were instructed " to make to the government of the United States
overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring that govern
ment that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate
States earnestly desire a peaceful solution of these great questions,
and that it is neither their interest nor their wish to make any de
mand that is not founded in strictest justice, nor to do any act to
injure their late confederates."*
It was hoped that these commissioners, representing an organ
ized government, perfect in all its parts, and clothed with powers
by seven sovereign States, would be deemed entitled to greater
consideration, and might accomplish more than the commissioners
sent by South Carolina alone had been able to do.
But Mr. Lincoln and his advisers assumed very formal ground,
and declined all official intercourse with representatives of "rebel
lious States." They would have nothing to do with "irregular
* See letter of Southern Commissioners to Mr. Lincoln, " Rebellion Record,"
vol. i. p. 42.

32 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
negotiations, having in view new and untried relations with agen
cies unknown to, and acting in derogation of, the Constitution
and the laws."*
The correspondence of the Southern Commissioners with Mr.
Seward attests this. The interesting particulars added thereto by
the Honorable John A. Campbell, late Associate-Justice of the Su
preme Court of the United States, show that not only were the
conciliatory proposals tendered to the Federal government by the
Confederate States treated with uncourteous disregard, but that a
covert attempt at provisioning and reinforcing Fort Sumter was
being made, pending the delay to which our commissioners were
subjected in Washington, while unofficial but positive assurances
were given them of an early evacuation of that fort.
So many despatches and letters, public and private, had been
forwarded to the South by influential Southern statesmen then in
Washington, to the effect that, despite heavy outside pressure, the
President could be induced to settle the question at issue with
out a resort to arms, if sufficient time were allowed him, that up
to the very last hour the Confederate authorities at Montgomery,
and many high officials in Charleston, really hoped that the Fed
eral troops would yet be withdrawn from Sumter, and the im
pending danger of war be averted. General Crawford, United
States Army, in his essay, " The First Shot Against the Flag,"
speaking of this impression, says distinctly, "and they had at one
time reason for the belief."f General Doubleday expresses him
self with no less certainty when he states that "Anderson now
had no doubt that we would be withdrawn, and the papers all
gave out the same idea."!
Not until Captain G. V. Fox, of the United States Navy, had
obtained introduction into Sumter, under the plea of " pacific pur
poses," though in reality to concert a plan for its reinforcement ;
not until Colonel Lamon, representing himself as a confidential
agent of President Lincoln, had gained access to the fort, under
the pretence of arranging matters for the removal of the troops,
but " in reality to confer with Major Anderson, and ascertain the
amount of provisions on hand ;"§ not until, on the 8th of April,
* Mr. Seward's reply to the Southern Commissioners.
t "Annals of the War," p. 324.
t General Doubleday's " Reminiscences of Sumter and Moultrie," p. 133.
§ Ibid. p. 134.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 33
Mr. Chew, from the State Department at Washington, had noti
fied both Governor Pickens and General Beauregard " that the
government intended to provision Fort Sumter peaceably, if pos
sible, forcibly, if necessary ;" not until then was the last expecta
tion of an amicable settlement of our difficulties dismissed from
the minds of those who, though vigorously preparing for war,
cherished none the less the delusive hope of peace.
It was rumored at the time, and has been repeated since by
General Crawford, that Mr. Chew, after delivering his message to
the South Carolina authorities, " barely escaped from the city of
Charleston without molestation." This is an error. Mr. Chew,
who was an intelligent man, no doubt felt the very equivocal nat
ure of his mission at such a juncture, and did manifest symptoms
of anxiety for his personal safety ; but General Beauregard and
Governor Pickens gave him at once most positive assurances that
he had no reason to fear any act of violence from the people of
Charleston. " The crowd you see around this building," General
Beauregard told him, " shows the eagerness of the people to be
informed of the news you bear us, and nothing more. You may
go among them, repeat what you have here said, and not a word
of insult will be offered you." To make assurance doubly sure,
however, and to appease the apparent nervousness of Mr. Lincoln's
messenger, he was escorted to the railroad depot by aids of Gen
eral Beauregard and Governor Pickens, and left Charleston un
molested, and as freely as he had entered it. The only thing he
could have complained of — though we have no evidence that he
ever did — is, that his telegrams to Mr. Lincoln never reached
their destination, and that his return journey was unusually pro
tracted. The explanation of these facts is that General Beau
regard, who considered himself justified in making use of every
rightful stratagem of war, arrested Mr. Chew's telegrams, and
purposely delayed some of the trains that took him back to Wash
ington. Major Anderson's letter to Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant-Gen
eral United States Army, dated April 8th, 1861, and the telegrams
from Messrs. Crawford, Roman, and Forsyth, from Washington,
establish the fact that the object of the Federal government in
delaying its final answer to the Southern Commissioners was to
gain time for the reinforcement of Sumter before it could be re
duced by the South Carolina troops under General Beauregard.
I.— 3

34 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
The following is an extract from Major Anderson's letter. It
explains itself, and clears him from all participation in that act
of duplicity : " Fort Sumter, S. G, April 8th, 1861.
" To Colonel L. Thomas, etc. :
" Colonel,—* ******
I had the honor to receive by yesterday's mail the letter of the Honorable
Secretary of War, dated April 4th, and confess that what he here states sur
prises me very greatly, following, as it does, and contradicting so positively,
the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was ' authorized ' to make. I trust
that this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a movement made
now, when the South has been erroneously informed that none such would be
attempted, would produce most disastrous results throughout our country.
It is, of course, now too late for me to give any advice in reference to the pro
posed scheme of Captain Fox. I fear that its result cannot fail to be disas
trous to all concerned. Even with his boat at our walls, the loss of life (as I
think I mentioned to Mr. Fox) in unloading her will more than pay for the
good to be accomplished by the expedition, which keeps us, if I can maintain
possession of this work, out of position, surrounded by strong works, which
must be carried to make this fort of the least value to the United States gov
ernment. " We have not oil enough to keep a light in the lantern for one night. The
boats will have to, therefore, rely at night entirely upon other marks. I ought
to have been informed that this expedition was to come. Colonel Lamon's
remark convinced me that the idea, merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox,
would not be carried out.
" We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not
in this war, which, I see, is to be thus commenced. That God will still avert
it, and cause us to resort to pacific means to maintain our rights, is my ardent
prayer. " I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" Robert Anderson, Major 1st Artillery commanding."
These three most significant telegrams are from our commis
sioners :
L " Washington, April 5th, 1861.
" Hon. Robert Toombs, etc., Montgomery, Ala. :
" The movement of troops and preparation on hoard of vessels of war, of
which you have already been apprised, are continued with the greatest activ
ity. An important move, requiring a formidable military and naval force, is
certainly on foot. The statement that this armament is intended for St. Do
mingo may be a mere ruse.
"We are, however, credibly informed that Commodore Stringham, who
takes charge of the squadron, sails for St. Domingo.
" Having no confidence in the administration, we say, be ever on your guard.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 35
Glad to hear that you are ready. The notice promised us will come at the
last moment, if the fleet be intended for our waters.
" Crawford.
" Roman.
" Forsyth."
2. "April 6th, 1861.
" Hon. Robert Toombs, Secretary, etc., Montgomery, Ala. :
"No change in the activity of the warlike armaments mentioned yesterday.
The rumor that they are destined against Pickens, and perhaps Sumter, is
getting every day stronger. We know nothing positive on the subject, but
advise equal activity on your part to receive them if they come. We have
not yet been notified of the movement, but the notification may come when
they are ready to start. " Crawford.
" Forsyth.
"Roman."
3. " Washington, April 11th, 1881.
" General G. T. Beauregard :
"The Tribune of to-day declares the main object of the expedition to be the
relief of Sumter, and that a force will be lauded which will overcome all op
position. " Roman.
" Crawford.
" Forsyth."
The correspondence between General Scott and Captain Fox,
the communication of Secretary Cameron to the latter, the letters
of President Lincoln to the same and to Lieutenant D. D. Porter,
come as corroborating evidence of the preconcerted determination
of the Federal authorities to dupe the Southern people and their
representatives in Washington.
The justice and impartial logic of history will establish, beyond
the possibility of a doubt, that the Southern Commissioners, in
their parting communication to Mr. Seward, dated April 9th, 1861,
were fully justified in using the following dignified and truthful
language :
" Your refusal to entertain these overtures for a peaceful solution, the active
naval and military preparations of this government, and a formal notice to the
commanding general of the Confederate forces in the harbor of Charleston,
that the President intends to provision Fort Sumter by forcible means, if nec
essary, are viewed by the undersigned, and can only be received by the world,
as a declaration of war against the Confederate States; for the President of
the United States knows that Fort Sumter cannot be provisioned without the
effusion of blood."

36 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Among the few persons, in Charleston and elsewhere, who, from
the first, doubted the purpose of the Federal authorities, and never
believed in any good coming from the unaccountable delays in the
negotiations at Washington, was General Beauregard, Charleston's
popular commander.
He had lost no time in pushing forward, as rapidly as possible,
the plan of attack he had adopted immediately after his arrival.
That plan was to form a circle of fire, by distributing all his avail
able guns and mortars around a circumference of which Fort
Sumter should be the centre. To accomplish this he had three of
the six mortars about to be put in position at Cummings's Point
removed to the Trapier Battery on Morris Island. They were
10 -inch mortars. The three others (8 -inch) he left where they
had been originally mounted. With his usual prompt decision
and remarkable activity, he asked and obtained from Savan
nah and Pensacola other mortars which he knew were there, and
distributed them as follows: three in Fort Johnson, on James
Island; one in Castle Pinckney, an inner defence in the harbor;
two in Christ Church parish, near Mount Pleasant; and three on
Sullivan's Island, in the vicinity of Fort Moultrie.
All his mortars were now placed in proper positions, and in
accord with the principles of gunnery ; that is to say, near enough
to Fort Sumter to do it the greatest possible damage, and yet far
enough away to be almost beyond range of its fire, with the ex
ception of the three 8-inch mortars at Cummings's Point, already
referred to, which were of but slight value or importance.
The merlons and traverses at Fort Moultrie and the batteries
near it, as originally constructed by the officers in charge, were to
tally inadequate to the purpose for which they were intended.
He had them rebuilt of a much larger size and greater solidity.
He also located his gun-batteries with the utmost care, endeav
oring to enfilade the barbette guns of Sumter, so as to disable
them, should the emergency arise.
It was on the Morris Island shore that General Beauregard first
applied his plan of detached batteries for the defence of channels
and rivers. Close observation had shown him that batteries thus
constructed and armed with a few guns each, well protected by
heavy traverses and merlons, were much more efficacious than
would be a single large work, having all the guns concentrated in
it, without these protections. When a fort is attacked by a fleet,

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 37
its exposed barbette guns are soon disabled and the gunners driven
to cover ; whereas, in detached batteries, which mutually support
each other, those not immediately under fire can be worked at
leisure and with accuracy. One gun ashore, well protected, is
equivalent to many guns afloat, and the advantage is certain to be
on the side of the fire of the detached batteries, especially when
guarded against a land attack by a proper supporting force.
Captain John Randolph Hamilton, of Charleston, an ex-officer
of the United States navy, had constructed a floating battery,
originally of rough materials, and so clumsy and ungainly in ap
pearance as to be criticised by those who first examined it.
General Beauregard being directly applied to by the inventor,
and approving of his design, procured for him the iron plating
necessary for the completion of his work. Early in April it was
ready for use, and was removed to the western extremity of
Sullivan's Island, where it was placed in position, so as to deliver
a destructive fire upon the postern entrance of the fort facing
the city, a point which could not be effectively bombarded from
any other battery.
An iron-clad land battery was ako constructed, at that time,
by C. H. Steven, of Charleston, who afterwards became a briga
dier-general in the Confederate army, and was killed at the battle
of Chickamauga. It consisted of heavy timbers overlaid with
railroad iron, so fitted together as to present a smooth inclined
surface, to be properly greased when ready for action. Its heavy
guns, three in number, were fired through embrasures supplied
with strong iron shutters. General Beauregard likewise approved
of Mr. Steven's plan, and added to it such suggestions as his
engineering experience justified. This battery was erected at
Cummings's Point, only thirteen hundred yards from Fort Sumter.
Both Captain Iiamilton's and Mr. Steven's batteries proved
the wisdom of their inventors, and fully met General Beaure
gard's expectations. They were, in fact, the first experiments
from which sprang all iron-clad war vessels and land batteries in
the United States, and to them may be attributed most of the
important changes and improvements since made in naval archi
tecture and armaments.
" Ou the 6th of April," says General Doubleday, in his " Remi
niscences," " Beauregard restricted our marketing to two days in
the week. On the 7th it was wholly cut off, and we noticed

38 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
gangs of negroes hard at work strengthening the defences on
Morris Island. . . . Anderson was greatly troubled at the failure
of all his plans to keep the peace. . . . The rebels knew, and per
haps he knew, that on the 6th and 7th of April a number of
naval vessels had left New York and Norfolk under sealed orders.
Their destination could hardly be doubted."
The orders cutting off the supplies, alluded to by General Dou
bleday, were issued and rigidly enforced by General Beauregard,
whose object was not only to prevent the fort from receiving
supplies of provisions, but also to prevent the purchase of oil,
without which no signals could be made to the expected fleet;
moreover, without oil, the wheels and chassis of Major Anderson's
guns, then clogged by the sand drifts in the work, could not be
kept in proper order for immediate effective use.
To guard further against the entrance of the Federal fleet,
which might be effected during a dark night, despite the vigilance
of our channel batteries, General Beauregard determined to use
two large Drummond lights, one on Morris Island, the other on
Sullivan's Island, at points specially selected, in order to illumi
nate the channels leading to Fort Sumter, and thereby facilitate
the firing of the Morris Island beach batteries and other works
bearing on the outer harbor. He had ordered and received these
valuable lights from New York, and having placed them in bomb-
proofs, so constructed as to insure their usefulness and safety,
intrusted them to the care of Professor Lewis R. Gibbes, of the
Charleston College.
In connection with these two Drummond lights, and as an ad
ditional safeguard, Captain Hartstein, a distinguished ex-officer of
the United States navy, was placed in command of the steam
harbor boats, and detailed to watch the various channel entrances,
with orders, should he discover vessels attempting to approach
Fort Sumter, to throw up signal rockets, as a warning to the
batteries and the Drummond lights, and then to steam slowly in,
after hoisting a light of special color, by which his vessels could
be distinguished from those of the enemy. This duty, at times
very harassing, was performed by him and his officers and men,
with unremitting zeal and energy.
Another object — and an important one — still remained to be
accomplished : some of the barbette guns of Sumter, on the land-
face fronting the city, could not be effectively reached by the

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 39
batteries thus far erected. General Beauregard, therefore, in
order to perfect his line of attack and also to prevent a landing
of any reinforcement at the postern gate of the fort, constructed
a masked battery of four guns at the west end of Sullivan's
Island, in rear of a small summer residence abandoned by its
owners. It proved to be, says General Doubleday, in his " Remi
niscences," page 140, a formidable work " which effectually en
filaded two rows of our upper tier of guns en barbette, and took a
third tier in reverse. It was a sad surprise to us, for we had our
heaviest metal there."
Immediately after the delivery of Mr. Lincoln's message by
Mr. Chew, General Beauregard sent the following despatch to
the Secretary of War, at Montgomery :
" Charleston, April 8th, 1861.
"To L.P.Walker:
" Dear Sir, — An authorized messenger from Mr. Lincoln has just informed
Governor Pickens and myself that provisions will be sent to Fort Sumter,
' peaceably if they can, forcibly if they must.' " G. T. Beauregard."
To this the Secretary of War replied :
" Montgomery, April 10th, 1861.
" To General Beauregard, Charleston :
" If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who com
municated to you the intention of the Washington government to supply Fort
Sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation ; and if this is re
fused, proceed in such a manner as you may determine to reduce it.
"L.P.Walker."
General Beauregard was ready. He had displayed untiring
energy in his preparations, and had been most zealously and
effectively assisted by the South Carolina authorities and the
officers and men under him. One thing only remained to be at
tended to, and that was the placing in position of a small Blake-
ly rifled gun, the first ever used in America, which had just ar
rived from England — an unexpected present to the State from
Charles K. Prioleau, of Charleston, a partner in the Liverpool
branch of the firm of John Frazer & Co. It arrived off the har
bor on the day before the order from Montgomery was received,
and delayed its execution for twenty-four hours.
At two o'clock p. M., April 11th, General Beauregard, through

40 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
his aids, Captain S. D. Lee, Colonel James Chestnut, Jr., and
Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm, made a formal demand for the imme
diate surrender of Fort Sumter. The terms offered were: "to
transport Major Anderson and his command to any port in the
United States he might select ; to allow him to move out of the
fort with company arms and property, and all private property ;
and to salute his flag on lowering it."*
General Beauregard's despatch, forwarded on the same day to
the Secretary of War, was as follows :
" Charleston, April 11th, 1861.
"To L.P.Walker:
" Major Anderson replied : ' I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt
of your communication, demanding the evacuation of this fort, and to say,
in reply thereto, that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense of
honor and of my obligation to my government prevent my compliance.' He
adds, verbally : ' I will await the first shot, and if you do not batter us to
pieces, we will be starved out in a few days.' Answer. " G. T. Beauregard."
The answer came in all haste. It was as follows :
" Montgomery, April 11th, 1861.
" To General Beauregard, Charleston :
" We do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter. If Major Anderson
will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree
that in the meantime he will not use his guns against us, unless ours should
be employed against Fort Sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid the effu
sion of blood. If this, or its equivalent, be refused, reduce the fort as your
judgment decides to be the most practicable. " L. P. Walker."
The substance of these instructions was immediately forwarded
to the fort, by General Beauregard's aids, accompanied by Colonel
Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia. But Major Anderson, as the official
despatch has it, " would not consent." In consequence of which,
after timely notice had been given to him in General Beauregard's
name, on April 12th, at 4.30 a. m., "We opened fire."
* General Beauregard's Report of the Bombardment of Sumter.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 41

CHAPTER IV.
General Beauregard Makes no Material Changes in the Distribution of Forces
in Charleston. — Brigadier-General Simons in Command of Morris Island.
— Brigadier- General Dunovant of Sullivan's Island. — Tone of Troops. —
The First Shell Fired from Fort Johnson. — The Only Motive Actuating
the South. — At 5 a. m., April 12th, every Battery in Full Play. — Sumter
Responds at 7 o'clock. — How our Guns were Served. — Engagement Con
tinued until Nightfall. — Firing Kept up all Night by our Batteries. —
No Response from Sumter. — Conduct of the Federal Fleet. — Fort Re-opens
Fire on the Morning of the 13th. — Burning of Barracks. — Sumter still
Firing. — Our Troops Cheer the Garrison. — General Beauregard Offers As
sistance to Major Anderson, who Declines. — Hoisting of the White Flag.
— Terms of Surrender. — Accident during the Salute of the Flag.— Evac
uation. — Our Troops Enter the Fort, April 14th. — Hoisting of Confederate
and Palmetto Flags.
On assuming command of Charleston, General Beauregard made
no material change in the distribution and location of the forces
he found there, and maintained the organization previously adopt
ed by the South Carolina State authorities.
Brigadier - General James Simons was therefore left in com
mand of Morris Island, all the batteries of which had been placed
under the immediate charge of Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. De Saus-
sure of the Second Artillery Battalion. He was assisted, at the
Trapier Battery, by Captain King, of the Marion Artillery, and,
later, by Captain Russell, of the Sumter Guards. Next to the
Trapier Battery, and closer to Sumter, was the Steven or Iron
Battery, of which special mention has already been made. Then
came the Cummings's Point battery, at a distance of only thir
teen hundred yards from Fort Sumter. To it had been attached
the rifled Blakely gun, just received from England. Both of these
were held by the Palmetto Guards, and commanded by Major
Stevens, of the Citadel Academy ; Captain Cuthbert having spe
cial charge of the Iron Battery, and Captain Thomas of the Blakely
gun. Besides the above-mentioned works, there could also be seen
a long line of detached batteries, guarding the entrance of Ship
Channel, and extending along the whole Morris Island beach. They

42 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
were manned by detachments taken from Gregg's regiment, and
from both the German and the Columbia Artillery, under Colonel
Lamar, Major Warley, and Captains Huger, Nohrden, and Green.
Sullivan's Island was under Brigadier-General R. G. M. Duno-
vant; and the command of all its batteries had been assigned to
Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley, of the First Artillery Battalion. Cap
tain Ransom Calhoun was stationed at Fort Moultrie, and Captain
Hallinquist at the " Enfilade " or masked battery. They were as
sisted by Lieutenants Wagner, Rhett, Yates, Valentine, Mitchel,
and Parker. Captain Butler was on duty at the mortar battery,
east of Fort Moultrie. Captain J. R. Hamilton commanded his
own floating battery and the Dahlgren gun. Captain Martin was
at the Mount Pleasant mortars; Captain George S. Thomas at
Fort Johnson ; and Castle Pinckney had been placed under the
charge of an officer whose name we have not been able to procure.
A few days previous to the bombardment, the general com
manding had announced, in general orders, the names of the of
ficers composing his staff. They were Major D. R. Jones, Assis
tant-Adjutant-General, Captain S. D. Lee, Captain S. Ferguson,
Lieutenant Sydney Legare — of the Regular staff ; Messrs. John L.
Manning, James Chestnut, Jr., William Porcher Miles, J. A. Gon
zales, and A. R. Chisolm, and Colonels L. T. Wigfall, of Texas, and
Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia — of the Volunteer staff.
Though the opening of hostilities had, for the last two days,
been almost hourly expected by officers and men of the various
commands, and by the whole population of the city of Charleston,
still, so good was the tone of the troops, so confident of the result
were the non-combatants, that when the last message of the com
manding general had been delivered, notifying Major Anderson
that fire would open on him in an hour's time, quiet, order, and
discipline reigned throughout the city and harbor.
The peaceful stillness of the night was suddenly broken just
before dawn. From Fort Johnson's mortar battery, at 4.30 a. m.,
April 12th, 1861, issued the first — and, as many thought, the too-
long-deferred — signal shell of the war. It was fired, not by Mr.
Edmund Ruffin, of Virginia, as has been erroneously believed, but
by Captain George S. James, of South Carolina, to whom Lieu
tenant Stephen D. Lee issued the order. It sped aloft, describ
ing its peculiar arc of fire, and, bursting over Fort Sumter, fell,
with crashing noise, in the very centre of the parade.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 43
Thus was " Reveille " sounded in Charleston and its harbor on
this eventful morning. In an instant all was bustle and activity.
Not an absentee was reported at roll-call. The citizens poured
down to the battery and the wharves, and women and children
crowded each window of the houses overlooking the sea — rapt
spectators of the scene. At ten minutes before five o'clock, all
the batteries and mortars which encircled the grim fortress were
in full play against it.
Round after round had already been fired ; and yet, for nearly
two hours, not a shot in response had come from Fort Sumter.
Had Major Anderson been taken by surprise ? Or was it that,
certain of his ability to pass unscathed through the onslaught thus
made upon him, it mattered not how soon or how late he commit
ted his flag in the war "in which his heart was not"? At last,
however, near seven o'clock, the United States flag having pre
viously been raised, the sound of a gun, not ours, was distinctly
heard. Sumter had taken up the gage of battle, and Cummings's
Point had first attracted its attention. It was almost a relief to
our troops — for gallantry ever admires gallantry, and a worthy foe
disdains one who makes no resistance.
The action was now general, and was so maintained throughout
the day, with vigor on both sides. Our guns were served with
admirable spirit, and the accuracy of our range was made evident
by the clouds of dust that flew as our balls struck the fort, and
by the indentations hollowed in its walls. The precision with
which solid shot and shells were thrown from our batteries, main
ly Fort Moultrie, was such that the enemy was soon compelled to
abandon the use of his barbette guns, several of which had been
dismounted in the early part of the bombardment.
The iron-clad battery at Cummings's Point, Fort Moultrie prop
er, and that end of Sullivan's Island where the floating battery,
the Dahlgren gun, and the enfilade or masked battery had been
placed, were the points which attracted Major Anderson's heavi
est firing. No better proof could he have given us of the effects
of our fire on his fort. An occasional shot only was aimed at Fort
Johnson, as if to remind the battery there that the explosion of
its first shell was not yet forgiven. Captain Butler's mortar bat
tery, east of Moultrie, had also a share of the enemy's wrath.
The engagement was continued with unceasing vigor until night
fall, although Sumter's fire had evidently slackened before that

44 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
time, and was then confined to its casemated guns. General Dou
bleday, U S. A., in his " Reminiscences," p. 154, speaking of the
first day's bombardment, says : " They had a great advantage over
us, as their fire was concentrated on the fort, which was in the
centre of the circle, while ours was diffused over the circumfer
ence. Their missiles were exceedingly destructive to the upper
exposed portion of the work, but no essential injury was done to
the lower casemates which sheltered us."
Noted among our mortar batteries — all so well served — was the
Trapier Battery, whose skilful firing had become the subject of
much admiration among officers and men. Almost every shell it
threw, from the first to the last, reached its aim with relentless
effect. The Steven Iron Battery, the destruction of which the
guns of Sumter sought to accomplish, paid but little attention to
the fierce opening attack made upon it, and received no serious
impression on its iron-coated surface ; while the south and soutb-
west faces of Sumter bore visible signs of its own effectiveness.
The floating battery was not far behind in destructive usefulness.
It proved of equal invulnerability, and left telling marks of its
battering powers.
During the whole night which followed, in spite of rain and
darkness, our batteries continued playing upon the fort with un
varying effect, but the shots were fired at longer intervals, in obe
dience to orders. No response was made. General Doubleday, in
his work already quoted, admits the fact. He says : " We did not
return the fire, having no ammunition to waste." And General
Crawford, in his " First Shot against the Flag," * makes the fol
lowing statement : " During the night of the 12th, the accurate
range of the mortars lodged a shell in the parade, or about the
work, at intervals of fifteen minutes. It was estimated that over
twenty-five hundred shot and shell struck the fort during the first
twenty-four hours."
It was expected that the Federal fleet, alluded to by Mr. Lin
coln's special messenger to Governor Pickens and General Beaure
gard, would arrive that night, and might attempt to throw troops,
ammunition, and supplies into Fort Sumter. To guard against.
such an untoward event, the keenest watchfulness was observed
at our beach batteries and by the forces on Morris and Sullivan's
* "Annals of the War," p. 328.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 45
islands. The details of men at the Drummond lights were also
on the alert, and ready at a moment's notice to illuminate the chan
nels ; while Captain Hartstein, with his cruising vessels, actively
patrolled the outer harbor. The fleet arrived on the morning of
the 13th, an hour or two after the action had been renewed, and
remained spectators off the bar.
Very early on that morning all our batteries re -opened on
the enemy, who responded with vigor for a while, concentrating
his fire almost exclusively on Fort Moultrie. The presence of the
fleet outside the bar, now visible to all, no doubt inspired both
officers and men of the garrison with additional courage and a re
newed spirit of endurance.
General Crawford, in his above - quoted essay, says : " Major
Anderson was directed, if possible, to hold out until the 12th of
April, when the expedition would go forward, and, finding his
'flag flying,' an effort would be made to provision him, and to
reinforce him, if resisted." *
Major Anderson, with his officers and men, followed the in
structions received. They did hold out ; their flag was " flying "
on the 12th of April, and again on the 13th ; and they were fight
ing in all earnest. The fleet outside thought proper, nevertheless,
to abstain from all participation in the engagement.
: " By morning," says General Crawford, " the fleet sent to our
assistance appeared off the bar, but did not enter." f And General
Doubleday adds, in his characteristic manner : " After the event
much obloquy was thrown upon the navy, because it did not come
in and engage the numerous batteries and forts, and open for it
self a way to Charleston ; but this course would probably have re
sulted in the sinking of every vessel." X
At about 8 o'clock a. m., in the thickest of the bombardment,
a thin smoke was observable, curling up from Fort Sumter. It
grew denser and denser as it steadily rose in the air ; and it soon
became apparent that the barracks of tlie fort had been set on fire
by forty rounds of red-hot shot, thrown from an 8-inch Colum-
biad at Fort Moultrie, by a detachment of Company B, under
Lieutenant Alfred Rhett. This sight increased the vigor of our
attack ; both officers and men feeling now that the garrison would
* "Annals of the War," p. 325. t Ibid. p. 329.
J General Doubleday's " Reminiscences," p. 150.

46 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
soon be brought to terms. In spite, however, of this new and ter
rible element against which it had to contend, the fort still re
sponded to the fire of our batteries, though at long and irregular
intervals only.
Appreciating the critical position of the enemy, and carried
away by their own enthusiasm, our troops, mounting the parapets
in their front, cheered Major Anderson at each successive discharge
that came from the fort, deriding and hooting, the while, what to
them seemed the timorous inaction of the fleet outside the bar.
Matters had evidently reached a crisis for the men within the
walls of Sumter. Feai-ing that some terrible calamity might be
fall them, and being informed that the United States flag no long
er floated over the fort, General Beauregard immediately de
spatched three of his aids with offers of assistance to Major Ander
son, who thanked him for his courtesy, but declined to accept aid.
Before General Beauregard's aids could get to the fort, the United
States flag, which had not been hauled down, as we supposed, but
had fallen from the effects of a shot, was hoisted anew. It did not
fly long,-however, but was soon lowered, and a white flag substitu
ted for it. The contest was over. Major Anderson had acknowl
edged his defeat.
Now occurred an incident which was in no way surprising, be
ing the natural result of inexperience in military matters and a
lack of discipline, among some of the officers commanding the
various points around the harbor. Seeing the fall of the flag, and
'the fort in flames, Brigadier-general Simons, actuated by the best
of motives, but without authority from the commanding general,
allowed Colonel Wigfall to cross from Cummings's Point to Sum
ter in a row-boat, to ascertain whether the absence of the flag over
the fort indicated a desire to surrender. The proximity of Morris
Island to Sumter enabled him to reach the fort before the aids,
who had been sent directly from general headquarters, could do so.
A short interview took place between Colonel Wigfall and
Major Anderson, during which a demand of surrender was made
by the former and acceded to by the latter, but upon terms not
clearly defined between them. i
We deem it best to transcribe the veryvwords made use of by
General Beauregard, in his "Final Report of Operations against
Sumter," as forwarded April 27th, 1361, to the Hon. L. P. Walker,
Secretary of War at Montgomery, Alabama :

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 47
"Major Anderson understood him [Colonel Wigfall] as offering the same con
ditions on the part of General Beauregard as had been tendered him on the
11th instant* while Colonel Wigfall's impression was that Major Anderson
unconditionally surrendered, trusting to the generosity of General Beauregard
to offer such terms as would be honorable and acceptable to both parties.
Meanwhile, before these circumstances had been reported to me, and, in fact,
soon after the aids I had despatched with the offer of assistance had set out on
their mission, hearing that a white flag was flying over the fort, I sent Major
Jones, chief of my staff, and some other aids, with substantially the same prop
osition I had made to Major Anderson on the 11th instant, excepting the
privilege of saluting his flag. Major Anderson replied that ' it would be ex
ceedingly gratifying to him, as well as to his command, to be permitted to
salute their flag, having so gallantly defended the fort under such trying cir
cumstances, and hoped that General Beauregard would not refuse it, as such
a privilege was not unusual.' He furthermore said ' he would not urge the
point, but would prefer to refer the matter again to General Beauregard.'
" I very cheerfully agreed to allow the salute as an honorable testimony of
the gallantry and fortitude with which Major Anderson and his command
had defended their post, and I informed Major Anderson of my decision
about half-past seven o'clock, p.m., through Major Jones, my chief of staff."
A melancholy occurrence took place during the salute of the
United States flag — the death of one of the garrison, who had his
right arm blown off and was almost instantaneously killed, by
the premature discharge of the piece he was loading. A spark,
also, it was alleged, having " dropped on a pile of cartridges below,
exploded them all," f and severely wounded five other men.
While final arrangements were being made for the withdrawal
of the garrison, and before it was effected, the general command
ing, who had twice attempted, but in vain, to assist Major Ander
son in quenching the fire in the fort, ordered a company of Regu
lars with two fire-engines from Sullivan's Island, to repair to Fort
Sumter, to put out the conflagration which, not entirely subdued,
had broken out afresh. This was a harder task than was at first
supposed. The two engines proved insufficient, and others had to
be brought from Charleston, with additional firemen. It was only
towards dawn that the fire was at last brought under control, and
the powder-magazine secured from explosion.
Owing to unavoidable delays'resulting from the state of confu-
* See Chapter III., pp. 40, 41 ; also Report of General Beauregard, in Appen
dix to this chapter.
t Gen. Doubleday's " Reminiscenses," p. 171.

48 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
sion existing in the fort, its formal transfer to our troops did not
take place until four o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, the 14th
of April. At that hour Major Anderson and his command
marched out of the work, and we entered it, taking final possession.
Then it was, that, amid deafening cheers and with an enthusiastic
salute from the guns of all the batteries around the harbor, the
Confederate and the Palmetto flags were hoisted side by side, on
the damaged ramparts of the fort. To Captain Hallinquist, of
the 1st Artillery Regulars, with his worthy Lieutenants Rhett,
Mitchell, and Blake, and to the gallant Captain Cuthbert, with his
Lieutenants, Brownfield, Holmes, and Buist, was confided the
keeping of Fort Sumter, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley as com
mander, and the Regulars remained there.
General Beauregard was not present at this imposing ceremony.
Prompted by the feeling of delicacy which so distinguishes all
his social and official relations, he abstained from meeting Major
Anderson, his former friend and professor, now his defeated foe,
lest his presence, at such a juncture, might add to the distress and
natural mortification of a gallant officer.
Not until the steamer Isabel, which was placed at the disposal
of Major Anderson, had conveyed him and his command to the
Federal fleet, riding at anchor outside the bar, did General Beaure
gard enter the fort, which, in obedience to orders from his govern
ment, he had successfully reduced.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 49

CHAPTER V.
Condition of Fort Sumter after the Bombardment. — Repairs Begun at Once. —
Mustering of South Carolina Volunteers. — Bonham's Brigade. — General
Beauregard makes a Reconnoissance of the South Carolina Coast. — Rec
ommends Works at Stono, the Two Edistos, and Georgetown. — Declines
Advising Plan of Defence for Port Royal Harbor. — Yields under Pressure,
but Predicts the Result. — Receives Congratulations upon the Reduction
of Sumter. — Vote of Thanks of Congress. — Resolutions of the General
Assembly of South Carolina.— General Beauregard is Called to Montgom
ery. — The President Wishes him to Assist General Bragg atPensacola.— He
Declines. — His Reasons therefor. — Deputation from New Orleans Asking
his Transfer to Louisiana. — The President Sends him Back to Charleston.
— Propositions of the House of John Frazer & Co., relative to Purchase
of Steamers. — Comments thereon. — General Beauregard Advocates the
Plan. — Government Declines Moving in the Matter. — Silence of Mr.
Davis's Book about it. — General Beauregard Ordered to Richmond. — Re
grets of Carolinians at his Departure. — Letter of Governor Pickens.
What with the burning of its quarters, the injury inflicted on
its walls, and the shattered condition of its parade and parapets,
where dismounted guns, broken carriages and chassis, fragments
of shell and shot, lay scattered on all sides — Fort Sumter, when
our troops marched into it, presented a picture of desolation and
ruin. One could well understand, upon viewing it then, how im
possible it would have been for Major Anderson and his command
to hold out more than a few hours longer. Suffocation and an en
dangered magazine, if not starvation, and, above all, the firing
from Moultrie and other batteries, must soon have destroyed the
entire garrison. With or without the assistance of the fleet, a sur
render was a foregone conclusion.
The triumph of our arms, so complete and — through the kindly
protection of Providence — so bloodless, was solemnly celebrated
in several of the ancient churches of Charleston ; and a Te Deum
was sung, with great pomp, in the beautiful cathedral, on the Sun
day next following this opening scene of the war.
General Beauregard, in orders issued on the day after the surren
der, congratulated his troops on " the brilliant success which had
I.— 4

50 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
crowned their gallantry." Commenting upon the terms granted
to Major Anderson and his command, he said : " And to show
our magnanimity to the gallant defenders, who were only execut
ing the orders of their government, they will be allowed to evacu
ate upon the same terms which were offered to them before the
bombardment commenced." He concluded as follows : " The gen
eral is highly gratified to state that the troops, by their labor,
privations, and endurance at the batteries and at other posts, have
exhibited the highest characteristics of tried soldiers."
And now began in earnest, without the loss of a day, the re
pairs, which amounted almost to the rebuilding of Fort Sumter.
With zeal and energy this work was done; and in less than three
weeks no vestige of the former injuries remained. The broken
chassis and carriages had been replaced, the barracks rebuilt — one
story in height instead of two, as formerly — and the walls restored
to their previous condition.
Meanwhile General Beauregard went on with the organization and
discipline of the troops called by South Carolina, which were grad
ually mustered into the Provisional Army of the Confederate States.
Early in May, a brigade of four regiments of South Carolina
volunteers was organized, under Brigadier-General Bonham. It
consisted of the 1st South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Gregg ;
the 2d South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Kershaw ; the 3d South
Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Williams ; and the 8th South Caro
lina Volunteers, Colonel Cash. That brigade, made up of the flow
er of Carolina's chivalry, was sent to Virginia, by order of the
War Department, the " Old Dominion " having, on the 17th of
April — four days after the fall of Sumter — joined her fate to that
of the Southern Confederacy.
One of the regiments of Bonham's brigade (Gregg's) had been
sent in advance to Norfolk. Its mission was to take possession
of the navy -yard and protect all public property there. This
was a judicious movement. The many cannon and mortars, and
the ammunition stored at Norfolk, were of the greatest value to
the Confederacy, then almost entirely destitute of such important
supplies. Tlie whole brigade was soon afterwards concentrated at
Manassas Junction, in the Department of Alexandria, or " the Alex
andria line," as it was also called, the command of which devolved
upon General Bonham. He remained there until relieved, on the
1st of June, by General Beauregard.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 51
As soon as he could be spared from Charleston, General Beau
regard made a thorough reconnoissance of the South Carolina
coast, from Charleston to Port Royal. This he did at the special
request of Governor Pickens, the object being the adoption of a
system of defence to be carried out at the earliest moment prac
ticable. On his return he prepared a memoir, wherein he recommended
the erection of several important works at the mouths of the Stono
and the two Edistos, and at Georgetown ; but declined advising
any for the entrance of Port Royal harbor. He was of opinion
that field-works located on the ends of the islands which closed
the harbor could not protect it, for the reason that the distance
between the islands was too great. Some light works he did rec
ommend, however, at the inner end of Port Royal, to guard that
part of the coast and prevent a landing of the enemy, which might
result in the destruction of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad.
But upon the earnest and reiterated request of Governor Pickens,
and other eminent citizens, whose zeal and efforts were untiring,
General Beauregard finally yielded, and drew out a plan for the
defence of Port Royal, with the distinct requirement, however,
that the field-works proposed in the plan should be armed with
the heaviest ordnance, chiefly 10-inch and rifled guns, and that a
steel-clad floating battery, with a similar armament, should be
moored midway between the two field-works. His explanation
was, that while the harbors of New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans — the entrances to which
are from half a mile to one and a quarter miles broad — require
strongly casemated forts, arm'ed with several hundred guns of
heavy caliber, it could not be expected that Port Royal harbor,
with an entrance nearly three miles wide and twenty-six feet deep,
could be effectively protected by small, hastily constructed field-
works, inadequately armed.
What General Beauregard had predicted was unfortunately
realized. In the autumn of that year the enemy's powerful fleet,
the acquisition and fitting-out of which had cost, according to
Northern accounts, more than four millions of dollars, entered
Port Royal harbor and reduced its isolated works, after a short
but gallant resistance on the part of their overpowered garrisons.
This event cast a gloom, for a while, over the new-born Southern
Confederacy.

52 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
General Beauregard, now thoroughly familiar with the topogra
phy of Charleston and the surrounding country, understood how
important it was to guard the Stono. He saw at a glance that,
should the enemy land a sufficient force on James Island, the city
of Charleston could easily be turned by way of that river. To
avert such a danger, he had a strong field-work erected on Battery
Island, that being the lowest point of dry land before reaching
the salt marshes which extend in an unbroken field on each side
of the stream. This work, although small, occupied a command
ing position, which no hostile craft could approach unseen. Tow
ards the latter part of May it was completed and ready for ser
vice. From various quarters messages of congratulation poured in to
General Beauregard, upon the brilliant success he had achieved.
The first in date was a telegram from President Davis, which read
as follows : " Montgomery, April 13«A, 1S61.
" To General G. T. Beauregard :
" Thanks for your achievement and for your courtesy to the garrison of Sum
ter. If occasion offers, tender my friendly remembrance to Major Anderson.
"Jefferson Davis."
Then, from the Secretary of War : " Montgomery, April lZth, 1861.
" To General Beauregard:
" Accept my congratulations. You have won your spurs. How many guns
can you spare for Pensacola ? "L.P.Walker."
The next communication was from one whose attitude towards
the administration already indicated the influence he would soon
exercise over it : " Montgomery, April 16th, 1861.
" My dear General, — In the midst of the eclat of your glorious triumph you
will, no doubt, value but little the tribute of a poor civilian who knows noth
ing of war; but I cannot refrain from joining in the general voice of your fel
low-citizens, and congratulating you on the signal success which has crowned
the first blow stricken in defence of our rights. Louisiana is proud of her son,
and I am Louisianian, heart and soul.
**** ****
" Renewing my cordial greetings, and envying your delight at accomplish
ing such a result as you have, without the loss of one man,
" I am your friend and servant, " J. P. Benjamin."

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 53
From Louisiana came words of enthusiastic rejoicing. New
Orleans, especially, was lavish in her praise.
The Confederate Congress tendered the following vote of thanks
to General Beauregard and the troops under him :
"No. 103. — A resolution of thanks to Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard
and the army under his command for their conduct in the affair of Fort
Sumter. " Be it unanimously resolved, by the Congress of the Confederate States of
America, That the thanks of the people of the Confederate States are clue, and
through this Congress are hereby tendered, to Brigadier-General G. T. Beau
regard and the officers, military and naval, under his command, and to the
gallant troops of the State of South Carolina, for tlie skill, fortitude, and cour
age by which they reduced, and caused the surrender of, Fort Sumter, in the
harbor of Charleston, on the 12th and 13th days of April, 1861. And the
commendation of Congress is also hereby declared of the generosity manifest
ed by their conduct towards a brave and vanquished foe.
" Be it further resolved, That a copy of this resolution be communicated by
the President to General Beauregard, and through him to the army then under
his command.
" Approved May ith, 1861."
South Carolina almost adopted General Beauregard as one of
her own sons. The Legislature of that State, at its first session
after the fall of Sumter, unanimously passed a resolution, the prin
cipal part of which is given below : " In General Assembly, S. C,
November 28ft, 1861.
" Resolved, That the General Assembly of South Carolina, in grateful recog
nition of the distinguished services of General G. T. Beauregard in the cause
of Southern independence, hereby tender to him the privilege of sending two
pupils to be educated at the military schools of this State, etc.
" Resolved, That his excellency the governor be requested to communicate
the foregoing to General G. T. Beauregard."
Governor Pickens, than whom none valued more the worth of
"the great Creole," as General Beauregard was then called, cheer
fully performed the pleasant duty assigned him ; and General
Beauregard, then in another field of action, gratefully accepted the
proffered honor. His younger son, Henry T. Beauregard, and his
nephew, James T. Proctor, were accordingly sent to the Military
Academy of South Carolina, and there enjoyed all the privileges of
State cadets. The former remained two years at the academy and
the latter one year, when they joined South Carolina regiments, and

54 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
served, though mere boys, to the end of the war. Young Proctor,
after promotion to a lieutenancy for gallant conduct at Fredericks
burg, was wounded and lost a foot at the battle of Chancellors-
ville. Governor Pickens also presented a commission as first lieu
tenant in the 1st South Carolina Battalion of Light Artillery to
the general's elder son, Rene' T. Beauregard, who was promoted,
first captain and then major of that command. He had previously
served as a private in the Washington Artillery, from New Or
leans, whose record throughout the war was surpassed by that of
no other organization.
About the 5th of May General Beauregard received a telegram
from the Secretary of War, requiring his immediate presence at
the seat of government. On his arrival at Montgomery he was
informed that the President desired to send him to Pensacola, to
co-operate with General Bragg, and assist him in the execution of
a plan — much thought of at the time — the main object of which
was the taking of Fort Pickens.
It must be remembered that no sooner had the State of Alaba
ma withdrawn from the Union than the Federal forces stationed
at Pensacola, in imitation of Major Anderson, evacuated Fort Bar
rancas, on the mainland, to occupy Fort Pickens, on Santa Rosa Isl
and — a much stronger, and in every way a more inaccessible, work.
The fort being in Confederate waters, the authorities at Mont
gomery feared that its occupancy by the enemy would imply
weakness on the part of our government, and might possibly
shake the confidence of the people. It had, therefore, been deter
mined to pursue a course towards Fort Pickens similar to that
which had been so successfully adopted against Fort Sumter.
Hence the desire for the services and experience of him who, after
thirty-three hours of bombardment, had forced the surrender of
Major Anderson and his command.
During a long conference held with President Davis and the
Secretary of War, General Beauregard stated his several objec
tions to being sent to Pensacola. In the first place, General
Bragg, not having sought his assistance, might perhaps be offended
at such apparent interference, and ask to be relieved from his com
mand, which would occasion no small annoyance to General Beau
regard, and be very detrimental to the cause. In the second
place, he was strongly of opinion that there was no advantage to
be gained by taking possession of Fort Pickens ; that to hold it

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 55
would necessitate the employment of more troops than we could
well spare at the time, and that it was not in ports and harbors,
but in the field, that the battles upon which hung the fate of
the Confederacy must be fought. He thought it wiser to leave
the disadvantage of garrisoning the fort upon the enemy, than
to take the task upon ourselves. He maintained, furthermore,
that, as we had yet no navy, and no commerce with the ex
terior world, Pensacola harbor could be of no use to us at this
juncture; and that, should we occupy Fort Pickens, we would, in
all likelihood, be forced, ere long, to withdraw our troops from it,
to employ them more usefully in other parts of the Confederacy.
He suggested that, meanwhile, a school of military practice and
instruction should be established at Pensacola, under General
Bragg, where all raw troops might be organized and properly pre
pared, before being forwarded to their ultimate destination. Gen
eral Beauregard's reasons finally prevailed, and he was sent back
to Charleston, the news from Washington indicating a general
war, and a strong determination on the part of the Federal gov
ernment to retake possession of Fort Sumter.
A deputation of gentlemen from New Orleans had recently ar
rived from that city, to direct the President's attention to its
unprotected condition. They urgently requested that General
Beauregard should be sent thither at once, to take command and
organize a system of defence, which, they were convinced, none
could do so well as himself. He would have gladly accepted such
an order — so many ties were drawing him back to Louisiana — but
the President deemed his presence imperatively necessary at
Charleston, then the most threatened point of the Confederacy,
and therefore persisted in his former determination.
While journeying from Charleston to Montgomery, General
Beauregard met Mr. W. L. Trenholm, whose father, George A.
Trenholm,* was a partner in the great firm of John Frazer &
Co., of Charleston and Liverpool. This gentleman, as he in
formed General Beauregard, was the bearer of important propo
sitions from the English branch of their house to the Confederate
government, for the purchase of ten large and powerful steamers,
then just built in England for the East India Company, which, no
longer needing them, was desirous of finding a purchaser ; the ships
* The Hon. George A. Trenholm was appointed Secretary of the Treasury
after the resignation of Mr. Memminger.

56 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
were to be properly manned and fitted out, and sent to the Con
federate States, thence to export enough cotton to pay for them,
and as much more as should be required to provide for the arma
ment and equipment of our forces. Such a plan, it was thought
by the Frazer house, could be easily carried out. The United
States government would require time to collect and rendezvous
its fleet, the inadequacy of which was well known; and no fear
need, therefore, be entertained of its ability, at that time, to en
force a blockade of the Southern ports: an effective blockade
could be prevented. After a certain number of voyages with
large cargoes of cotton, for the purposes already mentioned, these
steamers might be converted into cruisers, and employed to im
pede and destroy Northern commerce.
General Beauregard, thoroughly impressed with the incalculable
benefits to be derived from the adoption of such a project, prom
ised Mr. Trenholm to use his utmost endeavors in furtherance
of the measures that gentleman was sent to advocate. In a let
ter to General Beauregard, dated Charleston, 18th September,
187S, Mr. Trenholm says: "This I remember well, that you
warmly supported the proposition, and used your influence in
aid of its being brought before the cabinet, which was accom
plished." But neither General Beauregard's earnest advice, nor
the strong and cogent reasons given by Mr. Trenholm, were of
any avail. The Confederate government, under the erroneous
belief that the war would be a short one,* declined entertaining
the proposals made to it. " No discussion took place in my pres
ence," says Mr. Trenholm, in the letter already alluded to, "but
from questions put to me, I have always been under the impression
that few, if any, of those present " (meaning the President and mem
bers of the cabinet) "realized at all tlie scope and importance of
the measures laid before them." Thus was closed upon the Con
federacy a door — then wide open — through which might have
entered that material assistance, those sinews of war, the want of
which all the heroism of our troops and the endurance and self-
sacrifice of our people could not remedy.
General Beauregard believed — and expressed the opinion at the
time — that we were engaged in a long and terrible war ; and he
earnestly wished to see the country prepared accordingly. He was
* A member of the cabinet had given it as his opinion, on that occasion,
that the war would not last over ninety days.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 57
therefore most anxious that Mr. Trenholm's proposals should be
accepted. Four large and powerful steamers, and six smaller ones,
but " scarcely inferior for the required purpose "—as these were
represented to be — placed under the command of such officers as
Semmes, Maffitt, Brown, Taylor, Jones, linger, Hartstein, Hamil
ton, Pegram, and Reid, during the first year of the war, would not
only have raised the attempted blockade, but would have driven
the commerce of the United States from all the seas of the globe.
This was abundantly proved by the exploits of the Sumter and
Alabama, the results of which were so keenly felt by the North,
that England, irresponsible though she was, paid, at a later date,
the penalty of Admiral Semmes's achievements.
In his " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Mr.
Davis has not even alluded to the facts we have just related. He
states, however, that as early as February, 1861, " the third day
after my inauguration at Montgomery," he had directed Cap
tain (afterwards Admiral) Semmes, as agent of the Confederate
States, to proceed north in order not only to purchase " arms,
ammunition, and machinery," but also " to seek for vessels which
would serve for naval purposes." He further states that Captain
Semmes was unsuccessful in his errand, and, on his return, re
ported " that he could not find any vessels which in his judgment
were, or could be made, available for our uses." For that reason,
and for the additional reason, says Mr. Davis, that " the Southern
officers of the navy who were in command of United States ves
sels abroad," before resigning their commissions to join their re
spective States, invariably " brought the vessels they commanded
into the ports of the North," thereby depriving us of "our share
of the navy we had contributed to build," and allowing it to be
"employed to assail us," we were left "without the accessories
needful for the rapid supply of naval vessels." *
This is proof conclusive that Mr. Davis himself had some con
ception of the importance of procuring war-vessels for the Con
federacy; though the attempt to purchase them in the enemy's
country, was, under the circumstances, a strange proceeding, to say
the least of it. And yet, two months later, that is, in the early part
of May, when, to use Mr. Prioleau's expression, " a fleet of armed
vessels " was offered him, for the service of the Confederacy, with
* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. pp. 311, 313, 314.

58 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
an opportunity to procure an unlimited supply of arms and am
munition, not to speak of provisions and accoutrements for the
impending struggle, which he thought would be "long and
bloody," * Mr. Davis hardly considered the proposition at all, and
discarded it as being impracticable and unworthy of his attention.
Mr. Davis goes on to say : " While attempting whatever was
practicable at home, we sent a competent, well-deserving officer
of the navy to England, to obtain there and elsewhere, by pur
chase or by building, vessels which could be transformed into ships
of war." f
When was this done ? Mr. Davis is reticent upon that point ;
and, despite his statement that " these efforts and their results will
be noticed more fully hereafter," nowhere in his book is to be
found any additional information upon the subject. True, Mr.
Davis says, further on, "At the commencement of the war the
Confederacy was not only without a navy, all the naval vessels
possessed by the States having been, as explained elsewhere, left
in the hands of our enemies ; but worse than this was the fact
that ship-building had been almost exclusively done in the North
ern States, so that we had no means of acquiring equality in naval
power." X
This, instead of showing what were the efforts of our govern
ment to procure war-vessels for the South, shows, on the contrary,
how great was the folly, how disastrous to our interests the non-
acceptance of the contract almost effected, in London, by the
house of John Frazer & Co.
And Mr. Davis says also : " It has been shown that among the
first acts of the Confederate administration was the effort to buy
ships which could be used to naval purposes." § This can only re
fer to Captain Semmes's mission North, in the latter part of Febru
ary, 1861, and relates, not to what was done in Europe, not to the
reasons for rejecting the Trenholm proposal, but merely to what
was unsuccessfully attempted on our side of the water.
The impression Mr. Davis seems anxious to convey is, that his
efforts to procure war-vessels in Europe were made shortly after
his inauguration as President, and as soon as he had discovered
that none could be purchased at the North. From this, and with
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 230.
t Ibid. vol. i. p. 314. j; Ibid. vol. ii. p. 240. § Ibid. vol. ii. p. 245.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 59
the facts here submitted, it seems clear that, if Mr. Davis sent an
agent to purchase war-vessels in Europe, it must have been at a
later period, and when the opportunity to get such vessels, from
England and elsewhere, had already been allowed to slip by. For
he certainly cannot deny that, in May, 1861, a fleet of ten East
India steamers was offered the Confederate government, in Mont
gomery, through Mr. W. L. Trenholm, speaking in the name and
by the authority of the house of John Frazer & Co. Admitting
that, as he must, how is it possible that he could have rejected the
Trenholm offer — as he unquestionably did— if at that time he had
a naval officer in Europe, sent thither to effect the identical pur
chase he then declined? Was it that our government could not
have accepted any such proposal, except through the medium of
the agent already alluded to ? Why not, then, have referred the
house of John Frazer & Co. to him, or him to that house ?
Mr. Prioleau, one of the firm of John Frazer & Co., of Liver
pool, through whose hands had passed the negotiations relative to
the purchase of these vessels, wrote to General Beauregard the
following letter on the subject. It confirms the extracts from
Mr. Trenholm's letter, as given above; and adds so much interest
to the point under consideration, that we feel justified in submit
ting it without curtailment. " Bruges, September 25th, 1880.
" My dear General, — The facts with reference to the proposed fleet of armed
vessels for the service of tlie Confederacy were briefly as follows :
" I had, from the very beginning of the struggle, been more impressed with
the vital importance of the seaports than with anything else. I regarded
them as the lungs of the country, which, once really closed, asphyxia must fol
low. I therefore took an early occasion to go to London to see what could
be had in the shape of vessels fit to take and keep the sea, for a lengthened
period, and strong enough to carry an armament which would render them
efficient war-vessels, or, at all events, equal to cope with those of the enemy
engaged in the blockade of the coast.
" I was fortunate in finding exactly what was wanted. A fleet of first-class
East-Indiamen was lying there idle, under circumstances of a financial nature
which made them available to a buyer at less than half their cost. They had
been built with a view of being armed if required, and also to be used as
transports for troops, as well as to carry valuable cargoes and treasure in time
of peace. Four of them were vessels of great size and power, and of the very
first class, and there were six others which, although smaller, were scarcely in
ferior for the required purpose. Having, with the assistance of an expert,
thoroughly inspected them all, I at once entered into negotiations for their
purchase, and having secured them for the reply of the Confederate authori-

(JO MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
ties, I submitted the proposal, in a letter to the Hon. G. A. Trenholm, who re
ferred it, as I believe* to Montgomery. The total cost of buying, arming, and
fitting-out the ten ships was estimated at two millions of pounds, to put the
fleet on the coast ready for action ; a sum which would have been covered by
forty thousand bales of cotton, out of the three or four millions of bales which
the government had, at that time, under their hand, and which would not
have cost them, at 6d. in their own currency, more' than two millions of dollars.
There would have been little or no difficulty in getting the ships to sea. The
Foreign Enlistment Act had not then— and, indeed, never has been— authorita
tively interpreted to mean that a neutral may not sell an unarmed ship to a
belligerent: all that was required was commercial caution and coolness, and
naval skill and address ; all these were at hand, and there is no room for rea
sonable doubt that, within six months at furthest of the acceptance of the
offer being received on this side, the fleet would have appeared off Boston and
swept the coast thence to the Gulf, an achievement which would have com
pelled the prompt recognition of our government on this side, and the speedy
triumph of our cause. I have always understood that the proposition was
considered and rejected by the Confederate government, but I never had any
communication from them on the subject. Although much disappointed at this
result, so convinced was I of the value of the ships that I determined to retain
my hold upon them as long as possible, to prevent their being sold elsewhere,
and in hope that other counsels would prevail at home before it was too late.
By means of negotiations which it is not necessary to detail here, I did succeed
in retaining control of them until the occurrence of the ' Trent outrage ;'
when the British government, requiring immediately ships of this class for
transportation of troops and war-material to Canada, the owners broke off
the negotiations with mc, and got the ships, or many of them, employed in
this service, in which they remained until there was no further need of them.
" This is a correct and simple statement of the facts which are (as far as re
gards this side of the water) necessarily known better to myself than to any
other living person, and concerning which my memory is perfectly clear and
reliable. It occupied my mind almost exclusively for some time, and I built
the highest hopes upon the success of the scheme. It is true many of the ships
were of too great draught of water to enter some of our ports, but that was a
matter of comparatively little importance. What was wanted, in my view, was
the moral effect which would have been produced everywhere by such a
blow as could have been struck by even half of the whole number; an effect
which I have always, and will always believe, would have gone very far tow
ards determining, if it had not entirely reversed, the result of the struggle.
" I am, dear General,
" Yours very truly,
" C. K. Prioleau.
" General G. T. Beauregard."
* The proposal was referred, as we have seen, through Mr. W. L. Trenholm.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 61
We ask the reader to pause here, and reflect upon the stupen
dous consequences that might have followed the adoption of the
scheme proposed by the house of John Frazer & Co.
This was the first of a long series of irremediable errors com
mitted by the administration, through which, despite the right
eousness of our cause, the enthusiasm of our people, the splendid
fighting capacity of our armies, and all the many other chances in
our favor, the Confederacy was finally overwhelmed. The silence
Mr. Davis maintains in his book, as to the grave and most impor
tant proposition made to him through Mr. W. L. Trenholm, is,
indeed, extraordinary, and shows conclusively that he could have
given no satisfactory explanation of it to the public.
To show how completely our government was deluded, at that
time, as to the tendency of public events staring us in the face,
and how little it expected a "long and bloody war" with the
North, General Beauregard relates that, soon after the fall of
Sumter, one Major Huse — a gentleman in every sense of the word
— came to the city of Charleston, from Montgomery, with a pass
from the Secretary of War, authorizing him to leave for Europe,
on what he termed "a secret mission." He confidentially in
formed General Beauregard that he was empowered to purchase
ten thousand Enfield rifles for the Confederate War Department.
On his being asked whether he had not made an error in the num
ber, so insignificantly small did it appear, he replied: "No, those
were all he had been instructed to buy." " Why," said General
Beauregard, "I could have ordered them at once through the
house of John Frazer & Co., without the necessity of sending a spe
cial messenger to Europe on such a trifling errand." A few months
later, at Manassas, General Toombs confirmed the statement of
Major Huse. He was present as a member of the cabinet, when
the proposal about the purchase of the rifles was made. " The
original number proposed," said General Toombs, "was only
eight thousand." It was at his suggestion that the order for ten
thousand was given.
Mr. Davis, in his book,* makes mention of Major Huse, who,
he says, was " the officer sent to Europe, to buy in the market as
far as possible, and furthermore, to make contracts for arms and
munitions to be manufactured." But Mr. Davis does not state
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 311.

62 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
what number of " arms " Major Huse was at first instructed to pur
chase, or at what time he was sent, though he asserts that it was
"soon after" Captain Semmes had left for the North. As to the
first point, the reader has nothing further to learn ; Major Huse's
own testimony, corroborated by the distinct statement of Mr.
Toombs, leaves no doubt as to how many small arms (rifles) were
to be purchased, at that time, for the service of the Confederacy.
With regard to the second point, we positively allege that it was
after the fall of Fort Sumter — and therefore not prior to the 13th
of April — that Major Huse passed through Charleston, on his way
to Europe.
It appears from Mr. Davis's book that Major Huse "found"
but " few serviceable arms upon the market. ' He, however, suc
ceeded in making contracts for the manufacture of large quanti
ties, being in advance of the agents sent from the Northern gov
ernment for the same purpose." This, Mr. Davis evidently thinks,
was wonderful forethought, and a great display of energy, on the
part of our government ; though the sequel so painfully shows
how the first were the last and the last became the first.
The only conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing passage is,
that Major Huse was written to by his government, after his de
parture from Charleston, and was given additional instructions.
Mr. Davis, after reflection, may have found out that 10,000 rifles
would scarcely be enough for the armies of the South.
A letter of Major Huse is also given in Mr. Davis's book,* to
show how false was " the charge made early in the war that " the
President "was slow in securing arms and munitions of war from
Europe." This letter bears date December 30th, 1861 ; that is to
say, at least eight months after Major Huse's passage through
Charleston. It was written prior to the final settlement of the
Trent affair, for in it we find the following passage : " If the pris
oners are given up, the affair will result in great inconvenience to
us in the way of shipping goods." Major Huse had, clearly, no
great faith in the mission of Messrs. Mason and Slidell to Eu
rope, and considered his own functions as of infinitely more im
portance to the cause. The letter states, further, that Major Huse
had steamer-loads of arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, in di
vers warehouses of London, but that he could make no shipments
* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 482.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 63
to the South, because of his having to fight two governments,
" and because of the wharfingers' orders not to ship or deliver, by
land or water, any goods marked W. D., without first acquainting
the honorable Board of Customs."
It seems to us, after carefully examining the whole of Major
Huse's letter, not that the charge made against Mr. Davis, of
slowness in procuring arms from Europe, was untrue, but that
his agent there, whatever may have been his merit otherwise,
was totally unequal to the task assigned him. Had the orders to
purchase arms, ammunition, etc., for the Confederacy been con
fided to the house of John Frazer & Co., who had power, influ
ence, and enterprise enough in England, even to purchase " a
fleet of armed vessels," and offer it to our government — the
Southern armies, at that time and all through the war, would have
been as thoroughly and as promptly armed and equipped as the
Northern armies ; and Mr. Davis would have had no cause to la
ment the destitute condition of our men, or to write to General J.
E. Johnston, in September, 1861 : " One ship-load of small arms
would enable me to answer all demands, but vainly have I hoped
and waited."*
In the selection of Major Huse, as agent, Mr. Davis seems to
have been pursued by the same evil fate which almost always
caused him to assign men of inferior ability to positions requiring
great discernment and capacity. Major Huse asserts that in De
cember, 1861, he was incapable of shipping arms to the Confeder
acy ; whereas the entire country knows that, in 1861, there exist
ed no blockade of our ports, worthy of the name, and that block
ade-runners, throughout the years 1862, 1863, and even 1864, en
tered tlie ports of Charleston and Wilmington, with almost un
broken regularity; that provisions and stores of all kinds were
thus brought in by private individuals and commercial firms ; and
that the government — which, it seems, had succeeded in purchas
ing one small blockade-runner of its ownf — could, with perhaps
fewer impediments in its way, have done likewise, in the matter
of arms and ammunition. And here we might bring to light the
contradiction existing between Major Huse's letter and the asser
tions of Mr. Davis on the same subject : If, as late as December
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 441.
t Ibid, vol i. p. 479.

64 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
30th, 1861* no arms could be shipped from England, what are we
to think of the following passage, to be found on page 476 of the
first volume of Mr. Davis's work : " fn December, 1861, arms pur
chased abroad began to come in; and a good many Enfield rifles
were in the hands of the troops at the battle of Shiloh " ? The
query now is, which of these two statements is the correct one?
Mr. Davis vouches for both, but it is evident that both cannot be
relied upon.
The reader, we trust, will pardon this digression. It may have
caused a slight deviation from our main subject, but has, neverthe
less, a close relation to it.
On or about the 28th of May, General Beauregard was ordered
to meet the President at Richmond, whither the seat of Confeder
ate government was being transferred. He arrived there a few
days after the receipt of the order.
All along the railroad line, on his way from Charleston to Rich
mond, the people turned out, at the various stations, to welcome
him. They were addressed by Attorney-General Benjamin, who
happened to be on the cars, and by Governor Manning, of South
Carolina, one of General Beauregard's volunteer aids.
At Charleston, officers and men, and, in fact, the whole popula
tion of the State, had expressed their deep sense of regret that the
public service should require his transfer to another department.
Governor Pickens, in a letter wishing him God speed in his new
field of duty, said : "Your scientific attainments, your ability and
your incessant labors, have been of great advantage to our State ;
and I return you my thanks, and the thanks of the State, for the
patriotic zeal and distinguished services you have rendered us at a
critical and a trying time. . . . Wherever you go, I trust that
you will be blessed, and crowned with the honors of your coun
try." * " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 483.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 65

CHAPTER VL
Secession of Virginia. — Confederate Troops Sent to her Assistance. — Arrival of
General Beauregard in Richmond. — He Assumes Command at Manassas. —
Position of our Forces. — His Proclamation and the Reasons for it. — Site of
" Camp Pickens." — His Letter to President Davis. — Our Deficiencies. —
Mismanagement in Quartermaster's and Commissary's Departments. — How
he could have Procured Transportation. — Manufacture of Cartridges. — Se
cret Service with Washington.
Not until Fort Sumter had surrendered to the South Carolina
troops under General Beauregard ; not until Mr. Lincoln, misap
prehending the attitude of those Southern States still nominally
belonging to the Union, had made his requisition on them for their
quota of men to aid in suppressing the " Rebellion," did Virginia,
faithful to her old-time traditions, openly proclaim her adhesion
to the Southern cause, and assume her rightful place among the
seceded States. Hers was a disinterested step ; one taken with a
full appreciation of the inevitable dangers and devastation in store
for her, owing to her geographical position. Her hesitation was
but another instance of the historic firmness and deliberation
which had always characterized her official acts, and it was, no
doubt, her exam pie which shortly afterwards determined the with
drawal of Tennessee, Arkansas, and North Carolina.
No sooner had Virginia's voice, through her assembled con
vention, pronounced her severance from the North, than the seven
States forming the Confederacy, anxious to welcome her among
them, hurried forward to her support a portion of their best troops.
As a natural sequence to this provident measure, it followed that
the most experienced and successful of our military leaders were
selected to be placed at the head of such commands. Hence the
order transferring General Beauregard to Virginia. Pollard, in
his work entitled " Lee and his Lieutenants," when writing on
this subject, says : " Called for by the unanimous voice of the
Southern people, he was now ordered to take command of the main
portion of the Confederate army in northern Virginia." Pollard's
I.— 5

66 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
later description of the apprehension and flurry existing in the
Northern mind, concerning General Beauregard's whereabouts, is,
indeed, most singular, and shows the appreciation in which he was
held by our enemies.
Many writers, in describing the traits of General Beauregard's
character, have commented upon his very retiring disposition,
amounting almost to bashfulness, which forms so strong a contrast
to his boldness and indomitable spirit in the field. This was in
stanced upon his arrival at Richmond, May 30th, where a large
concourse of people awaited him, anxious to see and welcome the
Confederate commander who had already drawn upon himself the
attention and admiration of the whole country. A carriage-and-
four was in readiness at the Richmond depot to convey him to
the apartments which had been prepared for him at the Spots-
wood Hotel. But no sooner had he been apprised of this unex
pected honor — which, though gratifying, interfered with his de
sire for privacy — than he, wishing to avoid all public demonstra
tion, insisted upon taking an ordinary carriage, in which, with one
or two officers of his staff, he quietly drove to other quarters.
The next day, May 31st, he called on President Davis, who was
in conference with General Robert E. Lee, then commanding the
Virginia State forces. Gerund Lee had just returned from Manas
sas, about twent}'-seven miles below Alexandria, where he had left
Brigadier-General Bonham, of South Carolina, with some five
thousand men of all arms. This position had been taken at the
instance of Colonel Thomas Jordan, of the Virginia forces, who,
in a carefully written memoir on the subject, had shown the im
portance of at once occupying Manassas Junction, to prevent its
seizure, and the severance of communication by rail with the lower
valley of Virginia.
After a full interchange of views, which lasted several hours, it
was determined that General Beauregard should leave on the next
morning to assume command at Manassas, whither reinforcements
would be forwarded as soon as obtained. At first it had been in
tended to send him to Norfolk, but General Lee's report of the
condition of affairs on the Alexandria line, and the probability of
an early advance of the enemy on that point, caused the President
to change his mind.
From the moment General Beauregard had left New Orleans,
until the time of his arrival in Richmond, he had been so unre-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 67'
mittingly occupied with public affairs as to preclude all attention
to his personal interests and even his military outfit. He would
have willingly remained a day or two in Richmond, in order to
prepare himself better for the field ; but the juncture was consid
ered so urgent by the President and General Lee, that no such
leisure was granted him, and he departed at once, with two of his
aids, leaving other members of his staff, including his adjutant, to
effect such arrangements as were necessary. He left Richmond
on the 1st of June, and reached Manassas the same night, under
the following orders : "Headquarters or the Virginia Forces,
Richmond, Virginia, May Zlst, 1861.
" Special Orders, No. 149.
" General P. G. T. Beauregard, of the Confederate States arniy, is assigned to
the command of the troops on the Alexandria line. He is referred to the or
ders heretofore given to his predecessors in that command, for the general di
rection of operations. "By order of Major-General Lee,
"R. S. Garnett, Adjt.-Gen."
We copy below an extract from the orders alluded to, as given
to General Beauregard's predecessors, and transferred, as we have
seen, to himself :
" The policy of the State, at present, is strictly defensive. No attack or prov
ocation for attack will therefore be given, but every attack resisted to the
extent of your means. Great reliance is placed on your discretion and judg
ment in the application of your force, and I must urge upon you the impor
tance of organizing and instructing the troops as rapidly as possible, and pre
paring them for active service. For this purpose it will be necessary to post
them where their services may be needed and where they can be concentrated
at the points -threatened. The Manassas Junction is a very important point
on your line, as it commands the communication with Harper's Ferry, and
must be firmly held. Intrenchments at that point would add to its security ;
and in connection with its defence, you must watch the approaches from ei
ther flank, particularly towards Occoquan. Alexandria, in its front, will of
course claim your attention as the first point of attack, and as soon as your
force is sufficient, in your opinion, to resist successfully its occupation, you will
so dispose it as to effect this object, if possible, without appearing to threaten
Washington city. The navigation of the Potomac being closed to us, and the
United States armed vessels being able to take a position in front of the town,
you will perceive the hazard of its destruction unless your measures are such
as to prevent it. This subject being one of great delicacy, is left to your
judgment. The railroad communications must be secured, however, and their
use by the enemy prevented. . . . "R. E. Lee, Maj.-Gen. Comdg."

68 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
That such instructions, so vague as a whole, and yet so minute
in some respects, should have embarrassed Brigadier-General Bon
ham, as was asserted, is not, we submit, to be much wondered at.
To obey them implicitly was clearly an impossibility under the
circumstances. They were calculated to destroy every vestige of
discretion on the part of the commanding general, without lessen
ing, in any way, the weight of his responsibility. That General
Lee meant well in adopting such a programme of operations, no
one who knew him will for a moment question ; but that it must
have puzzled, to no inconsiderable degree, the minds of most of
those who were to be guided by it, to us appears no less evident.
And how, more than a month after the withdrawal of Virginia
from the Union, a State Major-General (for such was General
Lee at the time), and not the Confederate War Department, could
have given instructions and issued orders to Confederate generals
and to Confederate troops, is more than we can well understand.
True, the Secretary of War, with a view to avoid confusion,
had, on May 10th, authorized Major-General Lee, of the Virginia
troops, " to assume the control of the forces of the Confederate
States in Virginia, and assign them to such duties as he might in
dicate ;" but that authority emanated from Montgomery, while
the Confederate government was still there, and while no Con
federate general officer had, as yet, been sent to Virginia. This
was far from being the case at the time to which we now allude,
to wit, the 31st of May. Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston,
Confederate States Army, had, then, already been assigned to
duty in Virginia, and, furthermore, the Confederate government
itself was at that date transferred to Richmond. Even the Presi
dent was there in person, and could have acted with all authority
had he chosen to do so.
The measures of extreme caution suggested in General Lee's
instructions, and the solicitude manifested to soothe the ire of the
North, would have been admirably proper if the orders had been
issued before the first gun was fired at Sumter, and while nego
tiations for a peaceful solution of our difficulties were still pend
ing. But in May, 1861, war already existed. Virginia was threat
ened by three Northern armies, the immediate advance of one of
which was then almost daily expected. Why were we to avoid
"appearing" even to threaten the enemy's positions, when the in
vasion of our soil was openly declared to be the prime object act-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 69
uating the hostile forces arrayed against us ? Orders and instruc
tions such as these could have no other effect than to depress our
people, bewilder our commanders, and embolden the enemy.
The two or three days following his arrival in his new depart
ment were spent by General Beauregard in examining the troops
and the various positions tbey occupied, at and in advance of Ma
nassas. He then assumed command in the following orders :
" Headquarters, Dep't op Alex' a, Camp Pickens,
June 2d, 1861.
" New Series.
" General Orders, No. 1.
" In obedience to Special Orders, No. 149, from Headquarters Virginia forces,
Richmond, dated May 31st, 1861, assigning me to the command of the troops
on the Alexandria line, I have this day relieved Brigadier-General M. L. Bon
ham of said command.
"All orders and instructions from these Headquarters will be obeyed ac
cordingly. " The Brigadier-General Commanding feels assured that all the troops under
his orders will display, on all occasions, the discipline, patience, zeal, and gal
lantry of their forefathers, when defending, like ourselves, their sacred rights
and liberties. " G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Gen. Comdg.''
The troops were located at the following points : one regiment
at Mitchell's Ford, where the country road, from Manassas to Cen
treville, crosses Bull Bun, at a point midway between the two.
Another regiment was stationed at Union Mills Ford, not far from
where the railroad to Alexandria crosses the same stream. An
other regiment was placed at Centreville, and some detached com
panies of cavalry and infantry were in the vicinity of Fairfax
Court-House, about six miles in advance of Centreville. The re
maining forces were at and about Manassas.
The enemy was then engaged in collecting a large force in front
of Washington and Alexandria, with its advance at Falls Church,
half-way to Fairfax Court-House, and it was currently reported
by the Northern press that this army, under Major-General Mc
Dowell, would soon advance on Manassas, on its way to Rich
mond. General Beauregard was not satisfied with the grounds selected
for our troops, nor with the condition of things at Camp Pickens,
Manassas. There was no running water near enough ; the plan of
works was too extensive ; the fords were too numerous to be eas-

70 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
ily guarded by such a small force as was at his disposal. These
facts and observations he at once reported to the President, as
may be seen by the following letter:
" Dep't of Alexandria, Va., Prov'l A. C. S.,
June 3d, 1861.
" To his Excellency President Jefferson Davis, Richmond, Va. :
" Dear Sir,— I arrived here on the 1st at 2 p. m., and immediately examined
the site of this encampment and the plans of its proposed defences. The
former is in an open country, traversed by good roads in every direction, with
out any strong natural features for the purposes of defence, and without run
ning water nearer than three miles, except a few small springs at half that
distance. The plans of the works are good, but too extensive to be finished
in less than two or three weeks, and cannot be garrisoned with less than from
three to four thousand men. As this position can be turned in every direction
by an enemy, for the purpose of destroying the railroads intended to be de
fended by it, it becomes a question whether these works could be held more
than a few days, when thus isolated.
" I have reconnoitred closely several of the fords on Bull Run, and one on
Occoquan Run (about three miles from here), which offer strong natural features
of defence, but they are so numerous and far apart, that only a much larger
force than I have here at my command ( say not less than ten to fifteen thou
sand men ) could hope to defend them all, against a well-organized enemy
of about 20,000 men, who could select his point of attack. I must therefore
either be reinforced at once, as I have not more than about six thousand ef
fective men ; or I must be prepared to retire (upon the approach of the enemy)
in the direction of Richmond, with the intention of arresting him whenever
and wherever the opportunity presents itself; or I must march to meet him at
one of said fords, to sell our lives as dearly as practicable.
" Badly armed and badly equipped as my command is at present (several
regiments having but one or two field officers), and having hardly any means
of transportation, it would be expecting too much, that I could meet success
fully the foe who is preparing to attack us in a few days, with all the advan
tages of number, arms, and discipline. I beg, however, to remark, that my
troops are not only willing, but anxious, to meet the enemies of our coun
try, under all circumstances. " I remain, dear Sir, very respectfully,
" Your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard."
From what precedes it is easy to see why Bull Run did not
naturally afford a strong defensive line. In fact, the ground on
the Federal side of the run commanded, in most places, the ground
occupied by the Confederates. Still, Manassas Junction, as a
strategic point, was one of superior importance, as it secured com
munication with the valley of Virginia, and the army of the Shen-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 71
andoah, under General Joseph E. Johnston, at Harper's Ferry.
Hence General Beauregard's determination to hold it at all haz
ards ; and he began, without delay, to throw up works around it,
so as to make it a depot of supplies and a point d'appui for ulte
rior operations. But it was with great difficulty that, at this pe
riod, work on the fortifications could be procured from the troops,
as most of their time was necessarily taken up with drills, and
manual labor was in itself no light task for them, composed, as
the commands generally were, of young men of good position at
home, who had responded to the first call of the country, many of
them having come with no small amount of luggage and even with
body-servants. Their answer to company officers was, that they
were there to fight, and not to handle the pick and shovel. Ap
preciating such a feeling in men of their position, new to arduous
duties of that kind, and wishing to avoid whatever might at that
moment cause disaffection, General Beauregard abstained from em
ploying them on any but tlie most essential works, and procured,
as far as possible, negro labor, which was furnished at his call, by
the comparatively small number of slave-owners of the Piedmont
region of Virginia, with great readiness.
As soon as new regiments arrived they were armed and equip
ped as well as the means at hand allowed, and at once drilled and
organized into brigades.
This organization of an army, out of troops for the most part
wholly undisciplined, in the presence of an enemy composed of a
well-trained militia, superior in numbers and thoroughly appointed,
whose threatened advance was expected at every moment, apart
from being in itself a difficult and anxious task, was beset with
obstacles resulting from the narrow methods, slowness, and, in
some respects, unaccountable mismanagement, of the authorities
at Richmond.
General Beauregard's attention was at once seriously turned to
those two important staff departments, the Quartermaster's and
Commissary's, which, he thought, could never be too closely at
tended to. " An army " — he was wont to say — " without means
of transportation and sustenance is like a ship at sea without spars
or canvas, and with famine on board." His first step was to order
the collection of wagons and twenty-five days' rations for about
twenty thousand men. To this end his chief quartermaster, Ma
jor Cabell, and his chief commissary, Captain Fowle, who was well

72 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
acquainted with the resources of that region, were directed to
draw all their supplies of forage, grain, and provisions from the
fertile country stretching from Manassas to the Potomac, as far
northwest as Leesburg, so. as to exhaust that district first, and
compel the enemy to carry their own supplies in their advance
against our forces. This system, which would have left all the
region in rear of us with resources untouched, to meet the con
tingency of a forced withdrawal from Manassas, was most strenu
ously opposed by the Commissary-General, Colonel Northrop. In
a letter, singularly ill-tempered and discourteous, that functionary
arraigned General Beauregard for " thwarting " his plans for main
taining the army, and went so far as to prohibit Captain Fowle
from obeying the orders of his commanding general. Through
this vagary the provisions drawn from the vicinity of Manassas
and the neighboring counties of Loudon and Fauquier, after being
carried, directly, from General Beauregard's department to Bich-
mond, were thence returned to the chief commissary of the army
of Manassas, for distribution to the troops, and as there were
hardly enough cars to transport the men, guns, ammunition, and
other material to the army of the Potomac and the army of the
Shenandoah, which' received its ordnance supplies by the same
railroad, the result was that the troops at Manassas never had more
than two or three days' supplies on hand, even when thejr numbered
no more than fifteen thousand men. This almost incredible mis
management, so hurtful to the morale and efficiency of the army,
was persisted in, notwithstanding General Beauregard's earnest re
monstrances, and embarrassed and clogged the conduct of the whole
campaign. Captain Fowle, finding that the army could not be supplied
from Richmond, was compelled to resort to the system ordered
by General Beauregard ; whereupon he was summarily supersed
ed, and Colonel R. B. Lee appointed in his stead. This last offi
cer, it may be added, possessed undoubted merit, and by his pre
vious rank in the commissariat of the United States army, was
entitled to the position of Commissary-General of the Confederate
States army.
With such facts before us, and others that we shall have occa
sion to notice further on, the following eulogy of Colonel Nor
throp, by Mr. Davis, seems unwarranted and altogether out of
place: " To the able officer then at the head of the Commissariat

GENERAL BEAUREGARD 73
Department, Colonel L. B. Northrop, much credit is due for his
well-directed efforts to provide both for immediate and prospec
tive wants." *
There was a great deficiency also in the means of transporta
tion. It was insufficient, and of such poor quality as to break
down even in ordinary camp service. This evil, which continued
long after the battle of Manassas, was partially remedied before
that event, but the remedy was applied independently of the Quar
termaster's Department at Richmond. That department having
declared itself unable to procure transportation in the country,
General Beauregard called to his aid Colonel James L. Kemper
(7th Virginia Volunteers), whose knowledge of the resources of
that portion of the State enabled him to gather, within a few
days, at least two hundred effective wagons and teams. Three
times that number, and even more, could easily have been collect
ed, but General Beauregard, wishing to avoid collision with the
views of the administration at Richmond, limited Colonel Kem
per to the number stated above.
On the 5th of June, upon pressing application to that effect,
General Beauregard issued a proclamation to the people of the
counties of Loudon, Fairfax, and Prince William, which has been
much commented upon, but, outside of the South, where the facts
were known, has never been well understood.
The reason for issuing the proclamation was, that a deputation
of citizens, headed by a prominent lawyer of Alexandria, who, be
fore the secession of Virginia, was noted for his Union sentiments,
had presented a formal complaint, of very grave outrages prac
tised on the people by Federal troops.
General Beauregard, believing it to be his duty to take imme
diate steps in the matter, appointed a commission of inquiry, com
posed of Colonels Thomas Jordan, his Adjutant- General, and
John S. Preston, and William Porcher Miles, f his volunteer aids,
both eminent citizens of South Carolina.
That committee, after careful investigation of the charges made,
reported that the allegations were true. Though General Mc
Dowell solicitously repressed all acts of violence — which, as was
afterwards proved, were committed then only by marauding par-
* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 315.
t William Porcher Miles was afterwards Chairman of the Military Committee
of the House of Representatives, Confederate Congress.

74 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
ties from his army — yet the facts elicited were naturally construed,
at the time, as indicative of a truculent spirit animating a large
number of his troops, and produced the deepest indignation among
the people of the surrounding country.
This proclamation (others similar to which, in substance, were
afterwards issued by several Confederate officers, including General
Lee) was drawn up by the gentleman referred to, and, after some
slight modifications by the members of the commission, through
Colonel Preston, was signed and published by General Beauregard
in his name, as commander of the army. It became known and
was criticised in the Northern papers as the " Beauty and Booty
Proclamation " — words which were found by the commission, upon
the evidence given, to have been loudly used by the marauding
troops whose acts of violence were so indignantly denounced.
Our readers no doubt remember that these identical words, accom
panying like conduct, on the part of the British troops at New
Orleans, in the war of 1812, provoked vehement reprobation
throughout the country. However true it might be to say that
such a proclamation would have better fitted many subsequent
phases of the war, yet, with charges so fully substantiated before
the commission appointed by General Beauregard, no one can
deny that the measures adopted and the language used in relation
thereto were justifiable and imperatively necessary.
Besides being badly armed and suffering from the irregularity
and inefficiency of the Quartermaster's and Commissary's Depart
ments, the troops were also deficient in accoutrements, particular
ly in cartridges and cartridge-boxes, and were lacking in proper
camp equipments. Alarmed at the delay in adequately supplying
his forces with ammunition, General Beauregard proposed to the
government to establish a cartridge factory at Manassas, if certain
necessary appliances were furnished him ; which was not done.
His letter to that effect, dated Manassas Junction, June 23d, con
tained the following passage :
" I must call the attention of the department to the great deficiency of my
command in ammunition — not averaging more than 20 rounds in all per man.
If I were provided with the necessary materials, moulds, etc., I think I could
establish here a cartridge manufactory, which could supply all our wants in
that respect.
" Could not a similar arrangement be made at all hospital depots, State
arsenals, penitentiaries, etc.?

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 75
" To go into battle, each soldier ought to be provided with at least 40
rounds of cartridges and not less than 60 rounds in reserve.
" I remain, very respectfully, " Your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Gen. Comdg.
" Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, Richmond, Virginia."
As the Confederate troops had yet no uniform proper, it was
necessary that they should be distinguished from the enemy by
some clearly visible mark. To meet this requirement, a few days
after his arrival in camp General Beauregard asked that his men
should be provided with colored scarfs, to be worn, in battle, from
the shoulder to the waist, suggesting that a call on the ladies of
Richmond would no doubt secure their prompt suppty, as the
scarfs might be made of any material of the proper shade. As
many of the regiments were then without Confederate colors, and
the blue and the gray uniforms were common to the North and
the South, the importance of this matter, particularly in the event
of flank and rear attacks, was urged again upon the President, at
a later period. Although the expedient was as simple as the need
was great, the demand was complied with only after a long delay,
and then with so imperfect a contrivance — a sort of rosette, to be
pinned on the arm or breast — that on the field of Manassas, in the
critical moment, the troops themselves were confused as to identi
ty ; and when the rout was in full tide the pursuit was more than
once checked because of the difficulty of distinguishing friends
from foes.
During this period a thorough secret - service communication
was maintained between Washington and the Confederate head
quarters at Manassas, whereby trustworthy private information
was received through cipher despatches, while regular files of all
the important Northern journals reached our lines in the same
way ; those from New York, particularly, rendering unconscious
assistance to our cause.

76 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER VII.
Position of Troops in Northern Virginia.— General Beauregard Advocates
Concentration, June 12th.— Letter to that Effect to President Davis.— An
swer Declining.— General Beauregard Suggests a Junction with General
Holmes. — Again Refused. — Division of General Beauregard's Forces into
Brigades, 20th June.— Begins Forward Movement.— Instructions to Brig
ade Commanders. — Reconnoissances Made at the End of June. — McDow
ell's Strength. — General Beauregard's Anxieties.— His Letter to Senator
Wigfall.— Submits another Plan of Operations to the President, July
11th.
The Confederate troops in northern Virginia, east of the grand
chain of the Alleghanies, now formed a series of detached com
mands, stretching from northwest to southeast respectively, under
General Joseph E. Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, General Beaure
gard, at Manassas, and General Holmes, at Aquia Creek; each
outnumbered by confronting forces, excepting General Holmes's
command, whose position on the lower Potomac was taken only
to prevent a possible landing of the enemy at that point.
The forces in front of General Johnston and those in front of
Colonel Eppa Hunton, commanding a battalion at Leesburg, the
western extremity of the Manassas line, were still on the north
bank of the Potomac.
General Beauregard, appreciating the necessity of an immediate
concerted system between these independent commands, particu
larly between his own and the considerable forces at Harper's
Ferry, and viewing Manassas as the most important strategic point
for both belligerents, and the one most likely to attract the main
effort of the enemy, which, according to reports, might be made
at any moment, had determined if possible to reform the Confed
erate military situation, in accordance with his views of sound pol
icy. His plan, as the following letter shows, was marked, as were
all his military plans, by the leading ideas of concentration and ag
gression.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 77
" Headquarters Manassas, Dep't of Va.,
Camp Pickens, June 12th, 1861.
"To His Excellency President Davis :
" Sir, — The bearer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Jones of the Provisional Army
of Virginia, a member of my general staff, has been instructed by me to lay be
fore your Excellency a diagram, with my views relative to the operations of
the present campaign in this State, which should be acted upon at once.
" The enemy seem to be taking the offensive towards Harper's Ferry, and a
few days hence may find General J. E. Johnston in such a critical condition
as to render it impossible to relieve him. If he were ordered to abandon
forthwith his present position and concentrate suddenly his forces with mine,
guarding, with small detachments, all the passes through which the enemy
might follow him, we could, by a bold and rapid movement forward, retake
Arlington Heights and Alexandria, if not too strongly fortified and garri
soned, which would have the effect of recalling all the enemy's forces from
northern Virginia, for the protection of Washington. But should General
Johnston be unable to unite his forces with mine, then he ought to be instruct
ed to retreat at the proper time towards Richmond, through the valley of
Virginia, checking the enemy wherever and whenever he can. When com
pelled to abandon my present position, I will fall back also on Richmond ;
the forces along the lower Potomac, on the Peninsula, and at Norfolk, may
have to do likewise. Then, acting on interior lines, from Richmond as a cen
tre (our forces being increased by the reserves at that point), we could crush,
in rapid succession and in detail, the several columns of the enemy, which I
have supposed would move on three or four different lines. With thirty-five
thousand men, properly handled, I have not the least doubt that we could an
nihilate fifty thousand of the enemy. I beg and entreat that a concerted
plan of operations be adopted at once by the government, for its different col
umns. Otherwise, we will be assailed in detail by superior forces, and will be
cut off, or destroyed entirely.
" Lieutenant-Colonel Jones will present my views more in detail to your Ex
cellency. " G. T. Beauregard, Brig-Gen. Comdg."
The President made the following reply :
" Richmond, Va., June 13th, 1861.
" My dear General, — Colonel Jones delivered to me your letter of the 12th
instant, and, as suggested by you, I conversed with him of the matter to
which it related. Your information may be more accurate than we possess, in
relation to the purposes of the enemy, and I will briefly reply to you on the
hypothesis which forms the basis of your suggestions.
" If the enemy commence operations by attack upon Harper's Ferry, I do not
perceive why General Johnston should be unable, even before overwhelming
numbers to retire behind the positions where the enemy would approach in
reverse. It would seem to me not unreasonable to expect that, before he reach
es Winchester, the terminus of the railroad in his possession, the people of the

78 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
fertile and populous valley would rise in mass to aid him in repelling the in
vader. But suppose it should be otherwise, he could still, by retiring to the
passes of the Manassas railroad and its adjacent mountains, probably check
the progress of the enemy, and prevent him from either taking possession of
the valley, or passing to the rear of your position. We hope soon to rein
force you to an extent equal to the strength you require, by the junction of
General Johnston, and I cannot doubt but that you would then be better cir
cumstanced to advance upon Alexandria than if General Johnston, by with
drawing from the valley, had left the enemy the power to pass to your rear, to
cut your line of communication, and advance to attack you in reverse, while
you were engaged with the enemy in front.
" Concurring fully with you in the effect which would be produced by the
possession of Arlington Heights and Alexandria, if your rear is at the same
time sufficiently covered, it is quite clear that if the case should be otherwise,
your possession, if acquired, would be both brief and fruitless.
" To your request that a concerted plan of operations should be adopted, I
can only reply that the present position and unknown purposes of the enemy
require that our plan should have many alterations. I have noted your con
verging lines upon Richmond, and it can hardly be necessary to remind you
that we have not at this time the transportation which would enable us to
move upon those lines as described. Should the fortune of war render it nec
essary to retire our advance columns, they must be brought mainly upon rail
roads, and that of Harper's Ferry would come by your present position. It
would, therefore, be a necessity that General Johnston's column should make
a junction with yours, before yours retired ; but I have not anticipated the
necessity of your retreat, and have struggled to increase your force, and look
hopefully forward to see you enabled to assume the offensive. Had I been
less earnestly engaged in providing for yours and other commands, I should
have had the pleasure of visiting you before this date. Four regiments have
been sent forward, neither of which had reached you at the date of your let
ter ; and you will soon receive further reinforcements. They are not trained
troops, but I think they are better than those of the enemy, and the capacity
which you have recently exhibited, successfully to fight with undisciplined
citizens, justifies the expectation that you will know how to use such force as
we are able to furnish. Very truly yours,
" Jefferson Davis."
Still persisting, however, in his effort to make use of all possi
ble resources in meeting the imminent crisis, General Beauregard,
in his official and semi-official correspondence at the time, suggest
ed that the troops under General Holmes, at Aquia Creek, at least
two thousand five hundred men, with two batteries, should be so
posted as to be available for a timely junction with his own
forces. General Holmes fully concurred, asserting that his com
mand, as then disposed, was not likely to be of any military use ;
but the suggestion met with no favor at Richmond.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 79
On the 18th, having begun to receive from Norfolk the naval
guns for which he had called, to arm the works at Manassas, Gen
eral Beauregard made a requisition for naval officers to command
those batteries and drill the recruits. They came with a number
of sailors, bringing their gun-ropes, blocks, and tackles, and in their
exercises the terms " port " and " starboard," novel in the field,
were used as familiarly as on board a man-of-war. Officers and
men were noticeable for their zeal, efficiency, and discipline.
Meanwhile, vigilant observation of the opposite banks of the
Potomac was kept up at Leesburg, an important place, which the
enemy might strike in order to sever the communications between
Generals Beauregard and Johnston; and such small reinforce
ments as could be spared from Manassas were sent thither, but
without artillery, of which none was available.
From information collected in his front, General Johnston was
apprehensive that General Patterson would move to attack him,
and he soon abandoned the untenable salient position of Harper's
Ferry, held by him unwillingly, and to which General Patterson
afterwards crossed on the 2d of July. General Beauregard's
views, based partly on reports from Washington, were that Gen
eral Patterson's movements merely simulated the offensive, to
hold General Johnston in check.
About the 20th of June, General Beauregard, having organized
his forces into six brigades, began a forward movement, in order
to protect his advanced positions at Centreville, Fairfax Court-
House, and Sangster's Cross-roads, "so as to be able" — as he wrote
to Colonel Eppa Hunton — " to strike a blow upon the enemy, at
a moment's notice, which he hoped, they would long remem
ber." His advanced forces, three brigades of three regiments
each, occupied a triangle as follows : at Mitchell's Ford, on Bull
Run, one regiment ; at Centreville and another point half-way to
German town, one brigade; at Germantown and Fairfax Court-
House, one brigade, with a light battery ; at the crossing of Brad
dock's old road with the Fairfax Court-House and Fairfax Station
roads, one regiment ; and at Sangster's Cross-roads, one battalion :
all in easy and short communication with each other and with
headquarters. Most of his small body of cavalry was with the
advance, scouting and reconnoitring.
In view of coming events, General Beauregard now assembled
his brigade commanders, and, after general directions to all of

80 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
them, gave detailed instructions to those who had charge of the
advanced positions (at Fairfax Court-House and Fairfax Station)
touching their respective lines of retreat on Bull Run, in case
they should be menaced by a combined serious movement of the
enemy with largely superior forces. The substance of those in
structions was embodied, with minute details, in a Special Order,
No. 100, from the Adjutant-General's office, which was the order
literally executed on the 17th of July. This is one of the most re
markable instances in military history, of an order providing fully
and precisely, nearly a month in advance, for all the exigencies of
a strategic movement, remotely contingent upon the operations
of an enemy. General Bonham, upon the near approach of the
forces confronting him, was to retire slowly on Centreville, by
the turnpike, then to Mitchell's Ford, drawing the enemy after
him to that point, which was the only portion of General Beaure
gard's line yet fortified. General Ewell, from Sangster's Cross
roads and vicinity, was to follow the line of tlie railroad over a
rather rough and difficult country road to Union Mills .Ford,
where the position was naturally strong and offered good cover
to his men. The intermediate fords, McLean's and Blackburn's,
were at that time occupied by Jones's and Longstreet's brigades.
Early's brigade, which had been watching the fords of the Occo-
quan and the approaches on the right, was now held in reserve, a
short distance in rear of Union Mills Ford, to act according to
circumstances. A small force of infantry guarded the stone
bridge, on the extreme left, where the turnpike from Alexandria,
through Fairfax Court-House and Centreville, crosses Bull Run,
on its way to Warrenton. The works, armed with naval guns,
were manned by the seamen already alluded to, and also by a
force of the State militia, which Governor Letcher had called out,
at General Beauregard's request.
During the latter days of June and the first fortnight of July,
thorough reconnoissances were made of the whole region of
country likely to become the theatre of war in that qnarter, either
for a defensive or offensive campaign. In these General Beaure
gard had the effective aid of Colonel Williamson and Captains
D. B. Harris and Walter H. Stevens, of the Engineers. And it
may be of interest to mention here, that the reconnoissances we
speak of included the surroundings of Leesburg and the passes
westward, as well as the entire square between Difficult Run, the

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 81
Potomac, Goose Creek, and Gum Spring. The object was to
facilitate the movement of troops in that direction, to cross the
Potomac, and be prepared to oppose the enemy, should he at
tempt to advance by that way so as to reach the Manassas Gap
Railroad, on the left of General Beauregard's position.
In one of these reconnoissances, made in force — Colonel Maxey
Gregg, at the head of a South Carolina regiment, casually encoun
tered a Federal command, under General Schenck, coming into
Vienna Station, on a train of cars. A shot from a section of
Kemper's light battery brought them to a halt, and, after a few
exchanges, the Federals retired, and the locomotive escaped, leav
ing the cars, which were burned. This was the first hostile meet
ing, excepting the brilliant midnight dash of Lieutenant Tomp
kins against the Confederate outposts at Fairfax Court-House.
On the 4th of July the Confederate pickets, well in advance of
Fairfax Court-House, captured a sergeant and a private — the latter
a Scotchman, who chanced to be a clerk in McDowell's Adjutant-
General's office, and whose duty as such was to assist in making
up the army returns. They were taking a ride for pleasure, and,
having come a little too far, were picked up by the watchful
cavalry. The Scotchman at once stated his position, and, being
sent to headquarters, was there subjected to a close examination,
in which he spoke freely, and appeared, from his statements on
matters already known, to be telling the truth. Thus was Mc
Dowell's strength, at that date, pretty accurately ascertained ; and
events verified the correctness of the information thus obtained.
The increasing forces of McDowell, the clamor of the Northern
press for an advance, and the private reports from Washington,
all now indicated an early attack by an army more than twice the
strength of ours in numbers. And General Beauregard, in the
midst of his various solicitudes, balked in his endeavors to pro
cure the needed reinforcements, and grieved also at his unsuccess
ful attempts to induce the government to adopt his views, wrote
the following letter to his friend, Senator Wigfall. It shows
General Beauregard's unrelieved anxiety, and his determination,
while wishing and laboring for a better state of things, to make
the most of his limited means :
" Manassas Junction, Va., July 8th, 1861.
" Colonel Wigfall :
" My dear Colonel,—! believe we are about to be attacked by the enemy,
I.— 6

82 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
who has been increasing his forces rapidly in the last few days. He has
doubtless at present, on this side of the Potomac, at least 30,000 men, and
probably as many in or about Washington ; and I am informed on good au
thority that he is crossing over reinforcements in large numbers every night,
so that very shortly we will be attacked, probably by about 40,000 men !
What do you suppose is my effective force to resist this attack? About
15,000 effective men ! How can it be expected that I shall be able to main
tain my ground unless reinforced immediately ? I am determined to give the
enemy battle no matter at what odds against us ; but is it right and proper to
sacrifice so many valuable lives (and perhaps our cause) without the least
prospect of success ? But I hope it may have the effect, at least, of delaying
the advance of the enemy, and give our friends time to come to the rescue.
I have to apply two or three times for the most essential things required here.
To obtain anything with despatch, I have to send a special messenger to
Richmond. Is this the way to direct and control the operations of an army
in the field ? Cannot this evil be remedied ? I am sure it could be if properly
represented to the President.
" I fear General Johnston is no better off than I am ; but his section of
country is, I believe, more easily defended, being wooded and mountainous.
My troops are in fine spirits and anxious for a fight. They seem to have the
most unbounded confidence in me.
" Oh, that I had the genius of a Napoleon, to be more worthy of our cause
and of their confidence !
" If I could only get the enemy to attack me, as I am trying to have him do,
I would stake my reputation on the handsomest victory that could be hoped
for. Yours very truly,
" G. T. Beauregard."
The following letter, written a few days later, is also of particu
lar interest : " Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Manassas Junction, July 11th, 1861.
" To His Excellency Jefferson Davis :
" Sir, — I have the honor to transmit herewith the Field Return of the army
under my command, from which you will perceive the effective force at my
disposition is as follows : Light Artillery, 533, with 27 pieces ; Cavalry, 1425 ;
Foot Artillery, 293 ; and Infantry, 16,150 ; in all 18,401 men of all arms. From
this must be deducted the command of Colonel Hunton at Leesburg, of some
445 men, who will remain in position there until the enemy shall have ad
vanced to attack my outposts, when the colonel will fall back and unite his
force with that of Colonel Cocke, commanding the 5th Brigade at the stone
bridge across Bull Run. Colonel Sloan's regiment, 4th South Carolina Vol
unteers, has already fallen back from Leesburg to Frying-pan Church, prepara
tory to a junction with Colonel Cocke, at Centreville.
"I have every reason to believe that the enemy will begin his advance from
his present position, at or about Falls Church,to-morrow or on the following day.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 83
with a force not short of 35,000 men, supported by a reserve of not less than
15,000 infantry. To these I can oppose but about 16,500, reserving about
1500, merely for camp guards, pickets, and the garrison of the intrenched
camp here. In consequence of this great disparity in numbers, I have issued
the Special Order No. 100, enclosed herewith, concentrating my troops, in the
exigency, on the naturally strong positions enumerated therein, afforded by
Bull Run, in the hope of conducting the movement so as to induce the enemy
to offer me battle in front of Mitchell's Ford, where his numerical superiority
would be materially counterbalanced by the difficulties of the ground and my
previous preparations there for the event. But I am, however, inclined to be
lieve he may attempt to turn my left flank, by a movement in the direction of
Vienna, Frying-pan Church, and, possibly, Gum Spring, and thus cut off John
ston's line of retreat on and communications with this place, via the Manassas
Gap Railroad, while threatening my own communications with Richmond and
depots of supply, by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and opening his
communications with the Potomac through Leesburg and Edward's Ferry.
" Of course, if I had sufficient force, one less unequal to that of the enemy,
I would not permit him, with impunity, to attempt so dangerous a movement
on his part ; but, in view of the odds against me, and of the vital importance
at this juncture of avoiding the hazard of a defeat, which would open to the
enemy the way to Richmond, I shall act with extreme caution. If forced, how
ever, to retire before an overwhelming force by another route than the railroad,
my line of retreat can be taken at any time through Brentsville to a junction
with Brigadier-General Holmes, at or near Fredericksburg, whence we could
operate on the line of communication of the enemy on their advance, so as, at
least, to retard him by the way. In that event, if deemed expedient, I could
leave a suitable garrison in the intrenchments here, to occupy him and retard
his advance the longer, but with orders to spike our guns and follow in my
rear until effecting a reunion with me. In presenting the foregoing to the
consideration of your Excellency, I wish it distinctly understood, however, that
if the enemy should offer battle on the line of Bull Run, I shall accept it for
my command, against whatsoever odds he may array in my front.
" Respectfully, Sir, your obedient servant.
" G. T. Beauregard, General Commanding."

84- MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER VIII.
General Beauregard again Urging Concentration. — Colonels Preston and Chest
nut sent to Richmond, to Explain Plan. — Report of Colonel Chestnut.—
The President Disapproves the Proposed Campaign. — Letter of General
Beauregard to General Johnston. — Comments upon Mr. Davis's Refusal.—
General McDowell Ordered to Advance.— Strong Demonstration against
General Bonham. — General Beauregard's Telegram to the President. —
General Johnston Ordered to Make Junction if Practicable. — Action of
Bull Run. — What Major Barnard, U. S. E., Says of It. — Repulse of the
Enemy. — War Department Inclined to Withdraw Order to General John
ston.— General Beauregard Disregards the Suggestion.
A day or two after sending to the President the communication
given at the end of the preceding chapter, General Beauregard,
still hoping to obtain the government's assent to the concentration
of our forces, in view of the impending offensive movement of the
enemy, despatched to Richmond an aide-de-camp, Colonel John S.
Preston, of South Carolina, a gentleman of ability and much per
sonal weight, with special instructions to urge the absolute and
immediate necessity of adopting his plan of operations.
No sooner had Colonel Preston left Manassas, than General
Beauregard, engrossed with the all-absorbing idea of concentra
tion — and, from information hourly received, certain of its wisdom
— felt it impossible to remain passively on the defensive, while he
had the opportunity of dealing a series of aggressive blows on the
enemy, likely to produce decisive results favorable to the Confeder
ate States. He therefore enlarged his plan of campaign, basing it
partly upon the increased strength of our army, and sent another
of his aids, Colonel James R. Chestnut, to present and explain it
to the President. A memorandum, written by General (then
Colonel) Samuel Jones, under General Beauregard's dictation, and
containing the substance of all the instructions given to Colonel
Chestnut, had been handed to the latter, to assist his memory, and
prevent any misconception as to the main features of the pro
jected campaign.
It is well for the truth of history, that these precautionary meas-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. §5
ures were taken at that time ; for, as will be seen further on in this
work, Mr. Davis, who claims, even now, " that the great question
of uniting the two armies was decided at Richmond," * (which
seems to mean " decided at Richmond " by Mr. Davis), subse
quently denied that any such plan had ever been presented to him,
and that his alleged refusal to approve it could, in no manner or
form, have thwarted General Beauregard's efforts at concentration.
General Beauregard's anxiety was intense while awaiting the re
turn of his messengers. He knew that each moment was of vital
importance, and that the fate of our cause hung in the balance.
First came telegrams from Colonels Preston and Chestnut, stating
that the communication was before the President, who was givino-
it his careful consideration.! On the 16th of July, Colonel Chest
nut, upon his return, presented his official report, containing a de
tailed account of his mission. So great has become the historical
value of this paper, that we present it in full to the reader :
" Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
" Manassas, Va., July 16th, 1861.
" Brigadier-General Beauregard, Commanding Army of the Potomac :
" Sir, — In obedience to your order, I proceeded on Sunday last, 14th instant,
to Richmond, with the purpose of laying before the President, for his consid
eration, your views and plans for the combined operation of the two armies
under the commands of General Joseph E. Johnston and yourself respectively.
I arrived at Richmond at 3.30 on the same day I left your quarters, and with
out delay reported to the President, who, although sick in bed, received me
with great kindness and cordiality. After stating to him the object of my
visit, he appointed an hour to meet him, that evening, in company with Gen
eral R. E. Lee, and Adjutant and Inspector General Cooper. At the appointed
time the President, Generals Lee and Cooper, and Colonel Preston, of your
staff, met me in private conference. Being requested by the President to lay
before those present the subject-matter with which I was charged, I submitted,
on your part, the following proposition :
" That the Confederate armies were in front of the enemy, with greatly in
ferior forces at all points ; that it was desirable, by uniting a portion of our
forces, to outnumber the enemy at some important point ; that the point now
occupied by you was, at present, in reference to the armies, considered the most
important. I stated also that the enemy were at present at or near Falls
Church, with eight or ten thousand men on the Alexandria, Loudon, and Hamp
shire Railroad, and also with some portion of his forces at Springfield, on the
Alexandria and Orange Railroad, with every indication of a purpose to ad-

* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 347.
t See Appendix to Chapter VIII.

86 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
vance on both lines, and that it was most probable the enemy would threaten
our camps at Manassas with about ten thousand men, while with the main
body, twenty thousand or more, would advance towards Vienna, Frying-pans,
and Pleasant Valley to Hay Market, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, with a
view to cut off our communications with General Johnston. To accomplish this,
possession would be taken of passes of the Blue Ridge at Manassas, Ashby's,
and Snicker's Gaps. He would then endeavor to cut off your communication
with Richmond by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and force you either
to fight in open field, with greatly inferior numbers, or to retire towards Fred
ericksburg by way of Brentsville to join forces with General Holmes, or to
withdraw from the intrenched camp and retire by the Alexandria and Orange
Railroad, before the enemy could reach it.
"Under these circumstances, I stated, you would propose, and did propose,
that General Johnston should, with the bulk of his forces, say twenty thousand,
unite with you, leaving from three to five thousand men to guard the passes of
the Blue Ridge and to hold Patterson in check. Then, with the combined forces
of General Johnston and yourself, you would move rapidly forward on Fairfax
Court-House, establish yourself between the two lines of the enemy, attack
them separately with larger masses, and thus exterminate them or drive them
into the Potomac. This being done, General Johnston, with ten thousand of your
forces in addition to his own, and rallying, as he went, those left to guard the
passes, would return at once to the [valley with] superior numbers, say thirty-five
thousand, to attack and destroy Patterson, at Winchester, or wherever he might
be. One week from the time of leaving Winchester would be sufficient to ac
complish all this. You would then either occupy the enemy's works, in front
of Washington, if he should abandon them, or fall back on your present posi
tion, according to circumstances. General Johnston having disposed of Pat
terson, would detach a sufficient number from his force to reinforce Garnett,
and make him superior to McClellan. Having defeated McClellan, General
Garnett could then unite with Johnston, and the two cross the Potomac, at the
nearest point, for Maryland, and, arousing the people as they proceeded, march
to the rear of Washington, while you would attack it in front.
" To these propositions, respectful and earnest consideration was given by
the President and the generals I have mentioned. The scheme was con
sidered brilliant and comprehensive, but, to its adoption at this time, two lead
ing objections were urged by the President and by General Lee. One was
that General Johnston's force was not now sufficiently strong to allow of the
withdrawal of numbers sufficient to effect your object, and, at the same time,
leave enough to keep Patterson in check and keep him from coining down
upon your left; and tlie other and main objection was, that the enemy was as
yet too close to their cover to allow the reasonable expectation of the accom
plishment of your object ; that they would immediately fall back upon their
intrenchments, or, being so close to their large reserves, would be quickly re
inforced in numbers sufficient to regain the superiority of numbers, and thus
defeat your purpose. That the combination might be made at a later period,
when these objections would be removed by a sufficient increase of your ar-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 87
mies, and by the lengthening of the enemy's lines, and increase of distance
from river, and reserves for quick reinforcements. " Respectfully submitted,
" James Chestnut, Vol. A D. C."
Before commenting upon this report, and to illustrate — as we
think we should — the character of the military administration of
the Confederate authorities, the following unofficial letter of Gen
eral Beauregard to General Johnston is submitted to the reader.
It was written on the day before Colonel Chestnut was sent to
Richmond. " Manassas Junction, Va., July 13th, 1861.
" General J. E. Johnston :
" My dear General, — I write in haste. What a pity we cannot carry into
effect the following plan of operations : That you should leave four or five thou
sand men to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, and unite the mass of your
troops with mine. We will probably have, in a few days, about forty thousand
men to operate with. This- force would enable us to destroy the forces of
Generals Scott and McDowell, in my front. Then we would go back with as
many men as necessary to attack and disperse General Patterson's army, before
he could know positively what had become of you. We could then proceed
to General McClellan's theatre of war, and treat him likewise, after which we
could pass over into Maryland, to operate in rear of Washiugton. I think
this whole campaign could be completed brilliantly in from fifteen to twenty-
five days. Oh, that we had but one good head to conduct all our operations !
We are laboring, unfortunately, under the disadvantage of having about seven
armies in the field, under as many independent commanders, which is contrary
to the first principles of the art of war. Wishing you, however, ample success
in your operations, I remain, Yours very truly, "G. T. Beauregard."
He was striking at every door, as it were ; for he believed in
his plan, and felt that he could accomplish it. But the rigor of
military usage — so inexorable at times — compelled him to seek as
sistance and support from those whose right it was to adopt or re
ject his views. A high tribunal, composed of the President, Gen
erals Cooper and Lee, took upon itself to check and render barren
the strategic powers so greatly developed in General Beauregard,
and in which the immortal Jackson alone is acknowledged to have
been his peer. Who can forget that, at the period of which we
write, the Confederate commander at Manassas was looked up to
as the first and, unquestionably, the most promising of our gen
erals? His prestige was undeniable. Success, "the criterion of
merit " in military affairs, had already built up for him a reputa-

88 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
tion thus far unrivalled. The President knew this, as did the whole
South ; as did even the North, whose apprehension of the untiring
activity and engineering ability of General Beauregard was a se
cret to none. How Mr. Davis, with all this before his mind, could
have assumed the responsibility of declining so far-sighted and
far-reaching a campaign as was proposed to him, is more than
we can well explain. But, exercising the right which a thorough
knowledge of what then transpired affords us, we assert it as an
incontrovertible truth, fully proved by later events, that the Pres
ident of the Confederacy, by neglecting to compel his Quarter
master-General to procure the transportation which could have
been easily procured, more than a month before the battle of Ma
nassas ; by refusing, as early as the 13th of June, to assent to Gen
eral Beauregard's urgent request that authority should be given
to concentrate our forces at the proper moment, at Manassas Junc
tion ; by again refusing, on the 15th of July, to allow him to exe
cute his bold, offensive plans against the enemy, the certain re
sult of which would have been the taking of Washington ; that
the President of the Confederacy, by thus persisting in these
three lamentable errors, lost the South her independence. We
write this in no spirit of detraction. But, after a lapse of more
than twenty-two years, President Davis must expect to stand be
fore the public merely on the merits of his acts and omissions.
Personal friendships, which would kindly palliate errors, have fad
ed away or disappeared. The tribunal of public opinion, occupied
j~~by just and impartial men, will study the events of which we are
now treating by the light of truth alone, and, in seeking for the
causes of our failure, will unerringly place the finger on Mr. Da
vis's want of foresight, on his incapacity to appreciate and reward
merit, on his upholding of incompetent men in offices of responsi-
jj bility and trust, and, above all, on his unwillingness to allow others
to achieve greatness. The words, " T'etat, c'est nwi," — the haugh
ty maxim of the French monarch — unconsciously, perhaps, to
| President Davis, but not the less fatally, must have governed his
| course in the council-chamber on more than one occasion. His
I book, now before the public, whatever its merits in other respects
Lmay be, is powerless in its vain attempt to cover his fatal mis
takes, or to change the merciless logic of facts and events.
Before leaving Richmond, Colonel Chestnut had telegraphed to
General Beauregard that his recommendations would not be ap-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 89
proved. This was a heavy disappointment to him ; but, nothing
daunted, he began at once to provide for the possible contingency
of being compelled, by the greatly superior force of the enemy,
to retire behind the Rappahannock. He sent one of his engineers
to the crossings of that river, with orders to throw up such field-
works as would command them.
Colonel Chestnut had returned deeply impressed by the views
and ideas of the Richmond authorities, particularly by those of
General Lee — to wit, that the army should fall back behind the
Rappahannock ; and, not wishing to move, himself, in the matter,
endeavored to persuade Adjutant-General Jordan to urge the point
upon General Beauregard ; which, however, the former positively
declined to do.
The extension of McDowell's pickets had now interrupted our
" underground mail," between Washington and Manassas ; but it
had fortunately happened, a few days before, that a gentleman,
Mr. D  , formerly a clerk in one of the departments at Wash
ington, was introduced at headquarters by Colonel Chestnut as
perfectly trustworthy, and capable of performing the delicate office
of communicating with the friendly agencies we had managed to
establish in Washington. He was provided with a paper, having
neither signature nor address, but upon which was written the
ciphered message, " Trust the bearer" and with it immediately
despatched to the residence of Mrs. G  , our secret emissary in
the Federal capital. The result was that, at about 8 o'clock p. m.,
on the 16th, a sealed communication was received at headquarters,
despatched by relays from General Holmes's picket line, near East-
port. It had been brought that morning from Washington, to a
point on the opposite shore, by Mr. D  , from Mrs. G  , and
announced, in cipher, this simple but important piece of news:
" McDowell has been ordered to advance to-night;" confirming
General Beauregard's belief as to the intended Federal movement,
which was otherwise apparent to him.
General Bonham was at once informed of the impending event,
and directed to execute his retreat on the appearance of the ene
my in force, as prescribed by the order of the 20th of June, un
changed, though issued nearly a month previously. Colonel Rhodes,
at Fairfax Station, received like instructions through General
Ewell, his brigade commander ; and, in view of the exigency, Col
onel J. L. Kemper, whose energy and efficiency had already been

90 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
tested, was again detached from his command and sent to Fairfax
Court-House, to provide all necessary means of transportation.
During the night which followed (16th-17th July), General
Beauregard sent an urgent request to Richmond by telegram,
asking that Generals Johnston and Holmes be now ordered to
make a junction with him.
He also published General Orders No. 41, announcing to his
command the expected advance of the enemy, and expressing his
confidence in their ability to drive him beyond his intrenched
lines. It contained the names of his general and personal staff,*
and enjoined obedience to all orders conveyed through them to
the troops.
The news of the enemy's movement was true. On the morn
ing of the 17th McDowell's advance was reported to be approach
ing ; and before noon, General Bonham's pickets being driven
in, he began his retreat, as had been previously agreed upon.
The enemy made a strong demonstration against him, and sought
to strike his communication with Germantown, which was very
nearly effected — General Bonham's rear having just passed through
the junction of the two roads at the hamlet, as the head of the
Federal column came within sight. He retired in fine order to
Centreville, and though at night he was enveloped, he was quiet
ly withdrawn between 12 o'clock and daylight, behind Mitch
ell's Ford, fully carrying out the detailed instructions of the gen
eral commanding. Rhodes, after a sharp brush with the enemy,
fell back to Union Mills Ford, where Ewell was in command of the
heaviest brigade of the army.
The enemy had no sooner attacked General Bonham's line, than
General Beauregard forwarded the following telegram to the
President : " Headquarters, Manassas,
July nth, 1861.
" The enemy has assailed my outposts in heavy force. I have fallen back
on the line of Bull Run and will make a stand at Mitchell's Ford. If his force
is overwhelming I shall retire to the Rappahannock railroad bridge, saving my
command for defence there and future operations. Please inform Johnston
of this, via Stanton, and also Holmes. Send forward any reinforcements, at
the earliest possible instant, and by every possible means. " G. T. Beauregard."
To which the President answered :
* See Appendix to this chapter.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 91
"Richmond, July nth, 1861.
" General G. T. Beauregard :
" We are making all efforts to reinforce you. Cannot send to day, but after
wards they will go regularly, daily, railroads permitting. Hampton's Legion,
McRae's regiment, and two battalions, Mississippi and Alabama, under orders.
"Jefferson Davis."
Later in the day, however, Adjutant-General Cooper sent this
telegram : "Richmond, July nth, 1861.
" General Beauregard :
"You are authorized to appropriate the North Carolina regiment on its
route to General Johnston. If possible, send to General Johnston to say he
has been informed via Staunton that you were attacked, and that he will join
you, if practicable, with his effective force, sending his sick and baggage to
Culpepper Court-House, by rail or through Warrenton. " S.Cooper, Adj.-Genl."
General Beauregard, though gratified that such an order had at
last been given, was much annoyed at the thought that it had been
too long delayed to effect any substantial good. He so informed
the War Department, but lost no time in communicating with
General Johnston, through telegram and by means of a special
messenger, Colonel Chisolm, one of his aids. The latter was in
structed to say to General Johnston that there was not a moment
to lose, and that all the available transportation of the Manassas
Gap Railroad would be in waiting at Piedmont, to assist in con
veying his troops. Colonel Chisolm carried also a proposition that
at least a portion of General Johnston's forces should march by
the way of Aldie, so as to assail McDowell's left flank and rear,
at Centreville. But, for reasons General Johnston must have
thought important, based, as he alleges, on the difficulty of direct-
in w the movements of troops so distant from each other, no action
was taken by him about this suggestion.
The feigned resistance and retreat from Fairfax Court-House,
had had the desired effect of leading the enemy to believe in the
abandonment of our position at Manassas. " We had expected to
encounter the enemy at Fairfax Court-House, seven miles this
side of Centreville," says Major Barnard, United States Engineer*
" and our three right columns were directed to co-operate, on that
point. We entered that place about noon of the 17th, finding
the intrenchments abandoned, and every sign of a hasty retreat."
*See his book entitled " The C. S. A. and the Battle of Bull Run," p. 46.

92 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Hence the loud exultation of the Federal troops, and the predic
tions, in the Northern journals, of the certain defeat of the Con
federate army.
On the morning of the next day, the 18th, the enemy was re
ported advancing on Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords. As the
former was the only point even partially intrenched, and the lat
ter had natural defensive advantages, General Beauregard was
gratified that the attack, as he had hoped, was made there. His
line now extended some five miles, from Union Mills Ford, on
the right, to the stone bridge, on the left, as follows : at Union
Mills Ford, Ewell's brigade, with four 12-pounder howitzers and
three companies of Virginia cavalry ; at McLean's Ford, D. R.
Jones's brigade, with two brass 6-pounders and one company of
cavalry ; at Blackburn's Ford, Longstreet's brigade, with two brass
6-pounders at Mitchell's Ford, Bonham's brigade, with Shields's
and Delaware Kemper's batteries, and six companies of cavalry
under Colonel Radford ; in the rear of Island, Ball's and Lewis's
Fords, Cocke's brigade, with Latham's battery and one company
of cavalry ; while Evans's demi-brigade, with four 6-pounders and
two companies of cavalry, held the left flank, and protected the
stone-bridge crossing. Early's brigade stood in the rear of, and
as support to, Ewell's.
Bull Run is a small stream running in this locality, nearly from
west to east. Its banks, for the most part, are rocky and steep.
The country on either side, much broken and wooded, becomes
gently rolling and open as it recedes from the stream. On the
northern side the ground is much the higher and completely com
mands the southern bank. Roads traverse and intersect the sur
rounding country in every direction.
About noon, the enemy opened fire in front of Mitchell's Ford,
with several 20-pounder rifled guns, at a range of one and a half
miles, to which we had no means of replying, with any effect.
But a Federal light battery, afterwards sent forward, was soon
repulsed, with its supporting force, by Kemper's battery, which
occupied a ridge about six hundred yards in advance of the ford.
Major Barnard, in his work already quoted, speaking of the un
toward incident we have alluded to, says (page 48): "We had
the tables turned upon us by a sudden and rapid discharge from a
battery near the ford, invisible except by the smoke of its guns."
And lie adds : " However, our 20-pounders, assisted by a battery

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 93
of rifled 6-pounders, proved too much for it, and we soon succeeded
in silencing its fire." So well did they succeed, that, further on,
Major Barnard himself is compelled to use the following language :
" This ought to have been the end of the affair, but General Tyler,
. . . persisting in the belief that the enemy would run whenever men
aced by serious attack, had determined, I believe, to inarch to
Manassas that day. Had he made a vigorous charge and crossed
the stream at once, it is quite possible . . . that he might have suc
ceeded." Here, Major Barnard's and General Tyler's success is
evidently dwindling into something else. He proceeds thus:
"But he only filed his brigade down to the stream, drew it up
parallel to the other shore, and opened an unmeaning f usilade, the
results of which were all in favor of the enemy, and before which,
overawed rather by the tremendous volley directed at them than
suffering heavy loss, one of the regiments broke in confusion
and the whole force retired. This foolish affair (called by the
Confederates the battle of Bull Run, they applying the term
Manassas to the ensuing battle of the 21st, which we style the
battle of Bull Bun), had a marked effect upon the morale of our
raw troops."
Here we fail to comprehend Major Barnard's conclusions ; that
he attempts to palliate the defeat of the Federal forces on that
day, by calling such a forward movement " a foolish affair," is not
to be wondered at, and for this reason : the enemy's attack and its
result could only have been termed " battle " if our troops had
" broken in confusion," instead of those opposing them. Major
Barnard would have shown better grace, however, had he frankly
admitted that attacking columns, which, "overawed by the tre
mendous volleys directed at them," " break in confusion " and
retire from the field — as did the "whole Federal force "on that
occasion — are unquestionably defeated.
About the same hour (noon, on the 18th), the Federals were dis
covered advancing also in strong columns of infantry, with artillery
and cavalry, on Blackburn's Ford, near which General Beauregard
now took position. Here the ground on the northern side of the
Run, after a narrow level, ascends by a steep slope to a line of
heights commanding the entire southern side, which, for several
hundred yards, is almost a plain, and thence rises by a gentle slope
to a wooded country, undulating back to Manassas. After a half-
hour's cannonade from a battery of rifled guns, the column of

94 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
attack (Richardson's brigade), over three thousand strong, with
Sherman's brigade in immediate reserve, appeared over the brow
of the height which covered their approach, and advanced until
they were but a hundred yards from our skirmishers, who were
posted among the trees that lined the southern bank. A large
portion of the Federal force approached through the woods, near
the border of the stream, which on that side presented a thick cover
of trees and undergrowth, and the remainder advanced along the
road, to force the passage. Longstreet met the attack with about
twelve hundred men, of the 1st, 17th, and 11th Virginia Volun
teers, and, after quite a brisk contest, repulsed the opposing forces.
They rallied for a second attack, but were again driven back, with
the aid of the reserve companies.
Two regiments and two rifled guns from Early's brigade, which
had been brought from the right and held at even supporting dis
tance from the three threatened fords, were now ordered up. The
guns, placed in position under concealment of the trees that
fringed the stream, directed their fire by the sound of the enemy's
musketry, already active in a third attempt to force the crossing ;
which proved as unsuccessful as had the others. One of the at
tacking regiments gave way, and was rallied a mile and a half to
the rear. When the remaining companies of Early's brigade were
brought forward, and his five additional guns were placed in rear
of the other two — firing wherever the glitter of bayonets along the
slope above the tree-tops showed the Federals to be thickest — the
contest soon passed into an artillery duel, which lasted until the
enemy abandoned his ground, in full retreat. The Confederate
loss was but sixty-eight killed and wounded ; that of the enemy
seventy-three, besides one hundred and seventy-five stands of arms
and a quantity of accoutrements.
The result of that action was of great value to us, as it gave to
our army the prestige of success, and the confidence which is ever
an important element of victory.
General Beauregard at once reported the result of the day to
Richmond ; and Mr. Davis telegraphed back an expression of his
gratification, informing General Beauregard also that a regiment
was on its way to reinforce him, and that more would go as soon
as possible.
It would seem, however, that this first stroke of good fortune
was unduly estimated at the Confederate capital ; for General

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 95
Cooper, on the following day, telegraphed, saying that General
Johnston had not been heard from, and that, if the enemy had
abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston had not
yet moved, he (General Beauregard) had better withdraw his call
on him, as the enemy was advised, at Washington, of the projected
movement of Generals Johnston and, Holmes, and might vary his
plans in consequence.*
How can this telegram be made to tally with the following pas
sage, taken from Mr. Davis's book ? " As soon as I became satis
fied that Manassas was the objective point of the enemy's move
ment, I wrote to General Johnston, urging him to make prepara
tions for a junction with General Beauregard," etc.f Was he no
longer " satisfied," on the 19th of July, that Manassas was the en
emy's objective point ? If he was not — as we are inclined to believe
is the case — the fact clearly shows how little he knew of the
movements of the enemy, at that time ; if he was, why was he
bent upon reconsidering his action of July 17th, as shown by his
telegram of that day, to General Johnston ?
General Beauregard was too far-seeing, and had made too many
fruitless attempts to force the concentration which was, at last, to
be granted him, to be willing, of his own accord, to counter
mand the long-delayed order — contingent though it was — forward
ed to General Johnston. He declined to act upon General Coop
er's strange suggestion. Two days later he covered the Southern
arms with glory, and won for himself the proud and immortal
title of "Hero of Manassas."
* See Appendix to this chapter. t Vol. i. pp. 345, 346.

gg MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER IX.
Battle of Manassas. — General J. E. Johnston Assumes Command, but General
Beauregard Directs Operations and Fights the Battle. — Superiority of
Numbers Against us. — Deeds of Heroism. — Enemy Completely Routed. —
Ordnance and Supplies Captured. — Ours and Enemy's Losses. — Strength
of General McDowell's Army. — The Verdict of History.
Afteb the check received at Bull Run, on July 18th, the Fed- '
eral army remained inactive throughout the 19th and 20th,
except in efforts to reconnoitre and determine the Confederate
position and the best point for penetrating or turning it. This
prolonged delay, though somewhat unaccountable, under the cir
cumstances, was, certainly, of great advantage to General Beaure
gard. It allowed General Holmes to reach the theatre of oper
ations in time, with 1265 infantry, 6 pieces of light artillery, and
a company of cavalry of 90 men. General Johnston also arrived,
about noon on the 20th, with Jackson's brigade,* 2611 strong, a
portion of Bee's and Bartow's brigades numbering 2732 bayonets,
300 of Stuart's cavalry, and Imboden's and Pendleton's bat
teries; to which were added Barksdale's 13th Mississippi regi
ment, which came up from Lynchburg; and Hampton's Legion,
600 strong.
General Johnston was now the ranking officer at Manassas;
nevertheless, as General Beauregard had already made all his
plans and arrangements for the maintenance of the position, of
which General Johnston was, as yet, completely uninformed, he
declined assuming the responsibilities of the command until after
the impending battle, but offered General Beauregard his personal
services on the field, which were cordially accepted. General
Beauregard thereupon explained his plan of operations, which
was.agreed to, and he continued his active preparations for the
hourly expected conflict.
The question about to be tested was, whether our great struggle
* This brigade reached Manassas Junction the evening previous. So did,
at alaiernbur^tlio 7th and 8th Georgia regiments.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 97
for independence should win life and honor, or fail in disaster
and ruin. One or the other would necessarily be the fate of the
Confederacy. Heavy, therefore, was the responsibility upon the
commander who stood ready to meet the issue. What General
Beauregard had urged upon the government, and so earnestly de
manded, had not been accorded ; the military aspect had also
changed ; and he was now forced to occupy that defensive position
which he had tried his utmost to avoid. But McDowell's appar
ent hesitation in his forward movement, the confidence General
Beauregard had in his troops and in the wisdom of his order of
battle, were most encouraging, and justified him in looking hope
fully and fearlessly to the result.
Our line remained the same as on tlie 18th, except as modified
by the distribution of the newly arrived reinforcements. Gen
eral Holmes's brigade, the 2d Tennessee and 1st Arkansas regi
ments were placed in rear of Ewell. Early's brigade was shifted
from the rear of Ewell to the rear of Jones's brigade ; Longstreet
was supported by Bee's and Bartow's brigades (of General John
ston's forces), posted at even distance in rear of McLean's and
Blackburn's Fords; and, still farther in the rear, was Barksdale's
Mississippi regiment. Bonham was supported by Jackson's brig
ade (of General Johnston's forces) placed at even distance in rear
of Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords. Ten companies of infantry,
two of cavalry, and a battery of four 6-pounders, under Rogers,
had been added to Cocke's brigade, which covered the remaining
fords — Island, Ball's and Lewis's — extending to the right of
Evans's demi-brigade. The latter, which formed a part of Cocke's
command, held the stone bridge, and covered a farm ford, about
one mile above. Hampton's Legion of infantry, which had reached
the army that morning (20th), was at once thrown forward to the
Lewis House, as a support to any troops that might be engaged
in that quarter. Two companies of Radford's cavalry were held
in reserve, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, and Stuart's (of General
Johnston's forces) — some three hundred men — occupied the level
ground in rear, from Bonham's to Cocke's brigades. Five pieces
of Walton's battery were in reserve in rear of Bee's right, and
Pendleton's in rear of Bonham's extreme left.
The following table shows the composition and the total strength,
in men and guns, of the Confederate forces assembled on the morn
ing of the 21st, awaiting the conflict:
I.— 7

98 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
1. The Army of the Potomac, including the garrison at Camp
Pickens, Manassas  21,833 & 29 guns.
2. The Army of the Shenandoah  6,000 & 20 guns.
3. General Holmes's forces  1,355 & 6 guns.
In all, 29,188 & 55 guns.
One peculiar feature of the theatre of operations was a direct
road running in front of the Confederate positions, from the ex
treme right at Union Mills Ford, and trending off to Centreville.
This was seized upon, and entered prominently into the Confed
erate plan of battle, as drawn up on the night of the 20th. That
is to say, Ewell, from the extreme right, at Union Mills Ford, was
to advance towards Centreville by that road, and, halting about
half-way, await communication from Jones, who was to move
from McLean's Ford and place himself on the left of Ewell, await
ing in that position communication from Longstreet, who, by a
similar advance from Blackburn's Ford, was to take position on
the left of Jones, and be joined on his own left by Bonham, from
Mitchell's Ford. Ewell, having the longest march, was to begin
the movement, and each brigade was to be followed by its re
serves. The several commanders were instructed in the object of
the movement, which was to pivot the line on Mitchell's Ford, and
by a rapid and vigorous attack on McDowell's left flank and rear,
at Centreville, rout him and cut off his retreat on Washington.
"Sumter" — of good omen — was given as a watchword to the troops.
In the night, scouts posted by General Beauregard's orders in
front of Evans's lines brought in the report that McDowell was
concentrating at Centreville and on the Warrenton turnpike,
leading thence to the stone bridge. As General Beauregard be
lieved that the repulse of the 18th would deter the Federal gen
eral from another attack on the centre, these facts, in his opinion,
pointed to a movement against the left flank. In reality, Mc
Dowell had, at first, intended to move on the Confederate right,
in anticipation of which, as the most probable operation, the
strongest Confederate brigades were posted in that quarter; but
the result of further reconnoissances, made with more minuteness
by the enemy, the day after the engagement of Bull Run, caused
an alteration of his plans, as originally adopted. As this appar
ent new disposition of McDowell's forces rather favored the exe
cution of the Confederate plan of battle, no change was made by
General Beauregard ; but, in view of contingencies, he despatched

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 99
orders, by daybreak, to every command in the lines, to be ready
to move at a moment's notice.
At a very early hour in the morning of the 21st, Hunter's and
Heintzelman's divisions of McDowell's army, over sixteen thousand
strong, moved forward from Centreville by the Warrenton turn
pike. Striking off to the right, about half-way between Centreville
and the stone bridge, they made a circuit through a difficult forest,
guided by the trace of an old road, to the Sudley Springs Ford,
two miles above the stone bridge, with the design of flanking the
Confederate left and taking possession of the Manassas Gap Rail
road, so as to cut off the advent of General Johnston, most of
whose troops, it was known, had not yet arrived. Meanwhile,
Tyler moved his division down the Warrenton turnpike against.
the stone bridge, held by the Confederate extreme left, under
Colonel Evans, in front of whom he immediately deployed a por
tion of his force.
About 5.30 a. m., report of this latter demonstration reached
General Beauregard, who thereupon immediately ordered Colonel
Evans, and, with him, General Cocke, to watch most vigilantly the
movements of the forces confronting them, and, if attacked, to
maintain their position at all hazards.
The surest and most effective method of relieving our left,
General Beauregard thought, was by a rapid, vigorous attack of
our right wing and centre on the enemy's flank and rear, at Cen
treville, all due precautions being first taken against the advance
of any reserves from the direction of Washington. This pro
posed movement he submitted to General Johnston, who fully
approved of it, and orders were forthwith issued for its execution.
General Ewell was to lead the movement, followed by Jones,
Longstreet, and Bonham, with their respective reserves. Colonels
Stuart and Radford to be held in hand and brought forward
whenever their assistance might be deemed necessary.
The enemy's extended line of skirmishers was now visible in
front of Evans, who threw forward the two flank companies of
the 4th South Carolina, and one company of Wheat's Louisi
ana battalion, which were deployed as skirmishers to cover his
front. An occasional scattering fire resulted, and for more than
an hour did the two confronting forces thus face one another; the
main body of the enemy, meanwhile, cautiously advancing through
the forest, to take our forces in flank and rear.

100 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Colonel Evans, being, satisfied that the movement in his front
was merely a 6ham, the real object being to turn his left, deter
mined (8.30 a.m.) to change his position so as to meet the enemy,
and he accordingly ordered to his left and rear six companies
of Sloan's 4th South Carolina, five of Wheat's Louisiana battal
ion, and two 6-pounders of Latham's battery — leaving only four
of Sloan's companies to guard the stone bridge : General Cocke
being first informed of these changes and of the reasons necessi
tating them.
Colonel Evans formed his line some four hundred yards in rear
of the old Pittsylvania Mansion, but the enemy not approaching
by that road, he marched across the fields for three quarters of a
mile, and took position mainly on the Brentsville road, in front of
what was soon to be the enemy's line of battle. There he waited,
the opposing masses drawing nearer and nearer.
We now quote from General Beauregard's official report, and
will continue to do so at intervals as we proceed :
" In the meantime, about 7 o'clock a.m., Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's
and five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sent to take up a position along
Bull Run to guard the interval between Cocke's right and Bonham's left, with
orders to support either in case of need — the character and topographical
features of the ground having been shown to General Jackson by Captain D.
B. Harris, of the Engineers of this army corps.
" So much of Bee's and Bartow's brigades — now united — as had arrived —
some two thousand eight hundred muskets — had also been sent forward to
the support of the position of the stone bridge.
"Burnside's brigade — which here, as at Fairfax Court-House, led the ad
vance — at about 9.45 a.m. debouched from a wood in sight of Evans's posi
tion, some five hundred yards distant from Wheat's battalion.
" He immediately threw forward his skirmishers in force, and they became
engaged with Wheat's command, and the 6-pounder gun under Lieutenant
Leftwich." For upwards of an hour, with less than eight hundred men,
Sloan's companies and Wheat's battalion alone intrepidly resisted
the mass of three thousand five hundred bayonets and eight pieces
of artillery, including the strong battery of six 13-pounder rifled
guns of the 2d Rhode Island volunteers, and two Dahlgren how
itzers. At the urgent call of Colonel Evans, General Bee, with
his gallant command, came to their assistance. He had been
averse to leaving his position, which was the true one for the occa
sion, and had strongly advised Colonel Evans to fall back on his

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 101
line. But realizing that, if not supported, such a small force would
soon be crushed by the overwhelming numbers opposed to it, he
threw forward his entire command and engaged the enemy with
surpassing valor, Imboden's battery playing at the same time with
telling effect.
" A fierce and destructive conflict now ensued " [says General Beauregard].
" The fire was withering on both sides, while the enemy swept our short, thin
lines with their numerous artillery, which, according to their official reports, at
this time consisted of ten rifled guns and four howitzers. For one hour did
these stout-hearted men of the blended commands of Bee, Evans, and Bar
tow breast an uninterrupted battle-storm, animated surely by something more
than the ordinary courage of even the bravest men under fire. It must have
been, indeed, the inspiration of the cause, and consciousness of the great stake
at issuer which thus nerved and animated one and all to stand unawed and
unshrinking in such extremity."
Two brigades of Heintzelman's division, with Ricketts's light
battery of six 10-pounder rifled guns, now opened fire on Imbo
den's command, which had been increased by two rifled pieces
from the Washington Artillery, and two guns from Latham's bat
tery. Evans's eleven companies, Bee's and Bartow's four regiments,
two companies of the 11th Mississippi, commanded by Lieuten
ant-Colonel Liddle, and six pieces under Imboden and Richard
son, were the only forces we had to confront two divisions of four
strong brigades, of which seventeen companies were regulars of
all arms. Despite this fearful disparity in numbers our troops
still maintained their position, constantly breaking and shattering
the enemy's ranks. But now came Sherman's and Keyes's brigades
of Tyler's division, six thousand strong, adding number to num
ber, and forcing our line at last to give way, though only when or
dered to do so by the heroic Bee himself.
Our losses were heavy in officers and men. The 8th Georgia
and the 4th Alabama suffered terribly. Colonels Jones and Gar
diner were dangerously wounded ; and many other noble-hearted
patriot soldiers there fell, killed or disabled, under the murderous
fire directed against them.
From Generals Johnston's and Beauregard's headquarters, which
occupied a central position about half a mile to the rear of Mitch
ell's Ford, could be distinctly heard the clattering roll of mus
ketry and the incessant din of artillery, bearing witness to the
heavy onslaught made upon us on the left. Anxiously, but con-

102 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
fidently, did General Beauregard await its issue, expectant, the
while, that similar sounds would soon be audible from the right
and centre of the line. Instead of which, at about half -past 10
a.m., a messenger came from General Ewell, with the disappoint
ing news that General Beauregard's orders to him for his advance
upon Centreville, though forwarded quite early in the morning,
had not yet reached him ; but that, in consequence of a communi
cation from General D. R. Jones, he had thrown his brigade across
the stream at Union Mills. It was evidently too late to undertake
the projected movement. The firing appeared to be still increasing
on the left, while it would have taken Generals Ewell and Holmes
from two to three hours to reach the position first assigned to
them. Other combinations became necessary, and were immedi
ately resorted to.
"The movement of the right and centre" [says General Beauregard, in his
report], " already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once countermanded,
with the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged to meet the enemy
on the field upon which he had chosen to give us battle. Under these cir
cumstances, our reserves not already in movement were immediately ordered
up to support our left flank, namely, Holmes's two regiments, a battery of ar
tillery under Captain Lindsay Walker, of six guns, and Early's brigade. Two
regiments from Bonham's brigade, with Kemper's four 6-pounders, were also
called for ; and, with the sanction of General Johnston, Generals Ewell, Jones
(D.R.), Longstreet, and Bonham were directed to make a demonstration to their
several fronts, to retain and engross the enemy's reserves and forces on their
flank, and at and around Centreville. Previously, our respective chiefs of
staff, Major Rhett and Colonel Jordan, had been left at my headquarters to
hasten up and give directions to any troops that might arrive at Manassas."
And now, these orders having been rapidly despatched, Gener
als Johnston and Beauregard proceeded, at full gallop, to the im-
diate field of action, where they arrived just as the forces under
Bee, Bartow, and Evans had retired to a wooded ravine in rear of
the Robinson House, south of the stone bridge — which was then
gallantly held by the Hampton Legion.
At this critical moment disaster stared us in the face. Our men
seemed to have accomplished all that could be accomplished against
such overpowering numbers ; and depression, added to exhaustion,
was about to destroy their over-taxed endurance. The words of
the brigade, regiment, and company commanders were drowned
by the noise and confusion, the whizzing of balls and the explosion
of shells. Generals Johnston and Beauregard rode among the

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 103
troops, but even their presence was unavailing; when it occurred
to General Beauregard that the sight of their regimental colors,
borne to the front by their officers, would instil new vigor into
the men, and restore confidence and order among them. He in-
structed the colonels to plant their colors fifty yards in advance,
and call upon their troops to rally on them. This was done, and
proved a complete success. Few, if any, of the men remained be
hind ; and an unbroken line of battle again confronted the foe.
It was just before the execution of this brilliant device of General
Beauregard's, to the inspiriting effect of which may be attributed
the retrieved fortune of the day, that General Bee, while address
ing his troops and urging them forward, said of General Jackson's
brigade, which had not yet been engaged, but awaited, unmoved,
the attack of the enemy : " Look at Jackson's brigade ; it stands
there like a stone wall" — memorable words, that consecrated to
fame a command whose invincibility became proverbial under the
immortal hero who first led it into battle.
While our line was being reformed, and with a view to strength
ening the morale of the troops, both General Johnston and General
Beauregard, riding abreast with the color-bearer, led the 4th Ala
bama on tlie field, and directly engaged it with the enemy. This
gallant regiment had lost all its field-officers; seeing which, Gen
eral Beauregard shortly afterwards intrusted its command to S. R.
Gist, of South Carolina, a young officer who had already attracted
his attention, and who was then acting as volunteer aide-de-camp to
General Bee. The untiring energy and cool daring of both Gen
erals Johnston and Beauregard, as they hurried forth to the points
needing their presence, produced a lasting impression on officers
and men who witnessed that part of the struggle.
General Jackson had already moved up with his brigade of
five Virginia regiments, and taken position below the brim of the
plateau, to the left of the ravine where stood the remnants of Bee's,
Bartow's, and Evans's commands. With him were Imboden's bat
tery and two of Stanard's pieces, supported in the rear by I. L.
Preston's and Echolls's regiments, by Harper's on the right, and by
Allen's and Cummings's on the left.
It was now clearly demonstrated that upon this ground was the
battle to be fought. The enemy had forced us upon it, and there
all our available forces were being concentrated. This fact once
established, it became evident that the presence of both Generals

104 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Johnston and Beauregard on the immediate scene of operations,
instead of being of advantage, might impede prompt action — often
necessary — by either commander. Moreover, the important work
of pressing forward the reserves and other reinforcements yet
on the way from Winchester was a subject of great concern, and
could not be attended to personally by the general in actual com
mand. For these reasons, and because, by mutual consent, the
command had been left to General Beauregard, who had planned
the battle and knew every inch of the country occupied by our
troops, it was agreed that he should remain on the field to direct
the battle, while General Johnston should withdraw some distance
to the rear, where he could hurry forward the forces already or
dered to the front, and indicate the positions they were to assume.
General Johnston hesitated before complying with the request
that this arrangement should be made, but finally yielded, and
temporarily established himself at tlie Lewis House, before or near
which most of the forces called up had to pass on their way to
the field.
General Beauregard says, in his report:
" As General Johnston departed for the Lewis House, Colonel Bartow re
ported to me with the remains of the 7th Georgia Volunteers — Gartrell's —
which I ordered him to post on the left of Jackson's line, in the edge of a
belt of pines bordering the southeastern rim of the plateau, on which the bat
tle was to rage so fiercely.
"(Coign el WjUiam Smithy battalion of the 49th Virginia Volunteers, having
also come up, by myordefl; I placed it on the left of Gartrell's, as my extreme
left at the time. Repairing then to the right, I placed Hampton's Legion,
which had suffered greatly, on the flank, somewhat to the rear of Harper's regi
ment, and also the seven companies of the 8th (Hunter's) Virginia regiment,
which, detached from Cocke's brigade by my orders and those of General John
ston, had opportunely reached the ground. These, with Harper's regiment,
constituted a reserve to protect our right flank from an advance of the enemy
from the quarter of the stone bridge, and served as a support 'for the line of bat
tle, which was formed on the right by Bee's and Evans's commands ; in the
centre by four regiments of Jackson's brigade, with Imbodens' four 6-pound
ers, Walton's five guns (two rifled), two guns (one rifled) of Stanard's, and
two 6-pounders of Rogers's batteries, under Lieutenant Heaton ; and on the
left by Gartrell's reduced ranks and Colonel Smith's battalion, subsequently
reinforced by Faulkner's 2d Mississippi, and by another regiment of the Army
of the Shenandoah, just arrived upon the field, the 6th (Fisher's) North Caro
lina. Confronting the enemy at this time my forces numbered, at most, not
more than six thousand five hundred infantry and artillerists, with but thirteen
pieces of artillery, and two companies (Carter's and Hoge's) of Stuart's cavalry.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 105
" The enemy's force, now bearing hotly and confidently down on our posi
tion, regiment after regiment of the best-equipped men that ever took the field
— according to their own history of the day — was formed of Colonels Hunter's
and Heintzelman's divisions, Colonels Sherman's and Reyes's brigades of Tyler's
division, and the formidable batteries of Ricketts, Griffin, and Arnold's Regu
lars, and 2d Rhode Island and two Dahlgren howitzers — a force of over twen
ty thousand infantry, seven companies of regular cavalry, and twenty-four
pieces of improved artillery. At the same time, perilous heavy reserves of in
fantry and artillery hung in the distance around the stone bridge, Mitchell's,
Blackburn's, and Union Mills Fords, visibly ready to fall upon us at any mo
ment ; and I was also assured of the existence of other heavy corps at and
around Centreville, and elsewhere within convenient supporting distance."
While posting his lines for the fierce struggle about to be re
newed, General Beauregard, deeply impressed with the fearful
odds against us, exhorted his troops to stand fast for their homes
and the cause for which they were fighting. Telling them that
reinforcements would soon arrive, he urged them on to " victory
or death." His words were few, but they inspired the men, who
dashed forward with re-awakened ardor.
The enemy had now taken possession of the plateau which Gen
eral Bee's forces had occupied in the morning, and, with Ricketts's
battery of six rifled guns — the pride of the Federal army — and
Griffin's light battery of regulars, besides others already men
tioned, opened a most destructive fire upon our advancing col
umns. The plateau of which we speak, enclosed on three sides by small
water-courses emptying into Bull Run, rose to an elevation of
one hundred feet above the stream. Its crest ran obliquely to
Bull Run, and to the Brentsville and turnpike roads. East and
west of its brow could be seen an unbroken fringe of second-
growth pines, affording most excellent shelter for our sharpshoot
ers, who skilfully availed themselves of it. To the west was a
broad belt of oaks extending across the crest, right and left of
the Sudley road, where regiments of both armies now met and
hotly contended for the mastery.
The ground occupied by our guns was an open space of limited
extent, about six hundred yards from the Henry House. Here,
thirteen of our pieces, mostly 6-pounders, were maintained in ac
tion. They displayed from the outset such skill and accuracy of
aim as to excite the terror no less than the admiration of the ene
my. The advancing columns suffered severely from the fire of

106 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
this artillery, assisted by our musketry on the right, and part of
the left, whose good fortune it was to be under cover. Regiment
after regiment of the opposing forces, thrown forward to dislodge
us, was made to break in confusion, never completely to recover
their organization on that field. The gallant Stuart, with two
companies of his command, by a sudden rush on the right of the
enemy, on the Brentsville-Sudley road, greatly added to the dis
order our firing had caused. But still fresh Federal troops poured
in from the immediate rear, filling up their broken ranks and mak
ing it plain that their object was to turn our position.
At 2 p. m. General Beauregard, with characteristic promptitude,
bringing up the whole right of his line except the reserves, gave
the order to recover the plateau. The movement was executed
with determination and vigor. It was a bold one, and such as the
exigency required. Jackson's brigade, veteran-like and unwaver
ing, now came up and pierced the enemy's centre, successfully, but
not without heavy loss. With equal intrepidity the other por
tions of the line had joined in the onset, which proved irresistible,
and the lost ground was once more ours. The enemy being strong
ly reinforced, again rallied, however, and, by weight of numbers,
re-occupied the contested plateau and stood ready to resume the
attack. Between 2.30 and 3 p. m., just as the reinforcements sent for
ward by General Johnston reached the field, General Beauregard
— resolved upon dislodging the enemy — had brought up his en
tire line, including the reserves, which he led in person. It was
a general attack, shared in by every command then on the ground
— Fisher's North Carolina, which had just arrived, being among
them. The whole open space was taken by storm and swept clear
of the enemy, and the plateau around the Henry and Robinson
Houses, ever memorable in history, remained finally in our posses
sion. The greater part of Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries were
captured, with a flag of the 1st Michigan regiment, Sackson's bri
gade. Many were the deeds of valor accomplished during this
part of the day ; but many, also, the irreparable losses the Confed
eracy had now to mourn. The heroic Bee fell, mortally wounded,
at the head of the 4th Alabama; so did the intrepid Bartow, while
leading the 7th Georgia. Colonel Thomas, of General Johnston's
staff, was killed ; so was Colonel Fisher, whose regiment — as gal
lant as its leader — was terribly shattered.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 107
Withers's 28th regiment of Cocke's brigade, with Hampton's
Legion, followed the charge, and captured several rifled pieces,
which were instantly turned against the enemy with effect.
While the Federal troops had been driven back on our right,
across the turnpike and beyond Young's Branch, the woods on our
left yet swarmed with them. Just then arrived, most opportunely,
Kershaw's 2d and Cash's 8th South Carolina regiments. They
were led through the oaks, east of the Sudley-Brentsville road,
where, after sweeping the enemy before them, they took up a
commanding position on the west, and opened a galling fire upon
those commands — including the regular infantry — which had ral
lied in the southwest angle of the plateau, under cover of a strong
Federal brigade. Kemper's battery, evolving northward by tlie
same road, joined with signal effect in the attack on the enemy's
right. Preston's 38th regiment of Cocke's brigade had also come
up. It encountered some Michigan troops on the way, and cap
tured Colonel Wilcox, their brigade commander.
Our army had received another important reinforcement. While
these stirring events were taking place (3 p.m.) part of Brigadier-
General Kirby Smith's command, some seventeen hundred infan
try of Elzey's brigade, and Beckham's battery, were seen hurrying
to the field, from Camp Pickens (Manassas), where they had ar
rived by rail, two or three hours before. General Johnston had
directed them to the left of our line, where he thought reinforce
ments were most needed. Just as they reached their position,
south of the Henry House, General Smith was severely wounded,
and compelled to retire to the rear. His place was filled by
Colonel Elzey, an officer of merit, who displayed great discern
ment in selecting the ground for the battery attached to his com
mand. Its accurate firing, under Lieutenant Beckham, occasioned
much damage to the Federal right.
Colonel Early, who should have moved up with his command, at
noon, did not receive the order to do so until 2 p.m. He appeared
upon the field just after Elzey, with Kemper's 7th Virginia,
Hay's 7th Louisiana, and Barksdale's 13th Mississippi. He
was drawn up in line of battle near Chinn's House, flanking
the enemy's right. The clouds of dust raised by the advance of
his force, in a direction from which none of our troops were ex
pected at the time, had caused the keenest anxiety to General
Beauregard, who thought it might be another column of the

10s MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
enemy threatening to turn his left. There being then no breeze,
the flags, hanging heavily to their staffs, could not be distinguished,
even through field-glasses. At last, and as General Beauregard
was about to make preparations to meet this new foe, a propitious
breath of air spread out the colors of one of the advancing regi
ments—the 13th Mississippi — at that time so similar in design
to the United States flag. To the intense relief of all, it was now
ascertained that the column was Early's gallant command, hurry
ing on, with all possible speed, towards the point from which was
heard the heaviest firing.
At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy, driven back on their left and
centre, had formed a line of battle of gigantic proportions, crescent
like in form, from the old Carter Mansion to Chinn's House.
" The woods and fields " — says General Beauregard — " were filled
with masses of infantry and carefully preserved cavalry. It was
a truly magnificent though redoubtable spectacle, as they threw for
ward, in fine style, on the broad, gentle slope of the ridge occupied
by their main lines, a cloud of skirmishers, preparatory to another
attack. "But as Early formed his line and Beckham's pieces played
upon the right of the enemy, Elzey's brigade, Gibbon's 10th Vir
ginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart's 1st Maryland and Vaughn's 3d
Tennessee regiments, and Cash's 8th and Kershaw's 2d South
Carolina, Withers's 13th and 28th Virginia, advanced in an irregu
lar line, almost simultaneously, with great spirit, from their several
positions upon the front and flanks of the enemy in their quarter
of the field. At the same time, too, Early resolutely assailed their
right flank and rear. Under this combined attack the enemy was
soon forced, first, over the narrow plateau in the southern angle,
made by the two roads so often mentioned, into a patch of woods
on its western slope, thence over Young's Branch and the turn
pike into the fields of the Dogan Farm, and rearward, in extreme
disorder, in all available directions towards Bull Run. The rout
had now become general and complete."
As soon as General Beauregard had ascertained that final vic
tory was ours, he ordered all the forces then on the field to fol
low in active pursuit upon the heels of the enemy- With a proud
and happy feeling of elation at the issue of the day, he then rode
to the Lewis House to inform General Johnston of the glorious re
sult, and, as had been agreed — the battle being now over — to com-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 109
rait to his hands the command of our united forces. The inter
view was a short one, and General Beauregard, anxious to reap the
full benefit of the victory, hurried to the front to press the pursuit.
Early's brigade, with the 19th Virginia regiment, followed the
panic-stricken fugitive enemy. Stuart and Beckham had also
thrown their men forward along the road by which the flying col
umns had so confidently marched to the field that morning ; but
the prisoners so encumbered their way as to force them soon to
give up the pursuit. Kershaw's, Withers's, Preston's, and Cash's
regiments, Hampton's Legion and Kemper's battery, attached to
Kershaw, rushed forward on the Warrenton road, by the stone
bridge, where Kershaw's command captured a number of pieces
of artillery. " The enemy," says General Beauregard in his re
port, " having opportunely opened a way for them through the
heavy abattis which my troops had made on the west side of the
bridge, several days before."
The pursuit of the enemy, the result of which might have more
than doubled the importance of our victory, was not further con
tinued that evening. A false report which had reached General
Beauregard, on his way to the front, necessitated at once a com
plete change in the character of his orders. From Manassas, rid
ing at full speed, had come a messenger, sent to General Beaure
gard by Major Thomas G. Rhett, of General Johnston's staff, with
the startling information that the enemy's reserves, composed of
fresh troops, and in considerable force, had penetrated our lines
at Union Mills Ford, and were marching on Manassas. The re
port did not originate with Major Rhett, but had been brought to
him by the adjutant of General D. R. Jones, in person.
No sooner had this unwelcome news been received than General
Beauregard, without the loss of a moment, rode back to the Lewis
House, saw General Johnston, agreed with him as to what meas
ures should be adopted for the emergency, and, mounting a fresh
horse (the fourth on that day, one of them having been killed
under him by the explosion of a shell, while he was giving in
structions to General Jackson), he proceeded at once to the point
reported to be threatened, ordering thither Ewell's and Holmes's
brigades, which had just come up to the Lewis House. With these
troops he proposed to attack the enemy vigorously before he
should effect a lodgment on our side of Bull Run. He asked also
for such reinforcements as could be spared from the pursuit.

