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THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
IN AMERICA

LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOITISWOODE A1TD CO.
NEW-STEEET SQUAEE

PREFACE

THE SECOND GEBMAN EDITION.

The motive for the publication of ' The Second War
of Independence in America,' which appeared in
January last, was the earnest desire, by means of a
short and conscientious exposition of the American
question, to correct, as far as possible, the erroneous
notions which had been propagated in Germany with
regard to this unholy conflict. The attention with
which every event in the course of this war is fol
lowed, proves how intimately the sympathies and
interests of Europe are concerned in it.
Since the appearance of the first edition some
changes have taken place in the condition of things.
Wherever these have been of any importance, I have
communicated them in notes or additions, and have
called attention to their significance. In general, it.

vi PREFACE TO SECOND GERMAN EDITION.
may be remarked that the conduct of the war on the ,
part of the Confederates has been changed. Without
seeking now, as formerly, to check the enemy on the
frontiers of the Southern territory, it appears to be
the intention of the Southern Government to draw
him into the heart of the South; for there the South
will be able to oppose him, deprived of the protec
tion of his navy, with equal arms and with greater •
prospect of success.
The lack of authentic information at that time was
a sufficient ground for the publication of this volume.
In consequence of the total suspension of postal
communication between the South and Europe, no
accounts of transpiring events were able to reach us ;
and thus the people of Europe were able to base their
judgement only upon statements both one-sided and
coloured to suit party-purpose. The present condi
tion of the press in the Northern States, however, is
a still greater inducement for a caution against the
credibility of all news emanating from that source.
From the beginning, the South has suffered severely
from the difficulty of postal communication with
Europe, as the North has by this means been enabled
to deceive the nations of Europe. At the present
moment, the state of affairs is far more aggravated.
The Northern Government have issued a proclamation,

PREFACE TO SECOND GERMAN EDITION. vii
prohibiting the publication of a word with reference
to the events of the war, without special permission.
And when it is borne in mind that the Federal
Government are pledged to crush the rebellion by
May 1, in order to avert European intervention, it
will appear evident that no news favourable to the
South can be expected from the North. We shall,
however, now be able to estimate the value to be
attached to Northern accounts.
On many sides regret has been expressed through
the press that no special examination had been made
of the question of Slavery in the former edition. I
have, therefore, determined to add, as a supplement,
a particular chapter on the condition of the slaves in
America. This chapter is limited, however, to the
actual condition of the African slaves, with brief
reference to the question of emancipation. The moral
side of Slavery I have left undiscussed.
No one who examines well all the circumstances
can, in the face of these brief intimations, fail to be
convinced that the North, in inscribing emancipation
of the slaves upon its banner as the cause of the war
against the South, has acted with an entire disre
gard of truth ; and this, in order to win the approval
of the European States for its war of conquest, and
to frustrate the recognition of the Southern States

viii PREFACE TO SECOND GERMAN EDITION.
as an independent power, or at least to delay it as
long as possible, for the sake of self-preservation.
An impartial examination of the action of the North
towards its own emancipated slaves, which have not
been made equals of the whites, and the endeavour,
which it has never attempted to conceal, to disembarrass
itself of the emancipated negroes, favoured with only
inferior rights, by sending them beyond its borders,
will prove to the conviction of any one that it is out
of no considerations of humanity that the North is
induced to raise such a ' hue and cry ' about Slavery
in the South. On the other hand, it will be evident
to those whose attention is directed to the pecu
liarities of the country and the character of the
negro, that an emancipation of the slaves, in their
own interest as well as in that of $he country, could
not, with any degree of reason, be effected by a
sudden and hasty act; but that in all cases, sup
posing emancipation to be desirable, well-matured
plans of transition would be necessary to elevate the
negro-race, so far below the whites in the scale of
developement, to a condition for enjoying liberty,
without certain destruction to itself and to the
country. The Abolitionists would, without any
sacrifice on their part, consecrate the country and
its inhabitants to destruction for the sake of an idea,

PREFACE TO SECOND GERMAN EDITION. ix
and would apply to a condition, which they cha
racterise as a malady, a radical cure which they
refused to apply to their own body, as long as it
was suffering from a similar one.
The want of accurate and true representations of
the causes and objects of the war, because all ac
counts emanated from the North, has influenced the
press of Germany warmly to espouse the cause of
the Federal Government. It is, nevertheless, un
deniable that the press has recently been more
enlightened; but still prejudices, once awakened,
have remained, as it was the impression in Europe
that the abolition of Slavery was the great huma
nitarian object of the war in America. In con
firmation of my own views upon the American
question, I refer to the letter of Captain M. F.
Maury to Admiral Fitzroy. The writer, who is
well known throughout Europe for his extensive
scientific attainments, gives a clear statement of the
origin of the difficulty, criticises the measures of
Lincoln, and exposes the resources of the South
and the reasons for its eventual success.
With a quiet conscience, therefore, may I leave
the final decision about this war to the intelligent
public, who know very well that the faults of State
Government cannot be corrected by brilliant theories.

X PREFACE TO SECOND GERMAN EDITION.
I may now lay aside my pen with the consciousness,
equally free from over-estimation and self-praise, that
I have fearlessly followed the voice of truth in con
tributing my mite, as in duty bound, to the welfare
of my native land.
Berlin : March 28, 1862.

CONTENTS.

PAGE
Preface to the Second German Edition . v
Introduction ..... xiii

CHAPTER I.
Political Relations of the States of the Union to
each other .....

CHAPTER II.
Causes of. the Dissolution of the Union.
I. Social causes . . . . .39
II. Economic causes . . . . .45
IH. Political causes . . . .52

CHAPTER HI.
The War.
I. Unconstitutionality of the war . . .66
II. Commencement of the war . . . .69
IH. Character of the war — on the part of the North, a
means for the acquisition of greater power ; on the
part of the South, for securing its independence
and liberty . . . . .87
IV. Contradictions in the representations made respect
ing the motives for waging the war . . 94

Xll

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IV.
Capacity of both Parties for carrying on this War.
I. Resources in men
II. The navy
III. Material resources
IV. Army-organization
V. Duration of the war

100109113
125130

CHAPTER V.

Issue of the War

133

CHAPTER VI.
African Slavery.
I. General observations
II. Status of the slaves .
III. Manumission and emancipation

136
153162

INTRODUCTION.

The interest evinced by the British public for every
thing pertaining to the war in America, and the
success which the ' Second War of Independence in
America ' has obtained in scientific and political
circles in Germany, have induced Mr. Hudson to
reproduce it in England. The second German
edition has been made the basis of the English, some
points being treated more in detail, while others,
perhaps too elementary for this stage of the American
war, have been omitted.
The constitutional right of secession is developed
at length, and no point of discussion has been
omitted; while the author has given special pro
minence to the historical foundation of the right.
The causes which led to the exercise of this right
will be found all duly arrayed, and prominent among
them the original antipathy and antagonism of the
Northern and Southern colonists, and the influences
which have tended to keep these alive and active.
Indeed, when we seek to determine the true character

XIV INTRODUCTION.

of these two nations by the experience of the present
war, we are astonished that they could have lived so
long under the same government. This difference
was one of the principal reasons for the ardent attach
ment of the Southern people to the doctrine of
' State Rights.' All the elements of distinct national
life being present, the South, plastic from the heat of
political passion and war, has been moulded by her
leaders into a nation as complete in all that is* es
sential to the name, as though she were as old as the
' Celestial Empire.'
The subject of Slavery is briefly but fully treated.
Here the author has avoided no question but that of
the abstract right or wrong involved, deeming, very
properly, this to be a point the discussion of which
not being practical would be barren of results. He
takes a great fact, and treats it in its practical bear
ings, leaving to time the solution of those problems
which can never be determined by theoretical dis
cussions, by fanatical abuse and interference, or
by treaties which could never have any practical
effect if made. This portion of the work embraces
an historical sketch of African Slavery in the United
States, and an exposition of the legal condition of the
negro (free and slave) in America, thereby utterly
confounding those calumniators of the South who
have proclaimed the slave to be in the Southern code
only a ' chattel.' Unfortunately, the European public

INTRODUCTION. XV
seem to have been led, certainly not by the author
rized organs of the Confederate States, to believe that
the South was prepared to allow the condition of her
negro population to be determined by the European
powers. Nothing could be further from her inten
tions, since the question does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the powers delegated to the Confe
derate Government. Moreover, it would be an
endorsement of all the calumnies of her enemies, the
admission that Europe knows her internal condition
and interests better than herself, and is actuated by
higher motives of humanity ; and finally, it would be
a relinquishment of the dearest right of sovereignty,
impossible to a proud and sensitive people.
. The unparalleled growth of the United States in
wealth, population, and power has been viewed with
varied feelings by the different countries and classes
of Europe. According to the peculiar interests or
policy of the governments and people, or the political
theories which happened to prevail with a given
class, have opinions been formed. Upon the whole,
the Union carried with it the moral weight of suc
cess, except with a few far-seeing thinkers. This
mighty empire fell hopelessly at a time, when even
men hostile to its political ideas were upon the point
of acknowledging its success. The great majority
in the South had long seen the approach of the cata
strophe, and were divided only as to the best time and
a

XVI INTRODUCTION.
means for securing themselves from a government
that was fast becoming a tyranny of the most oppres
sive character. At the time of the secession of the
Southern States, there was a party, largely in the
minority, which thought that the appropriate time
for separation had not arrived, and that in case of
war the South, being unprepared, would be at a great
disadvantage. In this party was to be found what
of sentiment for the common history still existed,.
together with those interests which in case of a war
are always the first to suffer. The right of secession
was doubted by no party in the South ; it was with
all purely a question of time and expediency. The
secession of the South took the North by surprise, >
which, not at first appreciating that it was more than
the impulse of sudden passion, affected to consider it
as something exceedingly farcical, of which the South
would soon become most heartily ashamed . How much
of this was affected, and how much was the result of
ignorance or policy, it is impossible to determine.'.
Yet as the idea gained ground that the movement
had a real meaning and a purpose, the Abolitionists;
who had expressed their joy to be rid of the South,
the more moderate Republicans who had disavowed;
any desire to preserve the Union by force, and the'
Democrats, who had till then been friendly to the'
South, seeing that great political and material inte
rests were at stake, united to form that mass of

INTRODUCTION. XV11
fanaticism, hate, hypocrisy, and vandalism which has
disgraced the nineteenth century. When the news
of the dissolution of the Union reached Europe, there
was, in England at least, a feeling of relief; for every
trace of conservatism had disappeared from the
Government ; while the foreign policy had come to be
determined by the foreign population and the party
of ' Manifest Destiny ' at the hustings. Under the
influence of the lawless and socialistic elements from
Europe, and the extreme democratic ideas prevalent
in the North, the right of suffrage had lost its dignity,
and political power had passed into the hands of
those least capable of using it well. There was one
party in Europe that saw the dissolution with deep
and unconcealed disappointment. With the fall of
the Union were lost to the party of revolution its
hopes of powerful aid from that quarter, for re
moving the remaining restrictions upon their theory
of universal equality. They had always hated the
South, but now their hatred knew no bounds ; and,
with the Republican party of the North, they de
manded a war of extermination. A misconception
as to the true character of the Union produced at
first coolness on the part of the Conservatives, the
natural allies of the South, which has happily passed
away with the error that caused it. The whole of
Europe, misled by the malignant misrepresentations
of the Abolitionists of Europe and America, saw little
a 2

XVU1 INTRODUCTION.
occasion for sympathy in the picture of a nation com
posed of a few cruel and voluptuous slaveholders, a
large mass of ' white trash,' and millions of Africans
smarting from the lash and groaning under the bur-
dens of their taskmasters. Those interested in those
branches of commerce and manufactures which were
affected by the hostilities, naturally looked upon the
South as a disturber of the public peace, asking few
questions about the right or wrong of her actions.
If, at the commencement of the war, the South had
a friend in Europe, there was no evidence of the fact.
Some may have wished her success for political
reasons, but there was no sentiment of sympathy for
her cause, and but little hope that she would succeed
in the unequal contest, while her enemies were
confident of her speedy subjugation.
But what are the results of a war of nearly two
years ? Considering the populations engaged, and
the attending circumstances, they characterise it as
a war almost unparalleled in history. All the pre
dictions of the enemies of the South have been
falsified ; while her bold and defiant confidence,^
thought to be the result of ignorance, has been more
than justified by the almost romantic success of her
arms. We have seen a government spring into
existence, exercising with dignity and consummate
skill almost unlimited powers, without impairing the
liberty of the individual. We have seen a people in

INTRODUCTION. xix
the want of all the appliances of war, and supposed
to be enervated by indolence and vice, accomplish
all that could have been expected from a nation with
a highly developed industrial and military organi
zation. We have seen an army badly armed and
equipped supply itself from its rich, numerous, and
boasting enemy. We have seen a nation act as an
unit, and find its strength where friends and foes had
sought its weakness. In fine, every evidence of
unity, vitality, courage, perseverance, and success
has been presented to the world; and, upon the
whole, the South has gained moral as well as physi
cal victories, and has won the sympathy of all who
admire heroic spirit, and abhor treachery, corruption,
imbecility, and cruelty. In the meantime, she has
invited the most searching scrutiny of her internal
condition and institutions, knowing, as she does, that
ignorance of these has been the greatest obstacle in
her way. It is highly probable that, had the govern
ments of Europe had a clear view of the true state
of America at the commencement of the struggle,
their policy would have been somewhat different.
Apart from the causes which led to the dissolution,
it was best for the world and for America itself that
disunion should have taken place; for the idea of
future irresistible power, and the absence of all
conservative restraints, would soon have rendered
peace impossible ; and had the warlike enthusiasm of

XX INTRODUCTION.
the combined nation once engaged it in war with a
foreign power, it would have been the bloodiest of
history. For America it was best, since the political
system was fast demoralizing the people; and the
only hope was in the formation of two governments,
by which a balance of power might be created on
that continent, and with it more conservative
political tendencies. Besides, the territory of the
Union was too large to be longer well-governed;
and this of itself would have made dissolution in
evitable. War has its evils; but, upon the whole, a
long peace has evils perhaps equally great, which can
only be remedied by war. In addition to the ill
effects of a too-long peace, America had peculiar
necessity for internal war, in order that the political
and material forces of the continent should be mea
sured, both for the benefit of herself and of Europe,
as upon this point the ignorance seemed to be almost
universal. Viewed in this light, it appears, then, that
disunion was inevitable and desirable ; and that war
was necessary as a solid foundation for a long peace,
undisturbed by those quarrels which take place
between neighbours unacquainted with the horrors
of a war brought home to themselves, and ignorant
of their mutual strength. Great Britain, for obvious
reasons, felt the deepest interest in what transpired
in America. It was the fall of her great future rival,
the peculiarities of whose diplomacy she had learned

INTRODUCTION. XXI
to appreciate, and whose cotton-fields would have
been so potent for evil in the event of war. She
saw that America, under the political guidance of the
North, would inaugurate that system under which
her own industrial grandeur had been built up, and
which she has so recently learned to be a ruinous
error. Trembling for her commercial sceptre, her
relief must have been more profound than has ever
been acknowledged. The question of the blockade
came up and lessened somewhat this sense of satis
faction, in itself perfectly justifiable. But Manchester
had studied political economy, which teaches that
' supply is regulated by demand.' And there were
India, and Egypt, and Turkey, and Brazil, and
Australia, and the West Indies, and Central America,
and Mexico, and Africa, all ready to take part in
this great plan for emancipating British industry
from the American < monopoly.' Besides, a blockade
of the Southern ports, it was seen, would relieve the
market of the excess of cotton cloths, and though a
slight violation of Manchester philosophy, if not con
tinued too long, might act beneficially as a stimulant
for opening new cotton-fields. It has long been the
dream of England to become totally independent of
foreign countries for the supply of raw material for
her manufactures, and it had always been especially
galling to see herself dependent on the United States
for her chief supply of cotton. This feeling had

xxu introduction;
extended to the system of labour itself which pro
duced it, and explains, much more than the English
themselves are perhaps aware, their special hatred to
negro slavery in the South. The South had also
imprudently expressed the hope that the necessity
for cotton would force England to prevent the
blockade of her ports; and it was easy to see, by
consulting the expressions of the various organs of
public opinion at the time, that the English people
felt it to be almost a national insult to suppose that
they would be influenced in their political course by
interest. It is difficult to conceive that England has
been influenced as much by the threats of the
Government at Washington as the world has been
led to believe.
The idea that England, hating the institutions of
each section, calmly awaits the ruin of both, is in
consistent with her character for humanity, and a
clear view of her own interests. Though a rival,
they have furnished her with the best market in
which to buy and sell, and it is impossible to see
how their ruin could result in her benefit.
The opinion of those who maintain that action of
any kind whatever on the part of Europe, with
regard to America, would only tend to lengthen the
war and increase its bitterness, are not justified by
experience or history, and are contrary to public
opinion in America. .

INTRODUCTION; XX111
The commercial interests have been quieted by
the repeated intimation of the danger of a war, a
danger existing only in the imagination of the timid,
or of those totally unacquainted with the Yankee
character. Those engaged in manufactures have been
told that no action short of war would relieve their
sufferings, while their fears about the destruction of
their interests were quieted by the hope that the
misfortune would be of short duration.
The Radicals did not desire the termination of the
war, their motto being sympathy and alliance with
the North.
The war in America means not only the loss of
that great political power so necessary to the North
for her commercial and industrial schemes, but it
means the loss of the very foundation of her naval
and industrial greatness. The loss of the West will
soon follow that of the South, already accomplished.
It is useless for England to seek to make a friend of
this people without a nationality; it is impossible.
Their interests are diametrically opposed to hers, and
of this the Morrill Tariff is a sufficient confirmation.
Politically, she will gravitate anywhere else than
towards England.
Observed from the point of their geographical
relations, climate, productions, stage of industrial
developement, origin, character, and political interests,
one cannot fail to be struck with the community of

XXIV introduction.
interests between Great Britain and the Confederate'
States. The one a great manufacturer and importer
of raw materials, the other a great producer of raw
materials and importer of manufactured articles ; the
one possessing a great commercial navy, the other
producing in quantities, whose increase is hardly to
be limited, all those products most adapted to the
support of a large commercial navy; the one rich
and mature, the other young, but full of ardour and
enterprise, descended from England, speaking her
language, possessing the same laws, and, for the most
part, holding the same political ideas. The import
ance of the countries on the Mississippi and around
the Gulf of Mexico to England, needs no explana
tion ; but, to make them fully available for her pur
poses, it is absolutely necessary that a powerful and
well-ordered government should exist in the Southern
States, the policy of which should be dictated by
their obvious interests, and not by those of New
England. Certain social accidents, conflicting with
opinions that have gained ground only within the
last sixty years, are thought by some to be sufficient
to vitiate the benefit of this mutual interest. Nothing
could be more false, and a more intimate mutual
acquaintance would prove its falsity. Those who
believe that it is the duty of England to demand
conditions from the South in her present difficulties,
may be referred to the result of the contest between

INTRODUCTION. XXV
Boreas and the Sun, of which a lonely traveller was
the object. Free Trade is obviously to the interest
of the Confederate States, yet there is reason to fear
that, should the war continue, the Government of
the Confederate States will encounter great difficulties
in carrying out this policy, since the blockade has com
pelled the South to manufacture for herself. Large
amounts of capital have been forced into this channel,
and when the war ceases this must, without pro
tection, become a total loss. It may well be asked,
whether it would be just to sacrifice those who have
saved the South, for the interest of those who saw
the blockade — the true cause of the great length of
the war — go into force without a protest. The wedge
once introduced, we should in all probability have
the history of the protective system of the old Union,
which sprang up in this way, reenacted. The large
national debt would also operate in the same direc
tion, and have a stronger ground for its defence in
the fact that it would lighten in a high degree direct
taxation. The most important industrial considerations
arising from the war, and consequent blockade, are
the effects upon the cotton interests of Great Britain
and the Confederate States. Allusion to this subject
must naturally be very incomplete here, as a careful
investigation of all the questions involved would
demand a separate volume.