HO MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
As General Beauregard reached the vicinity of Union Mills Ford,
towards dark, he ascertained, with mingled feelings of joy and re
gret, that the troops which had been seen advancing from that
direction were none other than those belonging to the command
of General Jones, originally posted near McLean's Ford. General
Jones had crossed Bull Run at that point, in the morning, as al
ready stated, to aid in the projected attack by our right and centre
on the enemy, at Centreville ; but had been ordered back, in con
sequence of the movements against our left. In obedience to
new instructions, he was again thrown across Bull Run, to make
demonstrations against the enemy from. a quarter supposed by
him to be unguarded. His advance was most gallantly effected ;
and not only did the brisk firing of his brigade drive the enemy's
infantry to cover, but the bold, unexpected movement was greatly
instrumental in spreading the panic which finally disbanded the
Federal army. His command was on the march to resume its
former position, behind Bull Run, when thus mistaken for the
enemy. It should here be added, in explanation of this unfortu
nate error, that the uniforms of General Jones's men differed very
slightly from those of the Northern troops — a fact of no small
significance, which had already embarrassed many a Confederate
officer, during the day, particularly on the arrival of General
Early's forces on the field.
After this mishap and the causes leading to it had been fully
explained, it was too late to resume the pursuit, as night had
then set in. It must not be forgotten, besides, that our troops
had been marching and counter-marching since early morning —
" most of the time," says General Beauregard, " without water
and without food, except a hastily snatched meal at dawn " — and
that, when not thus marching, they had been fighting against a
determined foe, at some points more than three times their su
perior in number. Well, therefore, were the Confederate troops
of Manassas entitled to rest, that evening, on the laurels they had
so gallantly yet so dearly won. Few, however, enjoyed the privi
lege afforded them ; so wakeful had success made both officers and
men, so carried away were they by the glorious victory achieved.
While retracing his steps towards the Lewis House, General Beau
regard was informed that President Davis and General Johnston
had both gone to Manassas. He repaired thither and found them,
between half-past nine and ten o'clock, at his headquarters.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. HI
The President, who, upon approaching the field, accompanied
by Colonel Jordan, of General Beauregard's staff, had felt quite
despondent at the signs of defeat which he thought he saw in the
groups of stragglers and fugitives — fragments thrown out from the
heat and collision of battle — came up just in time to witness the
rout and pursuit of the enemy. He was greatly elated over the
victory, and was profuse in his compliments to the generals and the
troops. After listening to General Beauregard's account of the bat
tle, he proposed- that a brief despatch be sent to the War Depart
ment, which was done, that very night, in the following words :
"Manassas, July 21st, 1861.
" Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces have won a glori
ous victory. The enemy was routed, and fled precipitately, abandoning a
very large amount of arms, munitions, knapsacks, and baggage. The ground
was strewn for miles with those killed, and the farm-houses and the ground
around were filled with his wounded. The pursuit was continued along several
routes towards Leesburg and Centreville, until darkness covered the fugitives.
We have captured several field-batteries and regimental standards and one
United States flag. Many prisoners have been taken. Too high praise can
not be bestowed, whether for the skill of the principal officers, or for the gal
lantry of all the troops. The battle was mainly fought on our left, several
miles from our field works. Our force engaged them not exceeding fifteen
thousand; that of the enemy estimated at thirty-five thousand. "Jefferson Davis."
The list of the ordnance and supplies captured from the enemy,
merely alluded to in the foregoing despatch to General Cooper, in
cluded twenty-eight field-pieces, of the best character of arms,
with over one hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun ; thirty-
seven caissons ; six forges ; four battery wagons ; sixty-four artil
lery horses, completely equipped; five hundred thousand rounds
of small-arms ammunition; four thousand five hundred sets of
accoutrements; over five hundred muskets; nine regimental flags ;
a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, and blank
ets ; a great many axes and intrenching tools ; wagons, ambulances,
hospital stores, and not a small quantity of subsistence. We also
captured fully sixteen hundred prisoners, including those who re
covered from their wounds.
Our loss in this memorable battle was computed as follows :
Killed, 369 ; wounded, 1483 ; making an aggregate of 1852. This
statement is taken from General Beauregard's report. In Gener
al Johnston's report, written from Fairfax Court-Honse, the result

112 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
was summed up in this wise : Killed, 378 ; wounded, 1489 ; miss
ing, 30 ; aggregate, 1897.
The enemy's loss was not officially acknowledged at the time.
The feeling which had led the Northern press to conceal the real
strength of General McDowell's army seems also to have impelled
the enemy to withhold a true statement of his casualties.
In his, report, so often quoted from — the whole of which ap
pears in the appendix to this chapter — General Beauregard says:
" The actual loss of the enemy will never be known — it may now
only be conjectured. Their abandoned dead, as they were buried
by our people where they fell, unfortunately were not enumerated,
but many parts of the field were thick with their corpses as but
few battle-fields have ever been. The official reports of the
enemy are studiously silent on this point, but still afford us
data for an approximate estimate. Left almost in the dark in
respect to the losses of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions —
first, longest, and most hotly engaged — we are informed that
Sherman's brigade, Tyler's division, suffered, in killed, wounded,
and missing, 609 — that is, about eighteen per cent, of the bri
gade. A regiment of Franklin's brigade — Gorman's — lost twenty-
one per cent. Griffin's (battery) loss was thirty per cent., and
that of Keyes's brigade, which was so handled by its commander
as to be exposed to only occasional volleys from our troops, was at
least ten per cent. To these facts add the repeated references in
the reports of the reticent commanders to the 'murderous' fire
to which they were habitually exposed, the 'pistol-range' volleys
and galling musketry, of which they speak as scourging their
ranks, and we are warranted in placing the entire loss of the Fed
erals at over forty-ftoe hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners.
To this may be legitimately added, as a casualty of the battle,
the thousands of fugitives from the field, who never rejoined their
regiments, and who were as much lost to the enemy's service as
if slain or disabled by wounds. These may not be included under
the head of ' missing,' because in every instance of such report we
took as many prisoners of those brigades or regiments as are re
ported 'missing.'" In his report, General Johnston, confirming
General Beauregard's estimate, says : " The loss of the enemy
could not be ascertained. It must have been between four and
five thousand."
It is not our purpose to dwell at any length on that part of a

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 113
subject which, to us, appears of but minor importance in compar
ison with the real question at issue, to wit — the result of the bat
tle of Manassas, or, in other words, the acknowledged victory of
the Confederate forces over an army vastly superior in point of
number, armament, and equipment.
The reader is already informed of the correct strength of our
united forces, on the morning of the 21st July. It was increased
by 1700 infantry, and a battery, on the arrival of part of General
Kirby Smith's command, at 3.30 p. m., which would bring up our
aggregate to 30,888 of all arms. It must be borne in mind, how
ever, that the commands of Generals Holmes and Ewell, aggre
gating at least 3000 men, though mentioned on our field returns
as present at and around Manassas, were never directly engaged
with the enemy on that day.
General Beauregard estimates as follows the numerical strength
of the Federal forces against us. We quote from his report :
"Making all allowances for mistakes, we are warranted in saying
that the Federal army consisted of at least fifty-five regiments of
volunteers, eight companies of regular infantry, four of marines,
nine of the regular cavalry, and twelve batteries, numbering to
gether one hundred and nineteen guns. These regiments, at one
time, . . . numbered, in the aggregate, fifty-four thousand one
hundred and forty, and averaged nine hundred and sixty-four
men each." Deducting as many as one hundred and sixty-four
per regiment, for the sick, and men on detached service, the aver
age would then be reduced to eight hundred men. Adding, now,
the different commands of regulars of all arms, mentioned above,
and the aggregate of the Federal army opposing us at Manassas
could not have been less than fifty thousand men.
, The facts that have transpired one by one, gradually throwing
light upon this point, have already fallen within the domain of
history, and show, conclusively, in spite of the extreme reticence of
many Federal commanders, that an army fifty thousand strong,
under General McDowell, was defeated and routed, at Manassas,
on the 21st of July, 1861, by less than thirty thousand Confeder
ate troops, under the immediate command, before and during the
battle, of General G. T. Beauregard.
I.— 8

114 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER X.
President Davis and Generals Johnston and Beauregard Discuss the Propriety
of Pursuing the Enemy during the Night following the Battle. — Error of
Mr. Davis as to the Order he Wrote.— On the 22d General Beauregard As
signs his Troops to New Positions.— The President Confers the Rank of
General on General Beauregard, subject to the Approval of Congress. — On
the 25th, Address Issued to Troops by Generals Johnston and Beauregard.
— Organization of General Beauregard's Army into Brigades. — Impossi
bility of any Military Movement of Importance, and Why.— Army With
out Transportation and Without Subsistence.— Colonel Northrop Appoints
Major W. B. Blair as Chief Commissary of the Army. — General Beauregard
Informs the President of the Actual State of Affairs.— Colonel Lee to the
President. — General Beauregard to Colonels Chestnut and Miles. — His
Telegram to Colonel Myers. — Answer of President Davis. — General Beau
regard's Reply. — Colonel Myers alleges Ignorance of Want of Transporta
tion in the Army of the Potomac. — General Beauregard's Answer. — Cause
of the Failure of the Campaign. — Effect of General Beauregard's Letter
upon Congress.— An Apparent Improvement in Commissary and Quarter
master Departments. — General Beauregard Complains again op the 23d
of August. — No Action Taken. — Suggests Removal of Colonel Northrop.
— The President believes in his Efficiency, and Upholds him. — Fifteen
and Twenty Days' Rations asked for by General Beauregard.
Towards 11 p.m., on the day of the battle, while President
Davis, at General Beauregard's headquarters, was engaged in writ
ing the despatch to General Cooper given in the preceding chap
ter, information was received, through Captain Hill, of General
Johnston's forces, that the enemy, at Centreville, was in a com
plete state of demoralization, and in full flight towards Washing
ton. Upon learning this, President Davis, with great animation,
urged the necessity of an immediate pursuit by General Bonham's
forces, which, with General Longstreet's brigade, were then in the
closest proximity to Centreville. After a brief discussion of the
matter between the President and Generals Johnston and Beaure
gard, it was agreed that, as Captain Hill's informal report was not
sufficiently authenticated, and the troops were fatigued and with
out rations, the suggestion made should not be acted upon ; no
order, therefore, was issued for its execution.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 115
Mr. Davis's memory, that such an order was actually dictated by
him, and modified as to the hour of its execution, is clearly at
fault. This is shown by Colonel (afterwards General) Jordan's
letter, referred to by Mr. Davis himself, as the authority for his
assertion to that effect. That Generals Johnston and Beauregard
kept no copy of an order that fell still-born from the lips of the
President, is not to be wondered at; and Colonel Jordan, no doubt
— and very naturally — destroyed it as soon as it was penned, there
having been, as he says, " a unanimous decision against it." From
this expression we infer that Mr. Davis, no less than the two gen
erals, acknowledged the uselessness of the order.
There was no other order for pursuit given, or spoken of, that
night. So says General Beauregard ; so says Colonel Jordan, his
chief of staff ; so would undoubtedly say General Johnston, who
was opposed to any further immediate advance of our troops after
the battle. The order dictated substantially to Colonel Jordan,
and condemned and abandoned without being "despatched," is
the only order with which Mr. Davis had anything to do on the
night of the 21st of July. Colonel Jordan, in the letter quoted by
Mr. Davis, says : " This was the only instance during Mr. Davis's
stay at Manassas in which he exercised any voice as to the moye-
ment of the troops. Profoundly pleased with the results achieved,
. . . his bearing towards the generals who commanded them was
eminently proper, as I have testified on a former occasion ; and I
repeat, he certainly expressed or manifested no opposition to a for
ward movement, nor did he display the least disposition to inter
fere, by opinion or authority, touching what the Confederate forces
should or should not do." *
An " order to the same effect," says Mr. Davis (that is, an order
for pursuit, modified by him, and by him deferred till the next
day, at early dawn), "was sent" by General Beauregard, "on the
night of the 21st of July, ... for a copy of which " Mr. Davis
is " indebted to the kindness of that chivalrous gentleman, soldier,
and patriot, General Bonham." f
This is another error.
The order sent to General Bonham by General Beauregard, and
given in full in Mr. Davis's book, \ was not for the pursuit of the
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 354.
t Ibid. vol. i. p. 355. I Ibid. vol. i. pp. 355, 356.

116 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
enemy, but for the purpose of making a reconnoissance — of afford
ing assistance to our wounded, and of collecting " all the arms, am
munition, and abandoned stores, subsistence, and baggage," that
could be found " on the road in our front towards Centreville,"
and on other roads by which the enemy had retreated towards
the stone bridge and Sudley's Mills.
Whoever reads the order here referred to cannot fail to see,
from its very phraseology, that it conveys no such meaning as Mr.
Davis is pleased to ascribe to it. For the order required that Gen
eral Bonham should take with him " a vast amount of transporta
tion," which, of itself, would have impeded the pursuit. And Mr.
Davis acknowledges that " the 22d, the day after the battle, was
spent in following up the line of the retreating foe, and collecting
the large supplies of arms, of ammunition, and other military
stores." * Nor must it be forgotten that, at the time mentioned
by Mr. Davis, General Johnston was already in actual command
of our united forces, and that General Beauregard had, therefore,
no authority to issue any such orders. Strange, indeed, would it
have been that the general second in command should have sent
his troops, or part of his troops, in pursuit of the enemy, when he
knew that his superior in rank had expressed strong opposition to
any immediate advance on our part, and had declared it utterly
impracticable. Just then, General Johnston was correct in his judgment. Our
troops — even those that had taken no part in the battle — were
more or less exhausted by marches and countermarches, and our
cavalry was evidently too insignificant in number to admit of any
serious hope of an effectual pursuit that night, or even the next
morning. Another obstacle, of no minor importance, intervened,
which was sufficient of itself to cut short all idea of then following
the routed Federal army. On the evening of the 21st, at about
nine o'clock, the heavens began to assume a threatening appear
ance, and, a few hours later, a heavy rain fell, which lasted unre
mittingly throughout the whole of the succeeding day. Mean
while, our troops were without provisions, and had no means of
transportation. The railroad bridge across Bull Run had been de
stroyed, too, and its reconstruction was indispensable to open the
way for a farther advance, which, thus deferred, could no longer
* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol, i. p. 359.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 117
be called a pursuit. The fact is, the pursuit ordered by General
Beauregard, at the close of the battle,* having been stopped at
about 6.30 p.m., in consequence of the false alarm referred to in
the preceding chapter, no movement that night could have met
with a successful result. It should have been instantly and vigor
ously made, " on the very heels of the flying enemy ;" and, even
then, it could not have been kept up long under the circum
stances. At pages 359, 360, of the first volume of his work, Mr. Davis
says : " On the night of the 22d I held a second conference with
Generals Johnston and Beauregard, . . . and propounded to them
the inquiry as to what more it was pi'acticable to do. They con
curred as to their inability to cross the Potomac ; and to the fur
ther inquiry as to an advance to the south side of the Potomac,
General Beauregard promptly stated that there were strong forti
fications there, occupied by garrisons which had not been in the
battle, and were therefore not affected by the panic which had
seized the defeated army. He declared those fortifications as hav
ing wide, deep ditches, with palisades, which would prevent the
escalade of the works. Turning to General Johnston, he said,
' They have spared no expense.' "
Here, truth compels us to state that, in all this matter, Mr.
Davis's memory is again unqualifiedly at fault. General Beaure
gard could not have spoken as he is represented to have done,
for the simple reason that all the information then in his pos
session, whether received by means of his " underground rail
road " or otherwise, led him to the strong belief that Washington
was, at that time, entirely unprotected ; that the works on the
south side of the Potomac were barely commenced, except Fort
Runnyon, which was still incomplete, and armed with but a few
guns; as appeared by a sketch of it, received in the usual mysteri
ous way from within the enemy's lines. Mrs. G  , to whose
tact, and intelligence was due most of the secret knowledge of
the condition of affairs at and around the Federal capital, had
assured General Beauregard, many a time, that no obstacle ex
isted to prevent a successful advance on our part, and that noth
ing was dreaded more by those high in authority at Washington.
More than once, after the battle of Manassas, Mrs. G  ended

* See report of battle, in Chapter IX.

s

118 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
her despatches in these words: "Come on! why do you not
come?" We could, in this connection, were it not necessary to
resume the thread of our narrative, tell of some very interesting
occurrences, showing the manner in which news was brought to
General Beauregard from Washington. We mention a single in
stance. About the middle of July, on a bright, sultry morning,
a young lady of much refinement, and possessing both youth
and beauty, rode into General Bonham's lines, at Fairfax Court-
House, and delivered to him a despatch of great importance, for
General Beauregard, "from our friends in Washington." She
had incurred great fatigue and danger in the accomplishment of
her mission. This despatch she carried carefully concealed in her
hair, which, when enrolled in the presence of the Confederate
general, appeared to him — to use his own language — " the most
beautiful he had ever seen on human head."* The young lady
in question was a resident of the Federal capital, and had passed
out of it in a small farm wagon, disguised as a plain country
woman coming from market. Farther on her way, at the resi
dence of a relative, well known and wealthy, she obtained the
horse she was riding and the habit she then wore. We refrain
from giving her name, but it will never be forgotten either by
General Beauregard or by General Bonham, and is, no doubt, as
deeply graven upon the memory of the several staff officers who
had the pleasure of escorting her through our lines. We wish,
nevertheless — and look upon it as a duty — to place upon record
her patriotic deed, so fearlessly and successfully accomplished.
Irregular and unofficial as were the secret communications here
spoken of, General Beauregard, who knew their importance and
trustworthiness, never failed to forward their contents to the
War Department. Mr. Davis, therefore, was aware — or should
have been — of what General Beauregard thought of the readiness
of Washington to resist an advance of our forces at that time.
It is not here pretended that no one spoke to Mr. Davis, on that
occasion, as he asserts that General Beauregard did ; but it is
now stated, emphatically, and on the direct authority of General
Beauregard, that he did not make use of any such language to
Mr. Davis. In support of the position here so positively assumed
tlie reader is referred, first, to the fact, afterwards so thoroughly
*From a letter of General Bonham to General Beauregard.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 119
verified, that no fortifications existed then at or around Washing
ton ; none, at any rate, that could have seriously obstructed the
march of our army; second, to General Beauregard's letter to Colo
nels Chestnut and Miles, bearing date July 29th, 1861, and to his
answer to President Davis (August 10th of the same year), where
in is considered this very question of an advance upon Washing
ton, and its feasibility, as late as the 24th of July. These letters
appear in full further on in the present chapter. The fact is,
that General Beauregard's whole correspondence, official and pri
vate, touching these events, confirms, in every respect, what is
stated in the two letters above mentioned.
Our object is not, at present, to dwell upon the causes — what
ever they may have been — of our failure to reap the fruits of that
first great victory of the war. We wish merely to state that
General Beauregard exonerates Mr. Davis from all responsibility
for the failure to pursue the enemy on the night of the 21st of
July. Mr. Davis did not object to such a pursuit; on the con
trary, he desired it. But it was declared inexpedient, and, after
discussion, Mr. Davis himself acknowledged it to be so. This,
however, does not relieve him from the responsibility of prevent
ing, a few days or weeks later, the advance of our army, in an
aggressive campaign against Washington.
On the morning after the battle an order was issued by General
Beauregard, recalling his troops to their organization, and assign
ing them new positions, with the advance — Bonham's brigade —
at Centreville. Holmes's brigade, by direction of President
Davis, was ordered back to " its former position." *
At the breakfast -table, on the same morning, the President
handed General Beauregard the following graceful letter :
" Manassas, Va., July 21st, 1861.
"Sir, — Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas and on several
other occasions during the existing war, as affording the highest evidence of
your skill as a commander, your gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a
patriot, you are appointed to be ' General ' in the army of the Confederate
States of America, and, with the consent of the Congress, will be duly com
missioned accordingly. " Yours, etc., " Jeffekson Davis.
"General G. T. Beauregakd."
On the 23d, Hunton's 8th Virginia, with three companies of

* See Appendix to this chapter.

120 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
cavalry, was ordered to re-occupy Leesburg, and Bonham's brig
ade, with Delaware Kemper's and Shields's batteries and a force
of cavalry, were ordered to advance to Vienna Station, and Long-
street to Centreville. As the leading column was approaching
Fairfax Court-House, Captain Terry, of Texas, a noted marks
man, lowered the Federal flag by cutting the halliards with a rifle
ball. This flag was sent, through General Longstreet, as a present
to General Beauregard, but was placed among the stock of tro
phies where it belonged, as well as a larger flag, offered to Mr.
Davis, who had already left Manassas for Richmond. Many
spoils were gathered during and after the battle ; and the line of
march of our troops, on their way to the new positions assigned
them, was rich in abandoned arms and other military property. A
great deal was carried off by the people, and was recovered with
much trouble.
On the 25th, Generals Johnston and Beauregard issued an ad
dress to their troops, awarding to them the praises they deserved
for their patriotic courage on the battle-fields of the 18th and
21st. The concluding words were as follows : " Soldiers, we con
gratulate you on a glorious, triumphant, and complete victory.
We thank you for doing your whole duty in the service of your
country." On that day, also, General Beauregard, in anticipation, it might
be said, of the future orders of the government, organized his
army, as now increased into eight brigades, each of which was
made up of regiments coming from a single State. But no mili
tary movement of importance could be undertaken, on account of
additional embarrassments from the want of transportation and
subsistence. Only one wagon arid four horses were assigned to
every hundred men. Each brigade staff and each hospital were
limited to the same insufficient transportation. The army was
living from hand to mouth, and actually suffering from want of
food. Colonel R. B. Lee, the efficient Chief Commissary of the
army in the field, had not been long in finding out that the ways
of the Commissary-General, Colonel Northrop, were altogether im
practicable ; and, in order to keep our forces properly supplied,
he was compelled to resort, in a measure, to the system formerly
pursued by Captain Fowle, under General Beauregard's instruc
tions, and without which the army would have fallen to pieces,
even before the battle of Manassas. Colonel Northrop, thereupon,

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 121
became very much irritated against the energetic Colonel Lee,
and, without consulting or informing the general of either army,
superseded him, as he had lately done Captain Fowle, for a sim
ilar reason, appointing another Chief Commissary, namely, Major
William B. Blair.
With regard to this all-important question of provisioning the
army and supplying it with transportation, we put before the
reader the following letters, which speak for themselves, and show
General Beauregard's sagacity and intense anxiety upon these
points. They also hold up to public view the appalling misman
agement of all army affairs at Richmond, in relation to the Quar
termaster and Commissary Departments. " Camp Pickens, July 23d, 1861.
" To His Excellency the President of the Confederate States :
" Sir, — I am commanded by General Beauregard to inform your Excellency
that the stock of provisions has become alarmingly reduced, in consequence
of the non-fulfilment of requisitions of the Commissary-General.
" The general directs me to say, that unless immediate supplies are forwarded,
in conformity with these requisitions, most serious consequences are inevitable.
" With much respect, your obedient servant,
" R. B. Lee, Lieut.- Col. C. S. A.,
and Chief Commissary of Army of Potomac."
On the 29th of July, no satisfactory change having resulted
from the foregoing communication to the President, General Beau
regard wrote the following letter to Colonels Wm. P. Miles and
James Chestnut, both members of the Confederate Congress, at
that time, and both of whom had acted as his volunteer aids in
South Carolina and in Virginia. " Manassas, Virginia, July 29th, 1861.
"My dear Colonels, — I send you, herewith, some important suggestions rel
ative to the best mode of providing for the wants of this army, furnished me
by Colonel L. M. Hatch, whose experience in such matters entitles his views
and opinions to considerable weight. Unless the requirements of our army in
the field are provided for beforehand, we shall be in a perfect state of destitu
tion very shortly.
" I will remark here, that we have been out of subsistence for several days,
some of my regiments not having had anything to eat for more than twenty-
four hours. They have stood it, though, nobly ; but, if it happens again, I shall
join one of their camps and share their wants with them ; for I will never al
low them to suppose that I feast while they suffer.
" The want of food and transportation has made us lose all the fruits of our

122 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
victory. We ought at this moment to be in or about Washington, but we are
perfectly anchored here, and God only knows when we will be able to advance ;
without these means we can neither advance nor retreat. The mobility of an
army, which constitutes the great strength of modern armies, does not certainly
form an element of ours, for we seem to be rooted to this spot.
" Cannot something be done towards furnishing us more expeditiously and
regularly with food and transportation 1
"It seems to me that if the States had been called upon to furnish their
quota of wagons per regiment in the field, one of these evils could have been
obviated. " From all accounts, Washington could have been taken up to the 24th in
stant, by twenty thousand men ! Only think of the brilliant results we have
lost by the two causes referred to !
" Again, we must have a few more field-officers from the old service, other
wise our regiments will get worsted sooner or later.
" In haste, yours truly,
" G. T. Beaueegaed."
On the 1st of August he forwarded the following telegram to
Colonel A. C. Myers, Assistant Quartermaster-General :
" Several of my brigades are entirely destitute of transportation ; no advance
can be made until procured. Can you not send me about one hundred wagons ?
" G. T. Beauregard."
Congress becoming alarmed — and justly so — at such a state of
affairs, upon information communicated to it by members of the
Military Committee, instituted an investigation, which, besides
very much incensing the heads of the two departments implicated,
also aroused the displeasure of the President, who gave expression
to his irritation in the following letter :
" Richmond, Virginia, August 10th, 1861.
" General G. T. Beauregard :
" My dear Sir, — Enclosed I transmit copies of a resolution of inquiry and the
reply to it. You will perceive that the answer was made in view of the tele
gram which I enclosed to you, that being the only information then before me.
Since that time it has been communicated to me that your letter to Hon. Mr.
Miles, on the wants of your army, and the consequences thereof, was read to
the Congress, and hence the inquiry instituted. Permit me to request that you
will return the telegram to me, which I enclosed to show you the form in which
the matter came before me.
" Some excitement has been created by your letter; the Quartermaster and
the Commissary General both feel that they have been unjustly arraigned. As
for myself, I can only say that I have endeavored to anticipate wants, and any
failure which has occurred from imperfect knowledge might have been best
avoided by timely requisitions and estimates.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 123
"I think you are unjust to yourself in putting your failure to pursue the
enemy to Washington to the account of short supplies of subsistence and trans
portation. Under the circumstances of our army, and in the absence of the
knowledge since acquired, if, indeed, the statements be true, it would have been
extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed. You will not
fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the enemy was routed, a large
part of our forces was moved by you, in the night of the 21st, to repel a sup
posed attack on our right, and that the next day's operations did not fully
reveal what has since been reported of the enemy's panic.
" Enough was done for glory, and the measure of duty was full ; let us
rather show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable, than, by dwell
ing on possibilities recently developed, give form and substance to the criti
cisms always easy to those who judge after the event.
" With sincere esteem, I am, your friend,
"Jefferson Davis."
The foregoing letter shows, among other things, how complete
ly the reiterated suggestions and remonstrances and requisitions
of General Beauregard concerning the necessity of supplies and
transportation, had slipped President Davis's memory. We re
frain from fatiguing the attention of the reader, by again placing
before him the evidence and correspondence given on this sub
ject in a preceding chapter (Chapter VI.). It is enough to say
that, from the 3d of June, just after his arrival at Manassas, to
the time when President Davis penned the letter given above,
General Beauregard had never ceased calling his attention and
that of the War Department to the vital importance of these two
matters. How President Davis could possibly plead " imperfect
knowledge," and complain of want " of timely requisitions and
estimates," is more than we can understand ; and we have sought in
vain, in his book, for any satisfactory explanation of the matter.
But General Beauregard's answer to the President dispenses with
the necessity for further comment: "Manassas, Va., August 10th, 1861.
" Dear Sir, — Your letter of the 4th instant has been received, but my end
less occupations have prevented me from acknowledging it immediately, as
I should have done.
"I regret exceedingly to hear that Colonel Miles read my letter of the 29th
to Congress. It was written only for the purpose of expediting matters, if
possible, and immediately after having been informed that one brigade and
two or more regiments were without food, and had been so for twenty-four
hours. I had before been informed that we were short of provisions ; but I
never supposed it would be permitted to go to the extent referred to. Some
time before the battle of the 21st ultimo I had endeavored to remedy the im-

124 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
pending evil by ordering Major Fowle, the acting Commissary-General here,
to provide a certain number of rations, by purchasing in the surrounding coun
ties, which drew from the Commissary-General of the army a letter so dis
courteous to me that the want of time alone prevented me from enclosing it
to you for your consideration.
"With regard to making timely requisitions on the Quartermaster and
Commissary Department, not knowing what number of troops the War De
partment intended at any time to concentrate here, it was impossible to make
proper requisitions until after the arrival of those troops.
" I will here remark, that troops arriving at this place have often been a
day or more without food in the cars, and I have had several times to order
issues of provisions here to troops on their way to Winchester, for the same
cause. I accuse no one, I state facts.
" I am fully aware that you have done more than could be expected of you
for this army, and that it is utterly impossible you should be able to direct
each one of the bureaus of the War Department, but the facts referred to show
a deficiency somewhere, which ought to be remedied, otherwise we will, soon
er or later, be liable to the same unfortunate results.
" My experience here teaches me that, after issuing an order, I have to in
quire whether it has been carried into effect ; this is especially the case with
the newly arrived troops.
" With regard to my remarks about marching on to Washington, you must
have misunderstood them, for I never stated that we could have pursued the
enemy on the evening of the 21st, or even on the 22d. I wrote : ' The want of
food and transportation has made us lose all the fruits of our victory. We
ought at this time, the 29th of July, to be in or about Washington, and, from
all accounts, Washington could have been taken up to the 24th inst. (July),
by twenty thousand men.'
" Every news from there confirms me still more in that opinion. For sev
eral days (about one week) after the battle, I could not put my new regi
ments in position for want of transportation. I do not say this to injure my
friend Colonel Myers, but to benefit the service. We have, no doubt, by our
success here, achieved ' glory ' for our country, but I am fighting for some
thing more real and tangible, i. e., to save our homes and firesides from our
Northern invaders, and to maintain our freedom and independence as agna
tion. After that task shall have been accomplished, as I feel that I am only
fit for private life, I shall retire to my home, if my means will permit, never
again to leave it, unless called upon to repel again the same or another foe.
" With much respect, I remain,
" Sincerely your friend,
" G. T. Beauregard."
The same surprise and want of knowledge expressed by Pres
ident Davis, concerning the deficiency of these two departments,
was also manifested — strange to say — by the Quartermaster-Gen
eral himself. His communication to General Beauregard, dated

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 125
August 1st, establishes the almost incredible fact that the head of
one of the most important of our departments did not know the
state of its affairs. This was but additional evidence of improvi
dence and mismanagement. There was this difference, however,
between Colonel Myers and Colonel Northrop ; the former was
ever ready to correct an error when in his power to do so, the lat
ter would not allow his errors to be pointed out, and, still less,
discussed. In Colonel Myers's letter to General Beauregard, above
referred to, he writes: "I never, until day before yesterday, have
heard one word of this deficiency ; then, the knowledge came to
me through a despatch from General J. E. Johnston, to the Adju
tant-General. I took immediate steps to collect, at Manassas, as
much transportation as I suppose you will require. . . . The
military operations and manoeuvres of your army are never di
vulged, and it is utterly impossible for me to know how to an
ticipate your wants. . . . We have had, so far, too many
heads, which I can say to you, and which means, we have had no
head at all. You should write me often, if only a line, when any
thing is required, and you shall be provided if possible."
The only conclusion to be drawn from this is, that General
Beauregard's demands and requisitions made to the War Depart
ment were totally disregarded, and never reached the office of
the Quartermaster-General. We now give General Beauregard's
answer to Colonel Myers : " Manassas, Va., August 5th, 1861.
"Dear Colonel, — Your favor of the 1st has been received. My surprise was
as great as yours to find that you had not been informed of our want of
transportation, which has so crippled us, together with the want of provisions,
that we have been anchored here since the battle, not being able to send a
few regiments three or four miles from their former positions. Major Cabell
says that, ' Knowing your inability to comply with his former requisitions for
wagons, etc., he thought it was useless to make new ones upon you, hence he
was trying to get them from around here.' Be that as it may, the result was,
that about fifteen thousand men were sent me by the War Department, with
out one solitary wagon. Before the arrival of these troops, we had, per reg
iment, only about twelve wagons of the meanest description, being coun
try wagons, that break down whenever they come to a bad part of the
road. General Johnston's command had only about seven wagons per regi
ment on arriving here. This state of things cannot and ought not to last
longer. " I am perfectly willing to fight, but my troops must be provided with all
the means necessary to constitute an army. I must be prepared to advance

126 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
or retreat according to circumstances, otherwise disasters will overtake us in
every direction.
" For a long time I could not get more than twenty rounds of ammunition
per man, when within a few miles (not over ten) from an enemy three times
our strength.
" I have applied for Colonel J. L. Kemper, 7th Virginia regiment, to be made
Provisional Quartermaster-General of this and Johnston's army. I wish you
would aid in the matter. I should like, also, to have. General McGowan, of
South Carolina, appointed in that department. He would be very useful.
The best man for each position must be looked for and appointed forthwith,
without regard to other considerations ; otherwise we will never succeed in
defeating the enemy, who is more numerous than we, and has more resources
at hand. In haste, yours truly,
" G. T. Beauregard."
Upon calm reflection, an impartial mind is forced to acknowl
edge that the failure of this campaign, during what were so appro
priately called " the golden days of the Confederacj7," was the un
mistakable result of short-sighted and inefficient management, the
responsibility for which rests upon him who, though clearly un
able to give personal supervision to and direct each detail of the
wheels of government, yet would allow no latitude either to the
heads of the various bureaus of the War Department, or to the
generals in the field.
The unceasing efforts of General Beauregard finally succeeded
in stirring up the authorities at Richmond, and brought about
some effort to produce a favorable change in the administration
of the Quartermaster's and Commissary's Departments. This is
testified to by the following letter of Hon. W. P. Miles, of South
Carolina, then chairman of the Military Committee of Congress,
addressed to General Beauregard, under date of August 8th, 1861 :
" Dear General, — Your despatch has just been received, and I hasten to send
you copy of your letter, as you desire.
"Whatever 'the powers that be' may think of it, or however much they
may fail to relish it, I have no doubt it has had, and will continue to have, a
very salutary and stimulating effect. You may rely upon it, Congress and the
country sympathize with you, although there may be and are differences of
opinion as to the immediate advance upon Washington.
" Very truly yours,
" Wm. Porcher Miles."
But the improvement alluded to — a spasmodic one, it would
seem, and one which had been altogether compulsory — was only
of very short duration. Colonel Myers, it is fair to say, seriously

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 127
exerted himself, and, in a reasonable measure, satisfied many of the
exigencies of the hour. But Colonel Northrop was less open to
conviction. This officer, whose want of administrative capacity
was obvious to all — the President alone excepted — could not be
induced to pursue any other than the inefficient, improvident
course he had, thus far, so persistently followed. This fact is
again brought to notice by the following extract from another
communication from General Beauregard to President Davis:
" Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, Va., August 23d, 1861.
" To His Excellency, President Jefferson Davis, etc., etc. :
"Dear Sir, — I have the honor to enclose you herewith a copy of the state
ment of provisions, etc., remaining on hand at this point and available, on the
21st instant, for the army of the Potomac, by which it will be seen that little
improvement has taken place in that respect, since I last had the honor of ad
dressing your Excellency on the subject, on the 10th instant ; and that we are
still as unprepared to advance or retreat, in consequence thereof, as at that
period. A serious accident to the railroads, from here to Richmond, would
place this army in quite a critical condition, so far as its subsistence is con
cerned. " For the active operations that we may be called upon shortly to make in
this vicinity, with Camp Pickens as a pivot d'action (centre of movement), it
ought to be provided with at least fifteen or twenty days' provisions on hand;
otherwise, to prevent the enemy from taking possession of our lines of com
munication, we would have to abandon this place and fall back, as our forces
could not be provided with means of subsistence. • I regret to say that we
could not now march from here with even three days' rations. I earnestly
and solicitously call your attention to this important subject. Without an
ample supply of provisions we will be perfectly powerless.
" I hope you will do me the justice to believe that these facts are brought
to your Excellency's attention, without regard whatsoever to individuals. I
look only to the success of our cause, regardless of friends or foes.
********* " I remain, dear Sir, respectfully,
" Your obedient servant and friend,
"G.T. Beauregard.''
The most effective mode of remedying these evils was, as General
Beauregard and many other leading men of the country had
pointed out and suggested, forthwith to remove. Colonel Northrop
from a position he was so inadequate to fill. But this the admin
istration would not do. In spite of the pressure of public opinion,
brono-ht to bear against the Commissary-General, whose honesty
none doubted, but whose incapacity all knew, the President per-

128 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
sistently upheld him, as he was wont to do all personal friends of
his. This is corroborated by the following extract from a signifi
cant letter of the Hon. Wm. P. Miles to General Beauregard, bear
ing date of Richmond, August 6th, 1861.
" Dear General, — I received your despatch to-day, suggesting Colonel R. B.
Lee as the ' best man for Commissary-General, and Colonel J. L. Kemper as
Assistant Quartermaster-General.' The President has not the remotest idea
of removing Colonel Northrop. On the contrary, he is under the impression
that he has done everything in his power in his department. You can readily
see that there is, therefore, no possibility of the radical reform you suggest
in this department. In the other case it would require a reorganization of the
general staff, so far as the Quartermaster Department is concerned.
********* " Very sincerely yours,
" Wm. Porcher Miles."
Colonel Miles's opinion was more than confirmed by events.
Not only was the Commissary-General maintained in his position,
but his influence with the administration appeared to increase, as
did, most undoubtedly, his well-known and already proverbial in
efficiency. Mr. Davis's book is replete with words of praise and
commendation for him. Mr. Davis has not, even to this day, for
given those who complained, not of the motives of Colonel North
rop— who was known to be a man of character and education — but
of his fearful shortcomings, so detrimental to the good of the
service. Mr. Davis says that it affords him the greatest pleasure to speak
as he does of Colonel Northrop, " because those less informed of
all he did, and skilfully tried to do, have been profuse of criti
cism, and sparing indeed of the meed justly his due."* In an
other part of his book he uses the following language : " To di
rect the production, preservation, collection, and distribution of
food for the army, required a man of rare capacity and character
at the head of the subsistence department. It was our good fort
une to have such a one in Colonel L. B. Northrop, who was ap
pointed Commissary-General at the organization of the bureaus
of the executive department of the Confederate government"!
These remarks of Mr. Davis are made in defiance of the opinion
of the whole South, as entertained and openly expressed through
out the war. The disposition to defend a friend and to protect his
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 315.
t Ibid. vol. i. p. 303.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 129
reputation is a commendable trait, which should ever be admired
among men ; but the First Magistrate of a free people, and Com
mander-in-Chief of their armies, is not a man, in the ordinary sense
of the word : he must be more guarded in his encomiums of a
friend ; he cannot be allowed to give rein to his likes or dis
likes ; his eye, ever keen and watchful, must be directed to the
general good of those who chose him as their leader ; otherwise
he betrays the trust reposed in him ; he is recreant to his duty ;
he derides public opinion, becomes the accomplice of inefficiency,
if not unworthiness, and deserves as great — perhaps greater —
blame, than those he so unwisely sustains.
Mr. Davis's efforts to shield Colonel Northrop can only result
in shaking the confidence heretofore felt by many persons in the
judgment and sagacity of the ex-President of the Confederacy,
without doing the slightest good to his former Commissary-Gen
eral. It would have been kinder, on the part of Mr. Davis, to have
adopted towards him the course he never hesitates to follow to
wards those whose merits he cannot deny, but will not admit —
pass him by in silence, as though he had never been an actor in
the great drama wherein were lost most of the fondest hopes of
the South.
The supply of fifteen or twenty days' rations, at Manassas, sug
gested in the foregoing communication to the President, as a nec
essary preparation for probable movements of the army, had long
been the subject of General Beauregard's anxious thought. As
we have already seen (Chapter VI.), he had endeavored, as early
as June, to collect many of the wagons he needed, and " twenty-
five days' rations for about twenty thousand men." Again, a little
later, he caused the following order to be given to his Chief Com
missary : " Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Manassas Junction, July Itth, 1861.
" Captain W. H. Fowle, Camp Pickens :
" Captain, — The general commanding directs that you take prompt and ef
fective measures to provide forthwith, at your depot near these headquarters,
ample provisions — including fat cattle — for twenty-five thousand men for two
weeks, and that amount, at least, must be constantly maintained on hand,
subject to requisition, until otherwise ordered. " Thomas Jordan, A. A. G."
That this had not been done, at the time referred to, or at any
I.— 9

130 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
subsequent period, General Beauregard's earnest appeal to the
President for such supplies very conclusively demonstrates. It is
almost unnecessary to add, that no action was taken by the War
Department to carry out these all-important suggestions ; and that,
far from any advance on the enemy being made practicable for us,
we were saved from the calamities foreseen and dreaded by Gen
eral Beauregard, not through efforts of the administration, but by
the simple fact that the enemy was so crippled and demoralized
as to preclude any forward movement on his part.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 131

CHAPTER XI.
General Beauregard Suggests a Forward Movement. — Not Approved by Gen
eral Johnston. — Sanitary Measures. — Deficiency in Light Artillery. — In
structions to Colonel Stuart. — Mason's and Munson's Hills. — General
Beauregard Proposes to Hold Them. — General Johnston of a Different
Opinion. — Popularity of General Beauregard. — He Establishes His Head
quarters at Fairfax Court-House. — Proposes Another Plan Involving De
cisive Battle. — General Johnston Deems it Better not to Hazard the
Movement. — Organization of the Forces into Divisions. — General Beaure
gard Advises that the Army be Placed Under One Head. — President
Davis Invited to a Conference at Fairfax Court-House. — Scheme of Oper
ations Submitted. — Generals Johnston and G. W. Smith Approve it. —
Troops in Splendid Fighting Condition. — The President Objects. — No
Reinforcements can be Furnished, and no Arms in the Country. — Review
of Mr. Davis's Remarks on the Subject. — He Proposes a Plan for Opera
tions Across the Potomac. — The Commanding Generals do not Consider
it Feasible.
On the 8th of August, at General Beauregard's suggestion,
Colonel Evans was ordered to move his brigade to Leesburg, and
assume command of all the forces in Loudon County, the object
being to protect that region against Federal incursions, about
which numerous complaints were made.
It was about that time that General Beauregard resolved to
throw his own forces forward. He hoped, by an advance, to be
able more easily to take the offensive, or draw on a battle, while
the enemy was yet demoralized and undisciplined. Accordingly,
on the 9th and 10th, Longstreet's brigade was moved to Fairfax
Court-House, and D. R. Jones's to Germantown. Bonham was
drawn back from Vienna to Flint Hill, leaving a strong mounted
guard at the former place. Cocke was stationed at Centreville;
Ewell at Sangster's Crossroads ; Early and Hampton at the inter
section of the Occoquan with the Wolf Run Shoals road ; and the
Louisiana brigade at Mitchell's Ford. Elzey's brigade, of General
Johnston's forces, was placed in the immediate vicinity of Fairfax
Station, and Jackson's, also of General Johnston's forces, held a posi
tion near the crossing of Braddock's and the Fairfax Station roads.

132 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
From these advanced positions, the forces, as above enumerated,
could be, at any time, concentrated for offensive or defensive pur
poses. General Beauregard's desire was, by a bold movement, to
capture the exterior lines of the enemy at Annandale, and, should
any serious force come out in support, give it battle, with the
chances in favor of the Confederates. But this plan or project,
General Beauregard being second in command, had, first, to be
submitted to General Johnston, whose approval was necessary for
its execution. General Johnston did not assent to it. This dis
agreement of opinion between the two commanding generals,
whose official intercourse had always been — and continued to be —
most friendly, showed, however, that they differed widely in tem
perament, and belonged to essentially distinct military schools:
General Beauregard, ever in favor of the aggressive, and of sub
jecting an adversary's movements to his own plans — General
Johnston, ever on the defensive, and apparently awaiting the action
of the enemy.
On the 13th of August General Beauregard was officially in
formed, by the Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, of his ap
pointment, by and with the advice and consent of Congress, as
" General " in the army of the Confederate States, to take rank
from July 21st, 1861. He gratefully accepted the high distinction
thus conferred upon him by the President, who, it will be remem
bered, had not awaited the action of Congress to reward his services.
The reader is aware that, on the 23d of August, General Beau
regard again addressed the President* with regard to the insuffi
ciency of subsistence for the army at Manassas. He also urged
the sanitary benefits and economy of procuring for each company
a good professional cook and baker, with portable kitchens and
ovens for encampments. Out of thirty-two thousand six hundred
and fifty-five men, the total of his own army at that time, only
twenty-two thousand two hundred and ninety-one were fit for
duty ; much of the sickness being due, it was thought, to bad
cooking, as well as bad water.
General Beauregard, at this time, also represented to the Presi
dent, through Captain E. P. Alexander, his Chief of Artillery and
Ordnance, the great deficiency of the army in light artillery (there
was but one piece to each of his thirty-five regiments). He urged
* See Chapter X.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 133
the necessity of three guns to each regiment, or, if these were not
to be had, that rocket batteries should be supplied for the purpose
of frightening the untrained horses of the enemy. He asked,
likewise, that the cavalry should be raised to at least four or five
thousand men, for the purpose of charging on McClellan's bat
teries and raw troops, when thrown into disorder by the rockets.
It was long, however, before this want of artillery was even par
tially supplied, and the organization of the rocket batteries was
subsequently thwarted by the military authorities.
General Beauregard now instructed Colonel Stuart, command
ing the cavalry outposts, to keep constantly near the enemy, and
ordered General Longstreet, with his brigade, to remain in close
proximity to Stuart. Towards the end of August, in complying
with these orders, Stuart, who was an officer of great enterprise,
by a series of daily encounters gradually drove back the Federal
force in his front, and, with the co-operation of General Long-
street, finally captured Mason's and Munson's Hills, in full view of
Washington. General Beauregard, who had had minute informa
tion concerning these positions, through Colonel George W. Lay,
long a resident of Washington, proposed to General Johnston,
now that they were in our hands, to hold and support them by
the following arrangement of troops :
1 brigade (Bonham's) at or about old Court-House, near Vienna.
2 brigades (D. R. Jones's and Cocke's) at or about Falls Church.
1 brigade (Longstreet's) at or about Munson's Hill.
1 brigade (Johnston's forces) half-way between Mason's and Munson's Hills.
1 brigade (Johnston's forces) at Mason's Hill.
2 brigades (Walker's and Early's) at or about Annandale.
1 brigade (Ewell's) at or about Springfield.
Some of General Johnston's other brigades were to be placed at
Centreville, Fairfax Court-House, and Fairfax Station, and they
might occasionally be moved towards the Potomac above, to alarm
the enemy and keep him in a state of constant anxiety as to the
safety of Washington; then troops could cross into Maryland,
should the enemy move in a large force from Washington to any
point on the lower Potomac. The place on the river which
General Beauregard believed the enemy would make his next
point oVappui was Evansport, some thirty miles below Washing
ton, and, at the request of General Holmes, he had given instruc
tions as to the manner of its fortification.

134 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
General Johnston, however, was opposed to the occupation of
Mason's and Munson's Hills, and did not approve of the arrange
ment suggested, considering the line of Fairfax Court-House suf
ficiently advanced for all purposes ; and even too distant for the
support of Evansport. His main objection was the danger of
being drawn into a serious, perhaps general, action, so much nearer
to the Federal position than to our own. But General Beaure
gard believed that any expedition of the enemy, sent down the
Potomac, might be at once neutralized by a bold movement from
above into Maryland and on the rear of Washington. He was
willing, besides, should it so happen, to exchange Richmond, tem
porarily, for Washington and Maryland. As to a general action,
he desired it, for the reason that the Federal army was yet undis
ciplined, while our forces, as strong in numbers as might for some
time be expected, were in the full prestige of recent victory; an
advantage now clearly perceptible in the occasional encounters,
with or without an action, between the respective reconnoitring
and foraging parties, and quite conspicuous in the affair at Lewins-
ville, on the 11th of September — but sure to diminish, as time
elapsed, by the great increase in numbers, discipline, and arma
ment of the opposing forces.
The chronic evil — lack of transportation — had become the sub
ject of anxious remonstrance from Captain Alexander, General
Beauregard's Chief of Ordnance. With a portion of the army
now at the threshold of the Federal encampments (Sept. 7th) his
reserve ammunition had been more than a week awaiting trans
portation, for which requisition had been made on the 20th of
August, on the Chief Quartermaster of the army corps.
These ever-recurring annoyances, resulting from the incurable
inefficiency which had to be daily contended against, would have
depressed and utterly discouraged a man less gifted than General
Beauregard. But his activity, his energy and — we may add — his
confidence in his own resources, seemed to increase with the ob
stacles thus thrown in his way. He could not and would not be
despondent. His words, both to his officers and to his men, no
matter under what circumstances, were always of a nature to in
spire them with additional hope, renewed endurance, and confi
dence of success.
Through that quick, innate sympathy with military glory, which
has ever distinguished the American people, General Beauregard's

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 135
name was now borne to the highest point of popularity. He had
6truck the first blow at Sumter, and had thereby asserted the ex
istence of the Confederacy. He had struck the second blow at
Manassas, and had there demonstrated tlie power and vitality of
our cause. " On the afflatus of victory," says the author of " The
Lost Cause," " Beauregard at once ascended to the first reputation
of the war." He was looked up to as the future military agent
of Southern Independence. The many letters of congratulation,
and testimonials of sympathy, confidence, and esteem, he had re
ceived from every part of the country, and from all classes of our
people, sufficiently showed the light in which he was held, and to
whom chiefly, of all Southern leaders in the field, was attributed
the triumphant achievements of our arms. The real difficulties
of the task he had performed were better understood by his of
ficers and men ; and, with them, the enthusiasm which his successes
had created throughout the country took the form of an absolute
devotion. Nor was this all. Gentlemen of position and influence
outside of the army now urged him to allow his name to be pre
sented for the Constitutional Presidency, the election to which
was then approaching. But he unhesitatingly declined, declaring
his place to be only that of a soldier.
Led by that singleness of purpose which guided him through
out the war, and unelated, except by a just gratification that his
efforts in the cause had borne fruitful results, and had brought
him heart to heart with his comrades and countrymen, he at once
directed his whole care to the reorganization of the troops in the
field, to the preparation for new successes, and the advancement
of the strategic frontier beyond the Potomac.
Throwing forward a portion of his troops, by the 12th of Sep
tember, he moved his headquarters to Fairfax Court-House, in or
der to be nearer to his outer lines, which now stretched from
Springfield, below Alexandria, on the right, to the little falls on
the Potomac, above Georgetown, on the left, enclosing the Federal
forces within a narrow circle, from which they made their obser
vations and occasional sorties. For the purpose of watching our
camps, and of gaining information of what transpired there, a bal
loon was much used by the enemy, often in the night. To de
ceive this inconvenient scrutiny, General Beauregard ordered the
kindling of numerous fires as soon as darkness fell, so as to sug
gest extensive bivouacs on our lines. He had himself endeavored,

1^6 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
before this, to procure a balloon from Richmond, but without
success; and though he afterwards obtained one from a private
source, some defect in its construction rendered it of no avail.
Anxious not to lose the present opportunities, General Beaure
gard now proposed to General Johnston, who had also moved his
headquarters to Fairfax Court-House, a plan involving a decisive
battle. General Gustavus W. Smith,* with General Johnston's
forces, was to advance and menace the Federal front, while Gen
eral Beauregard, passing southward of the Occoquan, was to turn
the Federal left flank and attack it with vigor ; an operation re
sembling that subsequently made by General Jackson with brilliant
success, near Richmond, in 1862, though the Confederate forces,
at the time of which we write, were in a condition, both moral
and material, more favorable to success in such a movement.
General Johnston, however, deemed it better not to hazard a
battle at this juncture.
The necessity of organizing the forces into divisions had been
a matter -of discussion between the two generals. As the lack of
division-generals had been the principal cause of the unfortunate
miscarriage of General Beauregard's orders in the recent battle
of Manassas, he had shortly afterwards written to the Adjutant-
General on this important matter, and, later, had represented to
the President that both armies should be placed under one head,
and commanded as the two corps of a single army. The fact is
that, as early as July 24th, only a few days after the battle of
Manassas, the division of our forces into two army corps, as sug
gested by General Beauregard, had been practically effected by
the two commanding generals, f The War Department had not
authorized the change, but had, by its silence, clearly acquiesced
in it. This was followed by a recommendation, on the part of the
senior generals, of seven officers for appointment as major-generals,
and of eight others as brigadiers, two of whom were already in
command of brigades.
Towards the latter part of September General Johnston wrote

* General Smith had joined the Confederacy, and, upon the suggestion of
Generals Johnston and Beauregard, had been commissioned as a Major-General
by the War Department, August, 1861.
t From July 24th, all Orders, General or Special, issued by General Beau
regard, were dated " Headquarters 1st Corps, Army of the Potomac."

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 137
to the Secretary of War, asking that either he or the President
should come to Fairfax Court-House, to confer upon the subject
of organization, and upon a plan for an offensive movement, which
would then be submitted to him.
General Beauregard had conceived a scheme of operations, as
distinguished for its breadth of view, and greatness of proposed
result, as that which had been ineffectually urged before the bat
tle of Manassas. It involved the raising of the available forces
from forty thousand to sixty thousand, by drawing troops from
various parts of the Confederacy ; their places, in the meantime,
to be filled by State troops, called out for three or six months.
This force assembled, a small corps of diversion was to remain in
front, while the army should cross the Potomac, under partial cov
er of night, either at Edwards's Ferry, or, by means of a pontoon
train, at a point nearly north of Fairfax Court-House, which Gen
eral Beauregard was having reconnoitred for that purpose. This
army was then to march rapidly upon Washington, and seize the
Federal supplies in that city. It seemed almost certain that, even
should McClellan reach the threatened point in time — which he
might undoubtedly do — he could not withstand our sudden at
tack and maintain his position. His forces were undisciplined
and demoralized, and Washington had not yet been fortified.
McClellan's army thus placed at our mercy, and Maryland won,
the theatre of war was to be transferred to the Northern States,
from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, the entire West being there
by relieved from peril of invasion. As the Federal government
had not yet recovered from the effects of defeat, none of the
points from which troops were to be drawn for this movement
were seriously threatened ; some of them were not menaced at all ;
and this offensive movement would have forced the Federal gov
ernment to recall its scattered troops for the protection of those
points upon which the Confederate army would have been able
to march after the fall of Washington. The moral effect of such
an exhibition of power on the governments of England and
France would have been of incalculable benefit to the Confed
eracy. Upon the submission of this plan to Generals Johnston and
Smith, the latter at once approved it, and the former, though
for some time unwilling, finally yielded his assent.
President Davis arrived at Fairfax Court-House on the 30th of

138 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
September, and remained there two days, at General Beauregard's
headquarters. In the conferences which followed between him and
Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith, he objected to the
organization of the army into corps and divisions, and to the ap
pointment of major-generals, as suggested ; but yielded so far as to
consent to the formation of divisions and the appointment of two
division-generals (Van Dorn and Longstreet) to the Army of the
Potomac,* and two others (G. W. Smith and Jackson) to the Array of
the Shenandoah.f This matter, which we may call a compromise,
being thus settled, the plan of invading Maryland was earnestly
supported by the three senior generals. Mr. Davis, however,
would not agree to it. He declared that he could draw no troops
from the points named, and that there were no arms in the coun
try for new levies, if raised. This last objection, it is proper here
to say, was not an insuperable one. The President should have
remembered that if the Confederacy was thus deficient in arma
ment it was because he had refused to avail himself of the offer
by which, as early as May, 1861,^: all the arms and equipments
needed for our armies could have been procured. But why should
not arms have been imported, even at that time (October, 1861),
when no Federal blockading squadron could have interfered with
any of our plans to that effect ? It is an historical fact that the
blockade, though officially proclaimed in May, was only partially
effectual twelve months afterwards. Was it that the President
thought it too late then to make the effort? He should have
known that the plan of campaign submitted to him could not be
put into immediate execution ; that the massing of the additional
troops required to carry it out — some of which were to be drawn
from great distances — would necessarily consume some time. The
least display of energy on the part of the administration, the send
ing of an order by telegraph to the house of John Frazer & Co.,
of Charleston, would have been more than sufficient to secure for
the government all the arms it required for the new levies spoken
of, which, though not directly needed for the forward movement

* Designation of General Beauregard's forces, as per orders issued by him, on
the 20th of June, 1861.
t Designation of General Johnston's forces, before and after his junction with
General Beauregard.
J Proposal of John Frazer & Co., set forth in Chapter V.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 139
and aggressive campaign urged upon Mr. Davis, could have been
used to fill the place of the seasoned troops withdrawn to reinforce
the Army of Virginia.
In vain was it urged upon the President that the army was now
in splendid fighting condition, and eager again to meet its recently
defeated foe ; while, if left inactive, it was liable to deteriorate dur
ing the winter, and lose greatly in numbers by the expiration of the
enlistment term of the twelve months' men. It was further urged
that, with the army raised to sixty thousand men, the movement
could be undertaken, with the prospect of success to follow at
every other point along the frontier ; whereas, should disaster re
sult from the loss of present opportunity, the entire Confederacy
might be endangered at a later date, with but inferior hope of re-
cuperatiou. Mr. Davis, however, could not be influenced, and de
clared that the utmost he could do would be to furnish recruits,
to be armed with the surplus stands of arms then at Manassas,
amounting to about two thousand five hundred.
Thus was abandoned a plan which, had it been carried out,
would have borne mighty results to the Confederacy. That it was
a bold one is undoubted. But boldness in our movements, while
the prestige of victory yet animated our troops, was clearly the
wisest policy to be adopted. It was of the utmost importance for
us to follow up our victory, and the surest way of doing so was
by making an aggressive campaign. It would have compelled the
enemy, demoralized and unprepared as he still was, to put himself
on the defensive to repel invasion on his own soil, instead of at
tempting it on ours.
In lieu of thp unaccepted movement favored by the generals in
command, Mr. Davis suggested that a column be crossed to the
eastern shore of the Potomac, opposite Aquia Creek, to capture a
Federal division posted there under General Sickles. As the
river, at that point more than a mile wide, was held by United
States war vessels, and there would hardly have been an oppor
tunity for the troops, even if successful, to return to Virginia, this
proposition met the approval of none of the three generals, and
was therefore courteously discarded. We shall have to recur to
this subject later in the present chapter.
Mr. Davis devotes five pages of his book to the " Fairfax Court-
House Conference," as it was called, and most unjustifiably arraigns
Generals J. E. Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith, not for

140 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
having taken a part in it, or expressed their views upon the points
at issue between them, but for having, " about four months after
wards," prepared a " paper " wherein was made " a record of their
conversation ; a fact," says Mr. Davis, " which was concealed from
me, whereas, both for accuracy and frankness, it should have been
submitted to me, even if there had been nothing due to our official
relations. Twenty years after the event I learned of this secret
report, by one party, without notice having been given to the other,
of a conversation said to have lasted two hours."* And Mr. Davis
continues as follows: "I have noticed the improbabilities and
inconsistencies of the paper, and without remarks I submit to
honorable men the concealment from me in which it was pre
pared," etc.f
This language is all the more unwarrantable, because Mr. Davis
fails to show — though he asserts it — that any effort at conceal
ment was ever made by those whom he accuses of it. Knowing
the importance of this conference, and desirous of having a true
and correct account of it, one that could not be effaced or altered
by the lapse of time, the three generals wrote out, while it was
still fresh in their memory, all that had passed between them and
the President. As nothing was added and nothing suppressed in
the memorandum thus made, what obligation was there on their
part to submit it to Mr. Davis ? He knew, as well as they did,
what had transpired, and had nothing further to learn about it.
He also — in all propriety — could have committed the conversation
to writing, had it so pleased his fancy ; and, provided it was done
correctly, no account whatever of his action in the matter was due
to the three generals or any one of them.
What Mr. Davis says, to-day, of that conference, shows how
wise and how far-seeing were Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and
Smith, in preparing the paper alluded to, which has aroused to
such an extent the ire of the ex-President. General Beauregard,
for one, had already had occasion to learn what light work could
be made with a plan of operations verbally submitted to the Com
mander-in-Chief of our armies. We refer to the plan proposed,
through Colonel Chestnut, on the 14th of July, 1861, before the
battle of Manassas, which Mr. Davis denied having ever had any
* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol.i. p. 451.
t Ibid. vol. i. p. 452.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 141
official cognizance of, because no written communication had been
handed to him at the time; and because, no doubt, he was una
ware that a full report of the circumstance had been drawn up by
Colonel Chestnut, and was in General Beauregard's possession.
And here, perhaps, the following query may find a fitting place
in this review : Did Mr. Davis ever communicate to General Beau
regard his official endorsement upon the report of the battle of
Manassas ? If he had done so, his charge of " concealment," un
just though it is, would come with a better grace than it does ;
but, as he did not, his imputation of duplicity falls upon himself.
For, as the reader will hereafter learn,* the President's endorse
ment, contradicting, with unreserved severity, statements made by
General Beauregard in his report, was an official paper, officially
forwarded to Congress, but studiously kept from General Beaure
gard's knowledge. The impugned memorandum was altogether
an unofficial paper, prepared by the three generals for their
own private files, without even a shadow of reproach against the
President, and merely intended as a reminder, hereafter, of an
important military event. Hence we say, it was a wise and emi
nently proper measure to prepare a written memorandum of what
occurred at the Fairfax Court-House council. " Verba volant
scripta manent :" an adage always to be appreciated for the sound,
• practical teaching it contains. It is the right, no less than the
duty, of leading men, in all countries and in all ages, to see to it
that the truth concerning public events is carefully guarded and
preserved, in order that it may not be easily tampered with, or
made to degenerate into error. As matters now stand, and thanks
to the foresight displayed by Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and
Smith, Mr. Davis, no less than those who figured with him in the
conference we speak of, must abide by its text, as recorded at the
time. And to show how completely Mr. Davis errs, when he
charges that he was kept purposely in ignorance of the " secret
report " he so bitterly denounces, we here state that it was seen
of many men during the war — and not as a secret; and that, as
early as 1867 or 1868 — in other words, fully fifteen or sixteen
years ago — General Beauregard had this identical memorandum
published in The Land We Love — a magazine edited, at that time,
by General D. H. Hill, of North Carolina. It was commented on
* In Chapter XIII.

142 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
at length, if not republished, in the Jackson (Miss.) Clarion. No
one is responsible for Mr. Davis's neglect to take cognizance of
it. His appeal, therefore, to the " honorable men " of the country,
whose sympathies he desires to enlist in his favor, becomes sim
ply puerile; and, far from resulting in injury to those whom he
assails, it only recoils upon himself, and exposes the extreme care
lessness with which he writes.
Mr. Davis should have inserted that document in his book. His
criticisms would then have been better appreciated. Why he ab
stained from doing so is not, however, hard to understand. As
General Beauregard has no like reasons to refrain from giving full
publicity to it (we know that Generals Johnston and Smith think
as he does on the subject), we now lay the whole paper before the
reader, asking his most careful consideration of it.
" On the 26th of September, 1861, General Joseph E. Johnston addressed a
letter to the Secretary of War, in regard to the importance of putting this army
in condition to assume the offensive ; and suggested that his Excellency the
President, or the Secretary of War, or some one representing them, should at
an early day come to the headquarters of the army, then at or near Fairfax
Court-House, for the purpose of deciding whether the army could be rein
forced to the extent that the commanding general deemed necessary for an
offensive campaign.
" His Excellency the President arrived at Fairfax Court-House a few days
thereafter, late in the afternoon, and proceeded to the quarters of General
Beauregard. " On the same evening General Johnston and I called to pay our respects.
No official subjects of importance were alluded to in that interview. At eight
o'clock the next evening, by appointment of the President, a conference was
had between himself, General Johnston, General Beauregard, and myself. Va
rious matters of detail were introduced by the President, and talked over be
tween himself and the two senior generals. Having but recently arrived, and
not being well acquainted with the special subject referred to, I took little or
no part in this conversation. Finally, with perhaps some abruptness, I said,
' Mr. President, is it not possible to put this army in condition to assume the
active offensive ?' adding, that this was a question of vital importance, upon
which the success or failure of our cause might depend. This question
brought on discussion. The precise conversation which followed I do not
propose to give: it was not an argument; there seemed to be little difference
of opinion between us in regard to general views and principles. It was
clearly stated and agreed to, that the military force of the Confederate States
was at the highest point it could attain without arms from abroad ; that the
portion of this particular army present for duty was in the finest fighting con
dition ; that, if kept inactive, it must retrograde immensely in every respect

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 143
during the winter, the effect of which was foreseen and dreaded by us all.
The enemy were daily increasing in numbers, arms, discipline, and efficiency
— we looked forward to a sad state of things at the opening of a spring cam
paign. These and other points being agreed upon without argument, it was
again asked, ' Mr. President, is it not possible to increase the effective strength
of this army, and put us in condition to cross the Potomac- and carry the
war into the enemy's country ? Can you not, by stripping other points to the
last they will bear, and even risking defeat at all other places, put us in con
dition to move forward ? Success here at this time saves everything, defeat
here loses all.' In explanation, and as an illustration of this, the unqualified
opinion was advanced, that if, for want of adequate strength on our part in
Kentucky, the Federal forces should take military possession of that whole
State, and even enter and occupy a portion of Tennessee, that a victory gained
by this army beyond the Potomac would, by threatening the heart of the
Northern States, compel their armies to fall back, free Kentucky, and give us
the line of the Ohio within ten days thereafter. On the other hand, should
our forces in Tennessee and Southern Kentucky be strengthened so as to en
able us to take and to hold the Ohio River as a boundary, a disastrous de
feat of this army would at once be followed by an overwhelming wave of
Northern invaders, that would sweep over Kentucky and Tennessee, extend
ing to the northern part of the Cotton States, if not to New Orleans. Similar
views were expressed in regard to ultimate results, in Northwestern Virginia,
being dependent upon the success or failure of this army ; and various other
special illustrations were offered — showing, in shorj, that success here was
success everywhere; defeat here, defeat everywhere; and that this was the
point upon which all the available force of the Confederate States should be
concentrated. " It seemed to be conceded by all that our force, at that time here, was not
sufficient for assuming the offensive beyond the Potomac ; and that, even with
a much larger force, an attack upon their army, under the guns of their for
tifications on this side of the river, was out of the question. The President
asked me what number of men were necessary, in my opinion, to warrant an
offensive campaign, to cross the Potomac, cut off the communication of the
enemy with their fortified capital, and carry the war into their country. I
answered, 'Fifty thousand effective seasoned soldiers;' explaining that by sea
soned soldiers I meant such men as we had here present for duty ; and add
ed that they would have to be drawn from the peninsula about Yorktown,
Norfolk, from Western Virginia, Pensacola, or wherever might be most ex
pedient. " General Johnston and General Beauregard both said that a force of sixty
thousand such men would be necessary; and that this force would require
large additional transportation and munitions of war, the supplies here bein°-
entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy's country, even
with our present force. In this connection there was some discussion of
the difficulties to be overcome, and the probabilities of success, but no one
questioned the disastrous results of remaining inactive throughout the
winter.

144 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
" Notwithstanding the belief that many in the Northern army were opposed
on principle to invading the Southern States, and that they would fight bet
ter in defending their own homes than in attacking ours, it was believed that
the best, if not the only place, to insure success, was to concentrate our forces,
and attack the enemy in their own country. The President, I think, gave no
definite opinion in regard to the number of men necessary for that purpose,
and I am sure that no one present considered this a question to be finally de
cided by any other person than the commanding general of this army. Re
turning to the question that had been twice asked, the President expressed
"surprise and regret that the number of surplus arms here was so small ; and,
I thought, spoke bitterly of this disappointment. He then stated, that, at that
time, no reinforcement could be furnished to this army of the character asked for,
and that the most that could be done would be to furnish recruits. to take the
surplus arms in store here (say twenty-five hundred stand). That the whole coun
try was demanding protection at his hands, and praying for arms and troopsfor
defence. He had long been expecting arms from abroad, but had been disap
pointed. He still hoped to get them, but had no positive assurance that they
would be received at all. The manufacture of arms in the Confederate States
was as yet undeveloped to any considerable extent. Want of arms was the
great difficulty ; he could not take any troops from the points named, and,
without arms from abroad, could not reinforce this army. He expressed re
gret, and seemed to feel deeply, as did every one present.
" When the President had thus clearly and positively stated his inability
to put this army in the condition deemed by the general necessary before en
tering upon an active offensive campaign, it was felt that it might be better
to run the risk of almost certain destruction, fighting upon the other side of
the Potomac, rather than see the gradual dying-out and deterioration of this
army during a winter at the end of which the term of enlistment of half the
force would expire. The prospect of a spring campaign, to be commenced un
der such discouraging circumstances, was rendered all the more gloomy by
the daily increasing strength of an enemy already much superior in numbers.
On the other hand was the hope and expectation that before the end of win
ter arms would be introduced into the country ; and all were confident that
we could then not only protect our own country, but successfully invade that
of the enemy.
" General Johnston said that he did not feel at liberty to express an opinion
as to the practicability of reducing the strength of our forces at points not
within the limits of his command ; and with but few further remarks from
any one, the answer of the President was accepted as final ; and it was felt
that there was no other course left but to take a defensive position and await
the enemy. If they did not advance we had but to await the winter and its
results. " After the main question was dropped, the President proposed that, instead
of an active offensive campaign, we should attempt certain partial operations
— a sudden blow against Sickles or Banks, or to break the bridge over the
Monocacy. This, he thought, besides injuring the enemy, would exert a good
influence over our troops, and encourage the people of the Confederate States

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 145
generally. In regard to attacking Sickles, it was stated in reply that, as the
enemy controlled the river with their ships of war, it would be necessary for
us to occupy two points on the river, one above and another below the point
of crossing, that we might by our batteries prevent their armed vessels from
interfering with the passage of the troops. In any case the difficulty of cross
ing large bodies over wide rivers, in the vicinity of an enemy, and then recross-
ing, made such expeditions hazardous ; it was agreed, however, that if any
opportunity should occur, offering reasonable chances of success, that the at
tempt would be made.
"During this conference, or council, which lasted, perhaps, two hours, all.
was earnest, serious, deliberate ; the impression made upon me was deep and
lasting, and I am convinced that the foregoing statement is not only correct
as far as it goes, but, in my opinion, it gives a fair idea of all that occurred
at that time in regard to the question of our crossing the Potomac.
" G. W. Smith, Maj.-Gen. C. S. A.
" Centreville, Va., January 31st, 1862. Signed in Triplicate.
" Our recollections of that conference agree fully with this statement of Gen
eral G. W. Smith. " G. T. Beauregard, Gen. C. S. A.
" J. E. Johnston, Gen. C. S. A.
" Centreville, Va., January 31st, 1862. Signed in Triplicate."
This is what took place at the Fairfax Court-House conference.
It confirms what we have already stated at the beginning of the
present chapter.
We now resume our review of Mr. Davis's remarks about it.
In that authoritative tone which ill befits him to-day, and frees
from undue courtesy towards him those whom he so cavalierly
misrepresents, Mr. Davis, with a view to impugn the veracity of
the authors of the foregoing memorandum, writes as follows : " It
does not agree in some respects with my memory of what occurred,
and is not consistent with itself."* Not consistent, says Mr.
Davis, " because in one part of the paper it is stated that the re
inforcements asked for were to be ' seasoned soldiers,' such as were
there present ;" and in another part, " that he could not take any
troops from the points named, and, without arms from abroad,
could not reinforce that army." f
Thereupon, and after propping up his premises to suit his
purpose, Mr. Davis concludes that, clearly, from the answer he is
said to have made to the three generals, " the proposition had been

* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 450.
t Ibid. vol. i. p. 451.
I.— 10

146 MILITARY OPERATIONS OE
for such reinforcements as additional arms could enable him to
give."* These are sweeping assumptions, and such as only men who
think themselves certain of impunity would venture. Unfortu
nately for Mr. Davis, this is not the case with him. Can he really
believe that because he was President of the Confederate States,
his mere allegations, resting, as they do, only upon his memory of
what occurred twenty years ago, will counterbalance and even out
weigh a document, carefully prepared and signed and vouched
for, by three such generals as Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith,
his peers in gentlemanly attainments, his superiors — especially
two of them — in military merit ; men of unstained character, en
joying, now as then, the entire confidence of their people ; and
who have, to-day, something more tangible than words to fall back
upon, in support of their statements?
No unbiassed reader will believe that this document contains
aught but the truth. For, on the one hand, three men of honor
certify to its truth, and do so four months after the occurrence it
refers to ; while, on the other hand, Mr. Davis alone, without note
or memorandum to assist him, and after twenty years have elapsed,
comes forward and says : My version of the circumstances of the
case is not in accord with yours. You are wrong, though you
committed to writing the entire conference ; I am right, though
my memory, frail and treacherous as it may be, is my only vouch
er to justify me in controverting the positions yon have taken.
With regard to the " inconsistencies" complained of by Mr.
Davis, which he would have his readers believe were so easily de
tected in the written memorandum now before us, we do not hesi
tate to say that they exist in his imagination only. Let the reader
carefully examine the paper we have submitted to him, and see
if he can discover the " inconsistencies," so obvious, according to
Mr. Davis, as to make it a downright " absurdity." f However
strong Mr. Davis's arguments may appear in the absence of the doc
ument which he interprets to suit his fancy, they fall to the ground
and burst as bubbles when confronted with the true facts of the case.
The object of the conference, as we know, was to urge upon the
President the necessity of an offensive campaign ; to accomplish
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 451. The italics
are ours. \ Ibid. vol. i. p. 450.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 147
which, the army at or near Fairfax Court-House was to be raised
to an effective force of sixty thousand men. Not sixty thousand
additional men, but an increase of such a number of " seasoned
soldiers" as would make up a total of sixty thousand. The Vir
ginia army consisted, at that time, of about forty thousand men.
General Smith thought that fifty thousand, that is to say, only ten
thousand more than we then had — would be sufficient to under
take the forward movement. Generals Johnston and Beauregard
gave it as their opinion that sixty thousand would be needed ; in
other words, twenty thousand additional troops.
This being the case — as we have it vouched for by the three
generals — where did Mr. Davis discover and how can he assert,
that " the lowest estimate made by any of them was about twice
the number there present for duty " ? * which — if this were true,
as it is not — would have brought up "the force required for
the contemplated advance into Maryland " to eighty thousand
men and no less. This assertion shows how unsafe and untrust
worthy Mr. Davis's memory is, and it explains, satisfactorily, we
think, why it was that he would not give a place in his book to
that " secret report," as he is pleased to call it.
If, as late as October, 1861, Mr. Davis had no arms to furnish to
recruits, he had, unquestionably, at the different points designated
by the three generals, troops already armed and equipped, already
disciplined and drilled. These, had he been willing to favor the
plan submitted to him, he could, in less than three weeks' time,
have transported to the borders of Virginia, to reinforce the army
said, by those who knew it best, to be " in the finest fighting con
dition." He was asked for such troops as could then be found in
the peninsula around Yorktown, in Western Virginia, at Pensacola,
at Mobile, at Charleston, at New Orleans ; points from which about
twenty-five thousand men — five thousand more than were needed
— could have been withdrawn without unnecessarily exposing the
positions they occupied. These were the " seasoned soldiers "
the three generals wanted. They neither called for nor desired
raw recruits, raised to bear the arms Mr. Davis might possibly re
ceive from Europe, and which he was hoping for, " barring the
dangers of the sea." Recruits of that kind, however well armed,
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 449. The italics
are ours.

148 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
would have been useless, as they could not have sustained the ar
duous campaign sought to be inaugurated, which required pre
vious military training and discipline. But Mr. Davis turned a
deaf ear to the suggestions made to him. He would not receive
the advice of the generals in the field. He failed to seize the
great opportunity offered him, and, as usual, took upon himself to
decide the fortunes of the Confederacy. No troops, he declared,
could be taken from the points named — though none of them
were threatened at the time — and no reinforcements, of the char
acter asked for, could, therefore, be furnished to the army. He
did propose twenty-five hundred recruits for that number of small
arms which we had in store; but no further mention was made of
recruits, either before, during, or after the conference. What was
said of arms, of the expectations of the government about them,
and even of Mr. Davis's disappointment at finding the strength
of the army " but little increased," are side issues, which should
not divert our attention from the true object of the conference
and the main question submitted to the President, namely: An
aggressive campaign into the enemy's country, conditioned upon
reinforcements to be procured from divers points of the Confeder
acy, then and there specially designated.
Mr. Davis charges Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith
with assuming to know more about the positions of our troops at
different stations of the country than the War Department itself,
whose duty it was to receive all the army returns, and by which
questions involving the position and withdrawal of troops, in the
field or elsewhere, "could best be decided." If the War Depart
ment, or " Richmond," as Mr. Davis has it, knew so much about
army matters, how is it that the President, or head of the War
Department, expressed so much wonder at the relative small-
ness of our force at Fairfax Court-House? The "returns"
forwarded to Richmond must certainly have shown him the fact,
and the cause of it. If the Commander-in-Chief of the army
and navy knew so little about the number and condition of
forces then in such close proximity to Richmond, is it not rea
sonable to suppose that his knowledge of troops stationed at
distant points, and in other States, was still more scanty and im
perfect ?
Knowing the purely patriotic motives actuating Generals John
ston, Beauregard, and Smith, when they suggested the means by

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 149
which the advance movement urged by them could be effected;
and knowing also how far from their thought it was to make any
display of superior knowledge, we must deprecate the bitterness
of language used and the irritable personality indulged in by Mr.
Davis, in the following passage of his book : " Very little experi
ence, or a fair amount of modesty, without experience, would serve
to prevent one from announcing his conclusion that troops could
be withdrawn from a place or places, without knowing how many
were there, and what was the necessity for their presence." *
Whatever may be, to-day, the efforts made by Mr. Davis to
shield himself from censure, for the course he then adopted, it
remains none the less an incontrovertible fact, that troops, armed
and equipped, officered and drilled, could have been brought from
the points designated to him, and that he positively refused to al
low their transfer to be effected. That, as Commander-in-Chief,
he had the right so to act, is unquestioned ; but that he erred in
exercising that -right is clear to all who followed the history of
events, from that time to the end of the war.
Mr. Davis insists, that though the generals he met at Fairfax
Court-Houso were of opinion that " it were better to run the risk
of almost certain destruction fighting upon the other side of the
Potomac, rather than see the gradual dying-out and deterioration
of this army during a winter," etc.,f yet, "when it was proposed
to them " by Mr. Davis, " to cross into eastern Maryland, on a-
steamer in our possession, for a partial campaign, difficulties arose
like the lion in the path of the sluggard, so that the proposition
was postponed and never executed. Ln like manner, the other ex
pedition in the valley of Virginia was achieved by an officer not
of this council, General T. J. Jackson." %
No similar expedition was ever thought of or executed during
the Confederate War. Mr. Davis's proposition was unique. The
campaign in the valley of Virginia, which, he says, was achieved
" by another officer not of this council," resembled in nothing the
one he had suggested ; for, if it had, even with such a commander
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 451.
t They did make use of such language, but added : " At the end of which
the term of enlistment of half the force would expire;'1'1 which made a most sig
nificant difference.
I " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. pp. 450, 451. The
italics are ours.

150 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
as Jackson to lead it, overwhelming disaster would have been the
result. Mr. Davis's plan was, by means of a steamer (a single one), then
in our possession, to throw troops across the lower Potomac, for a
partial campaign, against a Federal force said to be on the oppo
site bank, under General Sickles.
Mr. Davis had evidently forgotten that the Potomac, at that
point, was more than a mile and a half wide ; with a tide rising
and falling from five to six feet, twice in twenty-four hours; with
shallow mud-flats in many places, along both shores ; and, last but
not least, with United States war-vessels controlling the river with
untiring activity. He had also forgotten that the Confederate
column — not a regiment, nor even a brigade, but, at least, a division
— thus to be sent into Maryland, would, of necessity, have had to
return to the Virginia shore after the expedition, whether success
ful or unsuccessful. Suppose the landing on the other side had
been safely effected — we cannot see how, but will suppose it,
nevertheless — while the fighting was in progress, the river would
have been patrolled with increased vigilance. The enemy would
have put forth every effort to cut off the return of the column.
Reinforcements would have poured in, from all points, to assist
the attacked Federals. What then would have become of the one
steamer in our possession ? How could she have brought back
our troops, and what troops would have been left to bring back?
We have no hesitation in saying that, had such a movement
been attempted, the fate that overtook the Federal column at
Ball's Bluff, on the 21st of October of the same year, would have
befallen the Confederates. Few indeed — if any — of the doomed
men sent across the Potomac, on Mr. Davis's expedition, would
have returned to the Virginia shore to tell the story of their
defeat. Had any other but the President and Commander-in-Chief of
our armies proposed such a movement to Generals Johnston and
Beauregard, he would have been pitilessly and openly derided.
As it was, our commanding generals did what military etiquette
and their duty towards their men required ; they courteously, but,
unhesitatingly, rejected the proposal.
We find it stated in the memorandum we have so often referred
to, that, at the end of the Fairfax Court-Houae conference, Mr.
Davis, after crushing the hopes of our generals by rejecting their

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 151
plan, suggested certain "partial operations" against the enemy,
among which, and most conspicuous of all, as being the most
promising, was the one just commented upon. This is un
doubtedly correct. But as no mention is made of other opera
tions in Mr. Davis's book, and as General Beauregard's recollec
tion is not quite clear as to their strategic merit, we refrain from
attempting any description of them. That they were not exe
cuted, is, to us, proof sufficient of their manifest impracticability.

152 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XII.
Signal Rockets and Signal Telegraph. — General Beauregard Advises Coast
Defenses at New Orleans, Mobile, Galveston, and Berwick Bay, and Calls
Attention to the Exposure of Port Royal. — Counsels General Lovell Con
cerning River Obstructions between Forts St. Philip and Jackson. — General
Johnston Orders the Troops into Winter Quarters. — Our Lines Formed at
Centreville. — Drainsville and Ball's Bluff. — General Beauregard Proposes
to Intercept General Stone's Retreat, and also Suggests Resolute Attack
against McClellan's Right. — Unfriendly Correspondence Between War
Department and General Beauregard. — Uncourteous Language of Mr.
Benjamin.— General Beauregard Exposes the Ignorance of the Acting
Secretary of War. — Controversy in the Press about General Beauregard's
Report of Battle of Manassas. — His Letter to the Editors of Richmond
Whig. — The President Accuses General Beauregard of Attempting to Ex
alt Himself at His Expense. — He Upholds Mr. Benjamin and Condemns
General Beauregard. — Dignity and Forbearance of the Latter.
While the organization of the army into divisions was being
effected, General Beauregard, from close scrutiny of the Northern
journals, had come to the conclusion that an early attack was
meditated against his lines. To avoid all possibility of surprise,
and deceive the enemy about his real strength, he caused rockets
to be distributed to his command, with minute instructions as to
their use. Very shortly afterwards, as night had just set in, Cap
tain E. P. Alexander, whose zeal and activity were untiring, came
to headquarters and reported that rockets were being thrown up,
in a very strange manner, from the lines of the forces opposing
us. General Beauregard at once ordered the discharge of the
appropriate signals; and, in a few moments a counter - blaze of
rockets swept the sky along the entire line of the Confederate
pickets, which extended about ten miles from the Occoquan, on
the right, to the vicinity of the Potomac, north of Falls Church,
on the left. The consequence was a most extraordinary illumina
tion, which produced an excitement in Washington, where charges
soon became rife that officers of the War Department had given
information of an intended advance by McClellan, in the night,
which the Confederates had shown their readiness to meet.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 153
Through the same officer (Captain Alexander), General Beaure
gard had also succeeded in establishing a signal telegraph between
Mason's and Munson's Hills and Washington. A piece of new
tin, made to perform certain turns in the sunlight, by a friendly
hand, from the window of an elevated mansion in the Federal capi
tal, informed him of McClellan's movements. True, the informa
tion was only of a general character, and, uncorroborated, could
not have been of much assistance. But it served to arouse his
attention, and what with the secret service of his "underground
railroad" and the news culled from Northern journals, which
were regularly procured, he arrived at a fairly correct knowledge
of the enemy's intentions. To render this communication more
efficient, an alphabet was afterwards established and messages were
sent by moving the shades on the several windows of the mansion
alluded to, which, at night, was well lighted up, to make the signs
visible. From Mason's and Munson's Hills answers were given by
the usual system, that is to say, flags in the daytime, and lanterns
as soon as it grew dark. From Washington, lights were resorted
to for night signals, and, for the day, the shifting of window cur
tains, right and left of an imaginary central line. As to General
Beauregard's headquarters and his different outposts, they were
put in communication by means of wire telegraph.
The inability of the President to aid in the execution of the
aggressive campaign so urgently pressed upon him had left no
other course open but to take a defensive position and "await
tne winter and its results." We were to take no initiatory
steps, and fight only if attacked. Believing that a period of
enforced inactivity would now ensue, General Beauregard's
thoughts were turned to the dangers which might threaten the
Southern ports — especially New Orleans; and on the 5th of
October, in a letter addressed to the Secretary of War, he ex
pressed his desire to be sent there during the probable suspension
of hostilities in Virginia. He gave it as his opinion that New
Orleans, Mobile, Galveston, and Berwick Bay, along the Gulf of
Mexico, would undoubtedly be assailed, and should be protected
by field defences proper to withstand attack, until reinforcements
could come to the rescue. He also called attention to the expos
ure of Port Royal, South Carolina, as a harbor of safety on the
Atlantic, for the Federals, and as leading directly to the railroad
communication between Charleston and Savannah.

154 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
On the 6th, Major-General Mansfield Lovell, who had joined
the Southern cause, and had just been commissioned in the Pro
visional Army, came to Fairfax Court-House, requesting General
Beauregard's counsel with regard to the defense of New Orleans,
whither he had been ordered by the War Department. This
counsel General Beauregard gave him with great care and much
minuteness. It is proper here to state, that, during the recent
visit of President Davis to Fairfax Court-House, the subject of
the unprotected condition of New Orleans having arisen, General
Beauregard, expressing his regret that the Military Board of
Louisiana had taken no action as to the suggestions he had made
to them, in February, 1861, again strongly urged his views about
constructing floating booms between Forts Jackson and St. Philip,
to obstruct the passage of a Federal fleet, should such be attempted.
The President gave but little weight to these suggestions, and ap
peared to have no apprehension as to the safety of that city.
In his interview with General Lovell, General Beauregard em
phasized, both orally and in writing, the absolute necessity of such
an obstruction, and hoped that General Lovell, who had approved
of his system, would lose no time in putting it into operation.
Later events showed, however, that the work was not constructed
as planned and advised by General Beauregard, both in his con
ference with General Lovell and in his memoir to the Louisiana
Military Board*
A few days later, General Johnston, apprehending the ap
proaching cold weather, proposed that the forces should now fall
back and establish their winter quarters at Manassas. General
Beauregard, whose arrangements for signal communication with
Washington had been perfected, was reluctant to retire with
out a trial of their present opportunity against the enemy. But
there was no way of avoiding the movement. General Beaure
gard, fearing the bad effect upon the army and the people of a
retreat to the point held by us before our late victory, proposed
Centreville instead of Manassas ; and, to overcome the objection
that the former place was somewhat commanded by a succession
of heights too distant to be embraced within the Confederate
line, he undertook himself to prepare its defences. The order to
* See Chapter I., page 17, about obstructions and floating boom between
Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 155
withdraw his army, however, was so abrupt as to be impracticable
without giving the movement the appearance of flight, and in
volving the loss of valuable property ; it was not executed, there
fore, until the 18th or 19th.
In withdrawing from Mason's and Munson's Hills, the Confed
erates took their last view of the Federal capital, and bade fare
well to a post where soldierly enjoyment, under the exhilaration
of successful daring, had been at its highest during days still
pleasantly remembered as the festive period of the army life.
The positions we abandoned were excellent points of observation,
from which the tents of General McClellan's army might be
counted ; and the fact of our being so near the enemy confused
him as to our plan of operations, for our position seemed to
promise, offensive measures on our part, and denoted both confi
dence and strength. Under a bolder direction, the two hills would
have been fortified and made central strategic and tactical points.
They were scarcely more than seven miles, in an air line, from
Washington, whence the Confederate flag was clearly visible, and
acted as a red capa on the impetuous and imprudent politicians,
provoking them to insist upon a premature attack. Had the two
hills been fortified and supplied with artillery, and the adjacent
ground arranged for a pitched battle, into which the enemy might
have been drawn in an attempt to seize them, the result to Gen
eral McClellan might have been made destructive, as, on his side,
the ground was very bad, and unfavorable to the movements of
troops.* Such an attack was intended by him about the time the
positions were abandoned.
The Confederate forces now took up a line of triangular shape,
with Centreville as the salient, one side running to Union Mills and
the other to the stone bridge, with outposts of regiments three or
four miles forward in all directions, and cavalry pickets as far in
advance as Fairfax Court-House. The Federals followed with a
corresponding advance of their outposts. Afterwards, upon the
closer approach of the enemy, in order to supply the deficiency of
cannon, General Beauregard devised a substitute in wooden logs,
so shaped and blackened as to present the appearance of guns.
They were covered with a shed of brush and leaves, so as to
escape balloon observations, and made quite an imposing array,
* General McClellan so describes it in his report.

150 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
the peaceful character of which very much surprised the Federal
forces when they occupied these works, after their evacuation in
the spring.
On the 19th, General McClellan having ordered McCall's divis
ion to Drainsville, about sixteen miles west of Alexandria, to cov
er reconnoissances in that quarter, and procure supplies, directed
Brigadier-General Stone to feign a crossing of the Potomac from
Poolsville, Maryland, and threaten Leesburg, held by one of Gen
eral Beauregard's brigades, under Colonel Evans. He hoped by
these movements to induce the evacuation of the place. On the
21st, while General McCall was returning to his camp at Langley,
General Stone began crossing his division at Edwards's Ferry, and
one of his subordinates, General Baker, engaged Colonel Evans in
the forenoon. During the day General Stone threw over his en
tire division, and the battle continued until night, when the Fed
eral forces were completely routed, and many of them, driven over
the steep banks at Ball's Bluff, lost their lives in the river.*
Upon receiving from Evans immediate news of the conflict,
General Beauregard proposed to General Johnston to march at
once, with sufficient force, and cut off General Stone's retreat, as
the Potomac, swollen by rains, was then difficult to cross. Gen
eral Johnston did not agree to this, fearing that some occurrence
might take place requiring the presence of all our forces with the
main army. While Banks's division, from Darnestown, Maryland,
moved to his support, General Stone intrenched on the Virginia
shore, but did not succeed in recrossing until the night of the 23d
and 24th.
Just at this time transports had been observed descending the
Potomac, laden with a heavy armament, reported to be intended
for use against General Magruder, who commanded at Yorktown,
on the Peninsula below Richmond, and a heavy force had, mean
while, gathered north of the Potomac, opposite to Evans. Seiz
ing the opportunity, General Beauregard proposed a resolute at
tack against McClellan's extreme right, exposed by its salience in
the quarter of Drainsville, in order to relieve Evans and break
through the enemy's plans ; but the proposition was not assented
to by General Johnston,
Evans's loss at Ball's Bluff was forty men. He captured four-
* From General McClellan's Report.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 157
teen officers and seven hundred men. The entire loss of the en
emy, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was between one thousand
and twelve hundred. Among the slain was General Baker,
whose body was returned to the Federal lines. When, at a later
date, General Stone was arrested and put on trial for his conduct
of that expedition, Colonel Jordan, General Beauregard's Chief of
Staff, noticed in a Northern journal that one of the charges against
General Stone was his failure to give certain orders to General
Baker. Written orders, however, had been found on General Ba
ker's body, which would aid in vindicating General Stone ; and
Colonel Jordan, having mentioned the fact to General Beaure
gard, the latter caused the papers to be immediately sent North,
under a flag of truce; an act of chivalry to the imperilled honor
of a foe.
Until early October, the personal relations of General Beaure
gard with the government officials — except in the case of Colo
nel Northrop's violent eccentricities — had been those of unstudied
friendship, although serious obstructions had also been encoun
tered from the Quartermaster's Department at Richmond. Hav
ing now occasion to recommend the appointment of Mr. T. B. Fer
guson, as Chief of Ordnance of the "First Corps," in the place of
Captain E. P. Alexander, whose services had been transferred to
General Johnston, on account of his needs as General-in-Chief,
General Beauregard received from a subordinate in the War De
partment* the brief reply that the President did not approve the
division of the army into two corps, and preferred that there
should be but one Chief of Ordnance to the Army of the Poto
mac. General Beauregard was more than disappointed at this abrupt,
unceremonious way of rejecting his demand. Though not always
successful in his applications, he had been accustomed to more
courteous treatment from the War Department. He thought
that, apart from the question of giving him an ordnance officer,
of the need of whose services he was no doubt the better judge,
the President ought not arbitrarily to interfere with measures of
usefulness and efficiency, which generals actually in the field could
more accurately appreciate and more wisely manage. In the an
tagonism of Mr. Davis to a system of organization which had

* A. T. Bledsoe, Assistant Secretary of War.

158 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
been working with remarkable success for several weeks, he saw a
fixed purpose to thwart not only his own views, but more partic
ularly those of General Johnston, whose relations with Richmond
were already growing to be of a delicate and uneasy character.
He therefore expressed his dissatisfaction to the Secretary of War,
and went so far as to say, that if he was to understand, by such a
letter, that he was no longer in command of an army corps, he re
quested to be relieved at once from his false position ; otherwise,
he desired the services of a Chief of Ordnance. He urged that
the more imperfect the elements of an army in the field, the
greater should be its subdivisions under competent officers, in or
der that commanders might spare, for their most important duties,
the time and attention unprofitably lost in devotion to minor de
tails ; and that Mr. Ferguson's appointment was to provide a
Chief of Ordnance to attend to the duties of that important de
partment. He also addressed the President on the same subject.
In the month of August, Adjutant-General Cooper had earnest
ly approved General Beauregard's proposition to introduce a rock
et battery in his command. The object of such a battery has al
ready been explained. The Chief of Ordnance, having procured
the manufacture of the rockets, General Beauregard intrusted
Captain E. P. Alexander with the organization of the battery, and
in the latter end of September, upon his recommendation, had au
thorized Lieutenant Edmund Cummins to enlist a rocket company
of fifty volunteers. Being now in Richmond on this duty, Lieu
tenant Cummins, on application to the Post Quartermaster and
Commissary, found his authority questioned, and no attention
given to his requisitions. Referred ultimately for recognition to
the Secretary of War, Mr. Benjamin, the latter told him to wait
until the President should decide the matter. ¦ He then finally in
formed him that his orders were invalid, and remanded him to the
army. There followed a letter from the Secretary of War to
General Beauregard, expressing his " no small surprise " that he
should have committed an act " without warrant in law," and in
forming him that he could be excused and "go unpunished," only
on account of his motive and his defect of judgment. This un
called-for and altogether unwarrantable language, on the part
of the Secretary of War, staggered General Beauregard, as it
seemed improbable that Mr. Benjamin had ventured it on his
own responsibility. Viewed as an extreme expedient to provoke a

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 159
predetermined quarrel, it corroborated warnings already received
from high quarters, warnings too authentic to be wholly disre
garded, to which, however, General Beauregard had been unwill
ing to yield entire credence. Overlooking Mr. Benjamin, he refer
red his letter to the President, to whom he exposed the Secretary's
ignorance upon the subject, and protested against his ill-timed ob
structions and arguments. The following is an extract from the
letter, written to Mr. Davis, under date of October 20th, 1861.
" I have felt it due to your Excellency and the country, at this juncture, as
well as to myself, to invoke your notice of this matter, so that guard may be
placed against a recurrence of this character of correspondence. ... I am utter
ly at a loss to understand wherein my course, in connection with the subject-
matter of the Secretary's letter, can be pronounced ' without warrant in law,'
and be the source of ' so much surprise.' The Secretary seems to be unaware,
evidently, that a rocket company is but a field artillery company, nothing
more, and not, by any means, a special corps or arm of the service, like that,
for example, of sappers, miners, or pontoniers — as I apprehend he supposes —
requiring congressional enactments for its organization, in addition to existing
laws. An acquaintance with the history of the military establishment and
organization of the late United States would have protected the Acting Secre
tary from this misapprehension, as he would have then known in what way,
during the war with Mexico, a rocket battery was organized for the field,
with the army under General Scott. . . .
" But in this very matter, it so happens I did not act without consultation
with all proper authorities. Assured of the difficulties in getting field guns
in any adequate number for the exigency, and convinced of the value of war
rockets against such troops as our adversaries have, I despatched an officer
of my staff — Captain E. P. Alexander — last August, to Richmond, to consult
and arrange measures with the proper departments. He saw the Adjutant-
General of the army on the subject, and received, I am happy to say, the most
ample, cordial approval of the plan ; and the Chief of Ordnance took immediate
steps for manufacturing the rockets with the utmost celerity.
" On the return of Captain Alexander from his mission, so satisfactorily con
cluded in all respects, it became proper to secure men to be ready for the rocket
battery, so that no time should be lost. It so happened that a valuable offi
cer, by circumstances thrown out of employment, was available, and thought
to be particularly fitted for the command of a rocket battery ; while it was
believed that he could readily recruit a company without subtracting from
our already too weak army. Under these circumstances, I need not say to
your Excellency, I did not hesitate to direct him to recruit such a company as
soon as possible. . . . God knows, in all I do at this time, I have no other end
in view than the good and success of our cause and the interests of our coun
try, now sorely pressed ; and I can and do confidently deny the allegation of
the Acting Secretary, that my conduct has been wanting in judgment in this

160 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
connection. I am quite willing, indeed, that you shall decide whose ^udgmenV
has been most at fault — that of your general, who has simply done what was
essential to provide men to handle the rockets as soon as ready for use, and
thus materially increase his means of defence and ability to maintain our im
perilled cause ; or that of the functionary at his desk, who deems it a fit time
to weave technical pleas of obstruction, to debate about the prerogative of
his office and of your Excellency's, and to write lectures on law while the
enemy is mustering in our front, with at least three times our force in infan
try, and four times as much artillery.
" In the interest of the country, you have been graciously pleased to dele
gate to myself and other generals in command of the armies of the Confeder
ate States, ample powers — which could be readily adduced — under which I
could show full ' warrant ' for what I have done. Strange, indeed, were it
not so ; passing strange that a general officer, intrusted with such an army as
I command, and the solemn, momentous duties imposed 'upon him at this
time,' should be left utterly without power to add to his forces a single com
pany, in the simple manner proposed in Special Orders No. 353 ; and that the
attempt to do so should fill a high public functionary with so much surprise
that I can only be excused and ' go unpunished ' in view of my motives and
defect of judgment.
r[^ tp. Sg; -Js *t- <v v n- *fc
"Excuse me for the length of this letter, the subject-matter of which I now
hope to dismiss, and about which I can have no controversy whatever with
the Secretary at this time.
" Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, Gen. Comdg."
As General Beauregard wrote the foregoing communication, an
other letter came from the Secretary on the subject of the appoint
ment of a Chief of Ordnance, and the question of treating the ar
mies of the Potomac and of the Shenandoah as two corps of one
army, characterized, likewise, by an unjustified and offensive li
cense of expression. This, also, General Beauregard felt bound
to refer to the President, with the request that he might be shield
ed from a repetition of such personal attacks. He said :
" I am willing that, in the future, my countrymen shall adjudge whether or
not I have ' studied ' aright the-legislation of Congress in relation to army or
ganizations ; whether, as the honorable Secretary courteously advises, I have
taken the ' pains' to read the laws of Congress, made to ' provide for the pub
lic defence ;' or whether, in my ignorance of that legislation, I require enlight
enment after the manner of the communication enclosed.
" Meantime I am here, as the soldier 6f the cause, ready, to the best of my
ability, to execute the orders of the government, either with regard to the
organization of this army or its operations, asking only for definite orders from

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 161
the proper source, and expressed in proper terms. I am ready to act in any
capacity demanded of me.
" With this, I shall leave it to your Excellency, an educated soldier, keenly
alive to all the sensibilities which our profession and associations engender,
to shield me, for the present, from these ill-timed, unaccountable annoyances.
"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, Gen. Comdg."
Though, as between General Beauregard and the Secretary of
War personally, these letters were well answered by a significant
silence on the part of the former, yet they produced on his mind
a painful impression. In close proximity to an enemy far supe
rior in number to our forces, and who, at any moment, might
make an attack upon us — every hour of his life, apart from brief
rest, being devoted to the hard task before him — he felt keenly
this absence of support, and the refusal of such an easy increase
to his scant resources ; all the more strange, as it had been previ
ously approved of by the heads of two high department bureaus,
to whom it had been submitted, and whose sanction had clothed
it with all sufficient authority.
Notwithstanding — and immediately following — this correspond
ence, General Beauregard, ever forgetful of self, and thinking only
of the interests of the cause, exchanged views with the President
respecting this important point of army organization. It was
done in the same spirit of friendliness and kindness of tone that
had hitherto prevailed between them. The Army of the Potomac
(General Beauregard's) and that of the Shenandoah (General
Johnston's) had never been merged by any order of the War De
partment, but had been designated by both generals, since the
battle of Manassas, the First and Second Corps of the Army of the
Potomac, for convenience and abbreviation; and, though separate
in administration, had been considered as acting together under the
chief command of General Johnston, as senior officer present ; Gen
eral Beauregard retaining command of his own troops, and Major-
General G. W. Smith taking charge of General Johnston's forces
proper. That the War Department, as we have already alleged,
was fully cognizant of this fact, is further shown by the very let
ter informing General Beauregard of the President's disapproval
of such a division. A. T. Bledsoe, " Chief Bureau of War " — as he
signs himself in that letter dated "War Department, Richmond,
October 8th, 1861"— says: "The letter of Captain E. P. Alexan-
I— 11

162 MILITARY OPERATIONS OP
der, recommending T. B. Ferguson for the post of Chief of Ord
nance for the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac, with your
endorsement, has been referred," etc. Besides, all the official pa
pers sent by Generals Johnston and Beauregard for months past
to the War Department, or to the President, had been headed
" First " or " Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac." It is nat
ural to suppose, therefore, that the change in the President's mind,
which induced him to disapprove, at this late hour, of what he had
tacitly — if not otherwise — consented to, had been brought about
by reasons and influences having very little to do with the real
question at issue.
The War Department acted on the theory that General Beaure
gard was in command of the whole united army; but, that there
being another officer present of equal grade and anterior commis
sion, the latter was first in command of the whole, and General
Beauregard second in command of the whole. The General rep
resented to Mr. Davis the evil consequences of this theory, as vir
tually throwing out of position several officers of the highest
grades, upon the junction of their forces for some great object,
and at the very time when their services, in command of their
proper corps, were most needed ; as in the event of General Lee's
army, in Northwestern Virginia, and General Holmes's, at Aquia
Creek, uniting with Generals Johnston's and Beauregard's. There
would thus be a second and third commander of the whole army,
which would result in all the generals, excepting the senior one —
General Lee — being out of service. He brought forward and
dwelt upon another reason, which was that, with such an organ
ization, separate inferior commanders would not be so prompt to
execute a junction at a critical moment.
This theory of the War Department was without precedent in
military administration, and one of its many evils, depending on
the possible deductions of the department, was the present with
drawal, from an entire army corps, of the services of a Chief of
Ordnance, on the ground that the army of the junior officer was
absorbed, and there existed no such legal organization as a " corps."
The President also desired that divisions, as well as brigades,
should be composed of troops from the same State. General
Beauregard had already thus organized his brigades on the 25th
of July, but declared his judgment against extending the rule to
divisions, because, in case a division thus organized were cut to

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 163
pieces or captured in battle, the loss would fall too heavily on a
single State ; and in this Mr. Davis seemed to agree, as that form
of organization was not further urged.
President Davis also wrote strongly, assuring General Beaure
gard that the Acting Secretary of War had intended no offense,
asking him to overlook the language of the technical lawyer, and
stating his conviction of the latter's regard and admiration for the
General ; though, meanwhile, Mr. Benjamin, certain of impunity,
was writing, upon other matters, letters of like impropriety, under
cover of the forms of conventional courtesy.
General Beauregard's attention was now drawn to a controversy,
raised in the press, about that portion of a published synopsis of
his Manassas report which revealed to the public his plan of cam
paign, as proposed to the President through Colonel Chestnut, for
the occupation of Maryland and the capture of Washington,*
which had been, at that time, the 14th of July, 1861, discarded by
Mr. Davis and pronounced impracticable. This publication, and
the discussion arising from it, were subjects of much concern to
General Beauregard, who, deploring all division among our lead
ers, refused to take any part whatever in the controversy. Finally,
however, but only with a view to allay public feeling, he wrote to
the Richmond Whig a letter, which called forth the warm praise
of his numerous friends, who were anxious, as he was himself, that
the cause of public defence should not be embarrassed by personal
contests. We deem it proper to lay this whole letter before the
reader. " Centreville, Va. (within hearing of the enemy's guns),
Nov. 3d, 1861.
"To the Editors of the Richmond Whig:
" Gentlemen, — My attention has just been called to an unfortunate contro
versy now going on, relative to the publication of the synopsis of my report of
the battle of Manassas. None can regret more than I do this publication,
which was made without my knowledge or authority.
" The President is the sole judge of when and what parts of the report ofa
commanding officer should be made public. I, individually, do not object to
delaying its publication as long as the War Department shall think it neces
sary and proper for the success of our cause.
" Meanwhile, I entreat my friends not to trouble themselves about refuting
the slanders and calumnies aimed at me. Alcibiades, on a certain occasion,
resorted to a singular method to occupy the minds of his traducers; let, then.
' that synopsis ' answer the same purpose for me in this instance.
* Chapter VIII., page 85.

164 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
"If certain minds cannot understand the difference between patriotism,
the highest civic virtue, and office-seeking, the lowest civic occupation, I pity
them from the bottom of my heart. Suffice it to say, that I prefer the respect
and esteem of my countrymen to the admiration and envy of the world. I
hope, for the sake of our cause and country, to be able, with the assistance of
a kind Providence, to answer my calumniators with new victories over our
national enemies ; but I have nothing to ask of the country, the government, or
my friends, except to afford me all the aid they can, in the great struggle we
are now engaged upon. I am not, and never expect or desire to be, a candidate
for any civil office in the gift of the people or of the executive. The acme of
my ambition is, after having cast my mite in the defense of our sacred cause,
and assisted, to the best of my ability, in securing our rights and independence
as a nation, to retire into private life (my means then permitting) never to
leave my home, unless to fight again the battles of my country.
" Respectfully, your most obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard."
The circumstances attending the publication of this letter are
described with graphic precision by Mr. Pollard, in his book en
titled "Lee and his Lieutenants," pp. 246-248. Our only sur
prise, after reading what the author there asserts of the causes
leading to the unfriendly relations which, from that time, existed
between the President and General Beauregard, is that he should
have deemed General Beauregard's letter unnecessary, and its
" publication ill-advised." Had he not disclaimed all idea of rival
ry with the President and openly declared that he was no aspirant
to political honors, the animosity displayed by President Davis
would have been still greater against him, to the manifest injury
of the public service. Mr. Pollard says : " Whatever the merits
of that controversy, it is not to be denied that from this time there
commenced to be evident that jealousy or dislike on the part of
the administration towards General Beauregard which, through
the war, tended to cripple his energies and neutralized his best
plans of campaign." Such being the case, what might not have
been the result, had General Beauregard, by his silence, confirmed
Mr. Davis in his avowed suppositions concerning him ? The fol
lowing letter testifies to the feelings which appear to have been
suddenly aroused in Mr. Davis's mind. It explains the hostile
attitude of his administration towards General Beauregard, and
fully justifies the latter in his endeavor to set himself right before
the country. The importance and the significant bearing of this
letter render necessary its publication entire. -

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 165
"Richmond, Va., Oct. 30th, 1861.
" General G. T. Beauregard :
" Sir, — Yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper publica
tions purporting to have been sent from Manassas, and to a synopsis of your
report of the battle of the 21st of July past, and in which it is represented that
you had been overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy south
of the Potomac, for the capture of Baltimore and Washington, and the libera
tion of Maryland.
" I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has to-day been submitted
to my inspection ; it appears by official endorsement to have been received by the
Adjutant-General on the 15th of October, though it is dated August 26th, 1861.*
" With much surprise I found that the newspaper statements were sustained
by the text of your report.
" I was surprised, because, if we did differ in opinion as to the measures and
purposes of contemplated campaigns, such fact could have no appropriate
place in the report ofa battle; further, because it seemed to be an attempt to
exalt yourself at my expense ; and especially because no such plan as that described
was submitted to me.\ It is true that some time before it was ordered you ex
pressed a desire for the junction of General Johnston's army with your own.
The movement was postponed until the operations of the enemy rendered it
necessary, and until it became thereby practicable to make it with safety to the
valley of Virginia. Hence, I believe, was secured the success by which it was
attended. "If you have retained a copy of the plan of campaign which you say was
submitted to me through Colonel Chestnut, allow me to request that you will
furnish me with a duplicate of it.
" Very respectfully yours, etc.,
" Jefferson Davis."
The tenor of this letter, the assertions it contains, and the ex
pressions made use of by President Davis are so extraordinary,
and denote such a state of mental irritation, that, though reluc
tant, we are compelled to fix public attention upon it. The press-
* General Beauregard's report of the battle of Manassas had been written
and was about to be forwarded to the War Department, when the Federal re
ports began to appear in the Northern papers. Taking advantage of many facts
and incidents thus divulged, and of important admissions on the part of the
enemy, General Beauregard determined to transform his report into a full " his
tory" of the battle — which was accordingly done — thereby considerably add-
in"- to its length and value. The first portion of the report, containing what
was termed the " strategy " of the campaign, remained unchanged, and, by an
oversight, the date was left as originally written. A letter from General Beau
regard to General Cooper showed distinctly, however, when the " history " of
the battle was prepared and sent in to Richmond.
t The italics are ours.

166 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
ure of official business may have contributed to weaken the Pres
ident's memory of many an event that occurred between the be-
o-inning of the war and the period we now write of ; but that the
proposition of so momentous a campaign, lyged and presented to
his consideration through the medium of such a man as Colo
nel Chestnut, could have altogether disappeared from his mem
ory, is an assertion which we regret that Mr. Davis ever made.
Still more to be deplored is the further assertion that the junc
tion of General Johnston's army with General Beauregard's was
purposely postponed by him (the President) until that junction
became opportune and thus " secured tlie success by which it was
attended." While writing these words, Mr. Davis had evidently
lost sight of the telegram sent by General Cooper — it is needless
to say by whose authority — which is given in full in the Appendix
to Chapter VIII. of this work. For convenience, we copy it again,
as follows : " Richmond, July 19th, 1861.
" General Beauregard, Manassas, Va. :
" We have no intelligence from General Johnston. If the enemy in front of
you has abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston has not moved,
you had better witlidraw the call upon him, so that he may be left to Jmfull discre
tion.* All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered to join you. From
this place we will send as fast as transportation permits. The enemy is advised
at Washington of the projected movement of Generals Johnston and Holmes, and
may vary his plans in conformity thereto. " S. Cooper, Adjutant-General."
Had General Beauregard obeyed the instructions there given
by the War Department, and " withdrawn" his call upon General
Johnston, need we say that no "junction " would have taken place
at all, and that the "success by which it was attended" would
never have caused Mr. Davis the gratification he expressed ?
Here are glaring facts which cannot be gainsaid. It was only
when the War Department had been informed, on the 17th of
July, that the enemy, in force, had driven in Gen eraL Bonham's
pickets, at Fairfax Court-House, not more than twelve miles from
Manassas, that General Beauregard was allowed to call upon Gen
eral Johnston, then at Winchester, more than sixty miles away on
his left, and upon General Holmes, then at Aquia Creek, about
* The italics are ours.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 167
thirty miles distant on his right, to form a junction with him at
Manassas. And it must be remembered, that General Beaure
gard's forces at that moment numbered about eighteen thousand
men, while those of General McDowell, at and advancing on Fair
fax Court-House, amounted to some forty thousand. And it was
only because General Beauregard's sagacious strategy forced the
enemy to follow General Bonham in his preconcerted retreat to
Mitchell's Ford, the only strong point of General Beauregard's de
fensive line, that he was enabled to defeat McDowell on the 18th,
and hold him in check until the 20th, when General Holmes joined
his forces with General Beauregard's, and General Johnston ar
rived with part of his own, the other and larger portion of which
only reached the point of concentration about 3 p. m. on the 21st,
while the battle was in fierce progress and we were near being over
powered. Procrastination and hesitation are always fatal to mili
tary success. It is through waiting for the enemy to develop his
plans that great battles and great opportunities in war are lost.
Two days after forwarding his letter to the Richmond Whig—
to wit, on November the 5th — General Beauregard addressed a
communication to the President, accepting his assurance that the
Secretary of War had meant no offence by his previous communi
cations, but protesting that the latter should not call his motives
into question, and, when seeking to point out errors, should do it
in a more becoming tone and style. Alluding to the reference
made by Mr. Davis to the " technical lawyer," he expressed his
concern lest Mr. Benjamin, following the professional bent of his
mind, would view only the legal aspect of things, and insensibly
put both the army and himself into the "strait jackets" of the
law. Mr. Davis, with the tenacity which characterized his whole career
as President, would not admit that the Secretary whom he had
selected could, under any circumstances, commit an error or im
propriety. And the injudicious support he had given, before, to
Colonel Northrop, he now, but more directly, bestowed upon Mr.
Benjamin, careless of the wide-spread evils which might result
from such an act. If he did not prompt the course of Mr. Benja
min,* he openly interposed himself to soothe the exaggerated sus-
* The Hon. L. P. Walker, of Alabama, being a civilian, without knowledge
of army matters, accepted the position of Secretary of War, with the express

168 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
ceptibilities of his Secretary of War, and sacrificed the feelings
and pride of a general who enjoyed, as he well knew, the full con
fidence of both army and people.
We extract the following passages from his answer to General
Beauregard : " Richmond, Va., November 10th, 1861.
" General G. T. Beauregard :
"Sir, — When I addressed you in relation to your complaint because of the
letters written to you by Mr. Benjamin, Acting Secretary of War, it was hoped
that you would see that you had misrepresented his expressions, and would be
content. "I do not feel competent to instruct Mr. Benjamin in the matter of style;
there are few whom the public would, probably, believe fit for that task. But
the other point quoted from your letter presents matters for graver considera
tion, and it is that which induces me to reply. It cannot be peculiar to Mr,
Benjamin to look at every exercise of official power in its legal aspect, and you
surely did not intend to inform me that your army and yourself are outside of
the limits of the law.
" It is my duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, and I cannot
recognize the pretension of any one that their restraint is too narrow for him.
" Very respectfully, "Jefferson Davis."
It was a polemic turn of words to give such meaning to Gen
eral Beauregard's language as applied to the facts and to Mr.
Davis's own suggestion about the "technical lawyer." Mr. Ben
jamin's possible merits as to "style " were, then, of little moment
to the public ; the graver matter being that it was " peculiar " to
the Administrator of the War Department to be " a poor civilian
who knows nothing about war" as he had regarded himself until
clothed with the pretensions of office ; * and to make up for his
lack of usefulness in that important seat, he was pleased to indulge
in abstract and futile disquisitions. The least, though still great,
harm of this peculiarity was the loss of time it occasioned, the
weight it became upon the service, when pushed to the extent of
understanding that President Davis, who had been Secretary of War under
President Pierce, should direct the affairs of the office. Doubtless, Mr. Benja
min filled the post in the same way.
* See letter of Mr. Benjamin to General Beauregard after the fall of Sumter,
Chapter V.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 169
harassing a general in the field, with sensitive personal cares, at a
time when his headquarters were " within sound of the enemy's
guns." As soon as he could, General Beauregard replied to the Presi
dent's letter respecting the Manassas report, but made it a point
to take no notice whatever of its, personal imputations. It was
impossible, of course, to comply literally with the request for a
duplicate of the copy of the plan said to have been submitted, as
the plan was not written, but presented to Mr. Davis himself,
through Colonel Chestnut, who carried a written memorandum of
its main features, and full verbal instructions. General Beaure
gard's answer read as follows :
" Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
" Centreville, Va., Nov. 22d, 1861.
" Sir, — In compliance with your request, I have the honor to enclose you
herewith, at the earliest moment practicable, a copy of the following papers
relating to the strategic part of my report of the battle of Manassas, to wit :
" 1st. Report of the Hon. James Chestnut of his visit to Richmond, July 14th,
1861, to submit to you my plan of operations for the defeat of the enemy. The
original of this report has just been received from New Orleans, where it had
been sent for safe-keeping, with other important papers.*
" 2d. Abstract of my report, containing only the strategic portion of it.f
" 3d. Letter of Brigadier-General Sam. Jones, giving his recollection of the
memorandum dictated to him by me, at about 11 o'clock p.m., on the 13th of
July last, for the use of Colonel James Chestnut, one of my volunteer aids.
The memorandum was never returned to me, and I kept no copy of it.J
" 4th. Nine telegrams received or sent by me, from the 15th to the 19th July,
1861.§ " I remain, Sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, General Comdg. '
" To his Excellency President Jefferson Davis, Richmond, Va."
* See Colonel Chestnut's report to General Beauregard, given in full in
Chapter VIII.
t The abstract alluded to is the first part of the Manassas Report, to be
found in Appendix to Chapter IX.
J Brigadier-General Sam. Jones's letter appears in full in Appendix to Chap
ter VIII.
§ Most of the telegrams referred to are given in Chapter VIH. One of them
appears in full in this Chapter.

170 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XIII.
Creation of the Department of Northern Virginia. — Distribution of New
Confederate Battle Flags. — Debate in Congress about the Action of the
President with Regard to General Beauregard's Report of the Battle
of Manassas.— /Telegram of the Hon. James L. Kemper Concerning it. —
General Beauregard's Answer. — Letter of Colonel Pryor on the Same
Subject. — Commentaries on the Executive Endorsement. — Governor Moore
Forwards Resolutions of Louisiana Legislature, Congratulating General
Beauregard. — Circular to Division Commanders about Leaves of Absence.
— Congress Passes an Act in Regard to the Matter. — Its Effect. — General
Beauregard's Plan of Recruitment.
By General Orders No. 15, received October 25th, from the
War Department, the armies in northern and eastern Virginia
were brought into combined relation ; a system which had been
urgently recommended by General Beauregard in the early part
of June.
The Potomac district, between the Blue Ridge and the Po
tomac, to the north bank of Powells River, was assigned to the
command of General Beauregard. On its right and rear, the
Aquia District, between the southern bank of Powells River, the
Potomac, the Chesapeake, and the Rappahannock, including the
counties along the southern bank of the latter river from its
mouth to Fredericksburg, was assigned to Major-General Holmes.
On its left, the Valley District, between the Blue Ridge and the
Alleghanies, was assigned to Major-General Jackson. All were
brought into one department, under the command of the senior
general — Joseph E. Johnston.
The army of the Potomac was organized into four divisions,
under Major-Generals Van Dorn, G. W. Smith, Longstreet, and E.
K. Smith. But as General Johnston did not give the command
of that army to General Beauregard, he, out of delicacy, would
not move in the matter, but confined himself technically, as be
fore, to a so-called army corps (his former army of the Potomac),
though under no orders placing him in command of that or any
other corps. Such a command the War Department persistently

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 171
' ignored, addressing General Beauregard as the commander of the
district, though sending to him, directly, for execution, orders
which evidently referred to the army. Delicate embarrassments
in administration arose from this state of affairs, which virtually
reduced the leading general of the Confederacy to the rank of a
Major-General. On the 7th of November a strong United States naval expedi
tion, under Admiral Dupont, seized Forts Walker and Beauregard,
two small field-works armed with thirty-five guns of inferior cali
bre and only two of them rifled, guarding the entrance to Port
Royal harbor, South Carolina. The reader is already aware of
what had been done, upon General Beauregard's advice, with re
gard to the protection of that harbor. He had never concealed
the fact that, inadequately armed as it necessarily would be, its
defense, against any regularly organized expedition, would be im
possible.* As it was, however, the works held out longer than
had been expected, and were the objects of praise even in the
reports of the Federal commanders.
On the 28th of November General Beauregard distributed to
his troops (Van Dorn's and Longstreet's divisions) the new Con
federate battle-flags which he had just received, and solemnized
the act with imposing religious ceremonies.
During the battle of Manassas he had observed the difficulty of
distinguishing our own from the enemy's colors, and, in order to
prevent all error in the future, had determined to adopt in his
army a battle -flag distinct in color and design. He, at first,
sought to procure a change in the Confederate flag itself, and
Colonel W. P. Miles, then chairman of the House Military Com
mittee, had caused, at his request, a report to be presented to
that effect, but with no result. General Johnston had then or
dered the troops to carry their State flags, none of which, how
ever, could be obtained except for the Virginia regiments, which
received them from the hands of Governor Letcher, on the 30th
of October. In a conference between the three senior officers, at
Fairfax Court - House, in September, out of four designs for a
battle -flag, one, presented by General Beauregard, was adopted.
It was a red field with a diagonal blue cross, the latter edged
with white, and bearing white stars.f To render it more portable,
* See Chapter V, p. 51.
t This beautiful design, by a strange coincidence, had been previously de-

172 MILITARY OPERATIONS. OF
it was made square instead of oblong, by order of General
Johnston. In the beginning of December, General D. H. Hill was sent to
relieve General Evans in the important command at Leesburg,
with instructions to fall back to the main army at Centreville in
the event of an advance on the latter place, as Colonel Hunton
had done before the battle of Manassas.
During the remainder of December there came occasional warn
ings and menaces of attack, to which, in fact, the United States
authorities and General McClellan were constantly urged by the
more impatient part of the Northern people and press; and a
watchful state of preparation was maintained along the Confed
erate positions, from Evansport, by the way of Centreville, to
Leesburg, on the upper Potomac. But no encounter of interest
occurred except one at Drainsville, on the 23d of December, be
tween two foraging parties of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The
Confederates, with about twenty-five hundred men, under Briga
dier-General Stuart, attacked the Federals, numbering four thou
sand in a strong position, under Brigadier-General Ord. After a
sharp conflict our forces were repulsed, though not pursued. The
enemy's loss was seven killed and sixty-one wounded ; ours, forty-
three killed and one hundred and eighty-seven wounded and missing.
Our army now went into winter quarters. The cold was in
tense, and it was hard, at times, for officers and men to protect
themselves against it. All remained quiet along the lines. Such,
however, was not the case in Richmond. Towards the 10th of
January the halls of the Confederate Congress became the scene
of an animated secret debate, resulting from Mr. Davis's action
upon General Beauregard's report of the battle of Manassas, the
preliminary remarks of which had been resented by the Presi
dent. Upon sending in this report to Congress, he had accom-
vised by Colonel Miles, and recommended, for the Confederate flag, to the
Congress then in session at Montgomery, in March, 1861. It had also been
proposed by Mr. Edward C. Hancock, at the request of Colonel James B.
Walton, at New Orleans, in the month of April. It had been offered by Colo
nel Miles to General Beauregard, in substitution for one nearly similar in em
blem and pattern, but different in the distribution of colors, suggested to him
by General Beauregard when the latter was seeking to procure a change in
the Confederate flag. And it was now proposed anew to the General by
Colonel Walton, who had Mr. Hancock's design.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 173
panied it with strictures and comments, which were never given
to the public until the appearance of his book, and which, after
much trouble, were procured about that time for this work ; not
through Mr. Davis, however, it is proper to add.
Personally, General Beauregard remained indifferent to this
debate, most sincerely deprecating the unfortunate effects it was
likely to produce. He positively declined to advise any of his
friends as to what should be done in the matter.
The following telegram, and his answer to it, show what were
his feelings on the subject. " Richmond, January 9th, 1862.
" General Beauregard:
" Hon. Mr. Pryor wishes to know, confidentially, if you wish report of the
battle of Manassas to be published, and, if published, must all, or a part, be
published, omitting preliminary statement. Congress discusses the matter to
morrow. " James L. Kemper."
The next day General Beauregard sent this reply :
"Centreville, Va., January 10th, 1862.
" Let Congress do for the best. We must think of the country before we
think of ourselves. I believe Burnside's expedition is intended for Wilming
ton, to cut off railroad to Charleston. Let government look to it.
" G. T. Beauregard.
"Hon. James L. Kemper, Speaker House of Delegates, Richmond, Va."
Referring to this despatch, Colonel R. A. Pryor, then a Member
of Congress, wrote as follows : " I took the liberty of reading your
telegram. The effect of its patriotic sentiment on Congress would
have been most grateful to your feelings had you witnessed it."
An effort was made to suppress the entire report ; while Gen
eral Beauregard's friends, and the friends of justice, were equally
resolved that it should be published as actually transmitted to the
War Department. The latter course would probably have pre
vailed, had not General Beauregard, in the same spirit which had
prompted his letter to the editors of the Richmond Whig, formally
requested that no further action should be taken in the matter.
Congress then decided to publish the report, omitting the first part,
which referred to the strategy of the campaign, and, with that part,
omitting also the accompanying annotations of the President.
The importance of this executive endorsement, and the notoriety

174; MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
given it since the appearance of Mr. Davis's book, justify us in
transcribing it in full, despite its length.
It is a key to the feelings underlying many of the official acts
of President Davis. It brings to light the reasoning to which he
resorted, at times, in his efforts to cover his errors as a military
chief. How strange, and how much to be regretted, that such
moral weaknesses should have existed in one whose career, as Chief
Magistrate of the Confederacy, had he been able to divest himself
of the inordinate love of power which is characteristic of him,
would have been one of unclouded success and glory. He could
easily have availed himself of the counsels of men whose patriot
ism equalled his own, and whose experience as statesmen, and tal
ents as commanders in the field, would have safely guided him to
the goal he must have earnestly desired, but signally failed, to at
tain. The endorsement of Mr. Davis began as follows :
" The order issued by the War Department to General Johnston was not, as
herein reported, to form a junction, ' should the movement, in his judgment, be
deemed advisable.'' * The following is an accurate copy of the order :
" ' General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction
of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending
your sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House, either by rail or by Warrenton.
In all the arrangements exercise your own discretion.' " *
It is proper, in the outset, to state, that no copy of this endorse
ment was ever seen by General Beauregard until one was fur
nished him from the Bureau of War Records at Washington, in the
autumn of 1880. Until that time he was unable to ascertain its
exact tenor, which, for reasons of their own, his friends, in Congress
and elsewhere, had carefully withheld from his knowledge.
The words given, no doubt from memory, in the preliminary
part of General Beauregard's report of the battle of Manassas, and
purporting to' be the substance of the order sent to General John
ston, under date of July 17th, 1861, are not identically the words
made use of in the order. That is evident. But who can deny
that, though different in exact phraseology, they convey precisely
the same meaning? Will any one pretend that such an order
could have been looked upon as a peremptory one, and that the
only thing General Johnston had to do after receiving it, was blind-
* The italics are ours.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 175
ly to obey it ? What difference is there between the words "Make
the movement should you, in your judgment, deem it advisable" —
which are the words objected to, and denied to have been used in
the order — and the following : " If practicable, make the movement"
— which, it is contended, were the real terms employed in the tele
gram to General Johnston ? Was not the latter fully authorized,
"in all arrangements" relative to the suggested movement, to
"exercise his own discretion"? Who was to judge of the advisa
bility or practicability of the junction sought to be made for the
purpose of " striking a decisive blow on the enemy ?" Was it the
War Department, who issued the order, or General Johnston, who
received it ? It is clear that, under the order as given, General
Johnston could have moved, or not, as he thought best in the cir
cumstances; and that the making or not making of the junction
was left entirely to his own decision.
That such is the only correct conclusion to be arrived at after
reading that order, is shown by the following passage in the en*
dorsement of Mr. Davis :
" The words ' if practicable ' had reference to letters of General Johnston
of 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely doubtful if he had the
power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of
Patterson's forces as compared with his own."
Hence the uncertainty, hence the want of authoritativeness, so
perceptible in the governmental despatch alluded to. That the
War Department construed it as entirely contingent, and as de
pending upon General Johnston's judgment, is further shown by
the telegram already mentioned in Chapter VIII. of this book, but
which we again offer to the reader : " Richmond, July nth, 1861.
" General Beauregard :
"You are authorized to appropriate the North Carolina regiment on its
route to General Johnston. If possible, send to General Johnston to say he
has been informed, via Staunton, that you were attacked, and that he will join
you, if practicable, with his effective force, sending his sick and baggage to
Culpepper Court-House, by rail or through Warrenton. " S. Cooper, Adjutant-General."
General Johnston's telegram to General Beauregard, of the same
date, corroborates our conclusion. It read as follows :

176 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
" Winchester, Va., July nth, 1861.
" General Beauregard, Manassas :
" Is the enemy upon you in force ? „ j E_ JoHNSTON„
He was gathering all such information as might guide him in
determining his course. He was carefully weighing the advisa
bility of moving just then, or not, as best suited the emergency and
the interests of his command. But, whatever may have prompted
his, final action, he was in nowise obeying a peremptory order.
" In the exercise of the discretion conferred by the terms of the
order" — says General Johnston, in his report of the battle of
Manassas — "I at once determined to march to join General Beau
regard." He determined. But, for having construed the Rich
mond order to him as a contingent one, General Johnston, no less
than General Beauregard, incurred the displeasure of the Presi-
ident.* In a foot-note in Johnston's " Narrative," p. 34, we read
as follows : "... In an endorsement on it (the report) by Mr.
Davis, I am accused of reporting his telegram to me inaccurately.
I did not profess to quote his words, but to give their meaning,
which was done correctly."
Mr. Davis's remarks, in his book, on this point, are valueless.
How can he tell what construction General Johnston put upon the
telegram he received % How can he deny that General Johnston
considered the question of making a junction as left to his discre
tion '? Further comments are unnecessary.
We quote again from the executive endorsement upon General
Beauregard's report :
" The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not accepted,
and to have led to a decision of the War Department, cannot be found among
its files, nor any reference to any decision made upon it ; and it was not known
that the army had advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previ
ously selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have continued to
be the defensive line occupied by the main body of our forces. Inquiry has
developed the fact that a message, to be verbally delivered, was sent by Hon.
Mr. Chestnut. If the conjectures recited in the report were entertained,
they rested on the accomplishment of one great condition, namely, that a
junction of the forces of Generals Johnston and Holmes should be made with
the army of General Beauregard, and should gain a victory. The junction was
made, the victory was won, but the consequences that were predicted did not
* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 366.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. ' 177
result. The reasons why no such consequences could result are given in the
closing passage of the reports of both the commanding generals, and the re
sponsibility cannot be transferred to the government at Richmond, which cer
tainly would have united in any feasible plan to accomplish such desirable
results." The plan of campaign, mentioned in the strategic portion of
General Beauregard's report, as having been submitted to and not
accepted by the President, " could not be found among the files of
the War Department," for the simple reason — and Mr. Davis
knew it — that the plan referred to was not proposed by letter, but
communicated, personally, through Colonel James Chestnut of
South Carolina, one of General Beauregard's aids. This officer
carried with him a written memorandum dictated by General
Beauregard to Colonel Sam. Jones, on the evening of the 13th of
July, containing all the main features of the military operations,
acknowledged to be " brilliant and comprehensive," but, unfortu
nately, opposed at Richmond, and no less unfortunately rejected.*
Mr. Davis, after showing great incredulity as to having ever
" entertained " such a plan — one of the most important of the war
— succeeds, however, in recalling to memory, " inquiry having de
veloped the fact," that Colonel Chestnut did, in effect, verbally
deliver a message in General Beauregard's name. That " mes
sage," as the President thought proper to call the communication
he had received, was no less than the plan for an aggressive ad
vance upon the enemy, ably and exhaustively explained by Colonel
Chestnut, in a conference granted him by the President, as the
representative and authorized exponent of General Beauregard's
views on the subject. Besides Mr. Davis and Colonel Chestnut,
Generals Lee and Cooper were present, and so was Colonel (after
wards General) John S. Preston, of South Carolina. We call the
reader's special attention to Colonel Chestnut's report to General
Beauregard, July 16th, 1861, on his return from Richmond,
wherein appear the full details of the plan proposed, and the
reasons given by the President for not adopting it. That report
is to be found in Chapter VIII. of this work, page 85. We also
refer the reader to the preceding chapter (Chapter XII.), in which

* See in Appendix to Chapter VIII., letter of General (then Colonel) Sam.
Jones, about written memorandum given to Colonel Chestnut by General
Beauregard.
I.— 12

178 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
was given, in extenso, President Davis's letter to General Beaure
gard (October 30th) and the answer thereto (November 22d), in
reference to the report of the battle of Manassas. "No such plan
as that described," said the President, in the letter we refer to,
" was submitted to me." Here the denial is absolute. Mr. Davis,
at that time, was evidently ignorant of the fact that Colonel Chest
nut had reduced to writing all that had occurred during that im
portant conference.
In the endorsement now occupying our attention the President
no longer denies, but, in his attempt to palliate his error, insinu
ates his doubts, and apparently — though not quite consistently —
fails to remember. This is all the more strange, inasmuch as he was
then in possession, not only of Colonel Chestnut's report, sent him
by General Beauregard at his own request, but also of General
Sam. Jones's letter, which bore witness that the plan referred to in
the report of the battle of Manassas was " substantially the same " as
the one proposed by him through the medium of Colonel Chestnut.
Early in the month of June Bonham's brigade of four South
Carolina regiments had been advanced to Fairfax Court-House,
and Ewell's brigade posted in front of Bull Run, at Union Mills
Ford ; all of which had been duly announced, and was well known
to the Confederate War Department, as the correspondence of the
period will show. This, however, is not at all material to the
issue made by Mr. Davis's endorsement with reference to General
Beauregard's plan of concentration and aggression, communicated
to him through Colonel Chestnut. We mention it here, that
our silence may not be construed as an acquiescence in Mr.
Davis's assertion "that it was not known that the army had ad
vanced beyond the line of Bull Run." The entire army had not,
but two of its brigades had ; and General Beauregard is certainly
not responsible for Mr. Davis's ignorance of the fact.
We positively assert — and history bears us out — that the "junc
tion" referred to in the endorsement was only effected because
General Beauregard, on the 19th of July, after checking Mc
Dowell's advance at the engagement of Bull Run, refused to with
draw the 'call made upon General Johnston, so that the latter
"might be left to his full discretion." * Had General Beauregard
* See, in Appendix to Chapter VIIL, General Cooper's telegram to General
Beauregard, to that effect.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 179
obeyed the telegram of General Cooper, General Johnston, about
whose movements the War Department admitted its ignorance,
would not have left Winchester, and no "victory" could have
been won by the Confederates on the 21st of July. That " junc
tion," that " victory," were the results of General Beauregard's
untiring, unflinching perseverance. The- first was effected, the
second achieved, in spite of — not owing to — the action of Mr.
Davis or of the War Department.
" The reasons why no such consequences could result are given,"
not only "in the closing passages of the reports of both the com
manding generals," as Mr. Davis has it, but also in General Beau
regard's repeated communications to the War Department, before
and after the battle of Manassas, and especially in his letter to
President Davis, dated August 10th, 1861,* in which he said :
" With regard to my remarks about marching on to Washington,
you must have misunderstood them, for I never stated that Ave
could have pursued the enemy on the evening of the 21st, or even
on the 22d. I wrote: ' The want of food and transportation has
made us lose all the fruits of our victory. We ought, at this time,
the 29 th July, to be in or about Washington, and from all ac
counts Washington could have been taken up to the 24th instant,
by twenty thousand men.' Every news from there confirms me
still 'more in that opinion. For several days' (about one week)
after the battle, I could not put my new regiments in position for
want of transportation. I do not say this to injure my friend
Colonel Myers, but to benefit the service. We have, no doubt, by
our success here, achieved 'glory' for the country, but I am
fighting for something more real and tangible, i. e., to save our
homes and firesides from our Northern invaders, and to maintain
our freedom and independence as a nation."
It is not desirable to repeat here the main reasons which pre
vented " the consequences predicted" as the result of the " victory
won," after the long-prayed-for junction of General Johnston's
forces with General Beauregard's at Manassas. For such infor
mation the reader is referred to Chapter X. of this work, wherein
full details of General Beauregard's requisitions, and complaints
as to insufficiency of provisions and transportation, are minutely
* The whole of this letter is to be found in Chapter X. of this work, at
page 123.

18Q MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

to

given. We will' merely add that" Mr. Davis, evidently lost sight
of the fact that even had he positively ordered the junction of the
Confederate forces at Manassas, and not "desired, as he- did, to
countermand it on the 19th of. July, that junction, effected eight
days' after it had been suggested, in General Beauregard's name,
by Colonel Chestnut, could very well fail to bring about the result
then reasonably expected of it and so* earnestly urged upon the
government. As originally proposed, it was a measure of timely
preparation for a clearly impending hostile movement on the part
of the enemy; a preparation to meet that movement upon the only
correct principle of war in the situation — the active defensive.
As executed, it was a junction unwillingly assented to, at the last
hour, when the enemy was already upon General Beauregard with
a largely superior force, and when most of the " consequences pre
dicted" could no longer be realized. For it must be borne in
mind that the plan insisted upon by General Beauregard involved
an offensive movement on our part after concentration ; while the
actual junction, when it was made, had become altogether impera
tive as a purely defensive measure ; and what Mr. Davis points
out as a different result from that originally proposed was but the
necessary sequel of the rejection of General Beauregard's plan.
The endorsement of Mr. Davis proceeds as follows :
"If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been presented in a
written communication, and in sufficient detail to permit proper investigation,
it must have been pronounced to bo impossible at that time, and its proposal
could only have been accounted for by the want of information of the forces
and positions of the armies in the field. The facts that rendered it impossible
are the following :
" 1. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chestnut, on the suppo
sition of drawing a force of about twenty-five thousand men from the command
of General Johnston. The letters of General Johnston show his effective force
to have been only eleven thousand, with an enemy thirty thousand strong in
his front, ready to take possession of the valley of Virginia on his withdrawal."
Mr. Davis's statement as to insufficiency of detail in the plan
submitted to him forces upon him one of the following alterna
tives : He was either thoroughly informed of General Beauregard's
proposal to him, and he, therefore, more than errs in alleging
want of adequate knowledge of the question at issue; or he was
without the necessary data to guide him; and, in that case, his re
jection of a proposition which he had not comprehended was cer
tainly unwise, if not unpardonable.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 181
The truth is, that the plan presented in General Beauregard's
name to President Davis had all the definiteness and detail that
any written proposition of the same import and moment could
have had. This is established by Colonel Chestnut's official report,
already referred to, which we urge the reader to examine again
with particular attention. It was presented by an interpreter
thoroughly possessed of his subject, speaking, not from memory
alone, but from carefully prepared notes, taken under the dicta
tion of General Beauregard himself. It is, therefore, superfluous
to deal further with Mr. Davis's futile attempt to prove that a
"written communication " was necessary for " the proper investi
gation " of a vital plan of campaign, upon the merits of which —
say what he may— he had, nevertheless, deliberated, and which he
had finally condemned.
The criticism of Mr. Davis, based on the estimated numbers,
whether of General Johnston or of General Patterson, is utterly
without point, in presence of the fact that the former had no dif
ficulty whatever in bringing away his forces, when he essayed to
do so. Nor did the latter " take possession of the valley of Vir
ginia on the withdrawal " of his opponent ; nor did he even threat
en to make any demonstration of the kind. On the other hand,
Colonel Chestnut's report shows that General Beauregard had es
timated General Johnston's forces at twenty thousand men, and
not at twenty-five thousand, as Mr. Davis has it. As to General
Patterson, his army, at the time we speak of — that is to say, be
tween the 14th and 21st of July — never amounted even to twenty
thousand men, though it was rumored, as early as the 13th, that
it numbered upwards of thirty-two thousand. General Johnston
refers to that rumor in his report of the battle of Manassas, but,
in his book, reduces the number " to about twenty thousand, in
stead of thirty-two thousand, the estimate of the people of Mar-
tinsburg, at the time."* And General Patterson, who must be sup
posed to have known something about it, in a letter from Harper's
Ferry, dated July 24th, says : " My force is less than twenty
thousand ; nineteen regiments, whose term of service was up, or
will be within a week. . . . Five regiments have gone home. Two
more go to day, and three to-morrow. To avoid being cut off
with the remainder, I fell back, and occupied this place." Now
* General Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 31.