XXvi ' INTRODUCTION.
A little over a century ago commenced in England
that series of inventions which render it the most
important era in her commercial history. Coin
cident with the improvements in the machinery for
spinning cotton and weaving cotton cloth, came into
operation the improvements in the application of
steam power. Immediately after the above-men
tioned inventions for the manufacture of cotton,
followed that of the cotton gin, for separating the
wool from the seed, an invention destined to revo
lutionise commerce. This gave the first impetus
to the culture of cotton in the South, the rapid de
velopement of which furnishes the most remarkable
facts in the history of industry. Before the com
mencement of the cotton trade between Europe and
the present Confederate States, the manufacture of
cotton had slowly but steadily increased in England.
The importation of cotton wool amounted in 1795
to 22,600,000 lbs., of which only 100,000 lbs. came
from the East Indies. The cotton gin was intro
duced in 1793, and in 1794 1,601,760 lbs. and
in 1795 5,276,300 lbs. of cotton were exported from
the South. The total quantity of cotton ex
ported from the South to Europe in 1860 was
1,767,686,338 lbs., valued at 191,806,555 dollars.
This estimate of value does not of course include
that of 1,000,000 of bales retained and consumed
mostly in New England. This gives an additional'

INTRODUCTION. XXV11
500,000,000 lbs. to the cotton production of the
South, which may be valued at 50,000,000 dollars.
The amount of capital invested in the manufacture
of cotton in Great Britain in 1787 was 1,000,000/.,
the number of operatives employed being about
60,000. The total import of cotton into Great
Britain in 1860 was 1,390,938,752 lbs., of which
1,115,890,608 lbs. were imported from the United
States; 204,141,168 lbs. from the East Indies;
1,050,784 lbs. from the West Indies; 17,286,864 lbs.
from the Brazils; and 52,369,328 lbs. from all
other countries. Of the whole amount imported,
1,140,510,112 lbs, were retained for British manu
factures. The declared value of cotton yarns and '
goods exported in 1860 was 44,104,636/., being about
4,100,000/. less than in 1859. The cheapness of
cotton goods, as well as the enormous increase in
the wealth of the country produced by the cotton
trade, has been a source of incalculable benefit to
all classes, and to all branches of industry. This
cheapness of one of the principal necessaries of
life has raised the standard of comfort and caused
a greater demand for luxuries, affording increased
means for their gratification. This fact applies
not only to Great Britain, but to all other countries
where cotton cloths are largely consumed; so that
cotton may be considered one of the greatest agents
for increasing commerce and extending civilization.

XXV1U INTRODUCTION.
It is an undisputed fact, that the steady and rapid
increase of the production of cotton in the South,
its convenience to the British manufacturer, and its
cheapness and superior quality, have been the causes
of the great increase in this branch of British industry.
There being no way of accounting for the position
of America in the cotton trade, except by the opera
tion of natural laws, it is of great importance to
have these clearly in view in discussing the general
question of the cotton supply, the results of the
American war, and the possible effects of the blockade
of the Southern ports upon the future of the cotton
trade. The cotton plant is not an indigenous growth of the
Southern States, having been imported from the West
Indies in 1621. It was first cultivated upon the
Southern coast, but its culture has gradually been ex-
tended northward, until it forms the principal article
of export from eight of the Southern States; and, great
as is its production, there is every reason to believe
that, without a revolution in the industry of the
Southern States, it may be almost indefinitely in
creased.* In the extension of its cultivation north
wards, the plant had to become acclimated; but such
was the natural adaptation of the soil and climate to
the growth of those kinds of cotton demanded by
commerce, that the quality of the cotton has been
* Consult Introduction to The South Vindicated. Williams.

INTRODUCTION. XXIX
greatly improved. The exact part played by pecu
liarity of soil is difficult to be determined, yet it
is well known that soils otherwise equally good are
not equally adapted to the production of cotton.
The influence of soil has nothing surprising in it,
since it has long been observed in the case of tobacco,
wine, coffee, and tea; it is, however, difficult to
separate this influence from that of climate, but there
is no doubt that it exists, and, in all probability, has
something to do with the superiority of American
cottons. The most important advantage which
America possesses is its climate, combining, as it
does, the characteristics of the tropical and of the
temperate zones. During the season for the growth
and maturition of the plant, the warm, moist winds
from the Gulf of Mexico equalize the temperature,
and occasion, as a rule, an abundant but not ex
cessive fall of rain, so necessary to its successful
cultivation. To those well acquainted with the con
ditions necessary to the successful culture of cotton
it will be obvious, that a climate subject to long
droughts, alternating with a superabundance of
rain, are entirely unsuited to its culture, as, under
these circumstances, almost all the pods will be
'shed,' or stunted in their growth. During the
' picking ' season the quantity of rain should be ex
tremely small, and the weather clear and cool, which
is true of the climate of the South for the greater

XXX INTRODUCTION.
part of the picking season. The winters, influenced
by northerly winds, are often quite cold for short
periods, even as far south as Florida, the fall of rain
being, as a rule, quite moderate. These two circum
stances are very favourable to the fruitfulness of the
soil, and the first must diminish, to a considerable
extent, the injury to the cotton plant from insects
during its growth. This is a fact by no means to
be underrated, for it is a source of great annual loss,
amounting sometimes to the half, and, in exceptional
cases, to almost the whole of the crop. Fortunately,
the loss in America from this source, though always
considerable, is not uniform over the whole cotton
region, or even over the same plantation, so that the
uniformity in the production is not seriously dis
turbed. There are two disadvantages for the culti
vation of cotton in the Southern States, growing out
of the character of the winter season. Unlike most
of the cotton-producing countries of the world, the
winter is so cold that the seed must be sown an
nually; besides, the cotton plant is usually killed over
almost the whole of the cotton region by the middle
or last of October. Could the death of the plant be
delayed a month, it would be utterly impossible, with
the present supply of labour, to gather the crops
which the area at present cultivated would produce.
It is probable, however, that this would bring with
it a corresponding impoverishment of the soil. Not-

INTRODUCTION. XXXI
withstanding the comparative shortness of the season,
the average yield per acre of clean cotton is much
higher than in India. The yield per acre varies very
much, even in the same locality, being for the whole
South from 200 to 1,000 lbs. ; while in India it is
from 60 to 80 lbs. This fact of itself would be
sufficient to cause us to doubt the capacity of India
to compete successfully with America in the cotton
market. It is true, that the cotton region of the
South is in the summer season not free from climatic
disadvantages, in certain portions intermittent fever
prevailing, while in others yellow fever and cholera
make their appearance at times. The negro is,
however, comparatively little injured by the inter
mittent and seldom attacked by the yellow fever,
and it may for this and other reasons be considered
the natural climate of the negro. As regards
healthfulness, it will compare favourably with any
cotton-producing region of the world, which the
statistics of population conclusively prove. The
sparseness of population of the Southern States, and
the fact that it is almost exclusively agricultural,
which furnishes one of the most important conditions
for enabling a nation to devote itself to a great ex
port trade in grain, or raw material, are again reasons
which increase its chances of success in a competition
with India. One of the most potent causes of the
success of the Southern States in the cultivation of
b

XXXU INTRODUCTION.
cotton is to be found in the organization of their labour,
and its relation to capital. This relation of labour
and capital places both under the immediate direction
of the most intelligent class, and renders their opera
tions harmonious and certain, and, in effect, obtains
the greatest results with the least loss of material and
effort. The Southern States have built up a great
railroad system which has cost about 250,000,000
dollars, and this almost exclusively by means of
private home capital. This has perfected her system
of internal intercourse, and brought the whole of
her vast territory into rapid communication with the
sea. Their geographical position with relation to
Europe is again of great advantage, enabling them
to deliver the raw material cheaper ; for, when it is
a question of the transport of an article so bulky in
proportion to value, distance from market must
always be a matter of prime consideration. When
all these advantages are combined in one country in
the hands of an energetic, intelligent, and skillful
people, can there be any doubt of their superiority
above other competitors? These advantages, to
gether with the vast fields suited to the cultivation
of cotton not yet brought into cultivation, considered
with reference to the fact of the rapid increase of
the labouring class of the Southern States, enable us
to predict with certainty that, should no disturbance
of the existing order of things take place, they will

INTRODUCTION. XXxiii
be more than able to meet the increased demand of
the world. This is rendered more certain by the
fact that the Southern States, in the greater portion
of their territory, are not adapted to the cultivation
of those tropical productions most likely to draw off
the .capital of * the other cotton-growing regions
from the cultivation of cotton. The planter of the
Southern States appreciates his advantages to the
fullest extent, and has no fear of foreign competition ;
in fact, he feels that to a certain extent the great
demand for cotton has been a disadvantage to the
South, for it has tended to cause the investment of
too much capital in this direction.
The country next in importance as a competitor
for supplying Europe with cotton is India. That
this is the country upon which Europe must chiefly
depend, as long as the supply from America is cut
off by the blockade, is a fact almost universally
admitted. At the time of the institution of the
blockade, India stood second on the list of exporters
of cotton to Europe. In 1795, the import of cotton
from the East Indies into England amounted only
to 100,000 lbs., while in 1860 it amounted to
204,141,608 lbs. Ages ago, India was a centre of
the cultivation and manufacture of cotton ; and
at the time of the commencement of its culture
in the Southern States, she was an exporter of
cotton goods. At present, she imports from
b2

XXxiv INTRODUCTION.
England cotton yarns and goods, manufactured
mostly from American cotton, to the amount of six
or eight millions of pounds sterling. The same
stimulus which was brought to bear upon other
countries was extended to her, and yet we see how
small has been her contribution to the cotton trade.
It must be that great natural disadvantages exist,
that the population do not possess the skill and capital
necessary, or that they find the cultivation of grain,
sugar, and indigo more profitable. All writers about
India agree that if she is to be depended upon for
supplying Europe with cotton, a much higher price
must be paid than heretofore. Another fact, upon
which all the world is agreed, is that up to this time
the cotton supplied by India has been of a very in
ferior quality, and, for manufacturing purposes, must
be mixed with the American cottons of bad colour,
in the proportion of 15 to 85, the Indian cottons
having all a fine colour. At present, one pound of
Indian cotton yields but twelve ounces of yarn,
while the same quantity of American cotton yields
thirteen ounces and a half. Spinners obtain three
pence halfpenny for converting one pound of Surat
cotton into yarn, while they only obtain threepence
farthing for converting the same quantity of American.
It has been seen that the cotton of India is mixed
with the inferior American sorts, in order to improve
their colour, which would in a great degree account