182 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
when General Johnston began to move from Winchester to Ma
nassas, on the 18th, his army, with an average effective strength,
per regiment, not much exceeding five hundred men, could be
computed at not less, than ten thousand, exclusive of artillery and
cavalry, exclusive also of the sick — seventeen hundred in number
— who were comfortably provided for in Winchester.* These,
however, are mere side issues, and not at all connected with the
question really before us. General Beauregard never pretended
to know, except by approximation, the exact force under General
Johnston. What he wished and asked for was the concentration
of that force, such as it might be, with his own, in order to strike
the enemy with masses, not with fractions, and thus compel him,
not us, to take the defensive. When General Beauregard recom
mended that concentration and predicted its results, he had every
reason to be confident that the advance of McDowell was immedi
ately impending; and had Mr. Davis allowed the scheme to be
carried out, in anticipation of what the enemy was preparing to do,
but had not yet actually done, the junction of our forces would
have taken place at least forty-eight hours earlier than the date at
which it was effected, and Bull Run would have been fought with
the combined forces of both Generals Johnston and Beauregard, to
say nothing of General Holmes, who naturally would have followed
and joined in the movement, and McDowell's army would have
been annihilated, or turned and cut off from Washington.
Mr. Davis's endorsement goes on as follows :
" 2. It proposed to continue operations, by effecting a junction of a part of
the victorious forces with the army of General Garnett, in Western Virginia ;
General Garnett's forces amounted only to three or four thousand men, then
known to be in rapid retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan,
and the news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived with
in forty-eight hours of Colonel Chestnut's arrival in Richmond."
This reference to the Garnett disaster is characteristic of Mr.
Davis as a polemist, and we chiefly touch upon it to assert that,
at the time he decided adversely on the general plan laid before
him, he was not aware of what had happened to Garnett, an event
which could only have made the concentration at Manassas — the
essential feature of General Beauregard's plan — the more necessary
in the exigency, as any military man may see.

General Johnston's " Narrative of Military Operations," p. 35.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 183
The co-operation with Garnett against McClellan was but a pos
sible incident of the scheme of campaign, and could not properly
have weighed in deciding the main question of General Johnston's
concentration with General Beauregard, in order to defeat Mc
Dowell and Patterson. These two results, even if not followed
by the proposed movement into Maryland, and on the rear of
Washington, would have driven McClellan back into Ohio, or, if
he had ventured a farther advance into Virginia, would have left
him at onr mercy.
The third main reason which rendered General Beauregard's
scheme "impossible" is thus explained in Mr. Davis's endorse
ment :
" 3. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that
the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces
could effect junctions, to attack them in detail."
This is without weight or effect, and scaroely deserves a serious
answer. The enemy, on his first entrance into Virginia, had displayed
the greatest hesitation and uncertainty in all his forward move
ments. He felt that he was treading upon dangerous ground. It
was the procrastination and lack of vigor of those who held the
reins of power in Richmond which finally aroused in that enemy
a spirit of assurance and conquest, until then dormant. To check
his first steps forward was, therefore, for us, the all-important
object. General Beauregard's plans were not based on any " improbable
and inadmissible supposition," as Mr. Davis asserts, but upon in
formation that the chief Federal force was about to be thrown for
ward against him ; and his scheme, in accordance with a cardinal
principle in war, involved an immediate concentration of our avail
able masses, offensively to meet and overwhelm that advance.
What actually occurred — the defeat of McDowell, after the long-
delayed junction was brought about, under the disadvantageous
conditions already alluded to — shows that the first and main
feature of General Beauregard's plan, to which the others were
mere consequences, was the true military course for the Confed
erate authorities to pursue. Its success — as always in the business
of war — must have deprived the enemy of the power to make his
own movements at his own pleasure, and enabled us to beat him

181 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
successively in detail. Mr. Davis, in rejecting that plan, left the
Confederate forces " to await everywhere, isolated and motionless,
until" the Federal "forces could effect junctions, to attack them
in detail." And this, we may add, was, unhappily, his military
method throughout the war.
Says Mr. Davis, in his endorsement :
" 4. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the battle-field
could enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac, garrisoned
and within supporting distance of fresh troops; nor, after the actual battle
and victory, did the generals on the field propose an advance on the capital;
nor does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a condition to
attempt such a movement."
Had the concentration been made, McDowell's forces would
have been captured, with his munitions and transportation, leaving
the works at Washington substantially unoccupied ; and Mr.
Davis had no authority for supposing that a supporting force was
in reach. The whole history of the time shows that, after Mc
Dowell's defeat, Washington was at our mercy, had we advanced
upon it. That we did not do so was in no way due to General
Beauregard or to his, plans.
The concluding words in Mr. Davis's fourth objection, to wit —
" nor does it appear that they (Generals Johnston and Beauregard)
have since believed themselves in a condition to attempt such a
movement," .are an extraordinary assertion when it is considered
that, not many weeks before this endorsement was written, the
President had visited our army headquarters, at Fairfax Oonrt-
Houce, and had there been urged by Generals Johnston, G. W.
Smith, and Beauregard, to make a concentration of 'our forces
readily available, for an offensive movement upon the rear of
Washington, the material for which was most minutely pointed
out to him.* This second proposed concentration and forward
movement was. then entirely practicable, and the failure to make
it at that time was one of the fatally false courses which charac
terized Mr. Davis's control of the military resources of the Con
federate people, by which he habitually neutralized the great ad
vantage that we had in the possession of the interior lines.
The following are the concluding words of the endorsement :
" It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on file in the
War Department, as recited at the close of the report, showing what were the
* See Chapter XL, p. 142, and Appendix to the same chapter.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 185
causes which prevented the advance of our forces, and prolonged vigorous pur
suits of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. "Jefferson Davis."
It was out of General Beauregard's power to know what was
technically " on file in the War Department," at the time Mr.
Davis wrote his endorsement ;. but he does know that the Presi
dent had been fully advised in writing, directly and through the
War Department, of certain needs with regard to subsistence
and transportation ; needs which, left unsupplied, as, they. were,
made it impossible for that army, immediately upon the defeat of
McDowell, to undertake the only practicable offensive movement,
to wit, the passage of the Potomac, at or about Edwards's Ferry,
into Maryland, and a march thence upon the rear of Washington.
If Mr. Davis had allowed General Beauregard to carry out his
proposed plan of operations against McDowell and Patterson, we
should have captured from the enemy all the requisite supplies
that the President and the chiefs of the Commissary and Quarter
master Departments had so signally failed to procure. This chap
ter and several preceding ones of this work are replete with proof
of remonstrances ignored, of demands unheeded, of requisitions dis
regarded, by Mr. Davis and the War Department, from the early
part of June up to, and long after, the battle of Manassas.
The foregoing commentaries upon this " executive endorsement "
may, at first sight, appear harsh, and, to a degree, unmerited.
But a critical examination will show their entire justice. Far eas
ier and less painful would it be, when. chronicling our defeat, to
place the blame upon circumstances and not upon persons. Un
happily for Mr. Davis, his conspicuous position as President, and
the fact that his friends attempt to make of him the sacred cen
tral figure of the late Southern Confederacy, to whom no reproach
should ever be affixed, compel all conscientious writers, while pass
ing upon his eventful career, to a clear and exhaustive exposition
of the truth. Such has been our object in discussing the different
parts of his criticism of General Beauregard's report of the battle
of Manassas. We hold that even Mr. Davis cannot be allowed to
controvert the historical events of that period; that he is bound
by them ; that he must accept the logical conclusions, whether for
praise or for censure, of his own acts ; and as his words — written
or spoken — have more weight in the minds of many persons than
the assertions of other men, he should be held to a strict responsi-

186 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
bility, and judged with all due severity, whenever he gives rein td
prejudice, or ceases to be fair and impartial.
In thus speaking, we are moved by no personal animosity to
Mr. Davis — far from it; but knowing the truth of all the facts
alluded to, and desiring that no injustice shall be done to one who,
no less than Mr. Davis, had his whole heart in the success of the
cause for which he fought, it is deemed a duty, as well as a right,
to .impart knowledge to the public, and show the source from
which it is derived.
The singular circumstance that General Beauregard's report of
the battle of Manassas is dated August the 26th, when it was not
forwarded until the 14th of October,* has already been explained
in afoot-note to be found in Chapter XII. of this work, page 165.
A repetition here would be unnecessary. We merely submit the
following letter, showing the exact time at which General Beau
regard's report was sent to the War Department.
" Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
" Fairfax Court-House, October lith, 1861.
" General S. Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Gen., Richmond, Va. :
" Sir, — I have the honor to transmit by my aid, Lieutenant S. W. Ferguson,
the report of the battle of Manassas, with the accompanying papers and draw
ings, as well as the flags and colors captured from the enemy on that occa
sion. Occupations of the gravest character have prevented their earlier trans
mission. " I send, as a guard to said colors, two of the soldiers who participated in
their capture. " I remain, Sir, respectfully, etc.,
" G. T. Beauregard, General."
After using his best endeavors to vindicate his course and fur
nish to " the student of history " all he should learn as to the facts
of the case, Mr. Davis, with great apparent generosity towards his
assailants, adds the following sentence : " It is fortunate for the
cause of justice that error and misrepresentation have, in their in
consistencies and improbabilities, the elements of self-destruction,
while truth is in its nature consistent, and therefore self-sustain
ing." f
We quite agree with Mr. Davis in this expression of a general
truth. Is it possible, however, that, while penning the words
* General J. E. Johnston's Report bore the same date.
t "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 371.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 187
quoted, he failed to see the stinging irony of their application to
that part of his own book which treats of this matter %
Among the many evidences of regard, in which General Beau
regard found consolation for official annoyances, came, just about
that time (January 20th), the following letter from Governor
Moore of Louisiana, transmitting the thanks of the Legislature
of his State, for the victories of Sumter, Bull Run, and Manassas.
"Executive Office, Baton Rouge, La., January lith, 1862.
" To Major-General G. T. Beauregard :
" Sir, — I have the honor to enclose herewith, as requested, a copy of a joint
resolution of the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana.
" The unanimous expression of the Legislature is but the echo of the equal
ly unanimous voices of the people of your native State. While they confide
in the efficiency and rejoice in the success of the troops under your command,
they entertain the highest esteem and gratitude for the talents and labor em
ployed by you in preparing our volunteers for such successful action and in
leading them to victory.
" In performing this pleasing duty, permit me to express my full and cor
dial concurrence in the well-deserved tribute of thanks which our Legislature
has offered you.
" With the highest consideration, I am, very respectfully,
" Your obedient servant,
" Thomas O. Moore, Governor."
Attentive, as ever, to the personal needs of his men, General
Beauregard, on the 18th of December, addressed a circular to
his division commanders, providing for the granting of leaves of
absence, after Christmas, to officers and privates, in limited num
bers at a time, and in the order claimed by the relative wants of
their families and affairs — a necessary privilege to many who, at
the first sudden call, had left their homes, and had, ever since,
been absent from them. On the 24th, however, upon learning
that Congress had passed an act granting furloughs of sixty days
to such twelve months' volunteers as would re-enlist for a term of
two or three years, or the war, General Beauregard revoked, but
with great reluctance, the leaves given, and ordered that, unless
in exceptional cases, they should be granted to those only who
would accept the provisions of the act. General Beauregard was
informed of this wholesale method of granting furloughs through
General Orders No. 1, from the Adjutant-General's office, which
was communicated to him as commander of the district, on or
about the 16th of January, with instructions to execute it at once,

188 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
but in such a manner only as might be compatible with safety to
the service. For reasons already stated, this order and the instruc
tions accompanying it were necessarily referred to General John-
stonj who deemed it best, at the time, to withhold its' publication.
On the 17th, circulars under cover to General Beauregard, and
separately addressed to his care, were received from Richmond,
for all the colonels in the army, providing for the issue of recruit
ing commissions from all regiments, battalions, and .independent
companies. This new official freak, on the part of the Acting Sec
retary of War, following, as it did, closely upon the " bounty and
furlough law," as it was called in the army, was calculated to do
the greatest harm, and pressed heavily, not only upon company
and regimental commanders, but, likewise, upon the generals in
chief. General Johnston, alluding to this unfortunate interven
tion of Mr. Benjamin, says in his " Narrative of Military Opera
tions," page 90 : " Either from defects in the law itself, or faults
in the manner in which it was administered, it had the effect of
weakening the army, by its immediate operation, without adding
to its strength subsequently. Its. numbers were greatly reduced
before the end of the month by furloughs under the recent law,
given directly by the Acting Secretary of War. It was further
weakened, and its discipline very much impaired, by Mr. Benja
min's daily interference in its administration and interior manage
ment. That officer was in the habit of granting leaves of absence,
furloughs, and discharges, accepting resignations, and detailing
soldiers to labor for contractors, or on nominal service, taking
them out of the army upon applications made directly to himself,
without the knowledge of the officers whose duty it was to look
to the interests of the government in such cases. He also granted
indiscriminately, to officers, privates, and civilians, authority to
raise companies of cavalry and artillery — especially the latter —
from our excellent infantry regiments, in some instances for
merely local services."
Meanwhile, a widespread spirit of discontent arose, from with
holding the publication of the orders of the department respect
ing furloughs; and General Beauregard again found himself in
the embarrassing position of being addressed and looked to by the
War Department as the commander of the army, while in reality
he had not been invested with such command by the commander
of the military department.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 189
To put an end to this embarrassing state of affairs, Colonel Jor
dan, his Chief of Staff, urged upon General Beauregard the advis
ability of dropping his practice of dating his orders from " Head
quarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac," and of informing Gen
eral Johnston of the change, in order to avoid clashing with the
War Department. General Beauregard acknowledged the sound
ness of the advice, which had already presented itself to his mind,
but, through a feeling of delicacy towards General Johnston, and
being reluctant to appear, in any way, to encroach upon his pre
rogatives as Commander-in-Chief, he once more declined to move
in the matter. Opposition to the War Department or to any or
der emanating therefrom, had nothing whatever to do with his de
cision. Shortly afterwards, fault being again found with this corps
command, General Beauregard, in order to avoid all further com
plication and appearance of disobedience to orders, forwarded the
following telegram to President Davis :
" Centreville, Va., December 31st, 1861.
" To President Jeff. Davis, Richmond :
" Please state definitely what I am to command, if I do not command a corps,
in consequence of latter being unauthorized. " G. T. Beauregard."
To this no reply came, and the uncertainty continued — the
War Department persisting in practically considering him as in
command of the whole army; while General Johnston, though
placed at the head of the Department of Northern Virginia, had
not relinquished his claim to the same position.
The matter of recruitment had given anxious thought to Gen
eral Beauregard, who reflected, with alarm, that, upon the disband-
ment of the twelve months' volunteers, the army would consist
mostly of raw recruits, in opposition to a force comparatively vet
eran, and superior both in numbers and in all the appointments of
war. Accordingly, on the 20th of January, he communicated to
the Hon. Roger A. Pryor, of the Confederate House of Represent
atives, a plan with the following main features: The governors of
the States, upon an immediate call by the Confederate govern
ment, to fill the regiments in the field to their legal standard, by
a draft of five hundred men for each ; to hold in reserve an addi
tional number of five hundred men, with which to raise them
again to their full standard at the end of the term of the twelve
months' men ; the second quota to be furnished about one month

190 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
before that event — less, however, such number of "veterans" as
'should then have re-enlisted; the recruits thus excepted forming
a reserve to supply occurring vacancies. Upon the arrival of the
second quota, the officers of regiments to be elected, subject to ap
proval after examination for competency ; promotion to be, thence
forward, by grade — the lowest grade being filled by election under
like approval.
No action was taken by Congress upon these suggestions, and
it is even doubtful that they were ever presented in that body.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 191

CHAPTER XIV.
The Part taken by General Johnston in the Battle of Manassas. — He Assumes
no Direct Responsibility, and, though Superior in Rank, desires General
Beauregard to Exercise Full Command. — President Davis did not Plan
the Campaign ; Ordered Concentration at the Last Moment ; Arrived on
the Battle-field after the Enemy had been Routed. — Pursuit Ordered and
Begun, but Checked in Consequence of False Alarm. — Advance on Wash
ington made Impossible by Want of Transportation and Subsistence.
Various are the comments and animadversions that have been
made upon the conduct of the Manassas campaign, and the Con
federate victory resulting from it. The clearest and most satis
factory evidence exists with regard to what then occurred. The
public, informed of the truth, would have naturally accepted it;
but public opinion has been studiously kept in a state of uncer
tainty by the propounding of many insidious questions which may
not here be passed without being set at rest.
What has been said, and is yet persisted in, by those who,
through error or otherwise, have drawn false conclusions from the
contradictory accounts of these events, may be classified and con
densed under three heads :
1. Was it not General Johnston, the superior in rank of General
Beauregard, who planned and fought the battle of Manassas?
Did not the latter merely act as one of the former's subordinates,
and in obedience to orders received ?
2. Was not President Davis the originator of the concentration
of our forces at and around Manassas? Was it not his timely
presence on the battle-field, and his inspiriting influence over the
troops, that secured victory to our arms ?
3. Why was not the pursuit of the enemy continued after the
battle of Manassas? Admitting the impossibility of doing so on
the evening of the 21st of July, why was it not attempted after
wards ?
It is due to the distinguished services of General Beauregard,
no less than to the truth, that each of the points enumerated above

192 MILITARY. OPERATIONS OF
shall be carefully and impartially examined, with the declared object
not to argue, but simply to demonstrate.
I. It must be borne in mind that General Johnston arrived at
Manassas on the 20th of July, at noon ; that is to say, only half a
day, and one night, before the battle of the 21st. He would cer
tainly have arrived too late, had not the result of the action of
Bull Run, on the 18th, deterred General McDowell from sooner
making his contemplated attack. And it must also be borne in
mind that General Johnston marched to the assistance of General
Beauregard, not of his own free will, or to prepare for a battle he
had already planned, but in compliance with a tardy telegram from
Richmond, issued at the urgent request of General Beauregard,
who, from the early part of June until that day, had never ceased
to counsel concentration and an aggressive campaign. Such a
junction had at last become an imperative necessity. General
Johnston was forced to acknowledge it. Left free to use his dis
cretion as to the "practicability" of the "movement," he lost no
time in putting his troops in motion.
Now, what did General Johnston do upon reaching General
Beauregard's headquarters at Camp Pickens ?. Upon assuming
command, did he immediately instruct General Beauregard as to
what should be done in view of the coming conflict % Did he draw
up a plan of operations? Did he issue orders for the distribu
tion and location of the forces already at Manassas, and of those
that had just arrived, or might come in afterwards ? Not at all.
In his own words we have it (Johnston's "Narrative of Military
Operations," p. 39) " that the position occupied by the Confed
erate army was too extensive, and the ground, much of it, too
broken, thickly wooded, and intricate, to be studied to any purpose
in the brief space of time at my disposal; for I had come im
pressed with the opinion that it was necessary. to attack the enemy
next morning, to decide the event before the arrival of General
Patterson's forces." And here we might properly remark, that
General Patterson never arrived, nor has it been shown that he
ever intended to do so. Long before writing his book, General
Johnston, in his official report, had said : "I found General Beau
regard's position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded
and intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and
therefore determined to rely on his knowledge of it and of the ene
my 's positions. This I did readily, from full confidence in his

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 193
capacity." And well may General Johnston have been impressed
with the opinion that it was necessary to attack the enemy the
next morning ; for General Beauregard, in several letters to him,
in messages delivered by special aids (Colonel Chisolm among
them), and by his telegram dated July 17th, had clearly announced
his determination, if reinforced, to attack and crush the enemy.
Before proceeding further, we think it our duty to add that
General Johnston is certainly mistaken when he asserts that Gen
eral Beauregard's telegram asking — we might almost say implor
ing — him to move on immediately, was only received on the 18th,
when his answer to it is dated July 17th, and reads as follows:
"Winchester, Va., July nth, 1861.
" General Beauregard, Manassas :
" Is the enemy upon you in force ? „ j K JoHNSTON_„
This shows conclusively how little General Johnston had thought
of leaving Winchester, and how utterly improbable it is that he
had planned a battle to be fought at Manassas, through a junction
of his forces with those of General Beauregard. Does it not
show, besides, how unwilling he was to move at all, unless assured
that there was no exaggeration in General Beauregard's anticipa
tion of a powerful impending attack ? It was necessary to telegraph
to him again before he finally agreed to put his troops in motion.
Hence their late arrival, some of them not coming up until the
latter part of the battle. General Johnston had, evidently, no
plan of his own when he reached Manassas. That he drew up no
plan after his arrival there is quite as evident. He had no time
in which to do so. The circumstances were too pressing. He
knew nothing of the position of our own forces, and still less of
that of the enemy. He was obliged to rely on the knowledge
which General Beauregard had of the whole country at and
around Manassas, and, though the superior in rank, he very wisely
declined to assume the responsibility of a battle in the prepar
ations for which he had had no share. In his report General
Beauregard says : " Made acquainted with my plan of operations
and dispositions to meet the enemy, he (General Johnston) gave
them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution
under my command." This passage of General Beauregard's
report corroborates and completes the passage quoted above from
General Johnston's report. Had not such an understanding existed
I.— 13

194 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
between the two generals, how can it be supposed, first, that Gen
eral Beauregard would have asserted it, and, next, that General
Johnston would have allowed the assertion to pass uncontradicted,
when we consider that the language used in General Beauregard's
report would have virtually deprived General Johnston of his right
ful claim to the command of our united forces.
We quote again from General Johnston's " Narrative of Military
Operations," pp. 40, 41 : " General Beauregard pointed out, on his
map, five roads converging to Centreville from different points of
his front, and proposed an order of march on these roads, by which
the army should be concentrated near the Federal camps. It was
accepted without hesitation ; and, having had no opportunit}7 to
sleep in either of the three nights immediately preceding, I re
quested him to draw up this order of march, and have the number
of copies necessary written by our staff officers and brought to me
for distribution that evening, while I was preparing, by rest, for
the impending battle."
The order of march — that is, the plan of battle — is proposed by
General Beauregard; "accepted without hesitation," by General
Johnston, and "drawn up" by the former, while the latter is
"preparing, by rest, for the impending battle." General John
ston sleeps quietly, undisturbed by any direct responsibility for
what is to ensue in the morning. He comes to assist General
Beauregard, not to interfere with his plans. This fight is not his
own, but General Beauregard's, and he so expresses himself in
declining to direct the operations against the enemy. And while
he thus tranquilly takes his rest, General Beauregard, who has no
leisure to do the same, and has hardly had any sleep at all since
the 17th, the day preceding the engagement of Bull Run, goes on
with the active preparations needed at the hour; issues and dis
tributes the order of march and other orders ; locates troops — his
own and General Johnston's — as if reinforcements alone had been
sent him, unaccompanied by an officer of superior rank.
We admit, say those critics to whom this chapter is specially
addressed, that the idea of concentration was General Beaure
gard's ; that the first plan of battle was his, likewise ; but it was
not carried out; the enemy's movements rendered it unavailing,
and another plan was substituted in its stead. General Johnston,
the superior in rank, being then on the field, who suggested it ?
Our answer is, that a modification of the original plan had to

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 195
be resorted to, but was suggested — as had been the plan itself — by
General Beauregard, and by no other. In his " Narrative of Mili
tary Operations," page 42, General Johnston says : " The plan of
operations adopted the day before was now, apparently, made im
practicable by the enemy's advance against our left. It was aban
doned, therefore, and another adopted, suggested by General Bean-
regard. . . . The orders for this, like those preceding them, were dis
tributed by General Beauregard's staff officers, because they were
addressed to his troops, and my staff knew neither the positions of
the different brigades nor the paths leading to them." It matters
very little whether " the enemy's advance against our left " had
necessitated " another" plan, as General Johnston affirms, or mere
ly a " modification " of the first, as he expresses it in his report, and
as was really the case ; the essential fact that it was General Beaure
gard — and not General Johnston — who again suggested it, remains
the same, and is beyond dispute. And, here, truth compels us to
add that the allegation that such orders "and those preceding them
were distributed by General Beauregard's staff officers because
they were addressed to his troops" is altogether erroneous; for
almost all orders, from the afternoon of the day previous to that
time, had been forwarded through General Beauregard's staff ;
the palpable reason being, that the officers of General Johnston's
staff were in complete ignorance of the location of our various
troops, as much so of General Johnston's as of General Beaure
gard's. Nor must we forget that General Johnston was "prepar
ing, by rest, for the impending battle," while all our forces — those
already arrived or arriving — at Manassas were being placed in
position, by General Beauregard's orders.
Be this as it may, the fact is not the less plain that the new
plan, or the modification of the original one, was conceived and
offered by General Beauregard, and merely adopted by General
Johnston. This forms an essential feature in our line of evidence,
and in no inconsiderable degree adds to its weight. What we con
sider ambiguous and incomprehensible are the following words, to
be found in General Johnston's "Narrative of Military Opera
tions," at the close of the paragraph we have given above: "Want
of promptness in the delivery of these orders frustrated this plan
— perhaps fortunately."
It is true that circumstances occurred which made necessary a
second modification in the details of General Beauregard's plan,

196 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
and this, we submit, should surprise no one ; but what can be the
meaning and intent of the words " perhaps fortunately," as applied
to the change General Johnston alludes to? If the plan was unwise,
why had he approved it? If it was judicious — as he must have
thought it — why does he afterwards cast a shadow of censure over
it ? It may have been because, having declined to assume com
mand, he was unwilling to appear to oppose General Beauregard's
views. Then, why should he lead the readers of his report and of
his book to the erroneous belief that his was the controlling spirit
directing each and every incident of the battle ? We can imagine
only one set of conditions under which the frustration of the
modified plan might have been a fortunate occurrence, and that
is, that General Johnston, who was ignorant, as he admits, of the
surrounding country, and had but superficially examined that plan,
should himself have undertaken to carry it into operation. Such
could not have been the case with General Beauregard, who knew
every inch of ground covered by our united forces, and certainly
understood what he had himself conceived. In truth, though it
seems idle to speculate upon the possible results of events that
never occurred, General Beauregard thinks1 — and so do many of
ficers of merit, well acquainted with the matter — that, if the plan
alluded to by General Johnston had been executed in time, the
rout of the enemy would have occurred early in the day, instead of
late in the afternoon, and the whole of General McDowell's army —
not a small portion of it only — would have been captured or an
nihilated. The use of the phrase " perhaps fortunately " is, there
fore, logically and truthfully speaking, without any justification
whatever. Towards the end of his report, alluding to the fact
of his orders having failed to reach the brigade commanders to
whom they were forwarded, General Beauregard says: "In con
nection with the miscarriage of the orders sent by courier to
Generals Holmes and Ewell, to attack the enemy in flank and re
verse at Centreville, through which the triumph of our arms was
prevented from being still more decisive, I regard it in place to
say," etc. And he here recommends a " divisional organization,"
which, he thinks, " would greatly reduce the risk of such mis
haps " in the future.
All things considered, we feel justified in saying that the phrase
"perhaps fortunately," though necessarily void of any effect,
would mean more if applied to what might have happened to

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 197
the enemy, than it does in connection with the modified plan of
General Beauregard. "Fortunately" for General McDowell's
army, not " fortunately " for ours, the miscarriage occurred.
Referring, in his report, to the movements of the enemy in the
early morning of the 21st, and the non-arrival of the expected
troops (some five thousand of his own) General Johnston says:
" General Beauregard afterwards proposed " (Beauregard always
proposing, Johnston always accepting) " a modification of the aban
doned plan — to attack with our right, while the left stood on the
defensive. This, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued,
different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on
our side." On the other hand, his "Narrative of Military Opera
tions," pp. 47, 48, has the following passage : " It was now evident
that a battle was to be fought, entirely different, in place and cir
cumstances, from either of the two plans previously adopted. . . .
Instead of taking the initiative and operating in front of our line,
we were now compelled to fight on the defensive, a mile and a
half behind that line, and at right angles to it, on a new and un-
surveyed field, with no other plans than those suggested by the
changing events of battle."
The conclusion we are to draw from this is, that, as first agreed,
we were to fight according to plans prepared and proposed by
General Beauregard and accepted by General Johnston ; and that
now — strange as the assertion may appear — we are abont to fight
according to no plan at all. We submit that the fact — if fact it
were — of our fighting " with no other plans than those suggested
by the changing events of battle," does not show, in the least, that
General Johnston, either at that moment, or before or afterwards,
ever assumed the responsibility of planning or directing the opera
tions of the day.
We thus dwell upon General Johnston's assertions, made in his
report and in his book, because we take it that no better evidence
than his own can be adduced in matters where he is so directly
concerned. More conclusive still does such evidence become,
when corroborated, explained — though at times corrected — by pas
sages of General Beauregard's report on the same subject-matter.
Before quoting again from General Johnston's work, let us
briefly review the situation, as defined by its author. We are now
fighting with no preconcerted plan whatever. We know nothing
of the ground we stand upon. This, however, clearly applies to

198 MILITARY OPERATIONS OE
General Johnston alone, for he admits the knowledge General
Beauregard had of our own and of the enemy's positions. All our
forces already on the field are being concentrated, as rapidly as
possible, on the ground where the enemy compels us to give him
battle. The weight against us is terrible. Our troops display
the greatest gallantry, but are about to give way. Generals John
ston and Beauregard are among them. They rally on their
colors. The battle is re-established.
And now, at this critical moment of the day, " the aspect of
affairs being not encouraging," as General Johnston says, a circum
stance occurred, which, better than any other, will serve to define
the real position of the two generals, and finally determine to
which of them unmistakably belong the success and glory of the
battle of Manassas
We quote from the " Narrative of Military Operations," p. 48 :
" After assigning General Beauregard to the command of the
troops immediately engaged, which he properly suggested belonged
to the second in rank, not to the commander of the army, I re
turned to the whole field." The language of the report is as follows :
" Then, in a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was
assigned to the command of the left, which, as the younger officer,
he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field."
The question naturally occurring to the reader's mind is, where,
at that momentous juncture, was "the whole field?" We must
not forget what General Johnston tells us, to wit, that the "field"
is a new one ; that the battle is being fought according to no
body's plan ; that all our forces are either now engaged on, or be
ing sent to, the ground where the enemy forced us to fight him,
and where " the aspect of affairs is not encouraging." To what
" whole field " is General Johnston, the " commander of the
army," now about to " return ?" The word "return " implies the
act of going back to a place — in this instance to a "field" — where
one had been before. Where was the " whole field," before ?
Where was it at this time? The evidence General Johnston fur
nishes shuts out all other conclusion than this, that by "return
ing" to what he terms "the whole field," he was actually leaving
the immediate field of battle. For here, on the ground where
General Beauregard is now fighting, where all our forces — except
reinforcements not yet arrived — are being massed, is unquestion
ably the "field."

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 199
With the passages just quoted from General Johnston's book
and from his report, let us now connect what General Beau
regard, in his report, says of this period of the day: "As soon
as we had just rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General
Johnston to leave the immediate command of the field to me" (the
"field"— not the " left ")—" while he, repairing to Portici— the
Lewis House — should urge reinforcements forward. At first he
was unwilling, but, reminded that one of us must do so, and that,
properly, it was his place, he reluctantly, but fortunately, com
plied ; fortunately, because, from that position, by his energy and
sagacity, his keen perception, and anticipation of my needs, he
so directed the reserves as to insure the success of the day."
This passage of General Beauregard's report, explaining the
part. General Johnston took in the battle, is marked by a high-
toned courtesy and disinterestedness reflecting honor upon the
spirit actuating it. He there speaks of his superior in rank, of
one who, in published orders, had ostensibly assumed command of
the army, but, wisely declining to exercise his rights as such, had
"generously permitted the carrying out of his (Beauregard's)
plans." Feeling sure that if untrammelled in the command, he
could achieve a victory, and fully appreciating the opportunity
left in his hands by General Johnston's withdrawal from the field,
he finds no words too eulogistic to express his gratification at the
assistance General Johnston gives him — how ? by sending forward
reinforcements in anticipation of his needs.
General Beauregard's cousiderateness of feeling is all the more
striking because what he says is in decided contrast with what
General Johnston does not say, but clearly insinuates, both in his
report and in his book.
The truth is, that the presence of the two generals on the field
was worse than useless, under the circumstances. So long as Gen
eral Johnston remained there, General Beauregard, in obedience
to military etiquette, had to refer to him, before issuing any of his
orders. Hence unavoidable delays must have occurred in their
execution, which might have imperilled the result of the day.
General Beauregard had strenously exerted himself to procure
the concentration of our forces at Manassas. He had suggested
the plan which was now being carried out, though modified, so as
to meet the inevitable changes and chances of a battle-field. To
him, the immediate position of our troops and all the surrounding

200 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
country were "as familiar as a nursery tale," whereas they were
wholly unknown to General Johnston. It was, therefore, both
natural and just that General Beauregard should have the actual
command of the army, as he certainly had the responsibility for
the issue of the contest. General Beauregard was in command,
not of the "left" only, but of our whole line, including the left,
the centre, and the right. He issued orders to all our united
forces then gathered on the field, the " new field," which, General
Johnson says, had been substituted for the first. On that "field"
did he command, fight, and win the battle, while General John
ston, at his request, had gone to the rear to assist him by sending
forward reinforcements. Not once during the whole battle did
General Johnston give him a single order. All orders on the
evening previous, as well as on that day, were, as we have seen,
suggested and issued by General Beauregard, and acquiesced
in by General Johnston. From the moment the latter withdrew
from the field, at 11.30 a. m., or about that time, until 4.30 p. m.,
when General Beauregard joined him at the Lewis House, he com
municated only once with General Beauregard, and then, only to
send him an unimportant message, through Colonel Lay, one of
his aids. So might have done, and so did, Colonel Jordan, Gen
eral Beauregard's Chief of Staff, and other subordinate officers,
whose duty it was to inform the commanding general of all that
occurred in their front, with a view to receiving further instruc
tions from him.
Suppose General Beauregard, yielding to General Johnston's
reluctance to take the position he had indicated for him at the
Lewis House, had gone thither himself, would that have put
General Beauregard in command of the " whole field " ? Yet that
is the very position General Johnston would have wished General
Beauregard to take, had not the latter "claimed" the command,
which, for the reasons so often alluded to, had been given him by
General Johnston himself. If the position taken by General
Johnston, at the request of General Beauregard, was the proper
one to be taken by the commander of the army, he should have
gone thither of his own free will, as soon as " order was restored
and the battle re-established." But he insisted upon remaining
with the troops immediately engaged, and upon doing what Gen
eral Beauregard actually did. Was it because he was the com
mander of the army ? If the Lewis House was not the position

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 201
for the responsible commander, then such, most undoubtedly, was
General Beauregard's on the field.
Much more could be said. Letters and documents could be
quoted to corroborate the truth of every assertion here made about
the point under examination. But it is deemed unnecessary, as it
would only multiply — not strengthen — our evidence. The reader
is referred simply to the two following letters — the first, an official
one, from the Secretary of War, and the other from General Lee
— which show conclusively to whom the honors of the victory of
Manassas were accorded. "¦ C. S. A. War Department,
Richmond, July 2ith, 1861.
" My dear General, — Accept my congratulations for the glorious and most
brilliant victory achieved by you.
" The country will bless you and honor you for it,
" Believe me, dear general, truly your friend, "L. P. Walker.
" General G. T. Beauregard." " Richmond, July 2ith, 1861.
" My dear General, — I cannot express the joy I feel, at the beautiful victory
of the 21st. The skill, courage, and endurance displayed by yourself excite my
highest admiration. You and your troops have the gratitude of the whole
country, and I offer to all my heartfelt congratulations at their success.
" The glorious dead are at peace. I grieve for their loss, and sympathize
with the living.
" May your subsequent course be attended with like success. "R.E.Lee.
"General Beauregard."
The War Department and General Lee no doubt knew that
such letters would have been altogether irrelevant had the hero of
Manassas been General Johnston, and not General Beauregard, to
whom they were addressed.
Ask the survivors of that first battle of the war — be they Vir
ginians, Carolinians, Georgians, Alabamians, Mississippians, Ten-
nesseeans, or Louisianians — who led them, on the 21st of July,
1861; ask them, when, broken down by exhaustion and over
whelmed by numbers, they wavered and had all but lost the sense
of their soldierly duties, who sprang before them, radiant with in
spiriting valor, and, ordering their colors planted in their front,
rallied them to these sacred emblems of country, honor, and liber
ty ? We have written and reasoned in vain ; we know not what

202 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
sounds and what echoes move most the hearts of those " who wore
the gray," if one name — Beauregard's — is not the name they will
one and all couple with that great victory.
II. A retrospective glance over the preceding chapters will con
vince the reader that President Davis had nothing whatever to
do with the plan according to which was effected the concentra
tion of our forces at Manassas. General Beauregard's letter to him,
written as early as June 12th, and the President's answer, are in
existence to testify that General Beauregard, ten days after assum
ing; command at Manassas, and as soon as he had familiarized him-
self with our own and the enemy's positions, began urging con
centration upon the Confederate government, in which he was
steadily opposed by Mr. Davis. Failing in this, General Beaure
gard asked for a junction of General Holmes's forces with his own,
showing — General Holmes agreeing — the uselessness of that com
mand in the position it then occupied. This, too, was refused.
Grieved, though not discouraged, at his want of success in securing
compliance with suggestions which he knew were not only wise
but of the utmost importance, General Beauregard did all he could
to prepare himself for the imminent conflict approaching. On the
8th of July he wrote to Senator Wigfall the letter already placed
before the reader (Chapter VII.), wherein is depicted the critical
strait he was in, owing to slowness, want of forethought, and gen
eral inefficiency in the management of military affairs at the seat
of government. With fifteen thousand men of all arms, he was
threatened and would soon be attacked by forty thousand of the
enemy's forces. He was determined to give battle, however, no
matter what odds there might be against him ; for the Federal ad
vance must be checked even at the heaviest cost. He was evidently
anxious that the President should be approached on the subject, so •
as to put a stop, at once, to the improvidence spoken of.
On the next day he forwarded the following telegram :
" Manassas, July 9th, 1861.
" President Davis /
"Enemy's force increasing and advancing daily this side of Potomac. He
will soon attack with very superior numbers. No time should be lost in rein
forcing me here, with at least ten thousand men, volunteers or militia. I write
to-day, " G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Gen. Comdg."
He did not write on that day, but did so on the 11th of July,

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 203
setting forth the disparity of numbers between his forces and
those of the enemy, and alluding to the apprehension of his left
flank being turned and his communication with Richmond event
ually destroj'ed. "In view of the odds against me" — he wrote
in that letter — " and of the vital importance, at this juncture, of
avoiding the hazard of defeat, which would open to the enemy
the way to Richmond, I shall act with extreme caution. If forced
to retire before an overwhelming force, . . . my line of retreat can
be taken, through Brentsville, to a junction with Brigadier-Gen
eral Holmes, at or near Fredericksburg, whence we could operate
on the line of communication of the enemy, ... so as to retard
him by the way." He wished it clearly understood, however,
that should the enemy offer battle on the line of Bull Run, he
would accept it for his command, against whatever odds he (the
enemy) might array in his front.
Hardly had this communication been forwarded to Richmond,
before he despatched thither Colonel Preston, and, immediately
afterwards, Colonel Chestnut, with another and more extensive
plan of concentration and aggression. It is given in full in
Colonel Chestnut's report of his mission, to which we refer the
reader.* The result was, that, after consultation with Generals
Cooper and Lee, the President once more refused to accede to the
plan of concentration offered him by General Beauregard. The
enemy were yet too near their cover to allow any reasonable hope
of the accomplishment of this proposed scheme, which was de
clared to be a very brilliant and comprehensive one, but, withal,
pronounced impracticable. Such, in substance, was the decision
against the wisest — as it was undoubtedly the boldest — concen
trated, aggressive campaign attempted during the war. Before
sending to Richmond, General Beauregard, in a letter dated July
13th, had also communicated the outlines of this plan to Gen
eral Johnston, whose influence in its support he was anxious to
secure. He was as unfortunate there as he was with the President.
An expectant and defensive policy was, at that moment, the one
absorbing thought of President Davis and of Generals Cooper,
Lee, and Johnston.
At last the crisis came upon us. On the 16th of July General
Beauregard was informed, by a secret message from Washington,
* To be found at the beginning of Chapter VIII.

204 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
that General McDowell had been ordered to advance, and would
do so that very night. He forwarded this news to Richmond, and,
undaunted by his former fruitless attempts, urged the absolute ne
cessity of ordering Generals Johnston and Holmes to join their
forces to his.
Then it was — but only then — that President Davis consented
to the long-suggested, long-prayed-for concentration, so repeatedly
and vainly demanded. An order — not an imperative one, how
ever — was sent to General Johnston, to move on to General
Beauregard's assistance, " if practicable." It was dated July 17th,
and has already been transcribed in these pages. Too late, thought
General Beauregard, and he so expressed himself in his telegram
to General Cooper, advising him that " the enemy will attack in
force" the next morning. And the enemy did. The engage
ment of Bull Run was fought and won ; and General McDowell,
frustrated in this his attempt to carry our lines, fortunately for
us, delayed his onward movement towards Richmond. Our suc
cess was announced to the War Department ; what answer came
back ? The despatch has already been given, but it is necessary
to lay it again before the reader. " Richmond, July 19th, 1861.
" General Beauregard, Manassas, Va. :
" We have no intelligence from General Johnston. If the enemy in front
of you has abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston has not
moved, you had better withdraw the call upon him, so that he may be left to
his full discretiou. All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered to join
you. From this place we will send as fast as transportation permits. The
enemy is advised at Washington of the projected movement of Generals John
ston and Holmes, and may vary his plans in conformity thereto.
" S. Cooper, Adjutant-General."
Even at this critical juncture, when no further doubt could ex
ist of the enemy's intention to rush upon our lines in overwhelm
ing force — the inevitable result of our defeat being the capture
of Richmond — President Davis, so far from having projected con
centrating our forces at Manassas, was desirous of countermanding
his order to General Johnston, on the 19th of July, and so caused
General Beauregard to be advised.
No more need be said to show that the concentration of our
forces at Manassas was due to the energy and untiring efforts of
General Beauregard alone, and in nowise to any prevision or
plan of President Davis, who agreed to the proposed movement

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 205
only at the very last hour, sorely against his wishes, and only
when he was forced to realize that an overpowering foe threat
ened us with annihilation.
All this is written after a careful perusal of Mr. Davis's book.
Nowhere in it does he assert, in so many words, that it was he,
and not General Beauregard, who first thought of and first suggest
ed the junction of our armies at Manassas ; but, by using 6uch
expressions as, " the great question of uniting the two armies had
been decided at Richmond," he creates a false impression on the
reader's mind. That it was Mr. Davis who finally signed the con
tingent order for the junction, and, to that extent, decided the
question of uniting the two armies, is not contended. He was
the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, and, as such, it
was necessary that his consent should be obtained before a mili
tary movement of so great importance could be carried out. It is
clear that General Beauregard had no right to order General John
ston to make a junction with him. But that the suggestion came
from General Beauregard, and that Mr. Davis, at the last hour
only, issued the necessary order, is none the less an undeniable
fact. And now, that many idle rumors of the first period of the war
have died out, and plain historical facts have rightfully taken their
place, is it possible that even the nearest of President Davis's
friends can still seriously claim that the victory of Manassas was,
in any way, due to his presence upon the battle-field ? So contra
ry to truth is any assertion of the kind, so plainly obvious is the
fact that President Davis saw nothing of the battle, and, therefore,
took no part whatever in it, that we are at a loss for means of
meeting the efforts of some of his admirers, who wish to give him
the meed of praise exclusively belonging to another.
That President Davis came to Manassas on the 21st of July,
with the probable intention of taking an active part in the battle,
should circumstances justify his doing so, none who know any
thing of the events of that memorable epoch are disposed to doubt
or gainsay. But that, if such were his intention, he was disap
pointed, is no less historically true.
In Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 53, we read
as follows : " Some half-hour after the termination of the battle, the
President rode upon the field, conducted from Manassas Station by
Lieutenant-Colonel Jordan. He had arrived there from Richmond

206 . MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
when the struggle had just closed, and had, doubtless, hurried out
to take part in it. The crowd of fugitives he had seen from his
railway car, bef ore reaching the station, had so strongly impressed
upon his mind the idea that we were defeated, that it was not
immediately removed by the appearance of the field. I judged
so, at least, from his first words, while we were shaking hands :
' How has the battle gone ?' "
In Alfriend's " Life of Jefferson Davis" it is asserted (p. 305)
that the President reached " the battle-field while the struggle was
still in progress ;" that " to the troops his name and bearing were
the symbols of victory ;" that " while the victory was assured, but
by no means complete, he urged that the enemy, still on the field
(Heintzelman's troops, as subsequently appeared), be warmly pur
sued, as was successfully done" (p. 313).
" These are fancies," says General Johnston. " He arrived upon
the field after the last-armed enemy had left it, when none were
within cannon-shot, or south of Bull Run, when the victory was
' complete ' as well as assured, and no opportunity left for the in
fluence of his name and bearing."
General Beauregard, in his report, also alludes to the arrival of
Mr. Davis on the battle-field of Manassas, just after the enemy
had " given way and fled, in wild disorder, in every direction — a
scene the President of the Confederacy had the high satisfaction of
witnessing, as he arrived upon the field at that exultant moment."
True, President Davis, on his return to Richmond, was serenad
ed in honor of the great Confederate victory, and was even ex
tolled as " the hero " of that memorable day. But nowhere has
it appeared, so far, that he ever laid claim to this honor, though
he is said never to have had sufficient moral courage openly to re
fuse it. Be this as it may, neither the efforts of his friends, nor
the insinuations in his published work, will succeed in altering
the facts of the case. History, in its wonted impartiality, will
never accord him the honors of the plan of campaign, or of the
concentration of the troops, or of the victory won on the hard-
fought field of Manassas. On those points the true verdict of
the country has already been rendered.
In a letter to, General Beauregard, dated Richmond, August
25th, 1861, Colonel Chestnut, of South Carolina, so aptly and for
cibly expresses this opinion, that we feel impelled to transcribe
his words. He wrote :

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 207
" The country owes you an immense debt of gratitude, and the world has
already paid you the tribute of just and unqualified admiration. The more
the consequences of the victory at Manassas are understood, the greater and
the more glorious will it seem.
" The unbecoming pruriency of some, and the voracious appetite of many
for even a fleeting notoriety, which have prompted undue and untimely claims
to all the honors of the fight, are to be regretted, but do not amount to any
serious grievance. After a little time truth will assign each his proper place.
********* " With great respect,
" Your friend and obedient servant,
" Jas. Chestnut, Jr.
" General Beauregard."
III. A few words will suffice to explain why our victory was
not pushed after the battle of Manassas.
It has already been shown — and a repetition here would be use
less — how it happened that the pursuit of the enemy, though or
dered and in course of execution, was checked and finally aban
doned on the night of the 21st of July ; and it has also been
shown how "an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain,"
the next day, made "an efficient pursuit," at that time, "a mili
tary impossibility." *
The reasons why the pursuit was not taken up later have also
been given in detail in Chapter X.
An army deprived of transportation and subsistence is utterly
powerless. This is a self-evident proposition, that needs no argu
ment in its support. That our army was in that position, despite
the unceasing efforts and remonstrances of General Beauregard,
is incontrovertibly true ; that there was no necessity for such des
titution is clear. At the opening of the war provisions were
plentiful all over the land. The rich agricultural districts of Vir
ginia, in close proximity to the army — not to speak of the entire
South, so willing to contribute in every way to the success of a
cause dear to all hearts — were stocked with food, wagons, and
teams. It would have required but the most ordinary administra
tive capacity, and but a small amount of enterprise, to furnish the
army with the "twenty days' rations" in advance, so earnestly and
repeatedly called for by General Beauregard, and with transporta-
* See Chapter IX. See also the latter part of General Beauregard's re
port.

208 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
tion enough to carry our combined forces into the city of Wash
ington. We do not say that President Davis was opposed to the ad
vance of our forces on Washington, or that he purposely prevent
ed such an advance, and the investment and consequent capitula
tion of the Federal capital which must have resulted from it ; but
we do say that, had he not persistently overlooked the just de
mands of General Beauregard for transportation and subsistence,
not only after bnt before the battle of Manassas, and had he not
as persistently approved the narrowness of views and improvident
methods of notoriously incompetent officials, whose shortcomings
were so often brought to his knowledge, the Federal capital could
have been captured by our victorious forces as early as the 24th
of July. General Beauregard stated this as his conviction, in let
ters to Representative Miles, and to Mr. Davis himself, when the
latter called him to account for having been the cause of a con
gressional investigation on the deplorable condition of our army,
and its inability either to advance or retreat.
From New Orleans, March, 1876, in answer to the Hon. John
C. Ferriss, of Tennessee, who wished to be informed upon this
point, General Beauregard explained how it was that no advance
was made on Washington. We commend to the serious attention
of the reader the following passage from his letter : " Our only
proper operation was to pass the Potomac above, into Maryland,
at or about Edwards's Ferry, and march upon the rear of Washing
ton. With the hope of undertaking such a movement, I had caused
a reconnoisance of the country and shore (south of the Potomac)
in that quarter to be made in the month of June ; but the neces
sary transportation even for the ammunition essential to such a
movement had not been provided for my forces, notwithstanding
my application for it during more than a month beforehand; nor
was there twenty-four hours' food at Manassas, for the troops
brought together for that battle." * The fact is, that some com
mands were without food for forty hours after the battle.
It is unnecessary to dwell further upon these events. The
thought of what could have been accomplished, but was not, and of
the reasons for our failure, will continue to be for us the subject of
lasting regret. Our army did not follow up the victory of Ma-
* The italics are ours.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 209
nassas, and march upon the rear of Washington, as already said, for
want of transportation and subsistence. Transportation and sub
sistence were lacking because the Commissary and Quartermaster
Departments, which could have procured both, and had ample
time to see to it, failed to do so through sheer improvidence and
incapacity.
I.— 14

210 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XV.
Colonel Pryor, of the Military Committee of Congress, Visits General Beaure
gard at Centreville, to Propose his Transfer to the West. — General Beau
regard finally Yields to the Wishes of Congress and the Executive. —
He Parts with his Army on the 2d of February, and on the 4th Arrives
at Bowling Green. — Interview with General A. S. Johnston. — Succinct
Review of the Latter's Situation. — Ignorance of the War Department with
Reference to his Forces. — General Beauregard Desires to go Back to his
Army in Virginia. — General Johnston urges Him to Stay and Assume
Command at Columbus. — Inspection of the Works at Bowling Green. —
What General Beauregard Thinks of Them. — He Suggests Concentration
at Henry and Donelson to Force a Battle upon Grant. — General Johnston
Fears the Risk of such a Movement, and Adheres to his own Plan of Op
erations. — Fall of Fort Henry. — Conference at Bowling Green. — Memo
randum of General Johnston's Plan of the Campaign.— His and General
Polk's Army to Operate on Divergent Lines. — Evacuation of Bowling
Green. — General Beauregard Asks for Specific Instructions. — Letter to
Colonel Pryor. — Fall of Fort Donelson. — Its Effect upon the Country. —
Criticism of General Johnston's Strategy.
Towards the end of January, 1862, General Beauregard re
ceived a visit, at his headquarters at Centreville, from Colonel
Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia, a member of the Military Commit
tee of the Confederate Congress. He informed General Beaure
gard that he had been deputed by his committee, and the Repre
sentatives in Congress of the Mississippi Valley States generally,
to confer with him upon a plan then under consideration at Rich
mond, and to urge him to give it his consent. This plan consisted
in the transfer of General Beauregard to the conduct of the de
fence of the Mississippi Valley, upon which public attention had
now centred, and about the security of which great apprehensions
were expressed. President Davis himself — Colonel Pryor said —
was desirous of ordering the transfer, should General Beauregard
agree to it.
The immediate command thus proposed to General Beauregard
included the forces under Major-General Polk, with headquarters
at Columbus, Kentucky, within the Department of Kentucky and
Tennessee, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 211
Colonel Pryor gave many strong reasons for the transfer he had
been sent to advocate, and mentioned, among others, the critical
condition of affairs in that part of the country, owing, it was be
lieved, to the bad organization and want of discipline of our troops,
confronting whom were superior Federal forces known to be am
ply furnished with all the appliances of war. Well-founded fears
of consequent disaster to the cause were very generally enter
tained, which, Colonel Pryor thought, could only be averted by
prompt and vigorous action on the part of the government.
General Beauregard at first declined to accede to the proposi
tion. He was loath to separate himself from the Army of the
Potomac, more than half of which he had organized and disci
plined, and whose conduct in the battle of Manassas, and through
out the minor operations of the fall, gave assurance of still greater
successes for the coming spring campaign. Moreover, he had just
undergone a surgical operation of the throat, the result of which
might lead to serious consequences, should he be too soon exposed
to the inclemencies of the weather. But Colonel Pryor, notwith
standing the objections raised against the purpose of his mission,
represented that General Beauregard's presence in the West was
necessary to revive public confidence, then very much shaken by
the defeat of Zollicoffer's command at Mill Spring, in eastern
Kentucky, and that it would impart activity and efficiency to our
operations. He also made a statement — the truth of which, he
said, was vouched for bj7 the Acting Secretary of War, Mr. Benja
min — that the effective force in General Johnston's department
numbered fully seventy thousand men — forty thousand under Gen
eral Johnston, in middle Kentucky, and the remainder under Gen
eral Polk, in western Tennessee.
Meanwhile, many of General Beauregard's friends at Centre
ville and Richmond, aware of the efforts that were being made,
sought to dissuade him from relinquishing his position in Vir
ginia, and what was considered the chief field of operations of the
Confederate forces. They argued, furthermore, that, should he
consent to leave this army, he would never be allowed to return
to it again, no matter upon what terms he might agree to accept
the offer so alluringly presented to him. General Beauregard care
fully weighed the strength of the arguments used on both sides.
He knew that, owing to bad weather, impracticable roads, and
other influences, there would probably be no military operations in

212 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
northeastern Virginia before the ensuing spring. He was gratified
by the high mark of confidence and consideration conferred upon
him by the gentlemen of Congress in whose names Colonel Pryor
had spoken. He was then, as ever, " the soldier of the cause and of
his country," ready " to do duty, cheerfully, wherever placed by the
constituted authorities." So lie finally yielded to Colonel Pryoi-'s
pressing representations, and informed him of his acceptance of
the proposed transfer, but upon the three following conditions :
first, that the Army of the West should consist of the effective
force stated by him,* or, if not, should be sufficiently reinforced
to enable him to assume the offensive immediately after his ar
rival in the Mississippi Valley; second, that he should take with
him his personal and general staff, and, if he required them, ten or
twelve experienced officers from the Army of the Potomac — none
above the rank of colonel — some of whom were to be promoted
to be brigadier and major generals, the others to receive staff ap
pointments, so as to aid in organizing and disciplining the forces
to be placed under him ; and, third, that he should return to the
command of his own army in Virginia, as soon as his services
could be dispensed with in tlie West, and, if possible, in time for
the spring campaign. Colonel Pryor stated that he was not au
thorized to agree to the last two conditions, but would telegraph
the answer of the War Department from Richmond. According
ly, on the 23d, he telegraphed the following assent :
"Richmond, January 23d, 1862.
" General Beauregard :
"Have not seen Toombs. Committee extremely anxious you should go.
Judge Harris is sure President consents to all your wishes. I send letter in
the morning. " Roger A. Pryor."
A letter to the same effect came the next day ; and, on the
25th, the War Department was officially notified of General Bean-
regard's final acquiescence in the wishes of Congress and of the
Executive. So important to success did he consider it to have experienced
* The statement of this effective force at seventy thousand men, by Colonel
Pryor, surprised General Beauregard to no small extent, as he could not un
derstand how, with such a force in hand, General Johnston could so long re
main inactive.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 213
officers with him, that he immediately forwarded to the Adjutant-
General's Department the names of six infantry colonels whom
he had selected for promotion and transfer to the West, and of
the engineers and other staff officers of lower grade, who should
accompany him. And, in order to prevent error or unnecessary
delay, he sent his Chief of Staff, Colonel Thomas Jordan, to
Richmond, to confer directly on the subject with the Secretary
of War.
On the 2d of February he parted, with much regret, at Ma
nassas, from the last representatives of that great Army of the
Potomac, which, afterwards, under the name of the "Army of
Northern Virginia," achieved, by innumerable victories, undying
renown for itself and its revered commander, General Robert E.
Lee. General Beauregard's journey from Manassas to Bowling
Green, the headquarters of General Johnston, was marked by the
most gratifying manifestations of confidence and enthusiasm on
the part of the people. Every railroad station was crowded with
men, women, and children, who, anticipating his arrival, had as
sembled to greet him, and wish Godspeed and continued success
to the "hero of Sumter and Manassas." He was detained a day
in Nashville, at the request of the State authorities, to be presented
to the Legislature and receive its welcome.
He reached Bowling Green on the evening of the 4th, and
there met, for the first time, General Albert Sidney Johnston,
who gave him, on arrival in his department, a heartfelt greeting.
The manly appearance, the simple, though dignified, bearing of
this noble patriot and soldier, made a deep impression upon Gen
eral Beauregard. He was drawn towards him by a spontaneous
feeling of sympathy, which insured, in the future, complete har
mony and effectual co-operation between them.
At General Beauregard's request, he made a succinct review of
the situation in his department, and showed much anxiety when
referring to the effects of Zollicoffer's late disaster at Mill Spring.
General Buell had advanced his forces, numbering from seventy-
five to eighty thousand men, to within forty miles of Bowling
Green, at Bacon Creek, on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad ;
General Grant was at Cairo and Paducah, with twenty thousand
men, pressing an expedition which was to move — General John
ston thought — either up the Tennessee River, against Fort Henry,

214 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
or up the Cumberland, against Fort Donelson ; and General Pope,
with at least thirty thousand men, in Missouri, stood confronting
Major-General Polk. The entire Federal forces, under the chief
command of General Halleck, with headquarters at St. Louis,
amounted to about one hundred and thirty thousand men. To
oppose such a host, General Johnston stated that he had, at Bowl
ing Green, some fourteen thousand effectives of all arms ; at Forts
Henry and Donelson about five thousand five hundred more,
under General Lloyd Tilghman ; that General Floyd was covering
Clarksville with eight thousand men, and that General Polk, in
his district of West Tennessee and West Kentucky (but princi
pally at and around Columbus), had some fifteen thousand men,
not yet well organized and but poorly armed, including detached
forces at Clarksville and Hopkinsville, under Generals Clark and
Pillow. Thus the whole Confederate force in General Johnston's
department numbered not more than forty-five thousand men of
all arms and conditions.* Tens of thousands of men were anxious
to go into the army to defend their homes, but the Confederate
government had no arms for them.
This fearful disparity between the actual effectiveness of Gen
eral Johnston's command and the fanciful figures which, by author
ity of the Secretary of War, Colonel Pryor had given him, struck
General Beauregard with amazement. He recounted to General
Johnston the statement made of the strength of the Western army,
and imparted to him the hopes lie had entertained that, by a
proper arrangement of the river defences for minimum garrisons,
and a rapid concentration by railroad of all our available forces,
we might suddenly have taken the offensive against Buell, who,
unprepared for such an onslaught, would undoubtedly have been
overpowered. Thus Kentucky would have fallen under our con
trol, and its people would have freely joined the Confederate
standard. No less painfully surprised than General Beauregard was Gen
eral Johnston, when apprised of the ignorance of the War De
partment about matters within its peculiar province. He con
firmed General Beauregard's previously expressed opinion, by
declaring at once that he never would have remained on the
defensive with such forces under him, and with Buell only a short
* General Beauregard has furnished these figures from memory.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 215
distance in his front. He also said that he had little confidence
in the defensive works on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers,
to inspect, strengthen, and complete which he had recently ordered
his Chief-Engineer, Major J. F. Gilmer, an officer of the old ser
vice, whose worth was about to be tested.
When thus made acquainted with the deplorable situation of
the Western department, General Beauregard, realizing to what an
extent he had been misinformed, and how useless his presence
would be to General Johnston, under the existing circumstances,
informed the latter that, in his opinion, he had best return at once
to Virginia, where an active campaign, in the early spring, was to
be expected, and where he could be of more service to the cause
than by remaining with a command which it was more than like
ly would be forced to stand passively on the defensive. General
Johnston strenuously objected to his adopting such a course. He
urged that General Beauregard's presence was most fortunate, and
that his co-operation would be invaluable, not only in western
Kentucky and western Tennessee, but in the whole Mississippi
Valley. Those who are well acquainted with General Beauregard have
often had occasion to note how largely the trait of self-forgetf ill
ness enters into his character. He gave a strong proof of the fact
on this occasion. With much disinterestedness, he immediately
offered to General Johnston to waive his rank and, acting as his
Chief-Engineer and Inspector-General, visit the various works and
defences throughout the department, and make such suggestions
for their improvement as his experience might dictate. But Gen
eral Johnston was unwilling to accept so great a sacrifice, and in
sisted that General Beauregard should go to Columbus, there to
ascertain, personally, the exact state of affairs, being convinced
that, upon doing so, he would no longer hesitate to assume com
mand. So earnest and pressing was he on this point that General
Beauregard acceded to his wishes, and began making preparations
to leave by the Louisville and Memphis Railroad. It was his near
est route, but, unless he used all due diligence, might be closed to
him by the destruction of the bridge over the Tennessee River,
should Fort Henry fall into the hands of the enemy. He delayed
his departure, however, at General Johnston's request, and on the
5th of February inspected with him all the works in and around
Bowling Green. He found them to be very strong, and so stated

216 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
to General Johnston, though he was not sure but that they could
be turned a short distance above, on the right. He inquired
whether, in such a case, General Johnston intended to remain and
defend them. The latter replied that there was a ford not many
miles above, and that, should the enemy advance by that way, upon
his flank, he would be compelled to withdraw, as he was not strong
enough to maintain the position with no army of relief to depend
upon. General Beauregard having now asked what was the
strength of Forts Henry and Donelson, General Johnston said
they were tolerably well fortified, but he was doubtful of their
ability long to withstand a determined attack. In the course of
this inspection tour General Beauregard expressed his regret that
the works at Bowling Green had not been limited to a tete de pont
on the north side of the Barren River, and to a single fort on the
south side, to defend the bridge, and enable the garrison of the
former work to retire at the proper moment and destroy the
bridge. The time and labor spent upon these extensive works by
General Gilmer, he thought, might have been far more judiciously
applied in the strengthening of Forts Henry and Donelson — par
ticularly the former — as the command of the Tennessee was next
in importance to that of the Mississippi. Its loss would not only
cut off communication between General Johnston's and General
Polk's forces, but allow the enemy to penetrate to Eastport and
Florence, near the Memphis and Charleston Railroad ; thus effec
tually turning all positions in Middle Kentucky and Middle Ten
nessee, on one side of the river, and West Kentucky and West
Tennessee, on the other side, down to the Memphis and Charles
ton Railroad.
In view of the importance of holding Fort Henry, then serious
ly threatened by the Federal forces under General Grant, General
Beauregard suggested to General Johnston the following views of
the situation, as the result of his reflections after their interview
of the previous evening.
That our defensive line, extending from Bowling Green on the
extreme right to Columbus on the extreme left, with Forts Hen
ry and Donelson at about the middle of the line, formed a re-en
tering angle of nearly thirty miles, which was very much weak
ened by being intersected, nearly at right angles ; by the two navi
gable streams on which those forts were located ; that our flanks
at Bowling Green and Columbus were ^o salient that the former

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 217
could be easily turned and must fall by its own weight, and that
the latter would become untenable also, should Grant's attack on
Fort Henry succeed ;* that, therefore, he thought it urgently nec
essary to abandon Bowling Green, except as a point of observa
tion, and concentrate as rapidly as possible all readily available
troops upon Henry and Donelson, so as to force Grant into a bat
tle in that quarter, with decisive odds against him, and the disad
vantage of isolation from immediate support. This General Beau
regard urged, not only as an essential measure towards regaining
control of the Tennessee River, and maintaining that of the Cum
berland, but as a means of placing our forces in a better position,
with respect to the ultimate defence of Nashville, than that which
they held at Bowling Green, which could not be looked upon as
safe, on account of its being too salient, and too easily turned. f
General Johnston, although admitting the force of these observa
tions, objected, substantially, that we were not in a condition to
risk too much ; that if we failed to defeat Grant, we might be
crushed between his forces and those of Buell ; that, even if vic
torious over Grant, our own forces wonld be more or less disorgan
ized, and if Buell, crossing the Big Barren River, above Bowling
Green, and then the Cumberland above Nashville, should place
himself between us and this latter city, and force us back
against the Tennessee River (then open to the Federal gunboats),
without the means of crossing or of extricating ourselves there
from, we would be destroyed or captured, Nashville would fall,
and the whole Tennessee and Mississippi valleys would be left un
protected, except by the as yet ill-organized forces of General
* At Centreville, Va., and before his trausfer, General Beauregard, while ex
amining the military situation in the West, had regarded the position of Forts
Henry and Donelson as faulty, the true position for the works to defend these
rivers being at an advanced point, where the streams approached each other
within three miles ; and this opinion he had expressed in a conversation on
the subject with his Chief of Staff, Colonel Jordan, at Centreville. In his in
terview with General Cooper, some days later, in the Adjutant-General's office,
at Richmond, Colonel Jordan laid before him these radical strategic defects
in the Confederate positions at Bowling Green, Forts Henry and Donelson, and
Columbus. General Cooper expressed himself as convinced of the truth of
these observations, and asked Colonel Jordan to present General Beauregard's
views to the President.
t The development of this plan of operations was also explained to Colonel
Jordan by General Beauregard, before his departure for the West.

218 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Polk, at Columbus, which were themselves threatened by greatly
superior numbers assembling in southeast Missouri. He further
said that, at present, the main object should be to gain time to re
move the supplies of ammunition and provisions collected at Bowl
ing Green, and the still larger supplies of pork, grain, and cloth
ing accumulated at Clarksville and Nashville, contrary to his ad
vice, by the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments at Rich
mond. In answer, General Beauregard remarked, that even if these
depots were to be endangered, it was more important to defeat the
enemy than to protect the supplies ; that Buell, being without a
pontoon train, and unable to cross the Cumberland between Nash
ville and Donelson, we could have time to escape from between
the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, and establish ourselves be
hind the new defensive line of Duck River, or probably reach
Nashville, if required, before the arrival of Buell, who would have
to make a much longer march. That our success must lie in fol
lowing the cardinal principle of war, the swift concentration of our
masses against the enemy's exposed fractions ; and that if we could
concentrate our forces for the offensive with greater rapidity, all
other things being equal, we had the chances in our favor; and
that in war it was "Nothing venture, nothing win." General
Johnston admitted this, but said that, owing to the great responsi
bility which rested on him, and the disaster to be apprehended to
the Confederacy, should he meet with defeat, he must adhere to
his intended plan of operations.
This was another of those fatal errors, and losses of priceless
opportunity, which caused the final defeat of our cause. The re
sult was a proof of it.
Fort Henry, being attacked on the 6th, was surrendered on the
same day, after a short, but soldierly, defence. Its commander,
Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman, as soon as he discovered his
inability to resist the overpowering land and naval forces brought
against him, detached the supporting force — two thousand six
hundred and ten strong — across the neck, to Fort Donelson, on
the Cumberland River, remaining himself to work the guns with
a handful of men — about one hundred — with whom he was cap
tured.* This was a conspicuous example of self-sacrifice and gal-
* That gallant officer was subsequently killed while defending Port Hudson,
on the Mississippi River, shortly after his return from captivity, which he had

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 219
lantry, for General Tilghman would have been justified in retiring
with the main body of his command, leaving a subordinate artil
lery officer to defend the work until compelled to surrender. The
railroad-bridge, only about twelve miles south of Fort Henry, was
now burned by the Federal gunboats, and that line of communi
cation between General Johnston and his forces at Columbus,
western Kentucky, was cut off, as had been apprehended, leaving,
as the shortest route available, the line of railroad by Nashville,
Decatur, Corinth, and Jackson.
On the morning of the 7th, while confined to his bed by sick
ness, General Beauregard was visited by General Hardee, a class
mate of his at the Academy at West Point, who afterwards dis
tinguished himself on many a battle-field during the Confederate
war. Exposure to the weather had produced upon General Beau
regard's health the effect he had feared when leaving Centreville.
He was then suffering from a severe cold, accompanied by fever,
and the violent inflammation of the throat (laryngitis) which result
ed therefrom, detained him at Bowling Green until its evacuation,
and, for six months afterwards, caused him acute pain and much
discomfort. The fall of Fort Henry had, more than ever, con
vinced General Beauregard of the necessity of the concentra
tion and aggressive movement he had already counselled. In his
conversation with General. Hardee he reiterated this opinion,
and it was agreed between them that General Hardee should
open the subject anew to General Johnston, and urge him to
adopt General Beauregard's views. Later in the day a confer
ence was held, at General Beauregard's room, between Generals
Johnston, Hardee, and himself, Colonel Mackall, A. A. G., be
ing present part of the time. General Beauregard again called
the attention of General Johnston to the movement of con
centration against General Grant, which he thought still practi
cable, if immediately carried out, General Hardee concurring,
though not with much earnestness. General Johnston, after some
discussion, adhered to the objections he had already made to this
plan, and gave his own views as to the future operations of the
campaign. He being Commander-in-Chief, and responsible for all
borne with no less patience than dignity. It is to be regretted that, since the
war, calumny has endeavored to fix upon him the responsibility and odium of
the loss of that weak and badly armed work. See, in Appendix, the report of
General Tilghman.

220 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
that might ensue, his views necessarily prevailed, and Colonel
Mackall having been called out to attend to some pressing matters,
relative to the fall of Fort Henry, in his absence Generals Beau^-
regard and Hardee drew up a memorandum of General Johnston's
projected plan, as then explained and insisted upon by him. He
had declined to adopt General Beauregard's proposed concentra
tion for the offensive, and had decided that his own and General
Polk's army should operate on divergent lines. General Beaure
gard acquiesced in the details incident to General Johnston's cam
paign, as stated in the memorandum. But this was the extent of
his concurrence. lie was the author of none of the movements
therein enumerated. The views he had expressed were diametri
cally opposite, and favored concentration against Grant at Donel
son. The following is the memorandum referred to:
" Bowling Green, Ky., February 7th, 1862.
" At a meeting held to-day at my quarters (Covington House) by Generals
Johnston, Hardee, and myself (Colonel Mackall, A. A. G., being present part of
the time), it was determined that Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, having
fallen yesterday into the hands of the enemy, and Fort Donelson, on the Cum
berland River, not being tenable, preparations should at once be made for the
removal of this army to Nashville, in the rear of the Cumberland River, a strong
point some miles below that city being fortified forthwith, to defend the river
from the damage of gunboats and transports.
" The troops at present at Clarksville shall cross over to the south side of
that river, leaving only sufficient force in that town to protect the manufactories
and other property, in the saving of which the Confederate government is in
terested. " From Nashville, should any further retrograde movement become neces
sary, it will be made to Stevenson, and thence according to circumstances.
" It was also determined that the possession of the Tennessee River by the
enemy, resulting from the fall of Fort Henry, separates the army at Bowling
Green from the one at Columbus, Kentucky, which must henceforth act inde
pendently of each other until they can again be brought together. The first
one having for object the defence of the State of Tennessee, along its line of
operation, as already stated, and the other one of that part of the State lying
between the Tennessee River and the Mississippi.
"But as the possession of the former river by the enemy renders the lines
of communication of the army at Columbus liable to be cut off at any time
from the Tennessee River as a base, by an overwhelming force of the enemy,
rapidly concentrated from various points on the Ohio, it becomes necessary, to
prevent such a calamity, that the main body of that army should fall back to
Humboldt, and thence, if necessary, to Grand Junction, so as to protect Mem-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 221
phis from either point, and still have a line of retreat to the latter place, or to
Grenada, Mississippi, and, if necessary, to Jackson, Mississippi.
"At Columbus, Kentucky, will be left only a sufficient garrison for the de
fence of the works there, assisted by Hollins's gunboats, for the purpose of
making a desperate defence of the river at that point.
" A sufficient number of transports will be kept near that place for the re
moval of the garrison therefrom, when no longer tenable, in the opinion of the
commanding officer.
" Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow will likewise be defended to the last ex
tremity, aided also by Hollins's gunboats, which will then retire to the vicinity
of Memphis, where another bold stand will be made.
" G. T. Beauregard, Gen. C. S. A.
" W. J. Hardee, Maj.-Gen."
Orders were accordingly issued on that day (7th), for the evacua
tion of Bowling Green, which was begun on the 11th and com
pleted on the 13th. General Beauregard left at that date, for
Columbus, via Nashville. But the lapse of time and the hurrying
of events since his conference with General Johnston made him
desirous of obtaining, before his departure, specific instructions as
to the immediate disposition of the force at Columbus. General
Johnston, he thought, might have modified his views; or he
might have received new directions from the War Department, it
being well known that the authorities at Richmond favored the
holding of Columbus. He therefore wrote the following letter,
recapitulating the expressed views of General Johnston as to the
military situation, and adding the suggestion that Columbus
should be abandoned altogether, as soon as Island No. 10 could be
made ready for defence ; and that instead of his falling back to
Humboldt, and thence to Grand Junction and other points in
rear, he should hold the Louisville and Memphis and the Memphis
and Charleston railroads, with Jackson as his centre, and Humboldt
and Corinth as left and right flanks, with proper detachments at
Iuka, Tuscumbia, and even Decatur; thus guarding his communi
cations by the Memphis and Charleston Railroad with the east, as
he apprehended incursions in advance of the enemy's main offen
sive movement in that direction, by the Tennessee River.
" Bowling Green, Ky., February 12th, 1862.
" General, — By the fall of Fort Henry, the enemy having possession of the
Tennessee River, which is navigable for their gunboats and transports to Flor
ence, it becomes evident that the forces under your immediate command and
those under General Polk, separated unfortunately by that river, can no longer

222 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
act in concert, and will be unable to support each other until the fortune of
war shall have restored the Tennessee River to our possession, or combined the
movements of the two armies in rear of it.
"It also becomes evident that, by the possession of that river, the enemy
can concentrate rapidly, by means of his innumerable transports, all his dis
posable forces on any point along its banks, either to attack Nashville in rear,
or cut off the communications of Columbus by the Mississippi River with
Memphis, and by the railroads with the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
" Should the enemy determine on the former plan of operations, your army,
threatened also in front and on the right flank by Buell's large army, will be
in a very critical condition, and may be forced to take refuge on the south
side of the Tennessee River. But should Halleck adopt the second plan re
ferred to, the position at Columbus will then become no longer tenable for an
army inferior in strength to that of the enemy, and must fall back to some
central point, where it can guard the main railroads to Memphis, i. e., from
Louisville and from Charleston. Jackson, Tennessee, would probably be the
best position for such an object, with strong detachments at Humboldt and
Corinth, and with the necessary advance guards.
" The Memphis and Charleston Railroad, so important on account of its exten
sion through eastern Tennessee and Virginia, must be properly guarded from
Iuka to Tuscumbia, and even to Decatur, if practicable.
" Columbus must either be left to be defended to the last extremity by its
proper garrison, assisted by Hollins's fleet of gunboats, and provided with
provisions and ammunition for several months,* or abandoned altogether, its
armament and garrison being transferred, if practicable, to Fort Pillow, which,
I am informed, is naturally and artificially a strong position, about fifty miles
above Memphis.
"Island No. 10, near New Madrid, could also be held by its garrison, assisted
by Hollins's fleet, until the possession of New Madrid by the enemy would
compel that position to be evacuated. I am clearly of the opinion that to at
tempt at present to hold so advanced a position as Columbus, with the mova
ble army under General Polk, when its communications can be so readily cut
off by a surprise force acting from the Tennessee River as a new base, would be
to jeopardize, not only the safety of that army, but, necessarily, of the whole
Mississippi valley. Hence I desire, as far as practicable, specific instructions
as to the future movements of the army of which I am about to assume com
mand. If it be necessary for the safety of the country to make, with all my
forces, a desperate stand at Columbus, I am ready to do so.
" I regret much that illness has prevented me from being already at my
post, but during my stay here I believe I have made myself as well acquaint
ed with your general views and intentions as circumstances have permitted,

* This alternative recommendation was based on the supposition that Com
modore Hollins's fleet of gunboats would prevent, or at least retard, the com
plete investment of the place, and that the country around Columbus was
favorable to its defence.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 223
and which I will always be happy to carry into effect to the best of my abil
ities. " I am, General, very respectfully, " Your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard,
" General A. S. Johnston, Comdg. Western Dept., Bowling Green, Ky."
General Johnston, being then busy with the evacuation of.
Bowling Green, informed General Beauregard, by messenger, that
he would confer with him at Nashville upon his arrival there. He
established his headquarters at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, on
the 13th, and the next day the two generals met in conference at
the residence of Mr. Stevenson, President of the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad. General Beauregard was still quite unwell,
but, notwithstanding his, failing health, always attending, with
scrupulous care, to the minutest details of his onerous duties.
In answer to his letter of the 12th, General Johnston said that
his views were unchanged as to the plan of operations recorded in
the memorandum of the 7th, with the exception that he assented
to the entire abandonment of Columbus, should the War Depart
ment approve of it. He informed General Beauregard that when
compelled to retire, he would do so along the line of the Nash
ville, Stevenson, and Chattanooga Railroad, to defend the country
in that direction, and the crossing of the Tennessee River ; and, as
it was probable that the Federal forces would soon interpose be
tween them, General Beauregard must take charge of the defence
of the Mississippi Valley without instructions or orders, using his
own judgment, in the event of that separation, to counteract the
movements and designs of the enemy in that quarter.
Before leaving Bowling Green, General Beauregard had tele
graphed Colonel Pryor, at Richmond, to meet him at Nashville,
that he might see with his own eyes, and make known to the Mil
itary Committee and to the government the exact condition of
affairs in the Western Department. Colonel Pryor came as far as
Lynchburg, Va., but hearing that communications with Nashville
were interrupted, and that the enemy was at Florence and Tus
cumbia, concluded to go back to Richmond.
The day after his arrival at Nashville, General Beauregard, in
reply to a letter from Colonel Pryor, dated February 9th, wrote
him the following :

224 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
' "Nashville, Tenn., February lith, 1862.
" Dear Colonel, — Your favor of the 9th inst. has been received. I regret
much you did not come on from Lynchburg, for the rumors you refer to were
all unfounded, and the matters General Johnston and myself had to communi
cate, through you, to the government, were of great importance — being to pro
vide for the very unfortunate contingency now existing here.
"Moreover, I desired you to see for yourself and others the exact condition
of things here, in justice to my own self; for I am taking the helm when the
ship is already on the breakers, and with but few sailors to man it. How it
is to be extricated from its present perilous condition Providence alone can
determine, and, unless with its aid, I can accomplish but little. My health,
moreover, has failed me completely lately. I was confined to my room by a
wretched cold all the time I was at Bowling Green. It was the most unfort
unate thing that could have happened to me ; for the loss of one or two weeks
now is, or may be, most fatal to us. However, I am better now, and am hur
rying on to my post as fast as possible. We must defeat the enemy some
where, to give confidence to our friends. Large depots of provisions, ammuni
tion, etc., ought to be provided for at Atlanta, Montgomery, and Jackson,
Miss., etc., without loss of time, for future contingency.
" We must give up some minor points, and concentrate our forces, to save the most
important ones, or we will lose all of them in succession.
" The loss of Fort Donelson (God grant it may not fall) would be followed
by consequences too lamentable to be now alluded to.
" General Johnston is doing his best, but what can he do against such tre
mendous odds ?
" Come what may, however, we must present a bold front and stout hearts
to the invaders of our country. " In haste, yours truly,
" G. T. Beauregard.
" Colonel'R. A. Prtor, Richmond, Va."
General Beauregard left Nashville on the 15th, and as there was
no train from Decatur that afternoon, resumed his journey next
morning with the opportunity — which he desired — of observing
the character of the country. At Corinth, on the morning of the
17th, Judge, Milton Brown, President of the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad, arrived with a special train to take him to Columbus ;
but he felt so extremely unwell that he was compelled to stop at
Jackson on the same day. There he became the guest of Judge
Brown, from whose family he received the kindest attentions
during his illhess.
On his arrival at Corinth on the 16th, he found waiting for him
two telegrams from Nashville — one from General Johnston, an
other from Colonel Mackall — informing him of the fall of Fort

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 225
Donelson at 2 o'clock a.m. on that day. The fort had surrendered,
and the whole army was lost, except half of Floyd's brigade, which
had crossed the river ; and the head of General Johnston's columns
was about reaching Nashville.
On the 6th of February, after the fall of Fort Henry, Brigadier-
General Bushrod R. Johnson had arrived at Fort Donelson and
assumed command; but on the 10th was relieved by his senior,
Brigadier - General Gideon J. Pillow, who had been a major-
general during the Mexican war. On the 11th, Brigadier-Gen
eral S. B. Buckner came in with orders from General Floyd to
withdraw his division to Cumberland City. These two officers,
deeming the fort untenable for a long defence, preferred leaving
a small force to hold it as long as possible, and then retire, if prac
ticable, upon Nashville. General Pillow, who was still in com
mand, insisted upon the retention of Buckner's division, and the
transfer to the fort of Floyd's scattered forces, which that officer
was still endeavoring to concentrate at Cumberland City. He ap
plied to. General Johnston, who ordered the movement on the
night of the 12th. Meanwhile, Floyd, yielding to General Pillow's
views, had entered Donelson on the 13th, before daylight, and as
sumed command, his whole force being fifteen thousand effectives.*
On the 12th General Grant appeared in front of Donelson, and,
early on the 13th, commenced its investment with fifteen thousand
men, increased to twenty-five thousand on the evening of the same
day. Commodore Foote, with a fleet consisting of two wooden
and four ironclad gunboats, made a determined attack on the 14th,
but was' definitively repulsed. A brilliant and successful sortie was
effected the next day by the Confederates, but, not being properly
sustained according to the plan decided upon, it failed of favorable
results ; so that, during the night between the 15th and 16th — as
mentioned in General Johnston's telegram — the commanding offi
cers, regarding the continuance of the struggle against the united
Federal land and naval forces as likely only to lead to a useless sac
rifice of life, concluded to surrender. This unpleasant duty devolved
upon General Buckner. About ten thousand men were surrendered ;
some two thousand were killed and wounded ; and about two thou
sand escaped, with Generals Floyd and Pillow, by boats and other-

* Report of Colonel J. F. Gilmer, Chief Engineer.
I.— 15

226 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
wise ; while some five hundred cavalry, with Colonel Forrest, passed
out between the enemy's right and the river.
The fall of Fort Henry and the calamitous capitulation of Fort
Donelson, resulting in the loss of Kentucky and Tennessee, were
blows that staggered the Confederacy. A cry of condemnation
arose against General Johnston, upon whom, as commander of the
Western Department, rested the responsibility of these irreparable
disasters. The disappointment and profound discouragement that became
manifest all over the country, but especially in that portion of it
lying in close proximity to the scenes of our successive defeats,
cannot be described. The demoralization of the army and the
panic of the people were complete ; and bitter complaints against
the general commanding our forces were heard on all sides. Pleas
of incompetency and lack of generalship were openly urged, and
direct demands were made to the President to remove the Com
mander-in-Chief and thus save the cause from irretrievable loss.
General Johnston, with that elevation of mind and uncomplaining
fortitude for which he was conspicuous, bore, unflinchingly, and
without explanation, the reproaches and accusations levelled against
him, though he was most keenly alive to the withdrawal of public
confidence from him.
On the 18th of March, about forty days after the events above
related, he wrote to President Davis a long and earnest letter,
wherein he described the disastrous results which had followed the
aggressive movement of the enemy, and explained what seemed
to him to make necessary his plan of campaign as given in the
" memorandum " we have already mentioned, and his evacuation of
Bowling Green, pending the battle that was then being fought at
Donelson. The letter was evidently meant as a justification of
his defensive policy, and contained a synopsis of his views and em
barrassments at that period. No one will ever question his sin
cerity or honesty of purpose as there expressed. Still, there are
passages of this letter, and inconsistencies, almost amounting to
contradictions, which it is but fair to point out and correct. We
shall consider these matters at the proper time and place, as we
proceed 'with our narrative.
Without wishing to cast undue blame on that gallant soldier, it
may not be amiss to look back to what might have been done even
with his small and ill-armed forces, had ho followed a different

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 227
course and adopted General Beauregard's suggestions, made to him
on the 6th of February, after their inspection of the works around
Bowling Green.
General Grant, according to his official report, brought to the
attack of Fort Henry, on the 6th of Febrnary, a force of fifteen
thousand men of all arms. After a delay of a week he appeared
before the unfinished defensive works of Fort Donelson with the
very same troops, and was there joined, not earlier than the even
ing of the 13th, by a reinforcement of ten thousand men, including
Lew Wallace's division of Buell's army. Buell's army, meanwhile,
was at Bacon Creek (on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
about fifty-five miles northeast of Bowling Green) and in southeast
Kentucky, with not less than seventy-three thousand five hundred
effectives in all. He would have had to march at least one hun
dred and twenty-five miles by the shortest distance, and on un-
macadamized roads, crossing two streams (the Big Barren and
Cumberland), to form a junction with General Grant ; which
movement, with his many new levies, unused to marching, would
have required at least ten days. That junction could not have
been made before the 17th : whereas General Johnston had, at
Bowling Green, on the 7th, about fourteen thousand men, of whom
ten thousand could have been transported by rail — about eighty
miles — to Cumberland city, thence, by boat — about twenty miles
— to Fort Donelson, or by railroad to the vicinity of the fort, in
two days at most ; as there was ample rolling-stock available in
west and middle Tennessee, and there was also a sufficient number
of steamboats at Nashville.* General Floyd had, at Russellville,
eight thousand men, who, with over three thousand at Clarksville,
could have been moved by railroad to Fort Donelson in two days
at most from the date of the order. Fort Donelson already con
tained a force of five thousand seven hundred and fifty men.
Thus, after leaving some troops — chiefly cavalry — at Bowling
Green, to keep up appearances of occupation and to delay Buell at
the Big Barren River while removing the public property col
lected there to Nashville, or southward, a force of about twenty-
seven thousand men could have been thrown suddenly upon Gen
eral Grant's forces near Fort Donelson, by the 10th of February
* There were, at that time, ten steamboats at Nashville, three of them in very
good order. These three could have towed the others down the stream.

228 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
at the latest. Such a force would have had ample time, before the
13th, to work the annihilation of General Grant's forces of fifteen
thousand men, and would have regained Fort Henry and the con
trol of the Tennessee River. The other ten thousand reinforce
ments of Buell's army, who arrived by boats on the evening of the
13th, would have met the same fate, had they landed on the left
bank of the Cumberland. Such a victory over General Grant
would certainly have deterred Buell from an offensive movement,
while our own success would have given us the power to act im
mediately against him.
The Tennessee River was next in importance to the Mississippi ;
and Fort Henry was the position of first strategic value, east of
Columbus, in the defensive line then held by General Johnston.
It was, therefore, deeply to be regretted that he spent so much
time, from September 18th to October 12th, superintending the
fortifying of Columbus, without giving proper and sufficient at
tention to Fort Henry. The works at Columbus were made for a
garrison of at least thirteen thousand men, armed with one hun
dred and forty (mostly heavy) guns; while the War Department
was short of guns for other defences and of men to operate with
in the field, where the fate of the Confederacy was, after all, to be
decided. The country about Columbus, on the left bank, after
wards proved, on proper examination, to be such as to afford ad
vantages to a land attack; yet stores, for six months, had been
accumulated there, although it is a well-known axiom in engineer
ing, that field-works capable of complete investment by a sufficient
force, without local advantages, cannot make a long defence, un
less there be lack of judgment on the part of the assailant, in the
investment and mode of attack. A well constructed work at
Columbus, armed with seventy-five or eighty guns, and with a gar
rison of at most five thousand men, would have been capable of as
long a defence as the extensive works there put up, leaving the
remaining troops for operation in the field, and the remaining sixty
£uns for other works on the Mississippi, or for Fort Henry, on the
Tennessee. The latter was a small and badly located work, com
manded and enfiladed by heights within easy range, on both sides
of the river.* It was armed with seventeen guns — twelve of them
* See reports of General Tilghman, commanding Fort Henry, and of Colonel
Gilmer, Chief-Engineer.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 229
bearing on the river — and was manned by a force of two brigades,
amounting to " two thousand six hundred and ten men, only one
third of whom had been at all disciplined or well armed."*
The position of Fort Donelson was no better, and its works were
incomplete, until inspected and strengthened by Colonel Gilmer,
on the 3d and following days of February .f Its armament con
sisted of thirteen guns, two of them heavy ones. Had a reasonable
portion of the time and labor misspent upon Columbus and Bowl
ing Green been applied to the construction of proper defensive
works on the Tennessee and Cumberland, and had the guns not
required at the former places been added to those of the two forts
and of other works on both rivers, our resistance at Henry and
Donelson, if not finally successful, would have certainly afforded
us ample time to retire with the whole of our forces, and to pre
serve, unaffected by too crushing a defeat, the morale of our troops,
and the confidence of our people in the cause we were fighting
for. It is even likely that, with sufficient energy, a system of
works might have been constructed, after General Johnston's as
sumption of command, at the narrowest part of the neck of land
where the rivers flow less than three miles apart, and nearly on a
line with Bowling Green and Columbus. These would have
given us complete command of the two rivers, and might have
been defended by a limited force which conld have been rapidly
reinforced by boats held ready for the purpose, at Cumberland
city, on the Cumberland River, or at Benton, where the Memphis
and Louisville Railroad crosses the Tennessee River.
Under the circumstances, to prevent the loss of the Tennessee
River, by which the whole country (including Columbus) north
of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad was turned, and that
great line of communication immediately exposed, the only course
for General Johnston was to concentrate, at the proper time, at
Henry and Donelson, and, for that purpose, to hold his forces and
means of transportation well in hand, so as to be read}', at a mo
ment's notice, to avail himself of his extraordinary advantages of
communication by rail and water between his centre and wings.
Thus Grant could have been opportunely met, and certainly crushed
with superior numbers. After the fall of Henry this plan of con
centration was again imperative for the regaining of the Tennes-
* See General Tilghman's 2d report.
t Colonel Gilmer's report, see " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 113 et seq.

230 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
see and the saving of the Cumberland, besides the great advantage
and prestige of destroying one of the Federal armies. The means
for such concentration were ample. It could have been effected
in two or, at most, three days, and in good season. After the
fall of Henry, on the 6th, General Grant did not move upon Don
elson until the 12th, with fifteen thousand men, and was only re
inforced to the number of twenty-five thousand on the evening
of the 13th; while General Johnston could have been present
with twenty-seven thousand men on the 10th, at the latest. No
serious conflict occurred until the garrison itself attacked the Fed
erals, on the 15th, and, in view of the brilliant success of that ef
fort in its first stages, there can be no room for doubt as to what
the result would have been if the Confederate forces had been ten
thousand stronger.
General Johnston gave disproportionate consequence to the
preservation of the depots of reserve supplies at Bowling Green,
Clarksville, and Nashville. Their accumulation at those points
was a serious error on the part of the government; and upon the
assembling of such large, threatening forces along General John
ston's front, these supplies should have been speedily removed far
to the rear, leaving the country and the army clear and free for
action. But, this having been neglected, the operations of the
army and the opportunity to defeat the enemy should not have
been subordinated and sacrificed to the immediate effort to save sup
plies which, after all, were destroyed at Clarksville, and, in great
measure, at Nashville.
This concentration should, therefore, have been made, or else
Donelson should have been abandoned altogether; thereby saving
its garrison, and part, at least, of the prestige of our arms. Gen
eral Floyd, however, was left without specific instructions, until,
with General Buckner's advice, he began to withdraw the latter's
division from the fort, but, upon General Pillow's remonstrance,
was ordered by General Johnston, on the night of the 12th, to go
into Donelson with all the forces under his control, aggregating
within the fort an effective force variously estimated at from thir
teen thousand to fifteen thousand men, in the reports, and by other
authorities at seventeen thousand.* Upon the adoption of this
* See General Floyd's supplemental report in " Confederate Reports of Bat
tles," pp. 55-57. See also his letter to General Johnston, of February 12th, ad
vising concentration near Cumberland city.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 231
latter course, General Johnston should have left to General Har
dee the evacuation of Bowling Green and the conduct of the re
treat of its garrison upon Nashville, and should himself have re
paired to Donelson, where so critical a struggle was imminent —
nay, certain. Such a step on his part would have harmonized the
divided counsels of the commanding officers, and undoubtedly
have prevented the demoralization of their troops. It would have
combined the resources of defence under his own inspiriting in
fluence, and history, though not crediting us with a Confederate
victory, would have spared us, at least, the humiliation of such an
overwhelming defeat. As it was, on the very day of the attack
on Fort Donelson — the 13th — the General-in-Chief, without being
pressed by Buell, was retreating from the scene of conflict, and
had even reached Nashville before evening. The Tennessee and
Cumberland were lost. The whole of middle Kentucky and mid
dle Tennessee, including Nashville, were given up. And, as a fatal
consequence of this great calamity, west Kentucky and west Ten
nessee, with Columbus, and with most of the supplies sought to be
saved, were also, shortly afterwards, entirely abandoned. About
thirteen thousand men, organized and disciplined, were thereby
withdrawn from operations in the field ; a force which would have
aided us to a complete and easy victory in the battle fought with
General Grant two months later, or, rather, which would have en
abled us to take the offensive some time earlier ; disposing of Gen
eral Grant's forces at Pittsburg Landing, recovering the Tennes
see River, and then, if made strong enough, meeting and fighting
Buell, as soon as the crossing of the river could be accomplished.
These would have been the immediate results in the field ; to say
nothing of the indirect consequences from the encouragement and
readiness of the people, instead of the anxiety and despondency
which fell so heavily upon them.

232 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XVI.
General Beauregard Telegraphs for Instructions after the Fall of Donelson. —
General Johnston's Answer. — Colonel Jordan's Report of the Situation at
Columbus. — General Beauregard Calls General Polk to Jackson, Tennessee,
for Conference. — Ojiinion of the Latter as to the Strength of Columbus. —
He Concurs, however, in General Beauregard's Views. — Evacuation of Co
lumbus Authorized by the War Department. — General Beauregard's De
tailed Instructions to that Effect. — Defects in River Defences at Columbus.
— Governor Harris of Tennessee. — General Johnston Retreating towards
Stevenson, along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. — His Letter of
February 18th to the War Department. — Depression of the People. — Gen
eral Beauregard Resolves to Replenish the Army. — Makes Use of the Dis
cretion given him by General Johnston. — His Plan of Operations. — Be
lieves Success Depends upon Offensive Movement on Our Part. — Calls
upon the Governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee;
and also upon Generals Van Dorn, Bragg, and Lovell, for Immediate As
sistance. — Sixty and Ninety Days Troops. — The War Department not
Favorable to the Method Proposed, but Finally Gives its Assent. — General
Johnston Requested by General Beauregard to Change his Line of Retreat
and Turn towards Decatur, so as to Co-operate with him. — General John
ston Accedes to his Request.
After receiving, at Corinth, the despatches announcing the fall
of Fort Donelson, with the capture of most of its garrison, General
Beauregard telegraphed General Johnston to know whether he
had issued any direct orders for the troops in General Polk's dis
trict. The following answer, forwarded to Columbus, in antici
pation of General Beauregard's arrival there, was received by him
on the 17th, at Jackson. It is given in full :
" Nashville, February 16th, 1862.
" To General Beauregard :
" Your despatch of 16th received. You must do as your judgment dictates.
No orders for your troops have issued from here. Colonel Chalmers is a
brigadier-general. " W. W. Mackall, A. A. Genl."
Two days afterwards General Johnston himself forwarded this
additional telegram :

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 233
" Nashville, February 18th, 1862.
" To General Beauregard, Jackson, Tennessee :
" You must now act as seems best to you. The separation of our armies is
for the present complete. " A. S. Johnston."
The day before receiving this last despatch, General Beaure
gard's Adjutant, Colonel Jordan, who, after his visit to the War
Department at Richmond, had gone directly to/ Columbus, re
joined him at Jackson, Tennessee. His report concerning General
Polk's district was decidedly unfavorable, and confirmed General
Beauregard's apprehensions as to the incomplete state of its de
fences. He emphasized the too great development of the lines,
and their defective location, characterizing the place as a certain
"dead fall" to its garrison, if attacked. He also reported the
troops to be imperfectly organized, and declared his inability to
procure a clear statement of the forces and resources present, for
want of proper returns.
General Beauregard, who was still too unwell to assume imme
diate command, called General Polk at once to Jackson, and also
his own Chief-Engineer, Captain D. B. Harris, who had preceded
him to Columbus. They came on the 19th, and Captain Harris's
detailed information as to the position, its works, and the surround
ing locality, confirmed Colonel Jordan's report of its alarming
weakness. Upon this definite statement of the character and con
dition of the place, General Beauregard considered that immediate
preparations should be made for its evacuation, so as to secure its
supplies, armament, and garrison, which included nearly all the
forces under General Polk. It was to be apprehended that Gen
eral Grant, by marching westward from Fort Henry to Union
City or Clinton — some sixty or seventy miles — after forming a
junction with part of the forces under General Pope, which might
have landed in Kentucky, above the fort, could complete its in
vestment within a few days ; while batteries placed below it, on
both sides of the river, would cut off communication or retreat by
water, unless prevented by our gunboat fleet. Batteries, enfilad
ing its parapets, which were without traverses, would dismount its
eruns, while mortar batteries would fire its wooden store-houses
and destroy its supplies, compelling its surrender in a very few
days. Apart from the river batteries, which were strongly constructed

234 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
and powerfully armed, the defensive works, besides being badly
planned and unfinished, were much too extensive, requiring a gar
rison of about thirteen thousand men, to resist a combined land
and naval attack, while the forces of General Polk, in his whole
district, numbered less than fifteen thousand of all arms, badly
equipped for the field, commanded by officers who were brave and
zealous, but without military training or experience. Moreover,
his troops were not regularly formed into brigades and divisions,
and his cavalry was not yet fully organized into regiments. The
capture of Fort Columbus and its garrison would have opened
to the Federals the whole Mississippi Valley to New Orleans, as
between those two points there was not another organized body
of troops capable of offering any resistance to the united forces of
Generals Grant and Pope. Fort Pillow, about fifty miles above
Memphis, was not then in as good condition as Fort Columbus;
its defences being still incomplete. It was not yet armed, and
required a garrison of about ten thousand men, while, at that time,
it only had one regiment to defend it. At the Madrid Bend de
fences only one or two heavy batteries had been commenced, on
Island No. 10, armed with a few guns of small calibre ; and at
New Madrid only some light field-works had been constructed.
General Polk had unbounded confidence in the strength of
Columbus, which he termed the " Gibraltar of the West." With
his characteristic gallantry he declared himself capable of holding
it against any force, as long as his supplies should last; and these,
he alleged, could hold out six months. But his statements, in
answer to minute inquiries as to its condition and surroundings,
corroborated none the less what had been previously reported by
Colonel Jordan and Captain Harris; and upon General Beaure
gard exposing to him the saliency of the fort and the various feat
ures of its weakness, he concurred in the opinion that it could not
long withstand a determined attack.
The War Department having, on the 19th, telegraphed its assent
to the evacuation of Columbus, General Beauregard directed Gen
eral Polk to prepare for it without delay. The safe removal of the
supplies and armament was likely to be a difficult operation, should
the Federal land and naval forces be handled with judgment and
resolution. Careful and minute instructions were accordingly
given to General Polk by General Beauregard. All reserve sup
plies and materials were to be sent to Grenada and Columbus, by

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 235
railroad, including those at Trenton and Jackson, Tennessee ; the
remaining supplies, to Union City, Humboldt, the positions at
Madrid Bend, New Madrid, and Memphis. The heaviest guns
that could be spared were to be taken to Island No. 10, to the
batteries at the Bend, on the left bank, and to New Madrid,
with some of lighter calibre, for the land defences of the latter
place. The other guns were to be placed as far as possible in con
dition for ready removal, part of them for transfer to the works
at Madrid Bend, and the remainder to Fort Pillow. The disman
tling of the fort and embarkation of material and supplies, by
boat and railroad, were to be conducted with secrecy, and, as far
as practicable, by night ; and as it was necessary to hold Colum
bus until the works at Island No. 10 and in the Bend should be
ready to defend the river, General Polk was to maintain a vigilant
watch and repel vigorously all attempts at reconnoissance, by land
or by water.
A few days later, he was instructed to open a road across the
difficult country opposite Island No. 10, and to establish a tele
graph line between the Island and Humboldt, or Union City,
via Obionville, as a line of communication. The cavalry, at Paris,
was to watch and report the passage of any gunboats or transports
up the Tennessee River, from the direction of Fort Henry, extend
ing its pickets as near as possible to Mayfield, which was then
occupied by Federal cavalry, keeping the latter always in sight,
and, if compelled to retire, to burn the bridges and thus hinder
reconnoissances. In view of the great importance of New Madrid, General Polk
was further instructed to send as strong a garrison thither as he
could, including most of the troops at Fort Pillow, if necessary.
He was also to aid in hastening the immediate completion and
armine of the batteries there and of those at the head of Island
No. 10 and at the Bend, which were intended for temporary occu
pation, while Fort Pillow was being strongly fortified and com
pleted for permanent maintenance. The gorges of the works at
New Madrid were to be palisaded merely, so that our gunboats
might fire into them from the river if taken by the enemy. The
defences, consisting of strong profiles, were composed of three
works, two on the river and one a little in advance of the others,
and were calculated for about five hundred men each. The cre-
mailllre lines, ordered on the right and rear of Island No. 10, were

236 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
to be provided with small redans for a few siege guns, and the
navigation of Black Lagoon obstructed, so as to prevent the
enemy's barges from getting into Reelfoot Lake, the shores of
which, between the two crimaillere lines, were to be well guarded,
and, if necessary, properly defended. The island opposite Tipton-
ville was to be examined, to determine whether or not it could be
advantageously fortified.
General McCown, of General Polk's forces, was selected to
command those river defences, and General Trudeau,* of Louisi
ana, to take charge of the heavy batteries at Island No. 10 and in
the Bend. Both of these officers were to report to General Beaure
gard at Jackson, for special instructions. The troops at Columbus,
apart from those to be sent to protect the construction of and
occupy the river defences at New Madrid, Island No. 10, and the
Bend, were to be withdrawn to Union City and Humboldt, for
the protection of the right flank and rear of those important de
fences, against any movement from the Tennessee River, the cav
alry to be thrown out well in advance.
It was understood, from General Polk, that the earth-works at
Island No. 10 and the Bend were already prepared for a sufficient
number of heavy guns to make an effective defence, and that a
large force of negro laborers was there with the necessary tools ;
which, however, proved to be an error. General Beauregard gave
specific instructions to Captain Harris (the only engineer who had
accompanied him from Virginia, and whose great ability was not
then matured by sufficient experience) as to the planning, laying-
out, and construction of these batteries, including the details of
their parapets, embrasures, traverses, and magazines; after the
completion of this duty he repaired to Fort Pillow, to reduce that
work and adapt it to a garrison of about three thousand men.
The work, at that point, had been planned upon so extensive a
scale as to require a garrison of nearly ten thousand men.
The grave defect in these river defences, at Columbus and Fort
Pillow, was in their extended lines, requiring a whole army to
hold them, leaving no forces for operations in the field. This was
one of the great mistakes in engineering on both sides during the
war. A garrison of from three to five thousand men, in properly
constructed forts, with an ample supply of ammunition and pro-
* At that time a Vol. A. D. C. to General Polk.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 237;
visions, would have been sufficient for the defence of our principal
rivers until reinforcements, in an emergency, could have been
sent to their relief.
From Memphis, on the 18th, Governor Harris, of Tennessee,
telegraphed General Beauregard to know his plans, saying that he
had made similar inquiries of the President and Generals John
ston and Pillow, so as to enable him to rally at once all possible
forces in Tennessee, and issue orders to them accordingly. He
was requested to meet General Beauregard, with General Polk,
at Jackson, on the 19th. His reply was that he had ordered ont
every man in the State who could be armed, but that he himself
was compelled to go to Nashville. General Beauregard, there
upon, repeated his request, through General Polk, urging the ad
vantage of the governor's visiting Jackson, where he arrived, ac
cordingly, on the 20th. It was agreed between them that the
State troops called out in west Tennessee should be directed to
Jackson and Corinth, from which latter place General Ruggles's
brigade was liable to be called, at any moment, to support General
Polk, at or about Columbus. General Ruggles's brigade had been
first ordered from New Orleans, by the Secretary of War, on Feb
ruary 8th, to report to General Beauregard at Columbus ; but his
communication of that date to General Johnston, having been re
ferred to the former, and the evacuation of Columbus being then
contemplated, General Beauregard, who had not yet directly as
sumed command, requested General Johnston, in accordance with
his letter of the 12th, to order that brigade to Corinth ; the im
mediate object being to protect that point and be within support
ing distance of General Polk.
Meanwhile, General Johnston, followed by Buell's forces, had
resolved to abandon Nashville. He began his retreat towards
Stevenson, along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga rail
road, as in that event previously determined upon, and fully set
forth in the memorandum of his plan of campaign, given in the
preceding chapter, at page 220.
The following is General Johnston's letter to the War De
partment, in explanation of his future operations :
"Headquarters Western Department,
Nashville, February 18th, 1862.
" Sir, — In conformity with the intention announced to the department, tho
corps under the command of Major-General Hardee completed the evacuation

238 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
of Bowling Green on the 14th instant, and the rear guard passed the Cumber
land at this point yesterday morning in good order.
" I have ordered the army to encamp to-night midway between this place
and Murfreesboro'. My purpose is, to place the force in such a position that the
enemy cannot concentrate his superior strength against the command, and to
enable me to assemble as rapidly as possible such other troops in addition as it
may be in my power to collect. The complete command which their gunboats
and transports give them upon the Tennessee and Cumberland, renders it
necessary for mc to retire my line between the rivers, I entertain the hope
that this disposition will enable me to hold the enemy in check ; and, when
my forces are sufficiently increased, to drive him back. . . .
" A. S. Johnston.
"Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, Richmond, Va."
The military situation was now of a desperate character. While
General Johnston's crippled army was retreating towards north
east Alabama and Georgia before Buell's overwhelming forces,
the Federal army, under General Grant, with or without the co
operation of Pope's command, might move from Fort Henry,
upon the rear of Columbus, or execute a still more dreaded move
ment by ascending the Tennessee River to Hamburg or East-
port, seizing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, thus defini
tively separating Generals Johnston and Polk, turning completely
west Kentucky and west Tennessee to Memphis, and compelling
the fall of the latter city, Fort Pillow, New Madrid, Island No. 10,
and Columbus. The capture of General Polk's forces would
thus be insured, and the entire Mississippi Valley would be thrown
open as far as New Orleans.
There was no army to oppose such a movement, and there were
no fortified positions on the Mississippi River, to check the Fed
eral gunboats and transports in carrying the supplies of the invad
ing forces, should the line of railroads be rendered unavailable.
The panic, followed by despondency, which had seized the people
after the successive disasters of the campaign, left little hope of
raising an army ; and the situation was such that, even with the
utmost enthusiasm to aid such an undertaking, there was no ex
pectation of its achievement in time to meet the emergency, un
less favored by our adversary's failure to embrace the opportunity
offered. General Johnston had informed General Beauregard, at
Bowling Green, that he had exhausted all means of procuring
more armed troops from the Confederate and State governments,

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 239
and his official correspondence shows that he had done his utmost
in that respect. General Beauregard resolved, nevertheless, to in
voke at once every possible resource, and, if he saw any expecta
tion of raising an army, to use every effort to that end, while con
tinuing to give general direction to affairs until his physical
condition should permit him to assume the cares of formal com
mand. His physicians had assured him that they could keep |lfe^
illness from which he was suffering under control, and the forlorn-
condition of the entire West, mingled now with fears for his own
home, determined him to make the effort, however doubtful the
result might be.
The only forces he could dispose of were some fourteen thousand
five hundred men, under General Polk, holding the Mississippi
River defences, imperfectly organized and, as yet, poorly equipped
for the field; about two thousand, under General Chalmers, at
Inka and its vicinity ; and three thousand, under General Ruggles,
at Corinth. But the energetic efforts of Governor Harris now
gave him the hope of soon being able to increase his strength.
Instead, therefore, of operating, with his movable forces, on the
defensive line laid down by General Johnston, as shown by the
memorandum of the 7th, that is, from Columbus via Jackson to
Grand Junction, fifty miles west of Corinth, with Memphis or
Grenada, and Jackson, Mississippi, as ultimate points of retreat,
General Beauregard determined to take up a new defensive line — ¦
confronting the enemy from that part of the Tennessee River —
a line extending from the river defences at Island No. 10 to Cor
inth, via Union City, Humboldt, and Jackson ; throwing his forces
across the Louisville and Memphis and Memphis and Charleston
Railroads; thus covering Memphis and the important railroad
centre of Corinth, with strong advanced forces at Iuka, and a
small force at Tuscumbia, to protect his railroad communication
with the East. With the Mobile and Ohio Railroad along his line,
he would thus be enabled to concentrate quickly, either to oppose
any advance of the enemy along the Louisville and Memphis
Railroad, or, if ready and strong enough for such an operation, to
attack him suddenly should he attempt or effect a landing at any
point along the bend of the Tennessee River, between Coffee
Landing and Eastport. General Beauregard decided on this new
disposition of his forces, in the exercise of that full discretion
given him by General Johnston's telegrams of February 16th and

240 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
18th, the full texts of which have already been laid before the
reader. An additional despatch of the 21st was, in substance, as
follows :
As you have had time sufficiently to study the field, even should
you be too unwell to assume command, I hope you will advise
General Polk of your judgment as to the proper disposition of his
army, in accordance with the views expressed in your memoran
dum, unless you have deemed it necessary to change them. I
cannot issue any orders to him, for fear that mine might conflict
with yours.
Here was an entirely different plan of operations, based upon
entirely different views, which circumstances now brought forth,
and to which no reference, however remote, had been or could
have been made in the "memorandum" of General Johnston's
strategic movements, so often alluded to before.
In reflecting upon the situation, as shaped by our recent disas
ters, General Beauregard became convinced that our substantial
success required the abandonment at once, on our part, of the pas
sive-defensive through which, defeated at every successive point
in the West, we had gradually been driven to our present state of
distress; and it was his conviction that necessity now compelled
us boldly to assume the offensive. To this end, and while review
ing thoroughly the sources from which additional troops might
be levied or spared, he resolved to call upon the governors of
Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Tennessee, for whatever num
ber of men they could collect, if only for sixty or ninety days,
with whatever arms they could procure, to enable him to make or
meet the last encounter, which, he .thought, would decide the fate
of the Mississippi Valley. The following is the confidential cir
cular he sent on that occasion. Its admirable conception and
characteristic vigor will, no doubt, be appreciated by the reader :
"Jackson, Tenn., February 21st, 1862.
" To his Excellency Thos. O. Moore, Governor of Louisiana, etc. :
"Dear Sir, — As you are aware, heavy disasters have recently befallen our
arms on the Kentucky border. The Tennessee River is in possession of the
enemy since the capture of Fort Henry. The evacuation of Bowling Green,
and subsequent fall of Fort Donelson, with large loss of officers, men, arms,
and munitions, have so weakened us on that line, that Nashville can only be
held by superhuman energy, determination, and courage. At the same time,
the direct communications of the forces at Columbus with those under General
A. S. Johnston are broken, and the two armies effectually isolated from each

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 241
other. With the enemy in command of the Tennessee River, the position at
Columbus is so endangered from a land approach from that river by a greatly
superior force, that its fall must be regarded as certain, unless some extraor
dinary efforts are made to reinforce its present small army of occupation. I
need not dwell upon the consequences of such a disaster. Suffice it to say,
it would involve the immediate loss to the Confederate States of the Mississippi
River and Valley.
"In view of the palpable situation, I am instructed to evacuate Columbus
and take up less vulnerable positions on and in the vicinity of Island No. 10,
and at New Madrid. In the execution of this measure, however, much will
depend on the energy with which our enemy may follow up his late success
es, and whether he will give us time to withdraw and receive his onset else
where. " Coming to the command at such a crisis, I have been filled with profound
anxiety and sense of the necessity for a prompt, resolute encounter with the
exigency, in time to prevent an irrevocable defeat. Columbus is now occu
pied by but about twelve thousand men of all arms. At Island No. 10 and
New Madrid are some four thousand men, to which add Ruggles's brigade and
one under General Chalmers at Iuka, say five thousand more ;. thus you will ,
perceive I have a force at my disposition of but twenty-one thousand. If we
remain supine and unaroused to the dangers accumulating day by day, await
ing the advance of the enemy, he will assemble such a force as to insure his
success and a repetition of the late disasters, only with more desolating con
sequences. " Hence, I have thought I would submit, for the consideration of the govern
ors of the Mississippi Valley States,* a plan which I deem most practicable for
the recovery of our losses and the defence of this river, and call upon them
for the means of execution.
" I propose that the governors of the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, and
Alabama, and your Excellency, shall each furnish me with from five thousand to
ten thousand men, armed and equipped, with the utmost possible celerity;
for time is precious, and despatch essential to success. I shall call on General
Van Dorn to unite his forces with mine, and, leaving a suitable garrison at
Columbus, with troops to guard and hold my rear at Island No. 10, 1 would
then take the field with at least forty thousand men, march on Paducah, seize
and close the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers; aided by
gun-boats, I would also successfully assail Cairo, and threaten, if not, indeed,
take, St. Louis itself.
" In this way, be assured, we may most certainly and speedily recover our
losses and insure the defence of the Valley of the Mississippi, and every man

* This confidential circular was sent by special messengers to the governors
of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana — the rendezvous of the
troops furnished to be as follows : those from Tennessee, at Jackson, Tenn. ;
from Alabama, at Corinth ; from Mississippi, at Grand Junction ; from Louis
iana, at Jackson, Tenn., if by railroad, and at Columbus, Ky., if by water.
I.— 16

242 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
you may send me will really be placed in the best possible position for the
defence of his own home and hearthstone.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, General C. S. A."
He also called upon General Bragg for what forces he could
spare from Pensacola and Mobile, inviting him to come in person,
if he could. A similar demand for troops he addressed to Gen
eral Lovell, at New Orleans ; and General Van Dorn was request
ed to join him at once, with ten thousand of his forces, from
Arkansas, across the Mississippi. The following is the letter de
spatched to General Van Dorn. Its importance and historical
value justify us in transcribing it here :
" Jackson, Tenn., February 21st, 1862.
" My dear General, — By the fall of the Tennessee aud Cumberland rivers, the
forces under General Polk (now to be under me) are entirely cut off from those
under General A. S. Johnston, and must henceforth depend upon themselves
alone for the defence of the Mississippi River and contiguous States; the fall
of Columbus, and of Island No. 10, must necessarily be followed by the loss of
the whole Mississippi Valley, to the mouth of the Mississippi River. The
fate of Missouri necessarily depends on the successful defence of Columbus,
and of Island No. 10 ; hence, we must, if possible, combine our operations not
only to defend those positions, but also to take the offensive, as soon as prac
ticable, to recover some of our lost ground. I have just called on the govern
ors of Tennessee, Louisiana, aud Mississippi, for five thousand men from each
State. I have fifteen thousand disposable for the field ; if you could certain
ly join me, via New Madrid or Columbus, with ten thousand more, we could
thus take the field with forty thousand men, take Cairo, Paducah, the mouth
of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, and, most probably, be able to take
also St. Louis, by the river. What say you to this brilliant programme which
I know is fully practicable, if we can get the forces ? At all events, we must
do something or die in the attempt, otherwise, all will be shortly lost.
" Yours truly and sincerely,
" G. T. Beauregard, General C. S. A.
"Earl Van Dorn, Commanding, etc., Pocahontas, Arkansas.
" P. S. — I expect also the co-operation of twelve gunboats from New Orleans.
I will inform you of the governors' answers, as soon as received.
" G. T. Beauregard."
General Beauregard was of the opinion, and so expressed it,
at the time, that the usefulness of Van Dorn's command would
be greater east of the Mississippi than in the position it then
occupied, and that New Orleans itself would be better defended
by the concentration he was endeavoring to effect, than by any ef-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 243
fort made at its own gates, when all outside barriers should have
been destroyed and swept away. He asked that all troops sent
him should be provided, upon starting, with three days' cooked
rations, and forty rounds of ammunition per man. And in order
to secure additional strength, and increase his chances of success,
he also sent to General Johnston, then at Murfreesboro', urging
him to abandon his line of retreat, along the Stevenson and Chat
tanooga Railroad, which was taking him farther and farther away,
and, unless the enemy should anticipate, or intercept him, to turn
towards Decatur, from which quarter he would then be within
easy distance to co-operate with or join him. Thus was he mak
ing all possible preparation, in case he should succeed, in levying
and assembling the troops he had called for, from so many differ
ent points.
On the 20th he sent despatches to each .of the governors of the
above-mentioned States, notifying them that special messengers
would go to them, from him, on important public business. And
the next morning (the 22d) the following members of his staff
left his headquarters, at Jackson, Tennessee, upon their several
missions : Lieutenant (afterwards General) S. W. Ferguson went
to General Johnston and Governor Harris, at Murfreesboro' ; Lieu
tenant A. R. Chisolm, to Governor Shorter, of Alabama, and Ma
jor-General Bragg, at Mobile ; Dr. Samuel Choppin, to Governor
Moore, of Louisiana, and Major-General Lovell, at New Orleans ;
Lieutenant A. N. T. Beauregard, to Governor Pettus, of Mississip
pi ; and Major B. B. Waddell, who was well acquainted with the
country in the Trans-Mississippi, was sent to General Van Dorn,
the location of whose headquarters had not yet been ascertained.
General Beauregard also wrote to General Cooper, at Richmond,
asking for any instructions the War Department might think prop
er to give him, with regard to this calling out of State troops, and
as to the movement he had requested General Van Dorn to make
out of the limits of his department, in order to join him in his
contemplated operations. He represented that all operations in
States bordering on the Mississippi River should be made subor
dinate to the secure possession of that river, which, if lost, would
involve the complete isolation and destruction of any army west
of it.
The War Department did not approve of this call on the govern
ors of the States, for sixty or ninety days troops, objecting that

244 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
there was no law authorizing such a levy, and that it interfered
with the War Department's own recruiting operations. General
Beauregard answered that the call was to be made by each gov
ernor, in the name of his own State, and that after the expected
battle, the troops thus levied might, on their return home, enlist
under the general government. These reasons appear to have
been satisfactory, as no further opposition was offered.
General Johnston, who was then at Murfreesboro', reorganizing
his troops, on his way towards Stevenson, acceded to General
Beauregard's request, and, some days later, upon completing his
reorganization, changed his line of march towards Decatur, via
Shelbyville, Fayetteville, and Huntsville. General Bragg refer
red the question of compliance with General Beauregard's re
quest to the War Department, which, as he informed General
Beauregard, left it to his own discretion. He decided to go at
once, and furnish about ten thousand men, including three regi
ments that he had already sent to Chattanooga, to reinforce
General Johnston, and some other regiments on their way to
that point, which he recalled. General Lovell also cheerfully
responded — so did the four governors — promising to do their
utmost in furtherance of the plan, and to rendezvous their troops
as requested, with the rations, and forty rounds of ammunition
called for. It was not until later, however, that any news, could
be had from General Van Dorn, he being then engaged in a
movement which resulted in the battle of Elkhorn, with the Fed
erals, under General Lyon.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD; 245

CHAPTER XVII.
Evacuation of Columbus. — How the Enemy Discovered It. — Loss of Ordnance
Stores, Anchors, and Torpedoes. — Island No. 10. — Difficulty in Placing
Guns in Position. — Federal Gunboats might have Passed Unhindered. —
Small Garrison under Colonel Gantt Reinforced by General McCown with
Part of the Garrison of Columbus. — Defences at New Madrid to be held un
til the Completion of the Works at Fort Pillow. — Remainder of General
Polk's Forces Assembled upon Humboldt. — Preparations for an Offensive
Movement by the Enemy. — Danger of Isolation for General Johnston. —
General Beauregard's Letter to him. — The Great Battle of the Controversy
to be Fought at or near Corinth. — General Johnston accedes to General
Beauregard's request, and Begins a Movement to Join him. — General
Beauregard Assumes Command. — Arrival of General Bragg's Forces at
Corinth. — Corinth the Chief Point of Concentration, as Originally De
cided upon. — General Beauregard Appeals to the War Department for
the General Officers Promised him. — Their Services Greatly Needed.—
Unwillingness and Apathy of the War Department.
It will be remembered that one of the conditions of General
Beauregard's departure for the Mississippi Valley was, that he
should be furnished with a certain number of officers from the
Army of the Potomac, should their services be needed, some of
them to be promoted to be brigadier-generals and others to be ma
jor-generals. Early in February a list of their names Was left with
the War Department by Colonel Thomas Jordan, General Beaure
gard's Adjutant and Chief of Staff. On the 20th of that month
General Beauregard called for Captains Wampler and Fr6meaux,
as Assistant Engineers, to aid in constructing' the several defences
on the Mississippi River; and for Major G. W. Brent, as Inspect
or and Judge-Advocate-General, whose immediate services were
much needed at the time. After considerable delay, the two en
gineers only were sent : Captain Fremeaux arriving a few days
previous to the impending battle, and Captain Wampler not until
it had been fought. Closely following this first demand upon the
War Department, General Beauregard, with a view properly to or
ganize the forces under General Polk, and the new levies daily
expected, formally applied for the general officers so greatly need-

246 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
ed for the efficiency of his command ; carefully explaining that no
suitable subdivision of the troops had yet been made, or could be
practicable, without their assistance. His request, however, re
mained unheeded, or, rather, after much controversy, was only
partly complied with at the last hour, and not according to his de
sires, nor in the manner promised. We shall again refer to this
subject as we proceed with the present chapter.
Meanwhile, General Polk was making preparations for the evac
uation of Columbus, which began on the 25th of February. The
next day he requested General Beauregard to join him there, but
this the latter was unable to do, being yet too unwell to under
take the journey. He continued, however, to send directions
to General Polk, as the necessity arose respecting certain main
points of the evacuation, and particularly as to the occupation of
New Madrid. So imminent was the danger of an attack upon
that place, that he had telegraphed General Johnston for a bri
gade to be sent there, as soon as possible, by railroad ; a request
which, it seems, could not be complied with. On the 28th, his
Adjutant -General was sent to Columbus, to suggest the estab
lishment of a telegraphic line between Humboldt or Union
City and Island No. 10, by means of which that now important
position — the left of his new defensive line— should be brought
into immediate communication with his headquarters. Colonel
Jordan was also commissioned to advise General Polk in person
as to the evacuation then in process of execution, which he did.
He then returned without delay to Jackson.
The evacuation of Columbus was completed on the 2d of
March, owing, in no small degree, to a lack of watchfulness and
daring on the part of the enemy. So cautious in their reconnoi
tring had the Federal gunboats been, that the fact that Columbus
was unoccupied was only discovered by them on the 4th, and then
by mere accident. While slowly advancing down the river, they
were much surprised at the sight of a United States' flag flying
over the place. It had been hoisted there on the afternoon of the
3d, by a troop of Federal cavalry, who, attracted by a cloud of
smoke rising from the quarters and storehouses, and prudently
creeping up to the works, had thus discovered the real state of the
case. These buildings had been set on fire by injudicious orders,
the day before the appearance of the reconnoitring party. In the
hurry of final departure, some ordnance and a quantity of ord-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 247
nance stores, torpedoes, and anchors — the latter much needed for
river obstructions at New Orleans — were left behind and fell into
the hands of the enemy.
At Island No. 10 and the batteries in the Bend, the difficulty
of placing the guns in position from the spot where they had been
landed was such that for at least two days neither of those de
fences could have successfully resisted the passage — if attempted
— of any of the Federal gunboats. Had Commodore Foote then
displayed the boldness which he afterwards showed at the same
place, and which so characterized Admirals Farragut and Buchan
an, and Captain Brown, of the Arkansas, he might have passed
without much resistance and captured New Orleans from the rear.
Instead of this, he merely left a gunboat and two mortar-boats to
protect Columbus from the river, and, with the remainder, quietly
returned to Cairo.*
A part of the heavy armament and ammunition from Colum
bus was sent to the unfinished batteries on the upper end of Island
No. 10, a naturally good and defensible position in New Madrid
Bend, and to those on the main Tennessee shore. The small gar
rison under Colonel Gantt, at New Madrid, a little town on the
Missouri bank of the river, about sixty miles below Columbus,
and ten, more or less, from Island No. 10, was reinforced by Gen
eral McCown, with part of the garrison of Columbus, and was has
tily fortified with field-works. General McCown, with about seven
thousand men, was placed in command of all the defences at Mad
rid Bend, intended to be held only long enough to permit the com
pletion of the stronger and more important works designed for
Fort Pillow, to which the remainder of the heavy armament and
ammunition from Columbus had already been sent. This position
(Fort Pillow), about fifty-nine miles above Memphis, which, as yet,
was but partly fortified, General Beauregard had determined to
strengthen and hold, with a garrison not to exceed four thousand
men, as the left of his new defensive line, already referred to, cov
ering Memphis, and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
What was left of General Polk's forces (about seven thousand
men) was then assembled, mainly upon Humboldt, at the inter
section of the Memphis and Louisville and Mobile and Ohio Rail
roads — a point having central relation and railroad communication
* See " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 226.

248 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
with the principal towns in west Tennessee and north Mississippi.
A strong line of infantry outposts was established from Union
City, on the left, to Lexington, on the right, by the way of Dresden
and Huntington, protected by a line of cavalry pickets thrown
well out in advance, from Hickman, on the Mississippi, to Paris,
near the Tennessee River. Mounted parties, supplied with light
artillery, patrolled the west bank of the latter stream, and kept
General Beauregard well informed of the movements of the ene
my's boats.
During the evacuation of Columbus, reports of great prepara
tions for an offensive movement had reached General Beauregard
from the Federal rendezvous at Cairo, Paducah, and Fort Henry.
Pope's forces were then moving upon New Madrid, the left of our
river defences, and it seemed evident that the abandonment of Co
lumbus must necessarily stimulate active hostile operations in the
valley. Convinced that there was early danger to be apprehended from
the direction of the Tennessee River, which might result in com
pletely isolating General Johnston's forces, General Beauregard,
who now had the assurance of being soon joined by General Bragg
and the reinforcements promised him by the governors to whom
he had applied, on the 2d of March despatched Captain Otey, of
his staff, to General Johnston, with written evidence of the ene
my's threatening intentions, and with a short but impressive letter,
urging him to hurry forward his troops by railroad to Corinth.
This letter read as follows: " Jackson, Tenn., March 2d, 1862.
" Dear General, — I send you herewith enclosed a slip showing the intended
movements of the enemy, no doubt against the troops in western Tennessee. I
think you ought to hurry up your troops to Corinth by railroad, as soon as
practicable, for there or thereabouts will soon be fought the great battle of this
controversy. General Bragg is with me ; we are trying to organize every
thing as rapidly as possible. Yours truly, " G. T. Beauregard.
"General A. S. Johnston, Stevenson, Ala."
On the same day, and to the same effect, he also telegraphed
General Johnston, reaffirming the urgency of a junction at Cor
inth, and asking specially for the 9th and 10th Mississippi and
5th Georgia regiments, under Brigadier-General J. R. Jackson,
they having been sent to Chattanooga, by order of the War De
partment, to reinforce General Johnston, then moving upon Steven-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 249
son, and about the disposition of whose troops, and projected plans,
Mr. Benjamin wrote that he " was still without any satisfactory
information."* General Beauregard was most anxious that these
troops should at once reach Corinth — now become the important
strategic point — in anticipation of the arrival there of the rein
forcements coming from the adjacent States.
On the 3d, General Johnston, through Colonel Mackall, A. A.
G., replied, from Shelbyville, that the 10th Mississippi would be
forwarded from Chattanooga, and that his own army would move
as rapidly as it could march. He then answered General Beaure
gard's letter, from Fayetteville, on the 5th, stating that his army
was advancing ; that it had already reached that place ; would
move on to join him, as fast as possible; and that, upon his arrival
at Decatur, he would decide upon the promptest mode of effect
ing the desired junction.
General Beauregard, by most strenuous efforts, and in the face
of almost insurmountable obstacles, was thus enabled to hope that
all our available forces would be assembled in the quarter desig
nated, ready to meet the enemy as soon as he should venture upon
the west bank of the Tennessee River, and before he could be fully
prepared for our attack.
Hitherto, in order to avoid the burden of the irksome details in
cident to the organization of an army, General Beauregard had
not assumed command, but had directed matters through General
Polk; but as the new levies and reinforcements were now gath
ering, and as there was a prospect of an early encounter with the
enemy, he determined formally to assume command, and, on the 5th
of March, issued the following order to the forces under him :
" Headquarters, Army of the Mississippi,
" Jackson, Tenn., March 5th, 1862.
" Soldiers, — I assume this day command of the ' Army of the Mississippi,' for
the defence of our homes and liberties, and to resist the subjugation, spoliation
and dishonor of our people. Our mothers and wives, our sisters and children
expect us to do our duty, even to the sacrifice of our lives.
" Our losses, since the commencement of the war, in killed, wounded, and
prisoners, are now about the same as those of the enemy.
" He must be made to atone for the reverses we have lately experienced.
Those reverses, far from disheartening, must nerve us to new deeds of valor
* See Mr. Benjamin's letter to General Bragg, dated Richmond, Va., Febru
ary 18th, 1862.

250 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
and patriotism, and should inspire us with an unconquerable determination to
drive back our invaders.
" Should any one in this army be unequal to the task before us, let him
transfer his arms aud equipments at once to braver, firmer hands, and return
to his home.
" Our cause is as just and sacred as ever animated men to take up arms, and
if we are true to it and to ourselves, with the continued protection of the Al
mighty, we must and shall triumph. " G. T. Beauregard, General Comdg."
Recent information had led General Beauregard to look upon
Pittsburg, on the Tennessee, as one of the places likely to be se
lected by the enemy for a landing ; and on the 1st he had ordered
General Buggies to occupy it, and make it, as well as Hamburg, a
point of observation. This required the substitution of Bethel Sta
tion, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, for McNairy's, as one of the
places appointed for the assembling of the Tennessee troops.
The order concerning Pittsburg was executed by General Rug-
gles, who sent thither the 18th Louisiana, one of the finest regi
ments from that State, supported by Captain Gibson's battery of
light artillery. On the day following, General Beauregard's fore
sight was shown to have been accurate by the enemy attempting
to make a landing at that point. The 18th Louisiana, armed with
rifles and smooth-bore muskets, and firing from the steep bluffs
overhanging the river, forced the landing party to take to their
boats, and even drove back the two gunboats — the Lexington
and Tyler — inflicting severe loss upon them. This dashing
and curious encounter caused the regiment* to be highly com
plimented in general orders. Had the supporting battery stood
its ground and exhibited equal intrepidity, not only would the
whole landing party have been captured, but probably the fore
most of the two gunboats would also have fallen into our hands.
General Bragg's forces began to arrive at Corinth, from Mobile
and Pensacola, on the 6th. He had reported in person to General
Beauregard, at Jackson, on the evening of the 2d, and was placed
at once in charge of that portion of the forces assembling at Cor
inth, with definite instructions as to their organization into bri
gades and divisions, and as to supplying them with equipments,
* The 18th Louisiana was, at that time, under Colonels Mouton and Roman
and Major Bush. Later it acquired additional fame under the heroic Armant,
killed at Mansfield. Colonel Jos. Collins, of New Orleans, wasits last commander.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 251
transportation, ammunition, and tents, according to our limited
means. General Beauregard now directed General Bragg to examine
critically the position of Monterey, about half-way from Corinth
to Pittsburg or Hamburg ; for though he had selected Corinth as
the chief point of concentration for his reinforcements, yet, from
examination of the map, the advanced position of Monterey seemed
to offer such advantages for a sudden offensive movement, in case
the enemy should land at either of those places, that he was in
clined to substitute Monterey for Corinth, as he could move from
either with equal facility, to the defensive position of Yellow
Creek, in- advance of Bnrnsville, should the enemy decide upon
effecting a landing at Eastport. General Bragg, however, having
reported in favor of Corinth, on account of the character of the
roads and the deficiency of transportation among the reinforce
ments arriving there, Corinth remained, as originally determined
upon by General Beauregard, the grand central point for the rally
ing and concentration of all the Confederate forces.
The services of the officers General Beauregard had called for
now became indispensable, in view of the great diligence and eu-
ergy displayed in the assembling of his forces. Though required
for the proper organization of the troops under General Polk,
these officers were even more needed to assist General Bragg in
preparing for the field the large number of raw Confederate and
State forces just concentrated at the three points designated, Cor
inth, Grand Junction, and Bethel. Every moment was precious,
and rapid and determined action imperative. On the 4th of
March, General Beauregard, therefore, again urgently asked for
two major-generals and five brigadiers — one of the latter to serve
with the cavalry — and all to be ordered to report immediately to
him. To his great surprise — and greater disappointment — the
War Department replied that these officers could not be spared.
General Beauregard's perplexity was extreme. He could not ac
count for the procrastination and evident unwillingness shown by
the War Department. Here was an incongruous army, concen
trated under the greatest difficulties imaginable, ready for any sac
rifice, eager to meet the enemy, but whose organization and effec
tiveness were fearfully impaired by the absolute want of general
officers, to enforce discipline and establish harmony between its
several parts. General Beauregard could not quietly acquiesce in

252 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
such supineness. He appealed to the War Department, " for the
sake of our cause and country," to send, at once, Colonel Mackall
as major-general, and three officers recommended by him for bri
gadiers, with Colonel Ransom to take charge of the cavalry. He
was informed that Colonel Mackall had been nominated for bri
gadier, and that all officers designed for promotion must be selected
from among those of his own present army. As General Beaure
gard had then with him very few graduates of West Point, or of
other military schools, or officers of any experience, he answered,
on the 7th, that he knew of none to recommend ; but he for
warded, for immediate action, a list containing the names of two
major-generals and six brigadiers, suggested by Generals Bragg
and Polk; and, as there was still no cavalry colonel to recommend,
he repeated his application for Colonel Ransom. On the 8th he
also asked that either Colonel R. B. Lee or Major Williams, of his
former Army of Virginia, be sent him, for the important duties of
Chief Commissary, as he had, in his present command, no officers
of equal experience to select from ; and he earnestly inquired
whether Major G. W. Brent would be sent him for inspector, as
he needed the services of such an officer almost hourly. The
reply came, that the promotions as general officers could not be
made until he recommended them from his own personal experi
ence of their merits.
The existing state of affairs had become all the more embarrass
ing for the reason that General Beauregard's scouts reported large
forces of the enemy moving, in transports, up the Tennessee River,
with the probability of an early landing, at any moment. He, there
fore, overlooking the discourtesy shown and the annoyance occasion
ed him by the War Department, asked that permission be given him
to appoint acting brigadiers and major-generals, to supply the im
mediate wants of his army. He again received an unfavorable
reply. His request, said the War Department, was irregular and
unauthorized by law. Not knowing what further step to take, he
telegraphed General Cooper, unofficially, that if the officers he had
applied for the day before were denied him (so disastrous might
be the consequences, from the fact that part of his forces were in
a state of chaos, and his health too greatly affected to allow him,
if unaided, to establish order around him), he would forthwith re
quest to be relieved from his present command. The obstructive
policy of the government so palpably thwarted his efforts and en-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 253
dangered the success of his plans, that he had even resolved, should
it be longer persevered in, to tender his resignation.
By telegram of the 9th, received on the 11th, he was notified
that the following officers were nominated for his command : J.
L. Bowen, as major-general ; J. M. Hawes, J. E. Slaughter, and S.
M. Walker, as brigadiers ; Hawes for the cavalry. He was also
notified that Ransom was appointed a brigadier, but must be sent
to North Carolina, as his presence there was of the first impor
tance; and that Samuel Jones had been promoted to be major-gen
eral, but could not be spared from Mobile. We must here state
that Bowen was not confirmed as major-general, and did not re
port ; nor did Hawes, until about a month later, and just before
the battle of Shiloh. General Beauregard at once replied that he
had called for ten generals, as absolutely indispensable to the
efficiency of his forces ; that out of the four granted him, two only
were present for duty ; and that, as the enemy was already en
gaged with his left at New Madrid, he wonld not hold himself
responsible for the consequences that might ensue. He appealed,
at the same time, to some leading members of Congress, urging
them to use their influence with the government, so as to change
its unaccountable policy in matters of such vital importance to
the Confederacy ; but this was of no effect. The course of the
War Department resulted disastrously, as General Beauregard
had apprehended ; for it contributed towards delaying, by several
days, our subsequent offensive movement from Corinth, against
the enemy at Pittsburg Landing.

254 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XVIII.
General Beauregard Orders the Collection of Grain and Provisions, and Es
tablishes Depots of Supplies. — His Appeal to the People to Procure Met
al for the Casting of Cannon. — Warning Preparations of the Enemy. —
Arrival of Federal Divisions at Savannah. — General Sherman's Attempt
ed Raid to Destroy the Railroad. — Burning of Small Bridge near Bethel
Station. — General Pope Before New Madrid. — The Place Abandoned. —
General Beauregard's Instructions to General McCown. — General Mackall
Relieves him. — Bombardment of Island No. 10. — What might have been
the Result had the Enemy Disembarked at once at Pittsburg Landing. —
The Troops we had to Oppose Them. — What General Johnston Thought
of Bolivar as a Base of Operation. — Recommends it as more Advanta
geous than Corinth. — Why General Beauregard Preferred Corinth. — He
Presses Concentration there, as soon as the Intentions of the Enemy be
come Sufficiently Developed. — Success of his Plan. — Co-operation of the
Governors of Adjacent States. — Troops Poorly Armed and Equipped. —
The Enemy begins Landing at Pittsburg. — Arrival of Hurlbut's, Prentiss's,
McClernand's, and the Two Wallaces' Divisions. — Force of the Army Op
posing us. — General Buell. — His Slow Advance on Nashville. — Is at Last
Aroused by Order to Unite his Forces with those of General Grant. —
Aggregate of Buell's Forces in Tennessee and Kentucky. — Our only Hope
for Success was to Strike a Sudden Blow before the Junction of Buell
and Grant.
Looking to the evacuation of Columbus and the concentration
of troops at and around Corinth, General Beauregard had ordered,
early in March, the immediate collection of the requisite quantity
of grain and provisions, at Union City, Humboldt, Jackson, and
Henderson, in West Tennessee, and at Corinth, Grand Junction,
and Iuka, in Mississippi, with the establishment of chief de
pots of supplies of all kinds, at Columbus, Mississippi, and Gre
nada. At this latter place he had endeavored to establish a
percussion-cap manufactory, which he looked upon as very im
portant, because the difficulty of procuring a proper supply of
this essential part of our ammunition had become great ; but he
failed in his efforts to accomplish the purpose. Foreseeing also
that the demand for powder would soon increase in the Missis
sippi Valley, he made a second — but likewise fruitless — effort to

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 255
6tart a powder factory at Meridian, a point he considered, and
rightly so, safe from Federal intrusion, and one which, in fact,
was held by the Confederates until the end of the war.
The need of metal for the casting of field-guns was already
a subject of most serious consideration for our leaders. The
guns the Confederacy had, in the field and elsewhere, were in
adequate, and that more were required was evident to all. So
lacking in enterprise and forethought, in that respect, had the gov
ernment shown itself, that no reliance could be placed upon it
to improve the situation. The people, not the government, were
the source from which alone assistance could be had. Deeply con
vinced of this truth, General Beauregard issued an appeal to the
good citizens of the Mississippi Valley, asking them to yield up their
plantation bells, that more cannon might be made for the defence
of their homes. They responded with alacrity to his call ; and, so
great was the enthusiasm pervading all classes of the population,
that even religions congregations gave up their church-bells, while
women offered their brass candlesticks and andirons.
By the 8th of March, the busy preparations of the enemy at
Fort Henry, up the Tennessee River, indicated an early offensive
movement, to meet which the greatest activity on our part was
necessary. On the 13th, five Federal divisions arrived at Savannah,
twelve miles below Pittsburg Landing, and on the opposite side of
the river, followed, a few days later, by a reinforcement of some
five thousand men. These troops, numbering now about forty
thousand infantry, and three thousand artillery and cavalry, were
commanded by Major-General C. F. Smith, a gallant and accom
plished officer.* General Grant, who, for a time after the capture
of Fort Donelson, had been virtually suspended by General Hal-
leck, for an alleged disobedience of orders, arrived on the 17th,
and resumed command. Meanwhile, on the 14th, General Sher
man's division, which had not been landed at Savannah, was de
tached up the river, under the protection of two gunboats, to de
stroy the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, near Eastport and
Chickasaw Bluff, but evinced such extreme caution that he was
deterred from landing by two companies of infantry, acting as
artillery, with two 24-pounders. These companies belonged to a
* He had been Commandant at the United States Military Academy, while
General Beauregard was a cadet there ; and had at a later period served with
distinction in the Mexican War.