INTRODUCTION. XXXV
for the increased use of the former, and thus place it
in the position of a commercial parasite. This impor
tation of Indian cotton may also be taken as partially
representing the amount of cotton freed by the dis
placement of the Indian manufactures, and not as an
absolute increase of its production. There is nothing,
however, which proves so conclusively the want of
adaptation of East Indian cotton to the British
market as the tables of cotton consumption ; showing
that, of the 524,000 bales imported, only 176,000 or
56,760,000 lbs. were retained for home consumption,
the rest being taken by the Continent.
On account of the want of facts, it is impossible to
speak of the suitedness of the soil of India to the
cultivation of cotton. The fact that it requires from
five to six acres of land for the production of a bale
of 385 lbs. is conclusive as regards the question of
productiveness ; but as so many elements enter into
this consideration, we must content ourselves with
the discussion of those which are certain. The climate
of India is purely tropical, and in this fact there is
all the difference between success and failure. Of
course, this does not apply equally to the whole of
India ; still it is true for that part upon which we
must depend for some years to come. Mr. Laing,
speaking of the dependence to be placed upon India
for the future supply of cotton, says : ' India has one
disadvantage only, the climate, and that is extreme.'

XXXVI INTRODUCTION.
As singular as it may appear, the cotton seed of the
Southern States is exported to India; seeming to
show that there is an essential defect in the climate,
otherwise the Indian cotton must have improved
more than it has after- ages of culture. Like the
potato, the cotton plant seems not perfect itself in it
native climate. The purely tropical character of the
climate of India, with its storms, long droughts, and
wet season, so disadvantageous to the cotton-plant, is
still favourable to the successful cultivation of indigo,
tea, coffee, and sugar. Even the extreme southern
portions of some of the Southern Gulf States is, by
reason of the more tropical character of the climate,
unfavourable to the growth of cotton; the plant
growing luxuriantly, but the wool becoming fine and
weak. There may be provinces in India which, by
reason of their possessing a more favourable climate,
were they developed and brought into communica
tion with the sea, would be able to furnish a better
quality of cotton than has yet been sent to Europe.
The province of Dharwar seems to give some promise,
yet the success claimed, if certain, has been on a
small scale, and is not available for saving Lancashire
from ruin. We have seen that the Southern cotton
States are as yet sparsely settled, and almost purely
devoted to agriculture, the principal product being
cotton; for, as a rule, provisions are only raised in
sufficient quantities for home use. We know more-

INTRODUCTION. XXXVU
over, that should bread fall short, the granaries of
the Border States and of the North-West are at
their doors, to supply their wants much more cheaply
than India could supply hers in case of a similar
need. India, with her 200,000,000 of souls, is ever
liable to famine, and cannot supply herself rapidly in
case of want, and then only at famine prices. We could
easily conceive of such a state of population that the
surplus of land to be employed in the raising of
articles not for food would be very limited. This, it
is true, is not the case with India ; yet the size of the
population, when considered in relation to the produc
tiveness of her agriculture, is such, that provisions
must be dear, and thus any crop not cultivated for
food must be very profitable. Now, upon a com
parison of the profits of capital engaged in the
cultivation of grain with those engaged in the culti
vation of cotton in India, we find that the advan
tage is largely in favour of grain; being by some
estimated even as high as 50 per cent, for ordinary
times. This would, however, not' prevent the
increase of the cultivation of cotton, were it not that
other articles, as mentioned above, came first in order
with regard to the profitableness of their culture.
Mr. Laing estimates the increase of the area cultivated
in cotton necessary to meet the wants of Great
Britain at from ten to twenty million acres, which
to the initiated means years engaged in improving

XXXviii INTRODUCTION.
land, and in changing the direction of capital.
Writers upon the cotton supply never tire in their
descriptions of the miserable condition of the Ryot,
his want of energy and enterprise, his Asiatic stub
bornness in adhering to old customs and usages,
his partial dependence upon the capitalist, without
the advantages to himself and production growing
out of a more complete dependence. We are told of
his want of skill and honesty, in fact, of his total
degradation, and yet Mr. Laing informs us that it
is upon this class that Lancashire must depend in
case the American supply should be long withheld;
for he affirms that the European planters find it
more profitable to raise tea, and other articles of a
similar kind. According to this, the cultivation of
cotton by the Ryot is to a certain extent a thing of
habit, want of skill and capital for the cultivation of
other products, the developement of which would
rather tend to diminish the cultivation of cotton in
the districts best adapted to the culture of coffee,
tea, indigo, and sugar. The village capitalist has
been pictured as a tyrant ruling without mercy the
Ryot, and cheating the cotton consumer at will.
The merchants of India have been blamed because
they have not developed the cotton production as
that of other things, as though the special mission
of the Indian merchant was to have foreseen the
American blockade, and the policy of the European

INTRODUCTION. XXXIX
powers, — in a word, to have ruined himself, in order to
rescue Lancashire. Of course the Indian and Home
Governments have been blamed by the manufacturers ;
the manufacturers have been blamed by everyone else,
while nobody is really to be blamed, as nobody could
have prevented the result which has taken place. The
blockade has caused all the trouble, and its removal
is the only remedy. The question, as regards India,
has seldom been fairly stated. It is not whether India,
by any possibility, can supply England with cotton, but
whether she can supply it now, and of such a sort as
England needs. Mr. Laing, the best authority who
has yet spoken, has given a most decided negative in
reply, and every fact yet adduced serves to confirm
this view. Let us, however, admit the capacity of
India to produce such cotton, and of such quantity as
desired; will she make the endeavour as long as
there is the least danger that the supplies in America
may be brought into the market ? India cannot afford
to furnish her cotton, inferior as it is, in greatly
increased quantities at former prices; and all the
world knows that, should the supply from America
commence to flow in, her cotton would have no chance,
except in the ridiculous remedy of an import tax
upon the cotton produced by slave labour. This
would of course result in transferring the seat of
cotton manufacture to the Continent. The estimates
of the amount of cotton available for 1863 have been

Xl INTRODUCTION.
much too large; but even admitting the correctness
of the figures of those who look ruin most hopefully
in the face, they do not represent the amount of
relief claimed from them. For the large amount of
manufactured goods on hand must cooperate with the
fear to manufacture inferior cotton, in hindering any
activity in the manufacture of Indian cottons, since
the doubt exists that, before the present supply of
goods is exhausted, an infinitely better class of cotton
will come into the market. Even the most hopeful
do not claim that the mill owners will be able to run
their mills with profit; but that they may do so
without loss. In considering the amount of cotton
to be expected, sufficient stress has not been laid
upon the fact, that great increase in price has drained
all cotton-growing countries of any reserve which
might have been on hand, so that we must depend
upon the crops now maturing or being gathered. The
fact that the Continent has heretofore used the greater
part of the cotton from India, would seem to indicate
that the increased .supply will benefit it more than
England. An examination of all the facts which
bear upon the question of the cotton supply leads to
the conclusion that we cannot reckon upon the mills
working much more than an average of two days
full time during the coming year, should the
cotton of America be kept out of the market so long.
It may be a little more, and yet the ruinous effects

INTRODUCTION. xli
will be but slightly modified. After all, it is sounder
economy to support the operatives than to clog the
market with a superabundance of inferior cloth.
The other sources of supply, furnishing at present
about 70,000,000 lbs., are generally admitted to be
incapable of any very rapid extension. Considering
the enormous interests at stake, it is a source for
wonder that the subject of the cotton supply has
been so imperfectly understood in England, and that
in the agony of the present industrial convulsion any
portion of the educated public should seek conso
lation in stupid ravings against the system of labour
in the Southern States, or hope for rebef for Lan
cashire from the almost unexplored and unorganized
resources of Africa. It seems that, in their hatred
of the South, these advocates of peace or extermina
tion, according to the mood of the moment, have
forgotten that the want is immediate, that fellow
beings are suffering, that proud wills are being bent,
and sensitive hearts broken, and that the grand
question of commercial supremacy is involved ; while
they offer for hope a possibility not to be realized in
a half century, if even in so short a space of time.
Do these dreamers and excited missionaries believe
that commerce can be revolutionised by a sample of
cotton and a little platform notoriety? Has it not long
been known that Africa produced cotton indigenously ?
Do these good people forget that Africa is the great

Xlii INTRODUCTION.
slaveholding country of modern times? Do they
forget that more slaves are used in Africa as human
sacrifices than are exported to the whole world
besides ? Have they forgotten the King of Dahomey ?
It seems that, instead of the present calamities
of England having been caused by the ' wickedness
of using slave-grown cotton,' they have resulted
rather from its scarcity.
In estimating the stock of cotton on hand in
America, the amount which must have been used
for home purposes during the war seems to have
been left out of question. Before the war com
menced, the South manufactured cotton annually
to the amount of 185,000 bales, or 74,000,000 lbs.
Since the war, she could not have consumed in this
way less than 500,000 bales. Before the war the
Southern States were large importers of cotton goods,
those manufactured by her being of the heavier sorts.
Since the war, being cut off from her usual supply,
and being neither a cultivator of flax nor of wool to
any extent, she has been compelled to use cotton
goods as a substitute for goods manufactured from
those articles. The amount used as a substitute for
leather in the form of roping and coarse cloth must
have been very great, not to speak of that used for
tents, waggon-covers, and the like. Of course, a
considerable part of this will have been manufactured
by hand.

INTRODUCTION. xliii
The rapidity with which the supply of American
cotton could be brought forward upon the opening of
the blockaded ports has, it seems, been exaggerated in
both senses. The surplus of the crop of 1860, which
is not unimportant, will in all probability have been
packed, and, though retained in the interior, can be
brought forward to the seaboard with rapidity. The
exact time necessary for the shipowners to get in
formation that it will be safe to send ships forward,
for the latter to reach the Southern ports, load, and
return to Liverpool, must depend upon whether
steamers or sailing ships will be used in the first in
stance. On account of the high price of cotton, and
the necessity for European manufactured articles in
the South, it is highly probable that at first the
number of steam- vessels bringing return cargoes of
cotton will not be inconsiderable, and that, though
there is no possibility of any large amount of Ameri
can cotton being thrown upon the market at any one
time, still some relief will be obtained from moderate
supplies arriving shortly after the termination of the
war. Those speculative interests which have been
brought into existence by the blockade naturally
seek to show that an opening of the ports would
bring great disaster upon the country; yet this is
unimportant, when compared with the injury which
follows upon the existence of the blockade and the
uncertainty of its termination.

xliv INTRODUCTION.
There is no doubt that a much longer continu
ance of the blockade, or a serious disturbance of
the labour system of the South, would be of perma
nent injury to the commercial position of England.
The war will never be terminated by the surrender
on the part of the South of the objects for which
she fights; while the North has given every evi
dence of, a savage determination to do her worst,
regardless of the laws of justice, humanity, and of
common decency, so that, whether in suspending all
the rights of her own citizens, in the massacre of
prisoners of war, in warring upon women, children,
and defenceless men, in sacking and burning of
towns, in exciting a half civilized race to the ex
termination of a civilized people, in gloating over the
distress of Manchester, or in her forgetfulness of all
the rules of intercourse between civilized nations,
she but declares herself what she, by the composition
and character of the majority of her people, truly is,
a nation with all the appliances of civilization and
the nature of savages.
We have seen that the consumption of East Indian
cotton by Great Britain was only 176,000 bales, or
about 56,700,000 lbs.; while the export trade to.
India in cotton yarns and cloths amounts to not far
from 8,000,000/. annually. These, of course, must
be mostly manufactured from American cotton, so
that we may regard it as established that she has

INTRODUCTION. xlv
obtained this market by means of the large quantity,
superior quality, and cheapness of American cotton.
For a confirmation of this view we have but to con
sider that the Indian manufactures, primitive as they
are, have held their ground tolerably well against the
capital, machinery, and skill of Europe, and this
leaves no ground for supposing that had England
heretofore obtained her supply of cotton from India,
her manufactures of cotton would have attained any
great importance ; and leads us to believe that,
should the supply from America be long cut off or
seriously diminished, she would be driven from some
of her best markets. This applies with especial force
to the Asiatic market, the grand field for the future
extension of the consumption of cotton, which, once
opened, would tax the producing power of the world
to the utmost. I have, up to this point, purposely
avoided referring to the distance of India from
Europe as a source of disadvantage in the compe
tition with America in furnishing the English
market with raw cotton. This, though in that sense
a disadvantage to India, would be, in case England
lost the advantage which American cotton gives her,
an important advantage for India in the manufacture
of cotton, which might transfer the capital of Man
chester to the banks of the Ganges. The chances of
this would be much increased were a decided im
provement in the staple of Indian cotton to take place,

xlvi INTRODUCTION.
thus, possibly, enabling her to compete with England
in all parts of the world, even should American
cotton continue to flow into the market. England
excels India only in capital, skilled labour, and cheap
coal; while the extreme cheapness of labour in India
(it being only a fourth so dear as in England), the
ingenious and docile nature of the inhabitants, the
superior climate for manufacturing purposes, and
the fact that the producer of the raw material, the
manufacturer and the consumer of manufactured
articles are upon the same spot, give India advantages
not to be despised. Cheap coal is not an advantage
of great importance; and the want of capital and
trained labour are by no means insurmountable
obstacles in the case of India. The extreme jealousy
of those interested in obtaining cotton from India
and extending the market there for cotton yarns and
cloths, because of the petty import duty of 3^ and
5 per cent, upon these, will be a sufficient proof that
the question is not entirely a speculative one. It is
not uninteresting to observe, how entirely these per
sons regard India as ' clay in the hands of a potter.'
Surely, if it be true that the affair is so nicely
balanced, it would be a temptation, regarded from
the ' Indian point of view,' to neglect for a short
time the teachings of Adam Smith. Mr. Laing, in a
letter addressed to Samuel Giles, Hon. Sec. to the
Manchester Committee formed for the abolition of

INTRODUCTION. xlvii
the Indian tariff on cotton goods and yarns, writes as
follows :
' The cotton industry is the largest branch of
English manufactures, and India is the largest market
in the world for cotton goods. India has also a large
native manufacture, which, although conducted for
the most part by primitive methods, still enters into
effective competition with the imported article over a
large area. India, moreover, is commencing cotton
manufacture with all the advantages of modern
science and machinery, under circumstances which
hold out good hope of future progress.
' A cotton factory at Bombay has the advantage of
saving two freights — on the raw material homewards,
and the manufactured article outwards; and her
labour, even now, after the great recent rise of wages
in India, is at about the same rate per month as is
paid per week in Lancashire. Coal is dearer, but
this is a comparatively small item in the total cost of
the production of a factory, and the main disadvan
tage is the want of that concentration of capital and
skill which is found in a district which has been for
years the metropolis of the cotton-manufacturing
interest of the world. But this is a disadvantage
which diminishes with the creation of every new
factory, and, as regards the Indian market at least,
the comparative cheapness of labour and raw material
c

xlviii INTRODUCTION.
makes the rising factories of India rivals not to be
despised. ' I admit, therefore, fully the importance, from an
English point of view, of a further reduction of the
5 per cent, import duty. But if India is to be
retained in peaceful and loyal allegiance to the British
Crown, these matters must be looked upon in an
Indian as in an English point of view; and the in
terests and wishes and the feelings of its 150,000,000
of inhabitants must be the primary consideration in
deciding how to raise the necessary revenue.'
The same high authority has also said that ' our
only hope is from America,' and the facts bearing on
the case tend to confirm this idea ; nor should the
evidence of a citizen of the Confederate States be
received with more suspicion, since the planters of
the South fear no competition, and know that their
interests for a long time to come will be identical
with those of England. Cheerless, indeed, would be
their feelings, should the termination of this war find
the capital and labour of England now employed in
the cotton trade scattered and disorganised. Concen
trated in a small space, the sufferings of this vast
interest must in England be tenfold more intense than
in other countries, and the recovery will be compara
tively slow. Circumstances have broken the effects
of the blow upon the prosperity of England caused

INTRODUCTION. xlix
by the war in America; but should the supply of
American cotton be much longer deferred, the chief
advantage in the manufacture of cotton possessed
by England over the Continental States will be
lost. Should the war not disorganise the labour of the
South more than it has up to this time, there will be
no diminution of importance in the supply of cotton
which she will hereafter be able to furnish. Should
no more of the cotton already gathered be destroyed,
there will be, at least, as much on the plantations as
would amount to a full crop; and should the war
close before March 1, 1863, the crop for that year
would not be so much diminished by the desolation
of the plantations on the coast and rivers as might be
thought, since the large excess of provisions in the
country will enable the rest to cultivate a greater
area in cotton.
The question of the future political relations of
India might here be discussed ; but this, though of
great interest in connection with the cotton question,
would lead us too far. It would be easy to show
that, supposing India as capable of furnishing Eng
land with cotton as the Southern States, still, from
political causes, this supply will be, in the future
at least, equally liable to disturbance as that from
the South.

1 INTRODUCTION.
The cotton trade of England, gigantic as it may
seem, is small in comparison with what it may be
come, in case of the continued prosperity of the
Southern States, as it is but in its infancy.
Bolling A. Pope.
London: December 1862.

THE SECOND WAE OE INDEPENDENCE
IN AMEEICA.
CHAPTER I.
political relations of the states of the union
to each other.
The first tendency of distinct communities in
America to form political leagues is to be sought
for at a period soon after the settlement of the
colonies in New England, about the middle of the
seventeenth century. As early as the year 1607 the
English had planted a colony in Virginia, and a few
years subsequently the Dutch one in New York. It
was at a still later period that the English estab
lished themselves in the region afterwards known as
New England.
The presence of the Dutch settlers in New York
called forth a feeling of jealousy on the part of
certain colonies of English origin, which caused
them to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance,

2 THE SECOND WAR OE INDEPENDENCE.
to which they gave the name ' the United Colonies
of New England.' An examination of the character
of this first confederation shows that its provisions
were limited to a state of war, to the relations of its
members with the Indians, and to the rendition of
fugitives from justice. In all other respects the
jurisdiction and government of each colony was
reserved to itself. On more than one occasion, it
may be remarked, did it occur that differences arose
about the construction of these simple Articles of
Union.* From this it will appear that the sole motive for
union was self-defence ; and it is singular to observe
that the provisions of this first confederation, in
substance, obtained a conspicuous place in the con
struction of the later American Union.
The second political league that claims our atten
tion in America was that of all the English colonies
on the Atlantic coast, which was formed in compli
ance with the recommendation of their delegates in
Congress assembled at Philadelphia in September
1774. When the colonies sent their delegates to this
general Congress at Philadelphia, alleging that the
English Government had deprived them of a part of
their inalienable rights, there was no intention on
* Tucker: 'History of the United States.' Philadelphia, 1856.
Vol. i. p. 29.