256 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
regiment of General Chalmers's brigade. The brigade proper,
composed of about two thousand five hundred men, was stationed
at the time at or near Iuka, on the Memphis and Charleston Rail
road, and five or six miles back from the river. Sherman's force
then retired a few miles, to the mouth of Yellow River, intending
to move thence to destroy the railroad company's shops at Beirns-
ville, a small village eight miles west of Iuka. After landing and
making an abortive attempt to reach Beirnsville, with nothing to
oppose him but high water, General Sherman hurriedly re-em
barked his troops and dropped down to Pittsburg Landing, on the
night of the 14th, having made a useless demonstration, but one
which confirmed General Beauregard in the opinion that Corinth
would be the final objective point of the Federal movement.
On the 13th, General McClernand's division of C. F. Smith's
forces was crossed over to Crump's (or McWilliams's) Landing, on
the west bank of the river, five or six miles above Savannah, to
destroy the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, between Corinth and Jack
son. But no more was effected than the burning of a small bridge
near Bethel Station, twenty-four miles north of Corinth. After
this the division fell back to the landing and re-embarked, show
ing the same degree of nervousness that characterized the Sher
man expedition.
General Pope, in co-operation with these movements on the
Tennessee, had appeared before New Madrid, about the end of Feb
ruary, and attacked that place with artillery. Not being defended
with the tenacity which afterwards distinguished the defence of
Island No. 10 and its neighboring batteries, that important position
was abandoned during the night of the 14th. Its garrison was
transferred to the opposite bank of the river, and a portion of it
sent to reinforce the troops supporting the batteries at and about
Island No. 10. The guns left in position at New Madrid, not
having been properly spiked, were immediately put in condition to
cut off, from escape down the river, eight transports and the gun
boat used by General McCown in the evacuation.
General Beauregard's instructions to that officer had been to
hold those defences to the very last extremity, in order to give
time for completing the works at Fort Pillow ; to sink some of
his transports in the Missouri-shore channel, so as to narrow it still
more, or render it impassable ; and to anchor a fire-raft in the middle
of the wider Tennessee-shore channel, so as to prevent the enemy's

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 257
gunboats from passing, under cover of night, the batteries protect
ing it. He was cautioned not to allow his remaining transports
and gunboats to fall into the hands of the enemy under any cir
cumstances. Finally, he was informed that no reinforcements
could possibly be sent him until after the impending battle in the
vicinity of Corinth.
Somewhat later General Beauregard relieved General McCown
from his duties, and General Mackall, the gallant and efficient
Assistant Adjutant-General of General Johnston's army, was se
lected to command at Madrid Bend. The following note was his
answer when first informed of General Beauregard's wish to that
effect : " Decatur, Ala., March 10th, 1862.
" Dear General, — I thank you for my promotion. You are entitled to my
services and shall always command them. But now this army is in trouble,
and I cannot leave it, with honor, until it joins you.
" Yours sincerely, " W. W. Mackall, A. A. G."
The junction having been effected, he left for his new post;
and held the works under him until after the battle of Shiloh,
several days longer than would have been done otherwise. It was
too late, however, to accomplish the main object General Beaure
gard had had in view, in assigning him to that important position.
On the 16th, the Federal fleet of gun and mortar boats, under
Commodore Foote, appeared, and began the prolonged attack and
bombardment which rendered the defence of Island No. 10 mem
orable in the history of the war.
Until the 10th of March, a large Federal army was intended to
operate against Florence, about seventy miles farther south than
Savannah, but on the 13th it landed at the latter place. Had that
army been at once disembarked at Pittsburg Landing, twenty-two
miles from Corintl!, or, better still, at Hamburg, eight miles south
of Pittsburg and two or three miles nearer to Corinth, it would
have met with no serious opposition ; for, at the time of the land-
in o-, General Beauregard had only one regiment of cavalry in ob
servation, supported, at Monterey, about half-way to Corinth, by
one or two regiments of infantry and a battery of field artillery ;
while at Hamburg he had only a strong picket of cavalry. At
Corinth he had, then collected, not more than fifteen thousand
men, who could have offered no great resistance, as they were in a
I.— 17

258 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
state of confusion, gathered, as they had been, from many different
quarters, as fast as they could be brought by rail, and were in large
part poorly armed and equipped. Some of the regiments were
not yet formed into brigades, and only one or two divisions had
been organized. General Beauregard is clearly of the opinion
that, had the Federal forces been handled with confidence and of
fensively pressed forward, they must have dispersed the troops he
had then assembled there, especially as more than half of the Fed
eral army consisted of seasoned troops, fresh from the successes
of Forts Henry and Donelson, with supports at convenient. dis
tances, and abundantly supplied with munitions for offensive oper
ations. In fact, General Johnston, regarding Corinth as too close
to the Tennessee River, as a point of concentration on our side,
had telegraphed General Beauregard, recommending the south
bank of the Hatchee River, near Bolivar, as offering greater secur
ity. His telegram read as follows :
(Ciphered Telegram.) " Decatur, March 15th, 1862.
" To General G. T. Beauregard :
" Have you had the south bank of the Hatchee examined, near Bolivar. I
recommend it to your attention. It has, besides other advantages, that of be
ing further from enemy's base. " A. S. Johnston."
This is very much in contrast with the assertions of some of
General Johnston's panegyrists, that, as early as January, 1862
(others have it on the 1st and 4th of February), he had designated
Shiloh Church — some say Corinth — as the spot where " the great
battle of the southwest would be fought." This erroneous state
ment merits — and will receive — attention before that part of our
narrative referring to the campaign of the West is closed.
General Beauregard differed with General Johnston on that all-
important subject, because, while willing to admit that the south
bank of the Hatchee River was, possibly, a good defensive line, it
was by no means, in his opinion, a proper one for the offensive he
proposed to take, and in view of which he would have even pre
ferred Monterey to Corinth, owing to its still greater proximity
to the anticipated landing-point of the enemy. Events, however,
justified his selection of Corinth, favored as he was by the hesi
tancy and lack of enterprise of the opposing forces, which enabled
him to proceed, unmolested, with the measures of concentration

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 259
he had so much at heart. General Beauregard's apparent temerity
in selecting for his base of operations a point so near the ground
chosen for the landing of a powerful enemy, was the result, not
of rashness, but of close and sagacious observation. With the
eye and daring of a true general — noting the timidity of the Fed
eral forces in their attempts at incursions on the western bank of
the Tennessee, and their disjointed manner of disembarking — he
knew that the nearer he was to his opponents the better it would
be for the handling of his troops and the success of his plan.
From a point near his foe he could attack fractions instead of con
centrated masses of the enemy, with the chances of success in his
favor. As soon as the movements of the enemy, on the Tennessee, had
sufficiently developed his intentions, General Beauregard ordered
an immediate concentration,. by railroad, of all troops then avail
able in West Tennessee and North Mississippi. Those at Grand
Junction and Iuka he massed upon Corinth ; those at Fort Pillow,
and General Polk's forces at Humboldt and Lexington, he assem
bled at Bethel and Corinth, leaving detachments at Union City
and Humboldt, to keep open the communications established, with
great difficulty, between Island No. 10 and Jackson. A line of
cavalry pickets was left in place of the infantry outposts at Union
City, Dresden, Huntington, and Lexington ; their fronts and inter
mediate spaces being well patrolled by scouting parties, to give
timely notice of any hostile advance ; in case of which, the cavalry,
if compelled to fall back, had orders to retire gradually on Bolivar,
on the Mississippi Central Railroad, thirty-eight miles northwest of
Corinth, keeping up constant communication with the forces at
Bethel and Corinth.
By the middle of March, less than one month after General
Beauregard's arrival at Jackson, Tennessee, he had succeeded in
assembling, within easy concentrating distances of Corinth, some
twenty-three thousand men of all arms, independently of the four
teen thousand, more or less, he had found in the district under
General Polk, on the 17th of February. He hoped to be joined,
before the end of March, by General Johnston's command, of
about thirteen thousand men — exclusive of cavalry — then arriving
at Decatur ; and General Van Dorn, at Van Buren, Arkansas, had
promised, at that time, his co-operation with an army of nearly
twenty thousand. General Beauregard had sent Van Dorn all the

260 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
water transportation he could collect on the Mississippi River, with
which to effect the junction. These movements of concentration
were approved by General Johnston, but had received no enpour-
agement from the War Department or the Chief Executive. They
were brought about through the untiring efforts and perseverance
of General Beauregard ; through the cheerful and patriotic assis
tance of the governors of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana; through General Bragg, at Pensacola, and General
Lovell, at New Orleans. Without their hearty and powerful aid
it would have been impossible to collect, in time, a force of suffi
cient strength successfully to oppose the enemy, who, had he used
his resources with ordinary vigor, must soon have obtained undis
puted possession of the Mississippi River, and, consequently, of
the entire valley, including New Orleans.
The State troops thus hastily assembled were, as we have said,
poorly equipped, without drill, and. badly armed, some of them only
with the discarded flint-lock musket of former days; and great
difficulty was experienced in procuring the proper quality of
flints. Not a third of the cavalry had fire-arms, and those who
had were ill-armed, with a medley of pistols, carbines, muskets,
and shot-guns, chiefly the latter. Few of them had sabres. The
personnel of this new levy, however, could not have been better.
It was composed of the best young men, from the city and coun
try, who had rushed to arms at the call of their States. Animated
by a feeling of patriotism and high martial spirit, they gave fair
promise of great efficiency, if well officered. As soon as their
regiments arrived at the rendezvous assigned them they were
brigaded, equipped for the field as well as our restricted means
permitted, and, owing to the lack of time for better instruction,
were exercised only — and but slightly — in company and battalion
drills, while awaiting orders to march to the battle-field.
On the 16th of March, General Sherman, by order of General
C. F. Smith, at Savannah, disembarked with his division at Pitts
burg Landing, to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Mon
terey, twelve miles from the Landing and ten miles from Corinth.
He marched a few miles into the interior, encountering only the
regiment stationed there, which retired as he advanced. He, never
theless, returned to the Landing and re-embarked with his division.
On the 18th Hurlbnt's division landed, and took position about
a mile and a half from the river, near the fork of the roads, lead-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 261
ing, the one to Corinth, the other to Hamburg, five or six miles
up the river. On the 19th, General Sherman again disembarked
his division, taking post about three miles in the interior, with
three of his brigades, at or near a little log meeting-house, cover
ing the roads to Purdy, in a northwesterly, and to Corinth, in a
southwesterly, direction. His fourth brigade was detached to a
point more tlian two miles to his left rear, at the crossing of the
Pittsburg and Hamburg road, over Lick Creek. " Within a few
days," says General Sherman, in his memoirs, Prentiss's division
arrived, and was camped on his left, filling the space between his
third and fourth brigades, but some distance in advance of the
latter ; afterwards McClernand's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions
were landed, the first placing itself within supporting distance of
Sherman, and the second on the right of Hurlbut, forming a
third line, about a mile and a half from the Landing.
Thus it will be seen that if we had been able to carry out Gen
eral Beauregard's original intention of concentrating his forces at
Monterey, only nine miles from Sherman's position, we should
have had several days during which to attack the isolated divisions
of Sherman and Hurlbut, numbering about seven thousand men,
according to Federal accounts, and with a large and rapid river in
their rear. Such an opportunity for annihilating in detail the
fractional part of a powerful enemy is seldom offered in a cam
paign. Another division, under Lew. Wallace, about seven thousand
strong, with twelve guns, had also landed, and occupied a position,
five or six miles from Sherman's right, on the north side of Snake
Creek, on a road leading from Crump's (McWilliams's) landing to
Purdy, a small village half-way to the railroad station of Bethel,
on the Mobile and Ohio road.
The five divisions in front of Pittsburg Landing were accom
panied by twelve batteries of field artillery, of six pieces each, and
four or five battalions of cavalry, distributed among the several
commands, which then numbered, together, at least thirty-nine
thousand infantry and artillery, with some fifteen hundred cav
alry, forming a well-organized and fully equipped force of over
forty -seven thousand men, including Lew. Wallace's division,
which was watching and threatening in the direction of Purdy.
This army, of which at least forty per cent, were flushed with
recent victories, was soon to be reinforced by General Buell, al-

262 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
ready on the march from Nashville to Savannah, with five divis
ions of the best organized, disciplined, and equipped troops in the
Federal service, numbering fully thirty-seven thousand effectives.*
General Buell f had entered Bowling Green on the 15th of
February, the day after it was evacuated by the Confederates, and
one day before the surrender of Fort Donelson. He had then ad
vanced leisurely on Nashville, about seventy-five miles distant, ar
riving opposite that city, on the Cumberland River, on the 23d.
It was surrendered to him on the 25th, by the civil authorities, and
he occupied it the next day. The rear guard of the Confederate
forces, under General Floyd, had left Nashville for Murfreesboro',
thirty-two miles distant in a southerly direction, on the Nashville
and Chattanooga Railroad, when the enemy appeared on the south
side of the river.
General Buell remained at Nashville, a passive spectator of
General Johnston's slow and quiet retreat, first to Murfreesboro',
thence to Fayetteville, Huntsville, and Decatur, making no appar
ent effort to harass him or prevent his junction with the forces
collected, meanwhile, by General Beauregard, about Corinth. The
Federal general's torpor does not seem to have been disturbed
until about the middle of March, when he was instructed by Gen
eral Halleck — who had been assigned, on the 11th, to the command
in chief — to unite his forces with those of General Grant, at
Savannah, on the Tennessee River. This point of concentration
was afterwards changed to Pittsburg Landing, twelve miles higher
up, on the opposite side of the river ; but no immediate communi
cation to that effect was made to General Buell. While on the
march, however, he decided to move to Hamburg, about six miles
above Pittsburg, and thence to the place of concentration, wher
ever it might be.
While at Nashville, Buell's whole force in Tennessee and Ken-
* " Buell himself, with five divisions, numbering nearly forty thousand men,
was ordered from Nashville, to the support of Grant." — Badeau's " Military
History of U. S. Grant," vol. i. p. 68.
t He was a contemporary of General Beauregard's at the United States
Military Academy, and had done good service as a young officer in Mexico.
He was on the staff of General A. S. Johnston, as Adjutant -General in the
Utah expedition, shortly before the late war between the States. He was
brave and intelligent, but was generally considered too much of a disciplina
rian to effect great results with irregular troops.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 263
tucky consisted of seven divisions, with detached troops for guard
ing his communications, maintaining order, and otherwise provid
ing for his safety, and amounted, in the aggregate, to 94,783 men
of all arms. The army presented an effective force for the field
of 73,472 men, of which 60,882 were infantry, 9237 cavalry, and
3368 artillery, with twenty-eight field and two siege batteries of
six guns each.*
On the 15th Buell commenced his march, with five divisions,
as already stated, to effect leisurely the junction ordered by Gen
eral Halleck ; while one division, the 7th, under General G. W.
Morgan, went to East Tennessee, and another, the 3d, under Gen
eral O. M. Mitchell, to pursue General Johnston and destroy the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad south of Fayetteville. Nei
ther of these last-named operations was performed with much
celerity. On arriving at Columbia, forty miles south of Nashville, Gen
eral Buell found the bridge across Duck River destroyed, and the
water too high to ford. He was delayed there until the morning
of the 29th, when, the bridge having been rebuilt, he again start
ed for Savannah, thence to Pittsburg Landing, a distance of about
one hundred miles, which he accomplished in nine days, marching
slightly more than eleven miles a day. His head of column, Nel
son's division, arrived at Pittsburg Landing at 3 o'clock p. m. on
the 6th of April, the march from Savannah having been hurried
in order to reach the field of Shiloh, from which the sound of the
battle was plainly heard.
The united armies of Grant and Buell (his five divisions) would
have presented a well -disciplined and fully equipped force of
about 84,000 men. Against this we could not possibly bring
more than 38,500 infantry and artillery, 4300 cavalry, and fifty
field guns. This estimate excludes 7000 men at Island No. 10
and vicinity, who were indispensable to hold at bay Pope's army
of over 20,000 men, and to keep control of the Mississippi River
at that point. Moreover, the forces General Beauregard had
hastily collected (about 25,000 strong) were imperfectly armed,
insufficiently drilled, and only partly disciplined. They had but
recently been organized into two corps, under Generals Polk and
Bragg, composed of two divisions each. General Beauregard be-
* See Van Home's " Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. p. 99.

264 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
lieved that, under such circumstances, our only hope of success lay
in striking a sudden, heavy blow before the enemy should concen
trate all his forces. He therefore urged General Johnston to join
him at Corinth at the earliest moment practicable, and he again
telegraphed the War Department (as late as the 28th) to send him
at once some of the field-officers he had so often called for. Those
most needed then were a chief of artillery, a commander of cav
alry, and a chief commissary, without whom his organization could
not be completed. But, notwithstanding the persistence of his
calls, only the last two were sent ; and they arrived when our
army was marching from Corinth, to fight the battle which proved
to be one of the greatest and bloodiest of the war.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 265

CHAPTER XIX.
Arrival of General Johnston at Corinth. — Position of his Troops on the 27th
of March. — Offers to Turn Over Command of the Army to General Beau
regard, who Declines. — • General Beauregard Urges an Early Offensive
Movement against the Enemy, and Gives his Views as to Plan of Organ
izing the Forces. — General Johnston Authorizes him to Complete the
Organization already Begun. — General Orders of March 29th. — Reasons
why the Army was Formed into Small Corps.— General Beauregard De
sirous of Moving against the Enemy on the 1st of April. — Why it was
not done. — On the 2d, General Cheatham Reports a Strong Federal
Force Threatening his Front. — General Beauregard Advises an Immedi
ate Advance. — General Johnston Yields. — General Jordan's Statement of
his Interview with General Johnston on that Occasion. — Special Orders
No. 8,j otherwise called " Order of March and Battle." — By Whom Sug
gested and by Whom Written. — General Beauregard Explains the Order
to Corps Commanders. — Tardiness of the First Corps in Marching from
Corinth. — Our Forces in Position for Battle on the Afternoon of the 5th;
Too Late to Commence Action on that Day. — Generals Hardee and Brao-o-
Request General Beauregard to Ride in Front of their Lines. — General
Johnston Calls General Beauregard and the Corps Commanders in an Infor
mal Council. — General Beauregard Believes the Object of the Movement
Foiled by the Tardiness of Troops in Arriving on the Battle-field. — Al
ludes to Noisy Demonstrations on the March, and to the Probability of
Buell's Junction, and Advises to Change Aggressive Movement into a Re
connoissance in Force. — General Johnston Decides Otherwise, and Orders
Preparations for an Attack at Dawn next Day. — Description of the Field
of Shiloh. — Strength of the Federal Forces. — What General Sherman Tes
tified to. — We Form into Three Lines of Battle. — Our Effective Strength.
— Carelessness and Oversight of the Federal Commanders. — They are*
not Aroused by the many Sounds in their Front, and are Taken by Sur
prise.
General Johnston reached Corinth on the night of the 22d
of March, in advance of his army, which followed closely after
him, portions arriving daily up to the 27th. General Hardee
took position in the vicinity, with a body of about eight thousand
men ; while the remainder, under General Crittenden — some five
thousand strong, exclusive of cavalry — were halted at Beirnsville
and Iuka, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

266 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
A shade of sadness, if not of despondency, rested upon General
Johnston's brow. The keen anxiety and still-increasing gloom
overspreading the country weighed heavily upon him. He suf
fered deeply, both as a patriot and as a soldier; but men of his
courage and character are uncomplaining. " The test of merit, in
my profession, with the people," he wrote to Mr. Davis, on the
18th of March, " is success. It is a hard rule, but I think it right."
The concluding lines of his letter show what were his feelings,
when complying with General Beauregard's urgent request for a
junction of their armies : " If I join this corps to the forces of
Beauregard (I confess, a hazardous experiment), then, those who
are now declaiming against me will be without an argument."
Soon after General Johnston's arrival, and in the course of his
first conference with General Beauregard, he expressed, with evi
dent emotion, his purpose to turn over to the latter the direct
command of our united forces, and to confine his own functions
to those of Department Commander, with headquarters at Mem
phis or Holly Springs. He alleged, as his reason for wishing to
do so, that such a course would be best for the success of our
cause ; that he had lost, in no small degree, the confidence of the
people, and somewhat, he feared, of the army itself, in consequence
of recent disasters ; while he felt sure that General Beauregard,
who held the confidence of both, was better fitted to cope with
present difficulties and dangers, and fulfil, successfully, public ex
pectation. General Beauregard, in a spirit of disinterestedness
and generosity which equalled that of General Johnston, refused
to accept his offer. He had left the Arm}- of the Potomac and
come to the West, he said, to assist General Johnston, not to su
persede him. That it was due to the country and to General
Johnston himself that he should remain at the head of the army,
now concentrated for a decisive blow before the enemy was fully
prepared, and pledged him his cordial support, as second in com
mand. Upon this, General Johnston, who, no doubt, understood
General Beauregard's motives, rose from his seat, advanced tow
ards him, and, shaking him warmly by the hand, said, "Well, be
it so, General ! We two together will do our best to secure suc
cess." It was an affecting scene, and one worthy of being re
corded. For, if General Johnston was loath to reap the benefit
of the great preparations made by General Beauregard, the latter
was no less reluctant that the victory which he hoped would re-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 267
suit from his efforts at concentration should be exclusively attrib
uted to himself, thus depriving General Johnston of the chance
of changing the tide of popular favor in his behalf, and of re
gaining the affection and confidence of the people and army,
which he feared he had lost.
Thus was finally settled the delicate question of precedence and
command between these two Confederate leaders, whose single ob
ject was, not personal advancement or glory, but the success of the
cause they were engaged in. General Beauregard now explained
the situation of affairs in the Mississippi Valley and immediately
around him ; urged the necessity of the earliest possible offensive
movement against the enemy, and gave his views, already fully
matured, as to the best plan of organizing our forces. General
Johnston readily agreed to what General Beauregard proposed,
and authorized him to complete all necessary orders to that effect.
Accordingly, a few days later, General Beauregard drew up a plan
for the reorganization of the Army of the Mississippi, which,
upon submission to General Johnston, was signed by the latter,
without the slightest change or alteration, and published to the
troops, in a general order, as follows :
" Headquarters oe the Forces,
" General Orders, No. -. Corinth, Miss., March 29th, 1862.
" I. The undersigned assumes the command and immediate direction of the
armies of Kentucky and of the Mississippi, now united, and which, in military
operations, will be known as the ' Army of the Mississippi.'
" II. General G. T. Beauregard will be second in command to the Command
er of the Forces.
" III. The Army of the Mississippi will be subdivided into three army corps,
and reserves of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, as follows : 1. The First Corps,
under the command of Major-General L. Polk, to consist of the Grand Division
now under his command, as originally organized, less the artillery and cav
alry hereinafter limited, and detached as reserves, and the garrison of Fort
Pillow and the works for the defence of Madrid Bend, already detached from
that command. 2. The Second Corps, under Major-General Braxton Bragg,
to consist of the Second Grand Division of the Army of the Mississippi, less
the artillery and cavalry, hereinafter limited, and detached as reserves. 3. The
Third Corps, under Major-General W. J. Hardee, to consist of the Army of Ken
tucky, less the cavalry, artillery, and infantry hereinafter limited, and detached
as reserves. 4. The infantry reserves, under command of Major-General G. B.
Crittenden, shall be formed of a division of not less than two brigades.*
* These infantry reserves, at Beirnsville, were under Brigadier - General
Breckinridge, who had succeeded General Crittenden.

268 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
" IV. The brigades of each army corps and of the reserve will be so formed
as to consist severally of about two thousand five hundred total infantry, and
one light battery of six pieces, if practicable.
" V. Divisions shall consist of not less than two brigades and one regiment
of cavalry.
" VI. All cavalry and artillery not hereinbefore assigned to divisions and
brigades will be held in reserve : the cavalry under Brigadier-General Hawes,
the artillery under an officer to be subsequently announced.
" VII. All general orders touching matters of organization, discipline, and
conduct of the troops, published by General G. T. Beauregard to the Army of
the Mississippi, will continue in force in the whole army until otherwise di
rected, and copies thereof will be furnished to the Third Army Corps and the
reserve. " VIII. Major-General Braxton Bragg, in addition to his duties as com
mander of the Second Army Corps, is announced as 'Chief of Staff' to the
Commander of the Forces. " A. S. Johnston, General C. S. A."
" Note. — The above organization .of the forces at Corinth was submitted
by General G. T. Beauregard, second in command, and adopted by General
A. S. Johnston,, first in command, without any alteration whatever.
" Thomas Jordan, A. A. G."
Our forces had thus been formed into small corps for two rea
sons: first, to enable our inexperienced senior commanders to handle
their raw troops with more facility ; second, to induce the enemy
to believe that our army was much stronger than it really was — it
being natural to suppose that each corps would number at least
twenty thousand men, with a general reserve of about half as
many. This second purpose was apparently accomplished, for,
during the battle of Shiloh, General Grant telegraphed General
Buell, who was then at Savannah, that he was heavily attacked by
one hundred thousand men, and that he needed his immediate as
sistance. In the general orders given above, General Beauregard was an
nounced as second in command, and General Bragg was appointed,
nominally, Chief of the General Staff, a position borrowed from
Continental European armies, though there was no provision for
such an arrangement made by law in the Confederate military
service ; it was, however, an irregularity not considered impor
tant, inasmuch as General Bragg was not to be detached or di
verted from the command of his corps. In fact, his designation
to that position was simply to enable him, in a contingency on the
field, to give orders in the name of the General-in-Chief, or of the

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 269
second in command ; an arrangement which both Generals John
ston and Beauregard thought could inure only to the benefit of
the service. Colonel Thomas Jordan, General Beauregard's Adju
tant-General, was named Adjutant-General of the united forces ;
but remained at General Beauregard's headquarters, receiving in
structions from the latter, and issuing them in the form of orders,
by command of the " General-in-Chief."*
General Beauregard, notwithstanding his impaired health, de
voted himself assiduously to preparing the army for an immediate
offensive movement, which he hoped would take place, at latest,
on the 1st of April, as our spies and friends in middle Tennes
see had informed us that General Buell was at Franklin, on his
way to form a junction with General Grant, at Savannah, where
he might be expected early in April. It was known, however,
that the bridges on his line of march — especially the large one
across Duck River, at Columbia— had been destroyed, and that
he might thereby be delayed several days.
General Johnston had left the organization and preparation of
the forces for offensive operations to General Beauregard. Corps
commanders made their reports directly to him, or through his of
fice ; the General-in-Chief being kept well advised of all informa
tion of an important nature that reached army headquarters.
The hope of being able to move from Corinth on the 1st of
April could not, however, be realized. As that day approached,
our deficiencies in arms, ammunition, and the most essential
equipments were more and more felt, as was also the want of the
general officers promised, but not sent, as agreed upon, by the
War Department. Their inexperienced substitutes, though zeal
ous and indefatigable, were unacquainted with the needs of their
new commands, or did not know how best to supply them. They
had to be instructed amid the hurry of the moment, as to many
details, which, to persons who are not conversant with military or
ganization, appear insignificant, but which are really very im
portant in the preparation of an army. The lack of competent
engineers was also a source of great annoyance, as without them
it became next to impossible to make necessary reconnoissances,
* General Mackall was not made Adjutant-General of the united armies, be
cause of his having been previously assigned, by General Beauregard, to the
command of Madrid Bend, on the Mississippi, his services at that important
point being considered indispensable. See Chapter XVIII., p. 257.

270 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
and map off the country lying between the two opposing armies.
The sketches prepared by staff officers, untrained and inexperi
enced in such matters, were very imperfect, but some accurate
knowledge of the future field of battle had been obtained, by con
ferring with officers of the troops who had been on picket duty
at and about Pittsburg Landing, before the appearance of the en
emy at that point. From inhabitants who had been compelled
to leave their homes, after the landing of the hostile forces, Gen
eral Beauregard also gained useful information, relative to the po
sitions occupied by the several Federal commands.
Such was •the situation, as night fell on the 2d of April, when
General Cheatham, who commanded a division posted at Bethel
Station,* telegraphed to his corps commander, General Polk, that
a strong body of the enemy, believed to be General Lew. Wallace's
division, was seriously threatening his front. General Polk at
once (about 10 p. m.) transmitted the despatch to General Beaure
gard, who, believing that the Federal forces were divided by the
reported movement, immediately sent in the news to General
Johnston, by the Adjutant-General of the Army, in person, with
this brief but significant endorsement: "Now is the moment to
advance, and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing."
General (then Colonel) Thomas Jordan, the Adjutant-General
above alluded to, reports his mission on that occasion, as follows:
" I found General Johnston in the room of some of his personal staff, where
I handed him the despatch with your endorsement. He then repaired with
me to the neighboring quarters of General Bragg, whom we found in bed.
This officer at once declared in favor of your proposition. General Johnston,
expressing several objections with much clearness and force, questioned the
readiness of the army for so grave an offensive movement. His views shook
the opinion of General Bragg. Having discussed the subject almost daily
with you during the past ten days, and knowing the reasons which made you
regard the immediate offensive our true course in the exigency, I stated them
with as much vigor and urgency as I could, dwelling particularly upon the
fact that we were now as strong as we could reasonably hope to be at any
early period, while our adversary would be gaining strength, by reinforce
ments, almost daily, until he would be so strong as to be able to take the of
fensive with irresistible numbers. That our adversary's position at Pittsburg
Landing, with his back against a deep, broad river, in a cul-de-sac formed by
the two creeks (Owl and Lick), would make his defeat decisively disastrous,
while the character of the country made it altogether practicable for us to steal
upon and surprise him; and that your proposition was based on the practi-
* Twenty-four miles north of Corinth.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 271
cability of such a surprise, with the conviction that we should find the Fed
eral army unprotected by intrenchments.
"These views seemed to satisfy General Johnston, and he authorized me to
give the preparatory orders for the movement, which orders I wrote at a table
in General Bragg's room, being a circular letter to Generals Bragg, Polk, and
Hardee,' directing them to hold their several corps in condition to move, at a
moment's notice, having forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes,
and three days' cooked rations in their haversacks ; also, sixty rounds of am
munition, and uncooked rations in wagons, for, I think, three days, together
with certain other details, affecting reserve supplies, and their transporta
tion. "These orders were immediately despatched by couriers, from General
Bragg's headquarters, to Generals Polk and Hardee, who received them, as
well as now remembered, at 1.40 a. m., as stated in the receipts signed by
those officers, respectively, at the time. General Breckinridge, commanding a
detached division at Beirnsville, received his orders from the telegraph-office.
After having despatched the orders in question, I repaired directly to your
headquarters, roused Captain A. R. Chisolm, of your personal staff, and told
him to awake you at 5 a. m.
" About 7 A. m. of (next clay) the 3d April, you sent for me, and I found
that you had drawn up the notes of a general order, prescribing the order and
method of the movement from Corinth upon Pittsburg, with peculiar minute
ness, as, from the wooded and broken nature of the country to be traversed,
it would be a most difficult matter to move so large a body of men with the
requisite celerity for the contemplated attack. These notes you gave me as
the basis for the proper general order to be issued, directing and regulating
the march, coupled with the order in which the enemy was to be attacked,
and from them I drew up the order of march and battle, which, issued in the
name of General Johnston, was signed by me as Adjutant-General of the
Army, in the course of that day, without any modification, but, of course, made
fuller with details in connection with the staff service, which details you left
habitually to me, holding me responsible that they should be clear and com
prehensive, so as to insure the execution of your general plan of operation.
But before I was able to shape the order in question, General Johnston and,
soon thereafter, General Bragg, came to your room, at your headquarters, where
I had gone also, to consult you upon some details. You were explaining
your plan of movement, and of the attack, to General Johnston, when I en
tered your apartment; and, to make the subject clearer, you drew a sketch of
the country, in pencil, upon your table,* as I had taken to my office the
sketch supplied by the engineers, to enable me to write the order with the
necessary precision.
"General Johnston weighed all that was said with much deliberation, and
not until every detail had been very thoroughly discussed did he decide to
* The table bearing the diagram here referred to went, as office furniture,
to Charleston, S. C, where the pencil sketch on the board was visible two
years afterwards.

272 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
make the movement, as you proposed it. By this time, Major-Generals Polk
and Hardee had likewise arrived. I then' remarked that, as the preparation
of the order, with all the necessary copies for general and staff officers, would
take some hours, its details might be verbally explained to the corps com
manders, all present, so that the movement could be made without delay at
the prescribed moment, by the several corps, without waiting for the written
orders, so much of which concerned the second day's march, and the tactics
of the attack. This was assented to by General Johnston, as best, and I left
you explaining to Generals Polk and Hardee that which they particularly
were to do, jointly and severally, on that day and the next morning; that is
to say, the order and manner in which they should begin, and make, the ad
vance, with their respective corps, to the vicinity of the enemy's position; as
will be found set forth in the written order, which was afterwards printed as
follows : " ' Headquarters Army op the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., Apn-il 3d, 1862.
" ' Special Orders, No. 8.
"'I. In the impending movement, the corps of this army will march, assem
ble, and take order of battle, in the following manner, it being assumed that
the enemy is in position about a mile in advance of Shiloh Church, with his
right resting on Owl Creek, and his left on Lick Creek.
" ' 1. The Third Corps, under Major-General Hardee, will advance, as soon as
practicable, on the Ridge road from Corinth, to what is known as the Bark
road, passing about half a mile northward of the workhouse. The head
of this column will bivouac, if possible, to-night, at Mickey's house, at the in
tersection of the road from Monterey to Savannah. The cavalry, thrown well
forward during the march, to reconnoitre and prevent surprise, will halt in
front of the Mickey house, on the Bark road.
" ' 2. Major Waddell, A. D. C. to General Beauregard, with two good guides,
will report for service to General Hardee.
" '3. At 3 o'clock a. m., to-morrow, the Third Corps, with the left in front,
will continue to advance by the Bark road until within sight of the enemy's
outposts or advanced position, when it will be deployed in line of battle, ac
cording to the nature of the ground, its left resting on Owl Creek, its right
towards Lick Creek, supported on that flank by half its cavalry, the left flank
being supported by the other half. The interval between the extreme right
of this corps and Lick Creek will be filled by a brigade or division — accord
ing to the extent of the ground — from the Second Corps. These troops, dur
ing the battle, will also be under the command of Major-General Hardee.
" ' He will make the proper distribution of the artillery along the line of
battle, remembering that the rifled guns are of long range, and should be
placed in commanding positions, in rear of his infantry, to fire mainly on re
serves and second line of the enemy, but occasionally will be directed on his
batteries and heads of columns.
" ' II. The Second Corps, under Major-General Braxton Bragg, will assemble
on Monterey and move thence as early as practicable, the right wing, with left
in front, by the road from Monterey to Savannah, the head of column to reach

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 273
the immediate vicinity of Mickey's house, at the intersection with the Bark
road, before sunset.
" ' The cavalry with this wing will take position on the road to Savannah,
beyond Mickey's, as far as Owl Creek, having advanced guards and pickets
well to the front. The left wing of this corps will advance at the same time,
also left in front, by the road from Monterey to Purdy ; the head of the column
to reach, by night, the intersection of that road with the Bark road. This
wing will continue the movement in the morning, as soon as the rear of
the Third Corps shall have passed the Purdy road, and which it will then
follow. " ' The Second Corps will form the second line of battle, about one thousand
yards in the rear of the first line. It will be formed, if practicable, with regi
ments in double columns, at half distance, disposed as advantageously as the
nature of the ground will admit. The artillery placed as may seem best
to Major-General Bragg.
" ' III. The First Corps, under Major-General Polk, with the exception of the
detached division at Bethel, will take up its line of march by the Ridge road,
hence to Pittsburg, half an hour after the rear of the Third Corps shall have
passed Corinth, and will bivouac to-night in rear of that corps, and on to
morrow will follow the movements of said corps, with the same interval of
time as to-day.
" ' When its head of column shall reach the vicinity of the Mickey house it
will be halted in column or massed on the line of the Bark road, according to
the nature of the ground, as a reserve. Meanwhile one regiment of its cavalry
will be placed in observation on the road from Johnston's house to Stanton-
ville, with advanced guards and pickets thrown out well in advance towards
Stantonville. Another regiment or battalion of cavalry will be posted, in the
same manner, on the road from Monterey to Purdy, with its rear resting on or
about the intersection of that road with the Bark road, having advanced
guards and pickets in the direction of Purdy.
" ' The forces at Bethel and Purdy will defend their positions, as already in
structed, if attacked ; otherwise they will assemble on Purdy and thence ad
vance, with advanced guards, flankers, and all other military precautions,
forming a junction with the rest of the First Corps, at the intersection of that
road with the Bark road leading from Corinth.
" ' IV. The reserve of the forces will be concentrated, by the shortest and
best routes, at Monterey, as soon as the rear of the Second Corps shall have
moved out of that place. Its commander will take up the best position,
whence to advance either in the direction of Mickey's or of Pratt's house, on
the direct road to Pittsburg, if that road is found practicable, or in the direc
tion of the Ridge road to Hamburg, throwing all its cavalry on the latter
road, as far as its intersection with the one to Pittsburg, passing through
Griersford, on Lick Creek.
" ' The cavalry will throw well forward advanced guards and videttes tow
ards Griersford and in the direction of Hamburg, and during the impending
battle, when called to the field of combat, will move by the Griersford road.
" ' A regiment of the infantry reserve will be thrown forward to the intersec-
L— 18

274 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
tion of the Gravel Hill road with the Ridge road to Hamburg, as a support
to the cavalry.
" ' The reserve will be formed of Breckinridge's, Bowen's, and Statham's
brigades, as now organized, the whole under command of Brigadier-General
Breckinridge. " ' V. General Bragg will detail the 51st and 52d regiments Tennessee Volun
teers, Blount's Alabama and Desha's Arkansas battalion, and Bairn's battery,
from his corps, which, with two of Carroll's regiments, now en route for these
headquarters, will form a garrison for the post and depot of Corinth.
" ' VI. Strong guards will be left at the railway bridge between Iuka and
Corinth, to be furnished in due proportion from the commands at Iuka, Beirns-
ville, and Corinth.
" ' VII. Proper guards will be left at the camps of the several regiments of
the forces in the field. Corps commanders will determine the strength of these
guards. " ' VIII. Wharton's regiment of Texas cavalry will be ordered forward, at
once, to scout on the road from Monterey to Savannah, between Mickey's and
its intersection with the Pittsburg-Purdy road. It will annoy and harass any
force of the enemy moving, by the latter way, to assail Cheatham's division at
Purdy. " ' IX. The Chief-Engineers of the forces will take due measures and pre
cautions, and give all requisite orders, for the repair of the bridges, causeways,
and roads, on which our troops may move, in the execution of these orders.
" ' X. The troops, individually so intelligent and with such great interest in
the issue, are urgently enjoined to be observant of the orders of their superiors,
in the hour of battle. Their officers must constantly endeavor to hold them in
hand, and prevent the waste of ammunition by heedless, aimless firing ; the fire
should be slow, always at a distinct mark. It is expected that much and ef
fective work will be done by the bayonet.
" ' By command of General A. S. Johnston, " ' Thomas Jordan, A. Adjt.-Gen.'
" Corinth, Miss., April 18th, 1862.
" The foregoing plan of operations and orders of engagement were drawn up
and submitted by General Beauregard, on the morning of the 3d of April, 1862,
to General A. S. Johnston, who accepted the same without modification in a
single particular. " Thomas Jordan, Brig.-Gen. and A. A. G."
The following passage is taken from a statement of Colonel D.
Urquhart, of General Bragg's staff, addressed to General Jordan.
It confirms, as the reader will see, all that precedes :
" Narragansett, R. I., August 25th, 1880.
"My dear General, — I am in receipt of your letter of  , and in reply have
to say, that I remember the visit of General A. S. Johnston, accompanied by
yourself, the night of the 2d of April, 1862, to the headquarters or apartments
of General Bragg, at Corinth, Mississippi. On that occasion, I was not pres-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 275
ent through the whole interview, but while the interview lasted I was in and
out of the room repeatedly, and know that that interview was had for the
consideration of a proposition on the part of General Beauregard, conveyed
through you, that the Confederate army should, the very next day, advance to
attack the Federal forces at or about Pittsburg Landing. And I know, also,
that the result of the conference was the order to make that advance, an order
written by you that night in the quarters of General Bragg, in the shape of a
circular letter, addressed to Generals Bragg, Polk, and Hardee, severally corps
commanders. " As for the order of march and battle issued the following day, I was fur
nished with a copy from your office, and can state that it was well understood
at the time throughout that army, that the whole plan of operations was Gen-
eral Beauregard's, and, in fact, that all which concerned the army, from the
time of its collection at Corinth, was arranged at and proceeded from
General Beauregard's headquarters. Further, that, essentially, he exercised
the command of the army. In this connection it is proper for me to state
that I learned at that time from General Bragg himself, that General Johnston
had said, soon after his arrival at Corinth, that he had lost the confidence of
his army, and therefore had insisted that General Beauregard must undertake
the work of organization ; also, that with General Bragg as Chief of Staff, he
should issue all orders without the formula of being submitted and approved
by General Johnston, except, of course, such an order as that of directing the
offensive. $$$$ fc * * * sfc
" Yours truly, David Urquhart.
" To General Thomas Jordan, New York."
At the hour prescribed in the preparatory circular to the corps
commanders, which had been sent out that morning — viz., about
ten o'clock — the troops were all under arms in Corinth, apparently
ready for the march. Meanwhile, owing to the many more ur
gent occupations of the Adjutant-General's office, copies of the pre
ceding general orders had not been prepared for distribution that
day, as the corps commanders were to begin the march pursuant
to the verbal order and instructions which General Beauregard, in
the presence of General Johnston, had given them, individually, as
to the initial movements from Corinth. The march, nevertheless,
did not begin at the time directed, chiefly through 'the misappre
hension of the commander of the First Corps, who, instead of
moving forward upon the full verbal instructions he had received,
held his corps under arms and, with its trains, blocked the way of
the other troops. As soon as this most unfortunate delay was
brought to General Beauregard's knowledge, he despatched an
order to the First Corps to clear the way at once, which was done;

276 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
but it was already dark before the rear of its column filed out of
Corinth. Had it not been for this deplorable loss of the after
noon of the 3d, the Confederate army must have made the march
to the immediate vicinity of the enemy by the evening of the 4th.
The attack would then have been made on the morning of the 5th,
as had been planned, or twenty-four hours earlier than it actually
occurred, in which event Buell must have reached the theatre of
action entirely too late to retrieve the disaster inflicted upon
Grant, and must himself have been forced to retire from middle
Tennessee. The delay which had marked the outset was followed
by unwarrantable tardiness in the general conduct of the march,
so much so that, by the evening of the 4th, the forces bivouacked
at and slightly in advance of Monterey, only ten miles from Cor
inth ; and it was not until two o'clock p.m., on the 5th, that they
approached the Federal position, near the Shiloh meeting-house.
The whole distance traversed was not more than about seventeen
and a half miles. True, there were heavy rain-falls during the
night of the 4th, and the early part of the next day, which made
the roads somewhat difficult, not to speak of their narrowness and
of the fact of their crossing a densely wooded country. But these
causes account only in part for the slowness of the march, which
was mainly attributable to the rawness of the troops and the in
experience of the officers, including some of superior rank.
During the advance of the 4th of April a reconnoissance in
force was injudiciously made by a part of the cavalry of the Sec
ond Corps, with such audacity — capturing an officer and thirteen
men of the enemy — that it ought to have warned the Federal
commander of our meditated attack.
Our forces could not get into position for battle until late on
the afternoon of the 5th — too late to commence the action on
that day. Soon after General Hardee's line of battle (the front
one) had been formed, he sent a messenger with an urgent request
that General Beauregard should ride along in front of his troops.
This General Beauregard, through motives of prudence, at first
refused, and only agreed to do at the instance of General John
ston himself, but he prohibited any cheering whatever, lest it
should attract the attention of the opposing forces, which were
known to be not more than two miles from us.* Afterwards, at
* See statements of Colonel Jacob Thompson and Major B. B. Waddell in
Appendix to Chapter XX.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 277
the request of General Bragg, General Beauregard also rode along
the front of the Second Corps, where it was difficult to enforce the
order prohibiting cheering, so enthusiastic were the troops — espe
cially those from Louisiana — when he appeared before them.
As soon as it had become evident that the day was too far ad
vanced for a decisive engagement, General Johnston called the
corps and reserve commanders together in an informal council, in
the roadway, near his temporary headquarters, within less than
two miles of those of General Sherman, at the Shiloh meeting
house. He was then informed, by Major-General Polk, that his
troops had already exhausted their rations and that he had brought
none in reserve. General Bragg thereupon stated that his men
had been so provident of their food that he could supply General
Polk with what he needed. This promise, however, he never
executed, because of the hurry and confusion of events, which
engrossed his own attention as well as that of his subordinate offi
cers; and because, though his troops might have been somewhat
less improvident than those of General Polk, they were, at best,
scantily provided with what was necessary for themselves, and had,
certainly, no surplus rations to spare. The transportation wagons,
containing the five days' uncooked reserved rations for all the
corps, were miles away in the rear, not having been able, on ac
count of the heavy roads, to keep up with the march.
The fact that the army was threatened with a total lack of food,
and that, by the loss of a whole day, the offensive movement he
had so carefully prepared was seriously imperilled, produced great
disappointment and distress in General Beauregard's mind. Im
pressed with the gravity of the situation and the responsibility
which rested on him, as having proposed and organized this entire
campaign, he stated to General Johnston and to the corps com
manders present at the conference, that, in his opinion, our plan
of operations had been foiled by the tardiness of our troops in
starting from Corinth, followed by such delays and noisy demon
strations on the march, that a surprise, which was the basis of his
plan, was now scarcely to be hoped for; that ample notice of our
proximity for an aggressive movement must have been given
through the conflict of our cavalry, on the preceding day, with
the enemy's reconnoitring force, and the prolongation of our
presence in front of their positions before the hour for battle,
next morning ; that the Federal army would, no doubt, be found

278 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
intrenched to the eyes, and ready for our attack ; that it was un
wise to push, against breastworks, troops so raw aud undisciplined
as ours, badly armed and worse equipped, while their antagonists,
besides the advantage of number, position, discipline, and superi
ority of arms, were largely composed of men lately victorious at
Forts Henry and Donelson ; that, from his experience in the war
with Mexico and, more recently, at Manassas and Centreville, he
considered volunteers, when well commanded and occupying strong
defensive positions, equal to regulars, if attacked in front, as the
Federals would be by us ; * that, under these circumstances, and
for the further reason that the enemy, being on the alert, Buell's
junction would no doubt be hastened, he was no longer in favor
of making the attack, but favored inviting one by turning this
offensive movement into a reconnoissance in force, to draw the
enemy after us nearer to our base— Corinth — and thereby detach
him further from his own, at Pittsburg Landing. Somewhat sim
ilar strategy had been resorted to by Wellington in 1810, when,
advancing to attack Massena at Santarem, he unexpectedly found
that able officer on his guard, ready for battle, on ground of his
own choosing, and much stronger than he had anticipated. After
making some demonstrations in front of his wily adversary, to
draw him away from his stronghold, Wellington did not hesitate
to retire without giving battle.
General Beauregard's views produced a visible effect on all
present. General Johnston, although shaken, after some reflec-
* General Sherman, in his " Memoirs," says of the Federal position : " The po
sition was naturally strong, with Snake Creek on our right, a deep, bold stream,
with a confluent (Owl Creek) to our right front, and Lick Creek, with a simi
lar confluent, on our left, thus narrowing the space over which we could be
attacked to one and a half or two miles. At a later period of the war we
could have rendered this position impregnable in one night, but at this time
we did not do it."
The fact is, that the position was not strong, except that it could not be
flanked, but might have been readily made impregnable in one night to the
assault of so raw a force as ours. We knew, from the careful examination of
Colonel Crocket, the Federal officer captured on the 4th, that, up to the even
ing of that day, there were no breastworks ; but the several warnings given
by the conflict in which he was captured, the noisy incidents of the next day's
march and reconnoissance, and our presence in full force on the field for fifteen
hours before the attack, were facts which forced General Beauregard to believe
the Federals would surely use the ample time they had, during that night, to
throw up intrenchments sufficient for the repulse of our raw troops.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 279
tion said that he admitted the weight and force of General Beau
regard's remarks, but still hoped we could find the enemy unpre
pared for an attack ; that as our army had been put in motion for
battle and was now on the field, it would be better to make the
venture. He therefore ordered that preparations should be made
for an attack at dawn, next day. Thus ended this memorable con
ference ; the officers who had been present at it repairing to their
respective headquarters, in good spirits and hopeful for the
morrow. A description of the field of Shiloh may be appropriate, to en
able the reader more readily to understand an account of that bat
tle. The sketch of the country furnished by General Jordan,
Adjutant-General of the Confederate forces, in his " Campaigns
of General Forrest," is so correct that we shall transcribe it here,
with only slight alteration :
" Two streams, Lick and Owl Creeks — the latter a confluent of Snake Creek,
which empties into the Tennessee — take their rise very near each other, just
westward of Monterey (in a ridge which parts the waters that fall into the
Mississippi from those which are affluents of the Tennessee), flowing sinuously
with a general direction, the latter to the northeast and the former south of
east, and they finally empty into the Tennessee, about four miles asunder. Be
tween these watercourses is embraced an area of undulating table-land, some
five miles in depth from the river bank, from three to five miles broad, and
about one hundred feet above the low-water level of the river. Intersected
by a labyrinth of ravines, the drainage is principally into Owl Creek, as the
land rises highest and ridgelike near Lick Creek. Adjoining the river these
ravines, deep and steep, have a water-shed in that direction. Recent heavy
rains had filled them all with springs and small streams, making the soil boggy,
and hence difficult for artillery, over much of their extent. A primeval forest
combined with a great deal of undergrowth covered the region, except a few
small farms of fifty or seventy acres, scattered occasionally here and there.
" Pittsburg Landing — a warehouse and a house or two by the water's side —
lay three miles below the month of Lick Creek. Two roads leading from
Corinth, crossing that creek about a mile apart, converge together about two
miles from the Landing and one mile in rear of the Shiloh meeting-house.
Other roads also approach from all directions ; one, passing Owl Creek by a
bridge before its junction with Snake Creek, branches, the one way tending
westwardly towards Purdy, the other northwardly towards Crump's Landing,
six miles below Pittsburg. Another, near the river bank, crossing Snake Creek
by a bridge, also connects the two points."
The Federal forces — five divisions of infantry, four or five
squadrons of cavalry, and sixteen light batteries of six pieces each,
amounting in all to at least forty-three thousand men, occupied

280 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
the ground between the Shiloh meeting-house and the river, in
three lines of encampments, as already stated.
General Sherman, in his sworn testimony before a court-mar
tial which, in August, 1862, tried Colonel Thomas Worthington
of the 46th Ohio Volunteers, for severely criticising his manage
ment before the battle of Shiloh, said, of the position occupied by
the Federals: "But even as we were on the 6th of April, 1862,
you might search the world over and not find a more advantage
ous field of battle ; flanks well-protected, and never threatened ;
troops in easy support ; timber and broken ground giving good
points to rally ; and the proof is, that forty-three thousand men, of
whom at least ten thousand ran away, held their ground against
sixty thousand chosen troops of the South with their best leaders.
On Friday, the 4th, no officers nor soldiers, not even Colonel
Worthington, looked for an attack, as I can prove."
It is somewhat strange that General Sherman, in his "Me
moirs," should maintain that the Federal forces engaged in the
battle of Shiloh numbered only thirty-two thousand men of all
arms, when, four months after that event, he stated, under oath, at
the trial of Colonel Worthington, that they amounted to forty-
three thousand men, exclusive, be it remembered, of Lew. Wallace's
division of about eight thousand men, on the northwest side, of
Owl Creek. He then supposed our force was sixty thousand
strong, instead of its actual number — forty thousand three hun
dred and thirty-five men of all arms and conditions. But it may
be fair to infer that he judged of their number by the effect they
produced. Thus it was that Mr. Lincoln was sorely puzzled dur
ing the war at his commanding generals reporting constantly
that they had fought the " Rebels " with inferior numbers. In
the instance of the battle of Shiloh, this phenomenon might, how
ever, possibly have happened ; for in about thirty days, with our
defective means of transportation, we had collected at Corinth,
from Murfreesboro', Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, and other
distant points, an effective force of over forty thousand men of all
arms, while the Federals had failed to bring together, in time, at
Pittsburg Landing, notwithstanding their ample means of land
and water transportation, the armies of Buell, from Nashville, Ten
nessee, and of Pope, from southeast Missouri.
Yet the Confederate army had advanced and was then assem
bled at Monterey and vicinity, less than nine miles in his front.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 281
Our forces, as they had arrived in the afternoon of the 5 th, at
the intersection of the Griersford (Lick Creek) and Ridge roads,
from Corinth to Pittsburg, less than two miles from the Shiloh
meeting-house, were formed into three lines of battle ; the first,
under General Hardee, extended from near Owl Creek, on the left,
to near Lick Creek, on the right, a distance of less than three miles,
and somewhat oblique to the Federal front line of encampments,
being separated from it, on the right, by about one and a half
miles, and on the left, by about two miles. General Hardee's com
mand not being sufficiently strong to occupy the whole front, it
was extended on the right by Gladden's brigade, of General Bragg's
corps, and his artillery was formed immediately in his rear, on the
main Pittsburg road. His cavalry protected and supported his
flanks. The second line, about five hundred yards in rear of
the first, was composed of the rest of General Bragg's troops, ar
ranged in the same order. General Polk's corps, formed in column
of brigades, deployed on the left of the Pittsburg road, between
the latter and Owl Creek. The front of the column was about
eight hundred yards in rear of the centre of General Bragg's
left wing, and each brigade was followed immediately by its bat
tery. General Polk's cavalry supported and protected his left
flank. Breckinridge's command occupied a corresponding position
behind General Bragg's right wing, between the Pittsburg road
and Lick Creek. His cavalry protected and supported his right
flank. The two latter commands constituted the reserve, and were
to support the front lines of battle by being deployed when re
quired on the right and left of the Pittsburg road, or otherwise,
according to exigencies.
General Hardee's effective force of infantry and artillery was,
then, nine thousand and twenty-four men; General Bragg's, ten
thousand seven hundred and thirty-one; General Polk's, nine
thousand one hundred and thirty-six ; and General Breckinridge's,
seven thousand and sixty-two; presenting a total of thirty-five
thousand nine hundred and fifty-three, infantry and artillery,* to
* It is proper to remark here, that, through the want of experienced com
manding officers of artillery and cavalry, and because of the wooded nature
of the battle-field, it became necessary to subdivide and distribute those two-*
arms of the service among the different corps, to enable us to obtain even a
partial benefit from their presence on the field. The strict rules of military
organization for battle, in that and other respects, had to be departed from
under stress of circumstances.

232 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
which must be added four thousand three hundred and eighty-two
cavalry, so imperfectly armed and so recently organized that all
but one third of it was useless, except for outpost service that did
not involve skirmishing.
Our pickets had been thrown out well in advance of onr first
line of battle, not far from the enemy's position, without seeing
or discovering any of his pickets or outposts. Such an oversight
on the part of the Federal commanders is really unaccountable,
unless they chose to overlook that important maxim of war:
" Never despise an enemy, however weak and insignificant he may
appear." So near to each other were the opposing forces, that, hearing a
loud beating of drums about the hour of tattoo, and believing it
proceeded from our lines, General Beauregard immediately de
spatched a staff officer with orders to suppress such thoughtless
and imprudent sounds. The staff officer returned shortly after
wards and reported that the noise General Beauregard had heard,
and was desirous of quieting, came, not from our troops, but from
the enemy's encampments in our front. Later in the evening, a
Federal assistant surgeon and his orderly, riding out on some night
excursion, crossed our picket lines and were captured. They were
speechless with astonishment when brought to Generals Johnston
and Beauregard, at beholding so large a force within striking dis
tance of their own camps, where all was now silence and repose,
and where none suspected the approaching storm. From them
we learned that General Grant had returned for the night to Sa
vannah, and that General Sherman commanded the advanced
forces. No other information of importance was obtained from
the two prisoners.
Such was the lack of discipline in the largest part of the Con
federate forces, that, despite the strict orders given to enforce
perfect quiet among our troops, drums were beaten, bugles blown,
fires kindled, here and there, by many regiments, and firearms dis
charged, at different points in our rear, during that eventful night.
These and other bivouac noises should have betrayed to the Fed
eral generals on the first line the close proximity of their foe.
«That such was not the case is due, no doubt, to the fact that they
fell into an error similar to that which General Beauregard and
others of our officers had made, and attributed these untimely
sounds to their own troops.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 283

CHAPTER XX.
Battle of Shiloh. — Varied Incidents and Events of the First Day. — Enemy
Taken by Surprise. — His Lines Driven in. — Entire Forces Engaged on Both
Sides. — Triumphant Advance of our Troops. — General Johnston in Com
mand of the Right and Centre. — General Beauregard of the Left and Re
serves. — Allurements of the Enemy's Camps. — Straggling Begins among
our Troops.— Death of the Commander-in-Chief. — General Beauregard As
sumes Command and Renews the Attack all along the Line. — Enemy again
Forced to Fall Back and Abandon other Camps. — Evidence of Exhaustion
among the Troops. — Straggling Increasing. — General Beauregard's Efforts
to Check it. — Collects Stragglers and Pushes them Forward. — Battle still
Raging. — Capture of General Prentiss and of his Command. — Our Troops
Reach the Tennessee River. — Colonel Webster's Batteries. — Arrival of
Ammen's Brigade, Nelson's Division, of Buell's Army. — Its Inspiriting
Effect upon the Enemy. — The Gunboats. — Intrepidity of our Troops. —
Their Brilliant but Ineffectual Charges. — Firing Gradually Slackens, as
the Day Declines. — At Dusk General Beauregard Orders Arrest of Conflict.
— Troops Ordered to Bivouac for the Night, and be in Readiness for
Offensive Movement next Day. — Storm during the Night. — Arrival of the
Whole of Buell's Army. — Gunboats Keep up an Incessant Shelling.
As the Federal troops lay encamped, Sherman's and Prentiss's
divisions stretched from the Owl Creek bridge, on the Purdy road,
to the ford of Lick Creek, on the Shore road, from Pittsburg to
Hamburg. Sherman's 1st brigade, under Colonel McDowell, was
on the extreme right ; his 4th, under Colonel Buckland, west
of and resting on the Shiloh meeting-house; his 3d, under Colo
nel Hildebrand, east of and resting also on the Shiloh meeting
house. Next came Prentiss's division, aud, at a very wide inter
val — by a loose arrangement — was Sherman's 2d brigade, un
der Colonel Stuart, near Lick Creek. About half a mile in rear
of this line, and between Sherman and Prentiss, lay McClernand's
division ; and two miles in rear, towards the Tennessee River, C.
F. Smith's division, now under General W. H. L. Wallace; while
on Wallace's left was Hurlbut's division, on the Hamburg road,
about a mile and a half in rear of Stuart.
Before five o'clock a. m., on the 6th of April, General Hardee's

284 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
pickets, driving in those of General Prentiss, encountered some
companies of the Federal advanced guard, and a desultory firing
began. The order to advance was now given, and at five o'clock
General Hardee's entire line moved forward. Overhead was the
promise of a bright day, but the after mists of the recent storm yet
hung in the valleys and woods, veiling still more thickly the for
est-screened positions of the enemy, upon which the lines of battle
were directed only by conjecture. General Prentiss having hur
ried a reinforcement to the guard and informed Generals Wallace
and Hurlbut of the attack, threw forward three regiments well to
the front.* His position was a prolongation of the elevated
ground where stood the Shiloh meeting-house, held by General
Sherman ; the whole bounded in front by a ravine and water
course which, rising near the left of Prentiss, fell into Owl Creek,
near the Purdy road bridge, occupied by Sherman's right.
The Confederate lines of attack soon appeared, driving before
them the skirmish line formed of the troops of the guard. Pren
tiss's whole force was now thrown forward and became the first
engaged, as his position was slightly in advance of General Sher
man's, and the difficulties of the ground in front of the latter
caused our line to oblique still more to the right. Shortly after six
o'clock General Prentiss's command was falling under fire, and
the assailing wave soon struck General Sherman's pickets, sweep
ing them back in the direction of his camps. General Sherman
called upon General McClernand for assistance and gave notice of
the attack to Generals Prentiss and Hurlbut, the latter of whom
despatched Veatch's brigade of four regiments to the support of
General Sherman's left.f Before seven o'clock the musketry fire,
which had gradnally swelled, slackened and almost ceased, while
the Federal skirmishers were leaving the field, and the wooded in
terval separating the enemy's encampments from our advancing
lines was lessening more and more. It was the momentary lull
before the full outburst of the storm.
* In his Report, General Prentiss says : "- . . This information received, I at
once ordered the entire force into line, and the remaining regiments of the 1st
brigade, commanded by Colonel Everett Peabody, consisting of the 25th Mis
souri, 16th Wisconsin, and 12th Michigan infantry, were advanced well to the
front. I forthwith, at this juncture, communicated the fact of the attack in
force to Major-General Smith and Brigadier-General S. A. Hurlbut."
t General Hurlbut's Report.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 285
Shortly before this General Johnston, meeting General Beaure
gard near the former's headquarters, expressed his satisfaction at
the manner in which the battle had been opened, and after an in
terchange of views concerning the operations of the day, left him
and rode to the front. They parted here for the last time.
At seven o'clock the thunder of artillery announced the serious
opening of the conflict, and was followed by the sharp, increasing
volleys of musketry. Generals Polk and Breckinridge were now
hastened forward, and, reporting to General Beauregard, at half-
past seven, were by him deployed in column of brigades, General
Breckinridge on the right, General Polk on the left. They re
ceived from General Beauregard brief general instructions to keep
at a proper distance in rear of General Bragg's line and apart from
each other, until called on for assistance, when they should move
promptly with concentrated forces wherever needed, and, if in
doubt from the hidden and broken character of the country, to
move upon the sound of the heaviest firing. By this time the
attack had become general along the entire front of Generals
Prentiss and Sherman, though stronger as yet on the former, who
received the full shock of Gladden's, Hindman's, and Wood's bri
gades of General Hardee's line, and was driven back upon his
camps, calling upon Generals Wallace and Hurlbut for assistance.*
General Beauregard now despatched members of his staff to several
quarters of the field, to ascertain and report its precise condition,
and sent forward Adjutant-General Jordan, charging him to main
tain a careful inspection of the lines of battle, so as to secure the
massing of the troops for unity of attack and prompt reinforce
ment to weakened points; also with impressive directions to the
corps and division commanders to mass their batteries in action,
and fight them twelve guns on a point.
Notwithstanding the bold movements of the Confederate cav
alry on the previous evening and the noise of the conflict since
dawn, General Sherman remained under the belief that no more
than a strong demonstration was intended, until nearly eight
o'clock, when, seeing the Confederate bayonets moving in the
woods beyond his front, he " became satisfied, for the first time,

* General Prentiss, in his Report, says he was assailed " by the entire force of
the enemy, advancing in three columns simultaneously upon our left, centre,
and right."

286 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
that the enemy designed a determined attack " on the entire Fed
eral camp.* The regiments of his division, all then under arms,
were thrown into line of battle. Taylor's and Waterhouse's bat
teries were posted, the former at the Shiloh meeting-house, and
the latter on a ridge to the left, with a front. fire over open ground
between Mungen's and Appier's regiments of his left (Hilde-
brand's) brigade. General McClernand, responding promptly to
General Sherman's call, had sent forward three Illinois regiments,
which were posted in rear of Waterhouse's battery and of Appier,
upon whom General Sherman impressed the necessity of holding
his ground at all hazards. Yeatch's brigade, of General Hurlbut's
division, took position on General Sherman's left.f
As the heavy roll of musketry soon extended to the left, Gen
eral Beauregard ordered General Polk to move two of his bri
gades to the left rear of General Bragg's line and to keep in per
sonal communication with the latter, who was also informed of
the movement. General Bragg reported that his infantry was
not yet engaged, but ready to support General Hardee when re
quired, and that his artillery was shelling the Federal camp.
Colonel Jacob Thompson, of General Beauregard's staff, now
came in with a message from General Johnston, informing him
that General Hardee's line was within half a mile of the enemy's
camps, and advising the sending forward of strong reinforcements
to the left, as he had. just learned that the enemy was there in
great force. Three brigades of General Breckinridge were accord
ingly set in motion as an additional reinforcement for that quarter.
But later a courier came in from General Johnston, with informa
tion that the enemy was not strong on the left, and had fallen back ;
while Colonel Augustin and Major Brent, of General Beauregard's
staff, returning about half-past eight from a reconnoissance of the
extreme right, reported an active engagement in that quarter, the
right of General Hardee's line under a severe fire, and requiring
extension, as it was uncovered for the space of a mile in the direc
tion of Lick Creek, and the enemy was occupying the country be
yond the right. General Beauregard thereupon ordered General
Breckinridge to send but one (Trabue's) brigade to the left, and
lead his remaining two brigades to the right of Gladden, so as to
* General Sherman's Report, see " Record of the Rebellion," p. 407.
t General Hurlbut's Report, " Record of the Rebellion," p. 400.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 287
share in the forward movement of the first line, and extend his
own right as far as possible towards Lick Creek. Colonel Augus
tin was sent to conduct him into position.
It was now half-past eight o'clock. The attack was being pushed
with great vigor, the Confederate lines of battle following quick
ly in the wake of the shells that were bursting in the enemy's
camps. Fortunately for the Federals, on that day, from an un
avoidable ignorance of their exact positions, the left of the Con
federate first line of battle fell short of General McDowell's bri
gade, on General Sherman's right, which thus had ample time for
deliberate preparation before it was struck by the second line, un
der General Bragg.* Thus, while the brigades of Generals Glad
den, Hindman, and Wood were striking an unbroken series of
blows on General Prentiss's division and on General Sherman's
left and left centre, it happened that Cleburne's brigade, the left
of General Hardee's line, was moving single-handed against Gen
eral Sherman's right centre and was being overlapped by his right.
Its order was broken in crossing the difficult morass which here
covered the Federal front, and, as it charged up the hill, deadly
volleys were poured upon it from behind bales of hay and other
convenient defences, till, after repeated efforts against a front and
flank fire, it was repulsed with heavy loss; the 6th Mississippi regi
ment losing in these charges more than three hundred killed and
wounded, out of an effective force of four hundred and twenty-
five men.
The diverging course of Lick Creek had left an ever-widening
space between it and the right of General Hardee's line, as the
latter advanced. To fill this space Chalmers's brigade, f with
Gage's battery, was thrown forward from the second line and de
ployed on the right of General Gladden, in conformity with direc
tions contained in the order of march and battle. The gallant
Gladden, at that time vigorously urging his troops against Pren
tiss, fell mortally wounded, and was carried from the field. His
brigade was now wavering before the severe artillery and musketry
* The Confederate line while advancing was somewhat oblique to the Fed
erals, being nearest to General Prentiss's left and farthest from General Sher
man's right.
t See General Withers's Report of the battle of Shiloh, in " Confederate Official
Reports of Battles," p. 235. See also, in same work, General Chalmers's Re
port, at page 256.

288 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
fire brought to bear against it, when Colonel Daniel W. Adams, its
new commander, seizing a battle-flag, "called upon his men to
follow him, which they did with great alacrity ;"* and such was the
impetus, as Chalmers's brigade charged on the right, that Pren
tiss's entire line gave way in confusion and disorder. It was
pursued through its camps and about half a mile across a ravine
to the ridge beyond, by Chalmers's brigade, till the latter was
halted by order of General Johnston,f then in that quarter, and
withdrawn to a position on the rear and right of General Gladden.
At the same time, Mungen's and Appier's regiments of Hilde-
brand's brigade, of Sherman's division, broke and fled, leaving
Waterhouse's battery entirely exposed.^ Here the supporting
regiments from McClernand's and Hurlbut's divisions pressed for
ward, and, together with Hildebrand's own regiment, still held
their ground, while another brigade of McClernand's came to their
support. Meantime McArthur's, brigade, of Wallace's division,
while moving to the assistance of Stuart's brigade, on the Federal
extreme left, had mistaken its way, and come opportunely into the
void left by the routed General Prentiss.§ For a while it stood
firmly, but was forced back and formed farther to the rear, with
the remaining forces of its own division, hurried forward to its
relief. General Hurlbut also was bringing up his <two remaining
brigades for the support of Prentiss's left, when he met the flee
ing troops of that division, who straggled through his lines. He
formed his brigades on two sides of an open field with woods in
rear, and his three batteries (Meyer's, Mann's, and Ross's) respect
ively on the right, the centre, and the left — their fire converging
over the open ground in front ;[| while General Prentiss, rallying
what he could of his troops, led them, together with the 23d Mis
souri (just landed from a transport), into position on Hurlbut's
right, and on the left of Wallace's division.^" But here, after the
capture of Prentiss's camps, further advance on the right was sus-
* See Colonel D. W. Adams's Report, in " Confederate Official Reports of
Battles," p. 242.
t See General Chalmers's Report, in " Confederate Official Reports of Battles,"
p. 257.
I General Sherman's Report, " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 407.
§ " Agate," " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 389.
|| Hurlbut's Report, " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 400.
IT Prentiss's Report.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 2S9
pended for about half an hour, as the enemy's movements were
concealed.* This proved a valuable respite to the Federals, pend
ing which, report coming to that quarter that the enemy was form
ing in line of battle some distance off, on the right flank, General
Johnston led Chalmers's and Jackson's brigades back across the
ravine and southeast three quarters of a mile to the right, until
the right of Chalmers rested on Lick Creek bottom, Jackson form
ing on his left. Here they were halted for about half an hour,
while the position of the enemy (Stuart's brigade) was being ascer-
tained.f After General Breckinridge's two brigades had passed head
quarters in their movement to the right, General Beauregard sent
Johnson's brigade, of General Polk's corps, as a further reinforce
ment to the right ; and, thereupon, at about 9.20 a.m., moved with
his staff to a more advanced position, on the road to Pittsburg,
now giving more particular attention to the conflict on the left.$
Here General Ruggles's division, of General Bragg's corps, the
second line of attack, had come into position on General Hardee's
left, and was ready to grapple with General Sherman, who, sup
ported now by all of McClernand's division and Wright's regi
ment of Wallace's second brigade,§ was endeavoring to cling to
the position of Shiloh.
The severity of the contest, thus far, was attested by the large
number of wounded found on the way. A great many stragglers
were also met, whom General Beauregard's staff | and escort pres
ent were at once employed in reorganizing and leading forward
to their regiments. As General Ruggles's division, the left of
General Bragg's line, was inclining to the right before making its
direct movement forward, an interval occurred between the lead
ing brigade, Gibson's, and its two other brigades, Anderson's and
Pond's.1]" A brigade of General Polk's division, believed to be
Russell's,** which had been ordered forward by General Beaure-
* Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Official Reports of Battles," p. 257.
t Generals Withers's, Chalmers's, and Jackson's Reports, " Confederate Re
ports of Battles," pp. 235, 257, 265.
J Reports of General Beauregard's Staff, in Appendix.
§ Colonel Wright's Report, " Rebellion Record," p. 370.
] Reports of General Beauregard's Staff, in Appendix.
IT General Bragg's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 227.
** Major Clack's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 317.
I.— 19'

290 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
gard, opportunely filled this vacant space, thus completing the sec
ond line in that quarter, and supporting the assault of Hindman's
division upon McClernand and Yeatch, who were then striving to
hold the position from which Sherman's left brigade had been
mostly routed, and was now wholly slipping away.
Still farther to the left, Anderson's brigade formed the second
line along the ridge, with Hodgson's battery, which went at once
into vigorous action.
Across the ravine, and on the opposite dominating ridge, were
General Sherman's remaining brigades, supporting their batteries,
with an infantry advance thrown out to the edge of the boggy
ravine which here divided the two lines of battle. It was a swamp
so overgrown with shrubs, saplings, and vines thickly interwoven,
as to require, in many places, the use of the knife to force a pas
sage.* As Anderson's regiments went down the slope and forced
their way through the swamp thicket, they encountered a severe
fire from the enemy's artillery and musketry, and, as the}' charged
up the opposite hill, they were partially broken by some scatter
ing forces from the first line and from the right. All, however,
were rallied together and held for a time, under cover of the brow
of the hill occupied by General Sherman, while Hodgson's guns
threw a destructive fire upon the opposite Federal battery; and
the neighboring forces on the right, supported by another battery,
moving around the swamp and thicket, poured a flank fire upon
General Sherman's left.f What remained of Hildebrand's bri
gade now wholly gave way, throwing disorder into McClernand's
forces, who were driven back, abandoning Waterhouse's six guns ;
and as Taylor's battery now slackened under Hodgson's fire, An
derson's brigade again ascended the slope with three regiments of
Pond's brigade, on the left, supported by two sections of Ketch-
urn's battery. By this front and flank charge, General Sherman
was forced to fall back with McDowell's and Buckland's brigades
to the Purdy and Hamburg roads; thus, by ten o'clock, abandon
ing his entire line of camps. ;{: As the attacking lines vigorously
* General Patton Anderson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p.
301. t This was one of the batteries which had been placed in position by General
Trudeau, volunteer aide-de-camp of General Polk, acting under instructions of
General Beauregard, who was present at the time.
X Colonel Buckland's Report, " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 372.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 291
followed, Buckland's brigade began rapidly to dissolve ; Behr's
battery was abandoned without firing a shot* from its new posi
tion, and the remains of Sherman's division fell farther back on
the right of McClernand's, which had been well rallied, and formed
on the line of its camps, with Yeatch's cleft brigade allotted on its
right and left. In taking his new position, General Sherman was
enabled somewhat to relieve McClernand,f who was under a se
vere attack, by delivering his retreating fire upon the flank of the
assailing force in that quarter.
About the hour that General Sherman's last camps were car
ried, and his troops were being driven back upon the line of the
Purdy road, the battle broke along the front formed by Generals
W. H. L. Wallace and Hurlbut, who had selected strong defensive
positions. Here, after the line of battle had been formed beyond
General Prentiss's camps, a fortunate shell, from Robertson's bat
tery, striking amid one of Hurlbut's, stampeded the entire bat
tery, horses and caissons, as well as guns, being abandoned, though
the latter were spiked by other artillerists.^ By direction of Gen
eral Hardee, then on his way towards the left, Colonel Adams
made a skirmishing reconnoissance to feel the enemy's strength.
He was then ordered by General Bragg to advance, but found his
men short of ammunition. At this moment General Breckin
ridge's division was led into position by Colonel Augustin, of
General Beauregard's staff,§ on Colonel Adams's right, while
Cheatham's division (Bushrod Johnson's and Stevens's brigades),
sent to the same quarter by General Beauregard, came up on its
left. J These two divisions now joined their lines and engaged
the enemy, while Adams's (Gladden's) brigade fell to the rear.
Johnson's two right regiments, which had become temporarily de
tached by reason of the features of the ground, were ordered sep
arately into action by General Bragg, and unfortunately remained
separated from the rest of the brigade and their commander dur
ing the day.1|"
Wallace's and Hurlbut's divisions, deliberately posted and han-
* General Sherman's Report, " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 407.
f Ibid.
| General Hurlbut's Report, " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 400.
§ See Colonel Augustin's Report, in Appendix.
|| General Cheatham's Report.
IT General Bushrod Johnson's Report.

292 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
died with skill, maintained a stubborn resistance to the attack.
Consisting mostly of troops who had served at Donelson, they
gallantly formed their lines, notwithstanding the surprise and dis
order through which they had been ushered into the conflict.
Shortly after ten o'clock, the enemy being reported very strong
in the centre — that is, along Wallace's front — General Beauregard
reinforced that point by Trabue's brigade,* of General Breckin
ridge's division, which he had held near his headquarters. A little
before that time Stuart's forces had also been reached.f This offi
cer, when warned, at half-past seven, by General Prentiss, of the
presence of the Confederates, had formed his three regiments in line
of battle on a ridge faced by a ravine and watercourse emptying into
Lick Creek, and awaited developments, until, seeing the Confed
erates penetrating on Prentiss's rear, he called for support from
Hurlbut, who despatched him an Illinois regiment and a battery,
which took position on his right. It was scarcely ten o'clock when
his skirmish line, thrown out on another ridge, in front, was driven
in by the attacking forces, who planted a battery there and shelled
his lines, Jackson's brigade opening the conflict under General
Johnston's personal order.:): Stuart, upon going to the right, found
that the 71st Ohio regiment, together with Hurlbut's Illinois bat
talion and battery, had taken flight.§ A similar fate had overtaken
the 52d Tennessee, of Chalmers's brigade, when, shortly before, it
had received the fire of Stuart's skirmishers ; and, excepting two
companies of soldierly behavior, it was ordered out of the lines.j|
Stuart's other two regiments, after being forced back some dis
tance, were still farther withdrawn, and formed along the brow of
a hill, numbering now a force of eight hundred men. His posi
tion was protected by a fence and thick undergrowth, with an
open field in front and a ravine on the left ; and here, without ar
tillery, he maintained a creditable resistance against greatly supe
rior numbers.^
* See Major Brent's Report, in Appendix.
t " Agate," " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. Doc. p. 391.
X Report of Colonel Joseph Wheeler, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p.
275. § Stuart's Report.
| Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 257.
T Stuart's Report mentions no artillery but the battery sent him by Hurlbut,
which went away; as to infantry, he was greatly outnumbered.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 293
All the forces on each side were now in action. The Confed
erate front line, as, according to the conformation of the ground,
it developed the positions of the enemy and the needs of reinforce
ments, had been extended on its right and left, and filled, at in
tervening points, by the troops of the second and third, or reserve
lines. With a general direction from northwest to southeast,
oblique to the Tennessee River, and its right thrown back, the
order of the Federal forces was, from right to left, as follows :
Sherman's remaining troops ; McClernand's division, with a por^
tion of Yeateh's brigade, of Hurlbut's division ; and, beyond a wide
interval, Stuart's isolated brigade, on the extreme left.
The Confederate forces in opposing order, left to right, were :
Two brigades (Pond's and Anderson's) of Ruggles's division, of
Bragg's corps ; one brigade (Russell's) of Polk's corps ; Hardee's
three brigades (Cleburne's, Wood's, and Hindman's), with Gibson's
brigade, of Ruggles's division, and Trabue's, of Breckinridge's di
vision, in support or filling up the line ; Cheatham's division, of
Polk's corps, and, Breckinridge's division, with Gladden in rear;
and on the extreme right, at the distance of about three quarters
of a mile, Withers's division (Jackson's and Chalmers's brigades),
of Bragg's corps, carrying on the attack against Stuart under Gen
eral Johnston.
The contest now went on in all parts of the field, without any
important incident or change, during the remainder of the morn
ing and the early afternoon. About eleven o'clock, General John
ston, leaving Withers's division, passed over to the rear of General
Breckinridge's, aud remained directing its movements. Previous
ly to this General Bragg had, by understanding with General
Polk, taken position near the right centre and General Polk near
the left centre, while General Hardee remained at the extreme
left. General Beauregard, following the general movement, main
tained a central position in rear.
In the succession of ravines, ridges, and woods, the Federals had,
everywhere, natural defensive positions more or less strong, which
their opponents were compelled to carry by assault. These were
attacked with great bravery and heavy loss of life, but not with
that concert and massing of forces essential to decisive effects,
though this fact was, in some measure, due to the concealed char
acter of the country, which, in most parts, admitted of no contin
uous view of any large body of troops. General officers in imme-

294 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
diate direction of their commands were too intent upon the efforts
of brigades, and even regiments, thus losing sight of the disjointed
remainder, and neglecting to combine efficiently the service of the
artillery and infantry. Brigades and regiments, as well as batter
ies, were often, for this reason, at a stand-still without orders ; and
sometimes, from the same lack of cohesion, bodies of our own
troops were mistaken for the enemy and even fired into on the
flank or rear, and thrown into some confusion. Other commands,
after casualties, remained without leadership from a ranking offi
cer, until so reported to General Beauregard, and by him supplied
through his staff. Straggling also began early in the day, a great
many men being engaged in the plunder of the captured camps,
while numbers made their way to the rear. General Beauregard
used part of the cavalry, under his staff and escort, to drive them
out of the camps, and when collected, they were formed into bat
talions, officered as well as could be done under the circumstances,
and again sent forward. Thus all loose or halting commands were
attached to the readiest lines of movement, or to those needing
reinforcement. At about half-past twelve, part of Pond's brigade
and two regiments of Cleburne's brigade, united under Colonel
Pond, with a battery and squadron of cavalry, were ordered to as
sail the Federal right. Here, between twelve and one o'clock,
Sherman's and McClernand's forces began to fall back,* aud, at
half -past one, General Beauregard ordered General Hardee to
throw the cavalry f upon the retreating regiments, sending a force
by a circuitous way, and under screen of the woods, against the
right rear, so as to cut them off. The movement was vigorously
executed, though a part of the force, carried too far by its ardor,
and coming upon an unseen body of the enemy in a wood, was re
pulsed ; but the remainder, under Morgan, charged and drove
back the retreating battalions, captnring a number of guns. At
two o'clock, General Beauregard again sent orders to General Har
dee^: to push the enemy's right with vigor, and Sherman's and
McClernand's troops now rapidly gave way, the larger part of them
retiring towards Snake Creek, where they remained aside from the
scene of conflict ; another part retreating upon Wallace's camps,
* Reports of Colonels Hare and Crocker, " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. pp.
376-378. t See Staff Reports in Appendix. J Ibid.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 295
while Yeatch's brigade fell back towards the landing, where, later,
it reunited with Hurlbut's division.
The way was now open for an advance of the Confederate left
against Wallace's division, which was, at that time, the advanced
Federal right. Posted on a ridge under cover of a thicket, and
supported by artillery, this division had unflinchingly held its
ground, repelling with slaughter every attack made upon it. Un
der the orders of General Bragg, who was directing the move
ments against its left, between eleven and three o'clock, Hindman's
division was led to the assault, but repulsed under a murderous
fire,* its gallant commander falling severely wounded. It was
rallied and led to a second charge, but with no better success.
Gibson's brigade was then sent up, without artillery support, in
four bloody, detached, and unavailing assaults,f its flank raked by
a battery, and its front covered by the fire of the infantry posted
in the thicket on the ridge. After these repulses, General Bragg
abandoned the task and passed farther to the right, in the direc
tion of Breckinridge's division.;}:
Meanwhile Withers's division (Chalmers's and Jackson's bri
gades) had been gradually forcing back Stuart's two regiments,
sweeping with its right the edge of the Tennessee bottom, until,
about three o'clock, Chalmers's brigade was struck by the shells
of the Federal gunboat " Tyler," and moved away from the river.§
As Stuart's force, winding its way through ravines to Pittsburg
Landing, went out of view, and no other enemy appeared in that
quarter, the division, wheeling on its left, by order of Withers, in
accordance with the general plan of battle,] advanced upon the
sound of the neighboring conflict, where Breckinridge's and
Cheatham's forces were warmly engaged with those of Hurlbut
and Prentiss. General Johnston had been some three quarters of
an hour in rear of Breckinridge's division^ (the right of the main
line of battle), while, under a galling fire and at great cost, it had
steadily held its position, until he decided to lead it to the charge.
* General Bragg's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 228.
t General Gibson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 286.
X General Bragg's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 228.
§ General Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 258, and
General Jackson's Report, p. 266.
|| General Withers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 236.
V Governor Harris's letter to General Beauregard, see Appendix.

296 MILITARY. OPERATIONS OF
The enemy's force was driven to the next ridge beyond, and Breck
inridge's line was re-formed under a severe fire\ when Governor
Harris,* volunteer aid, returning from the delivery of an order to
Colonel Statham, to charge a battery on their immediate left, found
General Johnston wounded. , This was between two and half-
past two o'clock. Sustaining him in the saddle, Governor Har
ris withdrew him to a ravine, about one hundred yards in the
rear, where, within half an hour, that patriotic and noble soldier
breathed his last. Meanwhile, General Hurlbut, informed by Stu
art that his left flank was uncovered by the latter's forced retreat, f
shifted his right (Lanman's) brigade to his left, and ordered Wil
liams's brigade and Prentiss's command to fall back steadily, thus
endeavoring to meet the flanking movement of Withers's division.
Adjutant-General Jordan had come upon this quarter of the field
at half-past two, shortly after General Johnston's withdrawal, and
finding Breckinridge's division at rest, ordered it to charge the
enemy in front,:): posted behind a fence in the border of a wood.
He gave the order in the name of General Johnston, not knowing
at the time of his whereabouts or mortal wound. General Breck
inridge advanced steadily, forcing the enemy back from their po
sition. While this was going on, and after the Federal right had been
broken and driven back, General Beauregard, having ordered Gen
eral Hardee to reorganize his forces for another onslaught, turned
his attention to that quarter of the field, in the centre, where the
enemy's obstinate resistance had baffled General Bragg's previous
efforts. He advanced in that direction portions of Anderson's and
Gibson's brigades, two detached batteries, and several battalions
just formed from stragglers and scattered commands. At this
moment Colonel Marshall J. Smith's Crescent regiment, of New
Orleans, came up from the extreme left, with Colonel Looney's
38th Tennessee, and, seeing General Beauregard, raised a gallant
cheer, which immediately drew upon the spot the concentrated
fire of the enemy. General Beauregard, bidding them " go forward
and drive the enemy into the Tennessee," § attached to them an-
* Governor Harris's letter to General Beauregard, see Appendix.
t General Hurlbut's Report, " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 401.
X General Cheatham's Report.
§ Colonel Marshall J. Smith's Report, "Confederate Official Reports of Bat
tles," p. 343.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 297
other battalion formed of stragglers, and sent them in the same
direction, to support two batteries (Hodgson's and another) which
he had just ordered ahead. Here a vigorous artillery fire was
now combined with the efforts of the infantry, under Generals
Polk and Ruggles, and the stubborn enemy began to relax his
hold *
But, farther down on the right, Generals Prentiss and Hurlbut
were still contending so strongly that Generals Breckinridge and
Crittenden called earnestly on Jackson and Chalmers for assist
ance. •)- The flanking march of these two latter brigades was met
by Lanman's brigade, supported by powerful artillery, and there a
fierce, exhausting contest ensued.
As General Beauregard, in advance of the Shiloh meeting-house,
was directing the movement beyond McClernand's camps, Governor
Harris reached him, shortly after three o'clock, and informed him
of General Johnston's death. This was a great shock to General
Beauregard, who had not anticipated the possibility of such a loss,
and who knew what effect it would produce upon the troops, es
pecially those who had formed part of General Johnston's original
command. He sent immediate intelligence of the sad event to
the corps commanders, enjoining silence concerning it, and, at the
same time, gave orders to push the attack vigorously in all quar
ters of the field.
Wallace's right was now attacked by Looney's and Marshall J.
Smith's regiments, of Anderson's brigade, and by a portion of Gib
son's, under General Polk. The remains of Hindman's division
and Gladden's brigade, with Cheatham's and Breckinridge's forces,
were pressed against his left; and Prentiss's command, with a
portion of Hurlbut's, was attacked with great determination by
General Bragg; while Jackson and Chalmers were assailing Hurl
but in front and on the left flank. The latter, as he withdrew,
attempted to make a stand on the line of his camps, but, to avoid
being cut off, fell back, at about four o'clock, upon Pittsburg Land
ing, thus allowing Chalmers and Jackson to move upon the flank
of the line formed by Prentiss and Wallace.
While all these forces were closing upon Wallace and Prentiss,

* See, in " Confederate Reports of Battles," Ruggles's Report, p. 282, Ander
son's Report, p. 304, and Hoge's Report, p. 291.
t Report of General Jackson, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 265.

298 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
General Hardee -was engaged on the left with McClernand's regi
ments and the remnants of Sherman's command. Hearing from
a staff officer * that a brigade was inactive in that quarter, and,
apparently, without a commander, General Beauregard sent
Colonel Ferguson, of his staff, to lead it into action, under the di
rection of General Hardee. This was part of the brigade of
Colonel Pond, who, far from being inactive, was, in fact, recon
noitring so as to ascertain his position more accurately and act un-
derstandingly against the battery in his front. By orders, said to
have been from General Hardee, a brilliant but ineffective charge
was then and there made by the 18th Louisiana, f under Colonel
Mouton, and immediately afterwards by the Orleans Guard battal
ion, under Major Querouze; the 16th Louisiana followed in the
rear of the column, but was only partially engaged. Alone and
unsupported the 18th Louisiana charged gallantly up the hill,
closely upon the battery, which had already begun to abandon its
ground, when a murderous fire from three regiments of McCler
nand's force compelled the regiment to retire, after a loss of two
hundred and seven officers and men, killed and wounded, who
could not be removed from the field.;]: The Orleans Guard bat
talion lost about eighty men while making a similar charge, im
mediately afterwards.
The enemy at this point, however, was now falling back, in ac
cordance wkh the retrograde movement of the other Federal
forces, when General Wallace fell, mortally wounded, after having,
by his skill and tenacity, contributed much towards the salvation
of the Federal army. But General Prentiss, unaware of the move
ment executed by Wallace's division, still clung to his position, to
gether with the 8th, 12th, and 14th Iowa and the 58th Illinois, of
Wallace's division, who were endeavoring to save their artillery.
After they were cut off they made several ineffectual charges in
an effort to break through to the Landing, and at about half-past
five o'clock p. m., surrounded and hemmed in by our troops, they
finally abandoned the struggle, and surrendered, amid the loud
cheers of the victors. The prisoners there captured numbered
some twenty-five hundred men, and among them was General

* Colonel Ferguson's Report, see Appendix.
t Colonel Pond's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 329.
X Colonel Moutou's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 333.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 299
Prentiss himself.* They were sent to the rear under escort of
cavalry and a detachment from Wood's brigade.f
This closing in of the Confederate lines had brought the ex
treme right and the left centre of the line of battle unexpectedly
face to face, as the last wooded ridge was crossed which had sepa-
ated them as they pressed on both flanks of the Federal divisions.
Much confusion ensued, as well as delay for the replenishment of
ammunition, before the commands were extricated and directed
anew against the enemy.
Meanwhile, since four o'clock, Colonel J. D. Webster, an able offi
cer of General Grant's staff, had been collecting the reserve artillery
and other batteries, till he had massed about sixty guns (some of
them 24-pounder siege guns) along a ridge covering Pittsburg
Landing, and reaching out to the camps of Wallace, a portion of
which was still held by the remainder of that division, with some
of McClernand's regiments, and fragments of Sherman's, on their
right. In rear of Webster's guns was also Hurlbut's division, %
with Yeatch's brigade now reattached, and two of Stuart's regi
ments, all of these reinforced by numbers rallied from the broken
commands. General Grant having arrived on the field at one
o'clock p. m.,§ or about that time, had been busy at this work since
three o'clock. The line of bluffs masked all view of the river ; but,
in fact, General Buell's Army of the Ohio was also now arriving
from Savannah, on the opposite bank, below Pittsburg Landing,
and Ammen's brigade, of Nelson's advance division, had been
thrown across and placed in support of Webster's battery, at five
o'clock. Generals Buell and Nelson were both present on the
field. J Behind these forces and below the bluff was the remainder
* General Prentiss, in his report of the battle, written after his return from
captivity, thus alludes to this memorable incident: "... I determined to as
sail the enemy, which had passed between me and the river, charging upon
him with my entire force. I found him advancing in mass, completely encir
cling my command, and nothing was left but to harass him and retard his
progress so long as might be possible. This I did until 5.30 p. m., when find-
ino- that further resistance must result in the slaughter of every man in the
command, I had to yield the fight. The enemy succeeded in capturing my
self and twenty-two hundred rank and file, many of them wounded."
t General Hardee's Report.
X General Hurlbut's Report, " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 401.
§ General Badeau says, eight o'clock a. m.
1 General Nelson's Report, " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 413.

300 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
of Grant's army, its flight arrested by the river, and its masses
tossing in uncontrollable panic and disorder.*
But in rear of the victorious Confederate line was a scene
of straggling and pillage which, for a time, defied all remon
strance and all efforts at coercion. The disorder and plunder
that had followed the capture of Prentiss's, Sherman's, and Mc-
•Clernand's camps were now all the greater, as the troops, fasting
since dawn— and some of them since the previous evening — were
exhausted from incessant fighting and marching. The commands
were broken and mixed ; and among many the idea prevailed that
the battle had been won and was virtually ended. One cheering
feature, however, in the scene of spoil, was the strewing of old
flint-locks and double-barrelled shot-guns, exchanged for the En
field and Minie rifles abandoned by the enemy. In view of this
change of armament and the general scarcity of ammunition,
General Beauregard ordered the collection of the enemy's ordnance
stores, as well as all available provisions, to be sent to the rear for
greater security.
The forces were deployed again into line from the" point around
which they had centred in the capture of Prentiss's and Wallace's
advanced regiments. Those under General Bragg's direction
moved to the right, Chalmers's brigade leading, after a halt for
re-distribution of ammunition ;f and, extending to the Tennessee
bottom, Jackson's brigade followed, without ammunition, the
bayonet being their only weapon.:]: The remainder of the line
was continued from right to left, with the same brigades that had
been previously engaged. Those on the right of the Ridge road
were practically under the direction of General Bragg, and those
on the left of it, under Generals Polk and Hardee. This road, as
well as all approaches to the Landing, was swept by the enemy's
artillery. The Federal position, on the bluffs, was fronted by a
deep ravine and. creek, running into the Tennessee, with branches
falling into it from the line of the Confederate advance, all filled
with back water from the river, on account of the late heavy rains ;
and the main ravine, which protected the Federal front, was enfi-
* "Agate," "Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 393. See also General
Buell's Report, vol. iv. p. 410.
t See Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 258.
X General Jackson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 266.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 301
laded by the fire of the gunboats lying in its mouth. Over this
ground, divided and thickly wooded, a continuous line of battle
was impracticable. General Beauregard, seeing that nothing but
a concerted and well-supported attack, in heavy mass, could, that
evening, strike the finishing blow by which the enemy would be
crushed, ordered the corps commanders, on the right and left, to
make a hasty reorganization of the troops under their control, for
a combined onslaught, while he, at the centre, should organize re
inforcements for the line of attack in his immediate front. He
caused all fragmentary bodies and stragglers, in his vicinity, to be
brought up from the rear, and formed into such organizations as
the emergency allowed, and they were thus carried forward to
swell the line of battle.
The troops, however, were not pressed to the front in combined
attack, as ordered, but in a series of disjointed assaults, with but
little support from the batteries, many of which were allowed to
remain inactive in the rear.* These assaults were easily broken,
and with slaughter, by the formidable weight of metal which
girded the Federal position, supported by a still heavy force of in
fantry, reinforced by some of General Buell's troops, while the
shells of the gunboats swept the long ravine which our different
commands had to cross in assailing the bluff, and which formed
their only rallying cover from the fire in front. The troops, more
over, were greatly disorganized ; the commands were cut up and
intermingled, and regimental organization was greatly confused.
The corps commanders, then as throughout the day, continued to
give examples of personal courage, but exhaustion and hunger nul-

* In his Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 324, Captain Hodgson,
writing of the charge made by the 18th Louisiana, and, subsequently, by the
Orleans Guard battalion, at four o'clock p. M., or about that time, says : "This
was about the last firing of my battery, on the 6th instant."
Captain Ketchum, in his Report (ibid. pp. 340, 341), says : " Colonel Pond's
fine brigade was badly cut up in a charge on a battery, in one of these camps,
which, I have always thought, might have been avoided, had my battery not been
withdrawn from the advance I was making on this camp.'1''
General Chalmers, in his Report, p. 260, says : " During this engagement,
Gage's battery was brought up to our assistance, but suffered so severely that
it was soon compelled to retire."
See also Pond's and Mouton's Reports, as to the separate and isolated action
of their commands.

302 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
lified all attempts to create enthusiasm on the part of the men.
General Hardee, in command on the left, to whom General Beau
regard had sent Lieutenant Chisolm, of his staff, to ascertain how
he was faring, answered: "We are getting along very well, but
tell the General they (meaning the enemy) are putting it to us
very severely." Chisolm, though ordered to return, and report
before dark, remained as aide-de-camp to General Hardee, who had
none of his staff with him, and was bringing up two regiments
into position, from the rear, when one of them broke in disorder,
under the artillery fire from the field-pieces and gunboats, and fell
back out of the fight.* Here, also, part of Pond's brigade, when
about to make a last forward movement, received a fatal volley
from the 27th Tennessee, of Cleburne's brigade, which compelled
it to face about, and their artillery support to take a new position
against a supposed hostile attack from the rear — an untoward event,
which ended the share of this brigade in the conflict of that day. f
, The remaining troops, under General Hardee — that is to say,
Wood's brigade, greatly diminished by detachment and casual
ties, and a small portion of Cleburne's — did not succeed in making
any impression on the force of artillery and infantry defending
the position of Wallace's camps, still held by fragments of Wal
lace's, McClernand's, and Sherman's divisions. The forces on the
right of General Hardee, under General Polk's direction, were en
gaged in the same desultory and indecisive contest, Gibson's and
Anderson's brigades not being actively emploj'ed by him.J So
was it with General Breckinridge's division. Colonel Trabue,
commanding the first Kentucky brigade of that division, in his re
port of the battle, speaking of the events of the day, following the
surrender and capture of General Prentiss's command, says :
"Finding the troops who had come in from my right halting one or two
hundred yards in my front, I allowed the 6th and 9th Kentucky regiments
hastily to change their guns for Enfield rifles, which the enemy had surren
dered, and I then moved up aud rejoined General Breckinridge, who, with
Statham's and Bowen's brigades, was occupying the front line, being on the
crest of the hill (or highland) overlooking the narrow' valley of the Tennes
see River, on which, and near by, was Pittsburg Landing. Having been
halted here for more than an hour, we endured a most terrific cannonading
• | —  — ¦
* Colonel Chisolm's Report, in Appendix.
t Colonel Pond's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 329.
X General Anderson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 305.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 303
and shelling from the enemy's gunboats. My command, however, had seen
too much hard fighting to be alarmed, and the 4th Kentucky stood firm,
while some of our troops to the front fell back through their lines in confu
sion. . . . From this position, when it was nearly dark, we were ordered to
the rear to encamp, which movement was effected in good order. I followed,
in the darkness of the night, the Purdy road, after having re-united to my
command Byrne's battery and the others of my troops who had been de
tached to the right, not including, however, Cobb's battery."
Among the forces of General Bragg, on the right, where that
officer was directing movements, Gladden's brigade had become
dissevered* in the confusion following the capture of General
Prentiss, and took no part in the assaults upon the last Federal
position, though the portion remaining under its commanding of
ficer, Colonel Deas, was formed on the left of Jackson's brigade.
This latter brigade was led, under a heavy fire from the light bat
teries, siege-pieces, and gunboats, f across the ravine, and with its
only weapon, the bayonet, ascended the ridge nearly to the crest,
bristling with guns ; but, without support, it could be urged no
farther. It remained for some time sheltering itself against the
precipitous sides of the ravine, till Jackson, seeing his men use
lessly under a raking fire, and that a farther advance was imprac
ticable, without support and a simultaneous movement along the
whole line, sought for orders from his division commander, Gen
eral Withers ; but darkness closed the conflict before he could
reach him. Of this eventful part of the day, after which hostili
ties entirely ceased on both sides, Colonel Joseph Wheeler, com
manding the 19th Alabama regiment, in his report says : " But af
ter passing through the deep ravine below the lowest camps, we
were halted within about four hundred yards of the river, and re
mained ready to move forward for about half an hour, when night
came on, and we were ordered to the rear, and were assigned to
bivouac, by General Withers.":]: Chalmers's brigade, the extreme
right, vainly attempted to mount the ridge against the fire from
the line of batteries and infantry, assisted by the flank fire of
the gunboats, though it made repeated charges, till night closed
in.§ * Colonel Deas's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 245.
t General Jackson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 266.
X " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 276.
§ General Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 260,

304 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Meanwhile, General Beauregard had been weighing attentively,
and no doubt anxiously, the premonitory signs visible during the
later hours of the battle. The strength" of the Federal batteries
was apparent, by their extent and sound, and by the effect pro
duced on the Confederate lines ; while the steady and heavy rolls
of musketry, proceeding from the same quarter, indicated the
presence either of fresh troops, the arrival of which General Beau
regard had feared and predicted the evening before, or of forces
reorganized from the stragglers on the field, as had been done
with our own stragglers several times that day. As General
Beauregard rode in rear of the disjointed lines, the futility of these
fitful, detailed attacks became more and more evident to him.
Most of the commands were disorganized and fragmentary, sun
dered by the deep, wooded ravines, and numbers of stragglers
could be seen in all directions. He felt not only that it was im
practicable to gather up all his forces for a general and simultane
ous onslaught, which alone might have been effective, but also
that the brief space of time now remaining to him before night
fall must be used to collect the troops into position, or the morn
ing, and its threatened possibilities, would find him with but a
nominal army. He knew that Lew. Wallace's division, of some eight
thousand men, was near by, observing the road from Purdy ; that it
had not, as yet, been engaged in the conflict, and might, at any mo
ment, fall upon us in flank, left, or rear. He therefore resolved,
without further delay, to withdraw the troops gradually from the
front, and reorganize them, as well as possible, to resume the offen
sive on the 7th, and complete his victory over Grant. According
ly, at dusk, he sent to the different corps commanders the order,
'• to arrest the conflict, and fall back to the enemy's abandoned
camps for the night."*
General Bragg had also concluded that the troops were incapable
of any further offensive efforts in his quarter of the field, and had
already resolved to withdraw.f He gave orders to that effect,
which wrere anticipated, as to some of the commands, by the or
ders sent by General Beauregard.:]: Chalmers had fought, as al-
* Colonel Augustin's and Captain C. H. Smith's Reports, in Appendix.
t Dr. Nott's letter, in Appendix.
X The order to General Bragg was borne by Captain Clifton Smith, acting
aide-de-camp. In a few cases it was communicated directly to brigade com
manders by Colonel Augustin, another aide-de-camp to General Beauregard.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 305
ready stated, till night had closed in upon him ; and as he and Jack
son fell back in the darkness, the latter's regiments became sepa
rated from each other,* and he from them, and so remained during
the night and the following day. The withdrawal of the troops, as
a general thing, was attended with disorder, by reason of the dark
woods and broken character of the country. " It was eight o'clock
at night," says General Anderson, in his report, " before we had
reached a bivouac, near General Bragg's headquarters, and in the
darkness of the night the 20th Louisiana, and portions of the 17th
Louisiana, and Confederate Guards, got separated from that por
tion of the command in which I was, and encamped on other
ground."f Colonel Forrest's cavalry was picketed along Wallace's and
Hurlbut's camps, while another regiment of cavalry was posted to
protect the left flank, and guard the approaches from the Snake
Creek bridge, exposed to Lew. Wallace's fresh force of eight thou
sand men. General Hardee's corps and General Breckinridge's di
vision withdrew to McClernand's camps, and General Bragg's corps,
with one (Clark's) division of General Polk's corps, rested in those
of Sherman. Through a misunderstanding of orders, on the part of
General Polk, his other (Cheatham's) division was sent back about
three miles and a half, to its bivouac of the previous night.:]:
General Bragg and, later in the evening, the other corps com
manders visited General Beauregard's headquarters, in General
Sherman's camps, and reported orally their operations of the day.
All were elated and congratulatory over the success of the day, and
the expectations of the morrow.§ The results, indeed, were great
* Jackson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 266.
t " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 305.
X General Cheatham says, in his Report : " At the close of the day, a part of
my command remained on the field, and a portion returned to our encamp
ment of the night previous." In a letter to General Beauregard, dated Nash
ville, Tenn., November 27th, 1876, General Cheatham uses the following lan
guage : " At dusk, on the evening of tlie 6th, I was on the extreme left of our
army, near the river. I recollect that General Cleburne's division was on my
right. The second brigade of my division (Stephens's), with a portion of
Johnson's (my first), retired to our camp of the night previous — Saturday
night. This camp was near General Polk's headquarters, where the enemy's
cavalry horses were killed by our artillery, on Friday, and several miles — at
least three — in front of Mickey's."
§ Colonel Jacob Thompson's letter, in Appendix.
I.— 20

306 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
and encouraging. A half-disciplined army, poorly equipped and ap
pointed, had assailed an opposing army larger in numbers, nearly
half of which was composed of seasoned troops, provided with the
best and most abundant armament and supplies, arrayed, besides,
on familiar ground, chosen by its own leaders. That army had
steadily been driven back to its last stronghold, a great part of it
routed and demoralized ; its tents, baggage, subsistence, and hos
pital stores captured, together with thirty stands of colors, fully
sixty field-pieces, many thousand small arms and accoutrements,
and ammunition enough for another day's battle. General Beau
regard's promise, that the Confederate army should sleep in the
enemy's camps, was fulfilled ; and, reorganized for the next day,
it would undoubtedly have given the finishing stroke to the entire
Federal forces, had Buell marched towards Florence,"!" as it had
just been reported that he had done, instead of effecting his junc
tion with Grant, on the evening and night of the 6th, as was
actually the case.
A despatch was sent to Richmond, announcing the day's victory
and the hope of its completion on the morrow, and the corps com
manders were dismissed with instructions to reorganize their re
spective forces as thoroughly as possible, and hold them in readi
ness to take the offensive at break of day.
The night had closed with heavy clouds, and, about midnight, a
cold, drenching rain set in, which made it the more difficult to col
lect and re-form the broken commands and numerous stragglers, who
were moving about for pillage, through the alluring camps of the
enemy. The storm also interfered with the care of the wounded,
who were unavoidedly neglected, but the little that could be done
for them was done alike for friend and foe.
The gunboats, all through the night, at the suggestion, it was
said, of General Nelson, threw shells into the Confederate bivouacs,
the dim light of the camp-fires guiding them in their aim. Thus
were slumber and rest chased away from our exhausted men.
Indefatigable and daring as usual, Colonel Forrest, under cover
of the storm and darkness, sent scouts, clothed in Federal over
coats, within the enemy's lines. They reported that large bodies
of troops were crossing the river to Pittsburg Landing and that
t Colonel Helm had telegraphed to General Beauregard that Buell's army
was marching on Florence ; it proved to be Mitchell's division, and not
Buell's army.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 307
much confusion existed among them. Colonel Forrest so advised
Generals Hardee and Breckinridge, suggesting that an attack
should be made at once, or that the army should withdraw next
morning. He was referred to General Beauregard, but, un
fortunately, was unable to find his headquarters.* At a later
hour he again sent in his scouts, who returned at two o'clock in
the morning, stating that Federal troops were still arriving. Gen
eral Hardee, being informed of the fact for the second time, in
structed Colonel Forrest to go back to his regiment, and, keeping
a vigilant picket line, to notify him of all hostile movements,
should any be attempted. But General Hardee failed to com
municate this important information to General Beauregard.
* See "Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," by General Thomas
Jordan.

30S MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XXL
Difficulty of Collecting and Organizing Commands during Night of the 6th. —
Firing Resumed Early next Morning. — Nelson's Brigades Cross the Ten
nessee. — Positions Taken by the Federals. — Chalmers's Brigade and a
Mixed Command Force Back Nelson's Advance. — At 8 a. m. the Confed
erates are Driven Back with the Loss of a Battery. — They Regain the
Position and Battery at 9. — Critical Situation of Ammen's Brigade. —
New Position Assumed by the Confederates. — Crittenden's Division En
gaged. — Absence of General Polk from the Field. — His Timely Arrival at
10.30. — His Charge with Cheatham's Brigade. — Organization of Federal
Army during the Night of the 6th. — Inaction of General Sherman on the
Morning of the 7th.— General Breckinridge Ordered Forward. — Enemy
Driven Back on our Whole Line. — Advance of Federal Right Wing. —
Its Repulse. — At 1 p. m. Enemy on our Left Reinforced. — General Bragg
Calls for Assistance. — General Beauregard in Person Leads the 18th
Louisiana and Other Troops to his Aid. — Predetermination of General
Beauregard to Withdraw from the Battle-field. — Couriers sent to Corinth
to Inquire about General Van Dorn. — Preparations for Retreat. — Guns and
Colors Captured by Confederates on the 6th. — Slow and Orderly With
drawal of Confederate Forces.— Inability of the Enemy to Follow.- —
Reconuoissance of General Sherman on the Morning of the 8th. — Con
federates not Disorganized. — Their Loss During the Battle. — Computa
tion of Numbers Engaged on Both Sides. — Federal Loss.
The night of the 6th of April, as has been already stated, was
so dark and stormy that it was found impossible properly to col
lect and organize all the commands. The fighting, moreover, had
been protracted even after dusk, on certain parts of the field, be
fore General Beauregard's orders to arrest the conflict could be
communicated and carried out.
At about half -past five o'clock, on the morning of the 7th,
the skirmish-firing on our right, in an easterly direction, towards
the Tennessee River, indicated that the enemy was about to as
sume the offensive. Generals Hardee, Breckinridge, and Bragg
repaired at once to their respective commands, and availed them
selves of such forces as they had immediately at hand, with which
to oppose this onset. General Hardee had, under his orders, on

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 309
his extreme right, two of General Bragg's brigades, namely —
Chalmers's and Jackson's, of Withers's division. General Bragg
had, on the left of our line, the remainder of his corps, increased
by one division (Clark's) of General Polk's corps, which was sub
sequently reinforced by Trabue's brigade. On the left of Gen
eral Hardee came General Breckinridge; and between him and
General Bragg was the position which had been assigned to Gen
eral Polk.
General Jordan, in his "Campaigns of Lieutenant-General For
rest," page 137, thus correctly gives the positions and forces of
the enemy : .
" By seven o'clock p. is., on the 6th, Nelson's (two) brigades had crossed the
Tennessee, and, with the one that so materially helped — with Webster's op
portunely posted battery — to save the Federal army from utter overthrow,
were at once thrown forward by General Buell, as a shield between General
Grant's army and the Confederates. Crittenden's division likewise came up
from Savannah by water not long after, and was promptly established in the
same manner, on Nelson's right. Moreover, Lew. Wallace, strangely unable to
find the road battleward, amid the thunder peals of more than a hundred
cannon within six miles of him, as soon as the dusky shadows and the quiet
of night had supervened, found a way to the south bank of Snake Creek and
to a position then commanding the bridge, and by chance, too, in the neigh
borhood of Sherman, with the shreds, or odds and ends, of his own and other
divisions that had rallied around him. One of McCook's brigades (Rousseau's)
also reached the scene about sunrise, and the other two were near at hand.
" Thus were marshalled there, or near at hand, ready to take the offensive
against the victors of the day before, twenty - five thousand fresh Federal
troops* three battalions of which were Regulars. On the Confederate side, to
meet such an onset, there was not a man who had not fought steadfastly for
the greater part of Sunday. In addition to the many stragglers incident to
all battles, the casualties did. not fall short of six thousand five hundred offi
cers and men, so that not more than twenty thousand Confederate infantry
(and artillery) could have been found to answer to their names that morning.
Scattered widely, the regiments of the brigades of Bragg's and Hardee's corps
had slept here and there, among the captured encampments, wheresoever they
could find subsistence. Polk's corps had been embodied, to some degree, and
led during the night by their general, rearward, at least a mile and a half be
yond Shiloh, towards Corinth." +
* General Sherman estimates at eighteen thousand men those that had fought
the day before. See his " Memoirs," p. 245.
t Only ene of his divisions (Cheatham's) had been collected together and
4aken back, through a misunderstanding of orders, to its bivouac of the night
of the 5th, about three and a half miles from the Shiloh meeting-house.

310 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
The positions occupied by the Federal forces on the morning
of the 7th are still more definitely given in Yan Home's " His
tory of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. pp. 109, 111, as
follows :
" General Buell first formed General Nelson's division next to the river as
the left of the battle front, and General Grant assigned Wallace's division to
the right flank, near Snake Creek, below the mouth of Owl Creek. Between
these extremes the remaining forces were formed — Crittenden's division on
the right of Nelson's, with a space for McCook's on his right, when it should
arrive, and on the right of the position of this division the troops engaged the
day previous, somewhat refreshed, extended the line to Wallace's left.
* * & $ ifc 3ji & $'&
" At the time that the recession of Nelson's line was arrested, McCook's fore
most brigade, Rousseau's, moved into position on the right of Crittenden.
This brigade extended the line, but Rousseau's flank was for a time as much
exposed as Crittenden's had been, as there was still a wide space between the
two armies. Before, however, the enemy could take advantage of this expos
ure Kirk's brigade reached the field, and was placed in reserve on the right
flank. Each brigade of Buell's army was now required to furnish its reserves,
while Boyle's brigade of Crittenden's division was designated as a general
reserve, and was so placed as to be facile of movement whenever there should
be need of support. General Buell also availed himself of the fragmentary
forces of the Army of the Tennessee, found in his rear.
"Tlie Army of the Ohio (Cumberland) now offered a battle front one mile
and a half long, about half the distance between Nelson's left and Wallace's
right. The left flank was covered with skirmishers, and was in some degree
protected by the roughness of the ground near the river. The right had no
assured connection with the Army of the Tennessee, but rested in a wood. To
strengthen the right, thus exposed to an enfilading or reverse fire, Gibson's
brigade of McCook's division, on coming to the field, was placed in reserve
in proximity. In front of Nelson was an open field, partially screened by
woods, which extended beyond the enemy's line. Crittenden's left brigade
and McCook's right were covered by a dense undergrowth, while in front
of their right and left brigades, respectively, the ground was open. The
ground, mainly level in front of Nelson, formed a hollow before Crittenden,
which fell into a small creek, passing in front of McCook. The Hamburg
road penetrated the line near Nelson's left* The enemy was in heavy force
beyond the open ground in Buell's front, in a line slightly oblique to his line,
having one battery so posted as to command Nelson's left, another to sweep
his front and the woods before Crittenden's left, a third bearing upon the
junction of Crittenden's right and McCook's left, and a fourth in the immedi-
* When Van Home states that the Hamburg road passed perpendicularly
through the Federal line near Nelson's left, he means the Hamburg and
Purely road, not the Hamburg and Pittsburg road.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 311
ate front of the latter. Beauregard had massed his forces on his right the
evening previous, under General Bragg, to grasp the Landing, and in conse
quence this flank was strong for defense in the morning."
The Confederate pickets and skirmishers encountered by the
advanced line of Nelson's division were those of Forrest's cavalry
regiment. They gradually fell back in the direction of Hardee's
line, then being formed near and beyond McClernand's old en
campments, to the rear of which they retired soon afterwards, to
take position on Hardee's right flank. Nelson's advancing line
soon encountered Chalmers's brigade and Moore's regiment, added
to which was an extemporized command, consisting of the 19th
Alabama, of Jackson's brigade ; the 21st Alabama, of Gladden's
brigade ; and, says General Chalmers, in his report,* the Crescent
(Louisiana) regiment; also a Tennessee regiment, under Lieuten
ant-Colonel Yenable ; and another Alabama regiment (the 26th),
under Lieutenant-Colonel Chadwick, supported by batteries. They
not only checked Nelson's force, but compelled it to fall back
some distance, when, being supported by the advance of Critten
den's division, it again resumed the offensive, at about eight o'clock
a.m. ; and Hazen's brigade, on Nelson's right, being now pushed
forward with great gallantry, forced the Confederates back, with
the temporary loss of a battery. They soon rallied, and, aided by
their batteries and other small reinforcements which General
Beauregard very opportunely sent them, resumed the offensive at
nine o'clock a.m., recovering their former position and their lost bat
tery, inflicting a severe loss on Hazen's brigade, and compelling
that officer to call earnestly for aid. Meanwhile, Nelson's left bri
gade, under Ammen, was sorely, pressed, and was in serious clanger
of being turned on its left.
" This brigade [says Van Home] fought gallantly to maintain a position
second to none on the field, but at length began to give ground, and a decided
advantage to the enemy seemed inevitable, as Nelson had neither artillery nor
infantry to direct to his support, Hazen's brigade having been shattered, and
Buell's being needed in its own position. But the impending disaster was
averted by Terrell's regular battery of McCook's division, which, having just
arrived from Savannah, dashed into position, and, by its rapid and accurate
firing, silenced the enemy's first battery, which was aiding the infantry force
pressing Ammen. Subsequently, the enemy repeated the attack, and endan-
* " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 261.

312 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
gered both the brigade and Terrell's battery, the latter having lost very many
gunners, and being without adequate support. . . . Then, by a flank attack
by Nelson, and a direct one by Crittenden, aided by a concentric Are from the
batteries of Mendenhall, Terrell, and Bartlett, he was driven beyond the posi
tion of his second and third batteries." *
The Confederates soon assumed a new position. It was main
tained, despite all the efforts of the Federals, until General Beau
regard determined to retire his troops, at about 2.30 p.m., when
some guns had to be abandoned for want of horses to carry them
off the field.
Crittenden's division had also been hotly engaged, shortly after
Nelson's, with the rest of Hardee's and part of Breckinridge's
commands, and, after a severe contest of several hours, in which
it had to be supported on the right, at about ten o'clock a.m., by
several thousands of General Grant's troops, under McClernand
and Hurlbut, it was held at bay until two brigades, Gibson's and
Kirk's, of McCook's division, joined in the struggle. His other
brigade, Rousseau's, containing three battalions of Regulars, had
reached the field early in the morning and taken a position near
General Sherman's left. Yan Home says :
" Thus, McCook followed Crittenden in attacking the enemy. This divis
ion met the same stubborn resistance, and made frequent charges. Rousseau's
brigade, having taken an advanced position early in the day, repulsed a charge
as its introduction to battle. It then gave a counter-blow, drove the oppos
ing force some distance, and captured a battery. The direction of Rousseau's
advance left an opening between McCook and Crittenden, which the enemy
perceived, and began to mass troops to occupy. To prevent this, General
McCook ordered Colonel Willich, commanding the 32d Indiana, to drive back
the enemy, and, by the bayonet and bullet, this was gallantly accomplished.
The remainder of Gibson's brigade followed Willich, and soon both brigades,
Rousseau's and Gibson's, were in hottest conflict. Willich's regiment at one
time became wedged between other forces, and, receiving their fire, was com
pelled to withdraw. This led to confusion, but order was soon restored.
Kirk's brigade reached the field just as Rousseau had exhausted his ammu
nition, and took his position, that he might replenish. While Rousseau was
absent Gibson was severely pressed, as the enemy continued his movements
to separate Crittenden and McCook. His left regiment, the 49th Ohio, was
involved in imminent danger, and was compelled to change front twice under
fire to prevent the turning of the position. Upon the return of Rousseau, his
brigade, aud two regiments of Hurlbut's division hitherto in reserve, went
* "History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i, pp. 112, 113.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 313
into Une, when General McCook's whole division, thus supported, advanced
and drove the enemy beyond General Sherman's camps." *
This was not done, however, until General Beauregard had de
termined to withdraw from the field, in order not to prolong a
then useless contest.
Just about the time (10.30 a.m.) when General McCook was as
suming the offensive with his whole division, and was near push
ing through the gap between General Breckinridge's left and Gen
eral Bragg's right, caused by the absence of General Polk with
one of his divisions, the latter arrived on the field. It was relief,
indeed, to General Beauregard, whose anxiety concerning Polk
had been intense. Unable, since morning, to hear anything of
General Polk's whereabouts, the thought had even crossed his
mind that the commander of his First Corps had been captured.
But, at half-past nine o'clock, he at last ascertained that, through a
misunderstanding of the orders given the previous evening, Gen
eral Polk had retired, with Cheatham's division, to his bivouac of
the 5th, for the purpose of recruiting and re-supplying that com
mand with provision and ammunition. A message — and rather
an imperative one — was instantly sent him, to hurry back to the
front — and hurry back he did. Dashing forward, with drawn
sword, at the head of Cheatham's fine division, he soon formed his
line of battle at the point where his presence was so much need
ed, and, with unsurpassed vigor, moved on, against a force at least
double his own, making one of the most brilliant charges of in
fantry made on either day of the battle. He drove back the op
posing column in confusion, and thus compensated for the tardi
ness of his appearance on the field. Shortly before this, General
Beauregard had placed a battery in position, on a slight elevation
some distance in advance of the Shiloh meeting-house, thereby
holding the enemy in check through the gap referred to, and ma
terially assisting the gallant charge of Cheatham's division.
During the night of the 6th and early morning of the 7th, Gen
eral Grant's shattered forces, of a mixed character, had been par
tially collected and formed into three divisions, under Generals
Sherman, McClernand, and Hurlbut, in advance of the bivouacs of
the first two commands, not far from the bridge across Snake
Creek. General Lew. Wallace's fresh division, with two batteries
* " History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. pp. 113, 114.

314 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
of six pieces each, from near Crump's landing, was formed on
Sherman's right, and constituted the extreme right of General
Grant's extensive line.
General Sherman, in his report of the battle, says of the opera
tions on this part of the field :
"At daylight, on Monday, I received General Grant's orders to advance
and recapture our original camps. I despatched several members of my staff
to bring up all the men they could find, especially the brigade of Colonel
Stuart, which had been separated from the division all the day before ; and
at the appointed time the division, or, rather, what remained of it, with the
13th Missouri and other fragments, moved forward and reoccupied the ground
on the extreme right of General McClernand's camp, where we attracted the
fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's former headquarters. Here
I remained, patiently waiting for the sound of General Buell's advance upon
the main Corinth road. About ten o'clock a.m., the heavy firing in that di
rection, and its steady approach, satisfied me ; and General Wallace being on
our right flank, with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my col
umn to General McClernand's right, formed line of battle facing south, with
Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge, and Stuart's brigade on its right
in the woods ; and thus advanced, steadily and slowly, under a heavy fire of
musketry and artillery."
Thus General Sherman remained several hours " patiently wait
ing for the sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Cor
inth road." But the attack of General Nelson had fairly com
menced at eight o'clock a.m., and that of Crittenden and McCook
about an hour later. This inaction, on the part of General Sher
man, enabled General Beauregard to reinforce his centre from his
left. Had General Sherman boldly advanced, before Cheatham's
division so gallantly took its position in line, he would have been
able to penetrate our line between General Bragg's right and Gen
eral Breckinridge's left, as we have already intimated, and would
have cut the Confederate line in two, for General Beauregard had
then no reserves, and could not have opposed General Sherman's
advance. When General Breckinridge, in the centre, was ordered to take
the offensive and relieve the right of our line, his left flank was
still unprotected, and the fear of its being turned prevented him
from executing the movement ; seeing this, General Beauregard
sent back to him one of his brigades — Trabue's — then on General
Bragg's left ; and, shortly afterwards, also gave orders that Rus
sell's brigade, of Clark's (now Stewart's) division, of General

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 315
Polk's corps — which, for the time being, was on General Bragg's
right — should be at once extended towards General Breckinridge's
left, so as to afford some protection to his threatened flank, and
enable him to engage the enemy in his front. This he did with
no less vigor than success, having Hodgson's (Slocomb's) Louis
iana battery, and two sections of other batteries, to support him.
But, at about eleven o'clock a.m., McCook's fresh division, with
a part of Crittenden's and some of General Grant's reorganized
forces, pressed him so hard that he was driven back some distance
and compelled to abandon one of his batteries. Then there was
sent to his assistance a small brigade, under Colonel Reichart, of
New Orleans — a most efficient Bavarian officer, commanding the
20th Louisiana regiment. This brigade was temporarily composed
of Colonel Reichart's own regiment, Colonel Hill's Tennessee reg
iment, and a battalion of stragglers, which General Beauregard had
very opportunely placed under command of Captain Lockett, of the
C. S. Engineers.* These troops, who had just been brought to
General Beauregard from the woods on our right rear, marched
forward with great alacrity and spirit, and by twelve o'clock Gen
eral Breckinridge had retaken both his position and his battery,
and the enemy was being driven back on our whole front.
This renewal of hostilities, first originating on our extreme left,
then gradually extending towards General Bragg's right, brought
out, most conspicuously, that soldierly valor and surprising spirit
of endurance which signalized the Confederate troops on many a
battle-field, but never more so than upon these two days of un
paralleled hard fighting. The battle now raged fiercely on our
whole front, except over the interval between Generals Bragg
* These stragglers, from every arm of the service, were brought to General
Beauregard, with no one to take command of them. As he was looking
around in search of a temporary leader to march them off to the front, his eye
fell on a young officer just then passing near him, whose soldierly bearing at
once attracted his attention. The young officer was halted, and found
himself in the presence of General Beauregard. " Could you command a bat
talion?" said the General to him. "If ordered to, do so, I think I can," was
the modest and, at the same time, firm reply. General Beauregard, having
now ascertained his name, took him to the battalion of stragglers near by, and,
introducing him to the men, said, " Here is Colonel Lockett, whom I now place
in charge of you. He will lead you to victory, if you only follow him." In
a loud and earnest cheer they each and all promised to do it, and gallantly
redeemed their promise half an hour later.

316 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
and Breckinridge, where skirmishing only appeared to be go
ing on.*
The Federal right wing advanced steadily at first, under a light
fire from the Confederates, but when it had come within fair range
of Bragg's line (consisting of the remnant of Ruggles's division,
his own corps, part of Polk's second division — Clark's, now com
manded by Stewart — and one brigade of Breckinridge's command),
it was greeted with such a terrible fire of musketry and artillery,
that— " The Federals reeled and rushed rearward, followed nearly a mile by the
Confederates ; but here, reinforced by McCook, Sherman attempted to resume
the advance. Now the fight waxed obstinate, and the firing, says Sherman,
was the severest musketry Are he had ever heard. Rousseau's Federal brigade
here was pitted against Trabue's Kentuckians. Both fought with uncommon
determination to win, but the Federals were repulsed, and Wallace was so
pressed that his situation became extremely critical.t McCook's other brigade
had joined in the action meanwhile ; and in that part of the field, including
Grant's forces under Sherman and McClernand, there were fully twenty thou
sand Federals opposed by not half that number of battle-battered Confederates.
The impetus of the Confederate attack was, therefore, slackened in the face of
such odds. Yet several brilliant charges were made, one of which, to the left
of Shiloh, General Beauregard himself led in person, carrying the battle-flag
ofa Louisiana regiment. "J
* During the fierce struggle in front, General Beauregard noticed, through
the woods, some troops apparently uniformed in white. He at first took them
to be Federals, but observing that they were fighting on our side, he sent an
aid to ascertain where they came from, hoping they might be part of Van
Dorn's army. They proved to be the 18th Louisiana and the Orleans Guard
battalion, temporarily merged into one command. Their coats being blue,
they had been fired into, on the day before, by some of our own troops ; and,.in
order to avoid a repetition of the mistake, had turned their coats "inside out."
When General Beauregard had resigned his commission in the United States
army, in February, 1861, he had joined, as a private, the Orleans Guard bat
talion, then just organized in the city of New Orleans. When he was made
brigadier-general in the Confederate service and sent to Charleston, his name
was preserved on the rolls of that battalion, and, whenever called, the color-
sergeant, stepping forward, would answer : " Absent on duty." This custom
was kept up as long as the battalion remained in service, and even on the bat
tle-field of Shiloh. Their flagstaff was made of a piece of the Sumter flagstaff,
which General Beauregard had sent to their commander, after the surrender
of that celebrated fort, in April, 1861.
fThis is General Wallace's own statement. See "Rebellion Record," vol.
iv. p. 359. X " Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," p. 142.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 317
At about one o'clock p. m., the enemy, on our left, being
reinforced, had resumed the offensive. General Bragg — whose
forces had been weakened by the withdrawal of three brigades
(Anderson's, Trabue's, and Russell's), which, in the course of the
morning, had been sent to strengthen our centre aud right — was
gradually driven back, towards the Shiloh meeting-house. He
then sent to General Beauregard for assistance. Fortunately, in
the small ravine passing immediately south of the meeting-house
were the 18th Louisiana and the Orleans Guard battalion, together
with two Tennessee regiments, which had been collected there in
obedience to orders. General Beauregard rode down to them, ad
dressed a few words of encouragement to the first two, and ordered
them to move promptly to the support of General Bragg. As
they passed by, with a tired, heavy gait, they endeavored to cheer
their own favorite commander, but were so hoarse from fatigue
and over-exertion that they could only utter a husky sound, which
grated painfully on General Beauregard's ear. They had not pro
ceeded far, when another staff officer came to him, in great haste,
and informed him, on the part of General Bragg, that unless the
latter was reinforced at once, he would certainly be overpowered.
Looking in his direction, General Beauregard saw the commander
of the Second Corps gallantly rallying his troops under a heavy fire
from a much superior force of the enemy. He rode, with his
staff, to the leading regiment of Pond's brigade, the 18th Louisi
ana (Lieutenant-Colonel Roman commanding, Colonel Mouton
having been wounded), and, seizing its colors, ordered " his Louisi-
anians " to follow him. They started with an elasticity of step sur
prising in troops that, a moment before, appeared so jaded and
broken down. They were soon at the side of General Bragg.*
Leaving them in his charge, General Beauregard returned to one
of the rear regiments of Tennesseeans, which he led in a similar
manner, but being too weak, from illness, to carry its flag, a large
and heavy one, he transferred it to one of his volunteer aids, Colo
nel H. E. Peyton, of Yirginia, who carried it until the regiment

* Then it was that General Beauregard, being almost reproved by Colonel
Augustin, one of his aids, for thus exposing himself, said : " The order must now
be '¦follow' not ' go /' " Colonel Augustin had taken the flag, however, and for a
few moments led the 18th Louisiana and the Orleans Guard battalion, the latter
of which he himself had organized, some eight months before, in New Orleans.

318 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
got into position. General Bragg resumed the offensive, and, de
spite the broken and disjointed condition of the forces under him,
drove the enemy back, out of sight from the Shiloh meeting
house, and kept him at that distance until about 2.30p. m., when
General Beauregard gave him orders to retire slowly and join the
retreat. At an early hour in the morning General Beauregard had es
tablished his headquarters on a small knoll, to the right (eastward)
of the Shiloh meeting-house, which appeared to be the most eligi
ble and central point, and one from which he could, with greatest
facility, communicate with his corps commanders and they with
him. Long before the charge we have just described, the enemy's
boldness, his active and steady movements, and the heavy roll of
musketry on our right, and, shortly afterwards, in our front, had
confirmed General Beauregard in his belief that General Buell
had, at last, formed a junction of the remainder of his forces with
those of General Grant. He knew that his depleted and exhausted
forces were now facing at least twenty thousand fresh troops, in
addition to Lew. Wallace's command, in addition also to Ammen's
brigade of Nelson's division, whose timely crossing, the day be
fore, had saved the Federals from annihilation. To indulge a
hope of success with these fearful odds against him would have
been to show a lack of judgment impossible to such a soldier as
Beauregard. The die, however, was cast. There was no means
of avoiding the issue. The only plan left, General Beauregard
thought, was, in appearance, to fight d outrance, so as to deceive
the enemy as to his real intentions, and, so deceiving him, to effect,
at the proper time, an orderly, safe, and honorable retreat. The
victorious army of the day before could leave the battle-field in
no other way. He carefully kept his own counsel, and, from about
noon, issued all his orders accordingly. To show a bold front all
along his line ; to offer as strong a resistance as the nature of the
ground and the condition of his forces would permit; and, if pos
sible, to cross to the south side of the ravines, in front of the
Shiloh meeting-house, which had so effectually protected Sher
man's and Prentiss's commands, on the preceding morning — such
were the objects he now strained every nerve to secure. And the
task before him was difficult, because the least symptom of weak
ness or hesitancy on his part would necessarily increase the bold-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 319
ness of his opponent, and correspondingly depress his new, hardly
organized, and worn-out forces.
Meanwhile, with feelings of anxiety easily understood, he de
spatched couriers to Corinth, to hurry forward General Yan Dorn's
army of about twenty thousand men, daily expected there from
Yan Buren, Arkansas, from which point he had promised to form
a junction with General Beauregard, at the earliest practicable
moment. But the high waters, and want of means of transporta
tion, had greatly delayed Yan Dorn's movement. Had he arrived
in time on the field, General Beauregard's intention was to have
kept about five or six thousand men of that command with him
self, as a reserve, and to have sent Yan Dorn with the rest to at
tack Lew. Wallace's extreme right and rear, while he, Beauregard,
would have attacked both Lew. Wallace and Sherman in front,
with his own left. The fight there could not have lasted long.
He would then have attacked successively, in flank, rear, and front,
McClernand's and McCook's divisions ; and afterwards, the other
divisions towards their left. Had it been possible to execute that
programme, there can be little doubt that the victory, on this sec
ond day of the battle, would have been more complete than on the
first ; and that it would have been ended before Wood's division, of
Buell's army, could have come to the enemy's relief; for it was
nearly dark when that division arrived.
While his couriers were hurrying on their way to Corinth, in
search of news from Yan Dorn's army, General Beauregard, still
biding his time, and unwilling, yet, to hasten the moment of his
predetermined retreat, went on supplying reinforcements to his
front, with stragglers and stray commands collected from the woods
and ravines in his rear. History, we think, furnishes no other ex
ample of a great battle, against such odds, being prolonged over
four hours, with reserves thus brought together and organized.*
* During the late war, General Beauregard's experience of Southern volunteers
convinced him that they furnish the best material for soldiers. Active, in
telligent, brave, self-reliant, and persevering, their powers of endurance are
simply wonderful. After being three months under arms, they become as
trustworthy on the field of battle as veterans ; and no more than six months'
drilling is required to make them as proficient as regulars of two and three
years' service. But they soon consider themselves capable of passing judg
ment on their commanders; and, should these forfeit their confidence, they
grow dissatisfied and intractable, and lose some of their best soldierly qualities.

320 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
At last, however, the drain made upon his feeble resources had ex
hausted them. Stragglers and stray commands could no longer
be found. And just then his couriers arrived from Corinth.
They reported that Yan Dorn was not there, and that his where
abouts was unknown. The time had evidently come when it
was imperative to put the plan of retreat into execution.* Gen
eral Beauregard's hope of Yan Dorn's junction on that day had
been but a fleeting one ; he had regarded it as a thing possible, but
hardly probable. He ordered Colonel Chisolm, one of his aids, to
go immediately to the rear with a company of cavalry, and clear
and repair the roads for any emergency. About an hour later, he
instructed Colonel Jordan, the Adjutant-General of the army, to
select at once a position across the ravine in the rear, for such
troops and batteries as were available to protect the retreat. He
then ordered the corps commanders to be prepared to retire slow
ly and leisurely, but, before doing so, to take the offensive again
with vigor, and drive back the enemy as far as possible, while he
established batteries and posted troops to protect his retiring
forces. After placing a battery in front of the Shiloh meeting
house, and another on the Ridge road, towards the right, he went
in person across the ravine, to examine the location of the troops
intrusted to Colonel Jordan, and he there posted two additional
batteries, the better to cover the retrograde movement, which had
then fairly begun, and was being executed in a very orderly man
ner. General Breckinridge, occupying the centre of the line of
battle, retired first (the adjacent divisions closing up the void
space) and took up his position in rear of the troops and batteries
*A remarkable instance of bravery was shown by a mere boy, about this
time, when matters were looking gloomy, and the stoutest hearts were begin
ning to fail. The meeting-house of Shiloh had been turned into a hospital,
and many of our wounded were collected there to be operated on. General
Beauregard sent one of his aids to have them transferred to the rear, prepara
tory to a retrograde movement. Upon his return the aid reported that while
there, a private (a boy scarcely over fourteen years of age), had come to have
a wound in his hand attended to. While the surgeon was dressing it — the
fighting still going on near by — the boy said : " Make haste, please, doctor, I
want to go back and take another shot at the Yankees." General Beauregard
told his aid to return immediately and ascertain the name of the young hero,
so as to have it published in general orders. It was too late. He had, no
doubt, gone back "to take another shot at the Yankees."

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 321
established across the Shiloh meeting-house ravine, so as to form
the rear guard. Then came the commands of Generals Polk,
Hardee, and Bragg, which gradually withdrew from the field, be
hind General Breckinridge's position, and continued their retreat
in the direction of Corinth, to the points designated to be occupied
by them that night.
General Jordan thus correctly speaks of that retreat in the
"Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," pages 143 and
144: " The battle kindled soon after daylight, and raged furiously from right to
left for more than five hours. And, notwithstanding the odds of fresh troops
brought up against them, despite their long-continued engagement, the Con
federates had not receded from the ground upon which they had been con
centrated, as soon as it was appareut that the battle was in their hands. But
they were being fearfully depleted meanwhile. Beginning the combat with
not more than twenty thousand men, exclusive of cavalry, less than fifteen
thousand were now in the Confederate ranks. General Beauregard, seeing
the unprofitable nature of the struggle, determined not to prolong it. Direct
ing his Adjutant-General to select a position, and post such troops as were
available to cover the retreat, he despatched other staff officers to the corps
commanders, with the order to retire simultaneously from their several posi
tions, ready, however, to turn and fight should it become necessary. And ac
cordingly, about two o'clock (2.30), the retrograde movement of the Confeder
ates was inaugurated and carried out with a steadiness never exceeded by
veterans of a hundred fields.
" During the various stages of the conflict General Beauregard had tried
to use his cavalry, but so dense and broad-spread were the woods that they
proved altogether fruitless of results. . . .
"The retreat had now commenced in earnest, but so stunned and crippled
was the enemy that no effort or pretence to pursue was made. The lino es
tablished to cover the movement commanded the ground of Shiloh church,
and some open fields in the neighborhood ; thence keeping up a vigorous
play of artillery on the woods beyond ; there was no reply, nor did any enemy
become visible. That line was then withdrawn about three fourths of a mile
to another favorable position. Meanwhile, the retreat had been effected in
admirable order, all stragglers falling in the ranks, and that line was abandoned
with no enemy in sight. . . .
" Of trophies the Confederates carried from the field some twenty-six stands
of flags and colors, and about thirty of the guns captured on the 6th. The
guns which figure in Federal subordinate reports as captured from the Con
federates, with few exceptions, were those lost on Sunday by the Federals
which, for want of horses to draw them from the field, had been left by the
Confederates where they had been taken."
General Grant says, in his report :
I.— 21

322 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
" Before the close of the action the advance of General T. J. Wood's division
(two brigades of Buell's corps) arrived in time to take part in the action.
" My force was too much fatigued from two days' hard fighting and ex
posure in the open air to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to
pursue immediately. Night closed in cloudy and with a heavy rain, making
the roads impracticable for artillery by the next morning.
" General Sherman, however, followed the enemy, finding that the main
part of the army had retreated in good order."
But General Sherman, in his report, uses the following lan-

" At the time of recovering our camps (about four o'clock p. m.) our men
were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreating masses of the enemy."
And General Buell says, in his report :
" Two brigades of General Wood's division arrived just at the close of the
battle ; but only one, that of Colonel Wagner, in time to participate actively
in the pursuit, which it continued for about a mile, and until halted by my
order." If any pursuit beyond the Shiloh meeting-house was made by
the Federals on the afternoon of the 7th, it must have been made
very cautiously, for the Confederates were not at all disturbed in
their slow and quiet retreat. General Breckinridge, commanding
the reserve, bivouacked for the night near the former headquarters
i of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, on the night of the 5th, at
about one and a half miles from the battle-field. The next morn
ing (on the 8th) he fell back to a position only three miles farther
to the rear, where he remained undisturbed for several days, with
the cavalry thrown out well to the front, in close proximity to the
Federal lines.
On the morning of the 8th, General Sherman, with two brigades
and some cavalry, advanced to reconnoitre, on the lower Corinth
road, while General Wood, with two brigades, reconnoitred on the
upper road. On arriving at General Breckinridge's bivouac of
the preceding night they found our cavalry pickets in position,
and pursued them for about half a mile with a regiment of cavalry
and one of infantry. At that point Colonel Forrest appeared,
and charged the enemy with a part of his forces, a company of
Wirt Adams's regiment, a squadron of the 8th Texas, and some
Kentuckians, under Captain John Morgan, amounting in all to
about three hundred and fifty troopers. The Federals were thrown
into great confusion, and routed ; " although," says General Sher-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 323
man, in his report, " the ground was admirably adapted for a de
fence of infantry against cavalry, being miry, and covered with
fallen timber." Their loss amounted to fifteen killed, about
twenty-five wounded, and some seventy prisoners. The Confed
erates pursuing too vigorously, and coming suddenly on the bri
gades of Federal infantry, were repulsed, after the. brave and dash
ing Forrest had been severely wounded in the side. His:command
then retired, followed a short distance by some of the enemy's
cavalry, towards General Breckinridge's encampment, at Mickey's
farm, only about two and a half miles from the point of collision.
General Sherman concludes his report, dated on the day of this
encounter, as follows : " The check sustained by us at the fallen
timber delayed our advance, so that night came upon us before
the wounded were provided for and the dead buried ; and our
troops being fagged out * by two days' liard. fighting, exposure, and
privation,! ordered them back to their camps, where they now are."
We discover here two oversights on General Sherman's part.
The short conflict referred' to occurred early in the morning, and
there was certainly ample time in which to bury fifteen dead and
remove twenty-five wounded. And the two brigades of Wood's
division, of Buell's army, which accompanied his command, had
taken but little part in the battle of the preceding day, having ar
rived on the field about the time the battle terminated.
The remainder of the Confederate forces, sorely disappointed,
but not without heart, returned from Shiloh to their former posi
tions at and about Corinth, to recruit and reorganize, and to await
a favorable opportunity of striking another blow at their antago
nists. The loss on the Confederate side was unusually heavy, but this
was due to the fact that it had been the assailant all day on the
6th, and very often on the 7th. The army under Generals John
ston and Beauregard had gone into the battle with thirty-nine
thousand six hundred and thirty men of all arms and condition,
and it received no reinforcements during the two days' fight, ex
cept Colonel Hill's Tennessee regiment, which reached the front
unarmed on the morning of the 6th, and was furnished with arms
and equipments picked up on the field. This regiment swelled

They could not have been more "fagged out" than their adversaries

were.

324 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
the Confederate numbers to about forty thousand men. Our loss
was 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, and 959 missing; presenting an
aggregate of 10,699, or, in killed and wounded, twenty-four and one
third per cent, of those present on the field. This is a very re
markable proportion, in view of the rawness of most of the troops,
and the nature of the ground upon which the battle was fought.
It is about the greatest average ever attained in any single contest
between veteran armies,* and in most instances the defeated army
is either completely routed or unfit for another campaign until
largely reinforced.
The Federals commenced the battle, on the 6th, with over forty
thousand men of all arms, and were reinforced that day by the
timely arrival of Ammen's brigade, of General Buell's army. . Dur
ing the night of the 6th and the next morning they were rein
forced again, by Lew. Wallace's division of General Grant's army;
by three divisions (Crittenden's, McCook's, and Nelson's two other
brigades) of General Buell's army ; and, towards the end of the
second day's battle, by two brigades of Wood's division of, the
same army, f which brought up the number of fresh Federal troops,
on the 7th, to over thirty-two thousand men of all arms. Our
computation is based on the fact that these divisions contained no
less than seven thousand men each, as is established by General
Yan Home, in his " History of the Army of the Cumberland,"
vol. i. p. 99, where the following passage is found:
" The 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions, commanded respectively by Briga
dier-Generals Thomas, McCook, Nelson, Crittenden, and Wood, with a contin
gent force of cavalry, in all thirty-seven thousand effective men, constituted
the main army, which, under the personal command of General Buell, was to
join General Halleck in the projected movement against the enemy at Corinth,
Mississippi." The total force of the Federals on both days amounted, there
fore, to about seventy-two thousand men of all arms, and their
losses were, according to official reports — in General Grant's army,
* Those losses generally vary from one twentieth, or five per cent., to one
fourth, or twenty-five per cent., of the troops engaged. The British, at Wa
terloo, lost not quite one sixth, or only sixteen per cent. The Austrians, at Ma
genta, lost only one thirteenth, that is, not quite eight per cent. ; and the Prus
sian loss at Sadowa was remarkably small, being only one twentieth, or five
per cent.
t See Generals Grant's and Buell's Reports.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 325
1437 killed, 5679 wounded, and 2934 prisoners ; in General Buell's
army, 236 killed, 1816 wounded, and 88 prisoners; making 1673
killed, 7495 wounded", and 3022 prisoners, or a grand total of
12,190. Thus the proportion of killed and wounded, on the Fed
eral side, as compared to the number of troops present on the
field, was nearly thirteen per cent., which is about the ordinary
proportion in modern warfare.

326 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XXII.
Commentaries on the Battle of Shiloh : I. Why Generals Johnston and Beau
regard did not Sooner Move the Army from Corinth. — II. Their Reasons
for Forming their Lines of Battle as they did. — III. Why the Con
federate Attack was Made Chiefly on the Enemy's Right, and not on
his Entire Front. — IV. Demonstration of the Fact that the Confederate
Attack took the Enemy Completely by Surprise. — V. General Beau
regard's Opinion and Criticism of General Sherman's Tactics during the
Battle. — VI. Refutation of the Charge that the Confederate Troops were
Withdrawn too soon from the Battle-field on the Evening of the 6th. —
Comparison Drawn by Mr. Davis between General A. S. Johnston and
Marshal Turenne.— VII. General Beauregard's Opinion as to the Fight
ing of the Confederates during the Battle of the 7th. — VIII. Correction
of the Absurd Story that General Beauregard did not Leave his Am
bulance during the First Day of the Battle, and, when Informed of Gen
eral Johnston's Death, " Quietly Remained where he was, Waiting the
Issue of Events." I.
Geneeals Johnston and Beauregard have both been censured
for not moving sooner and more rapidly from Corinth, to attack
the Federals at Pittsburg Landing, so as to anticipate General
Buell's junction with General Grant. The causes of this delay,
as already given in the preceding chapters, sufficiently absolve
the two Confederate commanders from any just blame. The read
er will pardon us for briefly reverting to them.
General Beauregard, it will be remembered, only arrived at
Jackson, Tennessee, on the 17th of February. General Polk, with
about fourteen thousand five hundred men of all arms, was in
command in that military district. Four days after General Beau
regard's arrival, and before he had yet formally assumed com
mand, he despatched five officers of his staff to the governors of
Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, to ascertain wheth
er they could send him, at Corinth, the State troops fhey had
available at that time ; and he also requested General Johnston,
who was then at Murfreesboro', retiring, with some fifteen thou-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 327
sand men, from Bowling Green and Nashville, to Stevenson, to
change the direction of his retreat to Decatur, Alabama, that he
might more readily form a junction with the forces at Corinth, at
the proper time. To this request, General Johnston willingly ac
ceded. By the 27th of March, with our defective means of transporta
tion, and restricted supplies of all kinds, General Beauregard had
assembled, at and about Corinth, an army of over forty thousand
men, exclusive of some nine thousand occupying the Mississippi
River defences, at New Madrid, Island No. 10, and Fort Pillow.
And General Yan Dorn, at Beauregard's request, was moving rap
idly from Yan Buren, Arkansas, with an army of nearly twenty
thousand men, to unite also with General Beauregard at Corinth.
He would have arrived in time to take a part in the battle of Shi
loh, had he not been delayed by high waters, which prevented his
marching to Memphis, when he could not immediately procure suf
ficient river transportation. Even with these obstacles to overcome,
General Yan Dorn's troops commenced arriving at Memphis on
the 10th of April, only three days after the battle of Shiloh. How
different might have been the result, had he arrived in time !
Great difficulties were encountered in organizing and supplying
so many troops, hastily gathered up from such remote points. These
difficulties were increased by the want of experienced officers, to
take charge of the brigades and divisions as soon as formed. A
delay of one or two days may be attributed to that cause alone.
The War Department had promised General Beauregard a certain
number of officers, below the rank of brigadier-generals, designa
ted by him, from his army of the Potomac, so as to assist in or
ganizing the troops of his new command, if needed ; but that
promise was only partly complied with, and much too late.
Generals Johnston and Beauregard intended to move from Cor
inth, on or about the 1st of April, with the hope of beginning
their attack against the Federals on the morning of the 3d, at
latest ; whereas they were not able to leave until the latter day,
and did not got into position before the afternoon of the 5th, at
too advanced an hour to open the attack immediately. With
better disciplined troops, the march of less than eighteen miles
could have been made in one day ; but two of our corps, Generals
Polk's and Bragg's, which had been recently organized, were most
ly composed of commands not yet used to marching. General

328 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Polk's corps was, besides, rather slow in starting ; and we were
two days in passing over that short distance.
II.
It has pleased some hypercritical military writers, also, to criticise
severely the order of battle adopted at Shiloh. They think that
a great mistake was made, in deploying the different corps, in sue.
cessive lines,* along the whole front of battle, instead of intrust
ing a part of that front to each corps, itself formed on several
lines. The first merit of a commander is, to be able to adapt the means
at his disposal to the circumstances in which he is placed, and
to apply them, in the simplest manner possible, to the accom
plishment of the object in view. Our " corps" were thus designa
ted, not only for the purpose of deceiving the enemy as to the
number of our troops, which we wished to exaggerate, but also to
inspire our own men with greater confidence. The truth is, that
these corps were properly " divisions," at least in size, and were
composed only of from four to five brigades, averaging each about
two thousand infantry, so that the first line, General Hardee's,
consisting of four brigades, contained some eight thousand five
hundred bayonets, and the second line — five hundred yards in
rear of the first — consisting of five brigades, under General Bragg,
had about fifteen hundred more bayonets, or nearly ten thousand
in all. General Polk's corps and General Breckinridge's division
composed the first of four brigades, numbering not over eight
thousand five hundred men, and the second, of about six thousand,
gave a total of less than thirty-five thousand infantry. The forces
of Generals Polk and Breckinridge were formed in columns of
brigades, at proper intervals, in rear of the second line of battle.
Our front was therefore of limited extent for one command, com
pared to many other fronts of battle subsequently used during
tire war, especially in Yirginia, with the corps of Generals Jack
son and Longstreet.
General Hardee's command, used to marching and moving as an
organized body, under that cool and gallant officer, constituted
* Only two corps, Generals Hardee's and Bragg's, were thus deployed; the
other two, Generals Polk's and Breckinridge's, were in columns of brigades,
supporting each wing.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 329
the front line of battle, to secure unity of action, during what
was expected to be a surprise. General Bragg's troops were
equally well disciplined as regiments, but were unused to march
ing by brigades, and many of his regiments had never before
been under his orders. It was supposed that, in a broken and
wooded country, they might very well follow and support General
Hardee's lines, but might not do so well if deployed to form the
immediate front. General Polk's command, recently organized,
was even less prepared to occupy such a position. Breckinridge's
division was composed of excellent material, and could march
well, having lately retreated from Kentucky and middle Tennes
see, with General Hardee's corps ; hence, it was thought advisable,
at first, to hold it in reserve for any emergency which might hap
pen on any distant part of the field.
That the commands got very much broken and mixed up dur
ing the battle was not surprising, and was due less to the order of
battle than to the rawness of the troops, including officers, the
broken and wooded nature of the field, and the severity of the
contest. General Beauregard is of opinion that any other order
of battle would have resulted similarly, under like circumstances.
The Federals were also in the same mixed-up condition, according
to their own reports, when the battle had lasted only a few hours.
At the close of the first battle of Manassas, the Confederates, who
had fought on the defensive, in a single line of battle, owing to
the want of troops, were nearly as badly disorganized as the army
at Shiloh was. General Beauregard says that he has often seen
new troops when attempting to manoeuvre, even on level ground,
get so thoroughly mixed up in a few moments that a long time
was required to disentangle them. It may be true that our re
serves were engaged somewhat too early in the action ; but this
was done to save time, as success depended on the rapid execution
of the offensive, and to prevent the enemy from reorganizing and
concentrating for the defensive. III.
Another objection raised against the attack at Shiloh is, that it
was made to bear too much on the Federal left, which brought
the Confederates in too close proximity to the Tennessee River,
where their right flank became exposed to the fire of the enemy's
two gunboats.