COMPLAINTS OF THE COLONISTS. 3
their part of revolting from the crown of England.
On the contrary, the sole design was to devise means
for obtaining redress of their different grievances.
To some of the delegates no instructions whatever
were given, except to attend the Congress. This
was true in the case of New Jersey and New York.
The chief ground of complaint was, notoriously,
the fact that taxes had been imposed upon the
colonies without their consent. It was contended
that in conformity to the English constitution, no
portion of the country could be taxed without being
represented, and that it was both unconstitutional
and unjust to deny to the colonies the right of send
ing representatives to the English parliament, or at
least of having a parliament of their own.
As a second cause of grievance was characterised
the infringement of the right of personal liberty
of the colonists ; who instead of being tried
by peers of their own country, as other English
subjects, were transported to England, there to
answer to criminal accusations before foreign tri
bunals. Accordingly Congress made a declaration of the
fundamental rights of all the colonists, giving promi
nence to the right of trial by jury, and security of
personal liberty by means of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
It was only when it was ascertained that the
b2

4 THE SECOND WAR OE INDEPENDENCE.
measures proposed by Congress, and the representa
tions made to the Crown had failed to attain the
intended results, that the colonies determined to
dissolve all political connection with the mother
country. In their celebrated Declaration of Independence the
colonists proclaimed that to their inalienable rights
belong 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;
that to secure these rights, governments are in
stituted among men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed.' Because these rights
had been violated, the colonies threw off their alle
giance to the crown.
When, however, England decided to force the
colonies to obedience, they united, thirteen in
number, for their common defence, to offer resist
ance; and thus commenced the first war of independ
ence in America.
Authority for conducting the war, and for pro
viding for the general welfare of the colonies, was
delegated to the Congress of Philadelphia, known in
American history as the ' Old Continental Congress.'
Conformably to these powers, certain ' Articles
of Confederation ' were framed and adopted by
Congress, which were intended to serve as the condi
tions of a permanent union of the colonies. The
' Articles of Confederation ' which had been adopted
on November 15, 1777, by Congress, would never

FIRST RECOGNITION OF STATE-SOVEREIGNTY. 5
have obtained any legal validity or binding authority
whatever, without the ratification of the individual
colonies, as was expressly declared at that time.
For in pursuance of a resolution of Congress the
'Articles of Confederation' were sent to the different*
colonies, now styled States, for ratification, and were,
at different times during the period between 1777
and 1781, successively ratified by the conventions of
the several States. In this act we perceive the first
open recognition of the sovereignty claimed by the
individual States. That no doubt whatever may re
main as to the existence of the claim of sovereignty
by the States, and of their mutual recognition of their
respective claims, it may be well to consider the
provisions of the ' Articles of Confederation.' We
read as follows : —
' Art. II. Each State retains its sovereignty, free
dom, and independence, and every power, juris
diction, and right, which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States in Congress
assembled.' No room is here left for doubt. Not only was the
sovereignty of each State acknowledged by all the
others, but, by the unequivocal terms of this league,
this sovereignty was emphatically reserved to the
States. In the meantime, between 1776 and 1780, each of
* Tucker, vol. i. p. 225.

6 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
the thirteen States, with the exception of New Jersey
and Connecticut, which still retained the charters
granted by Charles II. in 1662, had framed a new
constitution. And, with the exception of Massa
chusetts alone, every State had adopted its new
constitution before the framing of the ' Articles of
Confederation ' by the Old Congress. We know, in
fact, that the constitutions of the States served in a
measure as a model for the ' Articles of Confederation.'
And as the States asserted their sovereignty, in their
constitutions, prior to the adoption of the ' Articles
of Confederation,' it cannot be maintained that the
States derived their sovereignty from the Union.
A clear notion of the nature of this league may be
gained by a further examination of the provisions of
the ' Articles of Confederation.' The objects of the
league are stated as follows : — ' Art. III. The said
States hereby severally enter into a firm league of
friendship with each other, for their common defence,
the security of their liberties, and their mutual and
general welfare ; binding themselves to assist each
other against all force offered to or attacks made upon
them or any of them.'
Is it not evident from this language that, at least
here, there was no idea of a consolidated government
ignoring the sovereignty of the single States ?
For the better management of the general interests
of the United States, a Congress is provided by

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 7
Art. V. whose powers are subsequently enumerated
with the greatest care.
Finally, it is provided by Art. XIII. that ' Every
State shall abide by the determination of the United
States in Congress assembled, in all questions which
by this Confederation are submitted to tnem. And
the articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably
observed by every State, and the Union shall be per
petual : nor shall any alterations at any time hereafter
be made in them, unless such alteration be agreed to
in a Congress of the United States, arid be afterwards
confirmed by the legislatures of every State.'
The most convincing evidence of the weakness of
the Federal Government under the 'Articles of
Confederation ' is the total absence of any provision
for enforcing the execution of its own laws. Not
one word occurs with reference to this subject in that
instrument. Nor can it be assumed that this power
was to be inferred, for the Federal Government pos
sessed no powers but such as were 'expressly delegated
to it,' as we have seen in Art. II. We agree entirely
with the distinguished statesman who asserts that
the Federal Government was ' destitute of even the
shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execu
tion of its own laws.' * The reason of this seems
* See No. xxi. of the ' Federalist ' — a collection of essays written in
favour of the new constitution. New York 1788. No better authority
for the interpretation of the constitution ia to be found than the
' Federalist.'

8 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
obvious. It was the intention of the States, m unit
ing under the ' Articles of Confederation,' to secure
themselves against external attacks. No doubt was
entertained that in the presence of a common danger
they would be induced to cooperate with accord for
self-defence. This being then the chief object of the
league, it was held to be unnecessary to grant any
special power to the Federal Government for that
purpose ; particularly when such power might tend
to restrict the exercise of certain rights based upon
the sovereignty of the States. In fact, nothing was
more natural than that in attempting to make them
selves independent of the English Government, the
States should have been chary of constituting a govern
ment at home, with powers which might be used for
oppressing themselves. We shall see, however, that
the provisions of this league were for the most part
continued in the ' Constitution ' which was framed
to replace it.
Experience soon demonstrated that the ' Articles
of Confederation' were sufficient neither for the
administration of the general interests, nor for
promoting the general welfare of the States,
owing to their conflicting interests. In a word, the
means were not adequate to the accomplishment of
the object proposed; consequently, the Government
soon fell into decay, no one seemed to take any
interest in its success. To remedy these glaring

FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 8
defects in the Federal Government, delegates were
sent from twelve of the thirteen States, Rhode Island
refusing to participate, to a general convention,
which assembled in Philadelphia in May 1787, to
consult and devise measures for rendering the Union
' more perfect.' In this convention, which was pre
sided over by Washington, efforts were made to
define more exactly the relations of the States to
each other, as well as to their general agent, the
Federal Government. The most important task,
however, was to remove for the future those causes
for contention, which had in more than one instance
already jeopardised the peace of the country. By
reconciling conflicting interests it was hoped to
attain this result. It is evident that this was an
undertaking of no little magnitude. For the
population and extent of the several States was a
fruitful cause of dispute with reference to the basis
of representation, as well as the varied geographical
situations, which gave rise to oft recurring difficulties.
Commercial intercourse also was a source of
bitter discord. The States possessing harbours and
the facilities for trade in ships found it to their
interest to exclude foreign shipping from competition
with their own. On- the other hand, those States
which were less fortunate in this respect discerned in
the exclusion of foreign ships a decided disadvantage
for themselves, because competition would have had

10

THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

the effect of rendering the importation of foreign
articles cheaper. These States demanded the re
moval of the restrictions against competition. To
this the shipping States replied by refusing to accede
to any diminution of their advantages without full
indemnity. An appeal was also made to the patriot
ism of all the States to permit a policy which would
result in creating a navy for the United States, the
want of which had been felt so severely during the war.
Finally, after long and tedious deliberations, on
September 17, 1787, the convention adopted a new
constitution which was communicated to Congress.
The constitution having met with the approval of
Congress, was, in conformity with a resolution of that
body, sent to the States to be ratified or rejected by
their conventions. As will be seen from the table
below, nearly three years elapsed before the constitu
tion obtained the ratification of all the States.*

* The constitution was ratified
following order : —
Delaware <
PennsylvaniaNew Jersey
GeorgiaConnecticut Massachusetts
Maryland South Carolina
New Hampshire
VirginiaNew York .
North Carolina
Rhode Island

by the State conventions in the

December 7, 1787.
December 12, 1787.
December 18, 1787.
January 2, 1788.
January 9, 1788.
February 6, 1788.
April 28, 1788.
May 23, 1788.
June 2], 1788.
June 26, 1788.
July 26, 1788.
November 21, 1789.
May 29, 1790.

OMISSIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION. 11
Before entering upon a detailed examination of
the new constitution, it is necessary to contrast one
of its articles with one of the ' Articles of Con
federation.' Art. VII. of the ' Constitution ' reads
as follows: —
' The ratification of the conventions of nine States
shall be sufficient for the establishment of this con
stitution between the States so ratifying the same.'
We find the following words in Art. XIII. of the
' Articles of Confederation ' : —
' And the Articles of the Confederation shall be in
violably observed by every State, and the Union shall
be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made in any of them, unless such altera
tion be agreed to in a Congress of the United States,
and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of
every State.'
If we are to interpret the language of Art. XIII.
of the ' Articles of Confederation ' literally, we must
arrive at the conclusion that the theory of those who
contend that the Union was a thing which could
never constitutionally cease to exist, is devoid of all
foundation in fact, and eminently absurd. For it is
provided by this article, that any alteration may
be made to the ' Articles of Confederation ' by
obtaining the consent of 'the legislatures of every
State.' And as no prominence over the other articles
is given to that provision which declares that ' the

12 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Union shall be perpetual,' the conclusion is inevitable
that, under one condition at least, the unanimous
consent of all the States, that provision might be
cancelled, and the Union would be at an end.
But we must not stop here. How are the facts to
be accounted for, that in direct contradiction to
Art. XIII. just cited, the new constitution in Art.
VII. declares that not' the unanimous consent of all
the States, but simply the ratification of nine States,
should be sufficient for dissolving the Union? Un
questionably, the notion of individual consent on the
part of the States lies at the foundation of it. The
fundamental idea that the ' Articles of Confederation'
constituted a treaty, and nothing more, between in
dependent and sovereign States, was firmly estab
lished in the convictions of the people. And it was
believed here too that, as in the case of treaties
generally, a breach of one article is a breach of the
whole treaty, and in this case, one party to the treaty
failing in its obligations, the others are left free to
consider themselves liberated altogether from the
compact. Indeed, one of the able commentators in
the ' Federalist ' * confirms this view. He says :—
' Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these
delicate truths (i.e. the principles regarding treaties
just enunciated) for a justification for dispensing
with the consent of particular States to a dissolution
* Federalist, No. xliii.