33.0 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
The attack was made oblique on the right, as has been already
stated in the narrative of the battle, in order to get on better
ground, towards the ridge separating the waters which flow into
Lick Creek from those which empty into Owl Creek. This ar
rangement enabled us, besides, to take the Federal encampments
more in flank than would have been possible by a direct attack.
The country was too much broken and too heavily wooded to
justify much fear of the gunboats in the river. They could not
have distinguished friends from foes, except at a short distance,
and they would have had to fire at random. We expected to back
the Federals against Owl and Snake Creeks — the two narrow and
rickety bridges of which could not have stood heavy pressure —
early in the day, without incurring much risk from the gunboats.
It was only late ou the afternoon of the 6th, when attacking Pitts
burg Landing itself, that our right flank became really exposed to
their fire, and our attack was checked, principally, by the water
in the creeks and ravines which empty into the Tennessee River.
It must be remembered that the Confederates had no accurate
knowledge of the ground occupied by the Federals, and they had
no proper staff officers to make the necessary reconnoissances, if
practicable. The expedition was intended to be a surprise, and
they feared to arouse the suspicions of the enemy by a forced
reconnoissance : hence, they preferred to take the risk attending
an imperfect knowledge of the ground over which they had to
operate, rather than incur the danger of giving timely warning
of the attack to the enemy. War is usually a contest of chances,
and he who fears to incur any risk seldom accomplishes great re
sults. It is possible that, if we had had an army of veterans and had
possessed a thorough knowledge of the Federal positions, we
might have attacked in a different manner. At any rate, we
would have so extended our left as to engage Sherman's troops
shortly after we attacked Prentiss's, which would have given the
former less time to prepare for the onslaught. There is no doubt
that, at early dawn, Sherman was no better prepared than Pren
tiss to receive an attack. But General Beauregard had been as
sured, while collecting information at Corinth for the movement,
that the distance between Owl and Lick Creeks, near the Shiloh
meeting-house, was about two miles, whereas it was more nearly
three : hence our front was not sufficiently extended to attack,

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 331
in rapid succession, the whole Federal front, a circumstance which
gave Sherman time hastily to form his division to oppose us ; and
on this fact he bases his denial of having been surprised by the
Confederates. IY.
Our narrative of the movement from Corinth to Shiloh has
clearly established the surprise of the Federals on that occasion.
When an army of nearly forty thousand men advances to within
a mile and a half of an enemy's encampments; establishes lines
of battle in the woods in his front, during a whole afternoon ;
bivouacs all night in that position without being disturbed, and
the next morning advances at leisure, in line of battle, to within
sight of those encampments, without meeting any serious opposi
tion, it is absurd to deny that a surprise is effected; otherwise,
there is evidently no attack in war that can be thus designated.
If the attack was not a surprise, how can General Sherman ac
count for the success achieved against Prentiss, in about one hour,
and against himself in about two hours, by a force not well or
ganized, badly armed, and worse equipped ? He says, in his " Me
moirs," p. 233, of the general position at Pittsburg Landing :
" The ground itself admits of easy defence by a small command, and yet af
fords admirable camping ground for a hundred thousand men."
Again, on page 229 :
" We did not fortify our camps against an attack, because we had no orders
to do so, and because such a course would have made our raw men timid.
The position was naturally strong, with Snake Creek on our right, a deep,
bold stream, with a confluent (Owl Creek) to our right front; and Lick Creek,
with a similar confluent, on our left ; thus narrowing the space over which we
could be attacked to about a mile and a half or two miles."
In his report of the battle, he says of his own position near the
Shiloh meeting-house :
" The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream that rises in the
field in front of Appier's camp, and flows to the north along my whole front.
This valley afforded the enemy partial cover ; but our men were so posted as
to have a good fire at them as they crossed the valley and ascended the rising
ground on our side."
In his testimony at the trial of Colonel Worthington, an officer
of his command, in August, 1862, he said:
"And here I mention, for future history, that our right flank was well

332 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
guarded by Owl and Snake Creeks, our left by Lick Creek, leaving us simply
to guard our front. No stronger position was ever held by an army. . . . But
even as we were on the 6th of April, you might search the world over and
not find a more advantageous field of battle — flanks well protected, and never
threatened, troops in easy support, timber and broken ground giving good
points to rally; and the proof is that forty-three thousand men, of whom at
least ten thousand ran away, held their ground against sixty thousand chosen
troops* of the South with their best leaders. On Friday the 4th, nor officer,
nor soldier, not even Colonel Worthington, looked for an attack, as I can
prove." Now, what forces had he and General Prentiss with which to
hold and defend their impregnable positions? Sherman had
three of his brigades of infantry, three batteries of six pieces each,
and some cavalry, and was reinforced by one brigade of McCler
nand's division, making in all over nine thousand men ; and General
Prentiss had three brigades of infantry and two batteries, or about
six thousand men — together they had over fifteen thousand men.
Their positions were carried in from one to two hours by Har
dee's corps of four brigades, numbering nine thousand and twenty-
four infantry and artillery, assisted by Bragg's five brigades, ten
thousand seven hundred and thirty-one infantry and artillery, and
by two brigades of Polk's corps, about four thousand five hundred
men, or, in all, less than twenty-five thousand. Polk's other two
brigades and Breckinridge's division of three brigades took no part
in this first attack. Is it probable that the Federals, who fought
so gallantly during the rest of that day, would have been driven so
soon from such a stronghold as is described by General Sherman, if
they had not been surprised ? But the reports of several of Gen
eral Sherman's own brigade commanders show conclusively that
the Confederate attack, on the morning of the 6th, came upon
them quite unexpectedly. A remarkable circumstance is, that
General Sherman had then no cavalry pickets in advance of his
encampments, having forgotten, apparently, that cavalry is "the
eye of an army." His infantry pickets and guards were so few
and close to his first line of sentinels as not to be able to delay
our advance, or give timely notice of our approach. General
Sherman says also, in his report :
* The Confederates numbered not quite forty thousand men, and about one
third of this force was composed of newly formed regiments, very recently
armed.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 333
"On Saturday (5th) the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well
down to our front, yet I did not believe they designed anything but a strong
demonstration." And further on he adds :
About 8 A. m. (Sunday) I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of
infantry, to our left front, in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to,
and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined
attack on our whole camp."
Major Bicker says that, after reporting to General Sherman a
reconnoissance he had made on the day preceding the battle :
" I told him I had met and fought the advance of Beauregard's army, and
that he was advancing on us. General Sherman remarked, 'It could not be
possible ; Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations to
attack us in ours — mere reconnoissance in force.' " *
But Generals Sherman and Prentiss were not the only com
manding officers surprised by Beauregard's "foolish" attack.
Generals Halleck, Grant, and Buell seem to have been equally
unprepared for his sudden onslaught. General Buell, with five
divisions of his army, well organized and fully equipped, num
bering at least thirty-seven thousand men of all arms, had left
Nashville from the 15th to the 20th of March, to form a junction
at his leisure with Grant at Savannah, via Columbia, Mount Pleas
ant, and Waynesboro. He was delayed several days at Columbia
by high water in Duck River, the bridge having been destroyed
by the Confederates. While there he first heard, on or about the
29th of March, that Grant's army had moved to Pittsburg Land
ing, on the left bank of the Tennessee River. General Buell re
sumed his march on the 31st, intending — having obtained the ap
proval of General Halleck — "to stop for cleaning up and rest at
Waynesboro ;" he had not yet received any intimation that Gen
eral Grant was in danger, or that he (Buell) should hurry up with
his forces.
But in order that we may not be suspected of a disposition to
be unfair towards the distinguished generals referred to, we quote
from Yan Home's " History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol.
i. pp. 102 et seq., as follows :
* See Boynton's " Sherman's Historical Raid," pp. 33, 34, for further extracts
from official records.

334 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
" General Buell had not yet * received an intimation that General Grant was
in any danger, or that there was need of haste in the movement of his army,
and, desiring to have his forces in good shape to meet a comrade army, ob
tained permission from General Halleck to stop for rest at Waynesboro. The
army commander had also under consideration the propriety of moving to
Hamburg, above Pittsburg Landing, and thence to the place of conjunction.
Stronger evidence could not be adduced than this project of stopping at
Waynesboro, that neither General Halleck nor General Buell, at this time,
thought that there was anything actual, probable, or possible, in the situa
tion at Pittsburg Landing, to demand the hurried advance of the army of the
Ohio. But General Nelson [commanding the leading division], ignorant of
this proposal to halt at Waynesboro, and alive to the probability of an early
attack upon General Grant, hurried through the place for rest and trimming
up for a handsome introduction to the Army of the Tennessee, and, by sweep
ing impetuously on the road to Savannah, he both defeated the deflection
towards Hamburg and the halt at Waynesboro ; for before General Buell
thought it necessary to give orders to Nelson, other divisions, to which the
speed of the first had been communicated, were also beyond Waynesboro, and
could not then be recalled.
"That General Grant felt secure at this time is equally manifest. Tele
graphic communications between him and Nelson were established on the 3d
of April. The latter telegraphed that he could be at Savannah with his
division on the 5th. On the 4th, General Grant replied that he need not
hasten his march, as transports to convey him to Pittsburg Landing would
not be ready before the 8th. Nevertheless, Nelson hastened on, and it was well
he did, for he gave motion to the whole army behind him, and General John
ston was even then on the march from Corinth, with his entire army, to crush
General Grant before General Buell could give him assistance. . . .
" A variety of facts support the assumption that neither General Halleck,
General Grant, nor the division commanders on the field beyond Pittsburg
Landing, had the remotest expectation that the enemy would advance in of
fence from Corinth with full strength. General Halleck proposed to com
mand the united armies in their advance upon Corinth, and yet he was not
to leave his headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, until the 7th. On the 5th,
General Sherman, though not the senior division commander, yet virtually so,
from the confidence reposed in him by General Grant, telegraphed to the
latter : ' All is quiet along my lines now ; the enemy has cavalry in our front,
and I think there are two regiments and one battery six miles out.'t Again:
' I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket firing.
The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our
* On the 31st of March.
t The Confederates were then within that distance with their whole army
of nearly forty thousand men, and they formed their lines of battle that after
noon about a mile and a half in his front. They had passed the night of the
4th at Monterey, only nine miles from his headquarters.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 335
pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with a certainty of advantage,
and I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our position.'
" General Grant telegraphed the same day as follows : ' The main force of
the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points east. . . . The num
ber of men at Corinth, and within supporting distance of it, cannot be far
from eighty thousand men. Some skirmishing took place between our out-
guards and the enemy's yesterday and the day before. ... I have scarcely
the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be
prepared, should such a thing take place. ... It is my present intention to
send them (Buell's three foremost divisions) to Hamburg, some four miles
above Pittsburg, when they all get here.' . . .
" They [the Federal divisions at Pittsburg Landing] were widely separated,
and did not sustain such relations to each other that it was possible to form
quickly a connected defensive line. . . . They had no defences and no desig
nated line for defence in the event of a sudden attack, and there was no gen
eral on the field to take, by special authority, the command of the whole
force in an emergency.
" While the national army was unprepared for battle and unexpectant
of such an event, and was passing the night of the 5th in fancied security,
Johnston's army of forty thousand men was in close proximity, and ready for
the bloody revelation of its presence and purpose on the following morning.
. . . Early on the morning of the 6th of April, a Sabbath day of unusual
brightness, cannonading in the direction of Pittsburg Landing was distinctly
heard at Savannah. General Grant supposed that it indicated an attack upon
his most advanced positions, and, not waiting to meet General Buell, as he
had appointed, and not leaving any instructions or suggestions for his guid
ance in moving his army to the field, or even expressing a desire that he
should give him support, he gave an order to General Nelson to march his
division up to Pittsburg Landing, and, taking a steamer, hastened towards the
noise of battle. He did, however, advise General Buell, by note, that an at
tack had been made, whose occurrence he had not anticipated before Monday
or Tuesday; apologized for not meeting him, as he had contemplated, and
mentioned the fact that he had ordered General Nelson to move with his di
vision ' to opposite Pittsburg Landing.' The omission to request him to take
any other divisions to the field, or even to hasten their march to Savannah,
must be accepted as conclusive that General Grant did not at the time antici
pate such a battle as would require the assistance of other portions of the
Army of the Ohio. ... He [General Buell] subsequently received a note from
General Grant, addressed to the commanding officer, advanced forces, near
Pittsburg, Tennessee, advising him that his forces had been engaged since
early morning, contending against an army estimated at a hundred thousand
men, and that the introduction of fresh troops upon the field would inspire
his men and dishearten the enemy."
General Sherman's vain effort to show that he was ready for
the Confederate attack on the morning of the 6th contradicts his

336 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
former statements. It certainly weakens in nothing the prepon
derance of evidence offered by us, nor does it, in any way, impair
the force of what is said in Yan Home's " History of the Army
of the Cumberland." The discussion of this point has made it
clear that not only Sherman's division, but the entire Federal
army, was taken by surprise. That General Sherman should deny
it to-da}', with such bitterness of feeling towards those who prefer
the testimony of facts to his unsubstantiated assertions, seems the
result of an after-thought, which involves him in inconsistency.
In Badeau's " Military History of U. S. Grant " we read as fol
lows :*
"... On the 4th (April) the enemy felt Sherman's front in force, but noth
ing serious came of it, and the opinion of that commander was decided that
no probability of an immediate engagement existed. Grant rode out on the
day after (the 5th) to Sherman's lines, and concurred with him in this judg
ment. They were both mistaken, for the skirmish was the reconnoissance of
the enemy, preliminary to the battle of Shiloh. This affair, however, awoke
attention, and put both officers and men on the alert."
These are conflicting statements. How could " both officers
and men " be " on the alert " — that is to say, ready for an attack
on that morning — when the commanding general himself did "not
anticipate" any such attack; and when he and General Sherman
believed that no immediate engagement was likely to take place?
Were "the officers and men " of the Federal army better informed
than their commanding generals ? A few of them were, and even
ventured to suggest their fears to some of their commanders, but
they were rebuked for their presumption.
The Federal army could not have been "on the alert" and
ready, at that time, to meet the onset of the Confederate army,
for the simple and additional reason that, when our troops swept
into the enemy's encampments, most of the men off duty were
found at their morning meal, some loitering about their regi
mental grounds, some lying in their tents, while others were busi
ly attending to the nearly cooked bread which then filled their
well-lit ovens. This utter absence of preparation, obvious to all
the first assaulting Confederate columns, shows how secure the
enemy thought himself, and how little generals, officers, and men
dreamed of an attack on that day.
* Vol. i. pp. 71, 72.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 337
General Grant was evidently much mistaken as to the number
of the Confederates ; but, in war, one is very apt to judge of the
strength of an adversary by the severity of the blows he inflicts.
If General Grant really believed that his enemy was as strong as
his despatches of that period state, was he not at fault in having
landed his army on the exposed side of a wide and deep river,
when that enemy lay at so short a distance — only twenty-two
miles? Was he not to blame for leaving his entire front unpro
tected by field-works, and for neglecting to throw out all the cav
alry at his disposal, as far in his front and on his flanks as possi
ble ? But in his letter* to General Halleck, sent from Savannah,
April 5th, he said :
" General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two of General Buell's
column will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my present intention to
send them to Hamburg, some four or five miles above Pittsburg, when they
all get here. From that point to Corinth the road is good, and a junction
can be formed with the troops from Pittsburg at almost any point."
He proposed thus to violate two important maxims of war:
first, by dividing his forces and isolating a part of them — with a
broad and deep stream behind them, and a small one (Lick Creek)
separating the two bodies from each other — at a still shorter distance
than that which lay between Pittsburg Landing and the enemy at
Corinth, supposed to be eighty thousand strong ; secondly, by pro
posing to form the junction of his forces at a point even nearer to
the enemy than Pittsburg Landing. In such a case the tempta
tion to seize the opportunity for their separate destruction would
have been too great for even a non-aggressive adversary to re
sist. If General Grant had had time to carry out his intention, Gen
erals Johnston and Beauregard — guarding well the crossings of
Lick Creek, on its south side — would have concentrated all their
available forces against General Buell's first three divisions, which
would have been destroyed before they could have been rein
forced, either by his other two divisions or by troops from Pitts
burg Landing. Then the Confederate commanders would have
attacked General Grant himself, with all the chances of success in
their favor, especially if, meanwhile, Yan Dorn could have joined
them (as already instructed) with his forces from Arkansas.
* See Boynton, " Sherman's Historical Raid," p. CO.
I.— 22

338 MILITARY OPERATIONS OE
Y.
General Beauregard is of opinion that General Sherman com
mitted a grave error by protracting, as he did, the defence of the
position he held at the Shiloh meeting-house. When, at 8 a.m., he
" became satisfied, for the first time, that the enemy designed a
determined attack on his whole camp " — knowing his unprepared
condition to offer a long resistance — he should have " made a vir
tue of necessity," and, instead of calling on McClernand, in his
rear, to come to his assistance, he should have ordered or request
ed him, Wallace, and Hurlbut, to select at once a strong defensive
position near the former's camps (and there were many such), on
which Prentiss and himself could retire at the proper moment.
And when, at about 9 a.m., he "judged that Prentiss was falling
back," which exposed the left flank of his own two remaining bri
gades to the concentrated attack of the Confederates, he should
have retired, fighting, on the right of the defensive position occu
pied by the three divisions of McClernand, Wallace, and Hurl
but, behind which his and Prentiss's shattered troops could have
rallied as a reserve, increased by his fourth brigade— Stewart's — -
which, on his first arrival at the Landing, he had imprudently de
tached, over two miles to his left rear, to guard a bridge across
Lick Creek. That bridge might very well have been protected by
a small force of cavalry and a section of artillery. The Federals
would thus have presented a united front, in a strong position, as
an effective barrier to the headlong and disjointed attacks of the
Confederates, who would necessarily have been in some confusion
from their march through the woods and across the ravines, and
their assault on the first line of Federal encampments. As it
was, in their pursuit of Sherman's and Prentiss's commands, they
caught, " on the wing" and in succession, the divisions of McCler
nand, Wallace, and Hurlbut, who offered a gallant but ineffectual
resistance to the persistent and determined attacks of the elated
Confederates. This error of General Sherman is, however, one that is often
committed in an active campaign. Two memorable examples oc
curred in the late Franco -Prussian war, which cost France, be
sides her high military renown, the provinces of Alsace and Lor
raine, and one billion of dollars.
On the 4th of August, 1870, three Prussian divisions, of the

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 339
Crown Prince's army, surprised and crushed, at Wissembourg, on
the Sarre River, one division of McMahon's corps (the 1st) of
thirty-six thousand men, which formed the right wing of the
French army, composed of the eTite of the French troops. Two
days afterwards the Crown Prince attacked again, suddenly, the
remainder of the French corps, at Woerth, a few miles back from
Wissembourg. The other two corps, 5th and 7th of McMahon's
army, were not quite within supporting distance, and instead of
opposing his overpowering adversary in such a manner only as to
give time to those two corps to concentrate on a good defensive
position in his rear, he made a determined stand at Woerth, call
ing on them to hurry up to his assistance. Only two divisions
of the 5th corps (De Failly's) reached him in time to take part
in the desperate struggle then going on. But his gallant troops
were nearly annihilated, and he was compelled to retire to the
fortified and distant camp of Chalons, to recruit and reorganize
another army, which was lost shortly afterwards at Sedan.
The left wing of the French army met with nearly the same
fate. It consisted of five corps, scattered along the frontier in ad
vance of Metz, all under the immediate direction of the French
Emperor, Napoleon III., whose headquarters were established in
that fortified city. Three Prussian corps, under General Yon
Steinmetz, suddenly appeared at Sarrebriick, on the Sarre River,
which they crossed rapidly, and, on the 6th, surprised the 2d
French corps (Frossard's) at Speicheren, where another desperate
engagement ensued while awaiting the support of the other four
French corps. These arrived, however, in the vicinity only in
time to be caught "on the wing," and had to fall back in great
haste towards Metz — in a divergent direction from McMahon's line
of retreat — where they were finally surrounded, and compelled to
surrender, with Marshal Bazaine, October 29th, 1870, after an he
roic but useless defense, so far as regarded the safety of France.
General Beauregard is of opinion that, had the Confederates
been in better fighting condition, the corresponding error of Sher
man would have ended the battle of Shiloh long before Buell
could have come to the assistance of the Federals, and a decisive
victory would then have enabled the Confederates to take the of
fensive in middle Tennessee and Kentucky, with far greater re
sults than those obtained, at first, by General Bragg, a few months
later.

340 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
YI.
The blame for having withdrawn the Confederate troops too
soon from the fight, on the evening of the 6th, "just as" — it is
alleged — " a last concentrated effort was about to be made by
some of the subordinate commanders," has, we think, been conclu
sively refuted in the narrative of the battle. That charge is en
tirely disproved by the reports of brigade and regimental com
manders. The cessation of hostilities was not ordered until " a
last concentrated effort " had been made shortly after 4 p. m.,
under General Beauregard's own eyes, and not until he was satis
fied, from the condition of his troops, that no further attack on
our part would meet with success, especially after the opening of
Webster's reserved Federal batteries, supported by reinforcements,
as the rolls of infantry fire clearly indicated. It was not until then,
about 6 p. m., shortly before sunset, that the order was given to
cease the contest, and collect and reorganize the various com
mands, before it should be too dark to carry out the order effec
tually. But before these instructions could be generally distrib
uted, the fighting had, in reality, ceased on the greater part of the
field. As an additional proof that the order was not given too
soon, it is a positive fact that the brigades and divisions of the dif
ferent commands, especially Bragg's and Hardee's, were not col
lected and reorganized in time to meet the Federal attack, on the
next morning. The true reason, besides the rawness of our officers
and men, why we were not able to complete our victory on the
6th, is correctly given, by the Adjutant-General of the Confeder
ate army at Shiloh, in his " Campaigns of Lieutenant-General For
rest," p. 151, as follows :
" After the combat was at its height, about meridian, those superior officers
who should have been occupied with the concentration and continuous pro
jection of their troops in heavy masses upon the- shattered Federal divisions,
were at the very front and 'perilous edge' of the battle, leading forward regi
ments, perchance brigades, into action, with great individual intrepidity, and
doing a great deal, no doubt, by their personal example, to impel small bodies
forward. But, meanwhile, to their rear were left the masses of their respective
commands, without direction, and thus precious time was lost. The Confed
erates were not kept continuously massed and employed, either in corps or
divisions ; mere piecemeal onsets were the general method of fighting after
12 o'clock (on the 6th), with this consequence : Sherman was enabled to
make several obstinate, powerful stands, by which he protracted the battle

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 341
some hours. Had the corps been held well in hand, massed and pressed con
tinuously upon the tottering, demoralized foe ; had general officers attended to
the swing and direction of the great ' war-engine ' at their disposition, rather
than, as it were, becoming ' so many heads or battering-rams of that machine,'
the battle assuredly would have closed at latest by mid-day. By that hour, at
most, the whole Federal force might have been urged back and penned up,
utterly helpless, in the angle formed between the river and Lick (or Snake)
Creek, or dispersed along the river bank, between the two creeks ; we repeat,
that had the Confederate corps been kept in continuity, closely pressed en
masse upon the enemy, after the front line had been broken and swept back,
the Federal fragments must have been kept in a downward movement, like
the loose stones in the bed of a mountain torrent."
Before leaving this part of our subject it is proper, we think,
to direct attention to the comparison, drawn by Mr. Davis, be
tween General Albert Sidney Johnston and Marshal Turenne, with
reference to the battle of Shiloh. Says Mr. Davis : *
" To take an example far from us, in time and place, when Turenne had,
after months of successful manoeuvring, finally forced his enemy into a position
which gave assurance of victory, and had marshalled his forces for a decisive
battle, he was, when making a preliminary reconnoissance, killed by a chance
shot ; then his successor, instead of attacking, retreated, and all which the
one had gained for France the other lost."
The falsity of the comparison is too flagrant to need more than
a passing notice. First, it was at the suggestion of General Beaure
gard that General Johnston had marched his small army to Cor
inth, in order to form a junction there, and fight the battle of
Shiloh, not " after months of successful manoeuvring,'1 as was the
case with Marshal Turenne, but, on the contrary, after months of
irreparable disasters, which had brought the country to the brink
of despair, and led General Johnston to believe that he had lost
the confidence of both the people and the army. Second, it was
General Beauregard — not General Johnston — who " had marshalled
our forces for a decisive battle " at Pittsburg Landing, as has been
already fully and clearly established. Third, when the commanding
general fell, the battle had been in progress fully eight hours. His
"successor" continued the attack, with all the vigor and energy
possible, as long as daylight and the physical condition of his men
allowed him to do so. He renewed the attack the next day ; and
only began his masterly retreat because the enemy in his front had
been reinforced with overwhelming numbers. Fourth, the victory
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii. p. 68.

342 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
was by no means assured at the hour of General Johnston's death.
All that can be said is, that our right was then in the act of driv
ing back the enemy's left ; but there still remained his right and
centre, which, though hard pressed, had not yet been routed, and
only began to give way in confusion after General Beauregard
had assumed command. " It was after 6 p. m." he says, " when
the enemy's last position was carried, and his force finally broke
and sought refuge behind a commanding eminence covering Pitts
burg Landing." *
To a careless or superficial reader, this comparison, coming from
such a source, might have a certain weight, but when sifted and
closely analyzed, it is seen to be the far-fetched and idle fancy of
prejudice. YII.
General Beauregard says that the hardest fighting the Confeder
ates encountered on the 7th was with Buell's splendidly organized
and well - disciplined divisions, numbering at least twenty thou
sand f before the arrival of Wood's two brigades in the afternoon
of that day. According to Sherman's " Memoirs," X General
Grant's own forces, on the 7th, amounted to nearly twenty-five
thousand men (including Lew. Wallace's division of fresh troops),
but they did not fight with the animation and spirit of the pre
ceding day. Until about 10.30 a. m., General Beauregard had, in
the centre and on the right, as stated in the narrative of the
battle, only about ten thousand infantry and artillery, under Gen
erals Breckinridge and Hardee, to oppose Buell's three fresh divis
ions, supported by a part of General Grant's forces of the preced
ing day, under Hurlbut, while General Bragg had only about seven
thousand five hundred infantry and artillery, on the left, with which
to oppose General Grant's force of more than twenty thousand men.
By 11.30 a.m., General Beauregard had withdrawn from General
Bragg two brigades and a regiment, to reinforce the centre and
right, and he had made him extend another brigade (Russell's) to his
right, to cover the space between him and Breckinridge, left open by
the unfortunate absence of Cheatham's division, of General Polk's
corps. General Bragg had, therefore, at that time (11.30 a. m.),
* See General Beauregard's Report.
t " History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. p. 115.
X Page 245.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 343
only about five thousand men with whom to confront General
Grant's forces, and he was reinforced during the day by only two
straggling regiments under General J. K. Jackson, and by a small
disjointed brigade under Colonel Pond, at about 1 p. m. With
those forces General Bragg not only held at bay those opposed to
him, but took the offensive several times, and, on the arrival of
Cheatham's division in its proper place, compelled Wallace, Sher
man, and McClernand to call earnestly on McCook, of Buell's
army, for support. General Beauregard, therefore, felt not much
concerned about his left; and he directed all his attention and
most of his available troops to holding in check or driving back,
at times, Buell's forces, which showed considerable boldness, and
seemed to be well handled.
The result of that day's battle shows conclusively what would
have been the consequences had General Grant carried out his
intention — according to a statement to that effect in General
Sherman's "Memoirs" — of attacking the Confederates on the
morning of the 7th, without awaiting the assistance of General
Buell's forces. His disaster would undoubtedly have been irrepa
rable. With regard to the claim of victory raised by both sides, after
the battle of Shiloh, it is thus clearly and, we believe, fairly stated
by General Jordan :*
" The Confederates found their pretension upon the facts of the heavy capt
ures of men, artillery, and colors which they carried from the field, the com
plete rout inflicted on the Federals on Sunday, and their ability, on Monday,
to hold the ground upon which they had concentrated and made the battle
until 2 p. M\,t when General Beauregard withdrew from an unprofitable combat
— withdrew in admitted good order, taking with him all the captured guns
for which there was transportation. Moreover, his enemy was left so com
pletely battered and stunned as to be unable to pursue. The Federals claimed
the victory upon the grounds that, on Monday evening, they had recovered
their encampments and possession of the field of battle, from which the Con
federates had retired, leaving behind their dead and a number of wounded.
In this discussion it should be remembered that after the Confederates concen
trated on Monday, or from at least as late as 9 a. m. up to the time of their
retreat, they uniformly took the offensive and were the assailants. All sub
stantially claimed in reports of Federal subordinate generals is that, after
having been worsted between 9 a. m. and 2 p. m., they were then able to hold
* " Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," p. 150.
t It was after two o'clock p. m.

344 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
their own and check their antagonists.* After that, manifestly, there was a
complete lull in the battle until about 4 p. m., when, and no sooner, do the
Federals appear to have advanced.
" General Beauregard has been blamed, unjustly, for withdrawing his troops
just as they were being launched, on Sunday evening, against the last Fed
eral position, with such numbers and impetus, by generals on the spot, as must
have insured complete success. The reports of brigade and regimental com
manders entirely disprove this allegation.! His order, really, was not distrib
uted before the greater part of the Confederate troops had already given up
the attempt, for that day, to carry the ridge at the Landing."
For further particulars as to the hour when General Beaure
gard's order to cease firing was given and received, we refer the
reader to the Appendices to the present and the two preceding
chapters. VIII.
When error and falsehood have taken hold of public credulity,
their eradication is an arduous and unpleasant task. The. experi
ence of life teaches this lesson to most men. And it often hap
pens that even the fair-minded are slow to discard a conviction
which has grown upon them and is strengthened by the assertions
of those who are, or have been, high in authority. There seems
to be a fatal attraction about the propagation of evil reports, which
the preponderance of truth itself but tardily counterbalances and
destroys. " Listeners," says Hare, " do seldom refrain from evil
hearing." This applies to the unaccountable and malicious story, to which
additional notoriety has recently been given, that General Beau
regard, during the first day of the battle of Shiloh, up to the time
when he was informed of General Johnston's death, was lying in
his ambulance, taking no part whatever in the fight, and, that even
after the fall of the commanding general, he " quietly remained
where he was, waiting the issue of events."
To listen to such a statement, and see credence given to it, must
have been pleasing to those — fortunately few in number — whose
object has always been to misrepresent General Beauregard, to
ignore his merit as a commander, and rob him of the renown he
acquired despite their jealous efforts.
* See Reports of Generals Wallace, Nelson, Crittenden, etc., and Correspond
ence of " Agate," in " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. Doc. 114.
t See Appendix.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 345
On page 67 of the second volume of Mr. Davis's " Rise and
Fall of the Confederate Government," the following passage will
be found :
" General Beauregard had told General Johnston that morning, as he rode
off, that if it should be necessary to communicate with him or for him to do
anything, he would be found in his ambulance in bed. Governor Harris,
knowing this, and how feeble General Beauregard's health was, went first to
his headquarters, just in the rear of where the army had deployed into line
the evening before. Beauregard and his staff were gone on horseback in the.
direction of Shiloh church. He found them there. The Governor told Gen
eral Beauregard that General Johnston had been killed. Beauregard ex
pressed regret, and then remarked, ' Everything else seems to be going on well
on the right.' Governor Harris assented. ' Then,' said Beauregard, ' the bat
tle may as well go on.' The Governor replied that he certainly thought it
ought. He offered his services to Beauregard, and they were courteously ac
cepted. General Beauregard then remained where he was, waiting the issue
of events." It is to be regretted, on Mr. Davis's own account, that he has
given to the world as history so baseless a fiction.
A passage similar to this appears in Colonel W. P. Johnston's
" Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston," but it had been de
termined, after due reflection, to pass it by in silence in this
work. General Beauregard, it was thought, could afford to over
look a charge so palpably absurd. But Mr. Davis having thought
proper to reproduce the statement, with the evident purpose of
giving it the additional weight of his name and authority, we
now feel impelled, though reluctantly, to refute the statement
and set the matter finally at rest.
That General Beauregard's health was not good at the time of
the battle is an admitted fact ; but that, nevertheless, he displayed
the most untiring activity and energy, and, within less than two
months after his arrival in the West, mastered the minutest details
of the military situation, and changed its whole aspect, by inspir-
ino- new hope and confidence in the public mind, then so much de
pressed, is no less certain, and has been proved beyond dispute,
by the facts and documents already given to the reader in the
preceding chapters.
With the clear perception resulting from his remarkable stra
tegic powers, his ill-health had not prevented him from advising
and effecting the evacuation of Columbus, until then errone
ously considered the " Gibraltar of the West ;" fortifying and

346 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
strengthening Fort Pillow, New Madrid Bend, and Island No.
1.0; urging General Johnston to abandon his retreat towards
Stevenson, and march to Decatur, so as to facilitate a junction of
the two armies ; and, finally, despatching most of his staff, with
special messages, to the governors of four States, and to Gen
erals Van Dorn, Bragg, and Lovell, in one earnest and almost
desperate effort to obtain and concentrate an army of about
forty thousand men at or near Corinth, and thus prepare the
way for the great battle which was fought on the 6th and 7th of
April. Nor had his ill-health prevented him from organizing and dis
ciplining, as well as could be done, the heterogeneous army he had
thus collected, to the concentration of which the government had
merely given a silent, not to say unwilling, assent. For the read
er must not forget that General Beauregard's letter to General
Cooper, dated February 23d,* detailing his course as to the tem
porary enlistment of State troops, had met with no response ; and
that, to his question addressed to General Johnston as to whether
the War Department sanctioned his action in the matter, the an
swer, dated February 26th, was : " Government neither sanctioned
nor disapproved." f
The War Department had adopted the same irresponsible pol
icy with regard to the troops at Pensacola, asked for by General
Beauregard of General Bragg; the bald truth of the matter be
ing, that General Bragg, having referred General Beauregard's
call upon him to the government at Richmond, was left to his own
discretion as to his compliance with it. He was never ordered at
all, despite Mr. Davis's assertions to that effect ; % but came of his
own accord, thereby assuming the full responsibility of the move
ment. That the government did not prevent the transfer de
manded is all that can be claimed for it.
Not only had General Beauregard suggested and brought
about the concentration of our forces at Corinth, but, after declin
ing the command-in-chief, which was offered him by General
Johnston, he had also, at the request of the latter, drawn up the
General Orders, the seventh clause of which read as follows : " All
general orders touching matters of organization, discipline, and
* See Appendix to Chapter XVI. t Ibid.
X " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii. p. 54.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 347
conduct of the troops, published by General G. T. Beauregard to
the Army of the Mississippi, will continue in force in the whole
army until otherwise directed, and copies thereof will be furnished
to the 3d Army Corps and the reserve." *
When, at the suggestion of General Beauregard, it was deter
mined that we should advance on the 3d of April, to strike the
enemy at Pittsburg Landing, it was he again who, despite his ill-
health, prepared and delivered to the Adjutant-General of our
united forces all the notes from which was written General Order
No. 8, directing and regulating the march of the army from Cor
inth, and the order in which the enemy should be attacked.
General Beauregard left Corinth with the army, and reached,
simultaneously with General Johnston, the ground whereon was
formed the Confederate line of battle. He was then on horse
back, as was General Johnston himself.
To bring before the reader some of the incidents which occurred
on the afternoon of the 5th, the following passage is taken from
Major Waddell' s statement of facts relative to the battle of Shiloh :f
" St. Louis, November 8th, 1878.
" General G. T. Beaukegard :
*********
" I joined you on the morning of the 5th, at Monterey, and rode with you
to Headquarters No. 1. Judging of time by what I had done that morning, I
am of opinion that it was afternoon before you and General Johnston reached
the ridge where the front line was formed and Headquarters No. 1 was estab
lished. " After a conference of the general officers was held at a point in the road,
at which I witnessed a very marked deference on the part of General A. S,
Johnston for your opinions and plans of conducting the battle, it was suggest
ed by General Hardee that you should ride in front of his line of battle to
show yourself to his men, giving them the encouragement which nothing but
your presence could do. I well remember your modest hesitation at the prop
osition ; your plea of sickness was urged (a more delicate reason existed, no
doubt — your esteem of the chief in command), but when the request was made
unanimous, General Johnston urging, you consented, on condition that the
men should not cheer as you passed, as cheering might discover our position
to the enemy. An order was sent quickly along the lines, informing the men
that you should ride in front of them, and that no cheering should be indulged
* In other words, copies of orders already issued by General Beauregard to
his troops were to be sent to General Johnston's army.
t Major Waddell was one of General Beauregard's volunteer aids. For the
whole of his statement, see Appendix to Chapter XX.

$48 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
in. You passed in front of the lines, and never was an order so reluctantly
obeyed as was this order, 'No cheering, menP which had to be repeated at
every breath, and enforced by continuous gesture.
" General Johnston's prestige was great, but the hearts of the soldiers were
with you, and your presence awakened an enthusiasm and confidence magical
in its effect."
In corroboration of this we now give an extract from Colonel
Jacob Thompson's report of the battle. Colonel Thompson was
also one of General Beauregard's volunteer aids.*
" Headquarters Army op the Mississippi,
Corinth, April lith, 1862.
" To General G. T. Beauregard :
*********
" Soon after this, General Hardee, accompanied by his staff, came forward
and pressed you to ride along his line and show yourself to his men. He be
lieved it would revive and cheer their spirits to know that you were actually
in the field with them. You accepted the invitation, though then complain
ing of feebleness, on condition there should be no cheering." t
These are high testimonials of the estimation in which General
Beauregard was held by the corps commanders and by General
Johnston himself. They illustrate and explain the power and in
fluence he exercised over the troops. Neither officers nor men, to
whom his very presence was encouragement and comfort, supposed,
for an instant, as he rode slowly down their lines, that he was of
too feeble health to lead them on to victory the next day.
In the hurry and absorption of the occasion, General Beaure
gard had not given orders for the establishment of his night quar
ters : he therefore slept in his ambulance. Then — that is to say,
between eleven o'clock p.m., on the 5th of April, and half -past
four .o'clock a. m., on the 6th — had any officer of General John
ston's staff been sent to General Beauregard, the latter would have
been found " in his ambulance in bed ;" then, but only then ; for,
" the next morning, about dawn of day," according to a statement
prepared by General Bragg for Colonel W. P. Johnston's book,
General Beauregard was present "at the camp-fire of the general
in chief.":]: He had arrived there on horseback. From the time
* Colonel Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, had been Secretary of the Inte
rior under President Buchanan.
t See Appendix to Chapter XX.
| "Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston," p. 569.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 349
when he left his ambulance that morning he did not see it again
until his return to Corinth, after the battle of Shiloh.
In support of this statement the reader is referred to General
Beauregard's letter to Governor Harris, dated March 9th, 18S0,
written after the appearance of Colonel W. P. Johnston's book.*
The following is an extract from that letter :
" You will observe this text imputes to you a knowledge, and also implies
that it is upon your authority, that Colonel W. P. Johnston asserts my having
said that I would be found in bed in my ambulance ; whereas the fact is, that
I had ridden with General Johnston from Monterey, on the preceding day, to
the field. I only slept in my ambulance that night, as I had no tent, and did
not see it again until my return to Corinth. I was again on horseback short
ly after daybreak on the 6th — earlier, for that matter, than General Johnston
whom I found at his headquarters taking his coffee. We parted in advance
of his headquarters, when he went to the front, with the understanding that
I was to follow the movements of the field and direct the reserves ; in which
connection I call your attention to Colonel Jacob Thompson's statement, at
page 570 of W. P. Johnston's book : ' General Johnston determined to lead the
attack in person, and leave General Beauregard to direct the movements of
troops in the rear.' I may add, that I was on horseback all that day, with
very few intervals, until you rejoined me at my headquarters, near Shiloh meet
ing-house, about sundown, after my return from the front; and I was again on
horseback all the next day from about seven o'clock, with few intervals, until
my arrival at Corinth, late that night."
This is clear and unambiguous. It utterly disproves and re
duces to naught the groundless story chronicled by Mr. Davis.
In reply to that letter (April 13th, 1880) Governor Harris wrote :
"... But my recollection is, and I have so stated upon several occasions,
that the last words you spoke to General Johnston, as he was starting to the
front on Sunday morning of the battle of Shiloh, were, ' General, if you wish to
communicate with me, send, to my ambulance,' " etc.f
Here the words " in bed " are entirely omitted. They are in
Colonel Johnston's and Mr. Davis's books, but not in Governor
Harris's letter to General Beauregard. We know that Governor
Harris is sincere in his belief that these were General Beauregard's
words, but his impression about them, however strong it may be,
is none the less erroneous. Where that ambulance was, or would
be a few hours later, General Beauregard knew no more than
* See Appendix to Chapter XXII.
t The whole letter is in Appendix to Chapter XXII.

350 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Governor Harris, or any other member of General Johnston's
staff : how, then, could he have directed any one to it ? This, how
ever, is of small importance. Whatever may be the recollection
of Governor Harris, and even admitting its correctness, it still
remains an incontrovertible fact that no one saw, or professed to
have seen, General Beauregard in his ambulance on either day of
the battle ; for the very simple reason that he was not near it him
self, and hardly knew what had become of it.
As early as half-past six o'clock a. m., on the 6th, he was busily en
gaged issuing orders, first, to General Breckinridge, then to General
Polk, then to General Bragg ; and at twenty minutes after nine,
when the last reserves passed Headquarters No. 1, where he had
been left by General Johnston, he again mounted his horse and
followed them to the front, where he remained as long as the
battle raged, devoting his whole energy to the movements of our
left and centre, while General Johnston was directing the attack
on our right. This is conclusively established by the report of
General Beauregard himself, and by those of Colonels Thompson,
Augustin, Brent, Major Waddell, and Captains Ferguson, Chisolm,
and Smith, who were General Beauregard's aids, or acting aids, at
the time.*
Reverting now to what Mr. Davis insinuates was General Beau
regard's attitude when informed of General Johnston's death, we
have only to say, that the very source whence Colonel Johnston
and Mr. Davis seem to have derived their information — namely,
Governor Harris, in his letter of April 13th, 1880, already referred
to— in nowise confirms what is said to have been his language
on that occasion. Questioned by General Beauregard to that ef
fect, he says :
" I reported to you the death of General Johnston, when you expressed re
gret, inquired as to the circumstances under which he fell, and inquired also
of me if the battle was going on well on the right. I answered, it was ; when
you said, ' We will push on the attack,' or ' continue to press forward ;' the
exact words employed I cannot with confidence repeat ; but this is the sub
stance and meaning of what was said."
Mr. Davis's account of the matter would lead the public to be
lieve that General Beauregard was indifferent as to whether the
battle should continue or not ; nay, more, that he would have or-
* See their reports, in Appendix to Chapter XX.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 351
dered a cessation of hostilities had not Governor Harris suggested
that the fight had better go on. Who could give credence to this,
even if Governor Harris had not given the counter-statement al
ready submitted to the reader ? But Mr. Davis reaches the culini-
nating-point when, speaking through Colonel Johnston's book, he
describes General Beauregard as a sickly, broken-down, indiffer
ent commander, who was disposed to trust to chance for a favora
ble turn of events, and who listlessly remained where he was,
unable, if not unwilling, to take the helm and conduct the move
ments of the army.
This is trifling with public credulity. Mr. Davis certainly trusts
too presumptuously to the consideration accorded to him on ac
count of his former high position.
The entire country knows that General Beauregard, the trained
soldier, is a man of quick temperament, who, without being rash,
has never flinched under responsibility; that the salient traits of
his character are boldness and energy. To assert that such a man
remained quiet and inactive, when the chief command of the
army devolved upon him — when the boom of the cannon was in
his ear, and the clash and fury of the battle were around him ;
when news from the right told that victory on that part of the
line was almost within our grasp — is to put too great a strain
upon the credulity of even the simple. Words are not necessary
to refute this slander, or to establish the fact that General Beau
regard acted, under the circumstances, as his education, his nature,
his duty, and his will prompted him. The preceding chapters
have sufficiently shown the difficult and masterly work he accom
plished, after the sad event which left in his hands the command
of the army. Here, again, truth forces the statement that Mr.
Davis, in his effort to detract from the merits of one against whom
he has not scrupled to exhibit his persistent animosity, has over
reached his aim, and, far from accomplishing his purpose, has only
succeeded in impairing the historical value of his own book.

352 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XXIII.
General Beauregard's Insistance on the Evacuation of Columbus. — Docu
ments Relating to the Matter. — General McCown to be put in Command
of Madrid Bend. — He is Called by General Beauregard to Jackson for
Instructions. — He Repairs to Madrid Bend. — Dispositions Made for
its Defence. — Commodore Hollins to Co-operate with Land Forces. —
Number of Troops under General McCown. — Arrival of General Pope on
the 28th of February in Front of New Madrid. — Colonel Plummer Estab
lishes a Battery on the River. — Apprehensions of General McCown. — Gen
eral Beauregard's Despatch to General Cooper.— General McCown Exhib
its still Greater Anxiety. — General Beauregard Doubts General McCown's
Capacity. — Successful Evacuation of Columbus. — Attack Commenced on
New Madrid March 12th. — Conference of General McCown with Commo
dore Hollins on the 13th, and Evacuation of Forts. — General Beauregard
Applies for General Mackall. — Garrison of New Madrid Transferred to
Opposite Bank of River and Island No. 10. — General Beauregard Orders
all Surplus Guns, Supplies, and Boats to Fort Pillow. — Fall of Island No.
10 on the 7th of April. — General Pope's Forces Transported to Vicinity
of Fort Pillow. — General Pope Ordered to Pittsburg Landing. — Want of
Capacity of Commodore Hollins. — General Beauregard's Various Tele-
grains and Orders. — He Detains General Villepigue in Command of Fort
Pillow. — Instructions to Captain Harris. — Surrender of New Orleans. —
Bombardment of Fort Pillow. — The Montgomery Rams. — General Beau
regard has Steam Ram Arkansas Completed, Equipped, and Manned. —
History of the Arkansas. — Tribute to Captain Isaac Brown and Crew. —
Prisoners with Smallpox Sent to Fort Pillow. — What Became of Them. —
Letter to General Villepigue, May 28th. — He is Directed by General
Beauregard to Prepare for Withdrawing his Troops from Fort Pillow. —
Fort Evacuated 1st of June. — Responsibility of Various Movements Left
to General Beauregard.
It must not be forgotten that General Beauregard, in his con
ference with General Polk, a few days after his arrival at Jackson,
Tennessee, suggested and even urged the evacuation of Columbus
at the earliest moment practicable ; that is to say, as soon as Madrid
Bend, Island No. 10, and New Madrid could be fortified and suffi
ciently prepared for temporary occupation; the object being to
give time for the completion of the work of armament then going
on at Fort Pillow, fifty- nine miles above Memphis, which was

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 353
represented to be a strong natural position, but in a more unfin
ished state than any other around Madrid Bend. Some field-
works were also in process of construction at the points above
named, though little progress had yet been made upon them, as
was represented to General Beauregard by his Chief -Engineer,
Captain Harris.
The reader is referred to the several chapters preceding the ac
count of the battle of Shiloh,* wherein many of the arrangements
made by General Beauregard with regard to Columbus, and for
the defence of New Madrid, Island No. 10, and Madrid Bend,
including the incidents connected therewith, are mentioned at
length, and carefully reviewed in the order of their actual occur
rence. We allude to the memorandum of Febrnary 7th, prepared
at Bowling Green by General Beauregard, exhibiting the general
plans of operations adopted by General A. S. Johnston at that
time ;f to General Beauregard's letter to General Johnston, dated
February 12th, 1862; % to the telegram of the Secretary of War,
dated February 19th, authorizing the evacuation of Columbus, as
suggested by General Beauregard ;§ to the latter's communication
of February 21st to General Cooper ;|| to his circular of same date
to the governors of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisi
ana ; If and also to his letter of February 23d to Lieutenant-General
Polk.** These papers, documents, and outside details give an out
line of the dispositions General Beauregard considered it judicious
to make for the security of the defensive works on the Mississippi
River. They show that although his attention was engrossed by
the movements of concentration which he was then preparing, he
could, nevertheless, spare time and thought for distant points, fore
seeing what the probable plans of the enemy would be, and sug
gesting the means necessary to defeat them.
It had been agreed between Generals Beauregard and Polk
that Brigadier-General McCown, with some seven thousand men,
should be sent lo the positions about Madrid Bend as soon as the
works in process of construction there should have reached a suffi
cient state of completion to be properly armed and manned. The
surplus ammunition removed from Columbus was to be sent to

* Chapters XV.-XVIII. . f Chapter XV. p. 220.
| Ibid. p. 221. § Appendix to Chapter XVL || Ibid.
T Chapter XVI. p. 240. , ** Appendix to Chapter XVI.
I.— 23

354 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Fort Pillow, and also the surplus guns, which were to be mounted
with the greatest possible celerity.
General McCown, according to a telegram forwarded to that ef
fect, repaired to Jackson, Tennessee, to receive personal instructions
from General Beauregard. He was accompanied by General Tru-
deau, of Louisiana, acting Chief of Artillery on General Polk's staff.
The line of conduct to be adopted and the mode and manner of
defence were minutely traced out for him. He was told by Gen
eral Beauregard that he must not count upon reinforcements, for
all available troops were now being collected in or about western
Tennessee, to oppose the Federals, should they attempt to cross
the Tennessee River; that he must therefore make up his mind
to do his utmost with the troops he would take with him ; that he
would find two regiments at New Madrid, under Colonel Gantt,
and possibly two others, under Colonel L. M. Walker, at Fort Pil
low. As an additional assistance, Captain Harris, Chief-Engineer,
was to be put in charge of the construction of all the field-works
required, under specific verbal and written instructions from Gen
eral Beauregard. This was a system adopted and invariably fol
lowed by him throughout the course of the war. He knew that
subordinate commanders, however able in other respects, could
not, with justice, be expected to possess a thorough knowledge of
ensrineerin":. General McCown inspected the river defences at and about
Madrid Bend on the 25th of February, when, on his application,
Colonel L. M. Walker, with his two regiments from Fort Pillow,
was ordered to reinforce Colonel Gantt, at New Madrid. Shortly
afterwards General McCown's own troops arrived from Columbus,
at Island No. 10, and at Madrid Bend, where he established his
headquarters. He was followed, on the 1st of March, by Stewart's
brigade, which was sent to reinforce the troops at New Madrid,
where General Stewart, being the senior officer at that point, as
sumed command of the post under General McCown, who ranked
him. Commodore Hollins, C. S. N., with eight river gunboats,
which General Beauregard had obtained from New Orleans,
soon came up with his fleet to assist in the defence of the up
per Mississippi, until Fort Pillow, with the obstructions then in
process of construction somewhat higher up, could be made strong
enough to prevent the Federal gunboats and transports from pass
ing down the river. Thus, in the early part of March, General

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 355
McCown's forces at New Madrid were increased to six regiments
of infantry, and a few companies of heavy artillery, in two field-
works, one of which — Fort Thompson, a bastioned redoubt, south
of the town — had fourteen heavy guns, while the other — Fort
Bankhead, a battery north of the town — was armed with seven
, heavy guns. He also had a field battery, originally of six guns,
afterwards of seven. The two works were more or less connected
by rifle-pits.
The river was high at that season of the year, and the eight
Confederate gunboats, under Commodore Hollins, could easily
rake the approaches to the above-named forts.*
On or about the 12th of March, General McCown's forces, ex
clusive of the gunboats — which Were not under his orders, but had
come to co-operate with him — consisted of twelve regiments and
one battalion of infantry, five field-batteries of six pieces each, and
three companies of cavalry; added to which was the equivalent of
one regiment of heavy (foot) artillery, making an aggregate of
about eight thousand five hundred men of all arms.
His opponent, Major-General Pope, who had left Commerce, on
the Mississippi, above Columbus, Kentucky, on the 28th of Feb
ruary, arrived in front of New Madrid on the morning of the 3d
of March. His force numbered five small infantry divisions, with
one light battery to each, besides nine companies organized into a
division of light artillery ; about three regiments of cavalry, and
two of infantry acting as engineer troops — in all, some twenty-five
thousand men.
General Pope had no sooner ascertained the nature and arma
ment of the Confederate works in his front than he sent for and
obtained, from Cairo, with great labor and difficulty, three rifled
24-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, which were all the siege-
guns he could bring to his assistance.
On March 5th he detached Colonel Plummer, from near New
Madrid, with three regiments of infantry, four light rifled pieces
of artillery, two companies of cavalry, arid one of engineer troops,
to act as an outpost at Point Pleasant, some ten miles below New
Madrid, and to attempt, with their rifled field-pieces, to stop the
passage of transports up and down the river. By morning of the
7th the enemy's four guns were in position, in separate sunken
* General Force, " From Fort Henry to Corinth," pp. 68, 69.

356 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
batteries, along the river bank, connected together by rifle-pits ;
and so accurate was the fire of the sharpshooters there stationed
that the gunners on the Confederate gunboats could no longer
keep their posts. This compelled the fleet to retire, and the trans
ports to stop at Tiptonville, some eight miles farther down the river.
General McCown must have considered himself in a critical
condition from the very outset, for on the 6th General Beaure
gard received from him the following telegram :
" New Madrid, March 5th, 1862,
Via Memphis, 6th.
" General Beauregard :
" The force in my front is, say fifteen thousand ; between here and Sykes-
ton fifteen thousand, and large number of guns. Sigel is marching on Point
Pleasant with ten thousand. My position is eminently dangerous.
"J. P. McCown,
" Comdg. New Madrid."
This somewhat alarmed General Beauregard, although he could
not well believe that the forces under General Pope amounted to
more than twenty or twenty-five thousand men ; and he had good
reason to know that General Sigel was then operating in south
western Missouri, against Van Dorn's army. It was clear to him,
however, that he could not place much reliance in a subordinate
commander who was thus timorous under responsibility, and who
apparently gave way to nervous apprehension as to the strength of
his adversary. This was another and still stronger proof of the
absolute need of trustworthy commanders in General Beauregard's
military district. Acting under that impression, he, on the same
day, telegraphed General Cooper as follows :
" Jackson, Tenn., March 6th, 1862.
" For the sake of our cause and country, send at once Mackall as Major-
General, and three brigadier-generals recommended by me. Colonel Ransom
to command cavalry. Organization here much needed."
On the 9th came another despatch from General McCown,
dated the day previous. In it he said that he had not yet placed
the salient ordered by General Beauregard, in advance of the
works, as the position it was to occupy would be raked by our
gunboats, and that he had no force to place there ; that he would
erect it as soon as possible. [This, however, he never did.] In
the same telegram, which was a long one, he also said :
" The least estimate of the force of the enemy on Madrid plain is thirty

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 357
thousand, with sixty guns. . . . How long can I hold New Madrid with my
small force against such odds, is a question. I believe the enemy will soon be
fifty thousand strong. ... I am determined to hold my position at every haz
ard. Shall engage in no field risks ; I see my danger ; my men are confident
and in good spirit."
This communication aroused the greatest apprehension in Gen
eral Beauregard's mind,. as it confirmed his belief in General Mc
Cown's exaggerated fears of the dangers threatening his position.
Clearly, Napoleon's axiom — "Confidence is half the battle" — was
not known to the commander at Madrid Bend. General Beaure
gard began to think it would be necessary to send a steadier officer
to relieve him. Having but recently arrived in that military dis
trict, however, the direct command of which he had assumed only
four days previously,* and being, as yet, unacquainted with the
subordinate commanders serving there, General Beauregard, who,
on the other hand, was still awaiting the arrival of the officers so
urgently asked f of the War Department, concluded to await
further developments before taking final action in the matter.
He did not doubt the personal bravery of General McCown,
though his timorousness as a commander and.fear of responsibility
were most apparent. He therefore wrote him an earnest letter of
encouragement, of which the closing words were : " The country
expects us all to do our duty with a fearless heart, and we must
do it or die in the attempt."^:
Columbus had been successfully evacuated. Part of its troops
and most of its guns and other armament had been transferred to
the different defences about Madrid Bend, the enemy offering no
interference to delay the movement. There was additional cause
of gratification in the fact that the governors of the southwestern
States had all favorably answered General Beauregard's call on
them, through his circular of February 21st. We need not repeat
what we have already written about his efforts to organize and
concentrate an army under the most trying circumstances, and. the
noteworthy manner in which it was effected.§
The real attack on New Madrid commenced March 12th, but
* March 5th. See order to that effect, as given in Chapter XVII. p. 249.
t See General Beauregard's letter of February 24th, to General Cooper, in
Chapter XVI. See all his telegrams to same purpose.
X The letter appears in the Appendix to the present chapter.
§ See Chapters XVI.-XVIII.

358 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
the four siege-guns of the Federals were not in position, nor were
their batteries completed, until 3 a. m. on the 13th. The firing
opened at daybreak and ended at dusk, with very little injury on
either side; yet, that very evening, after a defence of less than
twelve hours, General McCown, although the vital importance of
holding his post to the last extremity had been repeatedly im
pressed upon him by General Beauregard, held an informal con
ference with Commodore Hollins, on board the latter's flagship,
at which General Stewart only was present, and it was agreed
that the forts must be immediately evacuated. This was done dur
ing the night of the 13th, in a heavy rain storm, and in a manner
far from creditable to the general commanding. The evacuation
was conducted with so- much confusion indeed as almost to amount
to a stampede. The Confederate forces there engaged numbered
some three thousand five hundred men of all arms, with twenty-
one heavy guns, and two light batteries of six pieces, opposed to
which were only four siege-guns, as we have already stated. All
our artillery, except the guns of one of the two light batteries,
together with ammunition, animals, and stores, were left in the
hands of the enemy. Not one of General Beauregard's impor
tant instructions had been carried out. This was the poorest de
fence made of any fortified post during the whole course of the
war ; and the responsibility for the disasters it entailed must neces
sarily rest on the immediate commander and not on the troops;
for they were formed of the same material as those who manned
and made glorious the defences of Island No. 10, Fort Pillow,
Vicksburg, Charleston Harbor, Petersburg, Fort Fisher, and Span
ish Fort.
The hasty and unnecessary evacuation of New Madrid destroyed
the little confidence General Beauregard had felt in the com
mander of that sub-district. It is but fair to add that the enemy
had displayed activity, enterprise, and determination in his attack
upon the Confederate works, though, as appears from the Federal
reports, no such easy victory had been anticipated.
General Beauregard now concluded to apply at once for Briga
dier-General W. W. Mackall, then Chief of Staff to General A. S.
Johnston, whose promotion he had long been urging, and who, he
knew, would have fulfilled all his expectations, had it been possi
ble sooner to secure his services.
General Johnston sustained the application, but could not spare

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 359
Brigadier -General Mackall, until his own and General Beaure
gard's forces were united at Corinth, which only occurred on March
27th. The hurried course of events and consequent dangerous
outlook on the Mississippi, from and after the 14th of March,
rendered it doubtful whether it was not too late, on the 31st, when
General Mackall assumed command, to accomplish any good re
sult, or provide for the emergencies of the situation. At his last
interview with General Beauregard before entering upon his new
duties, and in answer to the remark that he would probably com
mand only a forlorn hope, but that the fate of the Mississippi
Valley depended, just then, on the possession of Island No. 10 and
the surrounding works, if only for twelve days more, he, true
soldier as he was, said : " The post of danger is the post of honor.
I will do my duty to the best of my ability, and, I hope, to the
Satisfaction of the country and of yourself."
It has already been shown, in Chapter XVIIL, how the garrison
of New Madrid was transferred to the opposite bank of the river,
and how a portion of it was sent to reinforce the troops supporting
the works at and about Island No. 10.
General McCown, having succeeded in reaching Fort Pillow
" with a portion of his forces, was authorized by General Polk to
assume command there; but General Beauregard, though approv
ing the main dispositions taken for the defence of Madrid Bend
and Island No. 10, insisted upon General McCown's return to his
former headquarters, to resume the direction of operations ; which
he did, on the 21st, leaving General A. P. Stewart, a good artillery
officer, in charge of the fort and its immediate surroundings.
¦ The abandonment of New Madrid insured the fall, ere lon<r, of
Island No. 10, and, therefore, of Madrid Bend. Hence Geueral
Beauregard's immediate order to send at once all unmounted guns,
surplus supplies, and boats to Fort Pillow — thus reducing to a
minimum the forces necessary to hold those two now much en
dangered posts.* His order was first delayed on account of an
earnest appeal made to him by General McCown, but was renewed
and carried out on the 18th, the need being absolute for a garrison
at Fort Pillow, and no other troops being then available. The
force thus transferred thither consisted of five regiments of in
fantry, two light batteries of six guns each, and Captain Neely's
* General Beauregard's letter to General Bragg, of March 15th, see Appendix.

360 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
squadron of cavalry, which was soon to follow ; leaving, under
General Walker, for the defence of Island No. 10- and Madrid
Bend, some companies of heavy artillery, forming about the equiv
alent of a regiment; seven regiments and one battalion of infantry;
one company of Stewart's light battery, with six guns ; and two
companies of Mississippi cavalry — an aggregate of about four
thousand four hundred men.
General McCown's telegrams to General Beauregard now again
exhibited the same anxiety and discouragement so discernible in
those previously forwarded; and such continued to be his course,
until he was finally relieved by General Mackall, on the 31st, as
already explained. He was sent to Memphis, out of command,
and ordered to write the report of his operations, especially such
as referred to the evacuation of New Madrid.
After a stout and soldierly resistance at Island No. 10, our
troops displaying the unflinching spirit that distinguished them
during the war, the work at last succumbed on the 7th of April,
and surrendered to the Federal fleet, under Commodore A. H.
Foote, two or three hours after the retreat of the Confederate
forces from Shiloh had been ordered. The shattered condition
of the works proved to what extremity their defenders had been
reduced. A Federal writer says : " The earth is ploughed and
furrowed as with an earthquake. Small caverns were excavated
by the tremendous explosions," * etc. And General Force, a fair
narrator of this period of the war, speaking of the first or second
day of the bombardment (what must it not have been on the last!),
uses this language : " Thirteen-inch shells exploding in the ground
made caverns in the soil. Water stood on the ground within, and
the artillerists waded in mud and water." f Lieutenant-Colonel
Cook, of the 12th Arkansas, had been placed in command of the
Island on the morning of the 7th, by order of General Mackall.
Having had news, on the evening of that day, that General Pope's
forces had effected a landing on the east bank of the river, and
that the Confederate troops had already fallen back, he ordered
and effected the evacuation of the work, leaving it in charge of
Captain Hawes, of the artillery. Colonel Cook, that night, re
treated with his regiment (about four hundred men) along the
* " Record of the Rebellion " (Documents), 1862, vol. iv. p. 440.
t "From Fort Henry to Corinth," p. 80.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 361
western shore of Reelfoot Lake, until he reached a ferry landing,
near Tiptonville, where General Beauregard had had collected,
through the activity and energy of Colonel Pickett, commanding
at Union City, quite a number of canoes, skiffs, and other small
boats, for such an emergency. With these Colonel Cook succeeded
in saving, not only his own command, but several hundred strag
glers who had gathered there during the night. Meanwhile, towards
midnight on the 7th, General Pope's entire army had crossed the
river and was advancing on Tiptonville, General Paine's division
leading the march. With such overwhelming odds against him,
General Mackall was compelled to surrender with his small force,
aggregating about three thousand men. It follows, as a matter of
course, that General Pope's official report of the number of Con
federate prisoners taken on that occasion, namely, "six thousand
seven hundred," was a greatly exaggerated statement.
The enemy had now full control of the river as far down as
Fort Pillow, one hundred and ten miles below Island No. 10.
That fort, contrary to the general opinion about it, was not so
strong as its natural position indicated, nor as it had been repre
sented to be to General Beauregard. It was situated on the east
bank of the river, near the mouth of Coal Creek, and some ten
miles above the Hatchie River. A little over three miles east of
it, the two streams just mentioned, with their banks partially over
flowed and, therefore, almost impracticable, came within a mile
and a half of each other. Tet the engineers who planned the
works before General Beauregard's arrival in the West had not
availed themselves of this natural advantage, and, strangely
enough, instead of erecting the land defences at the point men
tioned, had placed them nearer the fort, thereby lengthening
their lines more than three miles, and necessitating a garrison of
nearly ten thousand men. A similar error, as we have already
pointed out, had been committed at Columbus. General Beaure
gard, upon assuming command of his new military district, and,
in fact, before he had done so, used every endeavor to introduce
a new and entirely different system, in the defensive works of the
Mississippi River. He caused them to be almost entirely recon
structed for minimum garrisons, which he knew would be amply
adequate, under efficient commanders, to resist a siege of several
weeks, or until assistance could be afforded them, thus increasing,
to a maximum, the troops available for operations in the field.

362 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
So far as circumstances would permit, this plan had been carried
out in regard to all the river defences. But, in order the sooner
to complete the works at New Madrid, Island No. 10, and Mad
rid Bend, which had first to be prepared against attack, only the
surplus guns of Columbus had been sent to Fort Pillow.
The recent loss of so much armament and ammunition had in
creased the gravity of the situation, not to speak of the additional
loss of General Mackall's forces at Island No. 10. We were in
one of those unfortunate positions in war where it becomes nec
essary to sacrifice a fractional command to save the other and larg
er portion. Here the sacrifice had become all the more impera
tive, by reason of the fact that Fort Pillow was now our only re
liance, for the safety of the Mississippi Valley ; except, perhaps,
Randolph, fifteen miles farther down, where some light works had
been thrown up, with as little regard to a minimum garrison as at
Forts Pillow and Columbus.
Less than a week after the surrender of Island No. 10, trans
ports were filled with General Pope's forces, and, thus loaded, de
scended the stream, reaching the vicinity of Fort Pillow on or
about the 14th of April. And here began a new phase of the
stirring drama of this period of the war ; for, before any active
operations were undertaken by General Pope against Fort Pillow,
he was suddenly ordered to Pittsburg Landing by General Hal
leck, who had arrived there on the 11th, and had officially assumed
command. This order was carried out ; and on the 21st, General
Pope's army was encamped at Hamburg, on the Tennessee River,
some twelve miles below the celebrated "Landing;" thus increas
ing the Federal forces at and around the battle-field of S,hiloh, to
an aggregate of at least one hundred and twenty thousand men.*
This was an error on the part of General Halleck ; for he certain
ly had no need of reinforcements at that time, his army being in
a state of complete inactivity. General Pope should have been
allowed to continue his operations against Fort Pillow, as he had
already successfully done against New Madrid, Island No. 10, and
Madrid Bend. The probabilities are that, with their immense re
sources in men and materials, and in view of the unfinished con-
* General Halleck puts the number at one hundred and twenty-five thou
sand. General Force, in his book, often quoted by us, says one hundred
thousand. General Sherman, in his " Memoirs," vol. i. p. 251, says that the
army " must have numbered nearly one hundred thousand men."

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 363
dition of the works at Fort Pillow, the Federals would, in a short
time, have succeeded in forcing its evacuation, when the whole
Mississippi River would have been opened to them down to New
Orleans. A respite of many months was thus unintentionally given, by the
commander of the Federal forces, to the Confederacy, then hard
pressed in the Southwest.
During the operations thus recorded, and judging from the dif
ferent telegrams he had received from Commodore Hollins, and
Generals Polk and McCown, General Beauregard was under the
impression that our gunboats had done all that could have been
expected of them. A careful reading of other telegrams, letters,
and reports, Confederate as well as Federal, have, since that time,
compelled him to modify his opinion. He now thinks that the
Confederate flotilla, under Commodore Hollins, did not display
the energy, resoluteness, and daring afterwards evinced by many
an officer in the' Confederate States navy, most conspicuous among
whom were the heroic Admiral Semmes, Commodore Maffitt, and
Captain Brown of the Arkansas.
Among the gunboats brought from New Orleans by Commo
dore Hollins, or sent to him after he had left, was the celebrated
ram Manassas, which, however, could not then be used to any ad
vantage, for the reason, as it appears, that there was no Federal
craft of any description south of Island No. 10, against which her
ramming qualities might be brought into play. Later, and just as
she could have been of much use, General Lovell insisted upon her
being sent back to him, which, after several remonstrances from
General Beauregard and from Commodore Hollins, was reluctant
ly done. Had the Manassas been with the flotilla, on the 5th of
April, when the Federal transports passed through the recently
excavated canal at New Madrid, and two of the enemy's gunboats
ran the gauntlet before Island No. 10 and the Madrid Bend bat
teries, it is more than probable that they would have been de
stroyed by the Confederate ram ; and that no other Federal trans
port or gunboat would have made a like attempt. In that case
General Pope would not have been able to cross his troops to the
Tennessee shore, and could not have taken in rear the forces hold
ing the works at Madrid Bend. Had a signal repulse been met with
by the first Federal boats entering that part of the Mississippi
River, it is to be presumed that General Pope's operations around

364 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
New Madrid would have been abandoned ; for twice, already, had
General Halleck been on the point of recalling his expedition.
Far as he was from the scene of action, General Beauregard's
telegrams and instructions to Generals Polk,, Withers, Stewart,
Rust, and Villepigue, to Captains Harris and Lynch, to Lieuten
ant Meriwether, and other officers of the engineer corps, show
how extreme was his vigilance, and what minute precision marked
his different orders.
We submit the following examples :*
1. "Jackson, Tenn., March 8th, 1862.
" Captain M. Lynch, Corps Engineers, Fort Pillow :
" Your traverses would do against field-guns, but not against heavy ones.
Dismount every third gun when sufficient force arrives. Surmount present
parapet in rifle-battery with sand-bags. " G. T. Beauregard."
2. " Jackson, Tenn., March 11th, 1862.
" Brigadier-General Withers, Fort Pillow, Tenn. :
" Select shortest line ; construct detached works first, then connect with
cremaillere. Get all negroes possible. Reconnoitre opposite shore also.
" G. T. Beauregard."
3. " Jackson, Tenn., March nth, 1862.
"Major-General L. Polk, Humboldt:
" What does McCown mean by his doubt ? Would it not be well to leave
to his judgment when to execute the movement decided upon ? Have you
given orders to proyision Fort Pillow for two or three months for five thou
sand men ? " G. T. Beauregard."
4. " Jackson, Tenn., March 21st, 1862.
" Captain D. B. Harris, Engineers, Fort Pillow :
" Look as soon as practicable to land defences of fort. Construct detached
works first, then cremaillere. Total garrison about three thousand men ; defen
sive lines must not be too extensive. " G. T. Beauregard."
5. " Jackson, Tenn., March 21st, 1862.
" Brigadier-General A. P. Stewart, Commanding Fort Pillow :
" Is water battery unserviceable from high water ? If so, remove guns im
mediately to better position. Put all river batteries in immediate serviceable
condition. How many negroes have you ? If not enough, call on Captain
Adams, Memphis, for more forthwith, also for tools. How are batteries off
for ammunition ? Look to this. "Thomas Jordan, Acting Adjutant-General."
* Other telegrams of equal importance are given in the Appendix.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 365
6. " Jackson, Tenn., March 22d, 1862.
" Captain J. Adams, Comdg. Memphis :
" Send Captain Owen's Arkansas company to Fort Pillow, to report for
heavy artillery service. " G. T. Beauregard."
7. " Jackson, Tenn., March 2ith, 1862.
" Brigadier-General A. P. Stewart, Comdg. Fort Pillow :
" The General wishes his instructions to engineers and commanding officers
at Fort Pillow collected and copied in a book, for information of command
ing officer of that post. The land front defences must be shortened, for a total
garrison of but three thousand men, as he has repeatedly stated before.
" Thos. Jordan, A. Adj-Gen."
8. "Jackson, Tenn., March 31st, 1862.
" Brigadier-General J. B. Villepigue, Comdg. Fort Pillow :
"Furnish 'Mississippi Defence Expedition' all requisite armament and am
munition for immediate service, and report. " G. T. Beauregard."
9. " Corinth, April lith, 1862.
" Brigadier-General Rust, Fort Pillow :
" No arms here, or available at present. Employ unarmed men to construct
bridge over Hatchie on roads to Covington and Randolph, and repair roads.
Impress negroes also for same purpose. Show to General Villepigue. Ample
additional forces ordered to \ our assistance. " G. T. Beauregard."
10. " Corinth, April lith, 1862.
" General Sam. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va. :
" Cannot a more active and efficient officer be put in command of gunboats
at Fort Pillow ? It is important to do so at once. I am informed garrison
at Madrid Bend capitulated ; part got off. No official report yet. I am rein
forcing garrison of Fort Pillow for a strong and long defence. When will
Memphis gunboats be ready ? Are much needed. " G. T. Beauregard."
On the 13th of April, General Rust, of General Price's division
of Van Dorn's Trans-Mississippi Department, was sent to Fort Pil
low with three regiments and a battalion of infantry, most of them
badly armed and equipped. On the following day he informed
General Beauregard of his arrival; spoke of the imminence of an
attack by the enemy's land forces ; and called for additional arms
for his men.
General Villepigue had asked for reinforcements as soon as he
no longer doubted the truth of the report of the fall of Island No.

366- MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
10 ; but, though expecting troops from Memphis, he had not been
apprised of the name or rank of the officer who was to accompany
them. He soon learned, however, that General Rust ranked him,
and wrote for instructions to army headquarters. General Beau
regard authorized him to retain the immediate command of the
works until the arrival of Major-General Samuel Jones, spoken of
as the next commander of the fort, but who never came, his ser
vices being required at Mobile. On the 24th, the whole of Gen
eral Rust's command — less one regiment left at Randolph — was
ordered to Corinth via Memphis. The object was to counteract,
as much as possible, by additional forces, whatever movement was
planned by the enemy, in consequence of the withdrawal of Gen
eral Pope's forces from the Mississippi River.
A few days before, General Beauregard being of opinion that
the services of Captain Harris could then be dispensed with at
Fort Pillow, and appreciating the necessity of defending the river
at some other point farther down, telegraphed General Villepigue
as follows : " Corinth, April 20th, 1862.
" Brigadier-General J. B. Villepigue, Comdg. works at Fort Pillow :
" Release Captain D. B. Harris, and instruct him to repair to Vicksburg,
where he will find orders in post-office.
" By command of General Beauregard. " Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Gen."
These orders ran thus : " Headquarters Army op the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 21st, 1862.
" Captain D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer, Vicksburg, Miss. :
" Captain, — Understanding that there are no points sufficiently high on the
river, between Memphis and Vicksburg, which could be fortified for the de
fence of the Mississippi, I have concluded to construct some defensive works
on the bluffs at or about Vicksburg, for which purpose you will make a care
ful reconnoissance of that locality. From what I am told, I should think the
bluffs immediately above that city, not far from where a small stream empties
into the river, would be a proper point for said works, provided it is not com
manded by surrounding heights within two miles. A lower battery, with four
or five guns, might be so located as to defend the entrance of the Yazoo River
and the small stream above mentioned, provided said battery can be protect
ed by the guns of the upper works ; otherwise the entrances into these two
branches of the Mississippi must be obstructed by rafts, piling, or other
wise. " Another important consideration is, that the peninsula opposite Vicksburg
should not be susceptible of being canalled across, from the river above to the

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 367
river below, for the passage of the enemy's boats beyond the reach of the guns
of the fort.
" Should the locality admit of such a canal, beyond the range of said guns,
another enclosed battery, of four or five guns, will have to be constructed be
low Vicksburg, to command the ground over which said canal might be
made. " The plans and profiles of these works must be left to your own judgment,
and to the nature of the ground on which they are to be located. Their ar
mament will consist often or twelve 8-inch and 10-inch guns, fifteen 42-pound-
ers, three 24-pounders, and several mortars, with a dozen field rifled guns, and
half a dozen 24-pounder howitzers ; those being all the guns we can spare at
present for the defence of the river at that point.
" The total garrison will consist of about three thousand men. There should
be ample space in those works for magazines — traverses in every direction,
field bomb-proofs, and a few storehouses and cisterns.
" Acting Captains John M. Reid and Pattison, also Acting Lieutenant John
H. Reid, have been ordered to report to you for the construction of these
works. The two Reids (father and son) I am well acquainted with ; they
were for years employed by me in the construction of my forts in Louisiana.
They are very reliable, practical men, and will be of much assistance to you ;
the other gentleman I am not personally acquainted with. Colonel Aubrey,
military commander of Vicksburg, has been ordered to afford you all the as
sistance in his power, in the collection of men and materials for the construc
tion of said works. About one thousand negroes have been ordered to report
to you with their tools, etc., immediately; but, should you not be able to pro
cure them otherwise, you will impress them at once. You must put forth all
your energy to complete those works as soon as practicable, and report their
progress every week. " Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, Gen. Comdg."
Nor was General Beauregard unmindful of the importance of
strengthening and increasing the armament of Randolph, as ap
pears by his letter to Commodore Pinckney, under date of April
24th, 1862.*
On the 27th Captain Harris answered that no batteries could
be placed on the Mississippi banks to command the mouth of the
Yazoo River, which is twelve miles above Vicksburg. He said it
was proposed to pass into the Yazoo much valuable property, and
obstruct the passage of the enemy's boats by booms, rafts, piling,
and batteries, at a point eighteen miles above its mouth, and twelve
miles from Vicksburg, where the highlands reach that stream ;
and he added, " Shall I order this work ? I am now constructing
* Sec letter in Appendix.

368 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
batteries below this city." His object was, in the event of New
Orleans falling into the hands of the Federals, to prevent their
passage up the river. General Beauregard approved at once his
proposed plans, and notified him to that effect. He had previously
written to Dr. E. K. Marshall, a very influential citizen of Vicks
burg, asking him " to give Captain Harris all the aid in his power,
and to arouse his people to a sense of their duty to furnish the nec
essary labor in such measure that the work will go on with prop
er celerity."
On the very day upon which Captain Harris's answer was
penned New Orleans surrendered to the Federal fleet under Ad
miral Farragnt, after a short and inglorious resistance on the part
of Forts Jackson and St. Philip. There had been no adequate
assistance from the Confederate gunboats and rams ordered to co
operate with them; nor did the armed vessels known as the "Mont
gomery fleet," with one or two exceptions, show any efficiency
whatever. Such a disaster, resulting from so weak a defence,
took the whole country by surprise — the North as well as the
South ; and it is grievous to make even a passing mention of it.
Want of foresight and discipline caused this irreparable calamity.
It affords us some consolation, however, to be able to state that
the Hon. J. T. Monroe, mayor of the unfortunate city, evinced
more than ordinary firmness and patriotism in his refusal to com
ply with the demand made upon him, to strike the Confederate
flag floating over the city hall.
On the 28th the bombardment of Fort Pillow was fairly begun.
No "mutineers" were there, as there were in Fort Jackson, to force
a surrender upon the officers. The whole command, men and offi
cers, vied with each other in a determined and resolute resistance,
and troops were even withdrawn from the fort to reinforce other
points needing assistance, without a sign of despondency, still less
of mutiny, among the men. Troops act differently in different
forts. Their conduct depends on the conduct of their officers.
As these prove themselves to be, so, invariably, are the men under
them. We were now in May, and no material change had been noticed
at General Villepigue's post. The bombardment was continued
day after day, and frequently throughout the nights, but with no
visible result. Now and then a man was killed, and one or two
wounded. The commander's spirit, however, and the spirit of his

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 369
troops, remained the same. A diversion occurred on the 10th of
May. The " Montgomery Rams," of which four out of eight were
fully armed and equipped, were induced by General Jeff. Thomp
son and his " jay - hawkers " — as the enemy called his men — to
run into the Federal fleet, then besieging Fort Pillow. General
Thompson took personal command of the movement — a decided
and bold one — which would have resulted in the dispersion of the
Federal fleet, had Commodore Pinckney, who now commanded the
Confederate gunboats, co-operated in the attack, as it was his plain
duty to do. . Two of the enemy's gunboats, the Mound City and
the Carondelet, were seriously crippled, and compelled to seek
safety in shoal water. The mortar-boats — of which one was re
ported sunk— were towed out of range.
This is proof of what could be accomplished by our fleet, such
as it was, when managed with determination and energy; and
caused General Beauregard to regret still more the supineness of
the naval commanders charged with the protection of that part of
the Mississippi River. Small hope, however, could be entertained
of a change for the better in these matters. For, on May 13th,
and despite strenuous efforts on the part of General Beauregard,
the two iron-clads on the stocks at Memphis were far from being
finished. On that day (13th) he was informed by General Ville
pigue that Mr. Ellerson, of Memphis, offered to complete at once
either of the two gunboats, if officially authorized, and properly
assisted in doing so. General Beauregard immediately forwarded
instructions to that effect, as is shown by the following telegrams:
1. " Corinth, May 13th, 1862.
" Brigadier-General J. B. Villepigue, Fort Pillow, Tenn. :
" Yes, let him work day and night until finished. .
" G. T. Beauregard."
2. " CoRiN-EH, May lith, 1862.
" General S. Cooper, A. and I. G., Richmond, Va. :
"I have ordered the Memphis ram to the Yazoo for safe -keeping until
finished. Have ordered every exertion made to finish it forthwith.' ' It will
be done in one week. May I request proper officers, crew, armament, and am
munition to be provided for it at once ? G. T. Beauregard."
3. " Corinth, May lith, 1862.
" Brigadier-General M. L. Smith, Comdg. Vicksburg :
" See that steam-ram be properly guarded, and use every exertion to finish
it forthwith. G. T. Beauregard."
I.— 24

370 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
On the following day, with a view to protect the river near Vicks
burg until the works in process of construction there could be
sufficiently completed, he ordered the heaviest steam-rams down
from Fort Pillow. His telegram to General Villepigue to that
effect speaks for itself : " Corinth, May 15th, 1862.
" Brigadier-General J. B. Villepigue, Comdg. Fort Pillow :
" Have those heaviest steam-rams been sent to Vicksburg ? If not, send
them forthwith. Otherwise, may lose the river from below. We want a few
days longer to finish the Arkansas. G. T. Beauregard."
On the 19th he asks General Smith, at Vicksburg, if it is true
that more iron is needed for the Arkansas, and if " no work is be
ing done on her," and on the 21st he telegraphs Hon. S. R. Mal
lory, as follows :
" I want a general order to get what rope is necessary for this army. Steam-
ram Arkansas reported, ' cannot be got ready for one month.' Is it not possi
ble to expedite its construction ? Safety of the river depends on it now."
These despatches invite us to give here the after-history of the
Confederate iron-clad whose name has just been mentioned. The
manner in which she was saved from destruction, completed, and
officered has already been described. The feats she performed
under her dauntless commander, Captain Isaac N. Brown, who,
upon General Beauregard's demand for an able officer, was ju
diciously selected by the Hon. Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the
Navy, are deserving of enthusiastic praise; the more so, since
Commodore Lynch, after inspection, said of her, she is "very
inferior to the Merrimac in every particular ; the iron with which
she is covered is worn and indifferent, taken from a railroad track,
and is poorly secured to the vessel ; boiler iron on stern and coun
ter ; her smoke-stack of sheet iron."*
Nevertheless, on the morning of the 15th of July, 1862, that
Confederate iron-clad, the Arkansas, mounting ten guns, with a
crew of two hundred men, descended the Yazoo River to attack,
not one or two Federal gunboats, but the fleets of Admirals Far-
ragut and Davis, then near Vicksburg. She was met at sunrise,
* See Captain C. W. Reid's " Reminiscences of the Confederate States Navy,"
vol. i. No. 5 of the " Southern Historical Society Papers," for May, 1876. Cap
tain Reid was one of the officers of the Arkansas, and it was he who, by order
of Commodore Lynch, forwarded to the Secretary of War the despatch above,
pronouncing the vessel inadequate for the service required of her.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 371
in Old River, ten miles from the Federal anchorage, by the
United States iron-clad Carondelet, the gunboat Tyler, and the
ram Monarch. The Carondelet alone was superior in guns,
armor, and speed to the Arkansas. Captain Brown promptly as
sailed this advance squadron, and, after an hour of close combat,
disabled and silenced the iron-clad and drove the other two ves
sels to the shelter of the fleets, in the main river. Losing no
time with the disabled Carondelet, the Confederate iron-clad pro
ceeded down stream, and attacked the combined fleet of more
than twenty men-of-war. She pushed through their double line
of heavy ships, rams, mortar-boats, and six iron-clads, each one of
which last, like her late antagonist, in Old River, was of greater
force than herself. She received the fire of three hundred guns,
which, at half cable's length, the lone Confederate ship returned
with destructive effect, from bow, stern, and both broadside bat
teries. For more than an hour the combat of one to thirty lasted,
until the Arkansas, cutting her way through the enemy's line of
massive ships, destroying some and disabling others, passed, shat
tered, but unconquered, on her way to Vicksburg, virtually raising
the siege of that hitherto closely blockaded city.
This combat, in its odds and results without a parallel in naval
warfare, was attended with great loss to the Confederates in killed
and wounded. The commander of the Arkansas, exposed on the
shield deck, was three times wounded : once by a Minie-ball,
touching him over the left temple; then by a contusion on the
head and slight wound in the hand and shoulder ; then, struck from
the deck insensible, he was, for the moment, supposed to be killed,
but he regained consciousness, and, dauntless as ever, resumed his
place and command till the end of the battle. Among the
wounded was Lieutenant G. W. Gift, who, with Grimball of South
Carolina, the second lieutenant, ably commanded the bow-guns.
Lieutenant Stevens, the executive officer, discharged with honor,
both in preparation for and during the action, every duty of his
responsible position. Barbot, Charles Reid, Wharton, and Dabney
Scales, lieutenants who, like their commander, were recently from
the United States navy, were alike distinguished for the bravery
and precision with which they served their guns. Captains Har
ris and McDonald, of a Missouri regiment, with sixty of their
men, volunteered for the naval service, and though they went on
board only forty-eight hours before the battle, and were entirely

372 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
unused to the exercise of great guns, formed an effective portion
of the Arkansas's crew. It is but a just tribute to the brave men
who figured in this engagement to add, that they did so, knowing
the odds against them, and with the resolution, inspired by a short
address of their commander, as the fight was about to begin, to
succeed in their work or perish.
The conflict here so briefly sketched took place in close prox
imity to the Federal army encamped on the west bank of the
river, but not in view of the city of Vicksburg. The solitary
Confederate ship was thus within hearing, but not within reach of
aid from her friends.
The subsequent history of the Arkansas may be given in a few
words. On the evening of the 15th (July), the day of the double
battle above Vicksburg, she engaged the fleet of Admiral Farra-
gut, passing Vicksburg, and, in the latter action, had both her ar
mor and machinery further damaged, suffering also severely in
killed and wounded among men and officers. A week later, when
the crew of the Arkansas had been reduced to twenty-eight men, by
sickness and the detachment of the Missouri volunteers, the iron
clad Essex, aided by the strongest ram of the Federal fleet, attacked
her. Both assailing vessels, though running into the Arkansas,
were repulsed, but with a loss to the latter of half her crew, killed
by the cannon-shot of the Essex. Not daring to make another
attack, the Union forces abandoned the blockade, some going down
and others np the river. Unfortunately the damaged condition
of the Arkansas would not allow pursuit.
Of admirals and naval commanders who have achieved exalted
fame, none accomplished a more fearless feat, with a better result,
than the commander of the Confederate iron-clad Arkansas. His
name, and, coupled with it, the names of his brave officers, merit
lasting honor at the hands of the. South. Nor are the men who
formed that matchless crew, because their names are unchronicled,
entitled to less applause.
On the 20th and 22d of May, General Villepigue informed
General Beauregard that the enemy had sent to Fort Pillow two
hundred prisoners, most of whom were sick with smallpox, and
who had been received, without his authority, by the second offi
cer in command. Believing, as did also General Villepigue, that
this would result in communicating that terrible disease to the
garrison, and thereby destroy its effectiveness, General Beauregard

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 373
at once telegraphed, " return them forthwith." But Commodore
Davis, of the United States navy, peremptorily refused to take
them back. They were then cared for by General Villepigue,
and placed, with great difficulty, in separate quarters, under the
intelligent and devoted supervision of Doctor C. H. Tebault, of
Louisiana, then a surgeon in the Confederate army. He wrote an
interesting paper on the subject, detailing all its circumstances ;
but this document, to our regret, is not in our possession.
Foreseeing the necessity of withdrawing his forces from Corinth,
and having, in fact, resolved to adopt that course within a short
time, General Beauregard began to prepare General Villepigue
for the event ; not that Fort Pillow was then in any immediate
danger, for the enemy had no land forces to spare for operations
against it, but because a retrograde movement from Corinth neces
sarily involved the evacuation of the fort. He, therefore, on the
25th, telegraphed to General Villepigue that " whenever the place,
in his judgment, should become untenable, he must destroy the
works aud armaments, and evacuate it, as already instructed ; re
pairing to Grenada, by the shortest route, for the protection of
the depot ; giving timely notice of the same to Fort Randolph and
to Memphis."
Three days afterwards, and when the precise moment of the re
treat from Corinth had been decided upon (as will be, hereafter,
more fully developed), General Beauregard forwarded the follow
ing instructions to General Villepigue :
" Headquarters Western Department,
Corinth, May 28th, 1862.
" Brigadier-General J. B. Villepigue, Comdg. at Fort Pillow, Tenn. :
" General,— Wishing to take the enemy further into the interior, where I
hope to be able to strike him a severe blow, which cannot be done here, where
he is so close to his supplies, I have concluded to withdraw on the 30th instant
from this place for the present, before he compels me to do so by his superi
ority of numbers. Tlie evacuation of this place necessarily involves that of
your present position, which you have so long and gallantly defended. Hence,
I have this day telegraphed you that, whenever the enemy shall have crossed
the Hatchie River, at Pocahontas or elsewhere, on his way westward, you will
immediately evacuate Fort Pillow for Grenada, by the best and shortest route.
" Should you, however, consider it necessary for the safety of your command
to evacuate Fort Pillow before the enemy shall have crossed the Hatchie, you
are left at liberty to do so, having entire confidence in your judgment and
ability, not being able to judge from here of your facilities for reaching Gre-

374 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
nada. I am of opinion, however, that he will venture slowly and cautiously
westward, so long as I shall remain within striking distance of him, on the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad, at or about Baldwin. It may be well for you
to know that the telegraph communication from there to Memphis will be
completed before a week or ten days.
" Whenever you shall be about to abandon the fort, you will telegraph the
commanding officer at Memphis to burn all the cotton, sugar, etc., in the vicin
ity of that city, as per my instructions already communicated to him.
" You will necessarily destroy all government property, arms, guns, etc.,
that you will not be able to carry off with you ; and on arriving at Grenada,
you will assume immediate command of all troops there assembled, to organize
and discipline them. You might also throw up some light works (batteries
and rifle-pits), for the defence of that important position against a small force
of the enemy. I have thought it advisable to give you the above instructions
in view of the probability that I may not be able shortly to communicate
with you.
" Hoping you may continue to meet with success in the defence of our cause
and country, " I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, Gen. Comdg."
The telegram referred to above, as being forwarded on the
same date, read thus : " Headquarters Western Department,
CoRiNTn, May 28th, 1862.
" Brigadier-General J. B. Villepigue, Comdg. Fort Pillow :
" We are to retire from here south. Make preparations to abandon Fort
Pillow when forces at Grand Junction retire from there, which commandant is
ordered to communicate to you and to execute when the enemy crosses Hat
chie River from here, at Pocahontas or elsewhere. " G. T. Beauregard."
To complete the record of this episode of the southwestern cam
paign — although by so doing the course of this narrative is an
ticipated — it must be stated here that Fort Pillow was successfully
evacuated about the 1st of June, and that its gallant commander,
after complying, so far as he could, with the instructions given
him, was subsequently sent to Port Hudson, where, not long after
wards, he unfortunately died — not in battle, as he would have
wished — but of fever, the result of too great exposure to the
weather, and over-fatigue in the performance of his laborious
duties. He was a graduate of West Point, and an officer of great
intelligence, perseverance, and bravery; never despondent under
difficulties ; never shrinking from responsibility. He had many

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 375
traits of resemblance to General Bee, who, like himself, was a
South Carolinian. Both of them would, no doubt, have attained
the highest rank in the Confederate service, had their lives been
spared to the end of the war.
During the occurrence of events of so momentous a character,
between the middle of February and the 6th of April, and upon
which hung the fate of the entire southwestern part of the Con
federacy, it was — and is — to some a matter of no small surprise
that General A. S. Johnston, the commander of the whole depart
ment, interposed neither advice nor authority, nor even made in
quiry as to the enemy's designs, or our plans to foil them. Such
silence, on the part of one whose love of the cause precludes all
idea of indifference, omission, or neglect, can only be explained by
the fact that he placed implicit reliance upon General Beaure
gard's ability to cope, unassisted, with the difficulties of the situa
tion, and successfully direct any and all movements originating
within the limits of his military district. The telegrams of Gen
eral Johnston, dated February 16th and 18th, confirm this inter
pretation. "You must do as your judgment dictates." And
again : " You must now act as seems best to you. The separation
of our armies is, for the present, complete."

376 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CIIAPTER XXIV.
Troops Resume their Former Positions after the Battle of Shiloh. — General
Breckinridge Forms the Rear Guard. — General Beauregard Recommends
General Bragg for Promotion. — Preliminary Report Sent by General Beau
regard, April 11th, to the War Department. — Difficulty of Obtaining Re
ports of Corps Commanders. — Their Reports sent Directly to the War De
partment. — Inaccuracies Resulting Therefrom. — General Beauregard Pro
poses an Exchange of Prisoners. — General Pope Gives no Satisfactory An
swer. — General Van Dorn's Forces Reach Memphis on the 11th. — Despatch
of the 12th to General Smith. — A Diversion Movement Determined upon
by General Beauregard. — Captain John Morgan. — He is Sent by General
Beauregard into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky. — Efforts to Force
Buell's Return to those States. — Location of General Van Dorn's Forces
at Corinth ; of Generals Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckinridge's. — Bad Wa
ter. — Mismanagement of Commissary Department. — Necessity of With
drawing from Corinth. — Tupelo Selected for next Defensive Position. —
General Beauregard Resolves to Construct Defensive Works Around
Vicksburg.' — General Pope Takes Farmington. — Confederate Attack. —
Federal Retreat. — On the 25th General Beauregard Calls a Council of
War. — Evacuation of Corinth Resolved Upon. — General Beauregard's In
structions to his Corps Commanders. — Dispositions Taken to Deceive the
Enemy. — Retreat Successfully Accomplished. — False Despatches of the
Enemy. — Correct Account by Correspondents.— General Force in Error. —
Retreat Considered Masterly. — Dissatisfaction of the War Department. —
Interrogatories Sent by President Davis.— General Beauregard's Answer.
Aftek the battle of Shiloh the Confederate troops resumed
their former positions, except the forces under General Breckin
ridge, composing the rear guard, which for several days remained
at Mickey's house,* some three or four miles from the battle
field, until proper dispositions of the cavalry could be made for
their withdrawal. Chalmers's brigade, at Monterey, was also with
drawn at that time to a position nearer to Corinth.
On the day following the retreat, General Beauregard made ap-
* General Force, in his book, " From Fort Henry to Corinth," p. 182, says :
"... Breckinridge remained at Mickey's three days, guarding the rear, and
by the end of the week Beauregard's army was again in Corinth. The battle
sobered both armies."

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 377
plication to the War Department for two additional major-gen
erals, four brigadier-generals, and a competent chief of artillery.
He also, in the same despatch, urgently recommended Major-
General Bragg for promotion. His gallant behavior on the battle
field had justified General Beauregard in the hope that, as an
army commander, he would show more than ordinary ability.
That he was a conscientious officer and a hard fighter, though too
rigid a disciplinarian at times, is known to all, especially to those
who served directly under him.
Under the same date (April 8th) a telegram was forwarded by
General Beauregard to the Adjutant-General's office at Richmond,
giving an account of the second day's battle ; and shortly after
wards (April 11th) a preliminary report* was likewise sent by him,
for the immediate use of the War Department. It was incomplete,
and, in many respects, imperfect, as it was written on the spur of
the moment, for the instant information of the government, and
before any of the reports of the corps commanders had yet reached
army headquarters. General Beauregard's intention was to write
a full and final narrative of the battle (as he had done of the bat
tle of Manassas), for the files of the War Department, as soon as
these reports should be forwarded to him ; but, for reasons still
unexplained, he never saw them until the winter of 1863-64,f
when the rapid and exciting events we were then passing through
prevented him from devoting any time to the preparation of that im
portant document. It may not beuseless briefly to notice here, what
there is of marked significance in the incident just touched upon.
From the date of the battle of Shiloh until General Beauregard
was relieved of the command of the army at Tupelo, in June,
1862, he frequently called on Generals Polk, Bragg, Hardee, and
Breckinridge, for their reports of the battle, but always in vain ;
their constant answer being that they had been unable, as yet, to
get official detailed information from the regiment, brigade, aud
division commanders under them. The consequence was, that the
reports we refer to were not transmitted until many months after
the battle, and one of them — General Polk's — was delayed until
nearly a year had elapsed. They were all addressed to the War

* This Report is given in full in the Appendix to Chapter XX.
t General Beauregard has never seen General Breckinridge's Report, not
withstanding repeated efforts to procure it, both during and after the war.

378 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Department, without passing through the regular channel; in other
words, without being first submitted to General Beauregard, who
was thus deprived of his unquestionable right of correction, ap
proval, or disapproval. And we will further state that General
Bragg's report, though transmitted, as were the others, without the
commanding general's endorsement, bore date April 30th, 1862,
as if regularly made to General Beauregard, through Colonel
Thomas Jordan, his Chief of Staff, when, in reality, it was not com
pleted and despatched from army headquarters until the 25th of
July, 1862.* None of the general officers who thus openly violated
the well-established rule of military etiquette were ignorant of its
acknowledged necessity. From the Adjutant-General at Rich
mond, who received the documents thus irregularly transmitted,
to the very corps commanders who forwarded them, all were
trained soldiers, all, except General Breckinridge, had belonged to
the Regular army before the war, where " red-tape " routine, in
every military bureau, had ever been strictly insisted upon and in
variably practised. It was by the act of a friend f that General
Beauregard's attention was attracted to the singular manner in
which these reports had been written and sent to the War Depart
ment. And he had cognizance of them only after repeatedly ap
plying for copies, which were finally furnished him from Rich
mond, but unaccompanied by any of the subordinate reports pur
porting to substantiate them. The result is, that the official
reports of the corps commanders at Shiloh (with the exception of
General Breckinridge's, which we have never seen), instead of
serving as a basis for history, are, on the contrary, erroneous in
many important particulars, and differ widely from those of the
other generals and subordinate officers who participated in the
battle, as we have already conclusively shown.:].
Commodore Hollins, on duty near Fort Pillow, was requested,
on the 8th, to propose an exchange of prisoners in General Beau
regard's name. Most of those we had taken immediately before
and since the battle of Shiloh had been sent temporarily to Mem-
* " Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," p. 134, note.
t That friend was General Breckinridge, who, in a letter to General Beaure
gard, stated that the corps commanders had been instructed to address their
reports directly to the War Department, and that General Beauregard had
better ascertain the contents of those documents.
X See Chapters XX. and XXII, and their Appendices.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 379
phis, to be forwarded thence to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, where it was
thought they might find better accommodations. General Pope
made an evasive answer to General Beauregard's overture, and
nothing satisfactory was effected.* It was about the same time
that General Beauregard wrote to General Grant concerning the
burial of the Confederate dead on the field of Shiloh, and sent to
him, under flag of truce, a mounted party, accompanied by several
citizens, especially from Louisiana, who were anxious to recover
and give proper interment to the remains of near relatives known
to have fallen during the battle. General Grant denied the priv
ilege thus requested, and said that he had already performed that
sad duty to our dead, and was taking all necessary care of the
wounded. On the 11th, that is to say, four days after the battle of Shiloh,
General Van Dorn's forces began to enter Memphis, Major-Gen
eral Price's division arriving first. General Rust's brigade was
immediately sent to Fort Pillow, as already explained, and General
Little's command ordered to Rienzi, some twelve miles from Cor
inth, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, for the purpose of making
a reconnoissance and securing a good encampment and suitable
defensive position, in case of a retrograde movement in that di
rection. On the day following, Major-General E. K. Smith, then com
manding in east Tennessee, received from General Beauregard a
despatch, in these terms : " Corinth, Miss., April 12th, 1862.
"Major-General E. K. Smith, Comdg. Knoxville, Tenn. :
" Six regiments on way from General Pemberton, South Carolina, to join
me. Three of yours failed to get by Huntsville. Could you not gather the
nine, add artillery, and push on Huntsville, taking enemy in reverse ? All
quiet in front. " G. T. Beauregard."
The South Carolina regiments above mentioned were being sent
by the War Department, at the request of General Beauregard,
to reinforce him at or near Corinth. The burning of a bridge on
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad prevented the execution of
this plan, and different orders were issued in regard to them.
* See General Villepigue's telegram to General. Beauregard, in Appendix to
Chapter XXIII..

380 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
The thread of our narrative would be too disconnected and its
interest impaired were we to follow too closely, in their order,
the various events that occurred during the first two weeks af
ter the retreat of the Confederate forces to Corinth. But the Ap
pendix to this chapter will impart all such additional information
as cannot be appropriately inserted within the limits of the text.
Reference is here made particularly to General Beauregard's
instructions to Generals Breckinridge and Chalmers, at Mickey's
house and Monterey ; to the list of officers forwarded to the Presi
dent for promotion ; to his further correspondence with General
Grant relative to the exchange of prisoners, and the distinction
to be made between colonels commanding brigades and brigadier-
generals duly commissioned as such ; also, to the difference to be
established between medical officers and other officers of the Con
federate and Federal armies.
Perhaps the most difficult feat to accomplish in war is -to com
pel an adversary to abandon the movement upon which he is en
gaged and adopt another by which his plans may be eventually
frustrated. Such a diversion, even with a well-trained army, pos
sessing every requisite for rapid motion, requires more than ordi
nary skill on the part of the general devising it. Greater still is
the hazard of the undertaking, when that army is, as compared to
the one confronting it, weaker in numbers, reduced by disease,
and wanting in the necessary means of transportation.
An effort of this kind, however, was determined upon by
General Beauregard, as soon as it became evident to him that
his inferior forces were no match for the too powerful and
daily increasing army under General Halleck. With a view to
this, Generals Van Dorn and Price were invited to a conference
at Corinth, ahead of their troops, then hourly arriving in Mem
phis. A promising cavalry officer, Captain John H. Morgan, com
manding two Kentucky companies belonging to General A. S.
Johnston's army, with which he had arrived from Bowling Green,
had highly distinguished himself, during the retreat to Corinth,
by his great energy and efficiency. He had kept the command
ing general thoroughly advised of the movements of the enemy,
and had performed many acts indicating high military ability.
Having thus had occasion to judge of his capacity and resources,
General Beauregard resolved to send him, with four companies of

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 381
cavalry,* into middle Tennessee and Kentucky ; there to cause as
much damage as possible to the enemy's railroads, bridges, and
telegraph lines. He was authorized to raise his battalion to a
regiment and even to a brigade, if he could. General Beauregard
supplied him with a sum of fifteen thousand dollars, f to start
with, and carry him into Kentucky, where he was, eventually, to
live on the enemy. This was the beginning of the brilliant career
of that intrepid partisan officer. His usefulness was afterwards
greatly impaired when General Bragg attempted to make of him
and his renowned brigade part of a regular command of cavalry.
Upon the recommendation of General Beauregard, he was pro
moted to the rank of colonel before he had organized his regi
ment ; and when he left, with his four companies, upon his
hazardous expedition, he was furnished by General Beauregard
with one of the ablest telegraph operators in the service — Mr.
Ellsworth — in order that he might bewilder the enemy — as he
so effectually did — by sending false despatches from the vari
ous telegraph stations during his raids into Tennessee and Ken
tucky. General Beauregard hoped that this expedition under Colonel
Morgan, together with the operations in Kentucky suggested by
General E. Kirby Smith, and strongly urged by General Beaure
gard on the War Department,^: would force General Halleck, who
was plodding away slowly in his advance on Corinth, to send back
a part, if not all, of General Buell's army into Tennessee and Ken
tucky. A third expedition of two regiments of cavalry, under
Colonels Claiborne and Jackson, was also thought of and organ
ized against Paducah, western Kentucky, to aid in the same pur
pose, and would have been a great success but for the notorious
incapacity of the officer in command. § However, General Beau
regard was not wholly disappointed in his expectations with re
gard to his diversion movements, for, immediately after the evac
uation of Corinth by the Confederate army (May 30th), General
* Two of which were his own, and the two others under Captain, afterwards
Colonel, Robert T. Wood, of New Orleans, a grandson of General Zachary
Taylor. t See, in Appendix, letter of General Beauregard to Major McLean, dated
April 24th, 1862.
X See his telegrams of April 14th, to Generals Cooper and E. K. Smith.
§ See, in Appendix, General Beauregard's instructions to Colonel Claiborne.

382 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Buell's entire force was ordered into middle Tennessee and Ken
tucky. On the arrival of the rest of General Van Dorn's forces at Cor
inth they were located — including General Little's brigade from
Rienzi — on the right and rear of the defensive lines, along the
south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, on several
small heights which commanded the approaches to the lines, and
afforded a good position for taking in flank any attack of the
Federals in that direction. Those lines extended about three
miles in advance of Corinth, from the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad, on the right, to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, on the
left, and were situated on rather high grounds immediately in rear
of a small creek, forming the head-waters of Bridge Creek, with
somewhat swampy sides. They had been located by General
Bragg and his engineers, before General Beauregard reached Cor
inth, and were defective on the left, near the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad ; thereby giving decided advantage to the enemy at that
point. They were subsequently corrected by General Beauregard,
but, in view of the time and labor already bestowed on them,
were not sufficiently altered entirely to remedy their original de
fect* General Hardee's corps extended along and from the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad, in front of General Van Dorn's position,
to the left, where it rested on the right of General Bragg, whose
left in turn rested on the right of General Polk's corps, stretching
across the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. The left of this command
occupied some woods protected by abatis and rifle-pits : each corps
holding a few brigades in reserve.
General Breckinridge's division formed a general reserve, and
was posted at first on or near the seminary hill (if we may so call
it) immediately in rear of Corinth, which is situated at the inter
section of the two railroads already mentioned.
Our small force of cavalry was stationed on the flanks of the
lines, with part of it in front, to guard the approaches to Corinth.
General Halleck, notwithstanding his large superiority in num
bers, was too cautious to bring about an immediate conflict be
tween the two opposing forces. He preferred advancing slowly

* The lines referred to were mostly armed with 42-, 32-, and 24-pounders,
brought from Pensacola and Mobile.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 383
and gradually ; a method which might have answered against a
well-fortified position, held by a correspondingly strong garrison,
but which, under the circumstances, exhibited, on his part, most
extraordinary prudence, and even timidity.
Meanwhile, the deficiency in good water, and the natural un-
healthfulness of the place, began to tell sadly on the Confederate
officers and men. They were, moreover, but scantily supplied
with food, and that of an inferior qualitj'. This was owing to the
chronic mismanagement of the Chief Commissary at Richmond,
a fact which General Beauregard had more than once pointed out
to the War Department, and which he again brought home to it
by the following despatch :* " Corinth, Miss., April 2ith, 1862.
" General S. Cooper, Adjutant-General, Richmond :
" The false views of administration — to say the least— of Colonel Northrop
will starve out this army unless I make other arrangements, which I have
done. I trust it may not be altogether too late, and that the government will
sustain me with means. " G. T. Beauregard, Gen. Comdg."
The truth is, it was almost impossible to have regular issues of
fresh provisions made to the Confederate troops at that time, until
General Beauregard took the matter into his own hands, and sent
agents to northern Texas and Arkansas, where he bought large herds
of cattle, which soon relieved the pressing necessities of his army.
Part of these supplies, however, he was afterwards compelled to
transfer to the General Subsistence Department, for other armies
in the field.
It soon became apparent to General Beauregard that the insa
lubrity of Corinth would increase as the season advanced, and that,
apart from the danger of being overwhelmed by a steadily grow
ing army in his front, he would have to select another strategic
position, by which he could hold the enemy in check and protect
the country in his rear as well as Fort Pillow, which still closed
the passage of the river. The idea of moving westward, to Grand
Junction,j- had at first been entertained ; but the lack of good wa
ter there, and the fear of losing Fort Pillow, fifty-nine miles above
* See also, in Appendix, letter of General Beauregard to General Cooper
dated April 16th, 1862.
t At the intersection of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad with the Mis
sissippi Central, fifty miles west of Corinth.

384 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Memphis, led to a change of plan. Nor must it be forgotten that
the defences and river batteries at Yicksburg were then just be
gun, as we have already shown,* and that, Fort Pillow falling, noth
ing could prevent the enemy from enjoying the free use of the
Mississippi as far down as New Orleans, where a base of abun
dant supplies would, no doubt, soon be established. These consid
erations impelled General Beauregard to hold on to his position at
Corinth until forced from it by his adversary.
Meanwhile, he caused thorough reconnoissances to be made
along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, for a good defensive position,
well supplied with pure water, and occupying a healthy region of
country. None could be found nearer than Tupelo, where begins
the fertile and salubrious " black-land" region of Mississippi.
There were not many running springs at Tupelo, but excellent
water could be had by digging wells from ten to fifteen feet deep.
He ordered them dug at once, where it was probable the troops
would take up their positions, in rear of some low lands, easily
defended and of difficult passage to an army on the offensive.
It was during these reconnoissances and preparations that Gen
eral Beauregard first turned his attention to the necessity of de
fending Yicksburg, as has already been shgwn in the preceding
chapter, by the telegrams and letters contained in it and its Ap
pendix. That to him, and neither to General Lovell nor to Gov
ernor Pettus, is due the credit of having originated the idea of
this defence, is further proved by the following telegrams :
1. " Corinth, April 18th, 1862.
" Major-General M. Lovell, New Orleans, La. :
" Have seen Lieutenant Brown. Have ordered a work at Vicksburg. Please
hold ready to send there sand -bags, guns, carriages, platforms, etc., when
called for by Chief-Engineer, Captain D. B. Harris.
" Have you constructed traverses and blindages at your forts ?
"G. T. Beauregard."
2. " Corinth, April 23d, 1862.
" General S. Cooper, Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va. :
"Services of General Sam. Jones are absolutely required here as soon as
practicable. Having obtained guns for Vicksburg, am going to fortify it. But
require engineers. I recommend John M. Reid, Louisiana, as captain, aud J.
H. Reid, Louisiana, as lieutenant. Am well acquainted with them, they hav
ing worked many years under my orders.
" G. T. Beauregard."
* See Chapter XXllI.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 385
3. " Corinth, April Zith, 1862.
" Major-General M. Lovell, New Orleans, La. :
" Two 10-inch and four rifled guns are under orders to you from Mobile.
Do you want them ? If not, say so to General S. Jones, and order them \p
Vicksburg. " G. T. Beauregard."
4. " Corinth, April 25th, 1862.
" Captain D. B. Harris :
" In consequence of news from Louisiana, put works below Vicksburg, to
prevent passage of river from New Orleans. Put guns in position first, then
construct works. System preferred is one main work, and detached batteries,
not too far from each other. Should you not have time, send guns to Jack
son, Mississippi, and be ready to destroy railroad between two places, when
necessary. " G. T. Beauregard."
5. " Corinth, April 29th, 1862.
" Governor J. J. Pettus, Jackson, Miss. :
" Please send immediately to Vicksburg, to report to commanding officer
there, one regiment of unarmed or partially armed volunteers. Also, one to
Columbus, Mississippi. They will be armed as soon as possible.
" G. T. Beauregard."
It is needless to accumulate further evidence. Other telegrams
and letters to the same effect will be found in the Appendix to
this chapter.
On his arrival near Pittsburg Landing, General Pope established
himself behind Seven Miles Creek, a stream that lies seven miles
from the Tennessee River. The Federal forces, as then reorgan
ized, subdivided, and located, amounted, as we have already
stated, to about one hundred and1 twenty-five thousand men, with
General Halleck, as first, and General Grant, as second, in com
mand.* The Confederate army, under General Beauregard, with
the reinforcement of Van Dorn's seventeen thousand men, num
bered about fifty thousand, but was daily decreasing on account
of sickness.
General Pope's recent successes on the Mississippi River had
given him an overweening opinion of his capacities as a com
mander. He was an officer of intelligence and activity, but in
clined to undertake almost any movement without sufficiently
considering the consequences that might follow. The expression
* See " History of the Army of the Cumberland," by Van Home, vol. i. pp.
126-130. t
I.— 25

386 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
used by him in his first order, upon taking command in Virginia
— "Headquarters in the Saddle" — which is even more than a
boastful cavalry officer might venture to announce, is indicative
of the undue self-esteem characterizing the man.
Hardly had he taken up his new position in front of Hamburg,
when, in order, no doubt, to hurry on and anticipate General
Halleck's advance against our forces, he determined to make an
offensive movement towards Corinth. Four miles from the latter
place was an elevated position, where stood the small village of
Farmington, then occupied by an insignificant force of Confeder
ate infantry and cavalry, with one battery of artillery. That force
was suddenly attacked on the 3d of May, by one or two Federal
divisions, and driven back across a narrow creek, west, and in the
near vicinity, of Farmington.
General Pope, ambitious now to accomplish something worthy
of the reputation he had acquired at New Madrid and Madrid
Bend, moved on the 8th, with his whole force, on the above-men
tioned village. As he was entirely separated from General Buell,
on his right, by the head of Seven Miles Creek, which was lined
with low, swampy grounds, rendered difficult to cross by recent
rains, General Beauregard determined, by a sudden and rapid at
tack in heavy force, to cut him off from his base, before he could
fortify his position at Farmington.
The Confederate corps and reserve commanders were, accord
ingly, called together at army headquarters, where special and
specific instructions were given them by General Beauregard, rel
ative to the movement about to be executed.
All our troops were to be held read}' for battle. General Yan
Dorn, on the right, was to move before daylight, by his right
flank, until his centre should be opposite General Pope's left
flank, at Farmington, where he was facing in the direction of Cor
inth. At dawn of day General Van Dorn, with his left and cen
tre, was to attack vigorously whatever force might be in his front,
and, with his right overlapping General Pope's left, take it in
rear and cut off the Federal line of retreat to Farmington.
At the same hour, General Bragg, with two divisions, was to ad
vance on the Farmington road, which crossed his line of defences,
and, by a front attack, co-operate with General Van Dorn, but
only after the latter should have taken up his position and should
be prepared to execute the movement intrusted to him.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 387
General Hardee was to guard the partly vacated lines of Gen
erals Van Dorn and Bragg, by extending his command to the
right and left, and be ready to support the attack if necessary.
General Polk was to take a position in advance of his lines, and
attack any Federal troops attempting to pass in his front. And
General Breckinridge's reserve was to occupy, temporarily, a cen
tral position within the Confederate lines, and support any part of
the field of battle which might require his assistance.
Through the inefficiency of his leading guide, and the slowness
of one of his major-generals, General Van Dorn did not get his
troops in position at the time prescribed. The result was that
when the Federals discovered the flanking movement threatening
them, they began retiring hastily to their position behind Seven
Miles Creek. General Yan Dora threw what forces he had in hand
against the enemy in his front, and, aided by the simultaneous at
tack of General Ruggles (Bragg's corps), very nearly captured two
brigades forming the rear of General Pope's command. The en
emy lost quite a number in killed and wounded, and a consider
able amount of camp equipage, arms, and equipments. Our loss
was insignificant, and consisted of some two hundred killed and
wounded, in both commands. The Confederate troops behaved
with great spirit, and appeared anxious to punish the enemy for
compelling them to prolong their sojourn at Corinth, which all
were eager to leave.*
General Beauregard was disappointed in the result of the expedi
tion, and thought the enemy would soon attempt to reoccupy the
prominent position from which we had driven him ; that a large
Confederate force would then be necessary to hold it ; and that,
strong as such -a force might be, it could be cut off by superior
numbers before assistance could be brought up from other points
of our weak and extended lines. He therefore instructed his sub
ordinate commanders to be prepared to renew the attack at any
moment ; for he was anxious to strike another blow on the enemy,
if only to blind him as to the future movements he now had in
contemplation. None more than he appreciated the strategic value of Corinth.
Its local features for defence and the fact of its being at the inter-
* For further particulars of the Farmington affair, see Report of General
D. Ruggles, " Southern Historical Society Papers," vol. vii. pp. 330-33.

388 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
section of two important railroads made it a very desirable point
to hold, as long as it was safe to do so. But the great odds in his
front and the persistent though over-cautious advance of General
Halleck, convinced General Beauregard that his withdrawal from
Corinth would, ere long, become a necessity.
General Pope having again, on the 18th, advanced towards
Farmington, and our scouts reporting all the creeks and their
swampy sides overflowed from late heavy rains, another concerted
movement was prepared by General Beauregard, wherein the
corps and reserve commanders were all, more or less, to partici
pate. The object was, as previously, to attack General Pope's
forces and cut off their line of retreat upon the main body of the
Federal army. Steady and continuous bad weather, however, de
layed the execution of the plan from day to day, and, on the 22d
of May, finding that General Yan Dorn could not accomplish his
part of the proposed plan, General Beauregard, after a conference
with him, ordered the troops back to their former positions.
From General Van Dorn's statement to him after the failure of
this, movement, General Beauregard concluded that any further
idea of the offensive must be abandoned, and that he must now
rest content with holding our lines, while he made arrangements
for an orderly retreat.
Meantime, General Halleck had not ceased advancing his suc
cessive lines, from his left to his right, notwithstanding the oppo
sition we offered him.
' On the 25th, General Beauregard called his subordinate com
manders together — namely, Generals Bragg, Yan Dorn, Polk, Har
dee, Breckinridge, and, by request, Major-General Price — to dis
cuss the necessity of evacuating Corinth, and determine the time
and method of so doing. He gave an elaborate exposition of his
views, and said that, situated as lie was at Corinth, with the advan
tages it afforded for defence, and the communication it kept open
to us, he had considered it a duty to hold his position as long as
possible, without danger of being overwhelmed ; but that, besides
the rapid decrease of our forces from sickness, the increase of the
enemy's strength in our front — not to speak of General Halleck's
persistent advance upon u-s — had led him to the conclusion that it
would be unwise to endeavor further to maintain our ground, with
such manifest odds against us. The result of a battle, at this
juncture, and even of a siege, would, he feared, amount to more

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 389
than defeat on our part, and might bring about the annihilation of
our forces. By a retreat we would, no doubt, lose a strategic po
sition of uncommon value, but by persisting in holding it we
might suffer a still greater loss.
The important question submitted at this council of war, if we
may so consider it, was freely and exhaustively examined by the
different generals present. But one opinion prevailed among
them : the evacuation of Corinth had now become imperative.*
After carefully listening to the views expressed by his subordi
nate commanders, General Beauregard requested them to get
ready for the movement as if it were already ordered, but to avoid
all mention of it except to their respective Chiefs of Staff. He
told them to state publicly that we were about to take the offen
sive against the enemy and bring on a general engagement with
him, and to begin at once sending off, to different points in our
rear, such as Baldwin, Tupelo, and others, their 6ick, their heavy
baggage, and such additional camp equipage as might encumber
the projected retreat. Immediate orders were issued to that effect
from army headquarters, and all things were prepared for remov
ing the heavy guns and ammunition to those places, and even
farther, at a moment's notice.
When General Beauregard's orders and instructions were com
pleted, he once more summoned his corps commanders to army
headquarters, and there carefully explained to each one individual
ly the part he would be called upon to perform in the designed
movement, which was to commence with General Van Dorn, on
the right, and end with General Polk, on the left — General Breck
inridge being in reserve, and occupying a more or less central po
sition, in rear of the other commands. Each sub-commander was
made, by General Beauregard, to go over and repeat what he and
the others were expected to do, until they became perfectly famil
iar with every detail of the plan adopted. They were thus thor
oughly drilled, as it were, and prepared for any emergency. The
result showed that General Beauregard had not taken this trouble
in vain. No other retreat during the war was conducted in so
systematic and masterly a manner, especially when we consider the

* See, in Appendix, General Hardee's views of the, situation, as given in
a letter to General Beauregard (May 25th), and the latter's endorsement
thereon.

390 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
comparative rawness of some of our troops, and the disparity of
numbers and resources between the two confronting armies.
The time fixed for the evacuation was 3 o'clock a. m. on the
29th. Delays occurred, however, which caused it to be postponed
until 1 o'clock a. m. on the 30th. The wagon -trains and rear
most troops had been started about 11 p. m. on the 29th, so as to
clear the way.
To deceive the enemy as to our intentions, General Beauregard
ordered that an empty train should be run occasionally during the
night, towards the right, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,
and another, towards the left, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,
as far as they could safely go ; and that whenever they reached
that point, the troops stationed there should cheer loudly and vig
orously, as though to welcome reinforcements. This stratagem
was carried out to the letter, and proved very successful ; for Gen
eral Pope, notwithstanding his false despatches forwarded after
the event, telegraphed General Halleck on the 30th of May, at
1 o'clock a. m., as follows :
"The enemy are reinforcing heavily in my front and left. The cars are
running constantly, and the cheering is immense every time they unload in
front of me. I have no doubt, from all appearances, that I shall be attacked
in heavy force at daylight."*
At the very moment when the foregoing despatch was penned
by General Pope the Confederate forces were actively evacuating
their lines, leaving skirmishers only in them, and some cavalry in
front, to hold the enemy at bay until the entire movement should
be completed.
The retreat was effected with great order and precision, the
enemy remaining in utter ignorance of it. The troops were halted
temporarily behind the Tuscumbia River, some six miles from
Corinth, to concentrate and give battle if pursued ; but no pursuit
being attempted, the movement was quietly continued to Rienzi
and Booneville, where another halt was made for the same pur
pose, and with a like result. The march M'as then resumed and
the army soon reached Baldwin, thirty miles from Corinth, where
another position was taken, and held until the 7th of June, to
await an advance of the enemy. It being apparent that no attack
would be made, General Beauregard again put his army in motion,
* Report of the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 391
the main portion of it arriving at Tupelo, fifty-two miles from
Corinth, on the 9th of June. There was found, as expected, a
salubrious region, pure water, and all the requirements of a good
defensive position.
The following extracts are from General Beauregard's official
report * of the evacuation of Corinth. After giving his reasons
for withdrawing his army, and explaining his various orders to
that effect, he says :
"... At the time finally prescribed the movement commenced, and was ac
complished without the knowledge of the enemy, who only began to suspect
the evacuation after broad daylight on the morning of May 30th, when, having
opened on our lines from his formidable batteries of heavy and long-range
guns, erected the night previous, he received no answer from any direction ;
but, as our cavalry pickets still maintained their positions of the preceding
day, he was not apparently fully satisfied of our movements, until some
stores, of little value, in the town, were burned, which could not be moved.
It was then, to his surprise, the enemy became satisfied that a large army,
approached and invested with such extraordinary preparations, expense,
labor, and timidity, had disappeared from his front with all its munitions
and heavy guns, leaving him' without knowledge, as I am assured, whither
it had gone, for his scouts were scattered everywhere, as I have since as
certained, to inquire what directions our forces had taken. . . . The troops
moved off in good spirits and order, prepared to give battle if pursued, but
no serious pursuit was attempted. . . . While at Rienzi, half-way to Bald
win, I was informed that on the morning of the 30th ultimo a detachment of
the enemy's cavalry had penetrated to Booneville, eight miles south of Rienzi,
and had captured and burned a railroad train of ammunition, baggage, and
subsistence, delayed there some forty-eight hours by mismanagement. I re
gret to add that the enemy also burned the railroad depot, in which were at
the moment a number of dead bodies and at least four sick soldiers of this
army, who were consumed — an act of barbarism scarcely credible, aud with
out a precedent, to my knowledge, in civilized warfare. Upon the opportune
appearance, in a short time, however, of an inferior force of our cavalry, the
enemy left in great haste and confusion, after having received one volley.
Only one of our men was carried away by him. Quite a number of stragglers,
and of our sick and convalescents, en route to Southern hospitals, who for a
few moments had fallen into the enemy's hands, were rescued. These are the
two thousand men untruthfully reported by Generals Pope and Halleck to
their War Department, as captured and paroled on that occasion. . . . Equally
inaccurate, reckless, and unworthy are the statements of these Federal com
manders in their several official reports by telegraph, bearing dates of May
30th and 31st, and June 1st, 2d, and 4th, as published in Cincinnati and Chi-
*The entire report, dated June 13th, 1862, will be found in the Appendix
to this chapter.

392 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
cago journals, touching the amount of property and stores destroyed by us at
Corinth, and General Pope's alleged pressing pursuit. Major-General Hal-
leck's despatch of June 4th may particularly be characterized as disgracefully
untrue. Possibly, however, he was duped by his subordinate. Nothing, for
example, can be wider from the truth than that ten thousand men and fifteen
thousand small arms of this army were captured or lost in addition to those
destroyed at Booneville. Some five hundred inferior small arms were acci
dentally left by convalescents in a camp four miles south of Corinth. No
artillery of any description was lost, no clothing, no tents worth removal were
left standing. In fine, the letters of newspaper correspondents, enclosed, give
a correct statement both as to the conduct of the retreat, the scanty spoils of
war left behind, the actual barrenness of substantial results to the enemy, and
exhibit his doubt, perplexity, and ignorance concerning the movements of this
army. if: 3}: * >ts * # 35: * *
" I feel authorized to say, by the evacuation the plan of campaign of the
enemy was utterly foiled, his delay of seven weeks and vast expenditures
were of little value, and he has reached Corinth to find it a barren locality,
which he must abandon as wholly worthless for his purposes."
We now refer the reader to the following extract from the let
ter of a correspondent to a Northern newspaper — the Chicago
Tribune — written at Pittsburg Landing, May 30th, 1S62, wherein
are correctly described some of the most important events relative
to the evacuation of Corinth :*
"... The retreat of the enemy was conducted in the best of order. Before
our men had entered the place all had got off safely. General Halleck has thus
achieved one of the most barren triumphs of the war. In fact, it is tantamount
to a defeat. It gives the enemy an opportunity to select a new position as
formidable as that at Corinth, and in which it will be far more difficult for us
to attack him, on account of the distance our army will have to transport its
supplies. Supposing the enemy take up their second position of defense at
Grand Junction, about sixty miles from here, four thousand additional wagons
will be required. . . . Then there is the fatigue of our men, the attacks of gue
rilla parties in our rear, etc. I look upon the evacuation there as a victory
for Beauregard, or, at least, as one of the most masterly pieces of strategy that
has been displayed during this war. It prolongs the contest in the Southwest
for at least six months. . . . Up to last night the enemy kept up a display of
force along his whole line, thus completely deceiving our generals. . . .
" General Halleck must feel deeply mortified at the evacuation. It clearly
shows that he knew nothing of the position and strength of the enemy and
of his ulterior designs."
* The entire letter, a very interesting one, is to be found in the " Confeder
ate Military Reports," 1860-1865 — as compiled by order of Congress — vol. iii.
part 2, pp. 739, 740.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 393
From "Kappa," the correspondent of the Cincinnati Commer
cial, we have the following letter, dated at Corinth, Mississippi,
May 30th, 1862 :*
"... On the day the second division moved out, advances, with
heavy cannonading, were made by Thomas and Pope on the left, but not a re
sponse in kind was elicited from the enemy. During that night we could hear
teams being driven off and boxes being nailed in the rebel camp. Deserters,
however, I understand, reported that they were making a staud and would
fight the next day. Considerable cannonading was done by our forces, and yet
no response, and yesterday the same. Last night the same band sounded re
treat, tattoo, and taps all along the rebel lines, moving from place to place, and
this morning suspicion was ripened into certainty when we saw dense vol
umes of smoke arise in the direction of Corinth, and heard the report of an ex
ploding magazine. Corinth was evacuated, and Beauregard had achieved
another triumph.
" I do not know how the matter strikes abler military men, but I think we
have been fooled," etc.
Van Home, in his " History of the Army of the Cumberland,"!
speaks of General Halleck's superior numbers at Corinth, and of
his gradual approaches, step by step, to his objective. He also
describes several heavy skirmishes and other sharp fighting, by
strong lines of the contending forces, in which the Federals, he
adds, were not always the aggressors. Referring afterwards to
the evacuation, he says :
" This seeming boldness in aggression was only a feint to cover the retreat
of General Beauregard's whole army from Corinth. . . . The explosions at
Corinth, early in the morning of May 30th, revealed General Beauregard's pur
pose and its accomplishment. For several days he had been sending off his
munitions and stores, and during the night of the 29th he had so quietly and
secretly withdrawn his army that his own pickets did not know that they had
been left a sacrifice for the safety of their comrades."
It is surprising that General Force, whose fairness of apprecia
tion we have noticed on several previons occasions, should appar
ently have founded his version of these events upon the incorrect
despatches forwarded by Generals Halleck and Pope. Had he
sifted the matter with greater care, he would undoubtedly have
avoided all mention of the imaginary pursuit by General Pope's.
army, first to Rienzi, then to Baldwin, then to Blackland, where,
* " Confederate Military Reports, 1860-1865," vol. iii. part 2, p. 741.
t Vol. i. pp. 128, 129.

394 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
he says, an order to attack had already been issued, when General
Buell arrived at the front and suspended it.* But General Force
himself must have been aware of the weakness of his authority,
for after endorsing, to some extent, the report about the " ten
thousand prisoners" and "fifteen thousand stand of arms" capt
ured by General Pope's forty thousand men, he makes the follow
ing remarks : " The prisoners taken were few, and Pope was cen
sured for making a statement of fact which he neither made nor
authorized."! General Badeau, after speaking of the evacuation of Corinth
and the " ineffectual pursuit" by the Federal army, terminating, on
the 10th of June, by the withdrawal of General Buell's forces tow
ards Chattanooga, uses the following language :
" And thus the great and tangible success, which was thrown so directly in
General Halleck's path that it seemed impossible for any one even to avoid a
victory, was allowed, nay, compelled, in Ms unskilful grasp to dissolve away, like
a shadow in the hands of him who stretches out to embrace what is not. Even after
the rebels had eluded him at Corinth, it was possible, with Halleck's immense
preponderance of force, to follow up and destroy the retreating enemy; and
when this opportunity was also lost, by his subordinate and counterpart, the
army that had been concentrated with so much care and labor was still avail
able for a concentrated campaign."!
Whoever considers the retreat from Corinth with a disinterested
and unbiassed mind, is forced to acknowledge that it amounted, in
reality, to a decided Confederate victory. It was so looked upon
both in Europe and in this country. It was effected, from the be
ginning to the end, as it had been planned. It deceived the en
emy to the last, and so completely that, while the evacuation had
already begun, and was, in fact, all but accomplished, General Hal
leck himself is known to have forwarded this information to his
command : " There is every indication that the enemy will attack
our left this morning, as troops have been moving in that direc
tion for some time." And, says General Badeau, " the largest army
ever assembled west of the Alleghanies was drawn out in line of
battle, awaiting an assault."^ An army of nearly fifty thousand,!
* " From Fort Henry to Corinth," by General Force, p. 190.
t Ibid. p. 191.
X " Military History of U. 8. Grant," vol. i. p. 106. The italics are ours.
§ " Military History of U. S. Grant," vol. i. p. 102. The italics are ours.
1 General Beauregard says forty-five thousand effective, exclusive of cavalry.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 395
invested by an army of fully one hundred and twenty-five thou
sand,* disappeared from the front of the latter quietly, noiselessly,
successfully, frustrating the plans of its adversary, carrying with it
all its munitions of war, and suffering in its retreat no material
loss whatever. And yet, so little was this result appreciated by the
War Department, that hardly had General Beauregard marched
his forces to Tupelo when a despatch from Richmond, indicative
rather of censure than of commendation, was forwarded to him,
requiring an immediate explanation of his movement.
It read as follows : " June 12th, 1862.
" To General G. T. Beauregard :
"The President has been expecting a communication explaining your last
movement. It has not yet arrived. " S. Cooper."
To this the following answer was sent : " Tupelo, June 12th.
" General Sam. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
" Have had no time to write report. Busy organizing and preparing for
battle if pursued. Will write it soon, however. Halleck's despatch nearly all
false. ' Retreat was a most brilliant and successful one. "G.T.Beauregard."
It is proper here to state that the evacuation had not taken
place without notification to the government, for a telegram of
the 28th of May had been forwarded to General Cooper, in these
words :
" Circumstances compel me to retire from this place to a position further in
the interior, on Mobile and Ohio Railroad, about thirty-five miles. I shall
leave here as soon as possible. I hope there to be able to beat the enemy in
detail.t " G. T. Beauregard."
But this was not the only information General Beauregard had
given of his movement. On the 3d of June, from Baldwin, he had
also telegraphed to General Cooper:
* General Badeau puts the number at " one hundred and twenty thousand
bayonets," and refers to the field returns of General Halleck's forces at Corinth.
t This telegram was in cipher ; General Cooper being referred to a letter of
May 25th for the key.

396 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
"We evacuated Corinth successfully on 30th ultimo. A complete surprise'
to the enemy. Rear guards arrived here, unmolested, last night. We brought
away all our heavy guns, tents, etc., 49 -2- 36 -a- 133 -1-126 -309 -1-35-
87.1.22-223.1.29.50.1.10-154.1.8-207.2.14-171.2.5-getting-307
-1.22- a. 46. 2. 6.* " G. T. Beauregard."
These telegrams, together with General Beauregard's letter of
May 19th, and General Lee's authorized answer to the same,f ap
proving the line of retreat suggested, should have sufficed the
authorities, at Richmond, and caused Mr. Davis to refrain from all
further questioning, until General Beauregard could command
leisure from the important duties then engrossing his mind.
To show that there is no mistake in ascribing to the govern
ment an unfriendly feeling towards General Beauregard, about
this matter, a list of interrogatories intrusted by Mr. Davis to
Colonel W. P. Johnston, his aide-de-camp, is given, with General
Beauregard's answers appended to the several questions. It was
dated Richmond, June 14th, and was presented, in the President's
name, to General Beauregard, after his departure from Tupelo.
We may add that no such inquiries were ever addressed to Gen
erals A. S. Johnston, Lee, Bragg, Hood, Pemberton, and other Con
federate generals, even after they had met with serious disasters.
" Question No. 1. — I desire to know what were the circumstances and pur
poses of the retreat from the Charleston and Memphis Railroad to the position
now occupied ?"
" Answer No. 1. — My detailed report of the evacuation of Corinth was sent by
special messenger to the War Department on the 13th instant (about one week
since). The retreat was not of choice, but of necessity. The position had
been held as long as prudence and the necesshy of the case required. We had
received our last available reinforcements. Our force was reduced by sickness
and other causes to about forty-five thousand effective men of all arms, ex
clusive of the cavalry scattered over a large extent of country to watch the
movements of the enemy and protect our railroad communications, while his
force was known to be at least twice as strong as ours, better disciplined, and
more amply supplied in every respect.
"But before adopting so important a measure, it was submitted to a meeting
of general officers, composed of Generals Bragg, Polk, Van Dorn, Hardee, Price,
and Breckinridge, who unanimously approved of the movement.
" In retiring towards Tupelo, it was hoped the enemy would have followed
* The key to this ciphered telegram is not in our possession.
t The two letters referred to will be found in the Appendix.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 397
the movement with a part of his forces, affording me the opportunity of taking
the offensive with a lesser disparity of numbers, and offered me the chances
of cutting off his line of communication.
" The retrograde movement was made in preference along the Mobile and
Ohio Railroad, because it was the true line of retreat, covering our main de
pots and lines of communication with the East, and was approved by General
R. E. Lee, Acting General-in-Chief, in his letter of the 26th ultimo."
" Question No. 2. — What is the plan of future operations and whether an ad
vance of the army is contemplated, and what prospect there is of a recovery
of the territory which has been yielded ?"
"Answer No. 2. — The plan of future operations must depend to a great extent
on the movements of the enemy ; should he divide his forces, the offensive
must be taken as soon as the condition of our troops and our means of trans
portation will permit ; but should he keep his forces together he must be made
to divide them by demonstrations on his right or left, and false reports in the
newspapers." " Question No. 3. — Why was it not deemed advisable to occupy the hills
north and east of Corinth, and could not a stronger line than that around
Corinth have been selected ?"
"Answer No. 3. — Tlie defensive lines at Corinth were selected by General
Bragg and his engineer, and were approved by General A. S. Johnston and my
self when we arrived there. They consisted of a series of elevated ridges,
protected in front and flank by extensive forests and two creeks and ' bot
toms,' which the enemy had to cross immediately under the guns and mus
ketry of the lines. The best proof of the judgment shown in their selection
is, that they compelled him to advance by a system approximating to regular
approaches, against a force only half as strong as his own, and much inferior in
discipline and all the appurtenances of war. These lines were mere rifle-pits
with slightly constructed batteries, enfilading the roads from the front. Hills
are not per se defensive lines, especially when nothing more than ' elevated posi
tions,' isolated by ravines, thick woods, and underbrush, and situated in a
country made easily passable in every direction with a little labor. They are
also badly supplied with water for a large force. Whereas, in the lines adopted,
the defensive forces were more concentrated around the intersection of the
Memphis and Charleston with the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and within easy
supporting distance of each other ; they were also nearer to the Tuscumbia
Creek, which afforded a good line to retire behind, whenever it should become
necessary to abandon Corinth. If a stronger line could have been taken in
the vicinity of Corinth, answering the same purposes, Generals Johnston,
Bragg, and myself were unable to discover it."
"Question No.i. — What was the cause of the sickness at Camp Corinth?
Would it have been avoided by occupying the higher grounds in front ? Has
it been avoided by retiring to the present position ?"
" Answer No. 4.— There were several causes for this sickness. First, the want
of good water. Second, the want of proper food (the salt meat furnished to
the troops being often not fit to eat), also the almost total want of fresh beef
and vegetables, beef having been furnished once a week or every ten days in-

398 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
stead of five times a week as ordered. The Commissary-General assured Gen
eral Johnston, a few days before the battle of Shiloh, that he had made am
ple provisions for the supply of fresh beef to this army, requested that the
matter should be left solely to his own (Colonel Northrop's) agents ; this sup
ply has since been ascertained to have been about sixteen thousand head of
poor cattle, collected in the parish of Calcasieu, Louisiana, for the purpose of
fattening, and now substantially cut off, by the fall of the Mississippi River
into the hands of the enemy. Every effort is now being made, by the Com
missary of Department No. 2, to relieve the wants of the troops. I will men
tion here that some of our troops were affected with the commencement of
scurvy. It is doubtful in my mind whether the health of the army would
have been much benefited by the occupation of the hills referred to, even had
it been practicable in a military point of view; General Van Dorn's army
corps occupied the hills three or four miles southeast of Corinth — a beautiful
location to look at — but was as sickly as the troops located nearer the
depot. " The present position at Tupelo, on the verge of the prairies, is considered
very healthy ; the water appears very good ; a greater quantity of cattle are be
ing obtained from the vicinity ; and a marked improvement seemed to have al
ready taken place in the condition of the troops, when I left there on the 17th
instant." " Question No. 5. — Was it at no time practicable to have cut the enemy's line
of communication, so as to compel him to abandon the Tennessee River, or to
permit us to reoccupy Nashville ?"
" Answer No. 5. — If it had been possible to effect either object I would not
have been slow in attempting it. I shall never be accused of being too slow
in taking the offensive or in carrying the ' war into Africa,' whenever practica
ble with any prospect of success. Several attempts were made by me about
the beginning of May (especially on the 9th and 19th to 22d) to draw the en
emy out of his intrenched positions, and separate his closed masses for a bat
tle ; but he was too prudent to separate from his heavy guus, and his adopted
system of ' regular approaches ;' he steadily declined coming to an engagement
until he had accumulated all his available forces in front of Corinth."
" Question No. 6. — What means were employed, after the fall of Island No. 10,
to prevent the descent of the Mississippi River by the enemy's gunboats ?
What dispositions were made to defend Memphis, and what was the cause of a
failure to preserve that most important of our lines of communication 2"
"Answer No. 6. — By fortifying Fort Pillow, as was done, and sending there
the best troops and most energetic young officer at my command — Brigadier-
General Villepigue — who with open batteries effectually defied and held at
bay the enemy's gun and mortar boats as long as the operations of the cam
paign permitted him to hold that position.
" The best way to defend Memphis, having no forces or guns to send there,
was to hold Fort Pillow and Corinth ; its fate had necessarily to follow that
of those two places, which fell, like so many other most important positions,
from the want of sufficient means (men and materials) to hold them longer
than was done."

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 399
*
" Question No. 7. — What loss of troops, stores, or arms occurred at the time of
the retreat from Corinth ?"
" Answer No. 7. — This loss is slight and trifling in comparison to the impor
tance of the object effected. My Inspectors General have been engaged in de
termining the facts called for; as soon as ascertained they shall be communi
cated to the War Department. I suppose about two hundred stragglers and
deserters, about fifteen hundred arms burned at Booneville, and about five
hundred left in the dark at a convalescent camp four miles south of Corinth,
will cover those two items of losses. With regard to the ordnance stores and
provisions, I could obtain no return from the respective chiefs of those depart
ments, although repeatedly called for by me, before leaving Tupelo.
" I firmly believe that all we lost at Corinth and during the retreat would
amount to much less than one day's expenses of the enemy's army in this
quarter. " G. T. Beauregard, Gen. Comdg. Dept. No. 2."

400 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

CHAPTER XXV.
General Beauregard is at Tupelo on the 7th of June. — The Main Body of his
Army Arrives on the 9th. — Telegrams Sent by him to Various Points. — His
Communication to General Cooper. — He Places Colonel Forrest in Com
mand of the Cavalry Regiments in Middle Tennessee. — General Beaure
gard's Ill-health. — He is urged by his Physicians to Take a Short Rest. — He
Finally Consents. — Order Sent to General Bragg from Richmond. — General
Beauregard's Despatch to General Cooper, June 14th. — His Letter to the
War Department, June 15th. — General Beauregard gives Temporary Com
mand of his Department to General Bragg, and Leaves Tupelo on the
17th. — General Bragg Notifies the Government of the Fact. — President
Davis Removes General Beauregard, and Gives Permanent Command of
his Army and Department to General Bragg. — Comments on President
Davis. — General Bragg's Despatch to General Beauregard.- — His Reply. —
Mr. Randolph's Telegram. — General Beauregard's Letter to General Coop
er. — Misstatements Contained in President Davis's Book. — Public Sympa
thy with General Beauregard. — General Bragg's Letter to Mr. Forsyth.—
His Letter to General Beauregard. — Answer to the Same. — General Beau
regard's Plan of Operations in Tennessee and Kentucky. — Interview of
the Hon. Thomas J. Semmes and Edward Sparrow with President Davis,
September 13th. — Petition of Senators and Representatives for General
Beauregard's Restoration to his Command. — President Davis's Refusal. —
Notes of the Interview, by Mr. Semmes. — Comments upon President Davis
in Connection with these Events. — Successful Result of Military Opera
tions from Bowling Green to the Retreat to Tupelo.
General Beatjeegaed arrived at Tupelo on the 7th of June.
The main body of the army reached there on the 9th. The position
had been previously reconnoitred, and no difficulty was encoun
tered in the selection of the grounds whereon the different corps
were to be encamped. Many orders and telegrams, forwarded
and received from different parts, far and near, show the watchful
supervision exercised by General Beauregard to complete the
movement he had thus far successfully accomplished. Although
paying little heed to the rumors circulated by his foiled adver
sary, still he used all necessary precaution to meet any advance
that might be attempted against him. He hoped that, once con
centrated and reorganized in his new position, the enemy would

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 401
soon be compelled to divide his ponderous forces, thereby mate
rially improving our condition, and demonstrating the judicious
ness of the diversion previously undertaken in middle Tennessee.
As soon as it became evident that the enemy did not intend to
attack our forces at Tupelo, and that two of his divisions — Mc
Cook's and Crittenden's,* and, as reported, others alsof — were
moving eastward, General Beauregard, relieved from the harass
ing duties that had so absorbed him of late, was able to attend
more directly to the recuperation, discipline, and comfort of his
command. On the 9th he addressed a communication to General Cooper,
calling his attention to the necessity of furnishing funds for the
payment of his men, who were growing dissatisfied — and justly so
— on this score, suggesting that the War Department, through the
Assistant Treasurer at Jackson, Mississippi, should make use of
several millions of dollars withdrawn from the banks of ISTew Or
leans, and seized by his (General Beauregard's) orders, when in
formed that these funds were about to be sent back to that city
in obedience to instructions from General Benjamin F. Butler.
The bank agents who had the money in charge had often ex
pressed their willingness to see it applied to the wants of our
army, provided the government made itself responsible for the
same4 He also urged the department to appoint an additional
Chief Commissary to the army, and stated that there was no less
need of a good and energetic Chief Quartermaster. He recom
mended several officers and citizens for the important positions
referred to. " These are times," he wrote, " when the man best
fitted for an office should be appointed, regardless of all other
considerations." At or about that time Colonel N. B. Forrest, who had been
wounded on the day after the battle of Shiloh, reported for duty at
Tupelo. He was hardly convalescent, but thought himself able,
nevertheless, to resume command of his regiment. He had ex
hibited so much coolness and daring near Pittsburg Landing
during the night of the 7th of April and the day following, while
charging a strong reconnoitring party of the enemy, that General
* Van Home's " History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. p. 142.
t Captain L. E. Hill's telegram to General Beauregard.
| The communication spoken of is in the Appendix to this chapter.
I.— 26

402 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
Beauregard determined to do all he could to increase, if possible,
his sphere of usefulness.
The reader is aware that three regiments of cavalry — Colonels
Scott's, Wharton's, and Adams's — had been sent, nearly two
months before, to assist General E. Kirby Smith in an offensive
movement into middle Tennessee from Chattanooga. This force,
instead of operating together against the common enemy, as or
dered, kept separated, because of some trivial misunderstanding
about rank among its officers, and was unable to accomplish any
valuable result. General Beauregard, troubled at such a state of
affairs, so clearly prejudicial to good order and discipline, resolved
to put a stop to it by placing Colonel Forrest in command of those
regiments, with special instructions to afford their officers no time
for further disputes. Forrest hesitated at first, modestly alleging
his inability to assume such a responsibility ; but yielded, finally,
when again urged by General Beauregard, and after receiving the
promise that his old regiment should be sent to him as soon as it
could be spared from the Army of the Mississippi. The following
order was thereupon written and immediately handed to him :
" Headquarters Western Department,
Tupelo, Miss., June 9th, 1862.
" Colonel N. B. Forrest, Comdg. Cavalry :
" Colonel, — The general commanding directs that you will, with as little de
lay as practicable, repair to north Alabama and middle Tennessee, and assume
command of the cavalry regiments in that section, commanded respectively
by Colonels Scott, Wharton, and Adams.
" You will carry into effect the verbal instructions communicated to you by
the general commanding.*
" I am, Colonel, very respectfully, " Your obedient servant,
" Geo. Wm. Brent, Acting Chief of Staff."
Thus began the brilliant military career of this remarkable
man. He was a born soldier, and had he received a military
education, would have ranked among the greatest commanders of
the late war. Even as it was, he should, perhaps, be counted as
one of the first.
It was shown in the preceding chapter with what persistence
Mr. Davis demanded of General Beauregard his reasons for aban-
* Copies of the order were furnished for the information of Colonels Scott,
Wharton, and Adams.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 403
doning Corinth, as though the possibility of such a movement had
never occurred to the President, and as though no communication
upon the subject had, up to that time, been addressed to the War
Department. General Beauregard wrote his report three days
later, and forwarded it to Richmond.* He counted upon no
congratulatory reply. The government had not habituated him
to such favors ; but, knowing how fully he had performed his duty
to the cause, he anticipated no reproof or censure on the part of
the Chief Executive of the Confederacy. The sequel will show
how much he erred in that respect.
General Beauregard's infirm health, which, however, had never
proved an obstacle to the discharge of the arduous duties devolv
ing upon him, had been severely tried by the wear and care of the
march from Corinth to Tupelo. He was, as usual, uncomplaining,
but his impaired physical condition had not escaped the observa
tion of his two physicians, Doctors Brodie and Choppin — the for
mer the Medical Director, the latter the Medical Inspector, of the
army, and both esteemed members of his military family. They
now urged him (for the third time since his departure from Vir
ginia) to take advantage of the partial lull in military operations
at and around Tupelo, and seek a brief rest from the incessant
labors incident to his immediate presence with the troops. He
finally agreed to follow their advice ; and they, gratified at this
result, but fearing he might let the opportune moment slip by,
wrote out and handed him the following certificate, which they
endeavored to make as impressive as possible :
" Headquarters Western Department,
Tupelo, June lith, 1862.
"We hereby certify that, after attendance upon General Beauregard for the
past four months, and treatment of his case.t in our professional opinion, he is
incapacitated physically for the arduous duties of his present command, and
we urgently recommend rest and recreation. " R. L. Brodie, Surgeon P. A. C. S.
" Sam. Choppin, Surgeon P. A. C. S."
On the very day on which the foregoing certificate was de
livered to General Beauregard, the following telegram was di
rectly forwarded to General Bragg from Richmond. The word
" directly" is here intentionally used, because, strange to say, this
* See Appendix to Chapter XXIV
t A severe attack of laryngitis.

404 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
telegram reached General Bragg without having first been sent to
General Beauregard, as was clearly required by all rules of pro
priety and of military usage. None will deny that, at that time
(14th of June), General Beauregard was still in command of De
partment No. 2, and of the Confederate army encamped at Tupe
lo. The full text of the telegram referred to is not in our posses
sion. It was an order addressed to General Bragg, and sending
him to Mississippi, to relieve General Lovell. Mr. Davis, in his
book, gives its concluding part, as follows :
" After General Magruder joins, your further services there may be dispensed
with. The necessity is urgent. J. Davis."
General Bragg referred this communication, so irregularly for
warded, to General Beauregard, who, immediately after reading
it, telegraphed General Cooper, in these words :
" Tupelo, June lith, 1862.
"General Bragg has just communicated to me a telegram sending him to
relieve, temporarily, General Lovell. His presence here I consider indispen
sable at this moment, especially as1 1 am leaving for a while on surgeon's cer
tificate. For four months I have delayed obeying their urgent recommenda
tions in that respect. I desire to be back here to retake the offensive as soon
as our forces shall have been sufficiently reorganized. I must have a short rest.
" G. T. Beauregard."
There was nothing improper or discourteous in the foregoing
despatch. No one could have interpreted it to involve disobedi
ence of the President's order. That it was laconic we readily con
cede, but telegraphic despatches are never otherwise. We ask the
reader to examine its phraseology carefully, and say whether it
could be so construed as to convey the idea that General Beaure
gard was about " to leave, on surgeon's certificate, for four months."
Knowing, however, that he had not sufficiently explained himself,
and wishing to create no false impression as to his intentions, Gen
eral Beauregard, on the succeeding day, wrote the following letter :
" Headquarters Western Department,
Tupelo, Miss., June loth, 1862.
" General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va. :
" General, — After delaying, as long as possible, to obey the oft-repeated rec
ommendations of my physicians to take some rest, for the restoration of my
health, I have concluded to take advantage of the present lull in the opera
tions of this army, due to the necessity of attending to its organization and
discipline, and to the uncertain movements of the enemy, for absenting my-

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 405
self for a short while from here, hoping to be back to assume the offensive at
the earliest moment practicable. ¦ Meanwhile, I will transfer the command of
the forces and of this department to the next officer in rank, General B. Bragg,
furnishing him with such instructions as will enable him to give all orders re
quired during my absence. I propose leaving here to-morrow, at 12 m., for
Mobile, where I will remain a day or two, inspecting the condition of its de
fences, and will offer to Brigadier-General Forney such advice as, in my judg
ment, may be necessary, and he may be willing to accept. I will then repair
to Bladon Springs, on the Tombigbee River, about seventy-five miles north of
Mobile, where I will remain about one week or ten days, or long enough to
restore my shattered health,
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, Gen. Comdg."
General Beauregard, after a conference with General Bragg, left
the latter in temporary command of the army and of the entire
department, and started, not hurriedly, as Mr. Davis, in his book,
indicates, but on the 17th of June, after all his arrangements had
been leisurely completed. Knowing that there was no danger,
just then, in absenting himself from his forces, and believing,
in all honesty, that no other answer than a favorable one could
possibly come from the War Department — for he knew of no army
regulation denying a commanding general the right, for reasons
of health, to move even beyond the boundaries of his own depart
ment — he proceeded quietly on his journej7, never suspecting the
result awaiting him, nor anticipating President Davis's resentment
at so simple an act.
Mr. Davis quotes the answer made by General Beauregard when
General Bragg presented him the first despatch received from Rich
mond; but without prefixing any date to.it.* It is not denied
that that answer contains the substance of General Beauregard's
telegram and letter — the first, of June 14th, the second, of June
15th — but it remains none the less a fact, that it was not General
Beauregard's real answer to Mr. Davis or to the War Department :
it was nothing more than the statement of General Bragg's inter
pretation of General Beauregard's remarks to him. Mr. Davis had
'also before him General Beauregard's own telegram, as forwarded
by himself, when informed of the President's action with regard
to General Bragg's departure for Vicksburg. That despatch has
already been submitted to the reader, and is, undoubtedly, the best
evidence to be offered in the case.
" Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 74.

406 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
General Bragg, after General Beauregard had left for Mobile,
on the 17th, informed the President of the fact, and, doubtful as
to what course to pursue, asked for further instructions.
And here it is but fair to assert that, on the 17th of June, the
War Department, and Mr. Davis likewise, had already received
General Beauregard's telegram of June 14th; for if the Pres
ident's telegram, forwarded from Richmond, at that date, to Gen
eral Bragg, had taken but one day to traverse the wires — and the
proof is there, none can deny it — it is certain that no greater time
was required for General Beauregard's despatch to travel the same
distance over the same line. And it should be stated further,
that, on the 20th of June, when the President sent his order, as
signing General Bragg to the permanent command of the West
ern Department and of the Army at Tupelo, he had not only full
cognizance of General Beauregard's telegram of the 14th, but also
of his explanatory letter of the 15th. The true motive actuat
ing General Beauregard in temporarily leaving his command, was,
therefore, perfectly brought home to the President, before he
penned the peremptory order, so uncalled for and so arbitrary, by
which — judging from appearances — he sought to humiliate and
cast aside one of the most prominent generals of the South, who en
joyed then, as always during the war, the full confidence and af
fection of the people — if not of the President — and whose influence
with the army was undoubted. If Mr. Davis had been animated,
at that time, by other feelings than those of personal dislike tow
ards General Beauregard, he would, with a view to the public
weal and to the eminent services of the latter, have simply sent
General Van Dorn — as he actually did — to relieve General Lovell
at Vicksburg, and would have ordered General Bragg to remain
with the forces at Tupelo until General Beauregard's return. It
is claimed, on behalf of Mr. Davis, that had such a course been
adopted, General Beauregard, though absent, would still have re
tained command of the department, and orders to General Bragg
would have had to pass through General Beauregard's hands be
fore finally reaching the actnal commander of the forces; which
would have entailed much delay, if nothing worse. This objection
is utterly futile, inasmuch as General Beauregard had transferred
to General Bragg the temporary command of the department as
well as of the army proper.* But even admitting that such a
* See his letter of June 15th to General Cooper.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 407
transfer had not been effected, is it not a fact — well known to
Mr. Davis — that, while in command of a mere military district,*
under General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Department
of Northern Virginia, General Beauregard corresponded directly
with the Secretary of War, with the Adjutant-General, and with
the President himself, without incurring the displeasure, or in any
way interfering with the red - tape routine, of the War Depart
ment? General Beauregard did the same thing again when he
commanded an army in Western Tennessee, under General A. S.
Johnston. The President and the War Department had never
been known to be so punctilious as to the observance of military
etiquette in matters of this kind, and Mr. Davis had clearly vio
lated it before General Beauregard's departure from Tupelo.
The order removing General Beauregard read as follows :
" Richmond, June 20th, 1862.
" General Braxton Bragg, Tupelo, Mississippi :
"Your despatch, informing me that General Beauregard had turned over
the command to you and left for Mobile, on surgeons' certificate, was duly re
ceived. You are assigned permanently to the command of the department,
as will be more formally notified to you by the Secretary of War. You will
correspond directly, and receive orders and instructions from the government
in relation to your future operations. " Jefferson Davis."
The opportunity was seized upon, and, under the transparent
pretense of affronted dignity, President Davis worked his will.
Thus was consummated an act of grossest injustice, one of the
most inexcusable abuses of power perpetrated by him during the
war. This was not all. His irritation at an assumed slight to
his authority induced him to go still further. He prepared the
list of interrogatories contained in a letter of instructions to
Colonel W. P. Johnston, A. D. O, dated Richmond, June 14th,
the day General Beauregard's first despatch was received. This
reached General Beauregard in Mobile, on the 20th, and shows the
searching ingenuity used to find him at fault, not only with re
gard to the evacuation of Corinth, but also as to all orders and
instructions issued or given by him, for the defence of the Missis
sippi River. These interrogatories and General Beauregard's
* The "Potomac District," created in October, 1861. See General Orders
No. 15, Adjutant and Inspector General's office, in Appendix to Chapter
XIII.

408 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
answers to, them were given at the end of the preceding chapter.
Nothing more, therefore, need be said about them here.
General Bragg informed General Beauregard of the President's
last order to him. He telegraphed as follows :
" Tupelo, June 21st, 1862.
" General G. T. Beauregard :
" I have a despatch, from the President direct, to relieve you permanently in
command of this department. I envy you, and am almost in despair.
" Braxton Bragg."
This was the first intimation General Beauregard received of
the arbitrary decree throwing him out of service. He felt it
keenly, as it was natural that he should. He knew he had done
nothing to merit such treatment, but understood the implied dis
grace intended by the President. The consciousness of his worth,
however, and his devotion to the cause, lent him a dignity and
forbearance deserving of high praise. His answer to General
Bragg exhibited no irritation whatever. It was a quiet, uncom
plaining acquiescence in the government's action, and read thus :
" Mobile, June 22d, 1862.
" General B. Bragg, Tupelo, Mississippi :
" I cannot congratulate you, but am happy for the change. It will take me
some time to recuperate. I will leave my Staff with you until required by me.
You will find it very useful."
On the next day, the Hon. George W. Randolph, Secretary of
War, confirmed General Bragg's despatch, as follows :
"Richmond, June 23d, 1862.
" General G. T. Beauregard, Mobile, Alabama :
"General,—! enclose copies of a telegram from the President to General
Bragg, and a letter which I have addressed to him.*
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"George W. Randolph, Sec. of War."
Not a word of explanation, not an expression of regret at the
abrupt change, are to be found in the few lines given above. An
act of greater official discourtesy could hardly have been com
mitted. A delinquent second lieutenant could not have been
more summarily dealt with.
General Beauregard made no direct answer to the Secretary of
* The telegram has already been given in our text. The letter referred to
is in the Appendix to this chapter.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 409
War ; but, on the 25th, from Mobile, where he still was, advising
General Forney, as he had said he would do, he wrote this letter
to General Cooper :
"General, — Enclosed please find the certificate* of my physicians, members
of my general staff as inspectors, recommending that I should withdraw for
a while from the command of Department No. 2. This is the third certificate
to the same effect I have received from them since my arrival at Jackson, Ten
nessee ; but finding, or believing, that my presence until now was absolutely
necessary, with the forces under my command, I persistently refused to avail
myself of their recommendation until the present moment, when I feel that in
justice to myself and to the cause I am endeavoring to defend I must take a
little rest, and retire for a while from the active scenes of life to which I have
been accustomed for the last sixteen months. I will, for the present, repair to
Bladon Springs, Alabama, where I will be always ready to obey any orders of
the department (regardless of my health) to resume the active duties of the
field, whenever circumstances will require that I should be so ordered.
" Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, General C. S. A."
We have now to refer to what Mr. Davis says in his book upon
this unfortunate incident of his administration, and to disclose the
errors he commits while relating it.
After giving his own version of what occurred at the time of
General Beauregard's departure from Tupelo, and producing such
evidence as might best support the conclusions he intended to
draw, Mr. Davis says :
" From this statement it appears : First, that General Beauregard was not,
as has been alleged, harshly deprived of his command, but that he voluntarily sur
rendered it, after being furnished with medical certificates of his physical inca
pacity for its arduous duties. Second, that he did not even notify his gov-.
ernment, still less ask permission to retire. Third, that the order, assigning
another to the command he had abandoned, could not be sent through him, when he
had departed and gone to a place where there was no telegraph, and rarely a mail.
Fourth, that it is neither customary nor proper to send orders to the com
mander of an army through a general on sick-leave; and in this case it would
have been very objectionable, as a similar order had just been sent and dis
obeyed. " t
The mere recital of the facts, as already given, clearly disproves
the foregoing statement :
* It has already been given to the reader.
t " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii. p. 75. The italics
are ours.

410 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
I. It would be as true to allege that General Beauregard was
never relieved of his command at all, as to state that he was not
" harshly deprived" of it. Mr. Davis, who had before him, or at
his disposal, every telegram and letter inserted in this text, could
not have believed that General Beauregard had "voluntarily aban
doned" his command — in other words, permanently withdrawn
from it, of his own free will — when it was so evident that the ab
sence spoken of would only be for a short time, and that, "mean
while," the command of the army would be intrusted to General
Bragg. No better proof could be offered to show that both Gen
eral Beauregard's intention and desire were to resume his com
mand as soon as he could.
II. If Mr. Davis is correct in his second point, what becomes of
General Beauregard's telegram of June 14th, where he says: "I
am leaving for a while, on surgeon's certificate. I must have a
short rest " ? He had certainly not left Tupelo when that despatch
was forwarded. He had therefore "notified his government," in the
telegram and in the letter. His "government," therefore, knew,
before his departure, that his intention was to leave. True, no
"permission" — in the strict sense of the term — was asked of the
War Department. But it was clearly with no thought of ignor
ing — still less of overriding — the authority of the War Depart
ment or of the Commander-in-Chief. No formal permission was
asked, because General Beauregard believed that, under the cir
cumstances, he could freely transport himself to any place in the
Confederacy, even outside of his territorial command, without
special leave from Richmond — all the more so, that he clearly in
dicated the precise localities to which he was going, the reasons
for which he was leaving, and the length of time he proposed be
ing absent.
III. Mr. Davis's assertion that " the order assigning another to
the command he had abandoned could not be sent through him
(General Beauregard), when he had departed and gone to a place
where there was no telegraph and rarely a mail," is, indeed,
extraordinary, to say the least of it. " Mobile " was not an inac
cessible place, nor was "Bladon Springs" an unknown locality.
General Bragg found no difficulty in notifying General Beaure
gard of the order superseding him ; and the curt, unceremonious,
official note of Mr. Randolph, dated Richmond, June 23d, also
reached General Beauregard without difficulty or delay.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 411
IV. If, as Mr. Davis has it, General Beauregard had abandoned
his command without " permission " — that is to say, in violation
of army regulations — he was not absent on "sick-leave," or any
other " leave ;" he had simply deserted his post. If, on the other
hand, as Mr. Davis plainly states, he was " on sick - leave," the
temporary arrangement made at and before his departure should
have been acquiesced in ; for he was clearly not at fault, if on
" sick-leave." But it is an undeniable fact that, when the government's de
spatch of June 14th was sent directly to General Bragg, General
Beauregard was still in full command at Tupelo, and had not,
then, even intimated his intention of going to the inaccessible
place Mr. Davis objects to. He only disclosed that intention af
ter the President's order had reached General Bragg; and this
is the " similar order," which, Mr. Davis states, was sent through
General Beauregard and disobeyed. Scarcely oyer three weeks
after he left Tupelo, General Beauregard — had he not been, at
that time, tacitly " shelved" — could have resumed his active du
ties in the field or elsewhere. His health was sufficiently restored
by the rest, quiet, and salubrious air he had enjoyed at Bladon
Springs. But, as is now apparent, the current of succeeding events
did not require his presence with the army, even a fortnight after
his sufficient restoration to health. And this had been clearly fore
seen by him before he left Tupelo. Nor was the hurried depart
ure of General Bragg, so much insisted upon by President Davis,
at all indispensable. General Van Dorn, when sent to relieve
General Lovell, did just as well ; and we have yet to learn that
he took even a company with him to reinforce a place which, Mr.
Davis said, was so imminently threatened.
Days, and even weeks, passed by. General Beauregard was still
in retirement at Bladon Springs. Letters of sympathy, and regret
reached him from all points of the Confederacy, and proved what
a high place he occupied in the public esteem. Yet some injudi
cious friends, or " mischief-makers "—as the Hon. John Forsyth,
who had been one of our three Peace Commissioners to Washing-
ton, so aptly called them — strove hard to create feelings of suspicion
and animosity between our leading men, and, what was worse, be
tween Generals Beauregard and Bragg. The former did his utmost,
incessantly, not only to screen his successor from all imputation of
blame concerning the action of the Executive in placing him in

412 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
command of Department No. 2, but made it a point (except when
speaking to a limited circle of tried friends) to approve of all that
had been done in that respect. We give here a few passages from
a letter from General Bragg to the Hon. John Forsyth, dated
Tupelo, July 17th, written in acknowledgment of a very remark
able article printed by the latter in the Mobile Evening News.
In the Appendix will also be found a letter of General Beaure
gard on the same subject.
After speaking of his determination ever to avoid discussions in
the public press, and thanking Mr. Forsyth for the sentiments he
had expressed concerning the positions, " personal and official," of
General Beauregard and himself, General Bragg said :
" No two men living ever served together more harmoniously, or parted
with more regret. None of us are free from our faults and weaknesses, but
among mine will never be found a jealousy which would detract from so pure
a man and eminent a general as Beauregard.
" No one could have been more surprised at the order assigning me to his
command than myself; aud certainly the idea of my being a ' pet ' with any
part of the administration is laughable. . . . Upon the urgent appeal of his
physicians, after arriving here, where it was supposed we should not be as
sailed by the enemy for a few weeks, he retired to seek some relief from the
toils which have made him an old man in the short space of one year. If it
be his friends who have started this discussion, they are doing him great in
justice, and so far as I am concerned I can only say to them, the records here
will show with what regret I parted with their chief, and how ardently I
hoped for his restoration, that he might resume the position he had filled so
honorably."* On the 22d of July, from Tupelo, where no incident of note
had thus far happened, General Bragg addressed an interesting
communication to General Beauregard, setting forth a plan of
active operations which he had prepared, and asking his opinion
and advice thereon.f General Beauregard answered as follows:
" Cullum Springs, Bladon, Ala., July 28th, 1862.
" General Braxton Bragg, Commanding Department No. 2, Mobile, Ala. :
" My dear General, — Your letter of the 22d instant was received only
last night. I give you with pleasure the following views on your proposed
operations from Tupelo, for I wish you the amplest success, both on your own
and the country's account. (
" You have evidently but one of four things to do. First, to attack Halleck
* The entire letter is in the Appendix to this Chapter.
t This communication is to be found in Appendix.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 413
at Corinth ; second, to attack Buell at or about Chattanooga ; third, to at
tack Grant at or about Memphis ; fourth, to remain idle at Tupelo.
"From what you state the first is evidently inadmissible, and the last can
not be entertained for one moment, for action, action, is what we require.
" Now, with regard to the other two propositions, it is evident that unless
you reinforce General E. K. Smith, at Chattanooga, he will be overpowered
by Buell, and that our communication with the East, and our supplies at At
lanta, Augusta, etc., will be cut off; also that a partial reinforcement would
so weaken you at Tupelo as to paralyze you for any other movements from
there ; hence you have adopted the wisest course in sending to Smith all your
available forces, except just enough to guard your depots, etc., to the rear of
your present position at Tupelo.
" The third proposition would have afforded you some success, but not as
brilliant and important in its results as the second one, if the newspapers will
permit you to carry it successfully into effect ; for Halleck and Buell, occupy
ing the base of a long isosceles triangle, of which Mobile is the apex, could
get to Chattanooga before you if they should become aware of your move
ments, and then you would have to contend again with superior forces, as usu
al to us. The moment you get to Chattanooga you ought to take the offen
sive, keeping in mind the following grand principles of the art of war : First,
always bring the masses of your army in contact with the fractions of the en
emy ; second, operate as much as possible on his communications without ex
posing your own; third, operate always on interior or shorter lines. I have
no doubt that with anything like equal numbers you will always meet with
success. " I am happy to see that my two lieutenants, Morgan and Forrest, are doing
such good service in Kentucky and Tennessee. When I appointed them I
thought they would leave their mark wherever they passed.
" Sincerely your friend, " G. T. Beauregard."
General Bragg, for reasons we cannot explain, did not follow
the advice given ; and his campaign into middle Tennessee and
Kentucky ended almost in disaster.
General Beauregard, it seems, had not given up all hope of
again assuming command of his army. He followed its every
movement with the greatest interest and anxiety ; and during the
leisure now afforded him, drew up an extensive plan for its
further success, which he finally forwarded to the War Depart
ment. In the meantime — namely, ou the 25th of August — he had
officially reported " for duty in the field." The plan we here re
fer to was addressed to General Cooper, whose relations with Gen
eral Beauregard had not ceased to be of an agreeable character.
It was marked " Confidential," and read thus :

414 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
" Mobile, Ala., September 5th, 1862.
" General, — Under the supposition that on the restoration of my health I
would be returned to the command of Department No. 2, 1 had prepared while at
Bladon, Alabama, a plan of operations in Tennessee and Kentucky, based on my
knowledge of that part of the theatre of war; but hearing that my just ex
pectations are to be disappointed, I have the honor to communicate it to the
War Department, in the hope that it may be of service to our arms and to our
cause. It was submitted by me to General Bragg on the 2d instant. By look
ing at the map it will be seen that the forces operating in that section of
country will be separated at first by one river (the Tennessee), and afterwards
by two (the Tennessee and Cumberland), hence they will be unable to support
each other, being unprovided with pontoon trains ; but their operations must
be more or less dependent on or connected with each other. I will first refer
to those in East Tennessee and then to those west of it.
" In the first case, our objective points must be, first, Louisville, and then Cin
cinnati. How best to reach them from Chattanooga, with Buell at Huntsville
and Stevenson, is the question. It is evident he has the advantage of two
bases of operations, the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and that if we ad
vance towards our objective points without getting rid of him, we would ex
pose our lines of communication with Chattanooga. We must, then, give him
battle first, or compel him to retire before us.
" Should he retire on Nashville (as the newspapers say he is now doing), we
will be advancing towards Louisville ; but should he venture on Florence or
Savannah, to unite his forces with Rosecrans and Grant, we will have to con
centrate enough of our forces from Mobile and East Tennessee to follow him
rapidly and defeat liim in a grand battle, when we would be able to resume
our march as before indicated. We must, however, as soon as practicable, con
struct strong works to command the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, for
otherwise our communication would be cut off by the enemy as soon as those
two rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit the entrance of their gunboats
and transports.
" The best positions for said works are about forty miles below forts Donel
son and Henry, not far from Eddysville, where those two rivers come within
one and a half miles of each other. I am informed there is at that point a
commanding elevation where a strong field-work could be constructed for a
garrison of about twenty-five hundred or three thousand men, who could hold
out (with ample provisions and ammunition) against a large army. Under
the guns of this work, and along the bank of each river, a series of batteries,
armed with the heaviest guns (eight, nine, ten inch, and rifled guns), could
be constructed, bearing directly on obstructions placed in each of said rivers.
" When Louisville shall have fallen into our possession, I would construct a
work there for the command of the Ohio and the canal, and I would destroy
the latter as soon as possible, so completely that future travellers would hardly
know where it was. This I would do as a return for the Yankee vandalism in
attempting to obstruct forever the harbors of Charleston and Savannah. A
detachment of our army could, I think, take Louisville, while the main body
would be marching to Cincinnati; but if we could get boats enough it would

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 415
be shorter to go up the Ohio in them. To keep the command of Cincinnati,
I would construct a strong work, heavily armed, at Covington.
" Now, for the operation of Western Tennessee. The object should be to
drive the enemy from there and resume the command of the Mississippi River.
For these purposes I would concentrate rapidly at Grand Junction Price's
army, and all that could be spared from Vicksburg of Van Dorn's. From
there I would make a forced march to Fort Pillow, which I would take with
probably only a very small loss. It is evident that the forces at Memphis and
Yazoo River would then have their line of communication by the river with
the North cut off, and they would have either to surrender or cross without
resources into Arkansas, where General Holmes would take good care of them.
From Fort Pillow I would compel the forces at Corinth and Jackson, Tennessee,
to fall back precipitately to Humboldt and Columbus, or their lines of commu
nication would be cut off also. We would then pursue them vigorously beyond
the Mississippi at Columbus, or the Ohio at Paducah. We would thus compel
the enemy to evacuate the State of Mississippi and Western Tennessee, with
probably the loss on our part of only a few hundred men. General Price could
then be detached into Missouri to support his friends, where his presence alone
would be worth an army to the Confederacy.
" The armament and ammunition of the works referred to should be collected,
as soon as possible, at Meridian and Chattanooga. Such are the operations
which I would carry into effect, with such modifications as circumstances might
require, if the President had judged proper to order me back to the command
of that army which I had, with General Bragg's assistance, collected together
and organized, and which I had only left to recover my shattered health, while
my presence could be spared . from it, and until he informed me that it was
ready to take the offensive.
" Hoping for its entire success, I remain, very respectfully,
" Your obedient servant,
" G. T. Beauregard, General C. S. A."
Hardly a week had elapsed after the foregoing communication
was forwarded to Richmond, when the Hon. Thomas J. Semmes
and the Hon. Edward Sparrow, Members of Congress from Louisi
ana, called by agreement, with their colleagues, on President
Davis, to present to him a petition, signed by nearly sixty Sena
tors and Representatives from different States of the Confederacy.
It is a paper of great interest, giving additional information upon
the subject which occupies our attention :
" To the President of the Confederate States :
" Sir, — The undersigned Senators and Representatives in Congress from the
Western and Southwestern States have learned with pleasure that General
Beauregard, restored in health, has reported for duty, and that he has been as
signed to the command of South Carolina and Georgia. They have also been
reliably informed that the General is anxious and eager to return to the com-

416

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

mand of the Army of the West. Without in any manner desiring to interfere
with the military dispositions of the government, or with the prerogatives of
the President as Commander-in-Chief of all the forces, they would respectfully
submit that a due regard, consistent with the best interests of the country,
should be paid to the wishes of one who has given such proofs of disinterested
devotion to our cause, and who has contributed so much by his generalship to
insure the success of our arms. Compelled by the exigencies of the country to
separate himself from his Army of the Potomac to go West in a new field, at
a most gloomy period of our revolution ; then, with scanty resources, to form
a new army, under every possible disadvantage, consequent upon the unex
pected fall of forts Henry and Donelson, he was found equal to every emer
gency ; and then at the battle of Shiloh, and in the masterly retreat from Cor
inth, saved that army. We know the enthusiasm with which his return would
inspire our noble army, who long to see him, and that the worthy general
commanding would be rejoiced and gladdened by his presence. As represen
tatives aforesaid, knowing well the sentiments and wishes of the people we
represent, we unhesitatingly say that the restoration of General Beauregard to
the Army of the West would be hailed with great joy by them ; and without
detracting from the acknowledged merit and well-earned reputation of the
present commander, we respectfully submit that a new guarantee for the suc
cess of our arms would be given. For these reasons we earnestly ask the
President to duly consider the expressed desire of General Beauregard, ere he
be definitely assigned to any position. Understanding that the assignment of
General "Beauregard to Charleston has been pressed upon the government by
the Governor and Council of South Carolina, we tender herewith the names of
the representatives of that State, as expressive of their assent to our petition.
" It is but justice to General Beauregard to say that this step is taken with
out his knowledge or consent.

"Ed. Sparrow,

La.

J. Perkins, Jr.,

La.

T. J. Semmes,

a

C. M. Conrad,

tt

W. L. Yancey,

Ala.

J. Wilcox,

Texas

L. C. Haynes,

Tenn.

P. W. Gray,

a

H. C. Burnet,

Ky.

T. B. Cexton,

u

J. B. Clark,

Mo.

J. C. Atkins,

Tenn.

 Peyton,

a

W. G. Swan,

a

G. A. Henry,

Tenn.

H. S. Foote,

il

L.T. Wigfall,

Texas.

T. B. Handley,

Ark.

 Mences,

a

H. W. Bruce,

Ky.

C. W. Bell,

Mo.

R. J. Breckinridge,

a

C. J. VillerS,

La.

W. R. Smith,

Ala.

G. D. Royston,

Ark.

E. L. Gardeushire,

Tenn.

J. M. Elliott,

Ky.

J. W. Moore,

Ky.

David Clopton,

Ark.

D. F. Kenncr,

La.

G. W. Ewing,

Ky.

L. C. Dupre,

a

W. N. Cooke,

Mo.

E. S. Dargan,

Ala.

F. S. Lyon,

Ala.

F. J. Batson,

Ark.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

417

J. B. Heiskell,

Tenn.

G. B. Hodge,

Ky.

T. A. Harris,

Mo.

H. E. Reid,

t<

C. C. Herbert,

Texas.

Wm. II. Tibbs,

Tenn

F. J. Foster,

Ala.

J. L. M. Curry,

Aia.

E. M. Bruce,

Ky.

A. W. Conrow,

Mo.

A. H. Garland,

Ark.

F. W. Freeman,

U

G. G. Vest,

Mo.

Wm. Porcher Miles,

S.C.

J. D. Crocket,

Ky.

M. L. Bonham,

a

W. R. Machen,

U

W. W. Boyce,

u

II. R. Wright,

Ga.

F. Farrow,

u

M. D. Graham,

Texas.

J. McQueen,

lb

D. M. Currin,

Tenn.

A true copy.

" Charles J. Villere, Representative in Congress."
President Davis's answer to this earnest appeal, supported by such
an imposing array of representative names, was truly characteristic.
The reader will judge of it after reading the following paper :
Notes of an Interview with the President relative to Transferring General Beaure
gard to the Command of Department No. 2.
"Richmond, September 13th, 1862.
" General Sparrow and myself this day called on the President, and' deliv
ered to him a petition, signed by about fifty members and senators from the
Western and Southwestern States, in which the restoration of Beauregard
to the command of the army now under Bragg was solicited, it being stated
in the petition that it was known that Bragg would welcome the restoration
of Beauregard. The President received it politely, and immediately read it
aloud in our presence, making, en passant, some running comments on the
correctness of some of the facts stated in the petition. He then calmly and
dispassionately read aloud all the signatures attached to the petition. Hav
ing sent to an adjoining office for five or six despatches, he read them aloud
in the order they were sent or received, according to date, and accompanied
them in a calm manner with the following explanation, prefacing it with the
remark that he supposed we had not a correct and faithful apprehension of
the facts. He stated that on the day preceding his first despatch command
ing Bragg to proceed to Vicksburg (14th June, I think), he received a de
spatch from Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, informing him that Beaure
gard (to whom Pickens had previously sent a despatch requesting him to
come to Charleston and take command there) had replied that his presence
was absolutely necessary to the army at Tupelo, and that he could not leave it.
He (the President) further stated the following condition of things existed at
that time : Columbus and Island No. 10 had surrendered ; Fort Pillow was
evacuated, Memphis was abandoned, the enemy were taking possession of the
line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and threatening a descent
through Mississippi ; that New Orleans had fallen, and the disposition seemed
I.-27
418 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
to be to give up everything; that he had just received a despatch from Lov
ell, statiug, unless reinforced, he would abandon Vicksburg ; besides all this, he
knew the people had no confidence in Lovell, and would not serve under
him. He at once determined to send Bragg to Vicksburg, and on the 15th
June, I think, telegraphed to Bragg to proceed at once to Vicksburg, as the
danger was pressing and imminent, and that the assignment of him to Vicks
burg was but temporary. Bragg immediately replied by telegraph (16th or
17th, I do not remember) that Beauregard, being in bad health, desired tem
porary repose, and intended to leave the army for a short period, and con
cluded by saying he would await further orders. When this despatch arrived
in Richmond, the President was at Raleigh ; as soon as he received it from the
Adjutant-General, he telegraphed Bragg to go at once to Vicksburg, the danger
was pressing and imminent, and he was sorry he had permitted anything to
interfere with his orders. Bragg replied on the 18th or 19th, that Beauregard
had left on a surgeon's certificate of four months, stating, however, that Beau
regard would return in a short time, and as soon as the army was reorgan
ized. I forget the exact terms of the despatch. It conveyed the idea of Beau
regard's absence being temporary, and of no very long duration ; but how
long was uncertain, and where he had gone was not stated* Bragg informed the
President his presence had now become absolutely necessary to the army, and
that he awaited further orders. The President replied, giving Bragg the com
mand of the department, and ordered Van Dorn to Vicksburg through Bragg.
The President stated that under these circumstances every military man will say
that Beauregard should have remained at Tupelo, even if he had to be carried about
in a litter.* He knew that Bragg's assignment to Vicksburg was but tempo
rary, and he ought to have waited at least two or three weeks ; that he left the
army under these circumstances without permission, and that he had no right
to leave on a surgeon's certificate without permission, and he had not stated
where he had gone ; that so long as Beauregard remained invested with the
command of the department, Bragg was only the commander of that army at
Tupelo ; that Bragg could not correspond with the War Department except
through Beauregard, and no orders could be issued to other forces in the de
partment at Vicksburg or elsewhere, except through Beauregard as head of
the department, and therefore, under the circumstances, a change of the head
of the department was absolutely necessary for the public interest. The
President, though stating the irregularities of Beauregard's conduct in leaving
the army, said he had overlooked all that, aud disavowed its influence on his
conduct, and based his action exclusively on the public interests at that
time. " That so far as giving Beauregard command of Bragg's army is concerned,
that was out of the question. Bragg had arranged all his plans, and had co-
ititelligence with the department, with Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall,
and to put a new commander* at the head of the army, would be so prejudicial
to the public interests, he would not do it if the whole world united in the peti
tion.* He further stated that Charleston was no unimportant command, that
* The italics are ours.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. 419
Charleston and Savannah were of vast consequence to the Confederacy, and
as he believed General Beauregard's qualifications peculiarly fitted him for its
defence, he had selected him on that account as the best man in the army for
the South Carolina and Georgia Department. The President read aloud to us
all the despatches spoken of above. I may not therefore give their tenor ac
curately; he promised us copies, and, moreover, authorized us to repeat what
passed in conversation. The above, however, is substantially what passed, as
far as I can recollect ; it is not all that passed, nor do I pretend to give the
exact language. " Thomas J. Semmes."
A few words more, and we have done with this subject. We have
furnished the whole of the evidence relating to it ; and, in order
to make the chain more complete, we now refer the reader to the
despatch of Governor Pickens, and General Beauregard's answer
to it, to be found in the Appendix to this chapter. Let the read
er carefully compare the facts composing that evidence with what
Mr. Davis writes in his book, and with what he said to the com
mittee of Congressmen who called on him to petition for General
Beauregard's restoration to his army. He will need no further
enlightenment in order to draw a just conclusion. We do not in
tend to scrutinize the motives which actuated Mr. Davis in his
conduct at that time towards General Beauregard ; but, that he
was not moved by a spirit of patriotism, or influenced only by a
pure desire to advance the interests of the cause, is shown by the
expressions used by him on that occasion : " He would not do it,
if the whole world united in the petition" Here was the Presi
dent of the Confederacy, the first and most prominent servant of
its people, ready to oppose his will, his rule, not only to the desire
of the majority of that people, but — if need be — to the declared
opinion of "the whole world:" the plain meaning of which was
that should he and the rest of mankind, including the whole pop
ulation of the South, differ as to the wisdom of any measure of
public interest, he would be right, and the "whole world" wrong.
What monarch, in this or in any former age, could have regarded
his power as more absolute ?
Taken as a whole, the military operations in Department No.
2, from Bowling Green to the evacuation of Corinth, including
the stand made at Tupelo, presented some of the most difficult
problems of war. Without the wish to claim undue credit for the
manner in which these were solved, in view of the desperate begin
ning, the wretched want of preparation, the deficiency of men and

420 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF GENERAL BEAUREGARD.
arms, the raw and incomplete materials, collected by such strenu
ous efforts, the friends of General A. S. Johnston and of General
Beauregard may be proud of the results ; of the skill with which
they met every emergency, and, with heavy odds against them,
balked the plans of the enemy.

APPENDICES TO VOL. I.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I.
Engineer Department,
Washington, Jan. 24th, 1861.
Bvt. Major P. G. T. Beauregard, Corps of Engineers, West Point, N. Y. :
Major, — The Secretary of War directs that Special Orders No. 238, of Nov.
8th, 1860, appointing you to the post of Superintendent of the Military Acad
emy, be revoked, aud that you return to your former station at New Orleans.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Jos. G. Totten, Bvt. Brig.-Genl., Chief Eng.

War Department, Adjutant- General's Office,
Washington, Jan. 25th, 1861.
Special Order No. 19.
Special Order No. 238, Adjutant-General's Office, of November, 1860, appoint
ing Bvt. Major Peter G. T. Beauregard, Captain Corps of Engineers, to be the
Superintendent of the Military Academy, is hereby revoked, and Major Beau
regard will return to his former station at New Orleans, La.
By order of the Secretary of War. S. Cooper, Adj.-Geul.
Major Beauregard, through Engineers.

New Orleans, Feb. 12th, 1861.
Hon. Rd. Taylor, New Orleaus, La. :
Dear Sir, — Upon reflection and consultation with my friends, I have come
to the conclusion that I ought not and cannot accept that Colonelcy of Engi
neers and Artillery in the State army — but my professional knowledge, expe
rience, and services, ivithout military rank, are at the command of the State, even
unto death. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard.

New Orleans, Feb. 12th, 1861.
Major G. T. Beauregard :
Dear Sir, — I regret most sincerely that anything should have occurred to
induce you to change the determination in which I left you on yesterday. A
great deal of apprehension has been felt for the safety of our forts commandin<»
the river, and the attention of the whole community has been directed to you
as the one upon whom the State must rely iu the hour of danger.

422 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I.
I cannot presume to intrude my advice and opinions upon you again, and
will only repeat that your decision will be a source of great regret aud disap
pointment to the whole country, as well as to your friends, among whom, my
dear sir, I hope you will permit me to include myself.
With high respect, your obedient servant, R. Taylor.
New Orleans, Feb. 13th, 1861.
Gentlemen, — As time presses, and it may soon become urgent to be prepared
for the worst, permit me to make a few suggestions which may lead to our
successful preparation.
In the first place, we must look to our most vulnerable point, the Mississippi
River; for one single steamer, with only two or three guns, coining into the
port of New Orleans, would in a few hours destroy millions' worth of property,
or lay the city under a forced contribution of millions of dollars.
It is an undeniable fact that, in the present condition of Forts Jackson aud
St. Philip, any steamer can pass them in broad daylight ; and that even when
in a proper condition for defence, they could not prevent the passage of one
or more steamers during a dark or stormy night, without the assistance of a
properly constructed raft or strong wire rope across the river between the
two forts, so as to arrest the course of said steamers, even only for half au
hour, under the severe cross-fire of said forts.
The first thing to be done, then, is to commence the construction of (or pre
pare at least the materials for) said obstacles ; then the guns of the land fronts of
Fort Jackson ought to bo mounted at once on the river fronts ; the guns, chassis,
and carriages at Baton Rouge, Forts Pike, Wood, Battery Bienvenu, etc., where
they are not required at present, ought to be sent at once to these two forts on
the river, to he put in position as advantageously as possible on their river
fronts — not overlooking, however, the flank guns of the other fronts ; all said
chassis and carriages ought to be tried forthwith by double charges of powder
and shot; ample supplies of ammunition ought to be sent there forthwith.
The trees along the river, masking the fires of those two forts, up and down
the river, ought to be cut down at once, particularly those on the Fort Jackson
side. In a few words, no expenses ought to be spared to put those two works
in a most efficient state of defence ; for |50,000 or $100,000 spent thus, might, a
few weeks hence, save millions of dollars to the State and city of New Orleans.
A rough calculation shows me that the raft spoken of would cost about
$40,000, and three wire cables probably $60,000. I prefer the first. Mr. John
Roy, my former assistant architect on the New Orleans custom-house, would be
of great assistance in the construction of either of said obstacles.
In haste, I remain, gentlemen, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard.
To the Military Board of the State of Louisiana, New Orleans, La.

Executive Office,
Baton Rouge, La., Feb. 17th, 1861.
Col. G. T. Beauregard :
Dear. Sir,— A copy of yours of the 13th instant, to the "Military Board,"

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I. 423
relative to the condition of Forts Jackson aud St. Philip, was received two days
since. For the information I thank you, also for the valuable suggestions
offered. I have written the members of the Board on the subject, aud urged
their immediate attention to the whole matter. I am aware of its importance,
but am compelled to leave all such matters (military) to those who have a,
knowledge of them. I only regret, with all of our friends, that you conld not
accept the post tendered you, Colonel of Artillery and Chief of Engineers.
With the highest regards, your obedient servant,
In haste. Thos. O. Moore.

New Orleans, Feb. 19th, 1861.
Dear Sir, — Your favor of the 17th instaut has just been received. I thank
you for regretting that I could not accept the military position tendered mo.
Although not in service, I wish it distinctly understood that my professional
knowledge and experience are at the command of my native State, even unto
death, whenever required — but without military rank ; not, however, through
any jealousy of General Bragg's appointment, for I am happy to state that it is
a most excellent choice ; aud I should have been very happy to serve with him
or under his orders, in the defence of our rights and firesides, if I could have
accopted the Colonel and Chief of Engineers and Artillery position tendered mo.
I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard.
To his Excellency, Gov. T. O. Moore, Baton Rouge, La.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, Feb. 23d, 1861.
Sir, — Your resignation has been accepted by the President of the United
States, to take effect the 20th instant.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. D. Townsend, Asst. Adj.-Genl.
To Bvt. Major P. G. T. Beauregard,
Captain Corps of Engineers, Now Orleans, La.

Telegram of L. F. Walker, Secretary of War, to Governor l^ickens, of South Carolina.
War Department, C. S. A.,
Montgomery, March 1st, 1861.
Gov. F. W. Pickens, Charleston, S. C. ;
Your letter to President received. This government assumes control of
military operations at Charleston, and will make demand of the fort when fully
advised. An officer goes to-night to take charge. L. P. Walker, Sec. of War.

War Department,
Montgomery, March 1st, 1801.
His Excellency F. W. Pickens, Governor, etc. :
Sir, — Your letter of the 27th ultimo, addressed to the President, has been
referred by him to this department. In controlling the military operations

424 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I.
in the harbor of Charleston, the President directs me to say that everything
will be done that may be due to the honor and rights of South Carolina.
The President shares the feeling expressed by yon, that Fort Sumter, should
he in our possession at the earliest moment possible. But this feeling, natural
and just as it is admitted to be, must yield to the necessity of the case.
Thorough preparation must be made before an attack is attempted, for the
first blow must be successful, both for its moral and physical consequences,
or otherwise the result might be disastrous to your State in the loss of many
of those whom we can least afford to spare. A failure would demoralize our
people, and injuriously affect us in the opinion of the world, as reckless and
precipitate. . . . Under the fourth section of an Act of Congress to raise Pro
visional Forces for the Confederate States of America., and for other purposes,
a copy of which I have the honor to enclose in another communication of this
date, the President has appointed Peter G. T. Beauregard Brigadier-General, to
commaud the Provisional Forces of this government in the harbor of Charles
ton. General Beauregard will be accompanied by an Adjutant, whose duty it
will be to receive into the Provisional army, with their officers, under the
provisions of the act aforesaid, the forces of your State now in Charleston.
General Beauregard has the entire confidence of the President and of this
department, and I beg to commend hirn as possessing every soldierly quality.
I have the honor to be, with high regard, your obedient servaut,
L. P. Walker, Sec. of War.
War Department, C. S. A.,
Montgomery, March 1st, 1861.
Brig.-Genl. P. G. T. Beauregard :
Sir,— You will proceed without delay to Charleston, aud report to Governor
Pickens for military duty iu that State.
You are authorized, by your appointment as Brigadier-General, under the
provisions of the third section of an Act of the Congress to raise Provisional
Forces for the Confederate States, to receive into the service of this govern
ment such forces as may be tendered or may volunteer, not to exceed five thou
sand men, as you may require, or for whom you can make suitable provision.
A copy of the Act referred to has been this day transmitted to Governor Pick
ens. You will report to this department your arrival at Charleston, and give such
information, with respect to the defences of that harbor, as you may consider
important. Yon will also secure, if possible, the services of a competent Adju
tant, and report your action, in that behalf, to this department.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, L. P. Walker, Sec. of War.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III. 425

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III.
Captain Fox to Lieutenant-General Scott.

Feb. 8th, 1861.

Lieut.-Genl. Winfield Scott, U. S. A. ¦.
Sir, — Tho proposition which I have had the honor to submit to you fully, in
person, is herewith presented in writing. Lieutenant Hall and myself have had
several free conferences ; and if he is permitted by the South Carolina authori
ties to re-enter Fort Sumter, Major Anderson will comprehend the plan for his
relief. I consider myself very fortunate in having proposed a project which
meets the approval of the gencral-in-chief ; and I ask no reward bnt the entire
conduct of the post, exclusive of the armed vessels. The commander of these
should be ordered to co-operate with mo, by affording mo protection and destroy
ing their naval preparations near the bar, leaving to me, as the author of the plan,
the actual operations of relief. I suggest that the Pawnee he immediately sent
to the Delaware Breakwater to await orders, the Harriet Lane to be ready for
sea, and some arrangement entered into by which the requisite steamer and
tugs should be engaged — at least, so far as not to excite suspicion. I should prefer
one of the Collins steamers. They are now being prepared for sea, and are of
such a size and power as to be able, fearlessly, to run down any vessel which
might attempt to capture us outside by coup de main. I could quietly engage
one, and have her ready to start on twenty-four hours' notice, without exciting
suspicion. I shall leave for New York at 3 p. M., and any communication will
find me at Judge Blair's. If the Pawnee's pivot-gun is landed, it should cer
tainly be remounted. Very respectfully, etc., G. V. Fox.

General Scott to Captain Fox.
Headquarters of the Army, Washington,
March 19th, 1861.
Dear Sir, — Iu accordance with the request contained in a note of the Secre
tary of War to me, of which I annex a copy, I request that you will have the
goodness to proceed to Charleston, S. C, and obtaiu permission, if necessary, to
visit Fort Sumter, in order to enable you to comply with the wish expressed in
the secretary's note. Very respectfully, etc., Winfield Scott.

Secretary Cameron's Instructions to Captain Fox.
War Department, Washington, April 6th, 1861.
Sir, — It having been decided to succor Fort Sumter, you have been selected
for this important duty. Accordingly, you will take charge of the transports
in New York, having the troops and supplies on hoard, to the port of Charles
ton harbor, and endeavor, in the first instance, to deliver the subsistence. If
you are opposed iu this, you are directed to report the fact to the senior naval
officer of the harbor, who will he instructed by the Secretary of the Navy to use
his entire force to open a passage, when you will, if possible, effect an en.
trance, and place both the troops and supplies in Fort Sumter.
I am, sir, etc., Simon Cameron, Sec. of War.

426 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III.
President Lincoln to Captain Fox.
Washington, May 1st, 1861.
Capt. G. V. Fox:
My Dear Sir, — I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt to pro
vision Fort Sumter should be the source of any annoyance to you. The prac
ticability of your plan was not, in fact, brought to a test. By reason of a gale,
well known in advance to be possible, and not improbable, the tugs, an essen
tial part of the plan, never reached the ground ; while, by an accident, for which
you were in nowise responsible, and possibly I, to some extent, was, you were de
prived of a war-vessel, with her men, which you deemed of great importance to
the enterprise.
I most cheerfully and truthfully declare that the failure of the undertaking
has not lowered you a particle, while the qualities you developed in the effort
have greatly heightened you in my estimation. For a daring and dangerous
enterprise of a similar character, you would, to-day, be the man of all my ac
quaintances whom I would select. You and I both anticipated that the cause
of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort
Sumter, even if it should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that
our anticipation is justified by the result.
Very truly your friend, A. Lincoln.

Confederate States of America, War Department,
Montgomery, April 2d, 1861.
Brig.-Geul. G. T. Beauregard, Comdg. Charleston Harbor, Charleston, S. C. :
Sir, — This government has at no time placed any reliance on assurances by
the government at Washington, in respect to the evacuation of Fort Sumter, or
entertained any confidence in the disposition of the latter to make any conces
sion, or yield any point to which it is not driven by an absolute necessity. And
I desire that you will govern yourself generally with reference to this, as the
key to the policy of the government of the Confederate States.
You are specially instructed to remit, in no degree, your efforts to prevent the
reinforcement of Fort Sumter; and to keep yourself in a state of the amplest
preparation and most perfect readiness to repel invasion ; acting in all respects
— save only in commencing an assault or attack (except to repel an invading or
reinforcing force) — precisely as if you were in the presence of an enemy con
templating to surprise you.
The delays and apparent vacillations of the Washington government make
it imperative that the further concession of courtesies such as have been ac
corded to Major Anderson aud his command, iu supplies from the city, must
cease. And, in general terms, the status which you must at once re-establish
and rigidly enforce is that of hostile forces in the presence of each other, aud
who may at any momont be in actual conflict.
But da past conditions have allowed this government to continue thus far
courtesies of personal convenience to Major Anderson and his officers, it is
proper now, as those courtesies are required to be determined by tho necessities

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV. 427
of your position, that you signify iu respectful terms to Major Anderson that
all communication with the city from the fort, and with the fort from the city,
for any purpose of supply, is absolutely inhibited. And after having so notified
that gentleman, at the very earliest moment practicable, you will make your
surveillance of the harbor, and the enforcement of the rule of instruction indi
cated in the notice to the commander of Fort Sumter, as rigid as all the means
at your command, in the most watchful vigilance, can secure.
Until the withdrawal of the commissioners of this government from Wash
ington — an event which may occur at any moment — no operations, beyoud what
is indicated in the foregoing, would be admissible. Promptly, however, on the
receipt, by this government, of the intelligence of such withdrawal, the depart
ment will transmit to you specific instructions for your guidance.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. P. Walker, Sec. of War.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV.
Headquarters Provisional Army C. S.
Charleston, S. C, April 21th, 1861.
Hon. L. P. Walker, Sec. of War, Montgomery, Ala. :
Sir, — I have the honor to transmit to the department my detailed report of
the operations during the bombardment of Fort Sumter, accompanied by copies
of the reports sent in to this office by the commanders of the batteries, together
with a series of photographs, twenty-two in number, showing the condition of
Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and of the floating battery, after the surrender of
the former fort.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

Headquarters Provisional Army C. S.
Charleston, S. C, April 27th, 1861.
Brig.-Genl. Cooper, Adj.-Geul. C. S. A. :
Sir, — I have the honor to submit the following detailed report of the bom
bardment and surrender of Fort Sumter, and the incidents connected therewith.
Having completed my channel-defences and batteries in the harbor, necessary
for the reduction of Fort Sumter, I despatched two of my aids at 2.20 p. m., on
Thursday, the 11th of April, with a communication to Major Anderson, in com
mand of the fort, demanding its evacuation. I offered to transport himself aud
command to any port in the United States he might select ; to allow him to
move out of the fort with compauy-arms and property, and all private property,
and to salute his flag on lowering it. He refused to accede to this demand.
As my aids were about leaving, Major Auderson remarked, " that if we did not
batter him to pieces he would be starved out in a few days," or words to that
effect.

428 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV.
This being reported to me by my aids, on their return with his refusal, at
5.10 p.m., I deemed it proper to telegraph the purport of his remark to the Sec
retary of War. I received by telegraph the following instruction at 9.10 p. m. ;
"Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter; if Major Anderson will
state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that
in the meantime he will not use his guns against us, unless ours should be em
ployed against Fort Sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid effusion of blood.
If this, or its equivalent, be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to
bo most practicable." At 11 p.m. I sent my aids with a communication to
Major Anderson, based upon these instructions. It was placed in his hands at
12.45 a. m. , on the 12th instant. Ho expressed his willingness to evacuate the
fort ou Monday afternoon, "if furuished with the necessary means of transpor
tation, and he should not receive contradictory instructions from his govern
ment, or additional supplies." But he declined to agree "not to open his guns
upon us in the event of any hostile demonstration, on our part, against his flag."
This reply, which was open, and shown to my aids, plainly indicated that, if in
structions should be received contrary to his purpose to evacuate, or he should
receive his supplies, or the Confederate troops should fire on hostile troops of
the United States, or upon transports bearing the United States flag, containing
men, munitions, and supplies designed for hostile operations against us, he would
feel bound to fire upon us, and to hold possession of the fort. As, in consequence
of a communication from the President of the United States to the Governor of
South Carolina, we were in momentary expectation of an attempt to reinforce
Fort Sumter, or of a descent upon our coast to that end from the United States
fleet lying off the entrance of the harbor, it was manifestly an apparent necessity
to reduce the fort as speedily as possible, and not to await until tho ships and
the fort should unite in a combined attack upon us. Accordingly, my aids, car
rying out my instructions, promptly refused to accede to the terms proposed
by Major Anderson, and notified him, in writing, that our batteries would open
upon Fort Sumter in one hour. This notification was given at 3.20 a. m., on Fri
day the 12th instant. The signal-shell was fired from Fort Johnson at 4.30
a. m., and, at about 5 o'clock, the fire from our batteries became general. Fort
Sumter did not open until 7 o'clock, when it commenced with a vigorous fire
upon the Cummiugs's Point Iron Battery. The enemy next directed his fire upon
the enfilade battery on Sullivan's Island, constructed to sweep the parapet of
Fort Sumter, to prevent the working of the barbette guns, and to dismount
them. This was also the aim of the floating battery, the Dahlgren battery,
and the gun-batteries at Cummings's Point. The enemy next opened fire on Fort
Moultrie, between which and Fort Sumter a steady and almost constant fire
was kept up throughout the day. These three points, Fort Moultrie, Cummings's
Point, and the end of Sullivan's Island, where the floating battery, Dahlgren
Battery, and the enfilade battery were placed, were the points to which the
enemy seemed almost to confine his attention, although a number of shots were
directed at Captain Butler's mortar battery, situated eastward of Fort Moultrie,
and a few at Captain James's mortar batteries at Fort Johnson. During the
day (12th instant) the fire of our batteries was kept up most spiritedly, the

APPENDIX TO CIIAPTER IV. 429
guns and mortars being worked in the coolest manner, preserving the prescribed
intervals of firing. Towards evening it became evident that our fire was very
effective, as the enemy was driven from his barbette guns, which he had at
tempted to work in the morning, and his fire was confined to his casemated
guns, but in a less active manner than in the morning, and it was observed that
several of his guns a barbette were disabled.
During the whole of Friday night our mortar batteries continued to throw
shells, but, in obedience to orders, at longer intervals. The night was rainy
and dark, and as it was confidently expected that the United States fleet would
attempt to land troops upon the islands, or throw men into Fort Sumter by
means of boats, the greatest vigilance was observed at all our channel batteries,
and by our troops on both Morris and Sullivan's islands. Early on Saturday
morning all our batteries reopened on Fort Sumter, which responded vigorously
for a while, directing its fire specially against Fort Moultrie. About 8 a. m.
smoke was seen issuing from the quarters of Fort Sumter ; the fire of our bat
teries was then increased, for the purpose of bringing the enemy to terms as
speedily as possible, inasmuch as his flag was still floating defiantly. Fort
Sumter coutinued to fire from time to time, but at long and irregular intervals,
amid the dense smoke. Our brave troops, carried away by their enthusiasm,
mounted the different batteries, and, at every discharge from the fort, cheered
the garrison for its pluck aud gallantry, and hooted at the fleet lying inactive
just outside the bar. About 1.30 p. m., it being reported to me that the Federal
flag was down (it was afterwards ascertained that the flagstaff had been shot
away), and the conflagration from the large volume of smoke appearing to in
crease, I sent three of my aids with a message to Major Auderson to the effect
that, " seeing his flag no longer flying, his quarters in flames, aud supposing him
to be in distress, I desired to offer him any assistance he might stand in need
of." Before my aids reached the fort the United States flag was displayed on
the parapets, but remained there only a short time when it was hauled down
and a white flag substituted iu its place. When the United States flag first
disappeared the firing from our batteries almost entirely ceased, but reopened
with increased vigor when it reappeared on the parapet, and was continued
until the white flag was raised, when the firing ceased entirely. Upon the ar
rival of my aids at Fort Sumter they delivered their message to Major Ander
son, who replied "that he thanked General Beauregard for his offer, but desired
no assistance." Just previous to their arrival at the fort, Colonel Wigfall, one
of my volunteer aids, who had been detached for special duty on Morris Islaud,
had, by order of Brigadier-General Simons, crossed over to Fort Sumter from
Cummings's Point iu an open boat, with private William Gourdin Young, amid a
heavy fire of shots and shells, for the purpose of ascertaining from Major Auder
son whether his intention was to surrender, his flag being down and his quarters
iu flames. On reaching the fort the colonel had an interview with Major An
derson, the result of which was that Major Anderson understood him as offering
the same conditions on the part of General Beauregard as had been tendered to
him on the 11th instant, while Colonel Wigfall's impression was that Major
Anderson unconditionally surrendered, trusting to the generosity of General

430 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV.
Beauregard to offer such terms as would be honorable and acceptable to both
parties ; meanwhile, before these circumstances had been reported to me, and,
in fact, soon after the aids I had despatched with the offer of assistance had set
out on their mission, heariug that a white flag was flying over the fort, I sent
Major Jones, chief of my staff, and some other aids, with substantially the same
proposition I had made to Major Anderson on the 11th instant, excepting the
privilege of salutiug his flag. Major Anderson replied that " it would be ex
ceedingly gratifying to him, as well as to his command, to be permitted to salute
their flag, having so gallantly defended the fort under such trying circum
stances, and hoped that General Beauregard would not refuse it, as snch a priv
ilege was not unusual." He furthermore said, " he would not urge the point,
but would prefer to refer the matter again to General Beauregard."
The point was, therefore, left open until the matter was submitted to me.
Previous to the return of Major Jones I had sent a fire-engine, under Mr. M. H.
Nathan, Chief of the Fire Department, and Surgeon-General Gibbs, of South
Carolina, with several of my aids, to offer further assistance to the garrison of
Fort Sumter, which was declined. I very cheerfully agreed to allow the salute,
as an honorable testimony to the gallantry and fortitude with which Major
Anderson and his command had defended their post, and I informed Major Ander
son of my decision about half-past seven o'clock, through Major Jones, my chief
of staff. The arrangements being completed, Major Anderson embarked, with
his command, on the transport prepared to convey them to the United States
fleet still lying outside of the bar, and our troops immediately garrisoned the
fort; before suuset the flag of the Confederate States floated over the ramparts
of Sumter.
I commend in the highest terms the gallantry of the troops under my com
mand, and where all have done their duty well it is difficult to discriminate.
Although the troops outside of the batteries bearing on Fort Sumter were not
so fortunate as their comrades working the guns and mortars, still their ser
vices were equally valuable and commendable ; for they were on their arms at
the channel batteries, and at their posts and bivouacs, exposed to severe weath
er and constant watchfulness, expecting every moment to have to repel rein
forcements from the powerful fleet off the bar. To all these troops I award
much praise for the cheerfulness with which they met the duties required of
them. I feel much indebted to Generals R. G. M. Dunovant and James Simons
(commanding on Sullivau's and Morris islands), and their staffs, especially Ma
jors Evans aud De Saussuro, S. C. A., for their valuable and gallant services, and
the discretion they displayed iu executing the duties devolviug on their respon
sible positions. Of Lieutenant- Colonel R. S. Ripley, 1st Artillery Battalion,
commandant of batteries on Sullivan's Island, I cannot speak too highly, and
join with General Duuovant, his immediate commander since January last, in
commending in the highest terms his sagacity, experience, and unflagging zeal.
I would also mention in the highest terms of praise Captains Calhoun and
Hallonquist, assistant commandauts of batteries to Colonel Ripley, and the fol
lowing commanders of batteries ou Sullivau's Island: Captain J. R. Hamilton,
commanding the floating battery aud Dahlgren gun ; Captains Butler, S. C. A.,

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV. 431
and Bruns, aide-de-camp to General Dunovant ; and Lieutenants Wagner, Rhett,
Yates, Valentine, and Parker.
To Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. De Saussure, 2d Artillery Battalion, comman
dant of batteries on Morris Island, too much praise canuot be given. He
displayed the most untiring energy; and his judicious arrangements, in the
good management of his batteries, contributed much to the reduction of Fort
Sumter. To Major Steveus, of the Citadel Academy, in charge of the Cummings's Poiut
batteries, I feel much indebted for his valuable and scientific assistance aud the
efficient working of the batteries under his immediate charge. The Cummings's
Point batteries (iron 42-pounders aud mortars) were manned by the Palmetto
Guards, Captain Cuthbert; and I take pleasure in expressing my admiration
of the service of the gallant captain and his distinguished company during
the action. I would also mention in terms of praise the following commanders
of batteries at the Point, viz. ; Lieutenants Armstrong, of the Citadel Academy,
and Brownfield, of the Palmetto Guards; also Captain Thomas, of the Citadel
Academy, who had charge of the rifled cannon and had the honor of using this
valuable weapon — a gift of one of Sonth Carolina's sons to his native State —
with peculiar effect. Captain J. G. King, with his company, the Marion Artil
lery, commanded the mortar battery in rear of the Cummings's Point batteries;
and the accuracy of his shell practice was the theme of general admiration.
Captain George S. James, commanding at Fort Johnson, had the honor of firing
the first shell at Fort Sumter; his conduct and that of those under him was
commendable during the action. Captain Martin, S. C. A., commanded the
Mount Pleasant mortar battery, and, with assistants, did good service. For a
more detailed account of the gallantry of the attack on Sumter, I would re
spectfully invite your attention to the copies of tho reports of the different
officers under my command, herewith enclosed. I cannot close this report with
out referring to the following gentlemen : To his Excellency, Governor Pickens,
and staff — especially Colonels Lamar and Deariug, who were so active and effi
cient in the construction of the channel batteries; Colonels Lucas and Moore,
for assistance oil various occasions ; and Colonel Daryea and Mr. Nathan, Chief
of the Fire Department, for their gallant assistance in putting out the fire at
Fort Sumter when the magazine of the latter was in imminent danger of explo
sion ; General Jamieson, Secretary of War, and General S. R. Gist, Adjutant-Gen
eral, for their valuable assistance in obtaining and despatching the troops for
the attack on Sumter and defeuee of the batteries ; Quartermaster's and Com
missary-General's Departments, Colonels Hatch and Walker; and the Ord
nance Board, especially Colonel Manigault, Chief of Ordnance, whose zeal and
activity were untiring ; the Medical Department, whose preparations had been
judiciously and amply made, but which a kind Providence rendered unnecessa
ry ; the Engineers, Majors Whiting aud Gwynn, Captains Trapiers aud Lee, and
Lieutenauts MeCrady, Earle, and Gregorie — on whom too much praise cannot
be bestowed for their untiring zeal, energy, and gallantry, and to whose labors
is greatly due the unprecedented example of taking such an important work,
after thirty-three hours firing, without having to report the loss of a single life,

432 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI.
aud but four persons slightly wounded ; from Major W. H. C. Whiting I derived
also much assistance, not only as an engineer, in selecting the sites and laying
out the channel batteries on Morris Island, but as Acting Assistant-Adjutant
and Inspector-General, in arranging aud stationing the troops on said island;
the Naval Department, especially Captain Hartstein, one of my volunteer aids,
who was indefatigable in guarding the entrance into the harbor aud in trans
mitting my orders.
Lieutenant T. B. Hugor was also of much service, first as ordnance-inspecting
officer of batteries, then in charge of the batteries on the south end of Morris
Island. Lieutenant Warley, who commanded the Dahlgren channel battery
and the school-ship, which was kindly offered by the Board of Directors, was of
much service. Lieutenant Rutledge was Acting Inspector-General of Ordnance
of the batteries, in which capacity, assisted by Lieutenant Williams, C. S. A., on
Morris Island, he was very useful iu organizing aud distributing ammunition.
Captains Childs and Jones, assistant commandants of batteries to Lieutenant-
Colonel De Saussure, Captains Winder and Allston, Acting Assistant- Adjutant
and Inspector-Generals to General Simons's brigade ; Captain Mauigault of my
staff, attached to General Simons's staff, did efficient and gallant services ou
Morris Island during the fight. Professor Lewis R. Gibbes, of the Charleston
College, and his aids, deserve much praise for their valuable services in operat
ing the Drummond lights, established at the extremities of Sullivan's and Mor
ris Islands. The venerable and gallant Edmund Ruffin, of Virginia, was at the
Iron Battery and fired many gnus, undergoing every fatigue and sharing the
hardships at the battery with the youngest of the Palmettos. To my regular
staff — Major D. R. Jones, C. S. A., Captains Lee aud Ferguson, C. S. A., and Lieu
tenant Legare", S. C. A. ; and my volunteer staff, Messrs. Chisolm, Wigfall, Chest
nut, Manning, Miles, Gonzales, and Pryor — I am much indebted for their inde
fatigable and valuable assistance, night and day, during the attack, transmit
ting my orders in open boats with alacrity aud cheerfulness to the different bat
teries, amid falling balls aud bursting shells. Captain Wigfall was the first iu
Fort Sumter to receive its surrender.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI.
Headquarters Department of Alexandria, Va.
Manassas Junction, June 16th, 1861.
Sir, — ******
Can I be informed why it is that none of my communications to the War
Department through the Adj utant-Geueral's Department are answered ? They
aro not even acknowledged. I refer more particularly to my letters of the 5th,
9th, and 12th instant.
Ought my communications (reports, etc.) to bo sent through General Lee or

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI. 433
not ? He is the only one from whom I receive any official orders of any im
portance. I beg to call your attention particularly to my letter of the 5th instant, re
ferring to the immediate necessity of furnishing my command with belts (of
any material) three (3) inches wide, red on one side aud yellow on the other, to
be worn with either color ou the outside, and from over the right shoulder
buttoued under the left arm, or from left to right, as the officer in command
shall direct, for the time being. Many of my regiments are not furnished with
the Confederate colors ; how are they to be distinguished in battle from the
enemy ? especially if we attack them in flank or rear, as we ought to do when
ever practicable. I feel very much concerned about these two matters. I
have no doubt that, if the ladies of Richmond were called upon, belts and
colors could be made iu a few days.
Mauy of my companies are entirely unprovided with cartridge and cap boxes ;
what are they to do, especially in wet weather? We have no ammunition to
waste. I have thought it advisable to call these facts to your Excellency's
attention, as they are going to play a very important part in our battles with
the euemy. I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.
To his Excellency President Jeff. Davis, Richmond, Va.

Headquarters Department op Alexandria,
Camp Pickens, June 2d, 1861.
Colonel, — I enclose a brief note just received from Lieutenant-Colonel Ewell,
commanding our advanced forces at Fairfax Court-House, as affording the latest
information of the movements of the euemy.
I must urge the importance of giving all possible strength to this command
at the earliest possible moment, as this section of country is difficult to defend
wifh a small force ; and I trust that any South Carolina, or other good aud well-
armed, troops that may reach Virginia will be sent hither with despatch.
I find that many of the troops here are badly armed and unprovided with
means of transportation and camp equipage.
Respectfully, Colonel, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.
To Col. R. S. Garnett, Adj.-Genl. Headquarters Department of Alexandria,
Camp Pickens, June 6th, 1861.
Special Orders, No. 9.
I. Colonel J. L. Kemper is assigned to temporary special service, being charged
with the duty of procuring the necessary means of transportation for this com
mand. He is authorized to employ the necessary agents, aud will be further
assisted by such officers and men from this department as he may select, not
to exceed four officers and twenty men. He is further authorized to require
of all officers or agents, acting in the Quartermaster's Department, at any post
in the department, efficient assistance in the prompt execution and accom
plishment of the purposes of these orders.
I.— 28

434: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI.
II. It is desirable that, in all cases when practicable, teams should be hired by
the month ; hired with wagon, four horses, or five mules to the team, harness
complete, and the driver, when practicable. Two hundred such hired teams
are required ; but if they cannot be procured, Colonel Kemper, in the exercise
of a sound discretion, is authorized to purchase horses or mules for one hundred
teams, with the necessary wagons and harness.
III. Colonel Kemper is further authorized to purchase a full supply of forage
for the teams he may secure,
IV. Colonel Kemper is authorized to transport himself and his agents, or any
individual of them, at the expense of the State, over any railroad in the State,.
or by other public means of conveyance.
V. Colonel Kemper will, if necessary, commnnicate by telegraph with these
headquarters, and with his agents, when reliance iu the usual mail facilities
will be to the public prejudice.
VI. The general commanding confidently relies on the patriotism and public
spirit of the people of Virginia, and cannot doubt they will cheerfully come for
ward with their supplies, teams, aud means of transportation, at this juncture,
for the service of the State, the general weal, aud their own safety and liberties.
By order of Brig.-Genl. Beauregard, Thomas Jordan, Act. Asst. Adj.-Geul.

Headquarters Department of Alexandria,
Camp Pickens, June 6th, 1861.
In consequence of the urgent necessity of completing the works already
commenced for the defence of this important point as rapidly as possible, and
of the fact that the troops here stationed cannot be employed continuously on
said works without serious interruption to the drills and military instruction
so essential to the young soldier, I am compelled to request the patriotic citi
zens of this and the neighboring counties to send here such of their negro men
as they can spare, with or without rations, and with spades and pickaxes, con
fident that they will cheerfully contribute this labor to assist in the defence
of our country and cause. G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.
Official : S. W. Ferguson, Lt. and A. D. C.

Headquarters Department of Alexandria, Va.,
Manassas Junction, June 9th, 1861.
Sir,— On assuming the command here, I found Dr. Gastin, South Carolina
Volunteers, actiug as medical director, and I have coutinued him in that posi
tion, as I believe him to be fully competent to fulfil its duties; but as he has
no Confederate States commission, the assistant surgeons of this command might
object to receiving orders from him ; I have, then, to request, either that he
should be confirmed in his preseut position, or that another surgeon should be
ordered here in his place.
Brigadier-General Bonham has applied for an officer of the Confederate Army
(who has seen some service) as Acting Adjutant-General of his command, and I
fully approve of that application. He suggests the name of Captain J. L. Corley.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII. 435.
I applied a few days ago for a certain number of colored belts (red on one
side and yellow on the other) for the purpose of distinguishing the soldiers of
my command from those of the enemy. I earnestly call the attention of the
War Department to my letter on that subject.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
. G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.
Hon. L. P. Walker, See. of War, Richmond, Va.

Richmond, June 17th, 1861.
My dear General,—! have yours of 15th instant ; all you ask for has been at
tended to so far as iu my power. The Zouaves have gone some days to York-
town. The 5th Regiment Alabama Volunteers, a fine regiment, has been or
dered to you. I shall try for Colonel Jenkins's South Carolina regiment to be
sent also. No bunting here. Have sent to Norfolk for some. Hope it can bo
had. Nothing here for flags. Cartridge-boxes Gorgas will see to, aud Major
Smith will send you pay-rolls.
Iu reference to the badges, immense numbers are being made — but I under
stand the President thinks them too conspicuous — so do I. A small rosette of
the same stuff pinned or attached on the arm or breast will be less uotable, and
quite enough distinguishable, I think. I wish I were with you in the conflict.
May God give you his protection ; your battle is righteous, and your victory
undoubted. Yours truly, A. C. Myers.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard.

APPENDIX TO CIIAPTER VII.
Headquarters Department of Fredericksburg,
Fredericksburg, Va., June 15th, 1861.
Ceiwal, — Since my arrival here I have made careful reconnoissance of the
coast, and sought in every way possible to possess myself of the enemy's move
ments and intentions ; there is no evidence of a disposition on his part to land
in this vicinity, and I am obliged to think the force here is unnecessarily large.
To all appearances the Federal forces will be directed against Manassas and
Harper's Ferry ; if those places fall, this position will be unnecessary, as he will
have opened for himself a more direct road to Richmond. I beg, therefore, re
spectfully to suggest that, after leaving a sufficient guard for the batteries, say
five hundred men, it will be better for me to march with the great body of my
command to Manassas, or some other point, where they can be made available
to resist the first great onslaught of the enemy. It may be the time for this
move has not yet arrived, but my only object now is to inform you that if you
agree with my opinion as to the enemy's intentions, I can, at very short notice,
march from here with three regiments of volunteers and two batteries of artil
lery. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. H. Holmes, Brig-Genl. Provisional Army.
To Genl. S. Cooper, Adj.-Gcnl. C. S. A., Richmond.

436 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII.
Headquarters Department of Fredericksburg,
Brooks Station, June 18th, 1861.
General, — Herewith enclosed you will please find a copy ofa letter addressed
to the Adjutant-General by me, and which was answered by General Lee, stating
that tho enemy's plans wore not yet sufficiently developed to justify the adop
tion of my suggestions, and recommending, if my force could be divided, that I
should erect a battery at Mathias Point, some thirty miles below here ; from this
you will see how utterly out of the question it is for me to send a regiment to
your neighborhood, as all the force I have would scarcely ho sufficient to resist
au effort by the enemy to land, with a view to invade.
I need not say it will give me the greatest satisfaction to co-operate with
you, and, if you will keep me advised of your wishes, they shall receive the most
respectful consideration, and, as far as I can, consistently with my other obliga
tions, be complied with.
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. H. Holmes, Brig-Genl. Comdg. Dept.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, Comdg. Mauassas.
A true copy. S. W. Ferguson, Aide-de-Camp.

Camp Jackson, June 22d, 1861.
General G. T. Beauregard :
Sir, — I received, aud read, your communication to me with a great deal of
pleasure. I presented it to General Holmes, as you requested, and forwarded it to
the War Department. General Holmes, in his endorsement on the back of the
communication, evidently admits the force of your suggestions, but objects to
having any portion of his command taken from him. I desire to take the
" Walter Legion " to the column which is to advance on Alexandria, if such ad
vance is made ; anyhow, I desire to co-operate with the main body of the army.
We are getting very well drilled, aud could be of efficient service, if in the right
place. It is no disposition in me to get my regiment from under General Holmes
which prompts these suggestions, for we are well pleased with him, but are
satisfied there is no necessity for us here. There could be twenty-five hun
dred efficient men and two batteries of artillery (four rifled cannon) transferred
to Manassas, or within supporting distance, and have sufficient forces here to
guard this place. It is certainly manifest injury to the service, that so efficient
a force should be kept inactive at this place. I think, by the proper represeu-
tation to the War Department, this force can be united with yours. Suppose
you make application immediately. I will co-operate with you in the matter.
I send this by Mr. Mhoon, of Mississippi, my relative, and my brother, Lieu
tenant Bate. I will be obliged if you will extend to them the privilege.of pass
ing through your camps during their stay, which will be bnt a day or two.
Yours, W. B. Bate, Col. Comdg.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Manassas Junction, Va., June 24th, 1861.
My clear General, — Your two letters of the 23d instant have just been delivered
to me. I regret much tho change you have been compelled to make iu your

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII. 437
arrangements, but I can well appreciate them, although I do not believe in the
hostile advance of General Patterson, for I am informed, on what I consider good
authority, that they have quite a stampede in Washington — thinking we are
going to unite our forces for its attack, or that you are going to cross the Poto
mac at or about Edwards's Ferry to attack it in rear, while I attack it in front
— hence, probably, the proposed movement of Patterson to keep you at bay. . . .
Not being able to obtain a full supply of cartridges for my increased forces,
I am going to establish a manufactory of them here.1 Whenever you cau spare
a few guns for Leesburg, pray send them. Yours very truly,
G. T. Beauregard.
To Genl. J. E. Johnston, Winchester, Va.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII.
General Sam. Jones's statement concerning strategic portion of General Beauregard's
report of the battle of Manassas.
Camp at Centreville, Nov. 9th, 1861.
General, — I have examined the extract which you handed to me, from your
report giving the strategy of the battle of Manassas, and find it, so far as my
memory serves me, substantially the same as that dictated by you to me on the
night of the 13th July last as a memorandum for the use of Colonel James Chest
nut, who was the next morning to repair to Richmond to urge upon the govern
ment the importance of adopting its recommendations ; not much importance
being attached to the joint action of General Holmes, who was supposed to have
but few troops to dispose of, he, I think, was not mentioned in the memoran
dum, but only referred to incidentally in your verbal instructions to Colonel
Chestnut. I have a very clear recollection of your instructions to Colonel Chestnut, as I
wrote the memorandum myself under your dictation, and after a long and freo
conversation with you on the general plan of campaign, aud especially of the
then impending battle. Very faithfully yours, Sam. Jones, Brig.-Genl.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, C. S. A.

Centreville, Va., Nov. 9th, 1861.
The above statement of General Sam. Jones agrees perfectly well with my
recollections of the matter referred to. G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.

1. Telegram from Colonel John S. Preston to General Beauregard, about concentra
tion of Generals Johnston and, Bolm.es' s forces with army at Manassas.
Richmond, July 15th, 1861.
General Beauregard:
Matter under deliberation. Have had two interviews. Await an answer,
Troops will be sent and some equipment for militia. J. S. Preston.

438 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII.
2. Telegram from Colonel James Chestnut to General Beauregard, as to concentration
of Generals Johnston and Holmes's forces with our army at Manassas.
Richmond, July 15th, 1861.
General Beauregard:
Matter seriously debated. Will await this morning for conclusion.
James Chestnut, Jr.
Telegram. Manassas, July 17th, 1861.
To Genl. J. E. Johnston, Winchester, Va. :
War Department has ordered you to join me ; do so immediately, if possible,
and we will crush the enemy. G. T. Beauregard.
Telegram. Winchester, Va., July 17th, 1861.
Genl. Beauregard, Manassas :
Is the enemy upon you in force ? Joseph E. Johnston.

Telegram. Richmond, July 18th, 1861.
Genl . G. T. Beauregard, Manassas, Va. :
McRae's regiment, N. C, goes to you this evening. Barksdale's Mississippi
regiment goes to you from Lynchburg. Further reinforcements have promise
of transportation in the morning. Hampton's Legion and others will go as
soon as possible. God be praised for your successful beginning. I have tried
to join you, but remain to serve you hero as most useful to the times.
Jefferson Davis.

Telegram. Richmond, July 19th, 1861.
Genl. Beauregard, Manassas, Va. :
We have no intelligence from General Johnston. If the enemy in front of
you has abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston has not moved,
you had better withdraw the call upon him so that he may be left to his full
discretion. All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered to join you.
From this place we will send as fast as transportation permits. The enemy is
advised at Washington of the projected movement of Generals Johnston arid
Holmes, and may vary his plans in conformity thereto. S. Cooper, Adj.-Genl.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Manassas Junction, July 17th, 1861.
General Orders, No. 41.
I. The general commanding tho army of the Potomac announces to his com
mand that, at length, the enemy have advanced to subjugate a sovereign State,
and to impose upon a free people an odious government.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII. 439
Notwithstanding their numerical superiority, they can be repelled ; and the
general commanding relies confidently ou his command to do it, and to drive
the invader back beyond his intrenched lines. But, to do this, the highest
order of coolness, individual intelligence, and obedience on the part of each
officer and man are essential. Great reliance will be placed on the bayonet at
the proper juncture ; but, above all, it is enjoined on officers and men to with
hold their fire until directed.
The superior intelligence of the individual members of this command should,
in this respect, compensate for the want of a veteran, long-traiued soldiery.
In firing each man should take aim and never discharge his piece without a
distinct object in full view.
II. The following are announced as the general and personal staff of the gen
eral commanding ; and any written or verbal orders conveyed through them, or
either of them, will be obeyed :
Col. Thomas Jordan, Provisional Army of the Confederate States, A. A. Adj.-
Genl. Capt. Clifton H. Smith, Provisional Army of Virginia, A. Adj.-Genl.
Capt. S. W. Ferguson, C'S. A., Aide-de-Camp.
Lieut.-Col. Thomas H. Williamson, Virginia Army, Chief-Engineer.
Capt. E. P. Alexander, Engineer Corps C. S. A.
Col. R. B. Lee, C. S. A., Chief Commissary of Subsistence.
Maj. William L. Cabell, C. S. A., Chief Quartermaster.
Surgeon T. H. Williams, Medical Director.
Col. Samuel Jones, C. S. A., Chief of Artillery and Ordnance.
Volunteer Aids.
Colonel James Chestnut, Jr., South Carolina.
" J. L. Manning, "
" W. Porcher Miles, "
" John S. Preston, "
" A. R. Chisolm, "
" Joseph Heyward, "
By command of Brig.-Genl. Beauregard. Thomas Jordan, A. A. Adj.-Genl,

Report of the Battle of Bull Run.
Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, Aug. 25th, 1861.
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg., to Genl. S. Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl., Rich
mond, Va. :
General, — With the general results of the engagement between several bri
gades of my command, and a considerable force of the euemy, in the vicinity of
Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords of Bull Run, on the 18th ultimo, you were made
duly acquainted at the time by telegraph ; but it is my place now to submit, in
detail, the operations of that day.
Opportunely informed of the determination of the enemy to advance on Ma-

440 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII.
nassas, my advanced brigades, on the night of the 16th of July, were made aware,
from these headquarters, of the impending movement; and in exact accordance
with my instructions, a copy of which is appeuded, marked "A," their with
drawal within the lines of Bull Run was effected with complete success during
the day and night of the 17th ultimo, in face of, aud in immediate proximity to,
a largely superior force, despite a well-plauued, well-executed effort to cut off
the retreat of Bonham's brigade, first at Germautown, and subsequently at Cen
treville, whence he withdrew by my direction, after midnight, without collision,
although enveloped on three sides by their lines. This movement had the in
tended effect of deceiving the enemy as to my ulterior designs, aud led him to
anticipate an unresisted passage of Bull Run.
As prescribed in the first arid second sections of the paper herewith, marked
"A," on the morning of the 18th of July, my troops, resting on Bull Run from
Union Mills Ford to the stone bridge, a distance of about eight (8) miles, were
posted as follows :
Ewell's brigade occupied a position in vicinity of Union Mills Ford. It con
sisted of Rodes's 5th and Seibel's 6th regiments of Alabama, and Seymour's
6th regiment Louisiana Volunteers, with four 12*pounder howitzers, of Wal
ton's battery ; and Harrison's, Cabell's, and Green's companies of Virginia cav
alry. D. R. Jones's brigade was in position in rear of McLean's Ford, and consisted
of Jenkins's 5th South Carolina and Burt's 17th and Featherstone's 18th regi
ments of Mississippi Volunteers, with two brass 6-pounder guns of Walton's
battery, and one company of cavalry.
Longstreet's brigade covered Blackburn's Ford, and consisted of Moore's 1st,
Garland's 11th, and Corse's 17th regiments Virginia Volunteers, with two
6-pounder brass guns of Walton's battery.
Bonham's brigade held the approaches to Mitchell's Ford. It was composed of
Kershaw's 2d, Williams's 3d, Bacon's 7th, and Cash's 8th regiments South Caro
lina Volunteers ; of Shields's and Del. Kemper's batteries, and of Flood's, Rad
ford's, Payne's, Ball's, Wickham's, and Powell's companies of Virginia Cavalry,
under Colonel Radford.
Cocke's brigade held the fords below and in vicinity of the stone bridge, and
consisted of Withers's 18th, Lieutenant-Colonel Strange's 19th, and R. T. Preston's
28th regiments, with Latham's battery, aud one compauy of cavalry, Virginia
Volunteers. Evans held my loft flank and protected the stone bridge crossing, with Sloan's
4th regiment South Carolina Volunteers, Wheat's special battalion Louisiana
Volunteers, four 6-pounder guns, and two companies of Virginia cavalry.
Early's brigade, consisting of Kemper's 7th, six compauies of Early's 24th reg
iments of Virginia Volunteers, Hays's 7th regiment Louisiana Volunteers, and
three rifled pieces of Walton's battery, Lieutenant Squires, at first were held in
position iu the rear of, and as a support to, Ewell's brigade, until after the de
velopment of the enemy, in heavy offensive force, in front of Mitchell's and
Blackburn's fords, when it was placed in rear of, and nearly equidistant be
tween, McLean's, Blackburn's, aud Mitchell's fords.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII. 441
Pending the development of the enemy's purpose, about ten (10) o'clock a.m.
I established my headquarters at a central point, McLean's farm-house, near to
McLean's and Blackburn's fords, where two 6-pouuders of Walton's battery
were in reserve ; but subsequently, during the engagement, I took post to the
left of my reserve.
Of the topographical features of tho country thus occupied it must suffice to
say, that Bull Run is a small stream running iu this locality, nearly from west
to east, to its confluence with the Oceoquau River, about twelve miles from the
Potomac, and draining a considerable scope of country, from its source iu Bull
Run Mountain, to a short distance of the Potomac, at Occoquan. At this sea
son habitually low and sluggish, it is, however, rapidly and frequently swollen
by the summer rains until unfordable. The banks, for the most part, are rocky
and steep, but abound in long-used fords. The country on either side, much
broken and thickly wooded, becomes gently rolling and open as it recedes from
the stream. On the northern side the ground is much the highest, and com
mands the other bauk completely. Roads traverse and intersect the sur
rounding country in almost every direction. Finally, at Mitchell's Ford, the
stream is about equidistant from Centreville and Manassas, some six miles
apart. On the morning of the 18th, finding that the enemy was assuming a threat
ening attitude, in addition to the regiments whose positions have been already
stated, I ordered up from Camp Pickens, as a reserve, in rear of Bonham's bri
gade, the effective men of six companies of Kelly's 8th regiment Louisiana Vol
unteers, and Kirklaud's 11th regiment North Carolina Volunteers, which, hav
ing arrived the night before en route for Winchester, I had halted, in view of
the existing necessities of the service. Subsequently the latter was placed in
position to the left of Bonham's brigade.
Appearing in heavy force in front of Bonham's position, the enemy, about
meridian, opened fire with several 20-pounder rifled gnus from a hill, over one
and a half miles from Bull Run. At the same time Kemper, supported by
two companies of light infantry, occupied a ridge on the left of the Centreville
road, about six hundred yards in advance of the ford, with two 6-pounder
(smooth) gnus. At first the firing of tho enemy was at random ; but by half-
past 12 P. m. he had obtained the rauge of our position, and poured into the
brigade a shower of shot, but without injury to us iu men, horses, or guns.
From the distance, however, our guns could not reply with effect, and we did
not attempt it, patiently awaiting an opportune movement.
Meanwhile, a light battery was pushed forward by the enemy, whereupon
Kemper threw only six solid shot, with the effect of driving back both the bat
tery and its supporting force. This is understood to have been Ayres's battery,
aud the damage must have been considerable, to have obliged such a retrograde
movement on the part of that officer.
The purposes of Kemper's position having now been fully served, his pieces
and support were withdrawn across Mitchell's Ford, to a point previously des
ignated, and which commanded the direct approaches to the ford.
About half-past 11 o'clock a. m. the enemy was also discovered by the pick-

442 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII.
ets of .Longstreet's brigade, advancing in strong columns of infantry, with ar
tillery and cavalry, on Blackburn's Ford.
At meridian these pickets fell back silently before the advancing foe, across
the ford, which, as well as the entire southern bauk of the stream for the whole
front of Longstreet's brigade, was covered at the water's edge by an extended
line of skirmishers, while two 6-pounders of Walton's battery, under Lieuten
ant Garnett, were advantageously placed to command the direct approach to
the ford, but with orders to retire to the rear as soon as commanded by the enemy.
The northern bank of the stream, in front of Longstreet's position, rises, with
a steep slope, at least fifty feet above the level of the water, leaving a narrow
berme in front of the ford, of some twenty yards. This ridge formed for them
an admirable natural parapet, behind which they could and did approach, un
der shelter, in heavy force, within less than oue hundred yards of our skirmish
ers. The southern shore was almost a plain, raised but a few feet above the
water, for several hundred yards ; then rising with a very gradual, gentle slope,
and undulating back to Manassas. On tho immediate bauk there was a fringe
of trees, but with little, if any, undergrowth or shelter ; while on the other shore
there was timber and much thick brush aud covering. The ground in rear of
our skirmishers, aud occupied by our artillery, was an old field, extending, along
the stream about one mile, aud immediately back for about half a mile, to a bor
der or skirting of dense, second-growth pines. The whole of this ground was
commanded at all points by the ridge occupied by the enemy's musketry, as was
also the country to the rear, for a distance much beyond the range of 20-pound-
er rifled guus, by the range of hills on which their batteries were planted; and
which, it may be further noted, commanded also all our approaches from this
direction to the three threatened fords.
Before advancing his infantry, the enemy maintained a fire of rifle artillery
from the batteries just mentioned, for half an hour ; then he pushed forward a
column of over three thousand infantry to the assault, with such weight of num
bers as to be repelled with difficulty by the comparatively small force of not
more than twelve hundred bayonets, with which Brigadier-General Longstreet
met him with characteristic vigor and intrepidity. Our troops engaged at this
time were the 1st and 17th and four companies of the 11th regiments Virginia
Volunteers. Their resistance was resolute, and maintained with a steadiness
worthy of all praise ; it was successful, and the enemy was repulsed. In a short
time, however, he returned to the contest with increased force and determina
tion, but was again foiled and driven back by our skirmishers and Longstreet's
reserve companies, which were brought up and employed at the most vigorous
ly assailed points at the critical moment.
It was now that Brigadier-General Longstreet sent for reinforcements from
Early's brigade, which I had anticipated, by directing the advance of General
Early, with two regiments of infantry and two pieces of artillery. As these
came upon the field the euemy had advanced a third time, with heavy num
bers, to force Longstreet's position. Hays's regiment, 7th Louisiana Volunteers,
which was in advance, was placed on the bank of the stream, uuder some cover,
to the immediate right aud left of the ford, relieving Corse's regiment, 17th

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII. 443
Virginia Volunteers ; this was done under a heavy fire of musketry, with prom
ising steadiness. The 7th Virginia, under Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, was
then formed to the right, also under heavy fire, and pushed forward to the
stream, relieving the 1st regiment Virginia Volunteers. At the same time two
rifled guns, brought up with Early's brigade, were moved down in the field to
the right of the road, so as to be concealed from the enemy's artillery by the
girth of timber on the immediate bank of the stream, and then opened fire,
directed only by the sound of the enemy's musketry. Unable to effect a pass
age, the enemy kept up a scattering fire for some time. Some of our troops
had pushed across the stream, and several small parties of Corse's regiment,
under command of Captain Marye, met and drove the enemy with the bayonet,
but as the roadway from the ford was too narrow for a combined movement
in force, General Longstreet recalled them to the south bank. Meanwhile, the
remainder of Early's infantry and artillery had been called up ; that is, six
companies of the 24th regiment Virginia Volunteers, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Hairston, and five pieces of artillery, one rifled gun, and four 6-pounder brass
guns, under Lieutenant Garnett, which had been previously sent to the rear of
General Longstreet. This infantry was at once placed in position to the left
of the ford, in a space unoccupied by Hays, and the artillery was unlimbered
in battery to the right of the road, in a line with the two rifled guns already
in action. A scattering fire of musketry was still kept up by tho enemy for
a short time, but that was soon silenced.
It was at this stage of the affair that a remarkable artillery duel was com
menced and maintained on our side, with a long-trained, professional opponent,
superior in the character as well as iu the number of his weapons, provided
with improved munitions and every artillery appliance, and at the same time
occupying the commanding position. The results were marvellous, and fitting
precursors to the artillery achievements of the 21st of July.
In the outset our fire was directed against the enemy's infantry, whose bay
onets, gleaming above the tree-tops, alone indicated their presence and force.
This drew the attention of a battery placed on a high, commanding ridge, and
the duel began in earnest. For a timo the aim of the adversary was inaccu
rate ; but this was quickly corrected, and shot fell and shells burst thick aud
fast in the very midst of our battery, wounding, in the course of the combat,
Captain Eschelman, five privates, aud the horse of Lieutenant Richardson.
From the position of our pieces and the nature of the ground, their aim could
only be directed at the smoke of the enemy's artillery; how skilfully and with
what execution this was done can only be fully realized by an eye-witness. For
a few moments their guns were silenced, but were soon reopened. By direction
of General Longstreet, his battery was then advanced by hand out of the range,
now ascertained by the enemy, and a shower of shell, case, and round shot flew
over the heads of our gunners, but one of our pieces had become hors de combat
from an enlarged vent. From the new position, our guns, fired as before, with
no other aim than the smoke and flash of their adversaries' pieces, renewed and
urged the conflict with such signal vigor and effect, that gradually the Are of
the euemy slackened, the intervals between their discharges grew longer and

444 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII.
longer, finally to cease ; aud we fired a last gun at a flying, baffled foe, whose
heavy masses, in the distance, were plainly seen to break and scatter in wild
confusion aud utter rout, strewing the ground with cast -away guns, hats,
blankets, and knapsacks, as our parting shell was thrown among them. Iu
their retreat one of their pieces was abandoned, but, from the nature of the
ground, it was not sent for that night, and, under cover of darkness, the enemy
recovered it.
The guns engaged in this singular conflict on our side were three 6-pounder
rifled pieces, and four ordinary 6-pounders, all of Walton's battery, the Wash
ington Artillery of New Orleans ; the officers immediately attaojied were Cap
tain Eschelman, Lieutenants C. W. Squires, Richardson, Garnett, and Whitting-
tou. At the same time our infantry held the bank of the stream, in advance
of our guns, and the missiles of the combatants flew to and fro above them, as,
cool and veteran-like, for more than au hour they steadily awaited the moment
and signal for the advance.
While the conflict was at its height, before Blackburn's Ford, about four
o'clock p.m., the enemy again displayed himself in force before Bonham's posi
tion. At this Colonel Kershaw, with four companies of his regiment, 2d South
Carolina, and one piece of Kemper's battery, were thrown across Mitchell's
Ford to the ridge which Kemper had occupied that morning. Two solid shot
aud three spherical case thrown among them, with a precision inaugurated by
that artillerist at Vienna, effected their discomfiture and disappearance, and
our troops in that quarter were again withdrawn within our lines, having dis
charged the duty assigned.
At the close of the engagement before Blackburn's Ford I directed General
Longstreet to withdraw the 1st and 17th regiments, which had borne the brunt
of the action, to a position in reserve, leaving Colonel Early to occupy the field
with his brigade and Garland's regiment.
As part of the history of this engagement, I desire to place on record that,
on the 18th of July, not one yard of intrenchments nor one rifle-pit sheltered
the men at Blackburn's Ford, who, officers and men, with rare exceptions, were
on that day for the first time under fire, and who, taking and maintaining
every position ordered, cannot be too much commended for their soldierly be
havior. Our artillery was manned and officered by those who but yesterday were
called from the civil avocatious of a busy city. They were matched with the
picked light artillery of the Federal Regular army — Company E, 3d Artillery,
under Captain Ayres — with an armament, as their own Chief of Artillery admits,
of two 10-pouuder Parrott rifled guus, two 12 -pounder howitzers, and two
6-ponnder pieces, aided by two 20-pouuder Parrott rifled guns, of Company G,
5th Artillery, under Lieutenant Benjamin ; thus matched, they drove their vet
eran adversaries from the field, giving confidence in aud promise of the comin"
efficiency of that brilliant arm of our service.
Having thus related the main or general results and events of the action of
Bull Run, in conclusion, it is proper to signalize some of those who contributed
the most to the satisfactory results of that day.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII. 445
Thanks are due to Brigadier-Generals Bonham and Ewell, and to Colonel
Cocke, and the officers under them, for the ability shown in conducting and ex
ecuting the retrograde movements on Bull Run, directed in my orders of the 8th
July — movements on which hung the fortunes of this army.
Brigadier-General Longstreet, who commauded immediately the troops en
gaged at Blackburn's Ford on the 18th, equalled my confident expectations, and
I may fitly say that, by his presence at the right place, at the right moment,
among his men, by the exhibition of characteristic coolness, and by his words
of encouragement to the mon of his command, he infused a confidence and a
spirit that contributed largely to the success of our arms on that day.
Colonel Early brought his brigade into position, and subsequently into action,
with judgment, and at the proper moment he displayed capacity for command
and personal gallantry.
Colonel Moore, commanding the 1st Virginia Volunteers, was severely wounded
at the head of his regiment, the command of which, subsequently, devolved upon
Major Skinner — Lieutenant-Colonel Fry having been obliged to leave the field
iu consequence of a sunstroke.
Au accomplished, promising officer, Major Carter H. Harrison, 11th regiment
Virginia Volunteers, was lost to the service ; while leading two companies of his
regiment against the enemy, ho fell, twice shot, mortally wouuded.
Brigadier-General Longstreet, while finding on all sides alacrity, order, and
intelligence, mentions his special obligations to Colonels Moore, Garland, and
Corse, commanding severally regiments of his brigade, and to their field officers,
Lieutenant-Colonels Fry, Funsten, and Munford ; and Majors Brent and Skin
ner, of whom he says, " they displayed more coolness and energy than is usual
among veterans of the old service." General Longstreet also mentions the con
duct of Captain Marye of the 17th regiment Virginia Volunteers, as especially
gallant on one occasion in advance of the ford.
The regiments of Early's brigade were commanded by Colonel Harry Hays
and Lieutenant-Colonels Williams and Hairston, who handled their commands
in action with satisfactory coolness and skill, supported by their field-officers,
Lieutenant-Colonel de Choiseul aud Major Penn of the 7th Louisiana, and Major
Patton of the 7th Virginia Volunteers.
The skill, the conduct, aud the soldierly qualities of the Washington Artillery
engaged were all that could be desired. The officers and men attached to the
seven pieces already specified won for their battalion a distinction which, I
feel assured, will never be tarnished, and which will ever serve to urge them
aud their corps to high endeavor. Lieutenant Squires worthily commanded the
pieces iu action. The commander of the battalion was necessarily absent from
the immediate field, under orders in the sphere of his duties, but the fruits of
his discipline, zeal, and instruction, and capacity as au artillery commauder,
were present, and must redound to his reputation.
On the left, at Mitchell's Ford, while no serious engagement occurred, the
conduct of all was eminently satisfactory to the general officer in commaud.
It is due, however, to Colonel J. L. Kemper, Virginia forces, to express my
sense of the value of his services in the preparation for, and execution of, the

446 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIDT.
retreat from Fairfax Court-House, on Bull Run. Called from tho head of his
regiment, by what appeared to me an imperative need of the service, to take
charge of the superior duties of the Quartermaster's Department, with the ad
vance at that critical juncture, he accepted the responsibilities involved, and
was eminently efficient. For further information touching officers and individ
uals of the 1st Brigade, aud the details of the retrograde movement, I have to
refer particularly to the report of Brigadier-General Bonham herewith.
It is proper here to state, that while, from the outset, it had been determined,
on the approach of the enemy in force, to faU back and fight him on the line of
Bull Run, yet the position occupied by General Ewell's brigade, if necessary,
could have been maintained against a largely superior force. This was espe
cially the case with the position of the 5th Alabama Volunteers, Colonel Rodes,
which that excellent officer had made capable of a resolute, protected defence
against heavy odds. Accordingly, on the morning of the 17th ultimo, when the
enemy appeared before that position, they were checked and held at bay, with
some confessed loss, in a skirmish in advance of the works, in which Major
Morgan aud Captain Shelly, 5th regiment Alabama Volunteers, acted with intel
ligent gallantry, and the post was only abandoned under general, but specific,
imperative orders, in conformity with a long-conceived, established plan of ac
tion aud battle.
Captain E. P. Alexander, Confederate States Engineers, fortunately joined my
headquarters in time to introduce the system of new field-signals, which, under
his skilful management, rendered me the most important service preceding and
during the engagement.
The medical officers serving with the regiments engaged were at their proper
posts, aud discharged their duties with satisfactory skill and zeal ; and, on one
occasion, at least, uuder an annoying fire — when Surgeon Cullen, 1st Regimeut
Virginia Volunteers, was obliged to remove our wounded from the hospital,
which had become the special target of the enemy's rifled guns, notwithstanding
it was surmounted by the usual yellow hospital flag ; but which, however, I
hope, for the sake of past associations, was iguorantly mistaken for a Confeder
ate flag. The name of each individual medical officer I cannot mention.
On the day of the engagement I was attended by my personal staff, Lieuten
ant S. W. Ferguson, A. D. C, and my volunteer aides-de-camp, Colonels Preston,
Manning, Chestnut, Miles, Chisolm, and Heyward, of South Carolina, to all of
whom I am greatly indebted for mauifold essential services in the transmission
of orders on the field, and in tho preliminary arrangements for the occupation
and maintenance of the line of Bull Run.
Colonel Thomas Jordan, Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain C. H. Smith,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel S. Jones, Chief of Artillery aud Ordnance,
Major Cabell, Chief Quartermaster, Captain W. H. Fowle, Chief of Subsistence
Department, Surgeon Thomas H. Williams, Medical Director, and Assistant-
Surgeon Brodie, Medical Purveyor, of the general staff attached to the Army of
the Potomac, were necessarily engaged severally with their responsible duties,
at my headquarters at Camp Pickens, which they discharged with an energy and
intelligence for which I have to tender my sincere thanks.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 447
Messrs. McLean, Wilcoxen, Kincheloe, and Branner, citizens of this immediate
vicinity, it is their due to say, have placed me and the country under great obli
gations for the information relative to this region, which has enabled me to avail
myself of its defensive features and resources. They were found ever ready to
give me their time, without stint or reward.
Our casualties, in all sixty -eight killed and wounded, were  killed,
and  wounded, several of whom have since died. The loss of the enemy
can only be conjectured ; it was unquestionably heavy. In the cursory exam
ination, which was made by details from Longstreet's and Early's brigades on
tho 18th of July, of that part of the field immediately contested, and near
Blackburn's Ford, some sixty -four corpses were found and buried, some few
wounded, and at least twenty prisoners were also picked up, besides one hundred
and seventy-five stands of arms, a large quantity of accoutrements aud blaukets,
and quite one hundred aud fifty hats.
The effect of this day's conflict was to satisfy the enemy he could not force a
passage across Bull Run in face of our troops, and led him into the flank move
ment of the 21st July, aud the battle of Manassas, the details of which will be
related in another paper.
Herewith I have the honor to transmit the reports of the several brigade com
manders engaged, and of the artillery ; also a map of the field of battle.
The rendition of this report, it is proper to say, in conclusion, has been un
avoidably delayed by the constantly engrossing administrative duties of the
comraauder of an army corps composed wholly of volunteers — duties virtually
essential to its well-being and future efficiency, and which I could not sot aside
or postpone on any account.
I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
Camp Pickens, July 21st, 1861.
General, — General Jones's Adjutant comes in to report that the Federal troops
are between us aud General Jones, and approaching. Thos. G. Rhett, A. Adj.-Genl.
(Received at about 6£ o'clock p. m.)

Manassas Junction, Va., July 21st, 1861.
Sont at 5J h. A. M.
General, — You will hold yourself iu readiness to take the offensive on Centre
ville at a moment's notice, to make a diversion against the enemy's intended
attack on Mitchell's Ford and, probably, Stone Bridge. You will protect well
your right flank against any attack from the eastward.
General Holmes's brigade will support your movement.
If the enemy bo prepared to attack in front of your left, leave it (said brigade)

44.8 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
in proper position, with orders to take the offensive when it hears your engage
ment on the other side of the Run. I intend to take the offensive throughout
my front as soon as possible. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.
Genl. R. S. Ewell, Union Mills, Va.

Report of the Battle of Manassas.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, Comdg. 1st Corps Army of the Potomac, to Genl. S.
Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl., Richmond, Va. :
General, — Before entering upon a narration of the general military operations
in the presence of the enemy, on the 21st of July, I propose — I hope not unsea
sonably — first, to recite certain events which belong to the strategy of the cam
paign, and consequently form an essential part of the history of the battle.
Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy, with a decidedly su
perior force, both as to numbers and war equipage, to attack or turn my posi
tion in this quarter, was immediately impending, I despatched, on 13th July,
one of my staff, Colonel James Chestnut, of South Carolina, to submit for the
consideration of the President a plau of operations, substantially as follows:
I proposed that General Johnston should unite, as soon as possible, the bulk
of the "Army of the Shenandoah" with that of the Potomac, then under my
commaud, leaving only sufficient forces to garrison his strong works at Winches
ter, and to guard the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, aud thus hold
Patterson in check.
At the same time Brigadier-General Holmes was to march hither, with all of
his command not essential for the defense of the position of Aquia Creek.
These junctions having been effected at Manassas, an immediate, impetuous
attack of our combined armies upon General McDowell was to follow, as soon
as he approached my advanced positions at and around Fairfax Court-House,
with the inevitable result, as I submitted, of his complete defeat, and the de
struction or capture of his army. This accomplished, the Army of the Shenan
doah, under General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces, and rejoined,
as ho returned, by the detachment left to hold the mountain passes, was to
march back rapidly into the valley, fall upon and crush Patterson, with a supe
rior force, wheresoever he might be found. This, I confidently estimated, could
bo achieved within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from Win
chester for Manassas. Meanwhile, I was to occupy the enemy's works on this
side of the Potomac, if, as I anticipated, ho had been so routed as to enable me
to enter them with him ; or, if not, to retire agaiu for a time within the lines of
Bull Run with my main force. Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then
General Johnston would reinforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him su
perior to his opponent, General McClellan, and able to defeat that officer.
This done, General Garnett was to form an immediate junction with General
Johnston, who was forthwith to cross tho Potomac into Maryland with his whole
force, arouse the people, as ho advanced, to tho recovery of their political rights

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 449
and the defence of their homes and families from an offensive invader, and then
march to the investment of Washington in the rear, while I resumed the offen
sive in front.
This plan of operations, you are aware, was not accepted at the time, from
considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than counterbalance its
proposed advantages.
Informed of these views, and of the decision of the War Department, I then
made my preparations for the stoutest practicable defence of the line of Bull
Run, the enemy having now developed his purposes by the advance on, and oc
cupation of, Fairfax Court-House, from which my advanced brigade had been
withdrawn.* The War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph, on the 17th
July, of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston was immedi
ately ordered to form a junction of his army corps with mine, should the move
ment, in his judgment, be deemed advisable. General Holmes was also directed
to push forward with two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry.
In view of those propitious approaching reinforcements, modifying my plan
of operations so far as to determine on attacking the enemy at Centreville, as
soon as I should hear of the near approach of the two reinforcing columns, I
sent one of my aids, Colonel Chisolm, of South Carolina, to meet and communi
cate my plans to General Johnston, aud my wish that one portion of his forces
should march by the way of Aldie and take the enemy on his right flank, and in
reverse at Centreville. Difficulties, however, of an insuperable character, in
connection with means of transportation and the marching condition of his
troops, made this impracticable; and it was determined our forces should be
united within the lines of Bull Run, and thence advance to the attack of the
enemy. General Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th of July, and being my
senior iu rank, he necessarily assumed command of all the forces of the Confed
erate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my plan
of operation and disposition to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire ap
proval, and generously directed their execution under my command, t
In consequence of the untoward detention, however, of some five thousand of
General Johnston's army corps, resulting from the inadequate and imperfect
means of transportation for so many troops, at the disposition of the Manassas
Gap Railroad, it became necessary, on the morning of the 21st, before daylight, to •
modify the plan accepted, to suit the contingency of an immediate attack on our
lines by the main force of the enemy, then plainly at hand.
The enemy's forces, reported by their best-informed journals to be fifty-five
thousand strong, I had learned from reliable sources, on the night of the 20th,
were being concentrated iu and around Centreville, and along the Warrenton
turnpike road to Bull Run, near which our respective pickets were in immedi
ate proximity. This fact, with the conviction that, after hi3 sigual discomfiture

* See papers herewith marked "A" and "B."
t See papers herewith marked "C" and "D."
I.— 29

450 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
on the 18th of July before Blackburn's Ford, the centre of my lines, he would
not reuew the attack in that quarter, induced me at once to look for an attempt
on my left flank resting on the stone bridge, which was but weakly guarded by
men, as well as but slightly provided with artificial defensive appliances and
artillery. In view of these palpably military conditions, by half-past four a. m. on the
21st of July I had prepared aud despatched orders directing the whole of the
Confederate forces within the lines of Bull Run, including the brigades and reg
iments of General Johnston which had arrived at that time, to be held in readi
ness to march at a moment's notice.
At that time the following was the disposition of our forces :
Ewell's brigade, constituted as on the 18th of July, remained in position at
Union Mills Ford, its left extending along Bull Run, in the direction of McLean's
Ford, and supported by Holmes's brigade, 2d Tennessee, aud 1st Arkansas regi
ments, a short distance to the rear — that is, at and near Camp Wigfall.
D. R. Jones's brigade, from Ewell's left iu front of McLean's Ford, and along
the stream to Longstreet's position. It was unchanged in organization, and was
supported by Early's brigade, also unchanged, placed behind a thicket of young
pines, a short distance in rear of McLean's Ford.
Longstreet's brigade held its former ground at Blackburn's Ford, from Jones's
left to Bouham's right at Mitchell's ford, and was supported by Jackson's bri
gade, consisting of Colonel James F. Preston's 4th, Harper's 5th, Allen's 2d, the
27th, Lieutenant-Colonel Echolls, and the 33d, Cummings's Virginia regiments,
twenty-six hundred and eleven strong, which were posted behind the skirting
of pines, to the rear of Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords ; and in rear of this sup
port was also Barksdale's 13th regiment Mississippi Volunteers, which had lately
arrived from Lynchburg.
Along the edge of a pine thicket in rear of and equidistant from McLean's
and Blackburn's fords, ready to support either position, I had also placed all
of Bee's and Bartow's brigades that had arrived, namely : two companies of the
11th Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, the 2d Mississippi, Colonel Falkner,
aud the 4th Alabama, with 7th aud 8th Georgia regiments, Colonel Gartrell and
Lieutenant - Colonel Gardner, in all twenty -seven hundred aud thirty -two
bayonets. Bonham's brigade, as before, held Mitchell's Ford, its right near Longstreet's
left, its left extending in the direction of Cocke's right. It was organized, as
at the end of the 18th of July, with Jackson's brigade, as before said, as a
support. Cooke's brigade, increased by soven companies of the 8th, Hunton's, three
companies of the 49th, Smith's, Virginia regiments, two companies of cavalry,
and a battery, uuder Rogers, of four 6-pounders, occupied the line in front and
rear of Bull Run, extending from the direction of Bonham's left, and guarding
Island, Ball's, aud Lewis's fords, to the right of Evans's demi-brigade, near the
stone bridge, also under General Cocke's command.
The latter held the stone bridge, and its left covered a farm-ford about ouo
mile above the bridge.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 451
Stuart's cavalry, some three hundred men of the Army of the Sheuandoah,
guarded the level ground, extending iu rear from Bonham's left to Cocke's
right. Two companies of Radford's cavalry were held in reserve a short distance in
roar of Mitchell's Ford, his left extending in the direction of Stuart's right.
Colonel Pendleton's reserve battery of eight pieces was temporarily placed in
rear of Bonham's extreme left.
Major Walton's reserve battery of five guns was in position on McLean's
farm, iu a piece of woods in rear of Bee's right.
Hampton's Legion, of six companies of infantry, six hundred strong, having
arrived that morniug by the cars from Richmond, was subsequently, as soou as
it arrived, ordered forward to a position in immediate vicinity of the Lewis
House, as a support for any troops engaged in that quarter.
The effective force of all arms of the Army of the Potomac ou that eventful
morning, including the garrison of Camp Pickens,- did not exceed 21,833 and
twenty-nine guns.
The Army of the Shenandoah, ready for action on the field, may be set at
6000 men and twenty guns.*
The brigade of General Holmes mustered about twelve hundred and sixty-five
bayonets, six guns, and a company of cavalry about ninety strong.
Informed, at 5.30 a.m., by Colonel Evans, that the enemy had deployed some
twelve hundred men t with several pieces of artillery in his immediate front, I
at once ordered him, as also General Cocke, if attacked, to maintain their posi
tion to the last extremity.
Iu my opinion, the most effective method of relieving that flank was by a
rapid, determined attack, with my right wing and ceutre, on the enemy's flank
aud rear at Centreville, with due precautious against the advance of his reserves
from the direction of Washington. By such a movement I confidently expected
to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 meridian.
These new dispositions were submitted to General Johnston, who fully ap
proved them, and the orders for their immediate execution were at once issued.
Brigadier-General Ewell was directed to begin the movement, to be followed
aud supported successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham,
respectively supported by their several appointed reserves.
The cavalry, under Stuart and Radford, were to be held in hand, subject to
future orders, and ready for employment, as might be required by the exigencies
of the battle.
* That is, when the battle began ; Smith's brigade and Fisher's North Carolina came up
later and made total of Army ol' Shenandoah engaged, of all arms, eight thousand three
hundred and thirty-four. Hill's Virginia regiment, five hundred and fifty, also arrived,
but was posted as reserve to right flank.
t These were what Colonel Evans saw of General Sehenek's brigade of General Tyler's
division, and two other heavy brigades, in all, over nine thousand men, and thirteen
pieces of artillery, Carlisle's and Ayres's batteries. That is, nine hundred men and two
6-p.ounders, confronted by nine thousand men and thirteen pieces of artillery, mostly
rifled.

452 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
About 8.30 a. m. General Johnston and myself transferred our headquarters
to a central position, about half a mile in rear of Mitchell's Ford, whence we
might watch the course of events.
Previously, as early as 5.30, the Federalists in front of Evans's position, Stone
Bridge, had opened with a large 30-pounder Parrott rifled gun, and, thirty min
utes later, with a moderate, apparently tentative, fire from a battery of rifled
pieces, directed, first in front, at Evans, aud then in the direction of Cocke's
position, hut without drawing a return fire and discovery of our positions;
chiefly because, in that quarter, we had nothing but eight 6-pounder pieces,
which could not reach the distant enemy.
As the Federalists had advanced with an extended line of skirmishers in front
of Evans, that officer promptly threw forward the two flank companies of the
4th South Carolina regiment, and one company of Wheat's Louisiana battalion,
deployed as skirmishers to cover his small front. An occasional scattering firo
resulted, and thus stood the two armies in that quarter for more than an hour,
while the main body of the enemy was marching his devious way through the
"Big Forest" to take our forces in flank and rear.
By 8.30 a. M., Colonel Evans having become satisfied of the counterfeit char
acter of the movement ou his front, and persuaded of au attempt to turn his
left flank, decided to change his position to meet the enemy, aud, for this pur
pose, immediately put in motion to his left and rear six companies of Sloan's 4th
South Carolina regiment, Wheat's Louisiana battalion (five companies), aud two
6-pounders of Latham's battery, leaving four companies of Sloan's regiment
under cover, as the sole, immediate defence of the stone bridge, but giving in
formation to General Cocke of his change of position and the reasons that im
pelled it.
Following a road leading to the old Pittsylvania (Carter) Mansion, Colonel
Evans formed in line of battle, some four hundred yards iu rear, as he advanced,
of that house, his guns to the front and in position, properly supported to its
immediate right. Finding, however, that the enemy did not appear on that
road, which was a branch of one leading by Sudley's Springs Ford to Brents-
ville and Dumfries, he turned abruptly to the left, and, marching across the
fields for three quarters of a mile, about 9.30 a. m. took position iu line of battle,
his left, Sloan's companies, resting on the main Broutsville road, in a shallow
ravine, the Louisiana battalion to tho right, in advance two hundred yards, a
rectangular copse of wood separating them — one piece of his artillery planted
on an eminence some seven hundred yards to the rear of Wheat's battalion, aud
the other on a ridge near, and in rear of Sloan's position, commanding a reach
of the road just in front of the line of battle. In this order he awaited the
coming of the masses of the enemy, now drawing near.
In the meantime, about 7 o'clock A. M., Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and
five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sont to take up a position along Bull
Run, to guard the iuterval between Cocke's right and Bonham's left, with orders
to support either in case of need, the character aud topographical features of
the ground having been shown to General Jackson by Captain D. B. Harris of
the Engineers of this army corps.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 453
So much of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, now united, as had arrived, some
twenty-eight hundred muskets, had also been sent forward to the support of the
position of the stone bridge.
The enemy, beginning his detour from the turnpike at a point nearly half-way
between Stoue Bridge aud Centreville, had pursued a tortuous, narrow trace of a
rarely used road, through a dense wood, the greater part of his way, until near
tho Sudley road. A division, under Colonel Huuter, of the Federal Regular
army, of two strong brigades, was in the advance, followed immediately by an
other division under Colonel Heiutzelman, of three brigades and seven companies
of Regular cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of artillery, eighteen of which were
rifled guns. This column, as it crossed Bull Run, numbered over sixteen thou
sand men of all arms, by their own accounts.
Burnside's brigade, which here, as at Fairfax Court-House, led the advance,
at about 9.45 a. m. debouched from a wood iu sight of Evans's position, some five
hundred yards distant from Wheat's battalion.
He immediately threw forward his skirmishers in force, and they became en
gaged with Wheat's command, and the 6-pounder gun under Lieutenant Left-
witch. The Federalists at once advanced, as they report officially, the 2d regiment
Rhode Island Volunteers, with its vaunted battery of six 13-pounder rifled guns.
Sloau's companies were then brought into action, having been pushed forward
through the woods. The enemy, soon galled, staggered by the fire, and pressed
by the determined valor with which Wheat handled his battalion, until he was
desperately wounded, hastened up three other regiments of the brigade and two
Dahlgren howitzers, making in all quite three thousand five hundred bayonets
and eight pieces of artillery, opposed to less than eight hundred men and two
6-pounder guus.
Despite this odds, this intrepid command of but eleven weak companies main
tained its front to the enemy for quite an hour, and until General Bee came to
their aid with his command. The heroic Bee, with a soldier's eye and recogni
tion of tho situation, had previously disposed his command with skill, Itnboden's
battery having been admirably placed between the two brigades, under shelter
behind the undulations of a hill about one hundred aud fifty yards north of the
now famous Henry house, and very near where he subsequently fell, mortally
wounded, to the great misfortuue of his country, but after deeds of deliberate
and ever-memorable courage.
Meanwhile, the enemy pushed forward a battalion of eight companies of Reg
ular infantry, and one of their best batteries of six pieces (four rifled), supported
by four companies of marines, to increase the desperate odds against which Evans
and his men had maintained their stand with an almost matchless tenacity.
General Bee, now finding Evans sorely pressed under the crushing weight of
the masses of the enemy, at the call of Colonel Evans, threw forward his whole
force to his aid, across a small stream, Young's Brauch, and valley, aud engaged
the Federalists with impetuosity, Itnboden's battery, at the time, playing from
his well-chosen position with brilliant effect, with spherical case, the enemy
having first opened on him from a rifled battery, probably Griffin's, with elon-

454 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
gated cylindrical shells, which flew a few feet above tho heads of our men, and
exploded in tho crest ofa hill immediately in rear.
As Bee advanced under a severe fire, he placed the 7th and 8th Georgia regi
ments, under the chivalrous Bartow, at about 11 a. m., in a wood of second-
growth pines, to the right aud front of, and nearly perpendicular to, Evans's
line of battle, the 4th Alabama to the left of them, along a fence connecting the
position of the Georgia regiments with the rectaugular copse in which Sloan's
South Carolina companies were engaged, and into which he also threw the 2d
Mississippi. A fierce and destructive conflict now ensued ; the fire was wither
ing on both sides, while the enemy swept our short, thin Hues with their numer
ous artillery, which, according to their official reports, at this time consisted of
at least ten rifled guns and four howitzers. For au hour did these stout-hearted
men of the blended commands of Bee, Evans, and Bartow breast an uniutermit-
ting battle-storm, animated, surely, by something more than the ordinary courage
of even the bravest men under fire; it must have been, indeed, the inspiration
of the cause and consciousness of tho great stake in issue which thus nerved
aud auimated one and all to stand nnawed and unshrinking iu such extremity.
The Federal brigades of Heintzelmau's division were now brought into action,
led by Pickett's superb light battery of six 10-ponuder rifled guns, which, post
ed on an eminence to the right of the Sudley road, opened fire on Iinboden's
battery, about this time increased by two rifled pieces of the Washington Ar
tillery, under Lieutenant Richardson, and already the mark of two batteries
which divided their fire with Imboden and two guns, under Lieutenants David
son aud Leftwiteh, of Latham's battery, posted as before mentioued.
At this time, confronting the euemy, wo had still but Evans's eleven compa
nies and two guns, Bee's and Bartow's four regiments, tho two companies 11th
Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, and the six pieces under Imboden
and Richardson. The enemy had two divisions of four strong brigades, iu-
cludiug seventeen companies of Regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery, four
companies of marines, and twenty pieces of artillery.* Against this odds, scarce
ly credible, our advance position was still for a while maintained, aud the ene
my's ranks constantly broken and shattered by the scorching fire of our men ;
but fresh regiments of Federalists came upon the field. Sherman's and Keyes's
brigades of Tyler's division, as is stated in their reports, numbered over six thou
sand bayonets, which had found a passage across tho Run about eight huudrcd
yards above the stone bridge, threatened our right.
Heavy losses had now beeu sustained on our side, both in numbers aud in
the personal worth of the slain. The 8th Georgia regiment had suffered heavily,
being exposed, as it took and maintained its position, to a fire from the enemy,
already posted within a hundred yards of their front aud right, sheltered by
fences and other cover. It was at this time that Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner
was severely wounded, as also several other valuable officers ; the Adjutant of
the regiment, Lieutenant Branch, was killed, and the horse of the regretted Bar
tow was shot under him. The 4th Alabama also suffered severely from deadly
* See official reports of Colonels Heintzelmaii, Porter, and Burnside.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 455
fire of the thousands of muskets which they so dauntlessly confronted under
the immediate leadership of Bee himself. Its brave colonel, E. J. Jones, was
dangerously wounded, and many gallant officers fell, slain or hors de combat.
Now, however, with the surging mass of over fourteen thousand Federal in
fantry pressing on their front, and under the incessant fire of at least twenty
pieces of artillery, with the fresh brigades of Sherman and Keyes approaching
the latter already in musket range, our lines gave back, but under orders from
General Bee.
The enemy, maintaining their fire, pressed their swelling masses onward as
our shattered battalions retired; the slaughter, for the moment, was deplorable,
and has filled many a Southern home with life-long sorrow.
Under this inexorable stress tho retreat was continued, until arrested by the
energy and resolution of General Bee, supported by Bartow and Evans, just in
rear of the Robinson house and Hampton's Legion, which had been already ad
vanced, and was in position near it.
Imboden's battery, which had been handled with marked skill, but whose men
wero almost exhausted, and the two pieces of Walton's battery, under Lieuten
ant Richardson, being threatened by the enemy's infantry on the left and front,
were also obliged to fall back ; Imboden, leaving a disabled piece on the ground,
retired until ho mot Jackson's brigade, while Richardson joined the main body
of his battery near the Lewis house.
As our infantry retired from the extreme front, the two 6-pounders of Latham's
battery, before mentioned, fell back with excellent judgment to suitable posi
tions in the rear, whence an effective fire was maintained upon the still ad
vancing lines of the Federalists, with damaging effect, until their ammunition
was nearly exhausted, when they, too, were withdrawn in the near presence of
the enemy and rejoined their captain.
From the point previously indicated, where General Johnston and myself had
established our headquarters, we heard the continuous roll of musketry and
the sustained din of the artillery, which announced the serious outburst of the
battle on our left flank; and we anxiously,, but confidently, awaited similar
sounds of conflict from our front at Centreville, resulting from the prescribed
attack in that quarter by our right wing.
At half-past ten A. M., however, this expectation was dissipated by a despatch
from Brigadier-General Ewell, informing me, to my profound disappointment,
that my orders for his advance had miscarried ; but that, in consequence of a
communication from General D. R. Jones, he had just thrown his brigade across
the stream at Union Mills. Buty in'my judgment, it was now too late for the
effective execution of the contemplated movement, which must have required
quite three hours for the troops to get into position for the attack. Therefore
it became immediately necessary to depend ou new combinations and other dis
positions suited to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and
centre already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once countermanded, with
the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged to meet the enemy on the
field upon which he had chosen to give us battle. Under these circumstances,
our reserves not already in movement were immediately ordered up to support

456 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
our left flank, namely : Holmes's two regiments, and battery of artillery, under
Captain Liudsey Walker, of six guns, and Early's brigade. Two regiments
from Bonham's brigade, with Kemper's four 6-pounders, were also called for ;
and with the sanction of General Johnston, Generals Ewell, Jones (D. R.), Long-
street, and Bonham were directed to make a demonstration to their several
fronts, to retain and engross the enemy's reserves, and any forces in their flank,
and at and around Centreville. Previously our respective Chiefs of Staff, Major
Rhett aud Colonel Jordan, had been left at my headquarters to hasten up and
give directions to any troops that might arrive at Manassas.
These orders having been duly despatched by staff officers, at 11.30 a. m., Gen
eral Johnston and myself set out for the immediate field of action, which we
reached, in rear of Robinson's and Widow Henry's houses, at about 12 meridian,
and just as the commands of Bee, Bartow, and Evans had taken shelter in a
wooded ravine behind the former, stoutly held, at the time, by Hampton, with
his Legion, which had made a stand there after having previously been as far
forward as the turnpike, where Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, au officer of brill
iant promise, was killed, and other severe losses were sustained.
Before our arrival on the scene, General Jackson had moved forward with his
brigade of five Virginia regimeuts, from his position in reserve, and had judi
ciously taken post below the brim of the plateau, nearly east of the Henry
house, aud to the left of the ravine and woods occupied by the mingled rem
nants of Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans's command, with Imboden's battery aud two
of Stanard's pieces placed so as to play upou the oncomiug enemy, supported
in the immediate rear by Colonel J. L. Preston's and Lieutenant-Colonel Echoll's
regimeuts, on the right by Harper's, aud on the left by Allen's and Cummings's
regiments. As soon as General Johnston and myself reached the field we were occupied
with the organization of the heroic troops, whose previous stand, with scarce a
parallel, has nothing more valiant in all the pages of history, and whose losses
fitly tell why at length their ranks had lost their cohesion. It was now that
General Johnston impressively aud gallantly charged to the front, with the
colors of the 4th Alabama regiment by his side, all the field-officers of the regi
ment having been previously disabled. Shortly afterwards I placed S. R. Gist,
Adjutant and Inspector-General of South Carolina, a Volunteer Aid of General
Bee, in command of this regiment, and who led it again to the front, as became
its previous behavior, and remained with it for the rest of the day.
As soon as we had thus rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General John
ston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, while he, repairing to
Portici (the Lewis house), should urge reinforcements forward. At first he was
unwilling, but, reminded that one of us must do so, and that properly it was
his place, he reluctantly, but fortunately, complied ; fortunately, because from
that position, by his energy and sagacity, his keen perception and anticipations
of my needs, he so directed tho reserves as to insure the success of the day.
As General Johnston departed for Portici, Colonel Bartow reported to me
with the remains of the 7th Georgia Volunteers, Gartrell's, which I ordered him
to post on the left of Jackson's Hues, iu the edge of the belt of pines bordering

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 457
the southeastern rim of the plateau, on which the battlo was now to rage so
long and so fiercely.
Colonel William Smith's battalion of the 49th Virginia Volunteers having
also come up by my orders, I placed it on the left of Gartrell's, as my extreme
left at the time. Repairing then to the right, I placed Hampton's Legion, which
had suffered greatly, on that flank, somewhat to the rear of Harper's regiment,
and also the seven companies of the 8th (Hnuton's) Virginia regiment, which,
detached from Cocke's brigade by my orders and those of General Johnston, had
opportunely reached the ground. These, with Harper's regiment, constituted a
reserve to protect our right flauk from au advance of the enemy from the quar
ter of the stono bridge, and served as a support for the line of battle, which was
formed on the right of Bee's aud Evans's commands, in the centre by four regi
ments of Jackson's brigade, with Itnboden's four 6-pounders, Walton's five guns-
two rifled, two guns— one piece rifled— of Stanard's, and two 6-pounders of Rog
ers's batteries, the latter under Lieutenant Heaton ; and ou the left by Gartrell's
reduced ranks and Colonel Smith's battalion, subsequently reinforced by Faulk
ner's 2d Mississippi regiment, and by another regiment of the Army of the Shen
andoah, just arrived upon tho field, the 6th, Fisher's, North Carolina. Confront
ing the enemy at this time, my forces numbered, at most, not more than six
thousand five hundred infantry aud artillerists, with but thirteen pieces of artil
lery aud two companies (Carter's and Hoge's) of Stuart's cavalry.
The enemy's force, now bearing hotly and confidently down ou our position,
regiment after regiment of the best-equipped men that ever took the field, ac
cording to their own official history of the day, was formed of Colonels Hunter's
and Heintzelman's divisions, Sherman's aud Keyes's brigades of Tyler's division,
and of the formidable batteries of Ricketts, Griffin, aud Arnold, Regulars, and
the 2d Rhode Island, and two Dahlgren howitzers, a force of over twenty thou
sand infantry, seven companies of Regular cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of
improved artillery. At the same time, perilous, heavy reserves of infantry and
artillery hung in the distauce around the stouo bridge, Mitchell's, Blackburn's,
and Uniou Mills' fords, visibly ready to fall upon us at any moment ; and I was
also assured of the existence of other heavy corps at aud around Centreville,
and elsewhere within convenient supporting distances.
Fully conscious of this portentous disparity of force, as I posted the lines for
the encounter, I sought to infuse into tho hearts of my officers and men the con
fidence and determined spirit of resistance to this wicked invasion of the homes
of a free people, which I felt. I informed them that reinforcements would rap
idly come up to their support, aud that we must, at all hazards, hold our posts
until reinforced. I reminded them that we fought for our homes, our firesides,
and for the independence of our country. I urged them to the resolution of
victory or death on that field. These sentiments were loudly, eagerly, cheered
wheresoever proclaimed, and I then felt reassured of the unconquerable spirit of
that army, which would enable us to wrench victory from the host then threat
ening us with destruction.
Oh, my country ! I would readily have sacrificed my life and those of all the
brave men around me, to save your honor, aud to maintain your independence

458 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
from the degrading yoke which these ruthless invaders had come to impose
and render perpetual, and the day's issue has assured me that such emotions
must have also animated all under my command.
In the meantime the euemy had seized upon the plateau on which Robinson's
and the Henry houses are situated, the position first occupied in the morning
by General Bee, before advancing to the support of Evaus. Ricketts's battery
of six rifled guns— the pride of the Federalists, the object of their unstinted ex
penditure in outfit — and the equally powerful Regular light battery of Griffin
were brought forward and placed in immediate action, after haviug, conjointly
with the batteries already mentioned, played from former positions with destruc
tive effect upon our forward battalions.
Tho topographical features of tho plateau, now become the stage of the con
tending armies, must be described iu outline.
A glance at the map will show that it is enclosed on three sides by two small
watercourses, which empty into Bull Run within a few yards of each other, a
half mile to the south of the stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite one
hundred feet above the level of Bull Run, at the bridge, it falls off on three sides
to the level of the enclosing streams, in gentle slopes, but which are furrowed
l>y ravines of irregular directions and length, and studded with clumps and
patches of young pines aud oaks. The general direction of the crest of the pla
teau is oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter, aud to the Brentsville
aud turnpike roads, which intersect each other at right angles. Immediately
surrounding tho two houses before mentioned are small, open fields of irregular
outline, not exceeding one hundred and fifty acres in extent. Tho houses, oc
cupied at the time, the one by the Widow Henry, and the other by the free
negro, Robinson, are small wooden buildings, the latter densely embowered in
trees, and environed by a double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern
and southern brow of the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth
pines gave excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it
with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields, a broad belt
of oaks extends directly across the crest on both sides of the Sudley Road, in
which, during the battle, regiments of both armies met and contended for the
mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view embraces a wide expanse of
woods, and gently undulating, open country, of broad grass and grain fields, in
all directions, including the scene of Evans's and Bee's recent encounter with the
enemy, some twelve hundred yards to the northward.
Iu reply to the play of tho enemy's batteries, our own artillery bad not been
either idle or unskilful. The ground occupied by our guns, on a level with that
held by tho batteries of the enemy, was an open space of limited extent, behind
a low undulation, just at the eastern verge of the plateau, some five or six hun
dred yards from the Henry house. Here, as before said, thirteen pieces, mostly
6-pounders, were maintained iu action. The several batteries of Imboden, Stan-
ard, Pendleton (Rockbridge Artillery), and Alburtis, of the Army of the Shenan
doah, and five guns of Walton's and Heaton's section of Rogers's battery, of the
Army of the Potomac, alternating, to some extent, with each other, and taking

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 459
part as needed ; all, from the outset, displaying that marvellous capacity of our
people as artillerists, which has made them, it would appear, at ouee the terror
and the admiration of the enemy.
As was soon apparent, the Federalists had suffered severely from our artillery,
aud from the fire of our musketry on the right, and especially from the left flank,
placed under close cover, within whose galling range they had been advanced.
And wo are told iu their official reports how regiment after regiment, thrown
forward to dislodge us, was broken, never to recover its entire organization on
that field.
In the meantime, also, two companies of Stuart's cavalry (Carter's and Hoge's)
made a dashing charge down the Breutsville and Sudley road upon the Fire Zou
aves, then the enemy's right on the plateau, which added to their disorder
wrought by our musketry on that flank. But still the press of the enemy was
heavy iu that quarter of tho field, as fresh troops were thrown forward there to
outflank us ; and some three guns of a battery, in an attempt to obtain a posi
tion, apparently to enfilade our batteries, were thrown so close to the 33d regi
ment, Jackson's brigade, that that regiment, springing forward, seized them,
but with severe loss, and was subsequently driven back by an overpowering
force of Federal musketry.
Now, full 2 o'clock p. m., I gave the order for the right of my line, except my
reserves, to advance to recover the plateau. It was done with uncommon reso
lution and vigor, and at the same time Jackson's brigade pierced the enemy's
centre, with the determination of veterans and the spirit of men who fight for a
sacred cause ; but it suffered seriously. With equal spirit the other parts of the
line made the onset, and the Federal lines were broken and swept back at all
points from the open ground of the plateau. Rallying soon, however, as they
were strongly reinforced by fresh regiments, the Federalists returned ; aud, by
weight of numbers, pressed our lines back, recovered their ground and guns,
and renewed the offensive.
By this time, between half-past 2 and 3 o'clock p. m., onr reinforcements
pushed forward, and, directed by General Johnston to the required quarter,
were at hand just as I had ordered forward to a second effort for the recovery
of the disputed plateau, the whole line, including my reserve, which, at this cri
sis of the battle, I felt called upon to lead in person. This attack was general,
aud was shared in b3' every regiment then in the field, including the 6th, Fisher's,
North Carolina regiment, which had just come up, and taken position on the
immediate left of the 49th Virginia regiment. The whole open ground was
again swept clear of the enemy, and the plateau around the Henry and Robin
son houses remained finally in our possession, with the greater part of the Rick-
etts and Griffin batteries, and a flag of the 1st Michigan regiment, captured by
the 27th Virginia regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Echolls), of Jackson's brigade.
This part of the day was rich with deeds of individual coolness and dauntless
conduct, as well as well-directed, embodied resolution and bravery, but fraught
with the loss to the service of tho country of lives of inestimable preciousness
at this juncture. The brave Bee was mortally wounded at the head of the 4th
Alabama aud some Mississippians, in tho open field near the Henry house; and,

460 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
a few yards distant, the promising life of Bartow, while leading the 7th Geor
gia regiment, was quenched in blood. Colouel F. I. Thomas, Acting Chief of
Ordnauce of General Johnston's staff, after gallant conduct and most efficient
service, was also slain. Colonel Fisher, 6th North Carolina, likewise fell,
after soldierly behavior, at the head of his regiment, with ranks greatly
thinned. Withers's 18th regiment, of Cocke's brigade, had come up in time to follow
this charge, aud, in conjunction with Hampton's Legion, captured several rifled
pieces, which may have fallen previously in possession of some of our troops, but
if so, had been recovered by the enemy. These pieces were immediately turned,
and effectively served on distant masses of the enemy by the hands of some of
our officers.
While the enemy had thus been driven back ou our right, entirely across the
turnpike, and beyond Young's Branch on our left, the woods yet swarmed with
them, when onr reinforcements opportunely arrived in quick succession and took
position in that portion of the field. Kershaw's 2d and Cash's 8th South Carolina
regiments, which had arrived soon after Withers's, were led through the oaks
just east of the Brentsville-Sudley road, brushing some of the enemy before them,
and, taking au advantageous position along and west of that road, opened with
much skill aud effect on bodies of the enemy that had been rallied under cover
of a strong Federal brigade, posted on a plateau in the southwest angle, formed
by intersection of the turnpike with the Sndloy-Brentsville road. Among the
troops thus engaged were the Federal Regular infantry.
At the same time, Kemper's battery, passing northward by the Sudley-Brents-
ville road, took position in the open space, under orders of Colonel Kershaw,
near where an enemy's battery had been captured, and was opened with effec
tive results upon the Federal right, then the mark, also, of Kershaw's and Cash's
regiments. Preston's 28th regiment, of Cocke's brigade, had, by that time, entered the
same body of oaks and encountered some Michigan troops, capturing their bri
gade commander, Colonel Wilcox.
Another important accession to our forces had also occurred about the same
time — 3 o'clock p. M. Brigadier-General E. K. Smith, with some seventeen hun
dred infantry of Elzey's brigade of the Army of tho Shenandoah, and Beckham's
battery, came upon the field, from Camp Pickens, Manassas, where they had ar
rived, by railroad, at noon. Directed by a staff officer, sent in person by General
Johnston, to the left, then so much endangered, on reachiug a position in rear of
the oak woods south of the Henry house, and immediately east of the Sudley road,
General Smith was disabled by a severe wound, and his valuable services were
lost at that critical juncture. But the command devolved upon a meritorious
officer of experience, Colonel Elzey, who led his infantry at once somewhat far
ther to the left in the direction of tho Chinn house, across the road, through
the oaks skirting the west side of the road, and around which he sent the bat
tery under Lieutenant Beckham. This officer took up a most favorable position
uoar that house, whence, with a clear view of the Federal right and centre fill
ing the open fields to the west of the Brentsville-Sudley road and gently sloping

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 461
southward, he opened fire with his battery upon them with deadly and dismay
ing effect.
Colonel Early, who by some mischance did not receive orders until 2 o'clock,
which had been sent him at noon, came on the ground immediately after Elzey,
with Kemper's 7th Virginia, Hays's 7th Louisiana, and Barksdale's 13th Missis
sippi regiments. This brigade, by the personal direction of Geueral Johnston,
was marched by the Holkham house across the fields to the left, entirely around
the woods through which Elzey had passed, and, under a severe fire, into a posi
tion in line of battle, near Chinu's house, outflanking the enemy's right.
At this time, about 3.30 p. m., the enemy, driven back on the left aud centre,
and brushed from the woods bordering the Sudley road south aud west of the
Henry house, had formed a line of battle of truly formidable proportions, of
crescent outline, reaching, on their left, from vicinity of Pittsylvania, the old
Carter mansion, by Matthews's and in rear of Dogan's, across tho turnpike near
to Chinu's house. The woods and fields were filled with their masses of infan
try and their carefully preserved cavalry. It was a truly magnificent, though
redoubtable, spectacle, as they threw forward, in fine style, on the broad, gentle
slopes of the ridge occupied by their main liuos, a cloud of skirmishers prepara
tory for another attack.
But as Early formed his line and Beckham's pieces played upon the right of the
enemy, Elzey's brigade, Gibbons's 10th Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart's 1st
Maryland, and Vaughn's 3d Tennessee regiments, Cash's 8th and Kershaw's 2d
South Carolina, Withers's 18th and Preston's 28th Virginia regiments advanced
in an irregular line, almost simultaneously, with great spirit, from their several
positions upon the front and flanks of the enemy in their quarter of the field.
At the same time, too, Early resolutely assailed their right flauk and rear. Un
der this combined attack the enemy was soon forced, first, over the narrow pla
teau in the southern angle made by the two roads so often mentioned, into a
patch of woods on its western slope, thence back over Young's Branch and the
turnpike into the fields of the Dogan farm, and rearward, iu extreme disorder,
across the country in all available directions, towards Bull Run. The rout had
now become general and complete.
About the time that Elzey and Early were entering into action, a column of
the euemy, Keyes's brigade, of Tyler's division, made its way across the turnpike
between Bull Run and the Robinson house, under cover of a wood and brow of
the ridges, apparently to turn my right ; but was easily repulsed by a few shot
from Latham's battery — now united and placed in position by Captain D. B. Har
ris of the Virginia Engineers, whoso services during the day became his charac
ter as an able, cool, and skilful officer — and from Alburtis's battery, opportunely
ordered by General Jackson to a position to the right of Latham's, on a hill
commanding the line of approach of the euemy, and supported by portions of
regiments collected together by the staff officers of General Johnston and my
self. Elzey's brigade, meanwhile, joined by the 19th Virginia regiment, Lieutenant-
Colonel Strange, of Cocke's brigade, pursued the now panic-stricken, fugitive
enemy. Stuart, with his cavalry, aud Beckham, had also taken up the pursuit

462 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
along the road by which the enemy had come upon the field that morning, but,
soon cumbered by.prisonors who thronged his way, the former was unable to
attack the mass of the fast-fleeing, frantic Federalists.
Withers's, R. T. Preston's, Cash's, and Kershaw's regiments, Hampton's Legion,
and Kemper's battery, also pursued along the Warrenton road by the stone
bridge ; the euemy having opportunely opened a way for them through the
heavy abattis which my troops had made on the west side of the bridge several
days before. But this pursuit was soon recalled in consequence of a false re
port which unfortunately reached us, that the enemy's reserves, known to be
fresh and of considerable strength, were threatening the position of Union Mills
Ford. Colonel Radford, with six companies Virginia cavalry, was also ordered by
General Johnston to cross Bull Ruu and attack the enemy from tho direction
of Lewis's house ; conducted by one of my aids, Colonel Chisolm, by the Lewis
Ford to the immediate vicinity of the suspension bridge, he charged a battery
with great gallantry, took Colonel Corcoran, of the 69th regiment New York
Volunteers, a prisoner, aud captured the Federal colors of that regiment, as well
as a number of the euemy. He lost, however, a promising officer of his regiment,
Captain Winston Radford.
Lieutenant-Colonel Munford also led some companies of cavalry in hot pur
suit, and rendered material service in the capture of prisoners, aud of cannon,
horses, ammunition, etc., abandoned by the enemy in their flight.
Captain Lay's squadron of the Powhatan Troop, and Utterback's Rangers,
Virginia Volunteers, attached to my person, did material service under Captain
Lay, in rallying troops broken for the time by the onset of the enemy's masses.
During the period of the momentous events, fraught with the weal of our
country, which were passing on the blood-stained plateau along the Sudley and
Warrenton roads, other portions of the line of Bull Run had not been void of
action of moment, aud of influence upon the general result.
While Colouel Evans and his sturdy band were holding at bay the Federal
advance beyond the turnpike, the enemy made repeated demonstrations with
artillery aud infantry upon the line of Cocke's brigade, with the serious inten
tion of forcing the position, as General Scheuck admits in his report. They
were driven back with severe loss, by Latham's (a section) and Rogers's four
6-pounders, and were so impressed with the strength of that lino as to be held
in check and inactive, even after it had been stripped of all its troops but one
company of the 19th Virginia regiment under Captain Duke, a meritorious
officer. And hero it is worthy of notice, that iu this encounter of our 6-pounder
guns, handled by our volunteer artillerists, they had worsted such a notoriona
adversary as tho Ayres's, formerly Sherman's, battery, which quit the contest
under the illusion that it had weightier metal than its own to contend with.
The centre brigades, Bonham's and Longstreet's, of the line of Bull Run, if
not closely engaged were, nevertheless, exposed for much of the day to au annoy ^
ing, almost incessant, fire of artillery of long range. But by a steady, veteran
like maintenance of their positions, they held virtually paralyzed, all day, two
strong brigades of the enemy, with their batteries (four) of rifled guns.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 463
As before said, two regiments of Bonham's brigade, 2d and 8th South Carolina
Voluuteers, and Kemper's battery, took a distinguished part in the batth». The
remainder, 3d, Williams's, 7th, Bacon's, South Carolina Volunteers, 11th, Kirk-
land's, North Carolina regiment, six compauios 8th Louisiana Voluuteers,
Shields's battery, and one section of Walton's battery, under Lieutenant Garnett,
whether in holding their post, or taking up the pursuit, officers and men dis
charged their whole duty with credit and promise.
Longstreet's brigade, pursuant to orders prescribing his part of tho opera
tions of the centre aud right wing, was thrown across Bull Run early iu the
morning, and, under a severe fire of artillery, was skilfully disposed for the as
sault of the enemy's batteries in that quarter, but was withdrawn subsequently
in conseqnonce of the change of plau already mentioned and explained. The
troops of this brigade were 1st, Major Skinner, 11th, Garland, 24th, Lieutenant-
Colonel Hairston, 17th, Corso, Virginia regiments, 5th North Carolina, Lieuten
ant-Colonel Jones, aud Whitehead's company Virginia cavalry ; throughout the
day these troops evinced the most soldierly spirit.
After the rout, having been ordered by General Johnston iu pursuit, in the
direction of Centreville, these brigades advanced nearly to that place, when,
night and darkness intervening, General Bonham thought it proper to direct
his own brigade, and that of General Longstreet, back to Bull Run.
General D. R. Jones, early iu the day, crossing Bull Run with his brigade,
pursuant to orders indicating his part iu the projected attack by our right wing
aud centre on the enemy at Centreville, took up a position on the Union Mills
and Centreville road, more than a mile in advance of the Run. Ordered back
in consequence of the miscarriage of the orders to General Ewell, the retrograde
movement was necessarily made under a sharp fire of artillery. At noon this
brigade, in obedience to now instructions, was again thrown across Bull Run
to make a demonstration. Unsupported by other troops, the advance was gal
lantly made until within musket-range of the enemy's force, Colonel Davies's
brigade, iu position near Rooky Run, and under the concentrated fire of their
artillery. In this affair the 5th, Jenkins's, South Carolina, and Captain Foun
tain's company of the 18th Mississippi regiment, are mentioned by Geueral
Jones as having shown conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and discipline, under a
combiued fire of infantry and artillery. Not only did the return-fire of the
brigade drive to cover the enemy's infantry, but the movement unquestionably
spread through the enemy's ranks a sense of insecurity, and danger from an at
tack by that route on their rear at Centreville, which served to augment the
extraordinary panic which we know disbanded the entire Federal army for the
time. This is evident from tho fact that Colonel Davies, the immediate ad
versary's eommauder, in his official report, was induced to magnify one small
company of our cavalry, which accompauied this brigade, into a force of two
thousand men, and Colonel Miles, the commander of the Federal reserves at
Centreville, says the movement "caused painful apprehensions for the left
flank " of their army.
General Ewell, occupying for the time the right of the lines of Bull Run at
Union Mills Ford, after tho miscarriage of my orders for his advance upon Cen-

464 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
treville in the afternoon, was ordered by General Johnston to bring up his bri
gade irfio battle, then raging on the left flank. Promptly executed as this
movement was, the brigade, after a severe march, reached the field too late to
share the glories, as they had the labors, of the day. As the important position
at the Union Mills had been left with but a slender guard, General Ewell was
at once ordered to retrace his steps and resume his position, to prevent the pos
sibility of its seizure by any force of the enemy in that quarter.
Brigadier-General Holmes, left with his brigade as n support to the same
position, iu the original plan of battle, had also been called to the left, whither
he marched with the utmost speed, but not in time to join actively in the battle.
Walker's rifled guns, of this brigade, however, came up in time to be fired with
precision and decided execution at the retreating euemy, and Scott's cavalry,
joining in the pursuit, assisted iu the capture of prisoners aud war-munitions.
This victory, the details of which I have thus sought to chronicle as fully as
were fitting au official report, it remains to record, was dearly won by the death
of many officers and men of inestimable value, belonging to all grades of our
society. In the death of General Barnard E. Bee tho Confederacy has sustained an
irreparable loss, for, with great personal bravery and coolness, he possessed the
qualities of an accomplished soldier, and an able, reliable commander.
Colouels Bartow and Fisher, and Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston of Hampton's
Legion, in the fearless command of their men, gave earnest of great usefulness
to the service, had they been spared to complete a career so brilliantly begun.
Besides the field-officers already meutioned as having been wounded while in
the gallant discharge of their duty, many others also received severe wounds
after equally honorable and distinguished conduct, whether in leading their
men forward, or in rallying them when overpowered and temporarily shattered
by the largely superior force to which we were generally opposed.
The subordinate grades wero likewise abundantly conspicuous for zeal and
capacity for the leadership of men in arms. To mention all, who, fighting well,
paid tho lavish forfeit of their lives, or at least crippled, mutilated bodies, on
the field of Manassas, cannot well he done within the compass of this paper, but
a grateful country and mourning friends will not suffer their names and services
to be forgotten and pass away unhonored.
Nor are those officers and men who were so fortunate as to escape the thick-
flying, deadly missiles of the enemy less worthy of praise for their endurance,
firmness, and valor than their brothers-in-artus, whose lives were closed or bodies
maimed on that memorable day. To mention all who exhibited ability and
brilliant courage, were impossible in this report ; nor do the reports of brigade
and other subordinate commanders supply full lists of all actually deserving of
distinction. I can only mention those whose conduct eame immediately under
my notice, or the consequence of whose actions happened to be signally im
portant. It is fit that I should in this way commend to notice the dauntless conduct
and imperturbable coolness of Colonel Evans ; and well, indeed, was he support
ed by Colonel Sloan aud the officers of the 4th Sputh Carolina regiment, as also

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 465
Major Wheat, than whom no one displayed more brilliant courage, until carried
from the field, shot through the lungs, though, happily, not mortally stricken.
But in the desperate contest to which these brave gentlemen were for a time
necessarily exposed, the behavior of officers and men, generally, was worthy of
the highest admiration; and assuredly, hereafter, all there may proudly say:
We were of that band who fought the first hour of the battle of Manassas.
Equal honors and credit must also be awarded, in the pages of history, to the
gallant officers and men who, under Bee and Bartow, subsequently marching to
their side, saved them from destruction and relieved them from the brunt of the
enemy's attack.
Tho conduct of General Jackson also requires mention, as eminently that of
an able, fearless soldier and sagacious commander — one fit to lead his efficient
brigade. His prompt, timely arrival before the plateau of the Henry house,
and his judicious distribution of his troops, contributed much to the success of
the day. Although painfully wounded in the hand, he remained on the field to
the end of the battle, rendering invaluable assistance.
Colonel William Smith was as efficient, as self-possessed, and bravo ; the influ
ence of his example and his words of encouragement was not confined to his
immediato command, the good conduct of which is especially noticeable, inas
much as it had been embodied but a day or two before the battle.
Colonels Harper, Hunton, and Hampton, commanding regiments of the re
serve, attracted my notice by their soldierly ability, as with their gallant com
mands they restored the fortunes of the day, at a time when the enemy, by a
last desperate onset, with heavy odds, had driven our forces from the fiercely
contested ground around the Henry and Robinson houses. Veterans could not
have behaved better than these well-led regiments.
High praise must also be given to Colonels Cocke, Early, and Elzey — brigade
commanders — also to Colonel Kershaw, commaudin-g, for the time, the 2d and
8th South Carolina regiments. Under the instruction of General Johnston,
these officers reached the field at an opportune, critical moment, and disposed,
handled, and fought their respective commands with sagacity, decision, and
successful results, which have been described in detail.
Colonel J. E. B. Stuart likewise deserves mention for his enterprise and abil
ity as a cavalry commander. Through his judicious reconnoissance of the coun
try on our left flank, he acquired information both of its topographical features
and of the positions of the enemy, of the utmost importance in the subsequent
and closing movements of the day on that flank; and his services iuthe pursuit
were highly effective.
Captain E. P. Alexander, C. S. Engineers, gave me seasonable and material as
sistance early in the day with his system of signals. Almost the first shot fired
by the enemy passed through the tent of his party, at the stone bridge, where
they subsequently firmly maintained their position in the maintenance of their
duty — the transmission of signal messages of the enemy's movements — for sev
eral hours under fire. Later, Captain Alexander acted as my Aide-de-Camp, in
the transmission of orders and iu observation of the enemy.
I was most effectively served throughout the day by my volunteer aids —
I.— 30

4:66 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
Colonels Preston, Manning, Chestnut, Miles, Rice, Heyward, and Chisolm — to
whom I tender my thanks for their unflagging, intelligent, aud fearless discharge
of the laborious, responsible duties intrusted to them. To Lieutenant S. W.
Ferguson, Aide-de-Camp, and Colonel Heyward, who were habitually at my side
from 12 noon until the close of the battle, my special acknowledgments are due.
The horse of the former was killed under him by the same shell that wounded
that of the latter. Roth were eminently useful to me, and were distinguished
for coolness and courage, until the enemy finally gave way aud fled in wild dis
order in every direction — a scene the President of the Confederacy had the high
satisfaction of witnessing, as he arrived upon the field at that exultant moment.
' I also received, from the time I reached the front, such signal service from H.
E. Peyton, at the time a private in the Loudon Cavalry, that I have called him
to my personal staff. Similar services were also rendered me repeatedly, dur
ing the battle, by T. J. Randolph, a volunteer Acting Aide-de-Camp to Colonel
Cocke. Captain Clifton H. Smith, of the general staff, was also present on the field,
and rendered efficient service in the transmission of orders.
It must be permitted me here to record my profound sense of my obligation
to General Johnston, for his generous permission to carry out my plans, with
such modifications as circumstances had required. . From his services on the
field— as we entered it together, already mentioned — and his subsequent watch
ful management of the reinforcements as they reached the vicinity of the field,
our countrymen may draw the most auspicious auguries.
To Colonel Thomas Jordan, my efficient and zealous Assistant Adjutant-Gen
eral, much credit is duo for his able assistance in the organization of the forces
under my command, and for the intelligence and promptness with which he has
discharged all the laborious and important duties of his office.
Valuable assistance was given to me by Major Cabell, chief officer of the Quar
termaster's Department, in the sphere of his duties; duties environed by far
more than the ordinary difficulties and embarrassments attending the opera
tions of a long-organized, regular establishment.
Colonel R. B. Lee, Chief of Subsistence Department, had but just entered on
his duties; but his experience and long and varied service iu his department
made him as efficient as possible.
Captain W. H. Fowle, whom Colonel Lee had relieved, had previously exerted
himself to the utmost to carry out orders from these headquarters, to render his
department equal to the demands of the service ; that it was not entirely so, it
is due to justice to say, was certainly not his fault.
Deprived by sudden severe illness of the services of the Medical Director, Sur
geon Thomas H. Williams, his duties were discharged by Surgeon R. L. Brodie
to my entire satisfaction. And it is proper to say that the entire medical corps
of the army present, embracing gentlemen of distinction in the profession, who
had quit lucrative private practice, by their services in the field, and subse
quently, did high honor to their profession.
The vital duties of the Ordnance Department were effectively discharged under
the administration of my Chief of Artillery and Ordnance, Colonel Samuel Jones.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 467
At one time, when reports of evil omen and disaster reached Camp Pickens
with such circumstantiality as to give reasonable grounds of anxiety, its com
mander, Colonel Territt, the commander of the intrenched batteries, Captain
Sterrett, of the Confederate States Navy, and their officers, made the most effi
cient possible preparations for the desperate defence of that position iu extrem
ity ; and, in this connection, I regret my inability to mention the names of those
patriotic gentlemen of Virginia, by the gratuitous labor of whose slaves the in
trenched camp at Manassas had been mainly constructed, relieving the troops
from that laborious service, and giving opportunity for their military instruction.
Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas H. Williamson, tho Engineer of those works, as
sisted by Captain D. B. Harris, discharged his duties with untiring energy and
devotion, as well as satisfactory skill.
Captain W. H. Stevens, Engineer C. S. A., served with the advanced forces at
Fairfax Court-House for some time before the battle. He laid out the works
there, in admirable accordance with the purposes for which they were designed ;
and yet, so as to admit of ultimato extension and adaptation to more serious
uses, as means and part of a system of real defence when determined upon. He
has shown himself to be an officer of energy and ability.
Major Thomas G. Rhett, after having discharged for several months the labo
rious duties of Adjutant-General to the commanding officer of Camp Pickens,
was detached to join the Army of the Shenandoah, ou the eve of the advance of
the enemy ; but, volunteering his services, was ordered to assist nn the staff of
General Bonham, joining that officer at Centreville on the night of the 17th, be
fore the battle of BuU Run, rendered valuable services until the arrival of Gen
eral Johnston, when he was called to the place of Chief of Staff of that officer.
It is also proper to acknowledge the signal services rendered by Colonels B.
F. Terry and T. Lubbock, of Texas, who had attached themselves to the staff of
General Longstreet. These gentlemen made daring and valuable reconnois
sances of the enemy's positions ; assisted by Captains Goree aud Chichester, they
also carried orders on the field. And on the following day, accompanying Cap-
taiu Whitehead's troops, to take possession of Fairfax Court-House, Colonel Ter
ry, with his unerring rifle, severed the halliard, and thus lowered the Federal
flag found still floating from the cupola of the court-house there. He also se
cured a large Federal garrison flag, designed, it is said, to be unfurled over our
intrenchmeuts at Manassas.
Iu connection with the unfortunate casualty of the day — that is, the miscar
riage of the orders seut by courier to Generals Holmes and Ewell, to attack the
enemy in flank and reverse at Centreville, through which the triumph of our
arms was prevented from being still more decisive, I regard it in place to say :
a divisioual organization, with officers in command of divisions, with appropri
ate rauk, as in European services, would greatly reduce the risk of such mishaps,
aud would advantageously simplify tho communications of the general iu com
mand of a field, with his troops.
While glorious for our people, and crushing in effect upon the morale of our
hitherto overweening adversary, as were the events of the battle of Manassas,
the field was only wou by stout fighting, and, as before reported, with much

468 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.
loss, as is precisely exhibited in the papers herewith marked " F," " G," and " H,"
and being lists of the killed aud wounded. The killed outright numbered three
hundred and sixty-nine, the wounded fourteen hundred and eighty-three, mak
ing an aggregate of casualties of eighteen hundred and fifty-two.
The actual loss of the enemy will never be known ; it may only be con
jectured. Their abandoned dead, as they were buried by our people where
they fell, unfortunately, were not enumerated; many parts of the fields were
thick with their corpses, as few battle-fields have ever been. The official re
ports of the enemy are studiously silent on this point, but still afford us data
for an approximate estimate. Left almost in the dark, in respect to the losses
of Hunter's and Heintzelmau's divisions — first, longest, and most hotly engaged —
we are informed Sherman's brigade, Tyler's division, suffered in killed, wounded,
and missing, six hundred and nine, that is, about eighteen per cent, of the bri
gade. A regiment of Franklin's brigade (Gorman's) lost twenty-one per cent.
Griffin's (battery) loss was thirty per cent., aud that of Keyes's brigade, which
was so handled by its commander as to be exposed to only occasional volleys
from onr troops, was at least ten per cent. To these facts, add the repeated
references in the reports of the more reticent commanders to the "murderous"
fire to which they were exposed, the "pistol-rauge" volleys and galling mus
ketry of which they speak as scourging their ranks, and we are warranted in
placing the entire loss of the Federalists at over forty-five hundred in killed,
wounded, and 'prisoners. To this may be legitimately added, as a casualty of
the battle, the thousands of fugitives from the field who have never rejoined
their regiments, and who are as much lost to the enemy's service as if slain or
disabled by wounds. These may not be included under the head of "missing,"
because, in every instance of such report, we took as many prisoners of those
brigades or regiments as are reported " missing."
A list appended, marked "I," exhibits some fourteen hundred and sixty
of their wounded and others who fell into our hands and were sent to Rich
mond ; some were sent to other points, so that the number of prisoners, includ
ing wounded, who did not die, may be set down as not less than sixteen hun
dred. Besides these, a considerable number, who could not be removed from
the field, died at the several farm-houses and field-hospitals within ten days
following the battle.
To serve the future historian of this war, I will notice the fact that, among
the captured Federalists, are officers and men of forty-seven regiments of voluu
teers, besides, from some nine different regiments of Regular troops, detachments
of which were engaged.
From their official reports we learn ofa regiment of volunteers, six regiments
of Milcs's division, and the five regiments of Runyon's brigade, from which we
have neither sound nor wounded prisoners. Making allowances for mistakes, we
are warranted in saying that the Federal army consisted of at least fifty-five reg
iments of volunteers, eight companies of Regular infantry, four of marines, nine
of Regular cavalry, and twelve batteries (49 guns). These regiments, at one time,
as will appear from a published list,* numbered, in the aggregate, fifty-four thon-
* Marked "K."