FIRST SECESSION FROM THE UNION. 13
of the federal pact, will not the complaining party
find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and
important infractions with which they may be con
fronted ? '
Is not this language sufficiently unequivocal ?
Here the right of nine States to dissolve the Union is
assumed as self-evident, by reason of their sovereignty ;
but, to avoid all appearance of illegality, the right is
further based upon that most general principle of
treaties between foreign nations. These are the
words of an eminent advocate of the new constitu
tion, to prove that there was nothing unconstitutional
in disregarding Art. XIII. of the ' Articles of Con
federation.' Facts show that in practice, at least, this doctrine
was fully recognised. By reference to the dates of
the ratification of the constitution by the conventions
of the States, it will be seen that the first secession
from the Union took place on the part of Delaware,
on December 7, 1787. Successively eight States
more seceded, till on June 21, 1788, nine States
having given their adhesion to the constitution as
required, a new Union came into existence. But
there was left the old Union, consisting of the States
of Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode
Island. Subsequently three of these States seceded
to the New Union, and so Rhode Island was left
alone, and did exist for six months and six days as

14 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
an independent sovereign State, in no way constitu
tionally bound to the ' United States.'
From May 29, 1790, however, the new Union
consisted of all the thirteen original States, and the
constitution was in force among them all.
A general idea of the constitution may be gained
from the following summary of its provisions. The
words of the preamble express distinctly the objects
for which the constitution was framed. These are
'to form a more perfect Union, establish justice,
ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common
defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.'
Art. I. establishes a Congress, to which certain
powers are delegated, they being most carefully and
accurately enumerated.
Art. II. provides for the office and duties of the
executive, whilst it expressly designates the au
thority and extent of authority conferred upon the
President. Art. III. regulates the judiciary of the United
States. Art. IV. defines more exactly certain relations of
the States to each other, as also to their general
agent, the Federal Government.
Art. V. relates exclusively to the manner of
amending the constitution.
Art. VI. acknowledges the validity of certain

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION. 15
claims against the old confederation, and charac
terises the constitution as the supreme law of the
land, and requires certain officers of the States as
well as of the United States to be bound by oath or
affirmation to support the constitution.
Art. VII. makes the validity of the constitution
depend upon the consent of each individual State.
Two points of difference between the ' Articles of
Confederation ' and the constitution suggest them
selves at the first glance. Firstly, among the
enumerated powers of Congress, that of making laws
to carry into execution all powers vested in the
Federal Government by the constitution. Experience
had taught the people of the States that such power
was necessary for the Federal Government. Nor was
there anything repulsive in the idea of it. On
entering into this neAV league, it was but reasonable
that the States should consent, and desire to have the
terms of the pact fulfilled.
This was both wise and just. It would have been
preposterous for a State, having entered into the
Union under certain conditions, to have allowed these
conditions to be violated by its citizens, whilst re
maining a party to the league. As might naturally
have been supposed, the power to act upon individuals
directly was accorded to the Federal Government, as
being the most practicable and most expedient
way of enforcing observance of the constitution.

16 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
This was too a matter of convenience for the States
generally. Secondly, we miss in the constitution that clause
of the 'Articles of Confederation' which provides that
' each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and in
dependence ; and every power, jurisdiction, and right,
which is not, by this confederation, expressly delegated
to the United States in Congress assembled.'
Can any misconception arise from this omission ?
We think not. No declaration of independence or
sovereignty was needed. This had been achieved by
the war with England. Equally self-evident was it,
that none but delegated powers could appertain to the
Federal Government. The Federal Government was
the creature of the State- sovereignties, and could only
possess attributes conferred by these States. Gra
dually, however, a party sprang into existence which
advocated' a consolidated general government, and
desired to see this centralised at the expense of
State- sovereignty, State-rights. Short-lived as was
this party, the Federalists, it succeeded in arousing
the fears of the States, lest the Federal Government
should assume powers not belonging to it. The
result was that about six months after the Constitu
tion had gone into operation, this reservation of
non-delegated powers was expressly declared in
Amendment X. to the Constitution.*
* Immediately after the meeting of the first Congress, the amend
ments to the Constitution were passed with the following preamble :—

FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION. 17
Upon consideration it appears that the intention
in forming the constitution, was not to make an
organic change in the nature of the Federal Govern
ment. It was to alter and revise the ' Articles of
Confederations ' that the delegates assembled in
Congress at Philadelphia. To revivify and give
efficacy to the existing conditions of Union, rather
than to make new ones, was the object of the consti
tution. Without doubt, the best exponents of the consti
tution were its framers; for the intention of the
law-giver is the law, as we know from the universal
maxims of jurisprudence. None among these is
entitled to as much respect as James Madison. At
the time when it was proposed to ratify the constitu
tion, a series of essays were published by the most
eminent statesmen of the time to ensure this result.
In these we have happily the opinions of those very
men, whose energy and ability produced the consti
tution. Perhaps nothing contributed more to the
adoption of the constitution than the writings of
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, which we now possess
in the 'Federalist.' Here we have the opinions of
' The Conventions of a number of States having, at the time of their
adopting the constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent mis
construction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and
restrictive clauses should be added ; and as extending the ground of
public confidence in the government will best insure the beneficent
ends of its institutions, therefore, Resolved, &c.'
C

18 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
both parties of that period, all agreeing in regard to
the nature of the Federal Government under the
constitution. By reference to the recorded opinions of Madison,*
a clear and unprejudiced view of this question may
be obtained. In explaining the nature of the Federal
Government, he says : —
' The proposed constitution, therefore, when tested
by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strict
ness, neither a national nor a Federal constitution,
but a composition of both. In its foundation it is
Federal, not national; in the sources from which the
ordinary powers of government are drawn, it is
partly Federal and partly national ; in the operation
of these powers, it is national not Federal; in the
extent of them, again, it is Federal not national ; and,
finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing
amendments, it is neither wholly Federal nor wholly
national.' As to its foundation, Madison lucidly demonstrates,
that the constitution is Federal. He remarks : —
' On examining the first relation, it appears on one
hand that the constitution is to be founded on the
assent and ratification of the people of America, given
by deputies elected for the special purpose ; but, on
the other hand, that this assent and ratification is to
be given by the people, not as individuals composing
* Federalist, No. xxxix.

THE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED. 19
one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and
independent States to which they respectively belong.
It is to be the assent and ratification of the several
States derived from the supreme authority in each
State, the authority of the people themselves. The
act, therefore, establishing the constitution, will not be
a national but a Federal act.'
In support of this Madison urges further, that ' it is
to result neither from a decision of a majority of the
people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of the
States; it must result from the unanimous assent of
the several States that are parties to it, differing in
no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its
being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but
that of the people themselves.' But we know that
according to the American theory of self-government,
as enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, ' the
right of the people to alter or abolish ' any form of
government, ' and to institute a new government,' is
asserted to be incontestable. Now we have the
explicit declaration of Madison to the effect, that
the assent given to the constitution differed in nowise
from the ordinary assent than in the manner of its
expression by the people directly through a convention.
Hence we deduce that, in assenting to the constitu
tion, the States did no act prejudicial to this right to
withdraw their consent whenever it should be deemed
expedient. c2

20 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Nevertheless, the ' Father of the Constitution ' does
not desert us here. He informs us that :
'Each State in ratifying the constitution is
considered as a sovereign body independent of all
others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary
act. In this relation then the new constitution will,
if estabhshed, be a Federal and not a national con
stitution.' With regard to the 'sources from which the
ordinary powers of government are to be derived,'
Madison describes the constitution as a complex.
For he continues :
' The House of Representatives will derive its powers
from the people of America, and the people will be
represented in the same proportion and on the same
principle as they are in the legislature of a particular
State.' Whilst the ' Senate, on the other hand, would
derive its powers from the States, as political and co
equal sovereignties ; and these will be represented on
the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now
are in the existing Congress.' The election of the
President is also complex. ' From this aspect of the
government, it appears to be of a mixed character,
presenting at least as many Federal as national
features.' The operation of the powers of the constitution is
' national,' says Madison, ' though perhaps not so com
pletely as has been understood. In several cases,

THE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED. 21
and particularly in the trial of controversies to which
the States may be parties, they must be viewed and
proceeded against in their collective or political
capacities only.'
Unquestionably reference is here made to the way
of acting upon individuals in a State directly by the
* Federal Government. This, as we have seen, does
not, however, impair the sovereignty of the States in
the least.
Madison proceeds as follows :
'But if the government be national with regard
to the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect
again when we contemplate it in relation to the
extent of its powers. The idea of a national govern
ment involves in itself not only an authority over
the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy
over all persons and things, so far as they are objects
of lawful government. Among a people consolidated
into one nation this supremacy is completely vested
in the national legislature. Among communities
united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in
the general and partly in the municipal legislatures.
In the former case, all local authorities are sub
ordinate to the supreme; and may be controuled,
directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter,
the local or municipal authorities form distinct and
independent portions of the supremacy, no more
subject, within their respective spheres, to the general

22 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
authority,' than the general authority is subject to
them within its own sphere. In this relation, then,
the proposed government can not be a national one,
since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated
objects only, and leaves to the States a residuary
and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.'
Here we have the essence of the whole matter.'
Supremacy is a necessity of a national government,
and this supremacy is founded upon sovereignty.
One cannot exist without the other. The Federal
Government, as it is seen, possesses neither of them ;
its jurisdiction is limited to 'certain enumerated
objects only,' and does not at all infringe the
sovereignty of the individual States, which is
inviolable. Amendments to the constitution are said by
Madison to be both Federal and national, because of
the number of State votes necessary to ratify and
make an amendment a part of the constitution.
Not the unanimous ratification of all the States, but
only that of three-fourths, at that time ten, was
required, and hence it appeared as though the
adoption of an amendment had somewhat the
character of a national act. This is, however, only
apparent, not real. For in agreeing to the constitu
tion unanimously, the State agreed to this rule of
action for the future. They bound themselves
voluntarily to be governed in a certain event by the