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 469
sand one hundred and forty, and averaged nine hundred aud sixty-four each ;
from au order of the enemy's commander, however, dated July 13th, we learn
that one hundred men from each regiment were directed to remain in charge
of their respective camps ; some allowance must further be made for the sick
and details, which would reduce the average to eight hundred men ; adding the
Regular infantry, cavalry, aud artillery present, an estimate of their force may
be made.
A paper appended, marked " L," exhibits, in part, the ordnance aud supplies
captured, including some 28 field-pieces, of the best character of arm, with over
100 rounds of ammunition for each gun, 37 caissons, 6 forges, 4 battery-wagons,
64 artillery-horses, completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small-arms ammuni
tion, 4500 sets of accoutrements, over 500 muskets, some 9 regimental aud gar
rison flags, with a number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, cautcens, blankets, a
large store of axes and intrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp
and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence besides.
Added to these results, may rightly be noticed here, that by this battle an
invading army, superbly equipped, within twenty miles of their base of opera
tions, has been converted into one virtually besieged, and exclusively occupied
for months in the construction of a stupendous series of fortifications, for the
defence of its own capital.
I beg to call attention to the reports of the several subordinate commanders,
for reference to the signal parts played by individuals of their respective com
mands. Contradictory statements, found iu these reports, should not excite
surprise, when we remember how difficult, if not impossible, it is to reconcile
the narrations of by-standers or participants in even the most inconsiderable
affair, much less the shifting, thrilling scenes of a battle-field.
Accompanying are maps, showing the positions of the armies on the morning
of 21st July, and of three several stages of the battle, also of the line of Bull
Ruu, north of Blackburn's Ford. These maps, from actual surveys made by
Captain D. B. Harris, assisted by Mr. John Grant, were drawn by the latter with
an accuracy worthy of high commendation.
Iu the conclusion of this report it is proper, and, doubtless, expected, that I
should acquaint my countrymen with some of the sufficient causes' that pre
vented the advance of our forces, and prolonged, vigorous pursuit of the enemy
to aud beyond the Potomac. The War Department has been fully advised,
long since, of all those causes, some of which only are proper to be here com
municated. Au army which had fought as ours that day,.agaiust uncommon
odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water, and without food,
except a hastily snatched meal at dawn, was not iu condition for the toil of an
ea<*er effective pursuit of an euemy immediately after the battle. On the fol
lowing day an unusually heavy aud uuintermitting fall of rain intervened to
obstruct our advance, with reasonable prospects of fruitful results. Added to
this the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made au efficient pursuit
a military impossibility. I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

470 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X.
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, July 22d, 1861.
Special Orders, No. 146.
The command of General Beauregard, as it stood organized on the 20th instant
into brigades or separate commands, will, for the present, return to that organi
zation, with the following headquarters :
1st Brigade, Brigadier-General M. L. Bonham, at Centreville.
2d Brigade, Brigadier-General Ewell, at or about Union Mills, in advance.
3d Brigade, Brigadier-General D. R. Jones, at a position on Union Mills and
Centreville road, about half-way between Braddock's road and Union Mills Ford.
4tii Brigade, Brigadier-General Longstreet, at or about the crossing of the
Centreville and Union Mills road and the Braddock's road,
5th Brigade, Colonel Cocke, at or about suspension bridge, over Cub Run.
6th Brigade, Colonel Early, iu position on Bull Run, one mile above Stone
Bridge. Evans's command, at or about Stone Bridge, except Hunton's regiment Vir
ginia Volunteers, which will remain at these headquarters for the present.
Colonel Radford will concentrate such of his companies as are not specially
detached, at a point on Bull Run to the left of Mitchell's Ford.
The commanders of all regiments will take immediate measnres for collecting
stragglers from other regiments, who will be then sent forthwith, under an
officer and proper guides, to join the headquarters of the several brigades to
which they belong.
By command of General Beauregard. Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, July 22d, 1861.
Special Orders, No. 147.
I. The Presideut deeming it important that General Holmes shall return with
his command to his former position, at au early moment, he will, accordingly,
prepare to march in the morning.
II. The President regrets to be obliged, at this juncture, to require this move
ment of General Holmes, after his remarkable march to the support of this
army at a critical juncture. A march for which the general commanding has
to express his sincere thanks, aud also for the critical services rendered ou the
field of battle yesterday, by that portion of his brigade which was called to the
immediate scene of action.
By command of General Beauregard. Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, July 23d, 1861.
Special Orders, No. 149.
I. Brigadier -General Bonham will advance his command forthwith, aud
occupy Vienna Station. His command will consist of the troops of the 1st

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X. 471
brigade of this army, Kemper's and Shields's batteries, all cavalry at present
attached, and as many companies of Colonel Radford's regiment of cavalry as
are not assigned to other brigades.
II. The utmost degree of military precaution must be exercised in tho execu
tion of these orders, especially in approaching within several miles of Vienna
Station; and no unnecessary exposure of our meu to fire from intrenchments
must occur. The ground in advance, therefore, must be carefully reconnoitred;
but at the same time celerity of movement is of great importance.
By command of General Beauregard. Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.

Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, July 25th, 1861.
Special Orders, No. 169.
I. The subdivisions of this Army Corps will be organized at once, as follows :
1st Brigade.
Genl. M. L. Bonham, Commanding.
2d South Carolina regiment Volunteers, Col. J. B. Kershaw.
3d " " " " J.H.Williams.
7th " " " " Thomas G. Bacon.
8th " " " " E.B.Cash.
2d Brigade.
Genl. R. S. Ewell, Commanding.
5th Alabama regiment Volunteers, Col. Robert E. Rodes.
6th " " " " J.J. Seibels.
13th " " " Lieut.-Col. Theo. O'Hara.
12th Mississippi " " Col. R. Griffith.
3d Brigade.
Genl. D. R. Jones, Commanding.
5th South Carolina regiment Volunteers, Col. M. Jenkins.
4th " " " " J-E. B.Sloan.
6th " " " " C. A. Winder.
9th " " " " J. D. Blanding.
4th Brigade.
Genl. James Longstreet, Commanding.
1st Virginia regiment Volunteers, Col. P. T. Moore.
7th " " " " J. L. Kemper. ,
Htb " " " " S. Garland, Jr.
17th » " " " M. D. Corse.
5th Brigade.
Genl. Philip St. George Cocke, Commanding.
18th Virginia regiment Volunteers, Col. R. E. Withers.
19th « " " Lieut.-Col. J. B. Strange.
28th " " " Col. R. Preston.
49th " " " " William Smith.

472 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI.
6th Brigade.
Genl. J. A. Early, Commanding.
24th Virginia regiment Volunteers, Lieut.-Col. Hairston.
5th North Carolina regiment Volunteers, Col. D. K. McRae.
13th " " " " J.H.Hoke.
11th " " " " Kirkland.
7th Brigade.
Col. N. G. Evans, Commanding.
7th Mississippi regiment Volunteers, Lieut.-Col. William L. Brandon.
13th " " " Col. William Barksdale.
17th " " " " W. S. Featherston.
18th " " " " E.R.Burt.
8th Brigade.
Col. J. G. Seymour, Commauding.
6th Louisiana regiment Volunteers, Col. J. G. Seymour.
7th " " " " Harry Hays.
8th " " " " H.B.Kelly.
9th " " " " Richard Taylor.
1st " Special Battalion, Major C. R. Wheat.
Separate Commands.
8th Virginia regiment Voluuteers, Col. Eppa Hunton, Leesburg.
Hampton's Legion.
II. The Horse Artillery, for the present, will be placed :
Kemper's Battery with the 1st Brigade.
Shields's " " 4th "
Latham's " " 5th "
Walton's Battery will concentrate at or about the left of Mitchell's Ford for
purposes of instruction.
III. The Cavalry, for the present, will be distributed in the following manner :
Colonel Radford, with Bix companies, will be on duty with the 1st Brigade
while in advance.
The remaining four companies of Radford's regiment, with Lieutenant-Col
onel Munford, will report for service with the 4th Brigade.
IV. Such changes as are involved in these orders will be made without delay.
By command of Genl. Beauregard. Thomas Jordan, A. A.-Genl.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI.
Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, Aug. 8th, 1861.
Special Oi-ders, No. 212.
I. Colonel Evans will inarch with his brigade, with as little delay as practica
ble, via Gum Spring and Ball's Mills, to Leesburg, or its vicinity. He will as-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI. 473
sumo command of all the Confederate States forces in Loudon County, and post
them as may appear best calculated to protect that section from tho incursions
of the enemy, and for the repression of any disaffection among any class of the
inhabitants. II. The officers of the Quartermaster's Department will provide the necessary
and ample moans of transportation for this movement.
By command of Genl. Beauregard. Thomas Jordan, A. A.-Geul.

Manassas, Va., Aug. 11th, 1861.
Dear General, — In order to prevent any coup de main from McClellan, as
already communicated to you, I have ordered Longstreet to Fairfax Court-
House, Jones to Germantown, aud Bonham to fall back on or about Flint Hill,
leaving a strong mounted guard at or about Vienna.
Cocke goes to Centreville.
Ewell to Sangster's Cross-roads.
Early aud Hampton to intersection of Occoqnan road with Wolf-run Shoals
road. Evans has gone to Leesburg.
The Louisiana brigade remains, for the present, at or about Mitchell's Ford.
Will you permit me to suggest that Elzey should concentrate his brigade at
or about Fairfax Station, aud Jackson at or about the cross of Braddock's road
with the Fairfax Court-House and Station road ?
Stuart to remain where ho is.
From those advanced positions we could at any time concentrate our forces
for offensive or defensive purposes. I thiuk, by a bold move, we could capture
the enemy's advance forces at Annandale ; and, should he come out to their sup
port, give him battle — with all the chances in our favor. But, for that object,
we must have all our artillery ready in every respect.
Yours very truly, G. T. Beauregard.
Genl. J. E. Johnston, Comdg. Manassas, Va.

Confederate States of America, War Department,
Richmond, Aug. 13lh, 1861.
Sir, — You are hereby informed that the President has appointed you, by and
with the advice of Congress, a General (to take rank July 21st, 1861) in the Army
of the Confederate States. You are requested to signify your acceptance or non-
acceptance of said appointment. Aud should you accept, you will sign before
a magistrate the oath of office herewith, and forward the same, with yonr letter
of acceptance, to this department. L. P. Walker, Sec. of War.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, etc., Manassas.

Manassas, Va., Aug. 14th, 1861.
Dear General,— In order to prevent the enemy from taking possession of your
work and battery at Evansport, before assistance could be sent to it, I would

474 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI.
make it a strong profile redoubt (closed), with ditch flanking arrangements, and
the whole work large enough to contain a pretty strong garrison. If there be a
height near by that commands it, I would make it less strong ; but I would hold
and fortify that height. I do not think they would attempt to storm such a
work. If you have no Engineer, apply for one from Richmond, otherwise I may,
before long, be able to send you one ; but prefer you should get one from the
War Department.
Nothing new here ; we are still organizing our forces.
Yours very truly, G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
Genl. T. H. Holmes, Comdg. at Fredericksburg, Va.
P. S. Apply for Captain F. D. Lee, Corps of Engineers, South Carolina Volun
teers, now with Major Trapier at Port Royal. B.

Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, Va., Aug. 17th, 1861.
Sir, — I have the honor to acknowledge the appointmeut of " General," con
ferred upon me by the President of the Confederate States, with the advice and
consent of Cougress, to date from July 21st, 1861. I accept with gratitude said
appointment, and will exert myself to the utmost to be deserving of so high a
position. I romain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Hon. L. P. Walker, Sec. of War, Richmond, Va.

Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, August 19th, 1861.
To Col. Thomas Jordan, Adj.-Genl. 1st Corps Army of the Potomac:
Sir, — Knowing it to be General Beauregard's desire to increase his artillery
force as far as practicable, I have tho honor to submit the following :
Some time since a requisition was made by the Washington Artillery for
three guns to complete their armament, and a caisson aud some extra boxes to
repair damages received in action. After some trouble and delay, unavoidable
on my part, Colonel Pendleton promised to fill this requisition (which had been
approved at these headquarters), and set aside, I believe with General John
ston's consent, the necessary articles. On going to receive them to-day, I found
that they had been issued yesterday, by direct order from General Johnston, to
Captain Hamilton's battery — a company recently arrived from Georgia, without
guns. Two guns previously assigned to Lee's battery, of Hampton's Legion, have
also been taken from another battery.
In view of these facts I have the honor to suggest that steps be taken at once
to procure other guns, through either the War Department or the founderies
where they are cast. To make the increase as immediate!}' effective as pos
sible, I would also recommend that additional guns be given to all of our
already organized batteries capable of expansion, as follows :

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XL 475
To the Washington Artillery, three, making in all sixteen ; to Lee's battery,
of Hampton's Legion, four, making ten ; to Latham's battery, two, making six.
The officers of these batteries say they can easily receive these increases.
Probably Kemper's, Shields's, and the Loudon batteries might also be
strengthened, but I have not seen their officers.
Authority has been obtained for armament, as light artillery, of Captain Bon-
yer's company of the 28th Virginia regiment, aud Captain Stribling's of the 49th
Virginia, but their equipment must all be obtained in Richmond, as the follow
ing disposition has been niado of the captured artillery : No. of puna rec'd. No. of puna ret'd.
By General Johnston's command   18 3
" " Holmes's "  5 0
" " Beauregard's "  4 3
Total  27 6
The guus noted as returned, in place of some of the captured, are either in
ferior, or damaged, except two small 6-pouuders turned in by Colonel Pendleton
aud re-issued to Captain Hamilton.
Of the remaining four, one is an iron 6-pounder, dismounted, and the other
three have been lent to Captain Cutts's company for drill.
I am, very respectfully yours,
E. P. Alexander, Capt. Eng., aud Chief Ord. and Arty.
Manassas, August 23d, 1861.
Dear General, — Longstreet had better look into this, and if there is such a
force unsupported, take possession of it, or drive it off.
I do not want to make a war of outposts, neither do I wish that ours should
be driven in just now. I had rather withdraw after driving back the enemy.
Yours truly, J. E. Johnston, Genl.
Genl. Beauregard, Comdg., etc. Manassas, Va., August 27th, 1861.
Capt., — I desire that you should call upon the Prest. with Major Gorgas,
to represent to him that I have but thirty-five pieces of light artillery for
thirty-five regiments of infantry, or one piece per regiment, whereas I think we
ought to have at least three per regiment. Should we not be able to have
additional light batteries, we must then supply their places with rocket bat
teries, for the purpose of frightening the untrained horses of the enemy. We
must also have an increase of cavalry, of which the enemy is very deficient. We
ought to have here about four thousand, or even five thousand, mounted men,
for the purpose of charging on McClellan's batteries and raw infantry, after our
rockets shall have put them in disorder. Colonels Preston, Miles, and Chestnut
may be able to help you. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard.
Capt. E. P. Alexander, care of Major J. Gorgas, Richmond, Va.
Duncan's House, August 31st, 1861.
Dear General, — *****».
I enclose a letter from Stuart, received this morning. My apprehension in re-

476 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI.
gard to this post, is the being drawn into a serious action in its defence. So
near them, and so far from our front, such a thing would be disadvantageous.
Wilcox goes to Winchester first to see if an adequate force can be raised, and
will write or send thenee to Evans. Yours truly, J. E. Johnston.
Genl. Beauregard.

Manassas, Va., Sept. 6th, 1861.
Dear General, — I have been reflecting much on our advanced positions since
my visit to them, aud I think, under the present circumstances, we can neither
give them up, nor allow them to be taken from us by a coup de main, or an
attack in force, for the effect on the morale of the enemy would be tremendous.
From what I saw the other day, our reserves at Fairfax Court-House, and Sta
tion (about eight miles back), are too far back to be able to come up in time to
tho assistance of those advanced positions; hence we must make up our minds,
I think, to advance them, for the present at any rate, in which case I would
propose the following arrangement and positions :
One brigade (Bonham's) to or about old Court-House, near Vienna.
Two brigades (D. R. Jones's and Cocke's) to or about Falls Church.
One brigade (Longstreet's) to Munson's Hill.
One brigade (of yours) to half-way (about) between Munson's and Mason's
hills. One brigade (of yours) to Mason's Hill.
Two brigades (Walker's and Early's) to or about Annandale.
One brigade (Ewell's) to Springfield.
Some of your other brigades might bo put at Centreville, Fairfax Court-
House aud Station, as a second reserve, which might occasionally be moved
towards the Potomac to keep the enemy constantly alarmed for the safety of
Washington, and to cross into Maryland should he send off a large force from
Washington to any point on the lower Potomac. If these suggestions are ac
cepted, I would then transfer my headquarters to Auuandale, otherwise to Fair
fax Court-House. Yours, very truly, G. T. Beauregard.
Genl. J. E. Johnston, Duncan's House, Manassas, Va.

 Duncan's House,
Manassas, Va., Sept 6th, 1861.
Dear General, — I cannot perceive the advantage of placing ourselves so near
the enemy's works as you propose (the lino of Munson's aud Mason's hills, etc.).
They seem to me too strong to be attacked by us with our present means.
We can rely upon sufficient supplies neither of ammunition, ordnance, nor
provisions. We should bring on a war of outposts and continual skirmishing, which would
gradually improve the United States troops, aud so diminish the difference now
existing in our favor.
Tho line of Fairfax Court-House seems to me sufficiently forward for our pur
poses and on it our troops are more easily supplied than on the other. Au
approach to Washington must be by crossing the Potomac above. For that we

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI. 477
want the men aud artillery I have asked for. That line, even, is too far from
Evansport, which we must be in position to assist.
I confess that I do not like the present arrangement in front, at Munson's
and Mason's hills. In authorizing their occupation I did not mean to have
such posts — posts of such magnitude — established, and now nothing but reluc
tance to withdraw — to go backward — prevents me from abandoning them.
Very truly yours, J. E. Johnston.
I desired Major Rhett to say to you, day before yesterday, that I propose to
move my headquarters forward. J. E. J.
Genl. Beauregard. 
Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Manassas, Sept. 71h, 1861.
Sir, — I have the honor to state that the efficiency of the Ordnance Depart
ment of this corps is at present much hindered from want of transportation for
ammunition. Iu our present situation this should not be allowed for an hour,
and yet my reserve ammunition has been ready, and only awaiting transporta
tion, for upwards of a week. I made requisition, about the 20th ultimo, for a
suitable train, but as yet only a fourth of it has been furnished. I have fur
nished the Acting Chief Quartermaster of this corps (just appointed) with a
statement of what is requisite, but at present the difficulty appears to be a lack
of authority on his part to purchase where supplies can be obtained.
Respectfully submitting the case for the action of the General, I have the
honor to be, Your obedient servant,
E. P. Alexander, Capt. Eng., Chief Old. and Arty.
To Col. Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl. 1st Corps.

Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Fairfax Court-House, Sept. 13th, 1861.
To His Excellency President Jefferson Davis, Richmond, Va. :
Dear Sir, — I have tho honor to enclose you, herewith, copy of information
just received from Washington, through a very good private channel, and
which, no doubt, contains a great deal of truth mixed up with some exaggera
tion. There is, however, little doubt but that the euemy is making Herculean
efforts to increase his forces iu infiiutry, artillery, and cavalry, for a last effort
iu or about these quarters, before the cold weather sets in. He probably has,
at present, on both sides of the Potomac, and about Washington, not far from
seventy thousand men, including a large number of field-guns ; but all in more
or less disorganized condition, and still under tho last impression of the battle
of Manassas.
On the 11th instant we had quite a brisk affair d'avant poste at Lewinsville,
between about three hundred men and two pieces of artillery on our part, and
on that of the enemy three regiments and eight pieces of artillery, which re
sulted in their complete rout, with tho known loss of about one dozen men
killed, wounded, and prisoners. " Nobody hurt " on our side, not even a horse !
But I suppose General Johnston will transmit to-day the official reports of the
affair, which does so much credit to Colonel Stuart, of the cavalry. He and

478 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI.
General Longstreet are two very promising officers. The latter will be ordered
to-day to advance with his brigade to Falls Church, aud General Ewell to An
nandale, so as to be ready to support, at a moment's notice, the forces at and
about Munson's and Mason's hills (the latter is called also Chestnut Hill). I
transferred, yesterday, my headquarters to this place, so as to be nearer the
scene of operations.
I am under the impression, from all I can learn, that the enemy, whenever
ready, will make a strong demonstration iu our front, and then endeavor to turn
this place, either by Dumfries, on the lower Potomac, or by Leesburg, on the
upper Potomac; in either case we ought to be prepared to strike him from
Camp Pickens as a centre, for which purpose we must have collected at that
point a large depot of provisions and ammunition. But, to insure success, the
Army of the Potomac ought to be under one head, with also one head to each of
the two corps of said army ; for the general-in-chief of such a large force has
too much to engross his time aud attention, to be able to discharge also the
important duties of chief of a corps oVarmie; and I take the liberty of presenting
this important subject to your serious and immediate consideration, as I believe
no time is to be lost in this matter. We still continue to have a great deal of
sickness among the troops, but less so than when they were all on the southern
side of Bull Run. I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard.
P. S. General McClellan is said, by the prisoners, to have been present at
Lewinsville. 
Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Fairfax Court-House, Sept. 23<i, 1861.
Special Orders, No. 353.
I. First Lieutenant Edmund H. Cummins, Second Lieutenant G. T. Cox, and
Private Walter Bowie, of the Beauregard Rifles, are hereby authorized to enlist
a company for the war, for service with a rocket battery, with the 1st Corps
Army of tho Potomac.
II. They are authorized to open recruitiug stations at Fredericksburg, Rich
mond, and Lynchburg, and the assistant quartermaster of this corps will fur
nish them with transportation to these points, aud also to themselves and re
cruits back to these headquarters.
III. The company will be mustered iuto service on the enrollment of not less
than fifty privates.
By command of Genl. Beauregard, Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XII. 479

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XII.
Fairfax Court-House, Oct. 8th, 1861.
Dear General, — Yours of the 6th has just been received. I regret I have not
time to write all I could say on the subject of the defences of New Orleans and
Louisiana. I will, however, give you the main points.
1st. Obstruct the navigation of the river up and doivn, particularly the latter,
by means of rafts properly constructed, and anchored under the guns of shore
batteries. Forts Jackson aud St. Philip are the proper ones below the city.
If you caunot construct such rafts as designed by Mr. John Roy and myself,
anchor in the stream several separate strong rafts, with openings large enough
for day navigation ; bo careful that tho enemy does not cut them loose at night,
hence they must be well guarded. Have hot-shot furnaces properly filled, etc.,
in all your water batteries.
2d. Look to the defences of Proctor's Landing, Tower Dupres, Battery Bien-
venu, Forts Macomb, Pike, and Livingston, and Berwick Bay. Their arma
ments, provisions, ammunition, etc., must be complete. Garrison, seven or ten
men to a gun.
3d. The land defences of the city must not be neglected ; they should be about
three miles from the suburbs of the city, on both sides of the river. I prefer
detached redans, closed at the gorge, with strong palisading, or redoubts, espe
cially when you have artillery for them, with here and there infantry, parapets
between them; othei-wise a cremaillere line, or something on the plan of Rayni-
art's " System," as given in Mahan's field fortifications. The great poinfs are
to be able to guard your lines with small forces, and not to be too far from your
reserve or reserves, which should occupy the most central positions to the points
threatened by the enemy.
My experience here teaches me that the weakest profiles will do — a command
of about eight feet above the natural ground is, I think, sufficient; the crest
ought to be four feet three inches abovo the tread of the banquette ; the latter
three feet wide and slope one upon two.
4th. Whenever you will ascertain positively that an expedition is about to
approach the coast of Louisiana, you ought to have felled into the many bayous
which lead from the Gulf Coast and Lake Borgne to the mainland, the trees
which grow along their banks, so as to impede their navigation, except such
as you may require for use yourself. Fishermen aud oystermen should then be
prohibited from going beyond half a mile of the shores, for fear of their being
captured and made to act as pilots, which was the case when the British at
tacked New Orleans in 1814-15. With regard to the persous who may be of
use to you, I will suggest the following names :
1. Messrs. I. Freret, Philip Guesnon, Norton, McClusky; Corns. Fellows,
Thomas B. Lee, W. C. C. Claiborne, Charles Denegre, and I. A. Deblano, who are
merchants of high positions and meaus, and know all about the environs and
resources of New Orleans.
2. Messrs. S. R. Proctor (my brother-in-law), parish of St. Bernard, Dr. J. B.

480 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII.
Wilkinson, and Charles J. ViHere" (another brother-in-law), parish of Plaque
mines, ditto for their parishes.
3. Mr. S. K. Wharton, Superintendent of the N. C. House, is very competent ;
J. M. Roy, assistant architect N. C. House, a practical mechanic, very superior
and full of resources ; J. H. Reid and son, and Henry Dart, for many years over
seers and superintendents of the forts already named by me, are very reliable as
military executive engineers ; William Baily, chief-engineer Os. Railroad ; these
gentlemen (of par. 3) can give you all the information you may require about
the localities they have worked at, and about the working men of New Orleans,
as well as the resources of the place.
Wishing you success, I remain, yours very truly,
G. T. Beauregard.
Maj.-Genl. Mansfield Lovell, Fairfax Court-House.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII.
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office,
Richmond, Oct. 22d, 1861.
General Orders, No. 15.
I. A department is established, to be known and designated as the Depart
ment of Northern Virginia. It will be composed of the three following dis
tricts, viz. : the Valley District, the Potomac District, and the Aquia District.
The Valley District will embrace the section of country between tho Blue Ridge
and the Allegheny Mountains ; the Potomac District between the Blue Ridge
Mountain aud the left bank of Powell River; and the Aquia District between
Powell River and the mouth of the Potomac, including the Northern Neck, and
embracing the counties on either side of the Rappahannock River from its
mouth to Fredericksburg. t
II. General J. E. Johnston is assigned to the command of the Department of
Northern Virginia ; General P. G. T. Beauregard to the command of the Potomac
Division ; Major-General T. H. Holmes to tho command of the Aquia District ;
and Major-General T. J. Jackson to the command of the Valley District.
III. The troops serving iu the Potomac District will be brigaded and formed
into divisions as follows :
First Division, under command of Major-General Van Dorn:
First Brigade, Brigadier-General Clark, to consist of four Mississippi regiments.
Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Whiting, to consist of five Mississippi reg
iments. Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Stuart, to consist of the cavalry of this dis
trict, to be united into one brigade.
Fourth, the Hampton Legion, under Colonel  .
Second Division, under command of Major-General G. W. Smith :
First Brigade, Brigadier-General Ewell, to consist of four Virginia regiments.
SecondBrigade, Brigadier-General S. Jones, to consist of four Virginia regiments.
Third Brigado, Brigadier-General Early, to consist of four Virginia regiments.
Fourth Brigade, Brigadier-General Crittenden, to consist of two Virginia reg
iments, two Tennessee regiments, and one Kentucky regiment.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII. 481
Fifth Brigade, Brigadier-General Cocke, to consist of four Virginia regiments.
Third Division, under command of Major-General Longstreet :
First Brigade, Brigadier-General D. R. Jones, to consist of four South Carolina
regiments. Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Bonham, to consist of four South Carolina
regiments. Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Wilcox, to consist of four Alabama regiments.
Fourth Brigade, Brigadier-General Rodes, to consist of four Alabama regimeuts.
Fifth Brigade, Brigadier-General Taylor, to consist of five Louisiana regiments.
Fourth Division, under command of Major-General E. K. Smith :
First Brigade, Brigadier-General Walker, to consist of four Georgia regiments.
Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Toombs, to consist of fourGeorgia regiments.
Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Elzey, to consist of three Georgia regiments
and one Maryland.
Fourth Brigade, Brigadier-General Evans, to consist of five North Carolina
regiments. Fifth Brigade, Brigadier-General Wigfall, to consist of three Texas regiments
aud one Louisiana regiment.
The particular regiments for these several brigades will be designated by the
commanding general of the Department of Northern Virginia, in conformity to
this programme, according to States.
The arrangement will be gradually carried into effect, as soon as, in the judg
ment of the commanding general, it can be safely done under present exigencies.
By command of the Secretary of War. S. Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl.
Official. Thomas Jordan, A. A.-Genl.

Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
near Centreville, Nov. 28th, 1861.
General Orders, No. 75.
A new banner is intrusted to-day, as a battle-flag, to the safe keeping of the
Army of the Potomac. Soldiers : Your mothers, your wives, and your sisters have
made it. Consecrated by their hands, it must lead you to substantial victory,
and the complete triumph of our cause. It can never be surrendered, save to
your unspeakable dishonor, and with consequences fraught with immeasurable
evil. Under its untarnished folds beat back the invader, and find nationality,
everlasting immunity from au atrocious despotism, and honor and renown for
yourselves — or death.
By command of General Beauregard. Thomas Jordan, A. A.-Geul,

Naval Rendezvous, Boston Navy Yard,
Jan. 3d, 1872.
Genl. Beauregard :
Dear Sir, — In a letter recently received from my friend, Edward C. Auderson,
Esq., of Savannah, whom, doubtless, you know, he says : " At the first battle of
I.— 31

482 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII.
Manassas, the regimental colors resembled each other so closely that each party
accused the other of displaying its colors. On that account, an attempt was
made by General Joseph E. Johnston to substitute State colors for those of the
Confederacy ; but not being able to obtain them, except for Virginia regiments,
designs were called for. Most of these were designs by Louisianians, and were
presented by General Beauregard. That selected had a red ground with a blue
diagonal cross."
Will you do me the favor to inform me who was the designer of the well-
known battle-flag of the Confederacy thus introduced by you, and as much as
may be convenient concerning it, and the other designs referred to ? I am also
very desirous of ascertaining the exact devices of the flag hoisted on the City
Hall at New Orleans — the flag of Louisiana, when Farragut appeared'before the
city, in April, 1862. My impression of it is that it had a blue Union blazoned
with a single white star, and that its field was striped horizontally white, red,
blue ; but I do not recollect the number of the stripes or tho order of their
arrangement. The enclosed prospectus will show you why I make these inquiries. I pro
pose giving, as you see, some account of the flags of the Confederacy, aud shall
illustrate the account with a page giving a colored representation of eighteen
varieties of flags. I wish to obtaiu, for that purpose, a correct drawing of the
State flag of Louisiaua.
Excuse my trespassing upou yon in this matter, and I am
Yours, respectfully, George Henry Preble, Capt. U. S. Navy.

Manassas, Sept. 5th, 1861.
Dear General, — Colonel Miles informs me that tho flag committee voted down
any change of our flag by a vote of four to one, he being alone in favor of it. I
wrote to him then to propose that we should have two flags — a peace or parade
flag, and a Avar flag, to be used only on the field of battle — but Congress having
adjourned, no action will bo taken iu the matter. How would it do for us to
address the War Department on tho subject for a supply of regimental, war, or
badge flags, made of red with two blue bars crossing each other diagonally, on
which shall be introduced the stars — tho edge of the flag to be trimmed all
around with white, yellow, or gold fringe ? We would then, on tho field of bat
tle, know our friends from our enemies.
I send you, herewith, a letter written yesterday to General Cooper. It would
seem that the small-minded politicians and newsmongers about Richmond can
not understand that we should be able to get along harmoniously together. To
prevent any evil consequences resulting therefrom, I thought it better to write
said letter to Cooper. Yours truly, G. T. Beauregard.
Genl. J. E. Johnston, Centreville, Va.
P. S. — Perhaps the rumor is due to my having sent my ordnance officer to Rich
mond to hurry up all the artillery and war rocket-batteries he could possibly get.
Let us each get all that we can, of both, aud then we will see about equaliziug

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII. 483
them to onr forces — the latter cau be done so likewise, if you desire it, when
reinforcements shall have stopped coming up. G. T. B.

Manassas, Va., Sept. 4 h, 1861.
Dear Colonel, — Your favor of the 2d instant was received last night. I am
glad to hear of the probable success of my artillery raid. I hope the rockets
(war) will also be forthcoming. I place much reliance upon thorn, for the pur
pose of running off the field McClellan's bipeds and quadrupeds.
I regret to hear of the failure about the change of flag; but what can now be
done is, to authorize commanding generals in the field to furnish their troops
with a " field, or battle-flag," which shall be according to your design, leaving out,
however, the white border, or rim, separating the blue from the red. I would
have it simply a red ground with two blue bars crossing each other diagonally,
on which shall be the white stars ; a white or golden fringe might go all around
tho sides of the flag ; we would then have two flags — a peace, or parade, flag,
and a war flag. This would obviate all difficulties.
I will be most happy to see here your committee. I hope no dissensions be
tween " the powers that be " will result from the action of said committee ; for
what we require most is the harmonious action of every department of our gov
ernment. We have no time now for quarrels and bickerings ; but there is no
doubt it would be a national good if one or two individuals of our acquaint
ance could be sent " ou a foreign mission," somewhere about the Celestial Em
pire or to Japan. I send you, herewith, a letter to General Cooper, which I
wish you to read and then send to him. I have thought it was best to stop the
thing referred to thoroin, at once. Read it, also, to Colonels Chestnut and
Preston. Yours truly, G. T. Beauregard.
Col. W. Porcher Miles, Member of Congress, Richmond, Va.

Saturday, Jan. 13th, 1872.
Dear General, — Apologizing for not having communicated with you on the
subject of your note of yesterday, I have to say that I presented several designs
(colored, on pasteboard) which were prepared prior to my leaving New Orleans,
with my command, in May, 1861.
The battle-flag which was adopted, as I remember, was a square flag with the
bar of blue running diagonally from the corners, making a Greek cross of blue,
with stars white on a red field. I do not recollect if there was any discussion
involving the question of the character of the cross. Tho flag was adopted as
the best to be recognized in battle, to distinguish our troops in action.
The time that has elapsed since we were at Fairfax, where these interesting
occurrences took place, will excuse the absence of any precise, or even authori
tative, statement. My memory is not as certain as I would desire.
I am, General, very truly yours, J. B. Walton.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard.

484 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII.
Frankfort, Ky., Jan. 15th, 1872.
My dear General, — Your kind note of the 11th instant, enclosing copy of letter
to Captain Preble, in reference to Confederate " battle-flag," is received. I con
cur with you in regard to your recollections of the circumstances connected
with its adoption, and have so endorsed upou the letter.
Caramba ! what recollection the sight of your handwriting and reference to
" Fairfax Court-House," " battle-flags," etc., brings swarming iu my mind. But
" What is done, is done," and can't be undone. My wife joins me in kind re
gards to yourself and family. As ever, very truly, your friend,
Gustavus W. Smith.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, New Orleans, La.

Savannah, Jan. 16th, 1872.
My dear General, — Your letter of the 11th is received, aud, as you request, I
write my "recollections" of the origin of the "battle-flag."
It was generally believed by those with whom I was in the habit of convers
ing, just after the battle of Manassas, that some of the Federal regiments bore
Confederate colors in the action, aud Northern papers contained similar accusa
tions against us. This led to observation of the difficulty of distinguishing
the colors of the armies from each other. Ou that account I attempted to
procure, from the different Southern States, State flags for their regiments.
Only the Virginia regiments were supplied in this way, however, when, you and
other leading officers concurring as to the necessity, I determined to have colors
made by the Quartermaster's Department. Many desigus, drawn by members
of the army, were offered — most by you. All of them were oblong. I selected
one of those you offered, but changed the shape to square, and fixed the size :
colors of infantry to be four feet, of artillery three, aud staudards to be two and
a half. They were then made by the Quartermaster's Departmeut as soou as
practicable. I had no conference or correspondence with the War Department or civilians
on the subject. My recollection is that it was an army affair, and, when ques
tioned on the subject, I have always said so. I was not a party to your consulta
tion with Colonel Miles, but heard long after, indirectly, from him, that he had
corresponded with you in relation to a new design for colors.
I have no particular confidence in my memory, but this subject has been so
often talked of iu my presence, both during and since the war, that I believe
that I am not far wrong in my recollection of my own agency in this matter,
such conversations having prevented me from forgetting circumstances not im
portant enough to be thought of otherwise.
There is no doubt that in this generation Southern troops will fight better
under that than any other flag, as you say. Yours truly, J. E. Johnston.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard.  Frankfort, Ky., Jan. 19lh, 1872.
My dear Genera/,— Yours of the 13th iustaut reached me yesterday. I en
closed and sent the copy of letter to Captain Preble back to you on the 15th. I

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII, 485
concur in the amendments about the Latin and Greek crosses, and general
recollection about Colonel Walton's proposed flag, aud accept your amendments
of the 13th.
With kind regards for you and yours, from Mrs. S. and myself, I remain as
ever, Very truly, your friend, Gustavus W. Smith.

99 Nassau Street, New York City, March 21st, 1881.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, New Orleans, La. :
Dear General, — In reply to your inquiry, I have to say, my recollection of the
circumstances leading to the adoption of the Confederate battle-flag is, that you
took the initiative in this matter, and directed the preparation of the various
drawings, etc., which were submitted to General Johnston. The design which
you preferred was approved by him, modified at his suggestion, by making the
flag square in form instead of rectangular, as originally drawn. Iu this shape
it was acceptable to all who were consulted on the subject.
Yours truly, Gustavus W. Smith.

New Orleans, La., Jan. ¦ — 1872.
Dear Sir, — In answer to the inquiries contained in your letter of the 3d instant,
relative to the origin of the Confederate battle-flag, and the devices of the
Louisiana State flag, flyiug on the City Hall of New Orleans when Commodore
Farragut appeared before this city in April, 1862, I give you, with pleasure, the
following information.
At the battle of Manassas, on the 21st of July, 1861, 1 found it difficult to dis
tinguish our then. Confederate flag from the United States flag, especially when
General Early made the flank movement which decided the fate of the day, and
I determined at that time to have adopted a "battle-flag" which would be en
tirely different from any State or Federal flags. I submitted my views ou the
subject to General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding, who approved of them,
and to the Confederate States War Department, who made at first some objec
tions to them, but finally oousented. I then designed a diagonal red cross with
white stars on a blue field, but, on consultation with General Johnston and
Colonel W. Porcher Miles, Chairman of the House Military Committee, the latter
gentleman suggested a red ground, with a blue cross, and the former a square
flag, instead of the slightly oblong one devised by me ; these suggestions were
adopted, after colored drawings of the two flags had been made and discussed,
as well as a nearly corresponding oue from Colonel J. B. Walton of the Louisiana
Washington Artillery. It had the merit of being small and light, and of being
very distinct at great distances. Should we ever be compelled to have a for
eign war, I trust that it will be adopted as our national battle-flag, to which
Southern soldiers will always gladly rally iu a just cause.
The State flag referred to by you contained thirteen stripes, four blue, six
white, and three red, commencing at top with the colors as written. The union

486 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII..
was red, with its sides equal to the width of seven stripes; in its centre was a
single pale-yellow star with five points. I remain, yours very truly,
G. T. Beauregard.
Capt. George Henry Preble, U. S. Navy,
Naval Rendezvous, Boston Navy Yard, Mass.

Frankfort, Ky., Jan. 15th, 1872.
I was serving with the Confederate army, in front of Manassas Junction, when
the Confederate "battle-flag" was adopted, and took part in the discussions iu
regard to it.
My recollections on the subject fully coincide with those expressed within
by General Beauregard. Gustavus W. Smith.

New York, Jan. 28th, 1872.
My dear General, — Your missing note of the 11th instant has come to hand
at last, with the copy of your note to Captain Preble, and, although I have
already substantially answered it in my own note of the other day, I will state
now that I distiuctly recollect that the origin of our battle-flag was due to the
trouble which arose, as yon say, at the battle of Manassas, in consequence of
the similarity between the Confederate and Federal flags, on that occasion.
I remember that you at once set to work to find a guard against a similar
accident, and made the first suggestion which I heard upon the subject.
I recollect also that there was a good deal of discussion touching the form
and precise style of the flag, and that it was finally settled to adopt the small
square flag with the Greek cross.
You will doubtless recollect the ceremony of presentation of these flags, first to
Longstreet's division, and afterwards to Van Doru's division, at Fairfax Court-
House, and the General Order that I read to the troops on both occasions.
It is strange how soon the details of such affairs become vague aud unsettled
in the memory of men. This should serve to show how uncertain the details
of history must be.
You may recollect that at Shiloh we had three battle-flags. That of Bragg's
corps was like the Virginia one — the model of which you furnished. Polk's
corps differed iu some way, although suggested by it ; or desigued to be, perhaps,
precisely alike, but differing by accident ; and tho one of Hardee's corps, which
was ofa blue ground with a central white medallion — one that the corps had
brought from Kentucky.
The whole idea of these battle-flags, however, came from tho battle of Ma
nassas, and was raised by you to obviate a repetition of the difficulty experienced
then. I recollect myself that, after the battle was over, and I had ridden iu
advance, I saw a flag with a regiment well in advance of me, that I was for the
time confident must be the Federal flag, and which I could not believe could be
ours from its appearance, even when very close to it. It was only the appear
ance of the men that gave me confidence to approach.
How much of the history of the most curious details of that war will go un
written 1

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII. 437
I see Early, in a recent lecture or address, gives Longstreet a slap about slow
ness and unreadiness, and lack of prompt obedience at Gettysburg, and attrib
utes disaster there to him. But the fact is, the disaster was almost inevitable
from the character of the campaigu, although, doubtless, all that Early says is
true. The campaigu was one that ought never to have been made.
But will it ever be said in history, that Polk's, and even Bragg's, tardiness
in quitting Corinth, aud their slowness on the next day, kept us from reaching
Shiloh in time to fight Saturday ? I presume I have approached as close to the
allegation as will ever be done, in my chapter on the battle, in the work on
Forrest's campaigns.
Were justice done Bragg he would figure very badly in several particulars,
including gross duplicity and bad faith, both to Johnston and yourself. Proof
of this is in a valuable book called " Diary of a Clerk of the War Department "
(Confederate), of which I wrote you once, aud which you ought to have if you
do not have it.
The Federal side of the history is having all its own way ; and it will be
more and more so, year by year, until our great struggle will almost sink into
oblivion, or leave little more trace behind than that of a pebble cast into a
deep lake. Yours very truly, Thomas Jordan.

Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
near Centreville, Dec. 18th, 1861.
General, — It is the wish of the general commanding this corps to inaugurate
a system by which leaves of absence 6hall bo given to persons whose families or
affairs actually need their early presence at home. For the present he has de
termined to grant leaves, to begin after Christmas, to the extent of two captaius
aud five lieutenants from a regiment, and say at the rate often men — non-com
missioned officers aud privates — from a company of average size. But he is anx
ious that these leaves should at first be extended to those in each regiment to
whom it will be of the most essential and manifest service. Therefore, I am
instructed to say, he desires these leaves to be determined by the recommenda
tion of the colonels or commanders of the regimeuts, after an examination of
pressing applications within the limits just prescribed. Not to exceed thirty
days will be granted at present.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. A.-Genl.

Summers House, Jan. 16th, 1862.
Dear General, — My horse is so smooth shod, and it is so slippery, that I am
afraid of him — fearful ofa fall, as he was near falling with me to-day.
I send over the paper, however, enclosed in the very envelope in which it came
to this office. I saw General Johnston, and explained to him the design aud
effect of the publication of the order — he seeming quite satisfied.
I was sorry to see Hill's note. The river will close soon under such cold as
this afternoon.

488 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII.
General Cooper will not inspect. I asked him to inspect the books- and pa
pers, but he said he would not have time. I had a long talk with him on gen
eral subjects. He was surprised to find that but one copy of the Order No. 1
had been received. There is an Order No. 2 out, he says, about sending persons
to recruit up the companies.
Hoping that you are better to-day, I will ride over in the morning for your
Orders. Thanks for the socks. Yours truly,
Thomas Jordan.
P. S. The endorsement does not order promulgation of Orders No. 1. It directs
you, by name, to act in accordance with that order in case of Captain Fowler,
whose company had re-enlisted.

Summers House, Jan. 17th, 1862.
Dear General, — Under cover to you came this morning packages addressed to
all the colonels of the Army of the Potomac, of both corps aud the reserve, and
which packages were severally addressed care of " General Beauregard." Now
these packages I know to contain the orders about re-enlistments and recruit
ment. I found in the package a number of loose copies of both orders — copies
of which I enclose for your files.
This is another marked instance of the determination at Richmond to hold you
as the commander of the A. P.
I think no copies of these orders have come either for General Johnston or
Smith G. W. and Kirby. It might bo well for me to enclose to General John
ston (unofficially) the two orders, and state the circumstances of the receipt of
these packages ; or, you could do it.
I send you a paper for Geueral Hill. I also send a package of envelopes
which I had ready done up to seud you, when your message was delivered.
The pencils were sent at request of Colonel Chisolm.
Yours truly, Thomas Jordan.

Summers House, Dec. 27th, 1861.
Dear General,— It is so bitter cold in the wind, to-night, that I shall not go
over. I would have gone over this morning, to consult your wishes as to some office
matters; but, just as I was about to leave, I was informed you were not at
home. I submit to your consideration the rough note of a letter to General Johnston,
on a subject really of importance. The War Department persisteutly ignore
the existence of corps commands, and address you as Commander of the "Poto
mac District." General Johnston does not give you the district command, and
you cannot assume it ; but he never, in orders, gave you the corps command.
You took the designation yourself. In view of the action, and repeatedly ex
pressed wishes, of the War Department, I submit that you should drop the des
ignation of Headquarters 1st Corps, and inform General Johnston of the fact. It

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV. 489
is best for all. I sincerely believe that this should be done, otherwise some dif
ficulty will grow out of it, though, as yet, the speck is not as "large as one's
hand." Yours truly, Thomas Jordan.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV.
Richmond, Jan. 20ih, 1862.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
In my opinion you ought not to go to the Mississippi. I will explain to you
when we meet. Your friend, R. Toombs, Brig.-Genl.

Centreville, Jan. 21st, 1862.
about 12 h. m.
Answer. Very well ; please explain as soon as possible. I am anxious to do for the
best. G. T. Beauregard.
Genl. R. Toombs. '  Richmond, Jan. 20lh, 1862.
Capt. E. P. Alexander :
Urge General Beauregard to decline all proposals and solicitations.
 William F. Alexander.
Private and confidential. Richmond, Va., Jan. 23d, 1862.
Dear General, — ******
My reasons for venturing to send you the telegram I did were few, but very
decided. Iu the first place, I think the line of the Potomac is by far the most
important in the contest. It is at that point, by strong and energetic move
ments, we will be compelled to disentangle ourselves from our present difficul
ties. I consider your presence there as of the highest possible importance to
the success of those movements. And I think it will be much easier for you to
get away from there than for the country to get you back there. Therefore
you ought to stand firmly by it. You will not be ordered away ; but, once away,
you would not, in my opinion, be ordered back.
# # *****
I am, very truly yours, etc., R. Toombs.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard.  Richmond, Jan. 24th, 1862.
Genl. Beauregard :
Don't think Toombs's objections valid. Your letter not received. May I tell
President you will go ? Say go. Roger A. Pryor.
[Answered on the 25th at 11 a. m., as follows :]
Yes, I will go. May God protect our cause ! G. T. Beauregard.
Col. Roger A. Pryor,

490 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV.
Headquarters near Centreville,
Jan. 23d, 1862.
My dear Colonel, — I need not assure you that I am deeply gratified by the
mark of consideration conferred by the gentlemen of Congress in tho request of
which you have been the agreeable bearer; a request made, as you advise me,
with the sanction of his Excellency the President, who has been pleased to ex
press the desire that my own wishes should be consulted before any assignment
to command should be made which shall separate me from the Army of the
Potomac. I am a soldier of the cause and of my couutry, ready, at this juncture and dur
ing this war, to do duty cheerfully wheresoever placed by the constituted au
thorities; but I must admit that I would be most reluctant to disassociate my
fortunes from those of this army, and unwilling to be permanently separated
from men to whose strong personal attachment for and confidence in me I shall
not affect blindness. In view, however, of the season, and of the had condition
of the country for military operations, I should be happy to be used elsewhere,
if my services are considered at all necessary for the public good, whether on
the Mississippi or at any other threatened point of the Confederate States.
But, should it be determined to employ me at Columbus, as you have given
me to understand is the wish of the President and Congress, I hope it will be
regarded as entirely within my province to be anxiously heedful of the means
of men and material to be placed at my disposition. In this connection I should
be particularly anxious to secure all possible assistance, and should desire to
take with me certain officers of my command, not indispensable to this army,
in addition to my present general and personal staff, to aid me iu the organiza
tion of the forces which may he intrusted to me. But, even with their assist
ance, time may be required to attain that degree of organization and discipline
so essential to military success. I repeat, however, that I am entirely at the
service of the country. Yours very truly, G. T. Beauregard.
P. S. Should I he ordered to the Mississippi Valley, it would be advisable, I
think, to request the newspapers not to publish it at present, for obvious
reasons. G. T. B.
To Col. Roger A. Pryor, Richmond, Virginia.

Petersburg, August 15th, 1864.
General, — Iu answer to your note of yesterday, I have the honor to submit
the following statement :
Some time in the winter of 1862, it was represented, at a meeting of the Mili
tary Committee of the Provisional Cougress, that the aspect of affairs in Ken
tucky and Tennessee was discouraging to our cause, and that your presence in
that quarter was extremely desirable, as well by reason of the confidence with
which the circumstance would inspire the public, as the efficiency which it
would probably impart to the operations of our forces on that theatre. Yield
ing to these suggestions, the committee unanimously agreed that an effort
should bo made to procure your transfer to the Army of the West. To that

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV. 491
end, I was directed to consult the President on the propriety of the measure,
and, in case he should approve it, I was requested to solicit your own acqui
escence in the transfer.
The President having avowed his readiness to order you West, on the condi
tion that you were not averse to the chauge, I went to Centreville to obtain
your consent. I remember you evinced the greatest reluctance to bo detached
from the Army of tho Potomac, but, yielding at last to my earnest importunities,
urged with an exclusive reference to the public interest, and supported by the
written entreaties and arguments of representatives from the States chiefly
concerned, you were pleased to give a qualified assent to the proposed transfer.
What your conditions Were, I find it impossible, after so long a lapse of time,
to recollect with sufficient particularity to affirm with an absolute assurance
of correctness. My impression, however, is that they were such as yon repre
sent. Whatever they were, I understood the Honorable Secretary of War to
agree to them, aud I telegraphed you accordingly. In reply you asked for
orders. As well as I am able to recollect the details of an affair so long past, and
which, until the present moment, I have had no occasion to recall, this, General,
is a correct statement of the circumstances of your transfer from the Army of
the Potomac to the Army of West Tennessee and Kentucky.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Roger A. Pryor,
Genl. G. T. Beauregard.  Centreville, Va., Jan. 25th, 1862.
Dear General, — Yours just received ; I will be on baud as directed.
I have received a telegram from Pryor which says I must go temporarily to
Columbus. Much fear is entertained of the Mississippi Valley. I have author
ized him to say Yes. I will bo back here as soon as possible.
I will not leave until you are back. Yours, etc., G. T. Beauregard.
Genl. J. E. Johnston.

Confederate States of America, War Dep.artment,
Richmond, 26th Jan., 1862.
Sir, — Colonel Pryor has reported to the President, as the result of his inter
view with you, that you would cheerfully accept the command of the defences
at Columbus, Ky., and that your absence from the Army of the Potomac, at the
present time, would not seriously impair its efficiency.
He, therefore, desires that you proceed at once to report to General A. S.
Johnston at Bowling Green, Ky., and thence proceed, as promptly as possible, to
assume your new command at Columbus, which is threatened by a powerful
force, and the successful defence of which is of vital importance.
You are authorized to take with you your present staff, or such members of it
as you wish to accompany you. I am, your obedieut servant,
J. P. Benjamin, Sec. of War.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, Manassas.

492 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV.
Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac, ¦
Centreville, Va., Jan. 29th, 1862.
gir — i have this day received the War Department letter of the 26th instant,
ordering me to assume " command of the defences " at Columbus, Ky. I will
leave here, as soon as practicable, via Nashville and Bowling Green.
I remain sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
Hou. J. P. Benjamin, Sec. of War, Richmond, Va.

Centreville, Jan. 29th, 1862.
My dear General, — I have just received the enclosed letter, much to my regret.
I have been hoping that the views of the War Department might be changed.
Your transfer from this army is a great loss to it — a very great loss to me.
The troops you have formed regard you as their general, and my confidence iu
you makes me feel weakened by our separation. You will take with you my
best wishes. The best is that you may have fair opportunities ; you know how
tc use them. Very truly yours, J. E. Johnston.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters 1st Corps Army of the Potomac,
Near Centreville, Jan. 29th, 1862.
General, — In addition to my staff, it is essential I should be allowed Major
G. W. Breut, 17th regiment Virginia Volunteers, in Inspector-General's Depart
ment. Captain S. W. Presstman, 17th Virginia, Captain J. M. Wampler, 8th
Virginia, as Topographical and Military Engineers, under the recent Act of
Congress. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
Samuel Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl., Richmoud.

Centreville, Va., Jan. 30th, 1862.
Sir, — I have the honor to report that I shall hurry through to Bowling Green
to report to General A. S. Johuston.
As it will be my object to have my command thoroughly organized as soon
after my arrival at Columbus as possible, I hope I shall be excused for suggest
ing to the War Department the following organization of the forces there, if
not already made, to wit :
Brigades of four regiments, divisions of three brigades, with a light battery,
at least, for each brigade.
Should officers of the proper rank and capacity be wanting, in part, for this
organization, my anxiety for securiug the efficiency of my command, to be
handled in a field unknown to me, must be my excuse, further, for respectfully
recommending the following as officers whose services I would be glad to have, in
case additional general officers are needed there, namely : Lieutenaut-Colouel W.
W. Mackall, Adjutant and Inspector General's Department, to command a divis-

APPENDIX .TO CHAPTER XV. 493
ion ; Colonels Charles Winder, 6th South Carolina Volunteers, A. P. Hill, 13th
regiment Virginia Volunteers, Samuel Garland, 11th Virginia, John Pegram
(late 2d Dragoons), and George H. Stewart, 1st Maryland, as brigade com
manders, in the order mentioned, as they may be required.
It is proper for me to say, that personally I am but slightly acquainted with
these officers, aud have been induced to present their names from the confidence
they havo inspired, as soldiers, iu those who know them well.
A certain number of engineer, or acting engineer, officers are also absolutely
essential for the efficient defence of such a position as Columbus, as well as for
any offensive operations from that point. I shall take Captain D. B. Harris,
Engineer Virginia forces, with me, but hope, in addition, I may be allowed the
assistance of Captain J. M. Wampler, 8th, and S. W. Presstman, 17th, Virginia
regiments, and of Captain  Frenieaux, 8th regiment Louisiana Volunteers,
to be appointed as officers in the Provisional Engiueer Corps.
I am further desirous of having the assistance of Major G. W. Brent, 17th
regiment Virginia Voluuteers, to act as an Assistant Inspector-General to Lieu
tenant-Colonel Polignac, whose health is delicate. Major Brent has shown
capacity for the important duties of the place, and has had experience that
would make him valuable to me.
A proper signal officer will be indispensable. The best I cau do is to recom
mend, for appointment, ex-Lieutenant Cummins, Maryland Volunteers, now in
Richmond, warmly recommended by Captain E. P. Alexander, Engineers, who
has trained him for the duties.
I trust competent ordnance and subsistence officers will be found already in
place, as I have none to suggest ; aud it is needless for me to say how impor
tant that such duties shall be efficiently discharged.
Colonel Jordan, my Adjutant-General, will give in person, to the War De
partment, any additional information that may be required iu connection with au
army of Volunteers in the field, based on nine months' experience with this army.
I have the honor to request that written instructions, for my guidance, may
be sent mo through Colonel Jordan, who will join me at Columbus without
delay. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Samuel Cooper, Genl. and Adj. and Insp. Genl., Richmond.

Headquarters Department Northern Virginia,
Jan. 30th, 1862.
General Orders, No. 17.
In obedience to orders received from the Secretary of War, assigning him to
an important position in another department, General Beauregard is relieved
from the duties of his present command.
In losing the aid of this distinguished soldier, the commanding general cau-
not withhold the expression of his sense of the eminent services by which he
has achieved so much for our country, our cause, and the renown of our arms.
By command of General Johnston. A. P. Mason, A. A. A.-Genl.

494 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV.
Feb. 12th, 1862.
Col. W. W. Mackall, A. A.-Genl. C. S. A., Bowling Green :
Sir, — My communication of the 7th instant, sent from Fort Henry, having an
nounced the fact of the surrender of that fort to Commodore Foote, of the Fed
eral navy, on the 6th iust., I have now the honor to submit the following report
of the details of tho action, together with the accompanying papers, marked
A, B, containing list of officers and men surrendered, together with casual
ties, etc. # * * * * * #
The wretched military position of Fort Henry, and the small force at my dis-i
posal, did not permit me to avail myself of the advantages to be derived from
the system of outworks, built with the hope of being reinforced in time, and
compelled me to determine to concentrate my efforts, by laud, within the rifle-
pits surrounding the 10th Tennessee and 4th Mississippi regiments, in case I
deemed it possible to do more than to operate solely against the attack by the
river. Accordingly, my entire command was paraded and placed in the rifle-
pits around the above camps, and minute instructions given, not only to bri
gades, but to regiments and companies, as to the exact ground each was to oc
cupy. Seconded by the able assistance of Major Gilmer, of the Engineers, of
whose valuable services I thus early take pleasure in speaking, and by Colonels
Heiman and Drake, everything was arranged to make a formidable resistance
against anything like fair odds. It was known to me, ou the day before, that
the enemy had reconnoitred the roads leading to Fort Donelson, from Bailey's
Ferry, by way of Iron Mountain Furnace ; and at 10 o'clock a. m., on the 5th, I
seut forward, from Fort Henry, a strong reconnoitring party of cavalry. They
had not advanced more than one and a half miles in the direction of the enemy,
when they encountered their reconnoitring party. Our cavalry charged them
in gallaut style, upon which the enemy's cavalry fell back, with a loss of only
one man on each side.
Very soon the main body of the Federal advance guard, composed of a rogi-
ment of iufantry and a large forco of cavalry, was met, upon which our cavalry
retreated. Ou receipt of this news I moved out in person, with five companies
of the 10th Tennessee, five companies of the 4th Mississippi, aud fifty cavalry,
ordering, at the same time, two additional companies of infantry to support Cap
tain Red at the outworks. Upon advancing well to the front I found that the
enemy had retired. I returned to camp at 5 p. m., leaving Captain Red rein
forced at the outworks. The enemy wore again reinforced by the arrival of a
large number of transports. At night the pickets from the west bank reported
the landing of troops ou that side, opposite Bailey's Ferry, their advance pick
ets having been met one aud a half miles from the river.
*******
To understand properly the difficulties of my position, it is right that I should
explain fully the unfortunate location of Fort Henry, iu reference to resistance
by a small force against au attack by land co-operating with the gunboats, as
well as its disadvantages in eveu an engagement with boats alone. The entire
fort, together with the intrenched camp spoken of, is enfiladed from three or

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV. 495
four points on the opposite shore, while three points on the eastern hank com
pletely command them both — all at easy camion range. At the same time the
intrenched camp, arranged as it was in the best possible manner to meet the
case, was two thirds of it completely under the control of the fire of the gun
boats. The history of military engineering records has no parallel to this case.
Points within a few miles of it, possessing great advantages and few disadvan
tages, were totally neglected ; aud a location fixed upon, without one redeeming
feature, or filling one of the mauy requirements of a site for a work such as Fort
Henry. The work itself was well built ; it was completed long before I took
command, but strengthened greatly by myself in building embrasures aud epaul-
ments of sand-hags. An enemy had but to use their most common sense in ob
taining the advantage of high water, as was the case, to have complete and en
tire control of the position. I am guilty of no act of injustice in this frank
avowal of the opinions entertained by myself, as well as by all other officers who
have become familiar with the location of Fort Henry. Nor do I desiro the de
fects of location to have an undue influence in directing public opinion in rela
tion to the battle of the 6th instant. The fort was built when I took charge,
and I had no time to build anew.
*******
The case stood thus : I had, at my command, a grand total of two thousand
six hundred aud ten men, only one third of whom had been at all disciplined or
woll armed. The high water in the river, filling the sloughs, gave me but one
route ou which to retire, if necessary ; and that route, for some distance, in direc
tion at right angles to the line of approach of the enemy, and over roads well-nigh
impassable for artillery, cavalry, or infantry. The enemy had seven gunboats,
with an armament of fifty-four guns, to engage the eleven guns at Fort Henry.
*******
I argued thus : Fort Donelson might possibly be held, if properly reinforced,
even though Fort Henry should fall ; but the reverse of this proposition was not
true. The force at Fort Henry was necessary to aid Fort Donelson, either iu
making a successful defence, or in holding it long enough to answer the pur
poses of a new disposition of the entire army from Bowling Greeu to Columbus,
which would necessarily follow the breaking of our centre, resting on Forts
Donelson and Henry. The latter alternative was all that I deemed possible.
I knew that reinforcements were difficult to be had; and that, unless sent in
such force as to make the defence certain, which I did not believe practicable,
the fate of our right wing at Bowling Green depended upon a concentration of
my entire division on Fort Donelsou, aud the holding of that place as long as
possible ; trusting that the delay, by an action at Fort Henry, would give time
for such reinforcement as might reasonably be expected to reach a point suffi
ciently near Donelson to co-operate with my division by getting to the rear and
rio-ht flank of the enemy, and in such a position as to control the roads over
which a safe retreat might be effected. I hesitated not a moment. My infan
try, artillery, and cavalry, removed, of necessity, to avoid the fire of the gunboats,
to the outworks, could not meet the enemy there. My only chance was to de
lay the enemy every moment possible, and retire the command, now outside the

496 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV.
main work, towards Fort Donelson, resolving to suffer as little loss as possible.
I retained only the heavy artillery company to fight the guns, and gave the or
der to commence the movement at ouce. At 10J o'clock Lieutenant MoGavock
sent a messenger to me, stating that our pickets reported General Grant ap
proaching rapidly, and within half a mile of the advance work ; aud movements
on the west bank indicated that General Smith was fast approaching also.
*******
At 11.45 a.m. the enemy opened from their gunboats ou tho fort. I waited a
few moments, until the effects of the first shots of the enemy were fully appre
ciated. I tfesn gave the order to return the fire, which was gallantly responded
to by the brave little band under my command. The enemy, with great delib
eration, steadily closed upon the fort, firing very wild until within twelve hun
dred yards. The cool deliberation of our men told from the first shot, fired with
tremendous effect. At twenty-five minutes of 1 o'clock P. m. tho bursting of
our 24-pounder rifled gun disabled every man at the piece.
This great loss was, to us, in a degree, made up by our disabling entirely the
Essex gunboat, which immediately floated down stream. Immediately after
the loss of this valuable gun we sustained another loss still greater, in the
closing up of the vent of 10-inch Columbiad, rendering that gun perfectly use
less, and defying all efforts to reopen it.
* * ***** *
It was now plain to be seen that the euemy were breaching the fort directly
in front of our guns, and that I could not much longer sustain their fire without
an unjustifiable exposure of the valuable lives of the men who had so nobly
seconded me in the unequal struggle. Several of my officers, Major Gilmer
among the number, now suggested to me the propriety of taking the subject of
a surrender into consideration.
Every moment, I knew, was of vast importance to those retreating on Fort
Donelson, and I declined, hoping to find men enough at baud to continue awhile
longer the fire now so destructive to the enemy. In this I was disappointed.
My next effort was to try the experiment of a flag of truce, which I waved from
the parapets myself. This was precisely at ten minutes before 2 o'clock p. m.
The flag was not noticed, I presume from the dense smoke that enveloped it,
and, leaping again into the fort, I continued the fire for five minutes, when,
with the advice of my brother officers, I ordered the flag to be lowered, after
an engagement of two hours and ten minutes with such an unequal force.
The surrender was made to Flag-Officer Foote, represented by Captain Stom-
ble, commanding gunboat Cincinnati, and was qualified by the single condition
that all officers should retain their side arms, that both officers and men should
be treated with the highest consideration due prisoners of war, which was
promptly and gracefully acceded to by Commodore Foote.
*******
Confident of having performed my whole duty to my government in the de
fence of Fort Henry, with the totally inadequate means at my disposal, I have
but little to add in support of the views before expressed. The reasons for the
line of policy pursued by me are, to my mind, convincing.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV. 497
Against such overwhelming odds as sixteen thousand well-armed men (ex
clusive of the force on the gunboats) to two thousand six hundred and ten
badly armed, in the field, and fifty-four heavy guns agaiust eleven medium oues,
in the fort, no tactics or bravery could avail. Tho rapid movements of the
enemy, with every facility at their command, rendered the defence, from the
beginning, a hopeless one. I succeeded iu doing even more than was to be
hoped for at first. I not only saved my entire command outside the fort, hut
damaged, materially, the flotilla of the enemy, demonstrating thoroughly a
problem of infinite value to us in the future. Had I been reinforced so as to
have justified my meeting the enemy at the advanced works, I might have made
good the land defence on the east bank. I make no inquiry as to why I was
not, for I have entire confidence in the judgment of my commanding general.
******* Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Lloyd Tilghman, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.
Official. Ed. A. Palfrey, A. A. Genl.
A. aud I. G. Office, Aug. 29th, 1862.

Clarksville, Tenn., Feb. 12th, 1862.
General Johnston :
Sir, — There is but little known satisfactorily of the enemy or their move
ments. Up to ten o'clock last night all was quiet as usual at the fort. General
Buckner is now there. I have thought the best disposition to make of the
troops on this line was to concentrate the main force at Cumberland City, leav
ing at Fort Donelson enough to make all possible resistance to any attack
which may be made upon tho fort, but no more. The character of the country
in the rear and to the left of the fort is such as to make it dangerous to concen
trate our whole force there; for, if their gunboats should pass the fort aud
command the river, our troops would be in danger of being cut off by a force
from the Tennessee. In this event, their road would be open to Nashville with
out any obstruction whatever. Tho position at Cumberland City is better; for
there, the railroad diverges from the river, which would afford some little facility
for transportation in case of necessity ; and from thence the open country south
ward towards Nashville is easily reached. Besides, from that point we threaten
the flank of any force sent from the Tennessee against the fort. I am making
every possible effort to concentrate the forces here at Cumberland City. I
have been in the greatest dread ever since I reached this place, at their scat
tered condition. The force is inadequate to defend a lino of forty miles iu length,
which can be attacked from three different directions. We can only be formi
dable by concentration. A strong guard is all that can be left here, and this no
longer than your movement can be made. I shall begin to-day, if the engineers
report favorably, to blockade the river at the piers of the railroad bridge. I
have taken up an idea that a " raft," secured against this bridge, can render the
river impassable for the gunboats. If this is possible, it will be an immense
I.— 32

498 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI.
relief to the movements above. I am quite sure this blockade can be made at
a lower stage of water, but the present stage of water renders this experiment
somewhat doubtful ; still, I will make every exertion to effect the blockade, if
possible. I received by telegraph your authority to make any disposition of
the troops which, in my judgment, was best, and acknowledged it by despatch
immediately. I am acting accordingly.
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
John B. Floyd, Brig.-Genl. C. S. A.

To General Beauregard :
At 2 a. M. to-day Fort Donelson surrendered. We lost all.

Nashville, Feb. 16ih, 1862.

A. S. Johnston.

Nashville, FeZ>. 16a, 1862.
10 o'clock A. M.
To General Beauregard, Corinth :
At 2 a. m. to-day Fort Donelson surrendered. We lost all the army except
half of Floyd's brigade, which crossed the river. The head of our column is
about reaching Nashville. W. W. Mackall, A. A. Genl.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI.
No. 1. Memphis, Feb. 18th, 1862.
To General Beauregard and General Polk :
Inform me, at the earliest moment, of the plans adopted and movements con
templated, that I may rally all the Tennessee forces possible. I will go with
them myself. Isham G. Harris, Governor, etc.

No. 2. Memphis, Feb. 18th, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
I telegraphed the President, Generals Johnston aud Pillow, and yourself, this
morning, to know the plans and movements of the future, stating that, as soon
as informed, I would rally all the force possible from Tennessee, and place my
self with it. I am compelled to know this, and issue orders accordingly, before
leaving here. If you do not feel authorized to communicate by telegraph, write,
and send a special messenger. I will see you as soon as I can.
Isham G. Harris, Governor, etc.

Jackson, Feb. 18th, 1862.
5 P.M.
Governor I. G. Harris :
I am anxious to see you here with General Polk, to discuss and determine the
matters referred to by you. Am still too unwell to assume direct command.
G. T. Beauregard.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI. 499
Memphis, Feb. 19th, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
I have ordered out every man in the State who is, and can be, armed. I re
turn to Nashville in the moruing. Regret I cannot see you. Isham G. Harris.

Richmond, Feb. 19th, 1862.
To General Beauregard, Jackson, Tenn. :
Your despatch to General Cooper received. Evacuation decided on. Select
defensive position below. Look to safety of artillery and munitious. A
fleet of boats should promptly be sent from Memphis, or other points, to aid
the movement. J. p. Benjamin.

Murfreesboro, Feb. 21st, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
If not well enough to assume command, I hope that you, now having had time
to study the field, will advise General Polk of your judgment as to the proper
disposition of his army, in accordance with the views you entertain iu your
memorandum, unless you have changed your views. I cau't order him, not
knowing but what you have assumed command, aud your orders conflict.
For Geueral Johnston,
W. W. Mackall, A. A. G.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 21st, 1862.
Answer.
To General A. S. Johnston, Murfreesboro :
I am not well enough to yet assume command. Will telegraph when I do
so. Have communicated views to General Polk; he is preparing to execute
them.  G. T. Beauregard.
Telegram forwarded to Governors Moore, of louisiana, Shorter, of Alabama, Harris
of Tennessee, and Pettus, of Mississippi.
Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 21st, 1862.
I shall despatch a messenger to you to-morrow morning, on important public
business. G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 21st, 1862.
Sir, — The general commanding directs that you will proceed, without delay,
to Montgomery, Alabama, via Atlanta, and deliver to Governor J. Gill Shorter
the accompanying despatches, and thence to Mobile with despatches for General
Bragg, returning to these headquarters as soon as practicable.
Respectfully, your obedient servant, Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.
Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm, A. D. C, Jackson, Tenn.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 23d, 1862.
Dear General, — I was informed by General McCown that you desired his bri
gade to move down at once to Island No. 10. I beg to remark it might be dan-

500 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI.
gerous to divide the forces under your command before the works at that island
shall have been put iu a defensible condition, and before we are ready to aban
don Columbus, in pursuance of what has already been determined on that sub
ject ; hence the necessity of hurrying the construction of the works at Island
No. 10 and at New Madrid. Meanwhile, all the necessary preparations can he
made for the rapid evacuation of Columbus at the proper time. *
The next most important question is, where shall we collect the balance of
the forces at Columbus, which is not to form a part of the garrison at Island
No. 10? Shall this be done at Union City, Humboldt, or Jackson? or shall it
be collected temporarily about that island, depending on water transportation
alone as far as Memphis, to effect a junction with Ruggles's forces now at Cor
inth and Grand Junction, for ulterior operations ?
I am not sufficiently well acquainted with the nature of the roads in western
Tennessee, and with the means of transportation at our command, to be able
to answer these queries; hence I would be most happy to have your views on
the subject.
The great point is, as I understand it, to be able to support in time the garri
son at Island No. 10, if attacked only by a force about equal to our own, or to be
able to keep open our communications, either by water or railroad, with the
States of Mississippi and Alabama, if attacked by an overwhelming force, which
might endanger, not only the safety of the garrison referred to, but especially
of its supporting force — intended, after having been driven out of western Ten
nessee, for the defence, inch by inch, of the roads leading into the interior of the
two States already mentioned.
Before concluding, I must call your attention to the necessity of making the
works at Island No. 10 and at New Madrid as strong as circumstances will per
mit; and to be armed with the heaviest guns that can be spared for that
purpose. I would advise the gorges of the works at New Madrid to he palisaded
merely, so that our gunboats might fire into them from the river if they were
taken by the enemy. The defences must consist of three works with strong
profiles, for about five hundred men each — two on the river, and one a little
in advance of the others. The cremaillere lines, on the right and rear of Isl
and No. 10, must be provided with small redans for a few siege-guns, and the
navigation of Black Lagoon obstructed so as to preveut the enemy's barges
from getting into Reelfoot Lake, the shores of which, hetweeu the two crdmail-
Itre lines, were to be well guarded, and, if need be, properly defended. The isl
and opposite Tiptonville was to be examined, to determine if it could be advan
tageously fortified.
I would advise the garrison at Fort Pillow (excepting a strong guard) to be
sent, for the present, to New Madrid or Island No. 10. All the heavy ordnance,
not required at these two points, should be sent, when removed, from Columbus
to Fort Pillow, or to any other point on the river (above, and not too far from
Memphis), which could be held by a small garrison.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Maj.-Geul. L. Polk, Comdg. 1st Division Dept. of West, Columbus, Ky.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI. 501
Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 23d, 1862.
General, — I have to submit, herewith, a copy of a circular I have folt called
upon to address to the governors respectively of the States of Tennessee, Missis
sippi, Louisiana, and Alabama, which I hope may meet the sanction of the War
Department. I shall be pleased to receive the instructions and views of the
department as soon as practicable. It is presumed that the troops thus called
into the field may be raised without difficulty or much delay, especially if I am
authorized at ouce to receive them as parts of the quotas due from the several
States mentioned.
Iu connection with the letter to Major-General Van Dorn, I beg to submit,
that all operations in States bordering ou the Mississippi River should be made
subordinate to the secure possession of that river, which, if lost, would involve
the complete isolation and destruction of any army west of it.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Samuel Cooper, Genl. and Adj. and I. Genl., Richmond, Va.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 23d, 1862.
Dear General, — You will remember it was agreed that certain subsistence
stores, at Trenton and Jackson, should be sent as soon as possible to Columbus
and Grenada, Mississippi. All at Trenton, and one half of the supplies here, to
be stored at the former place, aud the other half to be sent to Greuada.
It seems that the railroad officers, as yet, have received no orders in the
premises. On reflection, however, it would seem advisable, first, to relieve Columbus
(Kentucky) of about one half of its subsistence supplies, to be divided equally
between the two places above mentioned.
Yours very truly, G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Maj.-Genl. L. Polk, Comdg. forces, Columbus, Ky.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 24th, 1862.
General, — As I had anticipated, before leaving Centreville, I find that the
troops at Columbus have not been regularly organized, according to long-recog
nized military usage founded on experience in all services.
It is true there is a nominal organization into " divisions " formed of other
subdivisions called " brigades," but upon no regular basis. For example : Gen
eral McCown commands one of these so-called divisions, of but five regiments
of infantry, that is, more properly, a brigade.
Another of these divisions consists of two brigades of three regiments each,
commanded by colonels, Brigadier-General Cheatham commanding the " divis
ion." The other division, so called, really has had no division commander
since the departure of Brigadier-General Pillow. It consists of some eight
'regiments, which form two brigades, I believe, commanded by their senior col
onels respectively.

502 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI.
Brigadier-General A. P. Stewart commands an independent brigade of three
regiments and the heavy artillery, and is in immediate command of the works.
In addition, there are quite fourteen hundred cavalry, over whom there should
be some competent commander.
These twenty-two regiments really ought to be subdivided into five brigades,
two of them of four regiments and two of five regiments each, taking the weak
est regiments for the latter. Larger brigades of Volunteers cannot be well han
dled in action, and I prefer, on that account, brigades of but four regiments.
I regard the divisional organization as absolutely essential ; my experience
fully confirms the military practice in European services in this connection.
Volunteers need these subdivisions even more than regular troops.
As reported in a previous communication, I have called upon the governors of
Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Alabama for additional troops. To-day
I hear, by telegraph, that they will be furnished with the utmost alacrity and
despatch. For their prompt organization, brigade commanders will be wanted.
At present the general officers at Columbus are Major-General Polk, Briga
dier-Generals Cheatham, McCown, aud A. P. Stewart. Under these circum
stances, I must respectfully recall the attention of the department to my letter,
written just as I was leaving Centreville, touching the organization of this
army. I would, however, so far qualify that letter as to say, that officers serv
ing now with the troops at Columbus, who may have been recommended by
Generals Polk and Johnston for the command of brigades, should justly have
precedence over those indicated by me as suitable for such commands. But
some, at least, of those I recommended for division and brigade commands, I
shall need at an early day for the organization and command of the new levies ;
and I trust the President may be pleased to appoint and send them to report
to me with as little delay as practicable.
The services of Colonel Mackall, as a division commander, I consider as in
dispensable at this critical juncture. My health is such as to make it essential
for me to have as many trained, experienced officers to aid. me as practicable.
Respectfully, General, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Samuel Cooper, Genl. and A. and I. Geul., Richmond.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 25th, 1862.
To General S. Cooper, A. aud I. Genl., Richmond :
Am offered service of Louisiana Legion in the emergency, under Act of Con
gress, 21st July— August, 1861, for local defence. May I accept ? These troops
greatly needed. Time precious. Please answer in duplicate to Governor
Moore- G. T. Beauregard.
Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 25th, 1882.
To Major-General Polk, Columbus, Ky. :
Cavalry at Paris best be distributed on outpost duty to watch all important
roads from about Paris to as near south of Mayfield as possible. Burn bridges

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI. 503
on advance of enemy, whom they will always keep iu sight and hinder from
making reconnoissances. G. T. Beauregard.

Richmond, Feb. 26th, 1862.
To General G. T. Beauregard :
Certainly, accept services of tho Legion. Duplicate sent Governor Moore.
S. Cooper.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 27th, 1862.
Major-General Bragg :
Send the guns and ammunition via M. and O. Railroad to Hickman, on Mis
sissippi River. Thanks for the five regiments. The river shall be held.
G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 28th, 1862.
To Governor J. J. Pettus, Jackson, Miss. :
Do not send troops without three days' cooked rations and forty rounds am
munition, if possible. G.T.Beauregard.
[This telegram was repeated to the governors of Louisiana, Tennessee, and
Alabama, aud to Major-General Bragg.]

Grand Junction, Feb. 26th, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
What point have you fixed upon for rendezvous. Answer at Memphis.
Isham G. Harris, Governor, etc.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 26th, 1862.
Governor I. G. Harris, Memphis, Tenn. :
Henderson and McNairy Stations, on Mobile and Ohio Railroad, are proper
places of rendezvous. G. T. Beauregard.

Montgomery, Ala., Feb. 27th, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
Prospects for five regiments old troops (now in North Alabama), from General
Bragg. I go to Mobile immediately with copy of your letter. If you approve,
telegraph me. No other to be had here. A. R. Chisolm, A. D. C.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 27th, 1862.
To Lieutcnaut A. R. Chisolm, Mobile, Ala. :
Course approved. Get troops wherever you can. G. T. Beauregard.

Columbus, Ky., FeZ>. 26th, 1862.
To General G. T. Beauregard :
I am carrying out your views as rapidly as possible. Some of the most im
portant points you speak of in your letters and despatches it is difficult to

504: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI.
discuss at such a distance, especially as time presses. Could" you not- come up
to-day? I can make you comfortable in my quarters. L. Polk, Major-Gcul. Comdg.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 26th, 1862.
To Major-General Polk, Columbus, Ky. :
Colonel Jordan, A. A. G., has gone up to discuss matters with you. Cannot
telegraphic line be established between Humboldt or Union City, and Island
No 10 ? G. T. Beauregard.

New Orleans, Feb. 24th, 1862.
To General G. T. Beauregard :
Mississippi three regiments in six days ; balance (seven) shortly.
A. N. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 24th, 1862.
To A. N. T. Beauregard, New Orleans :
All right ; will prepare for them. G. T. Beauregard.

New Orleans, Feb. 28th, 1862.
To General G. T. Beauregard :
Are you authorized to take any troops under Act 21st August ? Are you author
ized, under that Act, to specify the length of time for which you will take them ?
If you are, please state shortest time. I am doing everything I can. Answer
quickly. It is useless to expect war men. T. O. Moore.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 28th, 1862.
To Governor T. 0. Moore, New Orleans :
Will accept all good, equipped troops under Act 21st August, that will offer
for ninety days. Let people of Louisiana understand 7<ere is the proper place
to defend Louisiana. G. T. Beauregard.

Mobile, Feb. 28th, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
Five regiments, four cavalry companies, and six field-guns, now loading. Five
more regiments, heavy guns, and supplies coming from Peusacola. Will be with
you myself next week. Braxton Bragg.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 28th, 1862.
To Major-Geucral Bragg, Mobile, Ala. :
All right. Como yourself at once; I wish to see you immediately. I am not
¦well. G. T. Beauregard.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI. 505
Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 26a, 1862.
To General A. S. Johnston, Murfreesboro, Tenn. :
Appearance of early attack on New Madrid in force. Position of absolute
necessity to us. Cannot you send a brigade at once by rail to assist in defence ?
G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 25th, 1862.
To General Johnston, Murfreesboro, Tenn. :
Did War Department sanction or disapprove call for sixty days' volunteers ?
G. T. Beauregard.

Murfreesboro, Tenn., Feb. 26th, 1862.
To General G. T. Beauregard :
* * *****
The government neither sanctioned nor disapproved.
W. W. Mackall, A. A. G.

New Orleans, March 8th, 1862.
Dear General, — Your letter by Dr. Choppin came duly to hand, aud I havo
spared no efforts to carry out your wishes. The doctor can explain to you
everything that has transpired. Besides the regiments sent forward by General
Lovell, you will get two or three thousand men from me, with two batteries of
artillery. But for the lack of arms I could furnish a large force to you. The
war spirit is very active all over the State, having extended to the lower par
ishes, where, until very recently, it was quite quiescent. Your name, and well-
earned reputation, I have no doubt, has materially contributed to rouse the
enthusiasm of our people. We place great confidence in you, and, when assured
of your having the reinforcement asked for, feel convinced that the alarm
which has prevailed here since the capitulation of our forces at Donelson will
be greatly abated.
I enter into no particulars about our affairs here, not only because Dr.
Choppin will be able to tell you all you may desire to know, but because I am
sure you have enough to occupy your attention, without troubling you about
home matters.
With the sincere hope and confident expectation that you will win additional
honors in your new field of exertion.
I remain, yours very truly, TnoMAS O. Moore, Governor.
To General G. T. Beauregard, Jackson, Tenn.

Langley, Fairfax County, Va., Sept. 25th, 1878.
My dear General, — Your two letters of the 20th and 22d ultimo have reached
me. Business and indisposition prevented an earlier reply.
*******
I cannot recall the various visits of your aids to General J. en route. I do
remember that a telegram was received from you, urging a speedy junction.

506 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI.
Are you not, however, mistaken as to where the message which you think in
duced J.'s change of direction reached him 1 You say Murfreesboro.
My strong impression is, that as early as the night before we reached that
point I was aware of the movement.
My impression was then, that the idea of uniting the Bowling Green forces
with those of Columbus, for future operations, was yours, aud by you impressed
upon General J. ; but I can give no proof that this was so.
I am afraid this will be to you an unsatisfactory letter, but it is all with
which my memory supplies me.
Fully reciprocating your wish that we may meet and renew our old acquaint
ance, I am, yours truly, • W. W. Mackall.
General G. T. Beauregard. 
Extracts from a letter of ex-Governor I. G. Harris, of Tennessee, to General Beauregard.
Washington, D. C, April 13th, 1880.
General G. T. Beauregard :
Dear Sir, — *****
On the 20th or 21st, when I was prepared to return to Nashville, I received
a telegram from you, asking me to come to Jackson to see you. I answered
that I could not, as I would leave, for Nashville within an hour or two. You
answered, urging me to take a special train to come to Jackson and see you,
aud then by special train intercept the Nashville train at Corinth. This I did,
and at Jackson had an interview of about an hour with you, iu which you in
formed me that you were concentrating your whole command on the line of the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad, extending from Jackson to Corinth, the principal
points of the concentration, according to my recollection, being Bethel Station and
Corinth. And you requested me to urge General A. S. Johnston to concentrate,
as speedily as possible, the troops under his command at Corinth. Being fully
satisfied of the wisdom of this policy, I promised to do so. I intercepted the
Nashville train that evening at Corinth, and reached Nashville early the next
morning. General Johnston being then in Murfreesboro, I remained in Nash
ville until the morning of the 22d or 23d of February, when I went to Murfrees
boro, where I met General Johnston for the first time since the 16th. I informed
him fully as to the interview that I had with you at Jackson, and your sug
gestion of the importance of concentrating the two armies at or near Corinth,
when General Johnston promptly answered that he was preparing, as rapidly
as possible, to move the army under his command to or near Corinth, as he re
garded it as important, if not absolutely necessary, that the troops commanded
by you and himself should be concentrated in tho country at or near Corinth.
******* Respectfully, Isham G. Harris.

Greenville, Miss., Jan. 24th, 1876.
General G. T. Beauregard :
Dear General, — In reply to your letter asking my recollection of certain events
that transpired in the early part and Spring of 1862, I submit the following

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI. 507
answers to the questions, seriatim, written entirely from memory, and without
note or memorandum of my own :
1st. On your arrival in west Tennessee (in February, 1862), the forces under
command of General Polk were not properly brigaded and organized, and I
know that you felt seriously the want of suitable experienced brigade and
division commanders. I cannot recall individual instances of excellent officers
and well-drilled troops, sruch as Bowen's Missouri regiment, but the want of
organization was perceptible, aud the contrast with the army we had left in
Virginia marked ; and you often wished for some of the officers of the latter,
whose merits and abilities were known to you, to aid in the task of organizing
the material at hand.
2d. The evacuation of Fort Columbus was ordered by you.
3d. As was also the conceutration of the forces in west Tennessee at Corinth.
4th. You called for the available forces (including sixty and niuety days
men) of the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana.
5th. You recommended the concentration of the forces under General Albert
Sidney Johnston with your own at Corinth. I was, as your aide-de-camp, tho
bearer of despatches from you to Governor Harris of Tennessee, at Murfreesboro
(where he was with General Johnston), making a call upon him for all the State
troops he could spare to be sent to Coriuth. At the same time I took a written
despatch, or verbal message (I don't now recollect which, for on that occasion
I committed all my despatches to memory), requesting General Johnston to
change his proposed line of retreat on Stevenson and Chattanooga, to Hunts
ville aud Decatur, so as to be better able to concentrate with you when occasion
might require. *******
9th. From the time that we left Virginia to come to Tennessee, until I left
your staff, after the affair at Farmington, it was the belief among all your staff
that the War Department was very unfriendly to you, and their action on
several occasions was such as to induce that belief iu those who knew, as we
did, the circumstances of the case. It was a source, not only of annoyauce to
you, but of deep regret, as in many instances your efforts were, you thought,
paralyzed, and the success of well-digested measures imperilled, by the action
of the War Department, based upon the evident hostility felt towards yourself.
******* Yours very truly, S. W. Ferguson.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 21st, 1862.
General Samuel Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl. :
General  I regret profoundly to have to acquaiut the War Department that
my ,ill-health has made it improper for me as yet to assume the command
assigned me.
In accordance with instructions, I repaired, with as little delay as practicable,
to Bowling Green, Ky., and reported to General A. S. Johnston, commanding the

508 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVI.
department, on the night of the 4th instant. After several interviews with him,
and the fall of Fort Henry, an informal conference was held at my lodging on the
7th instant, at which General Johnston, Major-General Hardee, and myself were
present, for the consideration of the military exigeucies. On that occasion it
was determined that, Fort Henry having fallen, and Fort Donelson not being
long tenable, preparations should be made at once for the removal of the army on
that line iu rear of the Cumberland River at Nashville, while a strong point on
that river, some few miles below the city, should be fortified forthwith against
the approach, by that way, of gunboats and transports.
The troops then at Clarksville were to be thrown across to the southern
bank of the Cumberland, leaving only a sufficient force in the town to protect
the manufactories and other property in which the Confederate government
was interested.
In the event a further retrograde movement became inevitable, Stevenson
was chosen as a suitable point for a stand, aud subsequent movements were to
be determined by circumstances.
It was likewise determined that the possession of the Tennessee River by the
euemy, consequent upon the capitulation of Fort Henry, must break the direct
communication between the army at Bowling Green and the one at Columbus,
which, henceforward, must act independently of each other, until they can
again be brought together.
Meanwhile, the first must defend the State of Tennessee along the line already
indicated, the second that part of the State included between the Tennessee
and Mississippi rivers.
But as the possession of the Tennessee River by the enemy had also rendered
the communications of the army at Columbus liable to be cut off at any time
from that river, by an overpowering force of the enemy, rapidly concentrated
from various points of the Ohio, it had become further necessary to guard aud
provide against such a calamity. To which eud it was decided that the main
force in occupation of Columbus should fall back upon Humboldt, and thence,
if need be, to Grand Junction, so as to protect Memphis from either point, and
still secure a liue of retreat to the latter place or Grenada, Mississippi, or even
to Jackson, of that State.
Finally, at Columbus, left with a sufficient garrison for the defence of the
works there, assisted by Hollins's gunboats, a desperate defence of the river was
to be made. But, at the same time, transports were to be collected aud held
near by, for the prompt removal of the entire garrison, when the position was
no longer tenable, iu the opinion of the commanding officer. Meanwhile, Island
No. 10 aud Fort Pillow would be fortified for defence to the last extremity,
assisted by the naval guuboats, which, as a last resort, would retire to the
vicinity of Memphis, when another resolute stand should be made.
Five days later, in view of existing conditions, I addressed to General
Johnston a paper, a copy of which I now transmit, for the information of the
War Department.
On reaching hero, I recoived information that confirmed my views, in great
part, as set forth in that letter, and satisfied me, that to attempt to hold Colum-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII. 509
bus with any force now at my disposition could only result in an early fate
like that of Fort Donelson, and the loss of the Mississippi Valley, as a necessary
consequence. Unfit physically to visit Columbus, I requested Geueral Polk and
Governor Harris to meet me here. They did so; meantime, your reply to my
telegraphic despatch, touching the further occupation of Columbus, had been
received. Arrangements were made for the prompt defence of Island No. 10,
a position naturally of great strength, and New Madrid, for the early evacua
tion of the position at Columbus, and removal of the large stores of supplies
and munitions now there, in such a way as to avoid publicity. These new lines
cau be made of great strength with a garrison of about five thousand men, thus
leaving free my main force, for manoeuvre and defensive active operations
against the enemy, as he shall penetrate the country by the avenues now un
fortunately in his possession. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.

APPENDIX TO CIIAPTER XVII.
Jackson, Tenn., March 4th, 1862.
S. Cooper, Adj. and I. Genl., Richmond, Va. :
We are much in need of two able major-generals ; also two brigadiers for Gen
eral Polk, two for General Bragg, and one for cavalry. Please order them to
report forthwith. New levies will soon be in the field.
 G. T. Beauregard.
Jackson, Tenn., March 6th, 1862.
S. Cooper, Adj. and I. Genl., Richmond, Va. ;
For the sake of our cause and country send, at once, Mackall as major-general,
and three brigadier-generals recommended by me. Colonel Ransom to com
mand cavalry. Organization here much needed. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 6th, 1862.
Dear General,—! received through Colonel Olivier your letter of the 4th in
stant, euclosing report of the gallant repulse of the enemy's troops and gunboats
at Pittsburg, by a part of Colonel Mouton's regiment, the 18th Louisiana. You
will please express to him my thanks, at this brilliant success on his first en
counter with the enemy. I hope it is only the forerunner of still more gallant
deeds on the part of his regiment.
Being still unwell, I have requested General Bragg to furnish you with all
necessary instructions. I remain, yours very truly,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Brig.-Genl. Daniel Ruggles, Comdg. at Corinth, Miss.
Jackson, Tenn., March 7th, 1862.
S. Cooper, Adj. and I. Genl., Richmond :
I know uo ono here to recommend. Bragg recommends Ruggles aud Sam. Jones
for major-generals; Colonels Slaughter, Villepigue, and Shepard for brigadiers.

510 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII.
Polk recommends Colonels E. W. Gantt, M. L. Walker, Lieutenant-Colonel M.
J. Wright. There is no cavalry colonel here to recommend. I consider Ran
som indispensable. He should be sent at once. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 8th, 1862.
S. Cooper, Adj. and I. Genl., Richmond :
Please1 order forthwith, to join me as Chief Commissary, Colonel Lee or Major
Williams. No officers here to select from. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 8th, 1862.
S. Cooper, Adj. and I. Genl., Richmond :
Will Major Brent be sent me or not ? I need him hourly.
My Quartermaster is a Captain Clement Young. He ought to be made a ma
jor; a common grade in that department here, I find.
 G. T. Beauregard.
Unofficial. Jackson, Tenn., March 8th, 1862.
Genl. S. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
If officers applied for yesterday cannot be ordered to report immediately to
me,T can but foresee most disastrous consequences here; for part of this army is
in a state of chaos.
My health being still bad, I am not able, unaided, to establish order here, and
would then request to be relieved from my present command.
 G. T. Beauregard.
Jackson, Tenn., March 11th, 1862.
Genl. S. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
Has my telegram of the 8th been received, relative to appointment of gener
als ? If so, what answer ? G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 11th, 1862.
Genl. S. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
We have called for ten generals as iudispensable ; four are granted, and only
two of these are present, the enemy being already engaged with our left at New
Madrid. I do not hold myself responsible for the results.
Commissary Department entirely out of funds. Nothing can be had without
them. Ouo million in hands of collector at Mobile can be had. Will depart
ment issue necessary orders at once ? G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 6th, 1862.
Dear General, — Colonel Maekall's letter, through Lieutenant Otey, has just
beeu received. I send you, by the same officer, information just obtained through
one Dr. Miuturn, j ust iu from Cairo, ou his way to Houston, Texas. He was aux-
ious, he said, to visit your headquarters to get some papers left with Mr. Bay
lor ; but his manners appearing rather suspicious, I preferred sending him direct
to Texas. His information may be true or not ; you will have to judge for your-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII. 5U
self. We believe here there is a great deal of truth in it ; if so, you must be
careful not to be separated from us by the enemy's forces getting between us,
at or about Tuscumbia. Hence, you must spread the rumor that the main body
of your forces is going to Chattanooga by railroad, via Decatur, to deceive the
enemy at Nashville ; for we must try to keep Buell away from us until we can
get through with Grant and Halleck's other forces.
I send you, herewith, my notes of reference, to give you a clear insight into
our position here. McCown is at Island No. 10 and New Madrid, with about
7000 effectives. Polk has at Humboldt and Union City about 7000 more. Bragg
will have soon at Corinth about 10,000, at Grand Junction about 5000, aud at
Fort Pillow about 2500. Ruggles, at Corinth, about 3000; and Chalmers, at
Iuka, about 2500. In all, nominally, 37,000 men, less 9500 on river, leaves for
the field about 27,500, possibly 30,000 men ; but not all very efficient. I cannot
get competent brigadier-generals from the department, although I have written
and telegraphed four times on the subject.
I am still unwell, hut am doing the best I can. I nominally assumed the
command yesterday. Yours truly, G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Genl. A. S. Johnston, Decatur. Headquarters Army of Mississippi Valley,
Jackson, Tenn., March 6th, 1862.
Dear Sir, — As my neighbor, as the Senator representing my State and section,
I take the liberty of addressing you this note ; and beg, for the good of our com
mon cause and the safety of our country, that you will use what influence you
possess, with the government at Richmond, to see that my general (General
Beauregard) receives some support from that quarter.
Before leaving Manassas, by his dictation, I wrote a letter which he afterwards
copied and signed, in which he informed the Secretary of War that he would
require good officers to be appointed as brigade commanders, suggesting certain
officers whom he knew to be competent ; not one of whom have been appointed
or any others ordered to report to him.
Of what service can the very best of generals be if he has not those under his
command who are competent to carry out his orders?
The different brigades of the division of the army under General Polk are
commanded by senior colonels, who themselves have only recently taken up the
profession of arms. Those regiments require all their time and attention ; aud
they themselves, in many instances, do not feel competent to the command.
This has beeu strikingly illustrated in the recent evacuation of Columbus. Of
ficers commanding brigades and regimeuts have become entirely separated from
the main body of their commands, and knew not where to find them ; they,
themselves, running to the commanding general when they should have been
with their men.
The following officers are some of whom he desired as brigadiers : Colouel
Charles Winder, 6th South Carolina regiment ; Colonel Samuel Garland, 11th
Virginia regiment ; Colonel A. P. Hill, 13th Virginia regiment ; Colonel Ransom,

512 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII.
1st regiment North Carolina Cavalry; Colonel Pegram, 1st Maryland regi
ment. Generals Polk and Bragg have made the same efforts to procure the proper
officers to command under them.
It is with the utmost difficulty, even with competent general officers, that a
volunteer army can be kept under proper discipline; aud without those officers
it becomes a rabble.
A fearful responsibility rests upon the general's shoulders ; and I honestly be
lieve that if he did not consider the country in great danger, he would not re
tain the command of this army for twenty-four hours ; but he knows the value
of his name, and is willing and anxious that its power and influence should be
used to the fullest extent. The numbers of this army have been more than
doubled since his arrival here ; but of what avail is this immense host if he can
not get the proper officers to put it in a condition by which he can make its
numbers effective, instead of being an encumbrance. The only way -he can
counterbalance the inexperience of the regimental commanders is to place com
petent generals over them.
I trust, sir, that this grave subject will receive your attention ; and if you
have any influence with the " powers that be," that you will use it for the coun
try's good ; for if we are defeated in the rapidly approaching combat, it will be
difficult for us again to rally, and the Mississippi Valley will be lost to the Con
federacy, and the cause we are contending for also lost forever.
I remain, dear sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. R. Chisolm.
P. S. Tho general considers the appointment of Lieutenant -Colonel W. W.
Mackall, C. S. A., and Brigadier-General Daniel Ruggles, as major-generals, abso
lutely necessary, and that they should be ordered by telegraph to report to him.
You are at liberty to make whatever use you see fit of this letter. A. R. C.

Private. Jackson, Tenn., March 16th, 1862.
My dear Colonel, — Can you not wake up the authorities to the great danger
of our army here, and necessarily of the Mississippi Valley, from lack of proper
organization — all due to a want of brigadiers ? I have been trying for the last
month and over, indeed, before I left Centreville, to have a certain number of
them appointed, but all to no purpose. Are we, for the sake of a little economy
iu the pay of said officers, to jeojiardize all we have at stake in this contest ?
Why, then, not authorize generals in the field to appoint acting brigadier and
major generals, when in their judgment required, but without additional pay,
until approved of by the President or Congress ?
Bragg, Polk, and myself applied, a few days ago, for ten general officers ; to
day we are informed that four are appointed, of whom two can't be here for one
week! in the meantime a part of this army is in a state of chaos, and fifteen
thousand new levies will soon be in the field ! What in the world shall I do
with them ? Will not Heaven open the eyes and senses of our rulers ? Where
in the world are we going to, if not to destruction ? Time is all-precious now ;
tho enemy will soon be upon us, aud, to cap tho climax, I cannot get well. I

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII. 513
am better, but the least excitement throws me back. We must cheer up, how
ever. With good troops and enough of them, there is a chance, at this moment,
of making a beautiful ten sti-ilce, but it would be risking too much in the pres
ent condition of affairs ; we would lose too much if I failed. The problem here
is very difficult. I have to look to the safety of this army and yet keep the
Mississippi River closed ; the latter a most difficult undertaking with our pres
ent means. By-the-bye, there were six brigades in Polk's army without brig
adier-generals, commanded by colonels according to rank. You may imagine
what kind of commanders some of them make, and what kind of brigades they
have! I enclose you copy of a telegram sent this day to the War Department. My
kind regards to friends. Yours truly, G. T. Beauregard.
Col. W. P. Miles, Member of Congress, Richmond, Va.

Jackson, Tenn., March 1st, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. Ruggles, Corinth, Miss. :
Subsequent information leads me to believe Bethel station preferable to Mc-
Nairy's. Pittsburg, on Tennessee River, is a good point of observation.
G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 1st, 1862.
Gov. I. G. Harris, Memphis, Tenn. :
Substitute Bethel for McNairy's station as rendezvous. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 2d, 1862.
To Genl. A. S. Johnston, Stevenson, Ala. (or on road from Murfreesboro) :
See Memphis Appeal of yesterday for movement of enemy's troops per steam
boats, taken from Cincinnati Enquirer. Hurry on your troops per railroad to
Corinth. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 2d, 1862.
To Genl. A. S. Johnston, Stevenson, Ala. :
Send 9th and 10th Mississippi and 5th Georgia regiments, if possible, under
Brigadier-General J. R. Jackson, to Corinth, so as to reunite the Pensacola
army under Bragg hero. G. T. Beauregard.
Shelbyville, Tenn., March 3d, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Telenrams of 2d received. Send 10th Mississippi by rail from Chattanooga.
This army will move as rapidly as it can march. Can't obtain Memphis papers
0f ist_ W. W. Mackall, A. A. Genl.
Headquarters Western Department, .
Fayetteville, March 5th, 1862.
General  Your letter of 2d inst. has been received by General Johnston. He
I.— 33

514 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII.
replies : the army advancing, had reached this place ; will move on to join you
as fast as possible ; on arriving at Decatur, he will decide on the promptest
mode. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. W. Mackall, A. A. Genl.

Richmond, March 6th, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Send recommendations for general officers out of your own forces. Colonel
Mackall has already been nominated for brigadier-general. S. Cooper, A. and I. Genl.

Richmond, March 9th, 1862.
(Received at Jackson, Tenn., March 11th, 1862.)
To Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
The following officers have been nominated for your command, viz., J. P.
McCown, as major-general, and J. M. Hawes, J. E. Slaughter, and L. M. Walker,
as brigadiers — Hawes for cavalry. Ransom appointed brigadier-general, and
sent to North Carolina, where his presence at this time is of the first importance.
S. Jones is also nomiuated as major-general, but he cannot bo spared from Mo
bile. S. Cooper, A. and I. Genl.

Richmond, March 10th, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Major Brent has been ordered to report to you. Captain Clement Young is ap
pointed assistant quartermaster, July 19th ; not having given the bond required
by law, he was, with several other disbursing officers, similarly situated, dropped
from the army in Special Orders, February 24th. He cau be appointed major
quartermaster when he furnishes his bond for thirty thousand dollars. S. Cooper.

Richmond, March 12th, 1862.
To Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
I telegraphed you on the 9th that McCowu was made major-general, and
Hawes, Slaughter, and Walker, brigadiers. Since then Cheatham has been
nominated major-general for your command. S. Cooper.

Richmond, March 18th, 1862.
(Received at Jackson, Tenn., March 21st, 1862.)
To Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
Wm. H. Jackson has been appointed to temporary rank of colonel, and ordered
to report to you for duty ; the appointment sent to you by this day's mail.
S. Cooper.

Richmond, March 18th, 1862.
(Received at Jackson, Tenn., March 21st.)
To Genl. Beauregard :
Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Lee is this day ordered to report to you at Jackson,
Tenn- S. Cooper, A. and I. Genl.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII. 515
Richmond, March 21st, 1861.
To General Beauregard :
The following gentlemen have been confirmed by the Senate to take rank in
the order in which they are named : Major-Generals B. F. Cheatham and John
P. McCown ; Brigadier-Generals W. W. Mackall, Sam. B. Maxey, J. M. Hawes,
J. L. Slaughter, L. M. Walker ; not yet confirmed, J. B. Villepigue, John S.
Bowen, and B. H. Helm. S, Cooper.

APPENDIX TO CIIAPTER XVIII.
Confidential. Jackson, Tenn., March 3d, 1862.
Notes of Reference.
I. Island No. 10 and New Madrid are fully prepared, according to means and
circumstances. ' II. Brigadier-General Withers, with 1st, 2d, and 21st Alabama regimeuts, to
go forthwith to Fort Pillow, with proper ammunition. About fifteen (15) guns
from Columbus are ordered to Fort Pillow, where sixteen (16) guns are already
in position. Said fifteen (15) guns are not probably provided with carriages, but
their platforms are iu position. Ten (10) shell-guns from Pensacola, complete,
are also ordered to Fort Pillow ; also one compauy of sappers and miners from
New Orleans. Troops from New Madrid and Island No. 10 to fall back to Fort
Pillow in case of necessity. Fort Pillow can be reinforced by railroad from
Humboldt to .Memphis and the military road from Mason's depot — twenty-
eight miles from Fort Pillow.
III. The main body of General Polk's command is to be at Humboldt, which
is central to Memphis, Jackson, Grand Junction, Henderson, Corinth, aud Fort
Pillow. IV. A rear guard of two (2) regimeuts and five hundred cavalry to be sta
tioned at Uuiou City.
V. A battalion of iufautry to bo stationed at Paris, from Humboldt, with say
five hundred cavalry, which, together with the other cavalry, will guard all
avenues of approach from tho Tennessee to the Mississippi River, in front of
Paris and Union City.
VI. All the above-named forces and positious to be under the command of
Major-General Polk, and to be called tho 1st Grand Division.
VII. The balance of the cavalry, say two hundred men, to report at these
headquarters. VIII. Two regiments of iufautry (4th Louisiana and 7th Mississippi), at
present here, to remain ready to move.
IX. The balance of new troops from Louisiana and Mississippi to rendezvous
at Grand Junction.
X. Ruggles's brigade, with troops from Alabama, to rendezvous at Corinth.
XI. Chalmers's to rendezvous at Iuka.

516 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII.
XII. Troops from Tennessee (new levies) to rendezvous at Henderson aud
Bethel Stations, with proper advance guards along Tennessee River.
XIII. Columbus and Grenada, Mississippi, to be grand depots of supplies of
all kinds for this army.
XIV. All heavy baggage, etc., to be sent to said depots forthwith.
XV. One regiment of unarmed troops (except with lances) to be sent to
Memphis, as a guard to that city.
XVI. The Governor of Mississippi to send unarmed troops to Columbus and
Grenada, Mississippi, as a rendezvous.
XVII. All troops of this army not included in General Polk's command as
above named to he under the command of Major-General Bragg, under the
denomination of 2d Grand Division ; he will resume, in addition thereto, the
command of his former department. G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.

Confidential. Jackson, Tenn., March 4th, 1862.
Notes of Reference.
Provisions, grain, etc., in western Tennessee, to be collected as rapidly as
possible and sent to Columbus aud Grenada, keeping on hand provisions and
forage as follows, viz. :
At Union C*ty, for 1,500 men, about 3 weeks.
" Humboldt, " 5,000 " " 3 "
" Jackson, " 900 infantry " 3 "
" Jackson, " 400 cavalry " 3 "
" Corinth, " 15,000 men for 4 "
" Henderson, " 800 " " 2 "
" Iuka, " 2,500 " " 2
" Grand Junction, " 10,000 " " 4 "
The regiment now at Trenton to be ordered forthwith, by General Polk, to
Fort Pillow, via Memphis.
Captain Robertson's cavalry to remain at Henderson ; the remainder of troops
now there, viz., Lea's and Browder's regiments, and stragglers collected, to be
ordered by General Polk to report to General Ruggles at Coriuth, forthwith.
The 7th Mississippi regiment, now at Jackson, Tennessee, to be ordered by
Bragg to Henderson. Organization.
Three or more regimeuts, or about twenty-five hundred effective men, to a
brigade. •
Two brigades to a division.
To each brigade one battery of six guns, either four smooth-bore and two
howitzers, or four rifles and two howitzers, or six rifled-guns.
Each Grand Division should have a reserved battery as large as practicable.
There should be a chief of artillery for light batteries on the General-in-ChiePs
staff.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII. 517
Ammunition.
Depots to be established at Columbus and Grenada, Mississippi.
Ammunition for Distribution.
100 rounds per man, for infantry and cavalry with each regiment.
200 rounds per piece with each company of artillery.
The requisite amount, in the same ratio, for an army of thirty-five thousand
men, to be held in depot at Grand Junction, ready for shipment at a moment's
notice. Ordnance.
One Chief of Ordnance, Captain Oladowski.
Ordnance officer at Columbus, Mr. W. R. Hunt.
" " " Grenada, Captain Gibbs.
" " " Grand Junction, Mr. Tonneau.
Powder manufactory to be established at Meridian, Mississippi, and sulphur,
etc., to be collected there.
Percussion-cap manufactory to be established at Columbus, and, if possible,
at Grenada.
Prisoners of war now at Memphis to be removed to Tuscaloosa, Alabama.
Troops to be prepared for active operations in the field, and their baggage to
he reduced to a minimum.
Transportation shall be from ten to fifteen wagons per regiment, if prac
ticable. Rear-guards must, as' they retire, destroy bridges behind them, especially on
ordinary roads, by felliug trees, etc., if practicable; for this purpose they must
be provided with axes.
Each fort aud light battery must he provided forthwith with an ample sup
ply of rat-tail files. General Polk will please issue necessary orders to that effect.
The 4th Louisiana regiment, at Jackson, will report to Major-General Bragg
for orders. G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.

Jackson, Tenn., March 8th, 1862.
Dear General,—! think it would be well to establish your headquarters at or
about Humboldt as soon as possible, so as to infuse some order and discipline
among the troops assembled there and at Union City. Please carry into effect,
at once, the instructions contained in my letter of the 6th instant, for I feel very
anxious at the condition of things in our front, due greatly to the want of the
general officers we have applied for.
I think it would be well to inquire strictly into the non-eompliance of your
first orders relative to those cars at and above Humboldt, and arrest whoever
is responsible for that neglect. Let the heavy baggage be separated at once
iu every company, regiment, and brigade, to be seut to the rear as soou as we can
dispose of the cars for that object. I am informed the enemy has threatened
to destroy the property of all inhabitants on this side of the Tennessee River
who should send away any cotton, pork, or forage to prevent the same from
fallin"- into his hands. If so, a mounted company or two must he sent there to

518 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII.
compel them, under written orders, to send those articles of provision and forage
to the railroad, and the cotton to be ready to be burned whenever the enemy
shall be disposed to take it.
Have the goodness to detail on your staff a corps of active and intelligent
officers, whose duty it will be to see that all your orders are immediately carried
into effect — that is the plan I am going to pursue.
Yours very truly,
G. T. Beauregard, Geul. C. S. A.
Miij.-Genl. L. Polk, Comdg., etc., Humboldt, Tenn.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., March 8th, 1862.
Dear Sir, — I am happy to hear, through the letter of your Adjutant-General,
dated March"6th, and addressed to Captain Young, of my staff, that during the
coming week a considerable number of your state troops will begin to assemble*
at Henderson. But permit me to suggest that instead of collecting two thou
sand men at Memphis, you should assemble there about five hundred, the rest
to rendezvous at Bethel Station, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.
The proper orders will be issued for their equipment and subsistence, to the
utmost degree within my power.
I hope the enemy will give us time for some efficient steps towards organiza
tion of these new levies. I trust, too, that the people will be thoroughly aroused
to a true sense and appreciation of the crisis upon us, and of their own duties in
the hour of trial. If so, I shall feel no doubt of our ability to rid the soil of
Tennessee, at no remote date, of all invaders. Yours very truly,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. C. S. A.
Isham G. Harris, Governor of the State of Teun., Memphis.

Beauregard's Order Respecting Bell-metal.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., March 8th, 1862.
To the Planters of the Mississippi Valley :
More than once a people, fighting with an enemy less ruthless than yours,
for imperilled rights not more dear and sacred than yours, for homes and a
land not more worthy of resolute aud unconquerable men than yours, and for
interests of far less magnitude thau you have now at stake, have not hesitated
to melt and mould into cannon the precious bells surmounting their houses of
God, which had called generations to prayer. The priesthood have ever sanc
tioned and consecrated the conversion, in the hour of their nation's need, as one
holy aud acceptable in the sight of God.
We want cannon as greatly as any people who ever, as history tells you,
melted their church bells to supply them ; and I, your general, intrusted with
the command of the army embodied of your sons, your kinsmen, aud your neigh
bors, do now call ou you to send your plantation-bells to the nearest railroad

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII. 519
depot, subject to my order, to be melted into canuou for the defeuce of your
plantations. Who will not cheerfully and promptly send me his bells under such circum
stances ?
Be of good cheer ; but timo is precious. G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., March 10th, 1862.
Dear Sir, — You will remember it was arranged with your Excellency, as best
for the service and all concerned, that a certain portion of the new levies from
your State should be sent to fill up tho several Tennessee regiments under Gen
eral Polk, and to take the arms of the sick or other non-effectives of those reg
iments. I have now to submit a list of the number of men wanted under that
arrangement, and I beg that you will cause the necessary orders to issue, at
once, so that the services of that number of men may bo available at the earli
est possible moment.
General McCown will ueed 740 men — that is : 103 for 4th Tennessee, Colonel
Noely, Island No. 10 ; 195 for 5th Tennessee, Colonel Traverse, New Ma
drid ; 75 for 46th Tennessee, Colonel Clark, Island No. 10 ; and 227 for 31st
Tennessee, Colonel Bradford, Island No. 10; West Tennessee Battalion, 140
men. General Polk will need, at Humboldt, fifteen hundred (1500) men — that is:
67 for 2d Tennessee regiment, Colonel Walker.
" " Douglas.
" " Freemau.
" " Smith.
" " Stephens.
" " Russell.
" " Campbell.
At Union City, Colonel Vaughan, 13th Tennessee regiment, will need 100 men,
and Colonel Pickett, 21st Tennessee regiment, will need 60 mon.
At Lexington, Colonel Carroll, of the 15th Tennessee regiment, will need 65.
At Fort Pillow, for tho 40th Tennessee regiment, there are 125 needed to
fill up the ranks, and at Trenton, the 47th regiment Tennessee Volunteers needs
30 men. <**"''
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
Isham G. H3IRRIS, Governor of the State of Tenn., Memphis.

65

a

9th

106

tt

22d

132

tt

154th Sr.

220

it

6th

144

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12th

166

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33d

Jackson, Miss., August 3d, 1876.
General, — Your last was forwarded to me bore. On reflection, I am sure that
General Chalmers remembers correctly, and that the guns were 24-pounders.
There were but two of them, aud they were put in position side by side in the
same battery, and within a stone's-throw of the corporate limits of the little

520 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII.
town of Eastport, and this was the only battery we had. This identical bat
tery had the contest with the gunboats. Very respectfully, S. S. Calhoun.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, New Orleans, La.

Belen, Miss., September 28th, 1878.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
Dear Sir, — Yours of 10th instant received, and I answer your questions as put
by you.
1st. I was ordered to Iuka by General Sidney Johnston about the 1st of Feb
ruary, 1862.
2d. I went there with eight companies of the 9th Mississippi, was reinforced
by Colonel R. F. Looney, 28th Tennessee, and Colonel (afterwards General) Max-
ey, of 9th Texas, and Baskewith's battalion of cavalry.
My infantry was located at Iuka, except two companies with two 24-pounders
located at old Chickasaw on Tennessee, under Captain S. S. Calhoun. These
companies had been trained in heavy artillery at Pensacola, and drove back the
gunboats that came up to burn Boar Creek bridge — as stated by General Sher
man. The cavalry was watching the Tennessee River, and one company, un
der Captain (afterwards General) Rodney, went across the Tennessee River to
watch the movements of the enemy.
* # ***** Yours truly, Jas. R. Chalmers.

Jackson, Tenn., March 10th, 1862.
To Governor I. G. Harris, Memphis, Tenn. :
I consider shot-guns, with bayonet attachment of Memphis, superior to ordi
nary muskets. G. T. Beauregard.
This telegram was repeated to the Governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama.

Jackson, Tenn., March 10th, 1862.
To General A. S. Johnston, Decatur :
Please send me immediately B. Johnson and Mackall, if possible. Do not
collect more cars and engines from western part of road than absolutely neces
sary, lest they be cut off at Tuscunibia. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 11th, 1862.
Genera?,— Knowing the importance of having all our orders faithfully and
promptly executed at this critical juncture, I have to request that you will
mark on my "notes of reference" of the 3d and 4th instants, and my instruc-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII. 521
tions of the 6th instant, all the items and orders referring to your command,
which you have reason to believe have not yet been executed, and then select
one or more officers to see that they are forthwith carried into effect. My ex
perience with volunteers teaches me that, with the best intoution imaginable,
they seldom execute one half of the orders they receive ; hence it becomes our
imperative duty to see that all orders given are complied with. Your special
attention is called to this fact.
Have you called yet for those new flags from General Lovell? Remember
there are three sizes, for infantry, artillery, and cavalry.
Have you distributed those printed orders for advanced guards, etc., to your
several brigades ? If not, please do so at once. I think it advisable to send
back, as soon as possible, all your heavy baggage to Columbus or Grenada — the
latter would probably be preferable at present, on account of means of trans
portation, but decide for yourself, after proper inquiry. I believe all the neces
sary arrangements are being made for the sick at Okalona. Your despatch on
the subject has been referred to General Bragg. I send you the copy of a tele
gram from General Withers at Fort Pillow. I am disappointed at the informa
tion it contained. I have ordered him to commeuce forthwith a system of de
tached works to protect his rear. The intelligence from General McCown is
also quite sad, but I do not see how we can reinforce him at present ; our forces
have not yet half arrived from the South, and then we must guard our rear,
threatened from the Tennessee River. With the small force at our command, we
cannot present a strong front everywhere.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
Maj. -Genl. L. Polk, Comdg. 1st G. Division, at Humboldt, Tenn.

Jackson, Tenn., March 14th, 1862.
To Genl. S. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
Enemy has landed in force about twenty thousand at Crump's Landing, op
posite Savannah. My forces preparing to meet him. Am much in need of
generals. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 16th, 1862.
To Genl. S. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
Must again apply for a Chief Commissary of experience, such as Colonel R.
B. Lee, or Major Blair, or Williams, otherwise millions' worth of property, not
to be replaced, will be lost. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 17th, 1862.
To Maj.-Genl. BRAGG, Corinth :
Have requested Mr. Fleming to inform you of the transportation capacity of
adjoining railroads, so that you can determine and order up the means (as far

522 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII.
as practicable) called for by General Johnston. Please let General Johnston
know what can be done to meet his wishes, and how. Thomas Jordan, A. A. G.

Jackson, Tenn., March 17th, 1862.
To Maj. -Genl. Bragg :
General Johnston wants four hundred cars, with locomotives, at Decatur.
What can be done from Corinth ? Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.

Jackson, Tenn., March 18th, 1862.
L. J. Fleming, Corinth :
What chance to get cars and locomotives from Memphis, Mississippi Central,
or other roads ? Where are the cars, etc., of the Memphis and Charleston, aud
those from the Nashville Road? General Johnston asks for cars. How are
they to be got for him ? Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.

Jackson, Tenn., March 18th, 1862.
To Genl. A. S. Johnston, Decatur :
General Bragg at Corinth. Have asked him to answer your question about
cars. Very large supply there. Enemy threw six hundred shells at Island No.
10, without damage to any one, or anything, yesterday. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 18th, 1862.
To General L. Polk :
What number of your troops remain at Humboldt ? Troops must he sent as
fast as practicable, with means of transportation, to Corinth. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 18lh, 1862.
General A. S. Johnston, Decatur:
One hundred and sixty cars with locomotives will be sent you from Mississippi
Central Railroad ; more will be quickly sent from other roads. G. T. BeaureGjVrd.

Jackson, Tenn., March 21st.
Maj.-Genl. Bragg, Corinth :
The General wishes an armed reconnoissance made, of say (3) three regiments
infantry, some cavalry and artillery, to feel the enemy. Must be cautiously
made with advance guards, and all due military precautious. Thomas Jordan, A. A. G.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVIII. 523
Jackson, Tenn., March 22d, 1882.
A. S. Johnston, Genl. Comdg., Courtland :
Following despatch just received from Van Dorn :
" Van Buren, Ark., March 21st, 1862.
" I march my first brigade to-morrow towards Jacksonport, Arkansas. All
the troops here will march in a few days to the same poiut. I will probably
have, on White River, by 10th or 12th April, twenty thousand men or more,
and about seventy pieces of artillery. It was my intention to attack the forces
near New Madrid and Poiut Pleasaut from the north by Greenville. What do
yon now advise ? There is au army of about twenty thousand. Enemy north
of this in Arkansas, but they cannot subsist there ; nor do I think they can do
much harm in the West. We cannot subsist here. I think it more important
to save the Mississippi River. Answer me at once. I start for Little Rock day
after to-morrow. Earl Van Dorn."
I shall try to see you to-morrow, unless you prefer to come here.
G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, March 22d, 9 h. p. m.
Major-General E. Van Dorn, Little Rock, Ark. :
Despatch received. 'Tis important to join our forces for defeuce of valley
by shortest route. Could you not come to Memphis, via river ? There we will
operate to best advantage. I will send you all the boats you may require.
Sidney Johnston will be with us. You might come ahead for conference. We
still hold Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 21st, 1832.
D. B. Harris, Engineers, Fort Pillow :
Look, as soon as practicable, to laud defence of fort. Construct detached
works first, then cremaillere. Total garrison about three thousand men ; de
fensive lines must not be too extensive. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, March 22d, 1862.
Major-General J. P. McCown, Comdg. Madrid Bend. Care Colonel Pickett,
Union City :
Van Dorn proposes to attack enemy in reverse at New Madrid. Be of good
cheer and hold out. G- T- Beauregard.
Jackson, Tenn., March 22d.
General A. S. Johnston, Decatur, or wherever he may be :
I consider presence of Major Gilmer indispensable at Fort Pillow for a few
days. Safety of the place aud Mississippi Valley may depend upon it.
G. T. Beauregard.
Jackson, Tenn., March 22d.
Major-General B. Bragg, Coriuth, Miss. :
When can you spare Oladowski to attend to the making of guns from bells.
G. T. Beauregard.

524 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
Corinth, Miss., March 27th, 1862.
General S. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
Headquarters established here (on 26th). Want officers Quartermaster's De
partment greatly ; recommend Thomas Clark, W. R. Bennett, J. W. Crocker, and
Addison Piles, as Assistant Quartermasters. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, Miss., March 28lh, 1862.
General S. Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Geul., Richmond, Va. :
Where are Generals Hawes and Brown, Colonel R. B. Lee, and Captain Wam
pler ? All greatly wanted. Spare me General Lawton with one brigade from
Georgia, if possible, for here a great battle is certain. I greatly want a general
of artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Calhoun very competent.
G. T. Beauregard.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
Extracts from Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm's Report of the Battle of Shiloh.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April lith, 1862.
General, — In accordance with your order, I have the honor to submit the fol
lowing report of orders conveyed by me on the 6th and 7th instants, during the
battle of Shiloh ; also a few of my observations during those two days.
A few minutes before 5 o'clock, on the morning of the 6th instant, the move
ment was commenced by General Hardee's command. At 6^ h. I inquired of
General Bragg where his ammunition wagons were stationed ; he informed me,
at a convenient distance on the Pittsburg and Hamburg roads. 6£ a. m. firing
ceased. 5 m. of 7 h. General Polk's command moved past Headquarters No.
1, at intersection of Pittsburg and Hamburg roads. 7 h. 5 m. the first can
non was fired on our left. From 7 to 7\ a. m. heavy musketry at intervals. 30
min. of 8 h. rear of General Polk's command passed headquarters and commenced
moving forward. 8 a. M. ordered General Polk to throw two brigades ou the
left of the oue moving along the road, so as to strengthen the loft and rear of
General Bragg. In conveying this order I was accompanied by Lieutenant-
Colonel Ferguson. I then proceeded on to General Bragg and comtniiuicated
the same order to him, in order that he would understand the movement. Re
turned, and while ou the way requested General Polk to place himself in com
munication with General Bragg. General Bragg directed me to say to you that
he was ready to support General Hardee when he shonld require it ; that he
was iu line, but not engaged, except with his artillery, which was shelling the
enemy's camps. Returned and reported at 8£ A. M. 9^ a. m. a surgeon of Gen
eral Hardee's corps reported to me that the General's commaud was within (50)
fifty yards of the enemy's camps. Reported this to you.
***** * *
12J p. m., delivered order to Colonel Pond to advance and attack the enemy.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 525
I found Colonel Hill with his former command near him. I requested Colonel
Pond to take command of the whole force. I made a reconnoissance with Colonel
Pond ; he discovered the position of the enemy near a log-house on the left of
General Hardee's command. Colonel Pond, wishing some cavalry to protect
his left, I ordered a squadron I found near by to support him. Colonel Pond
had under his command the Orleans Battalion, 16th and 18th Louisiana, besides
Colonel Hill's command (two regiments). I requested these two officers to act
in concert, which they said they would do, and it was agreed that Colonel Pond
should command the whole. Returned and reported to you.
*******
5£, was ordered by you from in front to find General Hardee, and see how he
was getting along, but to return and report to you before dark. I found his
command engaging the enemy — the General with his men, cheering them on.
Nothing could exceed his coolness aud gallantry. He was always in the thickest
of the fight. It was useless to look for him elsewhere. His answer, to my
question if he wished anything, was, " Tell the General we are getting along
very well, but they are putting it to us very severely." Not ouee did he ask
for assistance.
None of his staff being then with him, I offered to act as his aide-de-camp, and
to bring up two regiments which were in rear of him and place them on his
left. This I accomplished with one of them, and was bringing up the second,
when a tremendous fire was opened upon us from, I think, two field-pieces and
the heavy guns of the gunboats. The Tennessee regiment, which I was bring
ing into position, broke iu disorder and fell back. Major White (formerly of
General Hardee's staff, now commanding cavalry) assisted me in rallying them
and inducing them to lay down behind the crest of a hill. After sundown Gen
eral Hardee withdrew his command beyond the range of the guns of the gun
boats. There were many orders which I bore from you during the clay which
it is impossible for me now to recall to mind.
*******
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servaut,
A. R. Chisolm, 1st Lieut, and A. D. C, C. S. A.

Extracts from Colonel Brent's Report of the Bailie of Shiloh.
Headquarters Army of Mississippi,
Corinth, April 18th, 1862.
General G. T. Beauregard :
General, — In pursuance of your instructions, to give you a statement of the
several orders borne by me in the battle of Shiloh, on the 6th and 7th instant,
I beg leave respectfully to submit the following report :
After assuming your position with your staff in the angle formed by the in
tersection of the Pittsburg and Hamburg roads, I was, at 45 minutes past 5
o'clock A. M., directed to order the 1st Tennessee regiment, which was then
moving towards the rear on the Pittsburg road, to countermarch, and, with
right in front, to form along the Hamburg road, its left resting thereon, which.
was executed.

526 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.

At twenty-three minutes past 7 o'clock was directed, in conjunction with
Colonel Augustin, to move on the Hamburg road towards our right, and as
certain the coudition of affairs in that quarter.
*********
About this time, fifteen minutes to 8, the sharp rattle of musketry was heard
along the centre aud left, and in a minute the euemy, on General Gladden's
right, and at a distance of about two hundred and fifty yards, opened a heavy
fire. Colonel Adams behaved with coolness and gallantry, our right pressed
on, and the second line of battle was moving rapidly up to the support of the
first. At twenty-five minutes past 8 o'clock I reached your headquarters and
reported. At twenty minutes past 9 we moved from Headquarters No. 1, and
I was directed to advise Drs. Choppin and Brodie thereof, and where you could
be found. At five minutes past 10 was ordered to direct General Trabue to send
forward two regiments of his brigade to the centre, which was executed at thir
teen minutes past 10. I having reported, was then directed to General Trabue
to have an additional regiment sent forward to the same point. At twenty
minutes to 11 o'clock, it having been ascertained that the euemy had planted a
battery on our left, I was directed to ascertain its position, and have established
a counter-battery. *********
At fifteen minutes past 11 there was another report of au enemy's battery
threatening us on the left. I was directed to go forward, and, if additional
support were needed, to order forward two regiments, which were supposed to be
in reserve. I immediately went forward, and, at 11J- o'clock, found that while
our line was engaged, yet it was not hotly pressed. I found Colonel Hill in his
old position, and immediately directed him to advance to this position, which
he immediately did.
*********
At 12J o'clock I was ordered by you to collect all stragglers, and organize
them into a battalion and send them forward, and that a company of cavalry
would report to assist me. No company of cavalry reported, but, with the as
sistance of Majors Haines and Jnge, I succeeded in organizing a battalion of
two hundred and seventy men, with a complement of officers, and reported with
them to you at the cross-roads (I suppose your Headquarters No. 2), some dis
tance to the left and in advance of Shiloh church ; under your direction, it
marched to the front, under Majors Haines aud Juge.
At 2$ o'clock another battalion was formed, under Major Moore, and I was
ordered to march it to the front to put it under the command of General Bragg.
I proceeded immediately to General Bragg's command, hut could not find him ;
but saw Colonel Gardner. I moved this battalion to the right and formed it
ou the left of two regiments which had been ordered forward a few minutes be
fore, aud tho whole placed uuder Colonel Gibson.
At this point I saw the staff of our brave General A. S. Johnston, and was ad
vised for tho first time of his death, and was requested by Colonel O'Hara to
communicate it to you. I returned and did so, but found it had already been

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 527
communicated to you. At fifteen minutes to 4 was directed to accompany
Colonel Jordan to the left front, and at 4£ o'clock found the enemy in full re
treat. On my return (to Headquarters No. 4) was directed to establish a police
guard to protect the property, aided by Captain Cummings, as well as to prevent
stragglers, whom we arrested. Although aided by the assiduous efforts of Cap
tain Cummings to accomplish this, I am afraid that not much was effected.
*******
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
George Wm. Brent, Acting Insp.-Gen.

Extracts from the Report of Colonel Ferguson, A. D. C. to General Beauregard.
Hejvdquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, April 9th, 1862.
General, — In obedience to your instructions, I have the honor to submit the
following report of the orders conveyed by me, and of the operations of our
troops on the 6th instant, as far as my observation enables me.
At 4 h. 55 m. a. m., firing along our front commenced.
At 6 h. a. m., conveyed order to General Polk to advance tho centre of his lead
ing brigade to intersection of Hamburg and Pittsburg roads.
At 6 h. 40 m., General Johnston and Btaff advanced from Headquarters No. 1
to the front.
At 7 h. 4 m., Polk's advance brigade passed Headquarters No. 1.
At 7 h. 9 m., first cannon fired ou our left.
At 7 h. 33 m., General Cheatham's advauco brigade passed Headquarters
No. 1.
At 7 h. 35 m., ordered General Breckinridge to deploy, in column of brigades,
centre of leadiug brigade near cross-roads.
At 7 h. 52 m., ordered General Polk to advance his 3d and 4th brigades to left
and front, to strengthen Bragg's left.
At 9.10, ordered General Polk to send one brigade by flank to support our ex
treme right ; accompanied the brigade detailed, that of General Bushrod John
son, part of the way, and returned to Headquarters No. 1 at 9 h. 30 a. m.
At 9 h. 35 m., left Headquarters No. 1 with yourself and staff for more ad
vanced position. Between time of arrival at Headquarters No. 2 aud 11 h. a. m.,
carried orders to infantry ou our left and front, to advance two regiments to
front and right as a support to our batteries there massed. Order to Captain
Hodgson, of Washington Artillery, to make a reconuoissauce to front and left,
where a four-gun battory of the enemy was reported in position ; and, if the
ground admitted it, to advance his battery in that direction aud silence them.
Visited one of the captured camps and then reported to you the straggling
there going on for the purpose of plunder. You then ordered Captain Dreux,
of your escort, with part of his company, to clear the camps. Was employed
collecting stragglers, and men leaving field with wouuded, and sending them
back to the front.
At 11 h. 10 m., by your order, took command of the 27th Tennessee regi-

528 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
ment, reported without a field-officer and without ammunition. Reorganized
the regiment, and, while trying to procure ammunition, caused them to rest and
refresh themselves with coffee, etc. Having distributed ammunition, and find
ing the major fit for duty, with your consent I turned over the command of tho
regiment to him aud resumed my staff duties, about 1 h. p. m. Continued with
you, placing troops and hurrying forward reserves, etc. Carried an order to Cap
tain Bankhead to advance his battery to the front. This he executed by tho
Pittsburg roacl. At the time the enemy were being rapidly driven to the river
along our centre and right flank. Soon afterwards, part of General Anderson's
brigade, and then a Louisiana brigade — I think that of Colonel Gibson — were
advanced in the same direction.
Some time after this, a staff officer having reported a brigade without a com
mander, you directed me to assume command of and lead it iuto action. Pro
ceeding with said officer to the point designated, I met General Hardee, who
commanded that portion of the field, and reported my orders to him. He di
rected me to lead the brigade by the left flauk as far as possible to the rear of a
camp of the enemy in front of our left, and, if possible, to take it iu reverse.
At the same time he placed under my command Captain Hodgson's battery,
Washington Artillery of New Orleans, already in position, to shell the said
camp, and reply to a battery of the enemy there in position. After assuming
command of the brigade, which I found to consist of the 16th and 18th regiments
Louisiana Volunteers, and the battalion of Orleans Guards, all under the com-
niaud of Colonel Pond, I made a reconnoissance by which I found that the
camp I was ordered to carry was in a strong position, separated from the
ground we had already gained by a deep raviue, a branch of which extended to
our front, along our left of said camp. A considerable extent of open ground
to the left of this ravine contained another camp of the enemy, who could he
seen drawn up iu line of battle iu large force, at the edge of the woods still
farther to the left and front.
*******
Iu this connection, while noticing the general gallantry of the officers and
men I had the honor to command, I wish to call particular notice to the brave
and efficient services of Lieutenant E. Puech, Adjutant of the Orleans Guards,
and of Lieutenant C. M. Sheppard, Acting Adjutant of the 18th regiment Louis
iana volunteers, who acted as my staff; also of Major F. Dumonteil, a volun
teer with the Orleans Guards ; and of Father E. Turgis, who, in the performance
of his holy offices, freely exposed himself to the balls of the euemy.
Very respoctfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. Ferguson, Lieut.-Col. and A. D. C.
Goul. G. T. Beauregard, comdg. Army of the Mississippi.

Extracts from Colonel N. Augustin's Report of the Battle of Shiloh.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 10th, 1862.
General,—! have the honor to report, in obedience to your orders, the follow-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 529
ing notes and orders as taken by me during the engagements with the enemy
of the 6th and 7th instant.
Headquarters No. 1. At five minutes of 5 o'clock a. m., ou the 6th, we heard
the first fire from skirmishing on our right towards Lick Creek ; at half-past 5
we heard a volley of musketry ; at 6 o'clock a. m., the engagement appeared to
be becoming general ; at half-past 6 the fire slackened, and ceased at a quar
ter of 7.
At twenty minutes of 8 I went, by your order, to the right, and reported, at
twenty minutes of 9, a brisk engagement on tho right, and recommended send
ing troops to the right to support and extend our line in that direction ; re
marked that our men fired at too long a distance, and too high ; danger of the
enemy flanking our right. At twenty minutes of 9 received your order to ac
company Geueral Breckinridge's division to reinforce the right and to follow
the movement of the right in front, extending as much as possible his own
right towards Lick Creek, and to follow the general movement forward.
At 10 o'clock, reported that the preceding order had been executed, aud that
General Breckinridge and division had arrived in position in good time, at about
four hundred yards in rear of General Dan. Adams's command. Geueral Beaure
gard moved to Headquarters No. 2; went to meet him.
*********
From 3 to 4 o'clock was occupied in collecting together and organizing strag
glers, to march them as reinforcements to General Bragg ; placed one battalion
thus formed under command of W. W. Wood of Mississippi.
At dusk, about 6, sent by General Beauregard to the front, to order "to arrest
the conflict and fall back to the camps of the enemy for the night." Transmit
ted this order to Generals Bragg, Polk, and Hardee ; returned, and was happy to
congratulate the general upon the success of our army on that day. Encamped
in one of the enemy's tents near Shiloh.
******* Yours very respectfully, N. Augustin, V. A. D. C.

Extracts from the statement of facts relative to the first and second days of the battle of
Shiloh, prepared by Major B. B. Waddell, volunteer A. D. C. of General Beauregard.
St. Louis, Nov. 8th, 1878.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
*******
On the night of the 3d of April I received an order from you to select such
guides from my escort as I desired, aud report to General Hardee, early on the
morning of the 4th, and to go with General Hardee, via the Bark road, to a ridge
in front of the enemy at Pittsburg, at or near the junction of the Hamburg and
Pittsburg roads.
I reported early to General Hardee; but one cause and another prevented
his movement as early as had been ordered, and it was near noon before his en
tire command was in motion.
We moved out to the Monterey road, taking the Bark road at the fork, and at
I.— 34

530 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
nightfall bivouacked at a spring to the right of the Bark road. To reach tho
spring the command was moved off of the Bark road, on a blind road which
made a cut-off across the head- waters of a creek, while the Bark road followed
the ridge around the spring and small branches of the creek.
Late at night Geueral Polk's command came along, following his order, the
command of General Hardee, and, the Bark road being unoccupied, moved on it
until ho reached a picket which I had posted, over a mile in advance of General
Hardee's bivouac. On the morning of the 5th Geueral Hardee moved on early ;
and when we got back into the Bark road we found it occupied by General
Polk's command, which was in our front. The road was too narrow to admit
of a passage of Hardee's train, so it became necessary to lift General Polk's train
to one side of the road, which was effected by the aid of soldiers and teamsters.
This accideut occasioned some delay aud confusion, and may, to some extent,
accouut for a tardiness iu General Polk's arrival at the point designated for the
formation of the lines of battle.
In justice to General Polk, I will say that I do not think he discovered that
General Hardee had gone out of the Bark road until he had passed General Har
dee's command. Knowing that he was in its rear, he naturally enough had no
advance guard out, and no means of discovering the condition of affairs. I
joined you on the morning of the 5th at Monterey, and rode with you to Head
quarters No. 1. Judging of time by what I had done that morning, I am of
opinion that it was after noon before you and General Johnston reached the
ridge where the front line was formed and Headquarters No. 1 was established.
After a conference of the general officers was held, at a point in the road, at
which I witnessed a very marked deference on the part of General A. S. John
ston for your opinions and plaus of conducting the battle, it was suggested
by General Hardee that you should ride iu front of his line of battle to show
yourself to his men, giving them tho encouragement, which nothing but your
presence could do. I well remember your modest hesitation at the proposi
tion; your plea of sickness was urged (a more delicate reason existed, no doubt
— your esteem for the chief in command) ; but when the request was made
unanimous, General Johnston urging, you consented, on condition that the men
should not cheer as you passed, as cheering might discover our position to the
enemy. Au order was sent quickly along the lines, informing the men that
you would ride in front of them, and that no cheering should be indulged in.
You passed iu front of the lines, and never was an order so reluctantly obeyed
as was this order — "No cheering, men" — which had to be repeated at every
breath, and enforced by continuous gesture.
General Johnston's prestige was great, but the hearts of the soldiers were
with you ; and your presence awakened au enthusiasm aud confidence magical
iu its effect.
The formation in proper line was later than the original calculation; but I
heard no complaint except ofa tardiness on the part of General Polk.
The determination was to strike the enemy at daybreak on the 6th ; and the
general commanders received instructions for the attack. Officers aud soldiers
slept on their arms in hearing of the enemy, who, unconscious of our presence,

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 531
were cooking supper only a short distance beyond common range of our lines
of battle.
At daylight on the morning of the 6th of April, 1862, our lines moved in good
order, and, like an avalanche, struck the euemy left, right, aud centre, so nearly
simultaneously as to surprise his entire camp.
My first order received from you was early in the morning, after the firing ou
the right had indicated the propriety of directing Colonel Maury, I think (who
had been located with a small regiment on a road leading to a ford on Lick
Creek), to leave that position and go to the heaviest firing, and to inform Gen
eral Forrest (then Colonel), who was guarding a ford ou Lick Creek, of the re
moval of Colonel Maury's force. This order was promptly delivered, and I re
turned to you at Headquarters No. 2, about a quarter of a mile in advance of
Shiloh meeting-house ; time required to make this trip, judging from distance,
two hours. I found you there, and received an order to go into an encamp
ment which had been captured, stop the pillaging which was going on, and or
ganize stragglers and send them forward into line. I executed the order by
clearing the camps, placing a guard over them, and mustering into line forty or
fifty stragglers, aud went with them to the nearest line.
*******
I rode rapidly on by your Headquarters No. 2, where I had left you, as near
as I can now estimate, about 12 M. I found you had gone, or moved your head
quarters. I searched some time for you, and in the search, as near as I can now
estimate, went to your right aud somewhat in advauce of the poiut at which I
found you. My recollection is that I saw or met General Bragg not far from
you ; aud, learning that he was going to you, went with him, or after him, to you,
at what I understand was Headquarters No. 3, in advance of General Wallace's
captured camps. The sun was above the trees; heavy, broken clouds were
passing iu the west ; and I. would say it was not far from 5 o'clock p. m. The
battle was raging iu front at a terrible rate, and I was hopeful, which was bor
rowed, no doubt, from the hope which your face expressed, that we were rushiug
on them to complete the victory of the day. My recollection is that at this time
General Bragg expressed a difficulty he experienced iu forcing his men across a
depression by which gunboats were firing shells ; it was regarded as important
that the desired point should be carried. He left you with the order to press
forward, using his discretion as to the possibility of carrying the poiut, and as
to the sacrifice of men in the effort. He left you to make this important effort.
*******
At that time the struggle seemed to be an artillery duel, at least, the artillery
predominated over the firing of musketry.
Although the great confusion of our own forces was aud had been, for some
time, plainly apparent, as indicated in front and the great number of stragglers
in rear, yet the hope was justified that the enemy was more confused.
Two contingencies were looked for, at this critical period, with great care aud
anxiety. It was known that Buell, with a large force of fresh troops, had had
time to reach, at least, the opposite bank of the Tennessee River ; and you had
had no positive proof that Lew. Wallace, whose command was at a point on the

532 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX
river several miles below Pittsburg Landing, had reached the battle-field. Out
left had advanced beyond the point at which General Wallace would have been
expected to cross Owl Creek, in a march by the west side of the Tennessee, leav
ing our army and position sadly exposed in the event of such a movement on
his part. I stated to you my fears that Buell had arrived ; that I had been able
to see, from an elevated poiut, on my trip from Lick Creek, what I believed to
be the smoke of transport boats crossing or coming up the river.
Every resource and effort on your part was exerted at that critical point with
the shattered forces at your command.
The word was " Onward, onward ! a few more minutes, men, and the field is
ours." The struggle was, for a while, furious ; but night came, and the weary, worn-
out soldiers who had been in line for the past thirty hours, and under incessant
fire for the past twelve hours, without food or water (many of whom had seen
their brothers or comrades fall on that bloody field), with coming darkness
ceased their efforts, and the rattle of musketry ended.
I was engaged with the removal to the rear of a large number of prisoners,
captured with General Prentiss, until about sunset or after, and until late at
night, giving the best direction I could to soldiers who had lost their respective
commands. I saw you at Headquarters No. 4, near the Shiloh meeting-house, about dark,
from which time I did not see you until early Monday morning; but I have al
ways been under the impression that I heard you come to the tent in which you
slept, if you slept at all, late at night. It rained torrents during the night.
Monday, the 7th. — I was awakened early in the moruing by the rattle of mus
ketry. The enemy was advancing steadily on our forces in front. I was soon
in the saddle, and you directed me to go to the rear and find Geueral Polk, and
order him to come forward as rapidly as possible. Captain Clifton Smith, I
think, accompanied mo.
For some reason, I did not meet General Polk until I had gone to or near the
place to which ho had fallen back the previous night. He had gone to the
front ; and when I found him he was in line and under fire, executing in a most
beautiful manner the order I had for him. I reported to you the fact, and was
then sent to the rear to arrest and organize iu companies and squads the strag
glers and men who had lost their commands. At this I was engaged, I think,
until noon or later.
I then went forward, found a number of your staff under shelter at the meet
ing-house (a log-house) near Headquarters No. 4. I learned afterwards yon
had ordered your staff to that shelter, and had gone forward. Keeping as well
as I could under shelter of the elevation iu front, until I got near you, I joined
you on the hill, where you were giving direction to troops which were, I think,
lying down, with a view to reserving their fire for the enemy, then in full view.
After remaining with you iu this exposed condition a short time, we rode to
gether down the hill, not far from the log-house, probably crossing the depres
sion, about which time, say 1 o'clock p. m., you directed me to have the muskets
aud arms about the camps in rear loaded into wagous and taken to the rear.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 533
I put wagons and men at this work and returned to yon. You then directed
me, about 2 p. m., to find and locate a field battery at a point in rear, near
the corner of a field on the west side. I did so, under the fire of which and
other batteries our troops retired deliberately, the enemy not advancing.
I was more or less engaged, gathering guns and other property into wagons,
until you were ready to start back to Corinth, when I accompanied you, with
Governor Harris, by the shortest road to Corinth, where we arrived late at
night. Very truly, B. B. Waddell, ex- Vol. A. D. C.

Extracts from Colonel Jacob Tlwmpson's Report of the Battle of Shiloh.
Headquarters of the Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, April 14th, 1862.
To Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
General, — In pursuance of your directions, I beg leave to submit this as my
report of the battle of Shiloh.
*******
Soon after this, General Hardee, accompanied by his staff, came forward and
pressed you to ride along his Hue aud show yourself to his men. He believed it
would rovive and cheer their spirits to know that you were actually in the field
with them. You accepted the invitation, though then complaining of feeble
ness, on condition there should be no cheering. Ou your return from the review,
with your staff, every one was stopped for the coming up of General Polk's
corps. The whole army was not in position until about three o'clock, and then,
upon consultation, it was decided to postpone any further movement until morn
ing. The troops slept on their arms, aud the front Hues were allowed uo fires,
although the night was quite chilly.
Next morning, Sunday, 6th, the sky was without a cloud, and the sun arose
with cheering brilliancy. About five o'clock the first firing was heard iu the
centre down the Pittsburg road. Iu less than three minutes firing was heard
on the left. Intermittent firing in the centre and on tho right of our lines was
continued until five minutes after six o'clock. At half after six I bore order
from you to General Breckinridge, who commanded the reserve, that he must
hurry forward his troops, inasmuch as General Polk was in motion. This order
was promptly delivered. Soon after this General Johnston called on you and
expressed himself satisfied with the manner in which the battle had been opeued.
The greatest enthusiasm prevailed both with officers aud men. When you
established your headquarters on the high point between the Pittsburg and
Hamburg roads, heavy firing was heard on our right. The first cannon was
discharged on our left at seven o'clock, which was followed by a rapid discharge
of musketry. About half-past seven I rode forward with Colonel Jordan to the
front to fiud General Johnston, and ascertain how the battle was going. There
I was informed, by General Johnston, that General Hardee's line was within
half a mile of the enemy's camps, and bore from him a message to you that he
advised the sending forward strong reinforcements to our left, as he had just

534 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
then learned that the enemy was therein great force. Under this advice, two
of General Breckinridge's brigades were started to the support of the left, but
before he proceeded far I bore a message to General Breckinridge to send but
one to the left, and to order two brigades to the right, on Lick Creek. This
change was made in consequence of information brought by a courier that the
enemy was not strong on our left, aud had fallen back. From eight to half-
past eight the cannonading was very heavy along the whole lino, but especially
in the centre, which was in the line of their camps. It was about this time
General Breckinridge and staff moved by your headquarters with two brigades.
When his troops had passed, you broke up your headquarters at this point and
moved forward with your staff, aud halted on the Pittsburg road, about half a
mile west of the enemy's camps. Here we met large numbers of wounded men
aud stragglers from our ranks. Immediately your whole staff was ordered to
rally the stragglers and send them forward to their regiments. I was charged
with the duty of hurrying forward the ammunition wagons to a point of safety
in the rear of our lines. Several loads of ammunition were conducted to a point
of safety beyond the first encampment, to a point just outside of the firing.
After passing over the second ridge, where the conflict was maintained with the
greatest intensity, and remaining till I observed the enemy give back before our
troops, I returned to your quarters, which had then beeu moved up to the old
house on the ridge, where we first entered the enemy's encampment.
******* With'high respect and esteem, your obedient servant,
J. Thompson.

Extract from General Hardee's Report of the Battle of Shiloh.
Headquarters Hardee's Corps,
February, 1863.
General,— ******
The order was given to advance at daylight on Sunday, the 6th of April.
The morning was bright and bracing. At early dawn the enemy attacked the
skirmishers in front of my line, commanded by Major, now Colonel, Hardcastle
which was resisted handsomely by that promising young officer, and the battle
in half an hour, became fierce; my command advanced. Hindman's brio-ade
engaged the euemy with great vigor, on the edge of a wood, and drove him
rapidly back over the field towards Pittsburg, while Gladden's brigade on the
right, about eight o'clock, dashed upon tho encampments of a division under
the command of General Prentiss. At the same time, Cleburne's brigade, with
the 15th Arkansas deployed as skirmishers, and the 2d Tennessee en echelon
on the left, moved quickly through the fields, and, though far outflanked by the
enemy on our left, rushed forward under a terrific fire from the serried ranks
drawn up in front of the camp. A morass covered his front, aud, being difficult
to pass, caused a break in the brigade. Deadly volleys were poured upon the
men from behind bales of hay and other defences as they advanced, aud, after a
series of desperate charges, the brigade was compelled to fall back. In this

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 535
charge the 6th Mississippi, under Colonel Thornton, lost more than three hundred
killed and wounded out of an effective forco of four hundred and twenty-five.
******* I remain, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. J. Hardee, Lieut.-Genl.
To General S. Cooper, Adj.-Genl.

Extract from Dr. Nott's letter to General Beauregard, relative to tlie withdrawal of
troops on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh.
New York, November 6th, 1869.
My dear General, — Your letter of 30th October, enclosing a copy of one from
G. Humphries, Esq., of Mobile, relative to a conversation of his with me
touching a point iu the history of the battle of Shiloh, has just been received,
and I reply without a moment's delay.
I must commence by saying that, although I rode by the side of General
Bragg through the greater part of that day, carried several of his orders myself
to different parts of the field (all the other members of the staff being absent on
duty), was with him up to the close of the battle, aud rode off with him to his
tent after the order to recall the troops was given, the General never said to
me by whose authority the order was given.
I can only say that, at the close of the day, when beside him on horseback, I
heard him give an order to withdraw the troops from tho field, and also for their
disposition for the night. My impression at the time was, that General Bragg
gave the order on his own responsibility. We were immediately in the rear of
our line, the enemy had fallen back to Pittsburg Lauding, and their gunboats
were keeping a furious shelling. Our men, immediately in front of where we
were standing, were much demoralized, and indisposed to advance in the face
of the shells which were bursting over us in every direction ; and my impression
was (this was also the conclusion of General Bragg), that our troops had done
all that they would do aud had better be withdrawn.
The scene in front of Geueral Bragg and myself (in the direction of the
enemy's fire) was one of considerable confusion, aud np to the time he gave tho
order I had seen no messenger from you, aud believed that it emanated from
him. I heard him give it, and I rode with him from the battle-field, some two
miles, to his camp for the night. If he had received and disapproved such an
order, it is probable that something would have been said about it.
******* Very respectfully aud truly yours, J. C. Nott, M. D.*

Extracts from a letter of Colonel Jacob Thompson, Volunteer A. D. C. to General
Beauregard, relative to the Battle of Shiloh.
Memphis, Tenn., July 20th, I860.
To Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
My dear General, — I have been absent from home for more than three months,
* Dr. Nott was Medical Director of General Bragg's corps, and stood at the head of.
his profession iu Mobile. He ranked among the first surgeons of the United States.

536 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
and have but lately returned. On my arrival I find your letter, which had
been duly received.
I shall answer the several points to which you callmy attention, with readiness.
Ou the evening and night of the 6th April, the first day of the battle of
Shiloh, after the order had been given to cease firing, and all was quiet along
our lines, all, or nearly all, of the general officers came to headquarters, where I
mingled freely among them ; heard from them accounts of the many moving in
cidents of the day, the death of many good and brave men, the capture and
flight of the enemy. But on that evening, although all admitted the victory
was not complete, yet I heard no one express the slightest discontent with your
order to cease firing. On the contrary, the impression left on my mind, of which
I have a vivid recollection, by their conversation, was, that our troops had all
done well, and had accomplished all that could have been expected, and that we
were masters of tho field. I certainly heard no one say that if he had not been
called off he could have won for himself and his troops any additional laurels.
On that evening I heard no criticism of the order to cease firing, and I feel con
fident there was none in any quarter. I am further satisfied now, and always
have been, that all complaints of your drawing off the troops on the evening of the
6th were after-thoughts, and especially with the general officers. Because, until
the fact was well established that the enemy, during that night, received an
additional aid of more than twenty thousand fresh troops, no such thought
seemed to have occurred to any one. After that, however, many began to say
it would have been far better for us to have attempted to complete our work
on the day before. Some of the general officers began to say we could have
done more. But I have never thought that such was their opinion the day be
fore. The exhausted condition of our troops, their disorganization, derangement,
and straggling were fearfully great, and I have never believed that their wor
ried, hungry, and disorganized bands, though flushed with victory, could have
silenced General Buell's batteries, which wero brought into the action on the
evening of the 6th, and I do not think any of our generals thought so then.
* * * * * * *
My object in this letter has been to give you as frank and direct replies as
possible to your inquiries.
I shall be happy to hear from you at all times.
Very truly, your obedient servant, J. Thompson.

Extract from a Letter of ex-Governor I. G. Harris of Tennessee to General Beauregard,
relative to the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston.
Memphis, April 13ft, 1876.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, New Orleans :
My dear Sir, — Your letter of 5th instant came to hand a few days since. Iu
answer to which I beg to say that your letter of last autumn did not reach me,
or it should have been promptly answered.
About li h., an hour before his fall, Geueral Johnston moved around to about
the centre of General Breckinridge's division, upon our extreme right, and for
about three quarters of an hour occupied a position immediately in rear of Gen-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 537
eral Breckinridge's line, where a very hard fight was going ou. Exposed to a
galling fire, our line held its position steadily, but at very considerable cost,
until finally General Johnston decided to order and lead a charge from that po
sition upon the line of the enemy that confronted us. He rode to the front,
talked to the troops a moment or two, ordered aud led the charge. The ene
my's line gave away before us, and we advanced, I should think, three quarters
of a mile, and established our line on a ridge parallel to the one we had left,
meeting a galling fire from the enemy'while thus re-establishing our line.
Just as our line had been established and dressed, General Johnston called
my attention to the fact that the sole of one of his boots had been cut by a ball.
I asked him, somewhat eagerly, " Are you wounded ; did the ball touch your
foot ?" He said, " No ;" and was proceeding to make an additional remark,
when a battery of the enemy opened fire from a position to our left, which
enfiladed our line in its then position, when he said to me, " Order Colonel
Statham to wheel his regiment to the left, charge, and take that battery." I
galloped immediately to Colonel Statham, about two hundred yards distant,
aud gave the order, and gallopod immediately back to General Johnston, who
was sitting upon his horse where I had left him, a few feet in rear of our line
of battle. Riding up to his right side, I said, " Geueral, your order is delivered,
and Colonel Statham is in motion." As I was saying this, he leaned from me
iu a manner that impressed me with the idea that he was falliug from his
horse. I instantly extended my left arm around his neck, grasping his coat-
collar, and pulling him towards me until I righted him up in the saddle ; and,
stooping forward so that I could look him in the face, I asked him, "General,
are you wounded ?" He said, " Yes, and I fear seriously." At this moment his
rein dropped from his hand. Holding him with my left hand, I caught up his
rein with my right, in which I held my own, and guided both horses to a de
pression about one hundred yards in rear of the Hue, where I took him off his
horse, having asked Captain Wickham, just as I was leaving the line, to bring
me a surgeon at the earliest momeut possible. I am satisfied that General
Johnston did not live exceeding thirty minutes after he was taken from his
horse. I did not look at my watch at the time, but my best impression is that
it was 2% or 3 o'clock p.m. when he died.
*******
Just as he was breathing his last, and when he was unconscious, Geueral
Wm. Preston joined me, and General Preston and I agreed that General Preston
should remain with the remains aud attend. them hack to headquarters, and that
I should go immediately to you and report the fact of his death. My own horse
having run off when I dismounted, I took one of General Johnston's horses from
his orderly, who was near by, and galloped to you near North Shiloh church,
and reported to you the fact of his death. Having reported to you the fact, I
rode off, but returned in a few moments and said to you, "I came here as a vol
unteer aid to General Johnston ; as he has fallen, I no longer have any duties
to perform. I intend to remain until the battle is over, aud would like to be
useful, if there are duties that you can assign me to." You answered, " I shall
be pleased to have you with me," and from that time I reported to you.

538 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
From this somewhat detailed, but hurried, statement, you will see what my
recoUection is of the time aud place of his fall.
Very truly, your friend, Isham G. Harris.

Extracts from a Letter of Captain Clifton H. Smith, A. A. G. Confederate Army, to
General Beauregard, relative to the Battle of Shiloh.
My dear General, — Replying to the questions contained iu your note of the
30th ultimo, I beg to state, 1st. The order which you sent to General Bragg, ou
the afternoon of Sunday, April 6th, 1862, through me, was couched in the fol
lowing language, namely : " Ride to the front and instruct General Bragg to ar
rest the conflict and reform his lines." 2d. I found General Bragg in a slight
ravine in the immediate rear of Ruggles's division, accompanied by his staff and
escort. The distance from Shiloh church, where I left you, I should judge was
between one and two miles. He had evidently but just retired from some por
tion of his line of battle. General Ruggles himself was immediately at hand.
My impression is that they were, or had been, conferring about the disposition
of the troops when I rode up and joined them.
I cannot say what brigade of Ruggles's division was iu our immediate front,
but I am confident none of the troops in that immediate quarter were in offen
sive action at that moment; for I only remember hearing a dropping fire of
musketry, and not the regular roll of a line of battle in action — which, once
heard, is ever after easily recognized.
I communicated your order to General Bragg in the exact words I had re
ceived it. Without one syllable of comment, he transmitted samo to his divis
ion commanders, Withers aud Ruggles ; to the first through his aide-de-camp,
and possibly in person to General Ruggles, who was only a few yards off. After
the order had been thus communicated to the division commauders, General
Bragg, turning to me, asked, " Can you conduct me to the place where General
Beauregard is at present ?" I replied in the affirmative, aud we left the front,
riding towards the point where I had parted with you, and where I had left
you in conversation with General Prentiss (Federal prisoner, lately captured) be
side the rivulet which flowed at tho base of the hill, in rear of Shiloh chapel.
***** * *
After giving him the order, as before remarked, I remained by his side until
we started together to join you. I met some broken bodies of troops retiring
from the conflict, as I went forward ; one I remember especially, which some of
the men informed me was a Kentucky regiment, without ammunition, and its
organization almost lost. When I reached General Bragg, the troops appeared
to me to be substantially at a standstill, judging from the character of the firin<*
and the condition of things presented to my view.
*******
After transmitting your order to his division commauders, we left the front
together. From some cause or other, which I cannot at present call to mind, I
became detached from Geueral Bragg during our ride ; but I have a distinct
recoUection of again joining him before he met you, for I perfectly remember

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 539
walking with him, after dismounting, to the spot where you were standing, and
calling his attention to the fact that he was in your presence. It was quite
dark, and he was at first uuable to distinguish you. The darkness settles in
my mind the time of our return to your headquarters.
*******
The distance from Shiloh chapel to the poiut where I joined General Bragg
(as stated) must have been between one and two miles. I recollect, in carry
ing the order to him, that I crossed the line of fire of the Federal gunboats, both
going aud returning. They were shelling the woods at the points where they
supposed our people were engaged with their comrades. I should judge that
our front must have been quite a half a mile iu advance of this line of fire,
which seemed to me harmless, and doing no hurt beyond scaring horses aud
unsteadying a few men unaccustomed to heavy artillery fire.
Ceaseless comment has turned upon the execution and propriety of this mo
mentous order. Were it necessary, it would not be difficult to show that, at
that particular juncture, a proper alignment of our own disordered columns was
essentia], yea, of vital necessity to the existence of that army; and that the
strictures and innuendoes which have for years been spread broadcast through
out this land, blaming you for the loss of that battle, are unjust and without
any real foundation.
But why speculate upon the probable result ? It is in evidence, from the re
ports of division, brigade, and regimental commanders, that every effort to dis
lodge the enemy from their last stronghold, defended by forty guns, placed in
position by Colonel Webster, of the Regular (Federal) army, and fought under
his immediate eye, proved abortive.
* * * * * * *
I remain, my dear General,
Ever sincerely your friend and well-wisher,
Clifton H. Smith, Capt. and A. Adj.-Gcn.
in tho late Confederate Army.

Preliminary Report of the Battle of Shiloh.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April lift, 1862.
General,— On the 2d ultimo, having ascertained conclusively, from the move
ments of the enemy on the Tennessee River, and from reliable sources of infor
mation, that his aim would be to cut off my communications in West Tennessee
with the Eastern and Southern States, by operating from the Tennessee River
between Crump's Landing and Eastport, as a base, I determined to foil his de
signs by concentrating all my available forces at and around Corinth.
"Meanwhile, having called on the governors of the States of Tennessee, Mis
sissippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, to furnish additional troops, some of them,
chiefly regiments from Louisiana, soon reached this vicinity; and, with two
divisions of General Polk's command from Columbus, and a fine corps of troops
from Mobile and Pensacola, under Major-General Bragg, constituted the Army

540 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
of the Mississippi. At the same time, General Johnston, being at Murfreesboro',
on the march to form junction of his forces with mine, was called on to send
at least a brigade by railroad, so that we might hope to fall on and crush the
enemy should he attempt au advance from under his gunboats.
The call on General Johnston was promptly complied with. His entire force
was also hastened in this direction, and, by tho 1st of April, our united forces
were concentrated along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, from Bethel to Corinth,
and on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, from Corinth to Iuka.
It was then determined to assume the offensive and strike a sudden blow at
the enemy, iu position under General Grant, on the west bank of the Tennessee
at Pittsburg, aud in the direction of Savannah, before he was reinforced by the
army under General Buell, then known to be advancing for that purpose by
rapid marches from Nashville via Columbia. About the same time, General
Johnston was advised that such an operation conformed to the expectations of
the President.
By a rapid and vigorous attack on General Grant it was expected he would
be beaten back into his transports and the river, or captured, in time to enable
us to profit by the victory, aud remove to the rear all the stores and munitions
that would fall into our hands in such au event, before the arrival of General
Buell's army on the scene. It was never contemplated, however, to retain the
position thus gained and abandon Corinth, the strategic point of the campaigu.
Want of general officers, needful for the proper organization of divisions and
brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together, and other difficulties in
the way of an effective organization, delayed the movement until the night of
the 2d instant ; when it was heard from a reliable quarter that the juuction of
the enemy's armies was near at hand. It was then, at a late hour, determined
that the attack should be attempted at once, incomplete and imperfect as were
our preparations for such a grave and momentous adventure. Accordingly, that
night, at one o'clock a. m., the preliminary orders to the commanders of corps
were issued for the movement.
On the foUowing morning the detailed orders of movement, a copy of which
is herewith annexed, marked " A," were issued, and the movement, after some
delay, commenced, the troops being in admirable spirit. It was expected we
should be able to reach the enemy's lines iu time to attack him early on tho 5th
instant. The men, however, for the most part were uuused to marching, the
roads, narrow, and traversing a densely wooded country, became almost impas
sable after a severe rain-storm on the night of the 4th, which drenched the
troops in bivouac ; hence our forces did not reach the intersection of the roads
from Pittsburg and Hamburg, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, until late
Saturday afternoon.
It was then decided that the attack should be made on the next morning at
the earliest hour practicable, in accordance with the orders of movement. That
is, in three lines of battle, the first and second extending from Owl Creek, on the
left, to Lick Creek, on the right, a distance of about three miles, supported by
the third and the reserves. The first Hue, under Major-General Hardee, was con
stituted of his corps, augmented ou his right by Gladdon's brigade, of Major-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 541
General Bragg's corps, deployed in line of battle, with their respective artillery
following immediately by the main road to Pittsburg, aud the cavalry in rear
of the wings. The secoud line, composed of the other troops of Bragg's corps,
followed the first at a distance of five hundred yards, in the same order as the
first. The army corps under General Polk followed the second line at the dis
tance of about eight hundred yards, in lines of brigades, deployed with their
batteries in rear of each brigade, moving by the Pittsburg road, the left wing
supported by cavalry; the reserve, under Brigadier-General Breckinridge, fol
lowed closely the third line, in the same order, its right wing supported by
cavalry. These two corps constituted the reserve, and were to support the front lines
of battle, by being deployed, when required, on the right and left of the Pitts
burg road, or otherwise, according to the exigencies of the battle.
At 5 a. m. on the 6th instant, a reconnoitriug party of the enemy having
become engaged with our advanced pickets, the commander of tho forces gave
orders to begin the movemout and attack as determined upon; except that
Trabue's brigade of Breckinridge?s division was detached to support the left of
Bragg's corps and line of battle when menaced by the enemy, and the other two
brigades were directed to advance by the road to Hamburg, to support Bragg's
riglit, and at the same time Manney's regiment of Polk's corps was advauced
by the same road to reinforce the regiment of cavalry and battery of four pieces,
already thrown forward to watch and gnard Grier's, Tanner's, and Borland's
fords of Lick Creek.
Thirty minutes after 5 o'clock a. m. our lines and columns were in motion,
all animated, evidently, by a promising spirit. The front line was engaged at
once, but advanced steadily, followed, in due order, with equal resolution aud
steadiness, by the other lines, which were brought successively into action with
rare skill, judgment, and gallantry, by the several corps commanders, as the ene
my made a stand with his masses raUied for the struggle for his encampments.
Like an alpine avalanche onr troops moved forward, despite the determined
resistance of the euemy, until after 6 o'clock P. M., when we were iu possession
of all his encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but one, nearly all of his
field artillery, about thirty (30) flags, colors, and standards, over three thousand
prisoners, including a division commander, General Prentiss, and several bri
gade commanders, thousands of small arms, au immense supply of subsistence,
forage, and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of transportation —
all the substantial fruits of a complete victory, such, indeed, as rarely have fol
lowed the most successful battles, for never was an army so well provided as
that of our enemy.
The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the immediate
vicinity of Pittsburg, under the shelter of the heavy guns of his iron-clad gun
boats, and we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, admirably pro
vided cantonments, after over twelve hours of obstinate conflict with his forces,
who had been beaten from them and the contiguous covert, but only by a sus
tained ouset of all the men we could bring into action.
Our loss was heavy, as will appear from the accompanying return, marked

542 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
"B;" our Commander-in-Chief, General A. S. Johnston, fell, mortally wounded,
and died on the field at 2.30 p. m., after having showu the highest qualities of
the commander, and a personal intrepidity that inspired all around him and
gave resistless impulsion to his columns at critical moments.
The chief command then devolved upon me, though at the time I was greatly
prostrated, and suffering from the prolonged sickness with which I had been
afflicted since early in February. The responsibility was one which in my phys
ical condition I would have gladly avoided, though cast upon me when our
forces were successfully pushing the enemy back upon the Tennessee Rivelr,
and though supported on the immediate field by such corps commanders as
Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, and Brigadier-General Breckinridge
commanding the reserve.
It was after 6 o'clock p. m., as before said, when the enemy's last position was
carried, aud his forces finally broke aud sought refuge behind a commanding
eminence covering the Pittsburg Landings, not more than half a mile distant,
and under the guns of the gunboats, which opened on our eager columns a fierce
aud annoying fire, with shot and shell of the heaviest description. Darkness
was close at hand, officers and men were exhausted by a combat of over twelve
hours without food, aud jaded by the march of the preceding day through mud
and water; it was therefore impossible to collect the rich and opportune spoils
of war scattered broadcast on the field left in our possession, aud impracticable
to make any effective disposition for their removal to the rear.
I accordingly established my headquarters at the church of Shiloh, in the
enemy's encampments, with Major-General Bragg, and directed our troops to
sleep on their arms, in such positions in advance and rear as corps commanders
should determine ; hoping, from news received by a special despatch, that delays
had been encountered by General Buell in his march from Columbia, and that
his main force, therefore, could not reach the field of battle iu time to save Gen
eral Grant's shattered, fugitive forces from capture or destruction ou the follow
ing day.
During the night the rain fell iu torrents, adding to the discomforts aud har
assed condition of the men ; the enemy, moreover, had broken their rest by a
discharge, at measured intervals, of heavy shell thrown from the gunboats ;
therefore, on the following morning the troops under my command were not in
condition to cope with an equal force of fresh troops, armed and equipped like
our adversary, in the immediate possession of his depots, and sheltered by such
an auxiliary as the enemy's gunboats.
About 6 o'clock on the moruing of the 7th of April, however, a hot fire of
musketry and artillery, opened from the enemy's quarter on our advanced line,
assured me of the junction of his forces, and soon the battle raged with a fury
which satisfied me I was attacked by a largely superior force. But from tho
onset our troops, notwithstanding our fatigue and losses from the battle of
the day before, exhibited the most cheering, veteran-like steadiness. On the
right aud centre the enemy was repulsed in every attempt he made with his
heavy columns in that quarter of the field. On the left, however, aud nearest
to tho points of arrival of his reinforcements, he drove forward line after line of

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 543
his fresh troops, which were met by a courage and resolution of which our
country may be proudly hopeful. Again and again our troops were brought to
the charge, invariably to win the position already in issue, invariably to drive
back this foe. But hour by hour, thus opposed to an enemy constantly rein
forced, our ranks were perceptibly thinned under the increasing withering fire
of the enemy, and at 12 meridian, eighteen hours of hard fighting had sensibly
exhausted a large number, my last reserves had necessarily been disposed of,
and the enemy was evidently receiving fresh reinforcements after each repulse.
Accordingly, after 1 p. m., I determined to withdraw from so unequal a conflict, se
curing such of the results of the victory of the day before as was then practicable.
Officers of my staff were immediately despatched with the necessary orders
to make the best disposition for a deliberate, orderly withdrawal from the field,
and to collect, and post, a reserve to meet the enemy, should he attempt to push
after us. In this connection I will particularly mention my Adjutant-General,
Colonel Jordan, who was of much assistance to me on this occasion; as he had
already beeu on the field of battle, on that and the preceding day.
About 2 o'clock p. m. the lines in advance, which had repulsed the enemy in
their last fierce assault on our left and centre, received the orders to retire. This
was done with uncommon steadiness, and the enemy made no attempt to follow.
The lines of troops established to cover this movemeut had been disposed on
a favorable ridge, commanding the ground of Shiloh church; from this position
our artillery played upon the woods beyond for a while, but upon no visible
enemy, and without a reply. Soon satisfied that no serious pursuit was, or
would be, attempted, this last Hue was withdrawn, and never did troops leave
battle-field in better order ; even the stragglers fell into the ranks, and marched
off with those who had stood more steadily to their colors. A second strong
position was taken up about a mile in rear, where the approach of the enemy
was waited for more than one hour, but no effort to follow was made, and only
a small detachment of horsemen could be seen at a distance from this last po
sition, merely observing our movements.
Arranging through my staff officers for the completion of the movements thus
beguu, Brigadier-General Breckinridge was left with his command, as a rear
guard, to hold the ground we had occupied the night preceding the first battle,
just in front of the intersection of the Pittsburg and Hamburg roads, about four
miles from the former place, while the rest of the army passed in the rear, in ex
cellent order.
On the following day General Breckinridge fell back about three miles, to
Mackie's, which position we continue to hold, with our cavalry thrown consid
erably forward, in immediate proximity to the battle-field.
Unfortunately, towards night, on the 7th instant, it began to rain heavily;
this continued throughout tho night. The roads became almost impassable in
many places, and much hardship and suffering here ensued, before all the regi
ments reached their encampments.
But, despite the heavy losses and casualties of the two eventful days of the
6th and 7th of April, this army is more confident of ultimate success than before
its encounter with the enemy.

544 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
To Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, commanding corps, and to Briga
dier-General Breckinridge, commanding the reserve, the country is greatly in
debted for the zeal, intelligence, and energy with which all orders were exe
cuted; for the foresight and military ability they displayed iu the absence of
instruction in the many exigencies of the battle, on a field so densely wooded
and broken ; and for their fearless deportment as they repeatedly led their com
mands personally to the outset upon their powerful adversary. It was under these
circumstances that General Bragg had two horses shot under him, that Major-
General Hardee was slightly wounded, his coat cut with balls, and his horse dis
abled, and that Major-General Breckinridge was twice struck with spent balls.
For the services of their gallant subordinate commanders, and their officers
under them, as weU as for the details of the battle-field, I must refer to the re
ports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, which shall be forwarded as
soon as received.
To give more in detail the operations of the two battles resulting from the
movement on Pittsburg, than now attempted, must have delayed this report for
weeks, and interfered with the important duties of my position ; but I may be
permitted to say, that not only did the obstinate conflict of Sunday leave the
Confederates masters of the battle-field and our adversaries beaten, but we left
that field on the next day, only after eight hours' successive battle with a su
perior army of fresh troops, whom we had repulsed in every attack upon our
Hues ; so repulsed and crippled, indeed, as to leave it unable to take the field for
the campaign for which it was collected and equipped at such enormous ex
pense, and with such profusion of all the appliances of war. These successful
results were not achieved, however, as before said, without severe loss ; a loss
not to be measured by the number of tho slain or wounded, but by the high
social and personal position of so large a number of those who were killed or
disabled, including the commander of the forces, whose high qualities will be
greatly missed iu the momentous campaign impending.
I deeply regret to record, also, the death of the Hon. George Johnson, Pro
visional Governor of Kentucky, who went into action with the Kentucky troops,
and continually inspired them by his words and example. Having his horse
shot under him Sunday, he entered tho ranks of a Kentucky regiment on Mon
day, and feU mortally wounded towards the close of the clay. Not his State
alone, but the whole Confederacy, will mourn the death of this brave, upright,
and noble man.
Another gallant and able soldier and captain was lost to the service of the
country when Brigadier - General Gladden, commanding 1st brigade Withers's
division, second army corps, died from a severo wound, received on the 6th in
stant, after having been conspicuous to his whole command and army for cour
age and capacity.
Major-General Cheatham, commanding 1st division 1st corps, was slightly
wounded, and had threa horses shot under him.
Brigadier-General Clark, commanding 2d division of the 1st corps, received a
severe wound, also, on the first day, which will deprive the army of his valuahle
services for some time.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX. 545
Brigadier-General Hindman, engaged in the onset of the battle, was conspicu
ous for a cool courage in leading his men, even in the thickest of the fray, until
his horse was shot under him, and he was so severely injured by the fall that
the army was deprived the following day of his chivalric example.
Brigadier-Generals B. R. Johnson and Bowen, most meritorious officers, were
also severely wounded in the first combat, but it is hoped will soon be able to
return to duty with their brigades.
To mention the many field officers who died or were wounded, while gallantly
leading their commands into action, and the many iustances of brilliant indi
vidual courage displayed by officers and men in the twenty hours of battle, is
impossible at this time ; but their names will be made known to their country
men. The immediate staff of the lamented Commander-in-Chief, who accompanied
him to the field, rendered efficient service, and, either by his side, or in carrying
his orders, shared his exposure to the casualties of a well-contested battle-field.
I beg to commend their names to the notice of the War Department, namely :
of Captains H. P. Brewster and A. Wiokliffe, of the Adjutant and Inspector
General's Department; Captain Theodore O'Hara, Acting Inspector-General,
Lieutenants George Baylor and Thomas M. Jack, Aides-de-camp ; Volunteer
Aides-de-camp Colonel William Preston, Major D. M. Hayden, E. W. Munford,
aud Calhoun Benham ; Major Albert J. Smith and Captain  , Quarter
master's Department.
To these gentlemen was assigned the last sad duty of accompanying the re
mains of their lamented chief from the field, except Captains Brewster and
Wickliffe, who remained, and rendered valuable service as staff officers, on the
7th of April.
Governor Isham G. Harris, of Tennessee, went into the field with General
Johnston, was by his side when he was shot, aided him from his horse, and re
ceived him in his arms when he died. Subsequently the Governor joined my
staff, and remained with me throughout tho next day, except when carrying or
ders, or employed in encouraging the troops of his own State, to whom he gave
a conspicuous example of coolness, zeal, and intrepidity.
I am also under many obligations to my own general, personal, and volunteer
staff, many of whom have been so long associated with me. I append a list of
those present on the field on both days, and whose duties carried them con
stantly under fire ; namely, Colonel Thomas Jordan, Captain Clifton H. Smith,
and Lieutenant John M. Otey, Adjutant-General's Department ; Major George
W. Brent Acting Inspector-General ; Colonel R. B. Lee, Chief of Subsistence,
whose horse was wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel S.W.Ferguson and Lieuten
ant A. R. Chisolm, Aides-de-camp; Volunteer Aides-de-camp, Colonel Jacob
Thompson, Major Numa Augustin, Major H. E. Peyton, Captain Albert Ferry,
B. B. Waddell. Captain W. W. Porter, of Major-General Crittenden's staff, also
reported for duty, aud shared the duties of my volunteer staff on Monday.
Brigadier-General Trudeau, of Louisiana Volunteers, also, for part of the first
conflict, was with me as volunteer aid.
Captain E. H. Cummins, signal officer, also was actively employed as a staff
I.— 35

546 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XX.
officer both days. Nor must I fail to mention that Private W. E. Goolsby, 11th
regiment Virginia Volunteers, orderly to my headquarters since last Juno, re
peatedly employed to carry my verbal orders to the field, discharged tho duty
with great zeal and intelligence.
Other members of my staff were necessarily absent from the immediate field
of battle, intrusted with respective duties at their headquarters, viz. : Major Eu
gene E. McLean, Chief Quartermaster ; Captain E. Deslondes, Quartermaster's
Department. Lieutenant-Colonel Ferguson, A. D. C, early on Monday, was as
signed to command and direct the movements of a brigade of the 2d corps.
Lieutenant-Colonel Gilmer, Chief-Eugineer, after having performed the im
portant and varied duties of his place, with distinction to himself and material
benefit to the country, was wounded, late on Monday. I trust, however, I shall
not long be deprived of his essential services.
Captain Lockett, Engineer Corps, Chief Assistant to Colonel Gilmer, after
having been employed in the. duties of his corps on Sunday, was placed by me,
on Monday, in command of a battalion without field officers. Captain Fre-
meaux, Provisional Engineer, and Lieutenants Steel and Helm, also rendered
material aud even dangerous service iu the lino of tfieir duty. Major-General
(now General) Braxton Bragg, in addition to his duties as Chief of Staff, as has
been before stated, commanded his corps, much the largest in the field, ou both
days, with signal capacity and soldiership.
Surgeon Foard, Medical Director, Surgeon R.L. Brodie, and Surgeon D. W.Tau-
dal, Medical Director of the Western Department, with General Johnston, were
present in the discharge of their arduous and high duties, which they performed
with honor to their profession. Captain Thomas Saunders, Messrs. Scales and
Medcalf, and Mr. Tully of New Orleans, were of material aid on both days, ready
to give news of the enemy's positions and movements, regardless of exposure.
While thus partially making mention of some of those who rendered brilliant,
gallant, and meritorious service on the field, I have aimed merely to notice those
whose position would most probably exclude their services from the reports of
corps or subordinate commanders.
From this agreeable duty I turn to one in the highest degree unpleasant ; one
due, however, to the brave men uuder me. As a contrast to the behavior of
most of the army, who fought so honorably, I allude to the fact that some of
ficers, non-commissioned officers, and men, abandoned their colors on the first
day, to pillage the captured encampments, others retired shamefully from the
field on both clays while the thunder of cannou and the roar aud rattle of mus
ketry told them that their brothers were being slaughtered by the fresh legious
of the enemy. I have ordered tho names of the most conspicuous of these cow
ards and laggards to bo published in orders.
It remains to state that our loss in the two days, in killed outright, was 1728 ;
wounded 8012, missing 957 ; making an aggregate of casualties 10,699. This
sad list tells iii simple language of the stout fight made by our countrymen, in
front of the rude log chapel at Shiloh, especially when it is knowu that on
Monday, from exhaustion and other causes, not twonty thousand men on our
side could be brought iuto action.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXII. 547
Of the losses of the enemy I have no exact knowledge. Their newspaper
report is very heavy. Unquestionably it was greater, even in proportion, than
our own, on both days, for it was apparent to all that their dead left on the
field outnumbered ours two to one. Their casualties, therefore, cannot have
fallen many short of 20,000, in killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing.
Through information derived from many sources, including the newspapers
of the enemy, we engaged, on Sunday, the divisions of Generals Prentiss, Sher
man, Hurlbut, McClernand, and Smith, of 9000 men each, or at least 45,000 men.
This force was reinforced Sunday night by the divisions of Generals Nelson,
McCook, Crittenden, and Thomas, of Major-General Buell's army, some 25,000
strong, including all arms; also General L. Wallace's division of General Grant's
army, making at least 33,000 fresh troops; which, added to the remnant of
General Grant's forces on Monday morning, amounting to 20,000, made an ag
gregate force of at least 53,000 men arrayed against us on that clay.
In eonneetion with the results of the battle, I should state that most of our
men who had inferior arms exchanged them for the superior arms of the enemy ;
also, that most of the property, public aud personal, of the camps from which
the enemy were driven on Sunday, was rendered useless, or greatly damaged,
except some of the tents.
With this are transmitted certain papers, to wit :
Order of movements, marked " A."
A list of the killed and wounded, marked " B."
A list of captured flags, marked " C."
A map of the field of battle, marked " D."
AH of which is respectfully submitted through my volunteer Aide-de-camp,
Colonel Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, who has the flags in charge ; also the
standards and colors captured from the enemy.
I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
To General S. Cooper, Adj. aud Iusp. Genl., Richmond.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXII.
1. Colonel Joseph Wheeler, in his Report, to be found iu "Confederate Re
ports of Battles," p. 276, says :
" But after passing through the deep ravine below the lowest camps, we
were halted within about four hundred yards of the river, and remained ready
to move forward for about half an hour, when night came on, and we were or
dered to the rear, and were assigned to bivouac by General Withers. Duriug
all this movement, the regiment was under a heavy fire from their guuboats
and other artiUery."
2. Geueral Ruggles, in his Report, p. 283 of the same work, says :
" I received from Colonel Augustin notice of General Beauregard's orders to
withdraw from the further pursuit, and finding, soon afterwards, that the forces

548 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXII.
were falling back, I retired with them, just as night set in, to the open field in
rear;" etc.
3. Colonel Hodge, 19th Louisiana, iu his Report, same book, p. 288, says :
" After the enemy were driven from this stronghold, we, with several bri
gades, moved towards the river. It was then nigh sunset. In accordance with
your order [Colonel Gibson's] we commenced falling back about dusk, and being sep
arated from the brigade, I conducted the regiment to the camp of the enemy,
where I had estabHshed a temporary hospital iu the day."
4. Colonel Fagan, 1st Arkansas, in his Report, p. 294 (same book), says :
" It was late in the afternoon when the enemy were repulsed, and were, fol
lowed up in the direction of the river. That night we slept in the enemy's
tents, worn with fatigue, decimated in numbers, but elated that such a hard-
fought day had such a glorious close."
5. General Patton Anderson's Report, p. 305 of the same work, says :
" ... It was now twilight. As soon as we had placed a hill between us and
the gunboats, the troops moved slowly, and apparently with reluctance, from
the direction of the river. It was eight o'clock at night before we had reached a biv
ouac near General Bragg's headquarters, and in the darkness of the night the 20th Lou
isiana, and portions of the 17th and Confederate Guards, got separated from that
portion of the command in which I was, and encamped on other ground."
6. Colonel W. A. Stanley, 9th Texas, in his Report, p. 312 of the same work, says :
" At this point, night put a close to the action for the day of the 6th. We retired
from this point to form our encampment for the night, our troops being more
or less scattered, some having been completely exhausted from tho fatigues of
tho day."
7. Colonel Augustus Reichard, 20 th Louisiana, in his Report, p. 320 of the same
work, says :
". . . My regiment was separated from the rest of the brigade, and, as night
set in, I led the remnants of the regiment to our hospital, where we bivouacked."
8. Colonel Pond, commanding brigade, Ruggles's division, in his Report,
(same work), p. 330, says :
" At night, after the battle ceased, acting in obedience to orders received through
the clay from a great variety of sources, I formed my infantry line considerably
in advance of our general front."
9. General Chalmers's Report (same work), p. 260, says :
". . . Our men struggled vainly to ascend the hill, which was very steep,
making charge after charge without success, but continued the fight until night
closed the liostilities on both sides."
10. Colonel Z. C. Deas (commanding Gladden's brigade after Colonel Adams
was wounded), in his Report, p. 245 of the same work, says :

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXII. 549
" Here, in the hot pursuit, the 21st and 25th Alabama became separated from
me in the woods, and, before I had time to find them, I received au order from
General Withers to form on the extreme left, where I remained until night came
on, aud then attempted to get back to the camp I had left, but got into a differ
ent one."
11. General Withers, commanding division, in his Report, p. 239 of tho same
work, says :
"... The cavalry was thrown to our front. Thus we remained until dark, the
entire army, with the exception of the cavalry, having retired from the field,
when we received an order from General Bragg that, holding the command iu
readiness to form Hue of battle at any moment, we would fall back to Mickey's."
12. In his Report, Colonel John D. Martin, commanding 2d Confederate regi
ment, and Boweu's brigade, of General Breckinridge's division, says :
" When within three hundred or four hundred yards of the river the ene
my opened on us with their gunboats and two batteries, in position near
the bank of the river, which sounded trouble and looked ugly and hurt but
few. Our men began to discover this fact. Being now nearly night, I fell back,
by order of General Bragg, to the first encampment in the tents farthest from the
river, where we stayed all night, feasting upon stores of the enemy, visited oc
casionally by a shell from their gunboats. Major-General Hardee and General
Withers came to our encampment, where they remained all night."
13. Colonel R. P. Trabue, commanding 1st Kentucky brigade, Breckinridge's
division, in his Report, says :
"From this position, when it was nearly dark, we were ordered to the rear to
encamp, which movement was effected in good order. I followed, in the darkness
of the night, the Purdy Road, after having reunited to my command Byrne's
battery and the others of my troops who had been detached to the right, not
including, however, Cobb's battery."
14. Colonel John C. Moore, 2d Texas regiment, says (" Confederate Reports of
Battles," p. 271) :
" Seeing this state of things, we made a rapid retreat from our unpleasant
position, and proceeded back to the camp last taken, having been told that we
would here receive further orders. It was dark when toe reached the camp, and af
ter waiting an hour or so, we bivouacked near the encampment, in a drenching
rain." 15. General J. K. Jackson, commanding 3d brigade, Withers's division, in his
Report (same work), p. 266, says :
"... I proceeded to obtain orders from General Withers; but, before seeing
him, was ordered by a staff officer to retire. This order was announced to me
as coming from General Beauregard, and was promptly communicated to my
command. In the darkness of the night, which had then fallen upon us, my regiments
became separated from each other," etc.

550 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXII.
16. Geueral Cheatham, in his Report, says :
"... My command and other commands came rapidly forward, but mauy
regiments having exhausted their ammunition, a halt of some time was neces
sary for the purpose of replenishing. The day was now far advanced, and be
fore proper preparations were made, darkness prevented further operations that
day, and all commands were withdrawn for the night, out of range of the sheUs
from the enemy's gunboats."
17. General Grant, in his Report of the Battle of Shiloh, published in the
" Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 356, says :
" The battle soon waxed warm on the left and centre, varying at times to
all parts of the Hue. There was the most continuous firing of musketry and
artillery ever heard on this continent, kept up until nightfall."
18. General Buell, in his Report (" Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 410),
says: " General Nelson arrived with Colonel Ammen's brigade at this opportune mo
ment. It was immediately posted to meet the attack at that poiut, and, with
a battery of artillery, which happened to be on the ground aud was brought
into action, opened fire on the enemy and repulsed him. The action of the
gunboats also contributed very much to that result. The attack at that point
was not renewed. Night having come on, the firing ceased on both sides."
19. General Nelson (" Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 413), in his Report,
says: " The gallantry of the 36th Indiana, supported by the 6th Ohio, under the
able conduct of Colonel Ammen, commanding the 10th brigade, drove back the
enemy and restored the line of battle. This ivas at half -past six P. m., and soon
after the enemy withdrew, owing, I suppose, to the darkness."
20. From a narrative of the battle of Shiloh, entitled " Account by a Partici
pant," to be found iu the " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 415, we take the
following passage :
" Ou the top of the bank we were cheered by a sight of Nelson, with his well-
known overcoat and feathered hat. ' Sixth Ohio, I expect a good account from
you !' ' Yes ! Yes ! Hurrah !' and without an order our walking pace was changed
into a double quick. Wo only went a few yards, and were ordered to support
a battery. Darkness soon closed in, and compelled the belligerents to cease hostilities
for the night."
21. Colonel Tuttle, commanding 1st brigade, 2d division (W. H. L. Wallace's),
in his Report ("Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 406), says:
"... I assumed command of the division, and rallied what was left of my
brigade, and was joined by the 13th Iowa, Colonel Crocker ; 9th Illinois, Colonel
Mersey ; 12th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Chottain, and several other fragments
of regiments, aud formed iu Hue on the road, and held the enemy in check un
til the lino was formed that resisted ths last charge just before dark of that day."

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXII. 55I
22. Colonel M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa, commanding brigade, in his Report, says
("Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 379) :
" The fire of the enemy's guns ceased at dark, and during the night we remained
under arms in that position." 
Extract of a letter from Colonel David Urquhart, of General Bragg's staff, to Gener
al Thomas Jordan, late A. A. G. of the united Confederate forces at and around
Corinth. Narragansett, R. I., August 25th, 1880.
Dear General, — *****
During tho first day of the battle of Shiloh, I was with you a good deal of
the time, and repeatedly helped you to bring up and put the troops into action,
particularly, as I remember, those of Polk. I remember, further, that in conse
quence of an obstinate resistance made to General Bragg's advance by some
Federal batteries, he, having been told bynie that you were near by, sent me to
ask you to find and push forward a strong force to flank those batteries on our
right ; further, that meeting you (Colonel Wm. Preston, A. D. C. to General
Johnston, being with you), I made known to you General Bragg's desire, aud
that after some little conversation on your part with Colonel Preston as to the
propriety of putting the reserves into action, you gave the order to General
Breckinridge to advance and turn the batteries iu question. Immediately after
you gave this order, and while General Breckinridge was proceeding to execute
it, yon, accompauied by Colonel Preston and myself, withdrew rearward into a
narrow ravine, which separated the ground upon which we found General
Breckinridge from a higher ground, to which we went for the purpose of over
looking the movement. In the ravine, however, Colonel Preston concluded to
attempt to find General Johnston, and left us, and, as you will remember, a few
moments later, found General Johnston.
The hill to which you and I -went, as yon will recollect, had been occupied
as an encampment by the Federals, whose tents were standing full of baggage,
and there was a fine Federal battery of six pieces abaudoned there. From this
ground we saw General Breckinridge advance, engage, and drive the Federal
forces in his front, whose bullets reached tho ground wo occupied. I should
have mentioned that the order to Breckinridge was given by you about half-
past 2 o'clock.
Subsequently I rejoined General Bragg, whom I found engaged with the
Federal troops, who were now disputing every inch. At about sunset, an or
der came from General Beauregard to withdraw, collect, aud reorganize the
troops, all of which had become greatly broken and intermixed. This order
reached the division commauders. At the time this order was given, the plain
truth must bo told, that our troops at the front were a thin line of exhausted
men, who were making no further headway, and were glad to receive orders to
fall back. At the same time, as I had myself previously reported to General
Bra"-"- over one third of the army were scattered in different parts of the field,
loading themselves with plunder from the abandoned Federal encampments.
Nobody can realize the condition our army was in, after 4 o'clock p.m. ou Sun-

552 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII.
day, without having been an eye-witness. Brigades, regiments, and companies
began to disperse at that hour and move more or less distantly to the rear.
Several years of subsequent service have impressed me that General Beaure
gard's order for withdrawing the troops was most timely ; otherwise the collec
tion and reorganization of troops that took place that night could not have
been made, and the army would not have been in condition to make the obsti
nate head which it did on the next day, against Grant's and Buell's combined
armies, up to the moment in the afternoon when it was withdrawn, carrying
off so considerable a part of the enemy's captured artillery, and in such good or
der that Buell's and Grant's armies did not venture to follow.
Yours truly, David Urquhart.
To Genl. Thomas Jordan, New York.
For Genl. G. T. Beauregard, New Orleans, La.
Thomas Jordan.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII.
Telegram. Jackson, Tenn., Feb. 21st, 1862.
General L. Polk, Columbus :
Can you spare General McCown for one day to come here ? Let him bring
Trudeau's drawing of Island No. 10 and vicinity, taken back by Captain Harris.
G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters Madrid Bend, March 8ft, 1862,
via Union City.
To General Beauregard :
Your telegrams of 5th and 7th noted. Every effort is being made to remedy
the Battery No. 1. Ordnance was sent here from Columbus in such confusion
that I don't know what I can spare. I shall exercise my best judgment in all
ma±ters. Peremptory orders to save a battery from overflow might require all
my force for weeks. The euemy is erecting a battery at Poiut Pleasant. A gun
boat went down to shell them out. I have not heard the result. I have not
yet placed the salient in advance of the works at New Madrid ; the position it
would occupy is raked by the gunboats. I have not force enough to occupy it.
I shall erect it as soon as I can. From what I learn, I fear the enemy can get
guns clown as low as Tiptonville, on the Missouri shore. The railroad to Sykes-
tou is being rapidly repaired. Can soon be laid to New Madrid, as no grading
is required. The least estimate of the force of the euemy on Madrid plain is
thirty thousand, with sixty guns.
You express confidence in my holding the place. With my present force I
can only hold Island No. 10 aud the Bend by holding New Madrid. How long I
can hold New Madrid with my small force against such odds is a question. I be
lieve the enemy will soon be fifty thonsaud strong. He occupies position from
where he can't retreat. Iu my humble opinion, it is the place to inflict a great

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII. 553
overthrow upon the enemy. If this falls, the river is open. I place the facts
before you. I am determined to hold my position at every hazard. Shall en
gage in no field risks. I see my danger. My men are confident and in good
spirits. We have fifty guns, all told, mounted. Some of our best guns have no
carriagos. I will despatch as often as practicable.
Yours, etc., J. P. McCown, Brig.-Gen. Comdg.
Telegram. Jackson, Tenn., March 9th, 1852.
Humboldt, March 9ft, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
I send you the following despatch received from General McCown. L. Polk.
"Houses burned and torn down as necessity required. Captain Hallum, 5th
Tennessee regiment, wounded yesterday ; also three men on the Polk (steamer),
and oue scout. A lively skirmish yesterday. During a heavy demonstration
this afternoon, on New Madrid, they were driven back by Captain Bankhead's
guns and the gunboats. The enemy have established a battery at Point Pleas
ant, of smaU rifled guns. The river would be closed if New Madrid was aban
doned. A large force would be required to hold Island No. 10 if New Madrid
was iu the hands of the enemy. It is necessary to hold the place until forces
are thrown here to defeat the enemy — the quicker the better. I see no other
course to pursue. If I had twenty thousand more men, such would be my
course. . McCown.
" P. S. Shall I look for reinforcements ? I want commanders Trudeau, March,
Walker, aud Gantt. It is important."

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., March 9ft, 1862.
General, — I send you herewith enclosed a slip from the N. T. Herald, to show
you that the enemy's gunboats are not invulnerable to our heavy guns, so that
I have strong hopes now you will be able to keep them out of Madrid Beud.
I think they themselves have lost all confidence in them. They will hardly at
tack you on the water before their mortar-boats are ready. This is a very un
certain mode of firing against small works at long ranges. Small traverses
in every direction there and at New Madrid will guard your garrisons against any
bad effects, the main forces being kept, as much as practicable, away from their
ranges, but still within supporting distance.
Without the enemy's gunboats, I consider New Madrid impregnable in daylight,
having our gunboats to sweep the ground in front and around them. At night
yon must guard against surprises by strong advance guards and pickets, and
piles of wood, to which you can set fire on the approach of the enemy, to assist
the fire of the fort and gunboats. If you can get tar-barrels and light-balls, do
so by all means. I have just ordered Captain Adams to send you some from
Memphis. Should the enemy endeavor to comnjand the river below you with their light

554 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIIl.
artillery, gunboats must drive them away, which they can easily do. But by
aU means do not waste your ammunition, for we have to bo careful with it.
Should circumstances compel you to abandon New Madrid, be careful to take
away all the heavy guns, spike them, or destroy them ; and. destroy the gorge of
your works, to allow our gunboats to play into them night and day occasional
ly, so as to prevent the enemy from using them to command the river below
Island No. 10.
I am having Fort Pillow put in order, under General Withers, and about two
thousand five hundred men for the present, to fall back upon in case of neces
sity. In a few days it will be ready. Should we bo forced to give up Island No.
10, we will have to save from there, or destroy, as many of our heavy guns as
practicable. Under the present circumstances, it is impossible to send reinforcements, as
the enemy is threatening our rear iu great force along the Tennessee River ;
and to diminish any more our forces here would be total annihilation everj--
where. But if, by combining with General Johnston's army, we can defeat
them, then we can come and treat as you desire those in your front. I have
ordered gun-spikes or rat-tail files to be sent you from Memphis. Be of good
cheer, and do for the best, is all I aud the country can ask or expect from you.
In case of any retrograde movement, do so with system and order, saving what
can be saved aud destroying the rest; but leave no guns behind without being
spiked or permanently injured by knocking off the trunnions, bursting, or throw
ing into the river, etc. But, by all means, endeavor to save tho largest and
best guus for Fort Pillow.
The country expects us all to do our duty with a fearless heart, and we must
do it or dio in the attempt. Yours truly, G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
Brig.-Genl. J. P. McCown, New Madrid Bend, Tonn.

Telegram. Jackson, Tenn., March 10ft, 1862.
Maj .-Genl. M. Lovell, New Orleans:
Ram Manassas indispensable at present, but wiU send her if you need her ab
solutely. I think blockaders won't try the forts. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March lOtli, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. Withers, Fort Pillow, Tenn. :
Reconnoitre road from Fort Pillow to Mason Station, Memphis and Ohio
Road, and other features of country, and seud report. G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., March 10ft, 1882.
General, — I am instructed, by the geueral commanding, to inform you that he

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII. 555
wishes yon to despatch to Fort Pillow, as soon as possible, aU guns now at Mad
rid Bend for which you chance to have no carriages. It is hoped that the gun
boats will be able to convoy auy transport safely beyond that part of the river
which can be approached by the enemy.
Iu connection with any effort to save Battery No. 1, at Madrid Bend, from the
encroachments of the river, the General expects you to exercise your own judge
ment in the face of the exigency. You must determine what may be best to be
clone. He instructs me, however, to suggest, if practicable at the time this may
reach you, that you should construct some rifle-pits in front of your position at
New Madrid, and as far in advance as may be practicable.
Transports must always be held convenient for the certain, prompt removal
of your troops, if driven to that extremity by an overwhelming force, which the
gunboats, at any time, shall prove unable to keep from au assault of your posi
tions. Reinforcements cannot be sent you without tho risk of fatal consequences in
this quarter. Our dependence, as long as possible, must be maiuly on the gnu-
boats and their ability to hold the enemy at bay and hinder any effective ousot
upon your forces. Wheu that shall be no longer possible, in your j udgmeut, and
in that of Flag-Officer Hollins, you must evacuate, in accordance with the Gen
eral's instructions of the 9th instant.
Respectfully, your obedient servant, Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.
Brig.-Genl. John P. McCown, Comdg. C. S. Forces, Madrid Bend.

Madrid Bend, March 13th, 1862.
To Col. Thomas Jordan, A. A. G. :
Colonel, — Commodore Hollins says that he cannot dispense with the Manassas.
Let General Lovell know it. Batteries were plauted last night, and opened at
daylight against the lower fort. Dr. W. S. Bell, Medical Director, both legs
shot off, one man killed, and one wounded, when I left. As far as I know, I
think the object is regular approach. J. P. McCown, Brig.-Genl.

Jackson, Tenn., March 14th, 1862.
Maj. -Genl. M. Lovell, New Orleans :
Commodore Hollins say's he cannot dispense with Manassas.
 G. T. Beauregard.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., March 14th, 1862.
Capt. D. B. Harris, Corps of Engineers, Madrid Bend :
Captain  Your letter of the 9th instant was this day received and laid before
the general commanding, who directs me to write, in reply, as follows :
He approves of your suggestion to postpone construction of redoubts at Mad
rid Beud. You will first complete the cremaillere line of which you speak, and
place that Hue in defensive condition ; of course, however, first making the river

556 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIIL
front as nearly impregnable as your means will permit, and looking carefully
to timely provision for the caving in of the river shore, so as to avoid, if possi
ble, either loss of guns, or a substantial diminution, at any time, of our powers
of defence on that Hue or front.
Erect substantial traverses in abundance. The General is particularly anx
ious that this shall be done. t
You may dispense with any abatis on the Missouri shore at present.
The lunette, at a salient work at New Madrid, may also be relinquished, as
the gunboats appear able to cover the front effectively, and to keep off the
enemy. A special messenger will be sent to Memphis to procure the tools you call for,
and additional laborers will be sent you, if practicable.
Our forces are being concentrated rapidly to meet the enemy landing from
the Tennessee River, nearly opposite Savannah ; and we hope to throw there a
force competent to beat them decisively. If so, then a relief force will be thrown
into New Madrid with the utmost celerity, and the euemy may find himself iu
our toils. Meantime, the General confidently relies on your sagacity, industry,
and energy to render the position of Island No. 10, aud the mainland, impregna
ble to any means of attack the enemy may be able to wield against us.
Show this communication to General McCown.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., March 15ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. John P. McCown, Comdg. Madrid Bend :
Genei-al, — The geueral commanding fully approves tho projected evacuation
of your position of New Madrid, and trusts that it has already been safely ac
complished, if determined upon.
That step determines au immediate reduction of your force to the artillery
necessary to the efficient service of the batteries at Island No. 10 and Madrid
Bend, with an infantry support aud reserve of three regiments, under the com
mand of Brigadier-General Walker, to whom you will assign the command and
honor of defending that Thermopylse of tho Mississippi Valley. You will also
leave a light battery of six guns. It is suggested that one of the infantry regi
ments shall be stationed on Island No. 10, the other two on the mainland ; two
of the light guns, also, to be with the troops ou the island.
General Trudeau will remain with General Walker in charge of the batteries
as Chief of Artillery ; and, from his past distinguished services and skill, the Geu
eral confidently expects the guns will be served with all possible efficiency and
honor to the country.
The remainder of your command you will withdraw to Fort Pillow, with all
possible celerity, by water, from Tiptonville, where ample transportation will be
sent you. Should an unforeseen casualty, however, leave you unprovided with
sufficient transports for all your troops at once, yon will send as many as prac
ticable to Fort Pillow, with orders that the transports shall return for the re-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII. 557
mainder with the least possible delay. Leaving sixty days' provision for the
garrison, and au ample supply of ammunition for a prolonged, desperate defence,
including about three hundred rounds of small-arms ammunition for each infan
try soldier, you will remove the remainder of your supplies, if practicable ; oth
erwise destroy what cannot be removed, in the most effective way practicable.
Transports, at all times, will be left at Tiptonville for the removal of the gar
rison just prescribed, should General Walker, or officer in command at any sub
sequent time, determine further defence of his position fruitless, or without pos
sible beneficial issue.
Should this final evacuation become plainly proper and necessary, before the
troops retire all the guns must be either burst or thrown into the river, if prac
ticable ; if not, they must bo spiked.
Should it be deemed of service, you are authorized to leave with General
Walker one company of cavalry ; the other companies, including the squadron
of Logwood's battalion, will be sent to Fort Pillow.
A copy of this letter will be left with General Walker.
Captain Harris will be sent to Fort Pillow forthwith ; aud if you deem the
services of the other engineers not required, you will detach them also.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Jackson, Tenn., March 15ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. Braxton Bragg, Comdg. forces A. M., Bethel, Tenn. :
General, — Your despatch of this date, 11 a. m., duly received. Was laid be
fore the General, who directs me to say, that" he entirely accords with your
views as to the movements of the enemy, and approves your arrangements in the
premises, as he would have written you personally but for his continued indis
position, especially since a prolonged interview to-day with Major-General Polk.
The movement of General Polk's command will be hastened as much as may
be practicable with troops of that character. As his brigades come under your
command, of course you will be able to give them such directions as you may
find best.
The General confidently relies on your judgment, sagacity, and skill; and
your presence in the field is a groat comfort to him at this time. Should his
health debar him from being with you, he will take care that the command shall
effectually rest in your bauds, as was agreed upon with Geueral Polk.
New Madrid has been evacuated. This was done uuder the belief that an
overwhelming force had been collected, which, aided by heavy guns, must make
the early fall of the place inevitable. Most of the ammunition is said to have
been saved, but all guns in position were lost. The General awaits the official
report of the affair. This step, of course, made another a military consequence
—that is, the immediate reduction of the force at Islaud No. 10 and Madrid Bend
to the artillery to serve the guns in position, and enough infantry to support
them with a reserve. Hence, the Geueral, to-day, directed all the forces in that
quarter to be withdrawn, save the foot artillery, three regimeuts of infantry, »

558 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII.
company of cavalry, and a battery of six pieces of light artillery. The troops
withdrawn will be first assembled at Fort Pillow. Don't you think they might
be most needed for the impending conflict in your quarter?
I shall keep you thoroughly advised of aU that may be done or directed on
the river, as well as all the General's views or notions.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Jackson, Tenn., March 15ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. J. P. McCown, care of Col. Pickett, Union City :
Send down immediately to Fort Pillow all the negro force not required by
yon, with all extra tools, and also Captain Harris, of Engineers. G. T. Beauregard.

Humboldt, March 16ft, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
The attack on the islaud commenced this morning early, and has continued
up to this hour, 12 m. L. Polk.

To Genl. Beauregard : Humboldt, March 16ft, 1862.
The following just received: ¦"Madrid Bend, March 16th.
"General, — I received your despatch with Colonel Jordan's letter. I will, if
possible, execute your instructions. My experience makes me tremble for the
result. The gunboats are now off the point, dropping down.
"J. P. McCown."
 L. Polk.
Jackson, Tenn., March 16ft, 1,862.
To Brig.-Genl. McCown, Madrid Bend :
Prepare fire-rafts to anchor mid-channel and lighten up at night.
G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 17ft, 1862.
To Brig.-Genl. McCown:
In face of exigencies you must exercise your own judgment as to reduction
of force hitherto directed ; but cannot understand why you should tremble for
result. What obstacles intervene to withdrawal as instructed?
 G. T. Beauregard.
Humboldt, March 17ft, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Tho following j ust received from Colonel Pickett, 8.45 P. m., March 17th, Union
City: "General McCown writes, dated 7 a. m., over six hundred shot and shell
thrown at us yesterday. Nobody hurt. They will soon open fire to-day.
" Ed. Pickett, Comdg. Post;"
L. Polk.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII. 559
Jackson, Tenn., March 17ft, 1862.
Col. W. R. Hunt, Ordnanee Officer, Corinth :
General wishes twelve rifled guns you mention sent to Fort Pillow in haste.
Have they carriages ? If not, make them with all possible despatch.
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Telegram. Humboldt, March 18ft, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
The following just received from General McCown :
" Fort Pillow, March 18ft, 1862.
" General Polk :
" In obedience to orders, I am here with six guns of Bankhead's battery, six
guns Captain Stuart's battery ; Colonel Neilly Mark's, Colonel Scott's, Colonel
Kennedy's, Colonel Bradford's, and Colonel Travis's regiments. I directed
Captain Neilly's squadron to be sent down as soon as they could be withdrawn
from the position they occupied. I left with Colonel Walker the artillery,
heavy ; Colonel Steadmau's, Colonel Gantt's, Colonel Baker's, Colonel Hender
son Walker's, Colonel Clark's, aud Colonel Terry's battalion. Also one com
pany of Captain Stuart's battery, the least force that I thiuk he can maintain
his position with, and also two companies Mississippi cavalry. Terry's, Clark's,
and Brown's regiments are small and badly armed. Should you desire a further,
removal of troops from Island No. 10, you can direct General Walker what troops
to send. J. P. McCown." L. Polk, Maj.-Genl.

Telegram. Humboldt, March 18th, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
I have received the accompanying despatch, and have replied and given him
the following instructions :
" To Maj.-Genl. McCoWn, Comdg. Fort Pillow :
"Your despatch of this morning, informing me of your removal, received.
"I am gratified to know you have retired your troops so successfully. You
will assume command at Fort Pillow, and take immediate measures for putting
it in the most effective condition of defence. Please furnish me immediately
a report of its condition in every department, aud what you need. I am prom
ised, by General Bragg, ten heavy shell-guns for your use there. They are now
on the way. Is it possible for you to obtain any heavy guns from above (Island
10, etc.) ? Furnish me immediately a detailed report of your evacuation of
New Madrid, and the retirement of your troops from the Bend, with such general
information in regard to the condition of that post as will put me in possession
of all important particulars, and send it to me by an inteUigent officer. "L.Polk."

560 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII.
Jackson, Tenn., March 18ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. McCown:
If driven from your post, guns will be spiked ; also a shot driven in each, or
load and wedge in shell, fuse down, so that gun will hurst.
Even if Federal gunboats pass your batteries, transports cannot, so long as
batteries are held and bravely worked. Nor can enemy's army cross river;
but few would be crossed by gunboats ; those can be easily repulsed by resolute
attack. Post must be held, if possible for men to do it. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 18ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. McCowtst :
The General approves your dispositions for defence of Madrid Bend and Island
No. 10, but wishes you to resume the coinmaud there. It is said some of your
transports were left at Madrid Bend ; if so, how many ? They must never fall ,
in. enemy's hands. Some of them might be sunk to obstruct channel near Mis
souri shore. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, March 19ft.
Maj.-Genl. B. Bragg, Corinth :
May not enemy really mean to operate on Purdy and Bethel. We must draw
him into an engagement before he can bring up more of his forces. Must get
accurate hourly information of his movements. Three regiments from Madrid
Bend will be with you in season, if transportation meets them at Bethel. Keep
sharp lookout on Bethel and Purdy. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 19ft.
Maj.-Genl. E. Van Dorn, on his way to Pocahontas, care of Captain I. Adams,
Memphis :
Too late for movement on New Madrid, which is in possession of enemy ; but
if, at any time, you can join your forces with mine, it will be best to do so.
G. T. Beauregard.
Steamer Prince, six miles below Tiptonville* March 20ft, 1 p. m.
Col. T. Jordan :
Colonel, — I could not get to Tipton by the route I tried this mbrning. I shall
try the swamp in the morning. I shall try to open communication by land •
have not heard from General Walker to-day. I shall also try to put boats at
the ford or fords on the lake. I fear the result. Put Fort Pillow to fi<>-htin"-
order and reinforce me if you can. j. p. McCown.

Jackson, Tenn., March 21st.
Brig.-Genl. J. P. McCown, care Col. Pickett, Union City :
Even if enemy effect crossing — scarcely probable — you can still defend posi
tion of batteries for many days with proper detached field-works in their rear.
The country looks to you for a determined defence of your position. Mean-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII. 561
while, Fort PiUow will be made ready. Glean the country for provisions.
Husband ammunition. G. T. Beauregard.
Madrid Bend, March 21st, 1862,
via Union City, 22d.
" To Genl. Beauregard :
" General, — This command could not be withdrawn in any event. If tho
enemy effects a landing it will be below this place, which would out us off.
The gunboats expected (eight) may assist in preventing a crossing. Hurry
them up ; we have to fight it out. The transports at No. 10 shall not fall into
the hands of the enemy ; we must be reinforced. I regret any troops were
removed from here. General Walker coincides with me in this.
"J. P. McCown."
The above received hero just now, 11 o'clock a. m.
Ed. Pickett, Jr., Comdg. Post.

Telegram. Madrid Bend, March 20ft, 1862,
via Union City, 22d.
To Col. T. Jordan :
Colonel, — I arrived here this morning; found all going on well. General
Walker's arrangements are satisfactory — as good as can be made with his
force. I have left General Walker in immediate command. The enemy's forces
on the other Bide are much scattered ; if a force was seut to their rear via Gur-
nieville, Ark., it would relieve the pressure on this command, and, if strong
enough, capture the forces south of St. John's bayou. Read my last despatch.
J. P. McCown, Maj.-Genl.

Jackson, March 22d, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. J. P. McCown, Comdg. Madrid Bend, eare Col. Pickett, Union
City.
Van Dorn proposes to attack enemy in reverse at New Madrid. Be of good
cheer and hold out. G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 22d, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. J. P. McCown, Madrid Bend :
You must be aware that you cauuot, at this moment, be reinforced. Your
command forms the garrison of that key to Mississippi Valley. Country ex
pects you to defend that post of honor to the last, or until we can relieve you
by a victory here ; then to attack, in force, your adversary. Meanwhile, Pillow
is being put in fighting order, for another stand, if need be. Send names of our
boats above New Madrid ; use them, if necessary, to obstruct channels in front
of Island No. 10. G. T. Beauregard.

Union City, March 22d, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
Twenty-five or thirty canoes, three skiffs, and one ferry-flat on the lake.
I.— 36

562 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII.
Have ordered all to be collected at one point at once, and advised General Mc
Cown. Will report as soon as they are ready. E. Pickett, Jr., Comdg. Post.

Jackson, Tenn., March 22d, 1862.
General A. S. Johnston, Decatur :
I cousider presence of Major Gilmer indispensable at Fort Pillow for a few
days. Safety of the place and Mississippi Valley may depend ou.
G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 23d, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. A. P. Stewart, Comdg. Fort Pillow :
I waut eight 32 or long 24 pounders for floating rams. Which can you spare
best, aud are they with or without carriages ? Have yon any field-battery ?
Do you want field-guns for land fronts ? G. T. Beauregard.

Jackson, Tenn., March 24th, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. A. P. Stewart, Comdg. Fort Pillow :
A general court-martial will be ordered. Send worthless mules to Memphis.
Engineers all remain ; Captain Harris as Chief. Major Gilmer, Engineer Corps,
is en route for Fort Pillow. Send return, by mail, of all heavy ordnance and
ammunition. By order of General Beauregard. Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.

Telegram. Union City, March 24th, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
The following received here at 1 a. m. Ed. Pickett, Jr.
" Headquarters Madrko Bend,
March 23d.
" General, — I hope Van Dorn will act promptly. I am not desponding yet. I
know my position. One gunboat has sunk ou a bar just beyond range. They
are either tryiug to raise her, or removing the guns. Fire-rafts cannot be placed,
as our batteries are under fire. When we reply it is slowly, waiting until they
are where we waut them. Have sent to Pillow for two hundred rifle shots.
"J. P. McCown, Maj.-Geul. Comdg."

Telegram. Union City, March 25th, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Very heavy firing at No. 10 since 5 a. m. Apparently broadsides. Ed. Pickett, Jr.

APPENDIX TO CIIAPTER XXIII. 563
Corinth, Miss., March 27ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. M. Lovell, New Orleans :
I telegraphed two days ago I could arm eight gunboats at Fort Pillow with
32-pounders. Are these heavy enough ? G. T. Beauregard.

Telegram. Madrid Bend, March 26ft, 1862.
via Fort Pillow, 28ft, 4 p. m.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Shelling continues slowly. I believe the enemy will attempt to cross at three
or four points. I will do all I can to repel him if he attempts it. The negroes
left here yesterday by order of General Polk. Additional works will go on slowly,
as my force is so small and scattered. I think they will save the injured gun
boat. I need three thousand iufautry and the balance of Stewart's battery.
J. P. McCown, Maj.-Genl. Comdg.

Corinth, March 29ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. J. P. McCown, Madrid Bend, care Col. Pickett, Union City :
General Mackall is ordered to relieve you. You will then await orders at
Memphis. Send immediately your (and subordinate) detailed reports of evac
uation of New Madrid. G. T. Beauregard.

Madrid Bend, March 29ft, 1862.
via Union City.
Col. Thomas Jordan :
'Tis said that the enemy are cutting a way (a canal) from the foot of Island
No. 8 to St. John's Bayou. Said to be progressing rapidly for their boats. Bom
bardment still slowly continues. One of our gunboats came up to Tiptonville
last night ; fired at seventeen times. J. P. McCown, Maj.-Genl. Comdg.

Corinth, Miss., March 31st, 1862.
Capt. John Adams, Comdg. Memphis, Tenn. :
Bombardment of Island No. 10 and Madrid Bend commenced on 15th instant,
continued constantly night and day. Enemy has fired several thousand
13-inch and rifle shells. On the 17th a grand attack with five gunboats and four
mortar-boats, lasted nine hours. The result of bombardment to 28th instant,
is, on our side, one man killed, none seriously wounded, and no damage to bat
teries. Enemy had one gunboat disabled and another reported sunk.
G. T. Beauregard.

Telegram. Fort Pillow, April 8ft, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
The enemy have taken Island 10 ; this place should be reinforced at once.
J. B. Villepigue, Brig. Comdg.

564 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII.
Have ordered two regiments from Memphis.

G. T. Beauregard.

Telegram. Fort Pillow, April 13ft, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
The gunboat Little Rebel, at New Orleans, is very small, well protected against
shot, very swift, burns very little coal, and is much needed here for despatch
boat, picket boat, etc. Can she be ordered up ? I suggest that Governor Har
ris be requested to call out tho militia in the four surrounding counties, and
order them to report here, in case of an attack. Acting entirely on the defen
sive alone has produced the worst effect. General Pope replies to the proposi
tion for an exchange that he thinks there will be no difficulty in effecting an
exchange at a more convenient time. I learn our men have been sent to Colum
bus, Ohio, and other places. J. B. Villepigue, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

Telegram. Fort Pillow, April 13ft, 1862.
To Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
General Rust has arrived here, and, being my senior, will have to supersede
me in the command. He has no orders to show. Please let me know if it is
done by your direction. J. B. Villepigue, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

Corinth, April 13ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. J. B. Villepigue, Comdg. Fort Pillow :
General Sam. Jones will take command at Fort Pillow. Meantime retain
immediate command of post and carry on works. General Rust will encamp
his troops near by until General Jones shall arrive. G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Telegram. Fort Pillow, April 14ft, 1862.
To Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
By order, I am here with three regiments and a battalion of my brigade. An
attack by the gunboats and of the enemy's land forces in our rear imminent.
Many of my men unarmed totally. Others indifferently. The force is inade
quate if it was well armed. Can arms be forwarded immediately.
A. Rust, Brig.-Genl. C. S. A.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 20ft, 1862.
Dr. E. K. Marshall, Vicksburg, Miss.:
Dear Sir, — The General has taken steps for the immediate, effective fortifica
tion of the river near Vicksburg, and Captain D. B. Harris of his staff, an accom-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIII. 565
plished engineer, has been directed to repair there for that purpose. The Gen
eral wishes me to ask you to give Captain Harris all the aid in your power,
especiaHy to arouse your people to a sense of their duty to furnish the necessary
labor in such measure that the work will go on with the proper celerity.
And in this connection the General directs me to say, he shall confidently
expect the large slave-owners of the vicinity to come forward with their slaves,
with the same alacrity and liberality that has characterized aU other classes
of our people during this war.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Corinth, April 24ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. A. Rust, at Fort Pillow :
Come down to Memphis with your brigade, except one regiment, to be kept
at Randolph, as before directed. Five days' cooked subsistence, one hundred
rounds ammunition when you leave Memphis. Thomas Jordan, A. A. Genl.
Corinth, April 27th, 1862.
Captain D. B. Harris, Vicksburg :
Yes, construct proposed batteries and obstruct Yazoo.
G. T. Beauregard.

Telegram. Fort Pillow, April 28th, 1862.
To Genl. G. T. Beauregard :
Three companies artillery left for Corinth last night. Bombardment con
tinues day and night. One man killed last night.
J. B. Villepigue, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

Corinth, Miss., May 5ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. J. B. Villepigue, Fort Pillow, Tenn. :
You wiU judge when it is necessary to retire from Fort Pillow, via Covington
and SomerviUe, or Ripley, Brownsville, Jackson, and Grand Junction, to this
place. The enemy have no land force to fear. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, Miss., May 13th, 1862.
Genl. S. Cooper, A. and I. Genl., Richmond, Va. :
General Villepigue reports, "Scouts from Osceola say enemy's gunboats
Mound City and Carondelet run aground to prevent sinking ; another injured ;
one pilot and seventeen men killed." He thinks the report reliable. No firing
from the enemy since this morning. Their mortar-boats have all been towed
out of range. The " River Defence " men are greatly elated, and feel great con
fidence in their boats.
G. T. Beauregard.

566 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
Telegram. Corinth, April 8th, 1862.
Genl. S. Cooper, A. and I. Genl., Richmond, Va. :
We are much in need of at least two additional major-generals, and four ad
ditional brigadier-generals ; also one competent chief of artillery. I earnestly
and urgently recommend Major-General Bragg for immediate appointment iu
General A. S. Johnston's place. G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 8ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. J. C. Breckinridge, Comdg. Rear Guard, Mickey's House, Tenn. :
General, — Your letter of this date has been referred to the General command
ing, who agrees with you in the supposition that the movement of the enemy,
reported to yon, is but that ofa reconnoissance, which, however, cannot be sup
ported by artillery in the present state of the roads. The General expects to
morrow the arrival of several fresh regimeuts of infantry, which wiU be sent to
you at once. Meanwhile every effort will be made to repair the roads for the
passage of your wagons and artillery when you retire. Two of the best guides
available will be sent you. General Chalmers is still, and will remain, at
Monterey with his brigade, until you are prepared to fall back. Please commu
nicate with him so that he-may be able to conform his movements with yours.
The General regards the Ridge road as the only practicable oue at present.
Herewith is enclosed a communication for the commanding officer of tho
Federal forces, which please have sent to him by a flag of truce. If the an
swer is favorable you will detail a burial party from your cavalry to bury the
dead as soon as practicable. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 8ft, 1862.
Brig.-General J. R. Chalmers, Comdg. Brigade, A. of M. :
General, — Unless otherwise ordered by your immediate commanding officer,
you will allow your command to rest at Monterey. Sending working parties
to obstruct, by cutting down trees, removing bridges, etc., the bad places of the
roads leading from Monterey to positions now, or which may be, occupied by the
enemy, and which might be used by him in attacking you or in endeavoring to
cut off your retreat, look particularly to the roads leading towards Hamburg,
being careful, however, not to cut off our wagons, etc. Your working parties
should consist of those details left as a guard to your encampments. As soon
as your force shall have been sufficiently rested, you will retire to this place, on
the best road from Monterey to the Ridge road, passing west of the White
House. The necessary wagons will be furnished you, if possible ; meanwhile
you will have a guard to take care of and protect said baggage, or to destroy it

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 567
whenever the advanced pickets will give notice of the approach of the enemy.
You wiU coUect together as much cavalry as you shall think necessary, to act as
mounted pickets and guards on the roads leading into Monterey, placing them
sufficiently far in advance to give timely notice of the approach of the enemy.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Geul. Comdg.

Corinth, April 8ft, 1862.
Commodore G. N. Hollins, Fort PiUow, care Capt. Adams, Memphis :
Propose in my name an exchange of prisoners under flag of truce, according
to scale established by Federal War Department, as soon as possible. The ex
change to be made by river, my prisoners being at Memphis, en route for iuterior.
G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
April 8ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. U. S. Grant, Comdg. U. S. Forces near Pittsburg, Tenn. :
Sir,- — At the close of the conflict of yesterday, my forces being exhausted by
the extraordinary length of time during which they were engaged with yours
on that and the preceding day, and it being apparent that you had received,
aud were still receiving, large reiuforcements, I felt it my duty to withdraw my
troops from the immediate scene of conflict.
Under these circumstances, in accordance with the usages of war, I shall
transmit this under a flag of truce, to ask permission to send a mounted party
to the battle-field of Shiloh, for the purpose of giving decent interment to my
dead. Certain gentlemen wishing to avail themselves of this opportunity to remove
the remains of their sons and friends, I must request for them the privilege of
accompanying the burial party, aud iu this connection I deem it proper to say,
that I am asking only what I have extended to your own countrymen, under
similar circumstances. Respectfully, General, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
 v
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 8ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. J. R. Chalmers :
General, — The general commanding wishes that your movements, if practi
cable, shall conform strictly with those of General Breckinridge at the Mickey
House. Respectfully, General, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 9th, 1862.
Genl. John C. Breckinridge, Comdg. Rear Guard, etc. :
General, — Your note of this morning has been laid before tho General, who

568 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
directs me to say : a regiment, Newman's, will be sent out to meet your com
mand at the intersection of the Ridge road with one from Monterey to Purdy ;
to which point you are authorized to retire at once. A number of men were
also sent forward this morning — the guards left here in the encampment of the
several regiments. As soon as these troops and Newman's regiment shall join,
you will place Colonel Wheeler, 19th Alabama Volunteers, in command of the
demi-brigade, and your present command, except the cavalry, may then be
withdrawn to this place without further delay.
The General regrets exceedingly to hear of your indisposition, but trusts it is
only a transient ill, from which you will soon recover, so that he and. the
country may have the benefit of your highest physical aud mental faculties iu
the campaign inaugurated.
Enclosed are two open letters, which please transmit by the burial party,
should the sending of the latter be assented to by the enemy.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Corinth, April 9th, 1862.
Genl. S. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
All present probabilities are that whenever the enemy moves on this position,
he will do so with an overwhelming force of not less than eighty-flve thousand
men. We can muster only about thirty-five thousand effectives. Van Doru
may possibly join us in a few days with fourteen thousand more. Can we not
be reinforced by Pemberton's army ? If defeated here we lose the Mississippi
Valley, and, probably, our cause ; whereas we could even afford to lose, for
a while, Charleston and Savannah, for the purpose of defeating Buell's army,
which would not only insure us the Valley of the Mississippi, but onr inde
pendence. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, April 9ft, 1862.
Genl. S. Cooper, Richmond, Va. :
What shall I do with prisoners now on hand — about three thousand? —
Meanwhile, I have ordered to Tuscaloosa, via Mobile. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, April 13th, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. E. K. Smith, Chattanooga, Tenn. :
Six regimeuts from Pemberton on way to join you ; add to them three of
yours which failed to get by Huntsville, and with your forces dash at Mitchell
and take him in reverse. G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 13ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. U. S. Grant, Comdg. Forces of Uuited States, Pittsburg, West Tenn. :
General, — Your communication of yesterday, by flag of truce, enclosing the
application of Colonel Battle for exchange, has been received, and I hasten to
answer as soon as my pressing engagements have permitted.
Although Colonel Battle may be disabled for active service, I will neverthe-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 569
less exchange him for an officer of the same rank, provided you will indicate one
who did command a brigade in your expedition.
But the prisoners of war having been sent to the interior, the colonel you
may desire to have in exchange will have to be seut for, and will be delivered
at some point to be arranged hereafter. Meantime, I hope you will feel author
ized to permit Colonel Battle to be released on his parole, so that, as soon as
practicable, he may have the benefit of the care of his family and friends in his
injured condition.
I have been induced to make this distinction in connection with colonels
commanding brigades, because I have observed that nearly, if not all, brigades
in the United States' service, during this war, are iu command of colonels, while
iu the Confederate service most of our brigades are commanded by brigadiers;
consequently, unless some such distinction shall be regarded, we may suffer ma
terially in exchanges.
I propose, also, in a few clays, either to permit the medical officers of your
army in my possession to return to your camp, or to send them, by the Missis
sippi River, to General Pope.
Respectfully, General, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Corinth, Miss., April 14ft, 1 862.
Genl. S. Cooper, Adj.-Genl., Richmond, Va. :
As directed by President, I send a list of officers for immediate promotion :
Brigadier-Generals Breckinridge aud Hindman, for major-generals ; Colonels
Thos. Jordan, Wm. Preston, Alfred Mouton, Geo. Manney, Preston Smith, J. S.
Marmaduke, J. D. Martin, and Daul. Adams, for brigadier-generals; Captain
John Morgan, Ky., to be colonel of cavalry.
Please answer by telegraph. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, April 14th, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. E. K. Smith, Knoxville, Tenn. :
ShaU call the Pemberton regiments here under the circumstances. But sug
gest that movement you indicate, and urge War Department to send you the
troops for it by all means, and without hesitation, and I will throw a brigade
of cavalry across the river to aid you. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, April 14ft, 1862.
Genl. S. Cooper, Adj.-Genl., Richmond, Va. :
Pemherton's troops cut off by the Memphis and Charleston Road; should be
sent to me by way of Mobile. Cannot General Kirby Smith be furnished from
seaboard with a division to make a diversion on Nashville and enemy's rear, now
open and vulnerable ? He proposes such a movement. With celerity, it is emi
nently practicable. G. T. Beauregard.

570 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
Corinth, April 14ft, 1862.
Brig.-Genl. R. S. Ripley, Charleston, S. C :
Troops must not go to Kirby Smith now. Circumstances altered by burning
of railroad bridge. Hence let all be sent here at once via Mobile.
G. T. Beauregard.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 16ft, 1862.-
Brig.-Genl. H. Little, Rienzi, Miss. :
General, — I am instructed by the General to say that he wishes you to exam
ine the country for the distauee of five miles to the south and west of Rienzi,
with a view to ascertainingits fitness for an encampment for twenty-five thou
sand men. Look especially into the question of abundance of good water and
wood. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
 Thos. Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 16ft, 1862.
Genl. Sam. Cooper, A. and I. Genl. C. S. A., Richmond :
General, — I fear that Colonel Northrop, Chief of the Subsistence Department,
is disposed or determiued to ignore the presence with these headquarters of
Lieutenant-Colonel Lee of his department, the officer next in rank in it to him-
Belf, and one of the largest experience in our service, seut here, as you are arware,
on my application, because of that experience.
Circumstances convince me that I am not mistaken, aud, unless Colonel
Northrop is led to change his course, the service and the country will suffer.
His attempts to communicate directly with subordinates to Colonel Lee, and
not to communicate at all with Colonel Lee, are palpably disrespectful to the
authority that sent the Colonel to my staff, as well as to me, and I trust Col
onel Northrop will be made to understand this before he can do any material
mischief. I trust the department will understand that I have only noticed this matter
because I feared injury to great public interests might result if I were silent ;
and I beg to add that my attention to this matter has not been attracted by any
complaint from Colonel Lee.
Respectfully, your obedient servant, G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Corinth, April 22d, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. Van Dorn, Memphis :
You may as well begin sending your troops here by brigades at once.
G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, April 23d, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. Van Dorn, Memphis :
Information about Hamburg true. Send on your troops rapidly. Battery
horses, too, if possible Rust must hold himself ready to move, if required.
G. T. Beauregard.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 571
Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 24ft, 1862.
Major E. E. McLean, Chief Quartermaster, A. of M. :
Major,— Colonel Morgan is about starting on au important military expedition
beyond the Tennessee River ; and the general commanding directs that he be
furnished with fifteen thousand dollars for the wants of his expedition. As
there may be no bonded quartermaster with him, you are authorized and in
structed to take his official receipts for the same'. You may turn over to him,
as a part of said sum, the sum of one thousaud dollars, turned over to you the
other day by Captain John Adams.
Respectfully, your obedient servant, Thos. Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Corinth, April 25ft, 1882.
Capt. D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer, Vicksburg :
Two 10-inch guns and eighty-five hundred pounds powder, subject to your
order at Jackson, Miss. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, April 26ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. M. Lovell, Tangipaho :
Yes, look out for Jackson aud Vicksburg, but we may require you here soon.
G. T. Beauregard.
Corinth, April 28th, 1862.
S. Kirkpatrick, Grenada, Miss. :
Send guns to Vicksburg. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, April 29ft, 1862.
Col. J. L. Aubrey, Comdg. Vicksburg, Miss. :
Guns have been ordered to Jackson, Mississippi, subject to order of Captain
Harris. Let him send an agent there to forward them to him as wanted. Gov
ernor Pettus has been ordered to send one regiment of Volunteers to report to
you. They will be armed as soou as possible. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, Miss., April 29th, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. M. Lovell, Camp Moore, Tangipaho, La. :
Should you determine not to return to New Orleans, can yon not send one
regiment to Vicksburg with some artillerists, and come here immediately with
balance of forces ? I expect soon another battle. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, April 30ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. M. Lovell, Tangipaho, La. :
Send General Smith as .soon as practicable, with one regiment and artiller
ists, to fortify and defend river below Vicksburg. Heavy guns are at Jackson,
Mississippi. Get all the arras you can, and arm new Mississippi regiments to
send here immediately. G. T. Beauregard.

572 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. Corinth, April 29ft, 1862.
Com. R. F. Pinckney, Fort Pillow, Tenn. :
We are fortifying Vicksburg to guard river from below. Would it not be
preferable to send the boats we proposed dismantling, to assist the defence at
that point, instead of fortifying Randolph ? Consult General Villepigue.
G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., April 29ft, 1862.
Col. Thos. Claiborne, Comdg. Cavalry :
Colonel, — The Commander of the Forces instructs me to inform you that your
regiment has been assembled at Treutou for an important service, requiring
great vigor and secrecy of movement, and the utmost coolness and resolution
on the part of officers and men. Colonel Jackson has also been ordered to con
centrate his regiment at Trenton, for the same purpose.
When both regiments shall have arrived and are ready for the field, you will
assume command of the expedition, and march upon Paducah, Kentucky, with
as much celerity as may be judicious for your animals. You are expected to
move with the least possible baggage and subsistence, and, by a coup de main,
enter Paducah, capture its garrison, and destroy the large amouut of stores un
derstood to have been accumulated there.
Any steamboats that you may be able to seize, of course will be burned.
Arms captured, if any, will be brought away, if possible, without endangering
your command.
Detailed instructions cannot be given for your movements. The garrison of
the place is believed to be small, much inferior to the force you will be able to
command; and, should you be able to move with sufficient celerity, you can
surprise the place and effect the purposes of the expedition, with brilliant suc
cess — that is, cau destroy their supplies, capture prisoners, and greatly disturb
their communications.
Show this communication to Colonel Jackson.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.
P. S. Of course, you will so arrange your movements as to dash on to Padu
cah about daybreak. You should give out by the wayside that you are the ad
vance guard of General Van Dorn, en route to take possession of mouth of river,
to cut off retreat of enemy while we take him in front; General Price, mean
while, to cross the Tennessee and march on Nashville. T. J., A. A. G.

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi,
Corinth, Miss., May 1st, 1862.
Geul. Saml. Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl., Richmond, Va. :
General, — I have the honor to submit herewith a General Order, which I have
published in connection with, and regulating the subsistence of, this army ; the
operation of which, I am assured, will be in the interest of all concerned, and

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 573
which, I trust, will receive the sanction of the War Department. Just, how
ever, as this order was ready for publication, Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, Chief of
Subsistence, received the following telegram from Colonel Northrop, dated April
29th, 1862 :
" By order of the Secretary of War, the ration is reduced to half pound of ba
con or pork aud one pound of beef, and not exceeding one and a half pound of
flour or corn-meal."
In the name of my men I most respectfully, but urgently, protest against such
a reduction of the substantial part of the ration. Iu the orders I have the hon
or to submit, the greatest reduction has been made that the meat ration wiU
bear; and, as will be perceived, this retrenchment is partially made up to the
soldier by an increase of the rice ration. But for the disaster at New Orleaus,
I should have felt it my duty to add, likewise, to the sugar ration, as affording
a cheap and healthy nutritious addition to the diet of the soldiers in this cli
mate. I shall carry out the orders enclosed until otherwise instructed by the War
Department. Respectfully, your obedient servant, G. T. Beauregard.

Headquarters Western Department,
Corinth, Miss., May lift, 1862.
Col. R. B. Lee, Chief of Subsistence, etc. :
Colonel, — The Commander-in-Chief wishes you to establish a sub-depot of sub
sistence at either SaltiUo or Baldwin, on or near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,
with the least delay practicable — say of one hundred thousand rations. Please
report execution of these instructions.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Headquarters Western Department,
Corinth, Miss., May lift, 1862.
Col. W. G. Gill, Chief of Ordnance :
Colonel, — The General wishes you to provide an ample supply of signal rock
ets. There are some one hundred and eighty now on hand ; possibly some of
which, however, are not good. He expects to use them frequently to disturb
the enemy at night. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Jordan, A. Adj.-Genl.

Corinth, Miss., May 18th, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. Van Dorn, Danville Road, ete. :
Position "B" is more advantageous, provided enemy would attack; but I
fear he is advancing with gradual approaches. It would be well to have him
closely reconnoitred from the direction of Hardee's pickets, if practicable ; oth
erwise, from your own. G. T. Beauregard.

574 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
Corinth. May 18ft, 10.30 a. m.
Maj.-Genl. Van Dorn, near Corinth :
Bra.fg has recalled his troops to their encampments, having ascertained that
the enemy was not preparing for battle, but was out only to work. Let me
know in time if he should turn out again, to support or act with you.
 G. T. Beauregard.
Telegram. Headquarters, Corinth, May 19ft, 1862,
9£ h. p. m.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Will put everything iu complete readiness to-morrow. Will see you in the
moruin"-.  Earl Van Dorn.
Telegram. Headquarters, Corinth, May 19th, 1862,
9 h. p. m.
To Genl. Beauregard :
It is dark and rainy, but the movement is within possibility. I wUl go to
work again to reopen the crossing of Clear Creek to-night, and will make every
effort to be in position by 8 o'clock to-morrow, if you think it advisable to do
so. Kit is of the greatest importance, however, I must say that the promises
are not so bright as they would probably be by starting to-morrow evening. It
is extremely dark, and it will rain heavily, I think. Men will not be cheerful,
and many will remain, under plea of sickness, who would otherwise go. I will
await your telegram, to say go or wait.
Truly and respectfully, Earl Van Dorn, Maj.-Genl.

Corinth, May 20ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. Van Dorn :
Weather being so threatening, we had better wait as you propose.
 G. T. Beauregard.
Headquarters Western Department,
Corinth, Miss., May 19ft, 1862.
Genl. Sam. Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl., Richmond, Va. :
gir> — Since the battle of Shiloh, when I assumed command of the Western
Department, and the fall of New Orleans, which latter event has placed the Mis
sissippi River, from its mouth to Vicksburg, under the control of the enemy, no
instructions from the War Department, relative to the policy of the government
and the movements of the armies of the Confederacy, have been received by me.
In tho absence of such instructions, I deem it advisable to lay before the depart
ment, in as few words as practicable, my reasons for still holding this position
against a much stronger force of the enemy in my front, even at the risk of a
defeat, instead of retiring into the interior of the country along the Mobile and
Ohio or Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which would draw him after me and
increase the obstacles he would have to encounter in his march.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 575
It is evident that Corinth, situated at the intersection of those two railroads,
presents the advantage, besides its favorable local features for defence, of pos
sessing those two main arteries for the supplies of a large army. By its aban
donment, only one of those roads could then be relied upon for that object. If
the enemy took possession of this strategic poiut, he would at once open his
communications, by railroad, with Columbus and Paducah, in his rear, and
Huntsville, on his left flank, and thus relieve himself of the awkward position
in which he is about to find himself by the rapid fall of the Tennessee River.
It is evident, also, that the true Hue of retreat of the forces at this point is
along the Mobile and. Ohio road towards Meridian, and thence towards Mont
gomery, so as to be able, as a last resort, to unite with the armies of the East.
This line not only covers the railroad aud river linos of communication to Selma
and Montgomery, but also, from a position along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,
the enemy would expose his railroad lines of communication, already referred
to, if he should attempt to move on to Memphis. But if he should march in
force on the latter place, to change his lines of communication, Forts Pillow
and Randolph, on the Mississippi River, would have to be abandoned. This
would give the enemy command of the Mississippi River from Vicksburg to the
Ohio aud Missouri rivers, and enable him to concentrate a large force against
Vicksburg. Tho fall of the latter place would endanger our line of communi
cation thence to Meridian and Selma (the latter portion now nearly completed),
aud the armies of the Mississippi aud of the West would soon be compelled to
abandon the whole State of Mississippi and another large portion of Alabama,
to take refuge behind the Alabama River.
It might be asked : Why not retreat aloug the Memphis and Charleston Rail
road towards the Mississippi River ? The reason is obvious. Cut off from com-
muuication with the East, the State of Mississippi could not long support a
large army. It might also he asked : Why not attempt to hold both the Mem
phis and Charleston and the Mobile and Ohio railroads ? Because, being already
inferior iu numbers to the euemy, should we divide our forces, it would not take
him long to destroy both fractions.
Thus it becomes essential to hold Corinth to the last extremity, if the odds
are not too great against us, even at the risk of a defeat. Should the depart
ment judge otherwise, however, I stand ready to carry its views into effect as
soon as practicable, as my only desire is to save the cause aud serve the country.
I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Headquarters Western Department,
Corinth, Miss., May 20th, 1862.
Major-GenL H. W. Halleck, Comdg. U. S. Forces :
General,— I have this day been informed by Brigadier-General Villepigue,
commanding Confederate forces at Fort Pillow, that two hundred exchanged
prisoners were seut to him on yesterday, and that these prisoners had the small
pox among them. I have directed General Villepigue to return them forthwith.

576 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
I presume that all this has been done without your knowledge; as your com
munication on the subject of the exchange of prisoners I regarded as an agree
ment on fair and equal terms.
To send us prisoners afflicted with contagious diseases of a dangerous and
deadly character, is, iu my judgment, violative of aU ideas of fairness and justice
as well as humanity.
For all prisoners, therefore, surrendered by Confederate officers, I shall insist,
General, that they are entitled, by every claim of fairness and justice, to demand,
in exchange, an equal number of prisoners in like condition of those sent back
to you. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Telegram.
Headquarters, Corinth, May 20ft, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
I find I must reopen the road across Clear Creek. I will march this evening,
if we do not have a rain-storm, which now seems to be threatening.
Earl Van Dorn, Maj.-Genl.

Telegram. Headquarters, May 20ft, 1862, 4 p. m.
To Genl. Beauregard:
There is every prospect of a heavy rain ; shall I postpone the movement un
til morning or next evening ? I find, too, some difficulty in reopening crossings
of Clear Creek. Answer quick. Earl Van Dorn.

Maj.-Genl. Van Dorn, Comdg. A. W. :
Delay the movement twenty-four hours.

Corinth, May 20ft, 1862.
G. T. Beauregard.

Telegram. Headquarters, May 20ft, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
I have just learned that five hundred cavalry were seen yesterday mornin"
marching towards Biernsville.
Captain Reeves saw about that number going in that direction to-day.
Earl Van Dorn.

Corinth, May 20ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. Van Dorn, Comdg. A. W. :
What think you of weather aud of making move iu morning? 'Tis impor
tant to make it soon as possible. G. T. Beauregard.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 577
Corinth, May 22d, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. L. Polk, Mobile and Ohio Railroad :
All right, keep from discovery. Bragg is ready near, waiting for Van Dorn.
He will soon be ready. I send you his message. We have defeated the enemy
in Western Virginia and New Mexico. We may ho on the flood. Let pickets
do as usual. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, May 22d, 1862, 2 p. m.
Genl. B. Bragg, Farmington road :
Van Dorn cannot get in position. Movement delayed to another time. Re
turn troops to their positions. G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, May 22d, 1862, 3.15 p. m.
Maj.-Genl. E. Van Dorn, Widow Smith's:
Have ordered all the troops back to their encampments for the present.
G. T. Beauregard.

Corinth, May 22c?, 1862, 2 p. m.
Maj.-Genl. L.Polk:
Movement is delayed to future time. Take back your commands to their
usual positions. Van Dorn could not get into position. G. T. Beauregard.

Telegram. Headquarters 1st Corps, May 22d, 1862.
Genl. Beauregard :
General, — I will remain in the neighborhood of the telegraph for an hour or
two, and will be pleased to receive further orders by telegraph, if you have any.
L. Polk, Maj.-Genl.

Telegram. Polk's Station, May 22d, 1862, 2.30 p. m.
Genl. Beauregard :
Your despatch of 2 p. m. received ; the troops will be retired as you have or
dered. Five distinct columns of smoke are visible in front, extending apparent
ly from the Memphis aud Charleston to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.
 L. Polk.
Telegram. Headquarters, May 22d, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Just in ; note received ; will come in. General, don't be too much disappointed
with me, you can't imagine what I have had to contend with.
 Earl Van Dorn.
Telegram. Headquarters 1st Corps, May 22d, 1882.
Genl. Beauregard :
A prisoner just captured, who was in hunt- of water, says there is a brigade in
L— 37

578 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
front which has been lying on its arms for the last two days ; which brigade is
on the Purdy road, one mile in rear of its pickets. He also says there is a brigade
on the right of his brigade extending towards the trail road ; also says that the
enemy have thrown up intrenchments across the Purdy road, one mile iu rear
of his pickets, on which they have planted batteries with abatis in frout; he
says that Sigel was in our front inspecting batteries two days ago. I have
seut him to you. I hear through Colonel Wirt Adams that two or three de
serters from some regiment, designation not known, passed our lines last night
and went over to the enemy. I will investigate further. L. Polk, Maj.-Genl.

Corinth, Miss., Sunday Night, May 25ft, 1862.
Dear General, — I have thought it proper to reduce my views to writing on the
subject we were discussing to-day. Yon wiU give them whatever weight they
deserve ; they are honestly entertained. I think our situation critical, and what
ever is resolved on should be carried promptly into execution. With best
wishes for your success and an honest desire to serve you and our cause,
I remain, very truly your friend, W. J. Hardee.
Genl. Beauregard, Comdg., etc.

Views. Corinth, Miss., May 25ft, 1862.
The situation at Corinth requires that we should attack the enemy at once,
or await his attack, or evacuate the place.
Assuming that we have fifty thousand men and the enemy nearly twice that
number, protected by intrenchments, I am clearly of opinion that no attack
should be made. Our forces are inferior, and tho battle of Shiloh proves that
with only the advantage of position it was hazardous to contend against his
superior strength, and to attack him iu his intrenchments now would probably
inflict on us and the Confederacy a fatal blow. Neither the number nor in
struction of our troops renders them equal to the task.
I think we can successfully repel any attack upon our camp by the enemy ;
tmt it is manifest no attack is meditated ; it will be approached gradually, and
will be shelled and bombarded without equal means to respond. This will com
pel us to make sorties against his intrenched positions under most adverse cir
cumstances, or to evacuate the place. The latter seems to me inevitable. If so,
the only remaining question is, whether the place should be evacuated before,
or after, or during its defence.
After fire is opened, or the place is actively shelled or bombarded, or during
such an attack, it will be difficult to evacuate the place in good order. With a
large body of men imperfectly disciplined, any idle rumor may spread a panic,
and inextricable confusion may follow, so that the retreat may become a rout.
The same objections would apply to any partial or feeble defence of the place
and re-attempt to evacuate it in the meanwhile. If the defeuce be not deter
mined or the battle decisive, no useful result would follow, but it would afford

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 579
an opportunity to our enemies to magnify the facts, give them a pretext to
claim a victory aud to discourage our friends at home and abroad, aud diminish,
if not destroy, all chances of foreign interveution.
Under these circumstances I think the evacuation, if it be determined upon,
should be made before the euemy opens fire, and not coupled with a sortie
against his intrenchments, or partial battle. It should be done promptly if at
all. Even now the enemy can shell our camp. It should be done in good order,
so as not to discourage our friends or give a pretext for the triumph of our
enemies. With the forces at our disposition, with a vast territory behind us, with a
patriotic and devoted people to support us, the enemy as he moves southward,
away from rivers and railroads, would find insurmountable obstacles iu moving
columns so heavy that we cannot strike them, and over a country where his
mechanical superiority will not avail him.
If we resolve to evacuate, every hour of delay only serves to augment our
difficulties. The enemy every day grows stronger on our flanks, aud menaces
more and more our communicatious. If he effects his designs, we must fight at
every disadvantage or retreat disastrously. History and our country will j udge
us, not by the movement, but its consequences.
Respectfully submitted, W. J. Hardee, Maj.-Genl.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, Comdg., etc.

Corinth, Miss., May 26ft, 1862.
I concur fully iu the above views, and already all needful preparations are be
ing made for a proper and prompt evacuation of this place.
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Corinth, Miss., May 26ft, 1862.
Dear General, — I fully concur in the views contained in your letter of the 25th
instaut, received last night, and I had already commenced giving orders to my
chiefs of staff departments for their execution. But everything that is done
must be done under the plea of the intention " to take the offensi ve " at the op
portune moment. Every commander of corps must get everything ready to
move at a moment's notice, aud must see to the proper condition of the roads
and bridges his corps is to travel upon.
Thanking you for your kind wishes, I remain, yours truly, G. T. Beauregard.
Maj.-Genl. W. J. Hardee, near Corinth, Miss.

Headquarters Western Department,
Corinth, Miss., May 26ft, 1862.
Maj.-Genl. Mansfield Lovell, Vicksburg, Miss. :
General  Your favors of 25th and 26th instaut have just been received. I
telegraphed you yesterday relative to General Ruggles's position, which I hop^
is settled for the present. The great point is to defend the river at Vicksburg.
The question of who does it must be of a secondary consideration. The troops

580 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
of your command are there, and I think it but fair that you should direct the
operations at that point, and you have my warmest wishes for your success.
By the copy of War Department order which I ordered to be enclosed to you a
few days ago, you will perceive that Vicksburg is in my department and Jack
son in yours ; but I attach only little importance to this matter ; all that I de
sire is success to our arms and to our cause.
With regard to your appeal for small arms, I should be most happy to send
them to you if they could be spared from here at this critical moment ; but be
ing on the eve of a battle with a powerful euemy, close in my front, it becomes
impossible to grant your request, for a defeat here would result in the loss of
the whole Mississippi Valley, including your force, and the points you are now
holding. With regard to the defonce of the railroads you refer to, the best way
of accomplishing it is to remove the cars and engines and to destroy a few
bridges ; they could not then be used by the enemy. As soon, however, as I
can return you some arms it shall be done. I can only express again my re
gret at not having here the available force at present with you, for I care
more about my front at this moment than I do for my rear.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Headquarters, Richmond, Va., May 26ft, 1862.
General, — Your letter of the 19th instant has just been received. Although
no instructions have been given as to the military operations within your de
partment since its command devolved on you, yet your condition and move
ments have been the subject of anxious consideration. Full reliance was felt
in your judgment and skill and in the bravery of your army, to maintain the
great interest of the country, and to advance the general policy of the govern
ment. It was also hoped that the victory of Shiloh would have enabled you,
upon the arrival of your reinforcements, to reocoupy the country north of you
and to have re-established the former communications enjoyed by the army.
This hope is still indulged, and every effort will be made, as has heretofore been
done, to strengthen you by all the means within the control of the department.
Should, however, the superior numbers of the enemy force you back, the line
of retreat indicated by you is considered the best, and in that event, should it
be inevitable, it is hoped yon will be able to strike a successful blow at the eu
emy if ho follows, which will enable you to regain the ascendency and drive
him back to the Ohio.
The maintenance of your present position, with the advantages you ascribe
to it, so long as you can resist the enemy aud subsist your army, is, of course
preferable to withdrawing from it, and thus laying open more of the couutry
to his ravages, uuless by skilful mauceuviiug you can entice him to a more
favorable position to attack.
The question of subsisting your army for any length of time, cut off from '
the supplies north of you, may demand your serious attention, aud was the sub
ject of a telegraphic despatch to you this morning.
The supplies accumulated at Atlanta are intended as a reserve for the army

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 581
in the East as well as the West, and cannot be entirely appropriated to either
division. Each army must therefore draw its support as far as possible from
the country it can control ; and this necessity must not be lost sight of iu the
operations of either, aud may accelerate movements which otherwise it might
be deemed prudent to restrain.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. Lee, Genl.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard, Comdg. Western Dept.

Memorandum of Movements on Baldwin. — For General Van Dorn.
Headquarters Western Department,
Corinth, Miss., May 27ft, 1862.
1st. The baggage trains of his army must leave their position at daybreak
on the 28th iustant, by the road on the east of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,
to stop temporarily at about six miles from his headquarters, but with secret
orders to the officer iu charge of them to continue rapidly ou the direct road
to the vicinity of Baldwin. The provision trains will follow the baggage
trains. 2d. The ammunition and ambulance traius must be parked at the most con
venient point to their brigades, or near the general headquarters, where they
will remain until the troops shall have been moved to the front, to take up
their line of battle, when these traius will be ordered to follow the provision
trains. All of these trains must be accompanied by one pioneer company aud
two infantry companies (properly distributed) per brigade. The brigade and
regimental quartermasters must accompany aud be responsible for their trains.
The officers in charge of the baggage trains will receive sealed orders as to
their point of destination, which they will open at the already mentioned stop:
ping-place. 3d. As it may become necessary to take the offensive, the troops will take
their position in Hue of battle as soou as practicable after disposing of their
baggage in the wagon trains. These troops will bivouac in position, and at 3 a.m.
on the 29th instant, if not attacked by the enemy, will take up their line of
march to Baldwin by the route indicated (Article 1), leaving properly dis
tributed cavalry pickets in front of their lines, to guard and protect this retro
grade movement. These pickets shall remain in position until recalled by the
chief of cavalry, who will remain in Corinth for the purpose of directing the ret
rograde movemeut of the cavalry, when each regiment will follow the route
taken by the corps to which it shaH have been temporarily assigned for the
protection of its rear and flauks.
4th. Under no circumstances will the cavalry regiments abandon their posi
tion in front of the lines (unless compelled by overpowering numbers) until the
rear of the column of the Army of the West shall have crossed Clear Creek,
when the general commanding shall communicate the fact to the chief of cav
alry for his information and guidance.
5th. The cavalry pickets will continue the usual skirmishing with the ene
my in front of the lines, and when retiring will destroy, as far as practicable,

582 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
the roads aud bridges in their rear, and, after having crossed Clear Creek, they
will guard crossing until recalled by the general commanding.
6th. The chief of cavalry will order, if practicable, one regiment to report to
Major-General Polk, one to Major-General Hardee, one to General Bragg, and
one to Major-General Van Dorn, independently of the regiment now at Jacinto,
already ordered to report to the latter officer.
7th. After the departure of the troops from the intrenched lines, a sufficient
number of drums from each brigade must be left to beat the reveille at the
usual hour, after which they can rejoin their commands.
8th. The commanding officer of the Army of the West will leave, if necessary,
on the south side of Clear Creek, about five hundred infantry and two pieces of
artillery, to defend the crossing of said stream, and to effectually destroy the
bridge aud obstruct the road after the passage of the cavalry.
9th. On arriving in the vicinity of Guntown, the best defensive position will
be taken in rear of Twenty-mile Creek, due regard being had to a proper and
sufficient supply of wood aud water for the troops.
G. T. Beauregard, General Commanding.

Memorandum of Orders.
Headquarters Western Department,
Corinth, Miss., May 27ft, 1862.
The following memorandum is furnished to General Bragg for the intended
movement of his army from this place to Baldwin, at the time hereinafter indi
cated :
1st. Hardee's corps will move on the direct road from his position to Danville
by Cleburne's camp, which is on the east of the Mobile aud Ohio Railroad part
of the way; thence to Rienzi aud Baldwin.
2d. Bragg's corps via the Tennessee pike to Kossuth, until it reaches the south
side of the Tuscumbia ; thence by the Rienzi and Blackland Road to Carrolls-
ville and Baldwin.
3d. Breckinridge's corps (or reserve) via the turnpike to Kossuth ; thence to
Blackland, Carrollsville, aud Baldwin.
4th. Polk's corps via the turnpike to Kossuth ; thence, by the Western road,
to Blackland, Carrollsville, and Baldwin.
5th. The baggage trains of these corps must leave their position at 12 m. pre
cisely on the 28th instant, and stop for the night on the south side of the Tus
cumbia, on the best available ground. The provision traius will foUow the bag
gage trains.
6th. The ammunition and ambulance trains must be parked at tho most con
venient point to their brigades, and moved in rear of the provision trains to tho
south side of the Tuscumbia, where they will await further orders. All of these
trains are to be accompanied by one pioneer and two infantry companies, prop
erly distributed per brigade. The brigade and regimental quartermasters must
accompany and be responsible for their trains.
7th. The officers in charge of the baggage trains will receive sealed ordors as

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 583
to their point of destination, and which they will open at the first-mentioned
stopping-place. 8th. As it may become necessary to take the offensive, the troops will take
their position in the trenches as soon as practicable after disposing of their
l>aggage in the wagon trains. One brigade per corps will be put in line of
battle, in the best position for the offensive, in front of the trenches. The re
serve will remain in position as already indicated to its general commanding.
These troops will all bivouac in position, and at 3 a. m. on the 29th instant, if
not attacked by the enemy, will take up their line of march to Baldwin by the
routes indicated in Article 1, leaving properly distributed cavalry pickets in
front of their lines to guard and protect this retrograde movement. These
pickets will remain iu position until recalled by the chief of cavalry, who will
remain in Corinth for the purpose of directing the retrograde movement of cav
alry, aud when each regiment must follow the route taken by the corps to
which it shall have beeu temporarily assigned for the protection of its rear
and flanks.
9th. Under no circumstances will these cavalry regiments abandon their posi
tions in front of the Hues (unless compelled by overpowering numbers) until
tho rear of the columns of the Army of the Mississippi shall have crossed the
Tuscumbia, when the general commanding each corps will communicate that
fact to the chief of cavalry for his information and guidance.
10th. The cavalry pickets will continue the usual skirmishing with the ene
my in front of the Hues, aud, when retiring, they will destroy the roads and
bridges in their rear as far as practicable, and, after having crossed the Tus
cumbia, they will guard the crossings until recalled by the commanding gen
eral. 11th. The chief of cavalry will order, if practicable, one regiment to report
to Major-General Polk, one to Major-General Hardee, one to General Bragg, and
one to Major-General Van Dorn, independently of the regiment now at Jacinto,
already ordered to report to the latter officer.
12th. After the departure of the troops from the intrenched line, a sufficient
number of drums from each brigade must be left to beat reveille at the usual
hour, after which they can rejoin their commands.
13th. The commanding officer of the corps of the Army of the Mississippi
will leave on the south side of the Tuscumbia five hundred infantry and two
pieces of artillery, to guard the four crossings of that stream, and to effectually
destroy the bridges and obstruct tho roads after the passage of the cavalry.
14th. On arriving at Baldwin, the best defensive position will be taken by
the Army of the Mississippi, clue regard being had to a proper and sufficient
supply of wood and water for the troops and horses of the different commands.
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Telegram. Polk's Station, May 28ft, 1862.
Genl. Beauregard :
The enemy have pressed my pickets very hard to-day. They drove them

584: APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
well-nigh back to the intrenchments ; many of their shells have been thrown
into my lines. I have driven them back after a sharp skirmish, aud re-estab
lished my line. My trains have gone, and my troops that are not in advance iu
and near the trenches are ready for the march. I find I have some extra com
missary stores and some teuts, which I must have three or four cars to enable
me to remove. These might be had by being sent for, so as to be added to
those already here for the purpose of removing the heavy artillery. They wiU
be in time if here by 10 or 12 o'clock. Answer soon. L. Polk, Maj.-Genl.
Corinth, Miss., May 28ft, 1862.
Major-General E. Van Dorn, Danville Road, Miss. :
General, — I approve of your request to leave at 12 o'clock (not 11) to-night,
if it he clear, sending artillery at sundown two miles back, so as to be beyond
reach of sound to the enemy. Be careful, however, not to send it too far. As
Bragg's rear-guards will not leave until 3 p. m., yours ought not to leave before
2.30 o'clock, for Hardee's left would then be uucovered while moving in rear of
your present position, and before crossing the railroad. Hardee will destroy
the bridges (dirt and railroad) on the Tuscumbia, provided he is guarding
them; but have the matter clearly understood with him, so as to admit of no
error. I referred, in my note, to the small bridge on Clear Creek, over which
you must pass. You must, of course, have out as few details as possible. You
must be tho sole judge of that.
The telegraph operator must remain at his post as long as possible — say until
your main forces move to the rear; for at any moment we may be called upon
to move forward.
I am glad to hear of the sham balloon. I hope it is so, for I fear that more
than their artillery at this moment.
Your obedient servant, G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
P. S. You must not forget to obstruct thoroughly the road across Clear
Creek, near Geueral Jones's lines. You or Hardee must keep a strong guard of
infantry and two pieces of artillery at the Clear Creek railroad-bridge until the
last cars shall have left the depot here. Please arrange the matter distinctly
with him. Would it not be prudent to send one regiment, two pieces of artil
lery, and some cavalry to protect your train ? I thiuk I would keep Price back,
in the best position to move either to the rear, to protect the trains, if neces
sary, or to the front, in case of battle. G. T. B.

Corinth, Miss., May 28ft, 1862.
General B. Bragg, Corinth, Miss. :
General, — From information received, Guntown, four and a half miles below
Baldwin, is considered a better position for the defensive ; hence we will go
there. Please give the necessary orders. Small details must be kept in or
about old camps, to keep up usual fires, on account of balloons, with orders to
join their commauds at 10 o'clock on the march to the rear, or in front, in case
of battle. Not too many fires must bo kept on the Hues to-night, so as not to

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 585
reveal too clearly our position. A brigade (the best one) from each corps will
be selected to guard and bring up the rear of each column, to move off about
two hours after the rest of the column, aud from which a small detail will be
left at each bridge, to destroy it after the passage of cavalry ; detail to be iu
proportion to importance of bridge. Would it not be advisable for the main
forces to start at 1 a. m., and the rear-guards at 3 a. m. ? No rockets must be
fired to-night. Your obedient servant,
 G. T. Beauregard.
(Confidential.) Corinth, Miss., May 28ft, 1862.
General B. Bragg, Corinth, Miss. :
General, — Considering that we have still so much yet to be removed from
this place, I have decided that tho retrograde movement shall not take place
until the 30th instant, at the hours appointed, instead of the 29th. You will
please issue all necessary orders to that effect to the forces under your com
mand. It would be advisable to stop at once the ammunition and provision
trains at convenient points to this place.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.
Telegram. Headquarters, May 29ft, 1862, 9.45 a. m.
To Genl. Beauregard :
The enemy are throwing up works in the field near the  House, in the
front of Corinth lines. Shall I throw away any ammunition on them ? '
 Earl Van Dorn, Maj.-Genl.
Telegram. Headquarters, May 29ft, 1862.
To Genl. Beauregard :
Quite a force seen to be forming in onr front, reported by pickets. A sharp
skirmish just over, some ten or twelve reported killed and wounded ; will prob
ably have a fight.  Earl Van Dorn, Maj.-Genl.
Telegram. Headquarters, May 29th, 1862.
Genl. Beauregard :
Will send brigade. Earl Van Dorn.
Headquarters, Western Department,
Corinth, Miss., May 29ffi, 1862.
General B.Bragg;
Major-General E. Van Dorn ;
Major-General L. Polk ;
Major-General W. J. Hardee ;
Major-General J. C. Breckinridge :
General, — The following modifications have been made in the order relative
to the retrograde movement from this place :

586 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
1st. At sundown the light batteries must be sent to about one mile from the
intrenched lines, in order to avoid communicating to the enemy any information
of the movement. These hatteries must be so placed outside of the road as to
follow their brigades at night without any difficulty.
2d. At 8 p. m. the heavy batteries of the lines must be removed, without
noise, to the cars, and sent to the central depot.
3d. At 10 p. m. the retrograde movement of the forces is to commence, as al
ready instructed.
4th. At 12 p. m., or as soon thereafter as possible, the rear-guard is to follow
the movement.
5th. As soon as the Army of the Mississippi shall have got beyond the Tus
cumbia, and the Army of the West beyond Ridge Creek, General Beall, chief of
cavalry at Corinth, shall be informed of the fact, and the positions in rear of
said streams shall be held uutil all trains shall be considered beyond the reach
of the enemy.
6th. Camp-fires must be kept up all night by the troops in position, and then
by the cavalry.
7th. Three signal-rockets shall be sent up at 3 o'clock in the morning by the
cavalry pickets of Generals Van Dorn, Bragg, and Polk.
8th. All artesian and other wells must be destroyed this eveuing by a detach
ment from each brigade. All artesian-well machinery must be sent forthwith
to the depot for transportation to Saltillo.
9th. Whenever the railroad engine whistles during the night, near the in
trenchments, the troops in the vicinity will cheer repeatedly, as though rein
forcements had been received. G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Memorandum of Orders.
Headquarters Western Department,
Baldwin, Miss., June 6ft, 1862, 5 P. M.
1st. General Van Dorn's army will start at 3 a. m. on the 7th instant, on its
way to Tupelo, via the road from Baldwin to Priceville. It will halt for the
night at Sand Creek, a distance of about seventeen miles from Baldwin. It will
resume its line of march the next morning at 3 a.m., and will take position for
the present at Priceville, leaving a brigade at the cross of the road with the
Ripley and Cotton-gin roads, near Smith's or Brook's house, and a cavalry force
at or about the Hearn sawmill. One brigade will be sent to Mooresville or
vicinity, aud a force of cavalry to guard the Twenty-mile Creek ferry, on the
road from Fulton, with a strong picket at the latter place. Tho cavalry regi
ment at Marietta will not leave that position until the 8th instant, at 4 A. m.
2d. General Hardee's corps will start for Tupelo at 4 p. M. on tho 7th instant,
via the same road as General Van Dorn's army, stopping for the night at a
creek about nine miles from its present position. He will send, at 4 a. m. on
that day, one regiment and two pieces of artillery to the cross-road with tho
Natchez trail road, to guard the Twenty-mile Creek crossing. His corps will re
sume its line of march at 4 A. M. on the 8th instant, and will get to Tupelo that
night, if practicable. His rear-guard of cavalry will remain in its present posi-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 587
tion until 12 p. M. on the 7th instant, and afterwards in the vicinity of Baldwin,
guarding the rear of Hardee's corps, uutil 4 a. m. on the 8th instant.
3d. General Breckinridge's corps of reserve will leave for Tupelo, via Carroll-
ville and Birmingham, at 3 a. m. on the 7th instant, stopping for the night at
Yauoby Creek, a few miles beyond the latter town, and will resume its line of
march at 3 a. m. on the 8th instant.
4th. Geueral Bragg's corps will leave by the same road as General Breckin
ridge's (passing to the westward of Carrollville) at 2 p. m. on tho 7th instant,
stopping for the night at or near Birmiugham, leaving there at 3 a. m. for Tupelo.
His cavalry will follow (on the same road) the movement from where it is now
posted, at 3 A. m. on the 8th instant. The regiment at Ripley will move on the
road from that place to' Tupelo, and all said cavalry will be posted as already
indicated to General Bragg on the map.
5th. General Polk's corps will conform its movement to that of General Bragg,
starting at 2 p. m. on the 7th instaut on the direct road to Saltillo, west of the
railroad, halting at that place until further orders. His cavalry will remain
where at present posted, and will follow his movement along the same road,
guarding his rear, at 3 a. m. on the 8th instant.
6th. All infantry outposts should be recalled in time to join their commands.
7th. All finger-boards and mile-posts should be taken down by the cavalry of
the rear-guards. G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Report of Genl. G. T. Beauregard, commanding Western Department.
Tupelo, Miss., June 13ft, 1862.
Genl. Samuel Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl. C. S. Army, Richmond, Va. :
General, — In relation to recent military operations in this quarter, I have to
submit the following for the information of the War Department.
The purposes and ends for which I had occupied and held Corinth having
been mainly accomplished by the last of May, and by the 25th of that month
having ascertained definitely that tho enemy had received large accessions to
his already superior force, while ours had been reduced day by day, by disease
resulting from bad water aud inferior food, I felt it clearly my duty to evacuate
that position without delay. I was further induced to this step by the fact that
the enemy had declined my offer of battle, twice made him, outside of my in
trenched lines, and sedulously avoided the separation of his corps, which he ad
vanced with uncommon caution under cover of heavy guns, strong intrench
ments, constructed with uuusual labor and with singular delay, considering his
strength and our relative inferiority in numbers.
The transparent object of the Federal commander had been to out off my re
sources by destroying the Mobile and Ohio aud the Memphis and Charleston
railroads. This was substantially foiled by the evacuation and withdrawal
along the line of the former road, and, if followed by the enemy remote from his
base, I confidently anticipated an opportunity for resumption of the offensive,
with chances for sigual success.
Uuder these plain conditions, on the 26th ultimo, I issued verbally several

588 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV.
orders, copies of which are herewith, marked A, B, and C, partially modified
subsequently, as will be seen by the papers, etc., herewith, marked D, E, F, and
G. These orders were executed, I am happy to say, with singular precision, as
will be found fully admitted in the correspondence, from the scene, of the Chicago
Tribune, herewith transmitted.
At the time finally prescribed the movement commenced, and was accom
plished without the knowledge of the enemy, who only began to suspect the
evacuation after broad daylight ou the morning of May 30th, when, having
opened on our lines from his formidable batteries of heavy and long-range guns,
erected the night previous, he received no answer from any direction ; but, as
our cavalry pickets still maintained their positions of the preceding day, he was
not apparently fully satisfied of our movements until some stores, of little
value, in the town, were burned, which could not bo moved. It was then, to his
surprise, the euemy became satisfied that a large army, approached and invested
with such extraordinary preparations, expense, labor, and timidity, had disap
peared from his front with all its munitions and heavy guns, leaving him with
out knowledge, as I am assured, whither it had gone, for his scouts were
scattered in all directions, as I have siuce ascertained, to inquire what direc
tions our forces had taken. Even now, indeed, I have reason to believe tho
Federal commander has little knowledge of the position aud disposition of my
main forces. But for some unfortunate and needless delay on the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad of some five trains of box cars (three miscellaneously
freighted and two empty) in passing beyond the bridges over the Hatchie
River and its branches, which, iu the plan of evacuation, had been directed to be
destroyed at a certain hour iu the morning of the 30th ultimo, not an incident
would have marred, iu the least, the success of the evacuation in the face of a
force so largely superior. It was, however, through a too rigid execution of
orders that these bridges were burned, and we were obliged to destroy the
trains as far as practicable and burn the stores, including some valuable sub
sistence ; to what extent will be more precisely reported as soon as practicable.
The troops moved off in good spirits and order, prepared to give battle if
pursued; but no serious pursuit was attempted. Remaining iu rear of the
Tuscumbia and its affluents, some six miles from Corinth, loug enough to collect
stragglers incident to new levies, my main forces resumed the march, and were
concentrated at Baldwin, with rear-guards left to hold the bridges across the
Tuscumbia and tributaries, which, were not drawn back until the evening of
the 2d instant.
While at Rienzi, half-way to Baldwin, I was informed that on the morning of
the 30th ultimo a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had penetrated to Boon-
ville, eight miles south of Rienzi, and had captured and burned a railroad train
of ammunition, baggage, aud subsistence, delayed there some forty-eight hours
by mismanagement. I regret to add that the enemy also burned the railroad
depot, in which were at the moment a number of dead bodies and at least four
sick soldiers of this army, who were consumed — an act of barbarism scarcely
credible, aud without a precedent, to my knowledge, in civilized warfare. Upon
the opportune appearance iu a short time, however, of an inferior force of our

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV. 589
cavalry, the enemy left in great haste and confusion, after having received one
volley. Only one of our men was carried away by him. Quite a considerable
number of stragglers and of our sick and convalescents, en route to Southern hos
pitals, who for a few moments had fallen into the enemy's hands, were rescued.
These are the two thousand men untruthfully reported by Generals Pope aud
Halleck to their War Department as captured and paroled on that occasion.
I desire to record that one Colonel Elliott, of the Federal army, commanded
in this raid, and is responsible for the cruel death of our sick. As for the ten
thousand stands of small arms also reported by those officers as destroyed, the
truth is, that uot to exceed fifteen huudred, mostly inferior, muskets were lost
on that occasion.
I had intimations of this expedition the day before the evacuation, and had
detached immediately suitable commands of iufautry and cavalry to foil its
purposes and protect the bridges on the line of my march. Unfortunately, the
infantry passed through and south of Boonville but a little while before the
enemy made his descent; the cavalry, as before said, reached there in time only
to rescue our men who had been captured.
Equally inaccurate, reckless, and unworthy are the statements of these Fed
eral commanders in their several official reports by telegraph, bearing dates
of May 30th aud 31st, and June 1st, 2d, and 4th, as published in Cincinnati
aud Chicago journals, touching the amouut of property aud stores destroyed by
us at Corinth, and General Pope's alleged pressing pursuit. Major-General Hal
leck's despatch of Juue 4th may particularly be characterized as disgracefully
untrue. Possibly, however, he was duped by his subordinate. Nothing, for
example, can be wider from the truth than that ten thousand men and fifteen
thousand small arms of this army were captured or lost iu addition to those
destroyed at Boonville. Some five hundred inferior small arms were acciden
tally left by convalescents in a camp four miles south of Corinth. No artillery
of any description was lost ; no clothing ; no tents worth removal were left
standiug. Iu fine, the letters of newspaper correspondents, enclosed, give a cor
rect statement, both as to the conduct of the retreat, the scanty spoils of war
left behind, the actual barrenness of substantial results to the enemy, and ex
hibit his doubt, perplexity, and ignorance concerning the movements of this
army. Baldwin was found to offer no advantages of a defensive character, and, being
hadly provided with water, I determined to fall back upon this point, some
twenty miles south, fifty-two miles from Corinth, and here to await the develop
ment of the enemy's plans and movements. Accordingly, leaving Baldwin on
the 7th (see papers appended, marked H), the main body of my forces was as
sembled here on the 9th instant, leaving all the approaches from Corinth care
fully guarded by a competent force of cavalry under au efficient officer, who
occupies a line fifteen miles north of this place. Supported by my general
officers I am doing all that is practicable to organize for offensive operations
whensoever any movement of the enemy may give the opportunity, which I
anticipate as not remote.
I feel authorized to say, by the evacuation, the plan of campaigu of the enemy

590 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV.
was utterly foiled ; his delay of seven weeks and vast expenditures were of little
value, and he has reached Corinth to find it a barren locality, which he must
abandon as wholly worthless for his purposes.
I have tho honor to be, respectfully, your .obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Geul. Comdg.
P. S. My effective force on the morning of the evacuation (May 30th) did not
exceed forty-seven thousand men, of all arms. That of tho enemy, obtained
from the best sources of information, could not have been less than ninety thou
sand men, of all arms. G. T. B.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV.
Headquarters Western Department,
Tupelo, Miss., June 9ft, 1862.
General Saml. Cooper, Adj. and Insp. Genl. C. S. A., Richmond, Va. :
General, — I beg to call tho attention of the War Department to the absolute
necessity, as already telegraphed several times, of providing this army immedi
ately with funds; for otherwise its wants will become intolerable, and will
necessarily end in its disbaudment. This relief can the more readily be ob
tained from the Assistant Treasurer at Jackson, Miss., who has in his charge
several millions of dollars belonging to the banks of New Orleans, La., seizjed
by my orders when I was informed those funds were to be returned to those
banks, in obedience to instructions of Major-General Butler, Federal commander
at that point. I am assured that the bank agents, who bad that money iu
charge, are not only willing, but desirous, it should be applied to the present
wants of this army, the government becoming responsible for the same. I
would, therefore, request the department to give such orders iu the case as will
best secure the end in view ; moreover, it would be advisable to remove those
funds from Jackson, Miss., into the interior as soon as practicable. I must also
call the attention of the department to the absolute necessity of providing this
army with an energetic chief commissary, full of expedients and resources ;
for it is becoming more and more difficult to supply the wants of so large a
force as we retire in front of an overpowering enemy. I had the houor of
recommending, for that difficult position, several days ago, Major Moses I. Wicks,
of the Tennessee cavalry, a gentleman of Memphis, in every way qualified for it,
according to the recommendations of those best acquainted with him ; the case
is urgent and pressing ; if in no other way, he could be appointed a lieutenant-
colonel of the Provisional army, and ordered to report to me for duty, when
I will assign him to the position referred to. Nearly the same remarks are also
applicable to the chief quartermaster of this army, aud I have the honor to
recommend Mr. Jos. E. Bradley, of Huntsville, Ala., and Mr. Edward Richard
son, of New Orleans, who are said to possess all the qualities required for that
position. These are times when the man best fitted for an office should be ap
pointed, regardless of all other considerations.
A few weeks ago I informed the department that Brigadier-General Thomas
Jordan, Chief of Staff of this army, being absent, sick, I had appointed in his

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV. 591
place, temporarily, Major George W. Brent, Virgiuia Volunteers, who was acting
Assistant Adjutant-General. His term of service having expired, he is now with
out a commission, hut being an intelligent, gallant, and meritorious officer, who
highly distinguished himself at Shiloh, I have the honor to recommeud again
that he should be appointed lieutenant-colonel in the Adjutant-General's De
partment, if practicable — as was done in the case of Lieutenant-Colonel J. S.
Preston — or iu the Provisional army of the Confederate States. It would be a
serious loss to me and to this army if he were not retained in the service.
Hoping that I may receive by telegraph a favorable answer to the above
requests, I have the honor to remain,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.

Tupelo, June 9ft, 1862.
Major-Genl. L. Polk, Saltillo, Miss. :
Troops are arriving and taking their positions. The place appears very
healthy. Water very good, and obtained at twenty feet in abundance. Not so
plentiful for animals except in town creek. This is a strong position. Remain
at Saltillo for the present. Report your force at twenty-five thousand. Keep
cavalry well out. Fort Pillow evacuated. Enemy at Memphis. Nothing new
elsewhere. Colonel Tate is here. G. T. Beauregard.

Tupelo, June 9ft, 1862.
Major-Genl. L. Polk, Saltillo, Miss. :
Retire to-morrow to this place via Priceville, having sent off, first, everything
from Saltillo. The road by the swamp is impassable for wagons. Enemy not
much to be feared.  G. T. Beauregard.
Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, to General Beauregard.
Columbia, S. C, June 12ft, 1862.
To General Beauregard :
Sorry to hear of your ill-health and affliction. Sea-air good for you. We
waut you to fight our batteries again. We must now defend Charleston. Please
come, as the President is willing — at least for the present. Answer.
 F. W. Pickens.
General Beauregard's Answer.
Governor F. W. Pickens, Columbia, S. C. :
Would be happy to do so, but my presence absolutely required here at pres
ent. My health still bad. No doubt sea-air would restore it, but have no time
to restore it.  G. T. Beauregard.
Confederate States of America,
Richmond, June 23d, 1862.
General Braxton Bragg, Comdg. Army of the West, Tupelo, Miss. :
General, — You have no doubt received a telegram from the President assign
ing you permanently to the command turned over to you by General Beauregard.
I write to inform you officially of the fact, and to request that you wiU corre-

592 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV.
spond with and receive instructions from this department, and consider your
self as the Commander-in-Chief of the forces within your department. I do not
wish to be understood as restricting General Lee's functions ; they continue as
heretofore. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Geo. W. Randolph, Secretary of War.

Cullum's Springs, Bladon, Ala., July 16ft, 1862.
To the Editors of the Mobile Evg. News, Mobile, Ala. :
Gentlemen, — Your article of the 15th instant, entitled " Mischief Makers," has
just been called to my attention. I fully approve your remarks, deprecating
the attempts of friends or foes to make invidious distinctions between generals
now gallantly defending our cause aud country, or to excite feuds and animos
ities among them, especially between General Bragg and myself — a personal
friend, of whom I know not a superior in our service. If untrammelled, rest
assured he will leave his mark on the enemy, and add several bright pages to
the history of this revolution. I am, indeed, most happy that the command
of the Western Department has fallen into such able hands. As regards the
action of the President, relieving me of that command, not having anything to
say in justification of it, I shall remain silent.
RespectfuUy, your, obedient servant, G. T. Beauregard.
P. S. The above is not intended for publication.

Headquarters, near Tupelo, July 17ft, 1862.
To John Forsyth, Esq., Mobile, Ala. :
My dear Sir, — It has been a settled policy of my life to allow my acts to
speak for themselves, and, so far, I have no cause of complaint at the position,
public and private, they have assigned me, and especially has it been my will
to avoid discussions in the public press ; but it is no departure from that rule
to return you my cordial and heartfelt thanks for the sentiments expressed in
your article of the 15th on " Mischief Makers," so far as relates to the positions,
personal and official, of General Beauregard and myself. Whoever attempts to
disturb those cordial relations will only incur the contempt of both. No two
men living ever served together more harmoniously or parted with more regret,
aud few men possess my confidence aud esteem to the same exteut, as a gen
eral and a gentleman. None of us are free from our faults and weaknesses, hut
among mine will never be found a jealousy which would detract from so pure
a man and eminent a general as Beauregard. No one could have been more
surprised at the order assigning me to his command than myself, and certainly
the idea of my being a "pet" with any part of the administration is laughable.
General Beauregard has never been physically equal to the labors of his posi
tion since I joined him in March last, and has often said to me he could not get
on with its labors without the cordial aud earnest assistance I gave him. Our
intercourse was daily, free, unrestrained, and as harmonious as if we had been
brothers. Upon the urgent appeal of his physicians, after arriving here, where
it was supposed we should not bo assailed by the enemy for a few weeks, he re-

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV. 593
tired to seek some relief from the toils which have made him au old mau iu the
short space of one year. If it be his friends who have started this discussion,
they are doing him great injustice, and, so far as I am concerned, I can only say
to them the records here will show with what regret I parted with their chief,
and how ardently I hoped for his restoration, that he might resume the posi
tion he had filled so honorably. I still hope that when his health is restored
he may return to this commaud, for my poor abilities will still be taxed to the
fullest extent iu rendering him that aid he has ever candidly asked and cor
dially received.
No less sensible than others to the personal advantages of my present posi
tion, I still feel more for the success of our cause than for myself. Having so
far, without a murmur, labored somewhat in obscurity, though I feel not with
out some success, you will find me among tho last to seek or receive advance
ment at the expense of a brother soldier, especially when he deserves and pos
sesses my confidence and gratitude.
Excuse this hasty aud rambling note, but I could not pass the occasion
without thanking you. Truly your friend, Braxton Bragg.
It is reported Buell is returning this side the Tennessee, and that Curtis has
reached Helena safely, instead of being captured. If both be true, our hands
will soon be full. B. B.

Tupelo, July 22d, 1862.
Genl. G. T. Beauregard:
My dear General, — As I am changing entirely, under altered circumstances,
the plan of operations here, I submit to you what I propose, and beg your can
did criticism. And, iu view of the cordial and sincere relations we have ever
maintained, I trust to 3rour compliance.
I am moving the Army of the Mississippi, thirty-four thousand effectives, to
East Tennessee, to join with Smith's twenty thousand aud take the offensive.
My reasons are, Smith is so weak as to give me great uneasiness for the safety
of his line — to lose which would be a great disaster. They refuse to aid him
from the east or south, and put the whole responsibility ou me. To aid him
at all from here necessarily renders me too weak for the offensive against Hal
leck, with at least sixty thousand strongly intrenched iu my front. With the
country between us reduced almost to a desert by two armies aud a drought of
two mouths, neither of us could well advance iu the absence of railroad trans
portation. It seemed to me then, I was reduced to the defensive altogether, or
to the move I am making. By throwing my cavalry forward towards Grand
Junction and Tuscumbia, the impression is created that I am advancing on
both places, and they are drawing in to meet me. The Memphis and Charles
ton Road has been kept cut, so they have no use of it, and have at length given
it up. Before they can know my movement, I shall be in front of Buell at
Chattanooga, and, by cutting off his transportation, may have him in a tight
place.
I.— 38

594 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV.
Van Dorn will he able to hold his own -with about twenty thousand on the
Mississippi. Price stays here with sixteen thousand. Thus you have my plau.
I leave to-morrow for Mobile, thence to Chattanooga. Our cavalry is paving
the way for me in Middle Tenuessee and Kentucky. Crittenden is quite a
prize ; aud the whole affair, in proportion to numbers, more brilliant than the
grand battles where " strategy " seems to have been the staple production on
both sides ; and, if I am any judge, the enemy beat us at it. We may con
gratulate ourselves that McClellan was satisfied with changing his base, for it
occurs to my obtuse niiud that a bold stroke at Richmond, while we were hunt
ing for him, would have ruined us.
The papers seem to be groping jn the dark as to the reasons which influ
enced the change here, aud attributing motives to each of us never entertained
by either. Fortunately we know each other too well, and have this cause too
much at heart, to be influenced by these things. Hoping for your restoration
and return, Truly yours,
Braxton Bragg.

END OP VOL. I.

ERRATA.
Page 3, line 38.— For " Fleurian » read " Fleuriau."
„ 91' u 15— For "route" read "rail or."
„ 108' « 6.— For "7th Louisiana" read "13th Mississippi.'
" 146', " 30.— For "papers "read" paper."
„ if u 32._For "the paper " reafJ "it."
" 175 " 34.— For "efficient "read" effective."
.¦ ' " 35 _ For " route " read " rail or."
" 250 " 27.— For "regiments" read "regiment."