FEDERAL NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION. 23
decision of three-fourths of their number, just in the
same manner as they agreed, in Sect. V. of Art. 1 of
the Constitution, that 'a majority of each (House)
shall constitute a quorum to do business.' Here,
however, the matter is decided by votes of States, not
of a majority of three-fourths of the people. In a
word, this provision of the constitution in nowise
lessened the sovereignty of the States.
Summing up these considerations, it appears that
in the two most vital points of the Federal constitu
tion, its foundation and the extent of its powers, it is
purely Federal, having no characteristics of nationality
whatever. That in two other respects, less important
in themselves, in the sources of the ordinary powers
of government, and the operation of these powers,
there is a mixture of both, though the Federal
features predominate largely in the former, on account
of the Senate. That with regard to amendments, the
constitution is only apparently national, but in truth
Federal, and not at all derogatory of the sovereignty
of the States.
This testimony of Madison is sufficient to remove
every doubt as to the nature of the Union, and to
establish conclusively the principle of State sove
reignty. But in the fact that even after the ratification of
the constitution by the unanimous votes of all the
States, it was indispensable to obtain the ratification

24 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
of amendments to the constitution from the States in
their sovereign capacity, and not from the inhabitants
at large, we perceive the continued existence of the
sovereignty of the individual States. Two years after
the constitution had been confirmed by all of the
States, twelve amendments were proposed in the pre
scribed maimer, but only ten of them having been
confirmed by the States, these only became integral
parts of the constitution. Furthermore, these ten
amendments were restrictions of the powers of the
Federal Government, or supplementary means of pror
tection for the rights of the States, or of individuals,
and evinced the characteristic political jealousy towards
the Federal Government — a striking proof for the refu
tation of the arguments of those who assert, that by
adopting a new constitution the thirteen original
States made a surrender of their sovereignty to the
Federal Government.
In Art. X. of the Amendments to the Constitution,
we read furthermore : ' The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people: From this it follows, as before intimated,
that here, as well as under the ' Articles of Confede
ration,' the United States possessed no powers but
such as were delegated by the States.
Some partisans of the Union have asserted that, by
the expression ' or to the people,' the idea is to be

STATE SOVEREIGNTY NEVER SURRENDERED. 25
conveyed that the inhabitants of the United States
constituted politically one sovereign people. For this
assumption there is not the slightest foundation in
fact. Evidently, reference is here made to the two
ways in which a State may exercise its functions of
sovereignty. The one through the legislature, here
termed the ' State,' the other by the voice of a ' State
convention,' designated above as ' the people.' Were
further proof that the citizens of the several States,
taken in their totahty, never have constituted one
people in the history 'of America, necessary, we should
refer again to the unequivocal declarations of Madison,
to the effect that — 'The assent and ratification of the
people of America was given to the constitution,
not as individuals comprising one entire nation, but as
composing the distinct and independent States to which
they respectively belong: By referring to a similar
clause in the constitution of the Confederate States,
we find this idea fully expressed as follows: —
Art. VI. No. 6. ' The powers not delegated to
the Confederate States by the constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people thereof
In face of all that has been stated, it maybe that still
other evidence of the sovereignty of the States may be
demanded. If so, we refer to the history of those
times, and to the debates in the Convention which
framed the constitution, as also to the press of that

26 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
period. Whoever reads the debates in the Convention
and in the Congress of 1787 must be impressed with
the oft-recurring threats of dissolution of the Union,
a circumstance which attracted little notice at that
time, because no doubt whatever was entertained by
anyone of the strictly constitutional right of a State
to recall its delegated authority.
Even at this period some few statesmen were found
who were desirous of circumscribing the sovereignty of
the individual States, and of constituting a consolidated
national government. Prominent amongst these were
King of Massachusetts, Wilson of Pennsylvania, and
Alexander Hamilton. Wilson and his colleagues
advocated a representation of the States in the
Senate, as well as in the House of Representatives,
upon the basis of population exclusively; their
proposal in the Convention was lost by a large
majority of voices. And it was decided to the
contrary that each State, without reference to extent
or population, should send an equal number of
representatives to the United States Senate. A proof
that the interests of each individual State, represented
in a union of States, should enjoy a perfect equality in
its relations to the whole, and that consequently the
individuality of each State, even in affairs entrusted
to the administration of Congress, must be considered
as existing unimpaired. This individuality has its
origin and foundation in the sovereignty of the

ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATE SOVEREIGNTY. 27
individual States, and can exist only so long as the
sovereignty is complete. In accordance with this pro
vision of the constitution, Delaware, with a population
of 112,218 souls, has two votes in the United States
Senate, whereas New York, with 3,887,542 inhabitants,
is only entitled to the same number of votes in that
branch of Congress. In this case, as on all occasions
where it has been found necessary to decide between
consolidation and State sovereignty, the latter has
triumphed by forcing population into the background.
It is well known with what warmth the advocates
of the Union in the Northern States have pressed
everything approaching to an argument, to show their
enmity to the doctrine of State rights. Among the
principal grounds of their objections is the supposi
tion, that a Federal Government based upon the prin
ciple of State sovereignty, as claimed by the Southern
States, would be preposterous, irreconcilable with
the notion of a durable government, and would contain
the seeds of its own destruction within itself. Before
questioning the claims of this species of argument
to consideration, we desire to correct an error into
which the feelings or inclinations of some men not
unfrequently lead them. Obviously, it is altogether
foreign to the question to state that a given condition
of things never could have existed, because such a
state of things is in opposition to our own convictions
or notions of what is best at the present moment. In

28 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
examining the bearings of the question of State sove
reignty, and the application of this notion to the con
struction of the Federal Government in the constitu
tion, it is absolutely necessary to restrict our enquiries
to facts. Whether or not this principle, when applied
to the organization of government, is, in itself, and
abstractly, pernicious, is something with which we
are here in no way concerned. But we must endeavour
to decide this political problem: Was the idea of
State sovereignty the fundamental principle upon
which the Union was constructed? Did this continue
to be that principle which imparted to the constitu
tion the moral and political force that bound the
States together up to the dissolution of the Union?
Both of these interrogatories must, as we have tried to
demonstrate, be answered affirmatively. This con
ceded, men may amuse or perplex themselves as much
as they like by devising universal theories of govern
ment, and though they should divest their ideas of all
reality in pursuit of their abstractions, it will not
affect the weight attaching to the opinions of such
men as the framers of the constitution. But before
leaving this subject altogether, one thought suggests
itself. It was proposed to form a government of the
thirteen States for their common defence. Each State
was sovereign. No community of interests existed
between many of them, except that resulting from
their weakness in the presence of a common danger*

ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATE SOVEREIGNTY. 29
Was it, then, to be expected, that these States differing
so widely from each other would ever voluntarily have
surrendered their most cherished rights, and have
consolidated themselves into one central government,
in which the bonds of Union would have been more
galling because compulsory? Was it not rather an
evidence of wise foresight on the part of the framers
of the constitution, to have constructed the Union on
the recognised principle of consent? Evidently it
was believed that in leaving each State free to with
draw from the Union at pleasure, the States would be
induced to make greater concessions to each other for
the sake of preserving the Union and its benefits, and
that in this way a stronger feeling of respect would be
engendered, and a greater sense of justice and fairness
would influence the States in their relations to each
other. Above all, however, there was one excellency
in this system of government. It provided for a
peaceful separation of the States, whenever expe
rience should demonstrate the continuance of the
Union to be no longer desirable, or possible. How
wise it would have been, had their descendants have
executed the intentions of the authors of the consti
tution. Another argument often advanced to show the
inexpediency or absurdity of State sovereignty is the
following : Were the right of a State to secede from
the Union allowed, the right of a county to secede

30 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
from a State could not be denied. Much trouble
has been taken to deceive the people of Europe by
means of this fallacy. And we are sorry to confess
that it has not been ineffectual in deceiving quite a
number. No plausibility, however, atttaches to
this fallacy. It is well known that these counties
are only sub-divisions of the State territory and
population, existing for the more convenient adminis
tration of the laws. At pleasure the legislatures may,
and constantly do, change, unite or divide such
counties, or even merge them entirely into others.
These territorial divisions of a State have no political
existence or individuality whatever, and have no
historical foundation at all, upon which to base a
pretension to any of the rights of an independent,
sovereign community. Besides, who has ever heard
of such a claim being advanced by a county in anyof
the States ? It is simply absurd to institute such a
comparison between the States and the counties
thereof. Others, again, maintain that the sovereignty of the
individual States is only a limited sovereignty. This
assumption is devoid of even the shadow of reason.
For sovereignty resides in the people of each State;
it is indivisible and incapable of restriction. And
the source of the rights of sovereignty which are
inherent in the people of the States, and inviolable,
remained unimpaired by the delegation of the exercise

POWERS OF THE UNION DELEGATED. 31
of certain powers to the Union. Moreover, this
delegation, which, as already stated, was accompanied
by no renunciation of the right of retraction, could not
under any circumstances signify more than the legal
relation of a principal to his agent. On this point the
testimony of Madison, already cited, is conclusive,
and no other evidence is required to refute this
objection. Turning to the terms of recognition of the United
States after the war of independence, on the part of
Great Britain, the most explicit acknowledgement is
made of the ' free, sovereign, and independent States,'
the original thirteen being enumerated. France and
the other European States, as well as Great Britain,
all made treaties with the thirteen States in their
individual sovereign capacity, in all of which treaties
the States are designated by name.
From all that has been stated we now conclude that
the Union possessed only the exercise of those powers
which were expressly delegated to it ; that the
political individuality (sovereignty) remained intact
to the separate States; that the States could have
iost their sovereignty only by express surrender and
abandonment of it ; and that an express renunciation
of the right to separate from the Union would in all
cases have been necessary, in order to deprive the
States of this inherent, natural right.
No one has ever denied that it was the desire and

32 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
intention of the framers of the constitution to render
the Union as durable as possible ; but this desire had
its foundation most certainly in the objects for which
the Union was formed—' to establish justice, insure
domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings
of liberty.' The Union was not its own object. In
a word, the Union was intended to be the means of
securing the objects above enumerated, and not to be
the purpose of its own existence.
In recent times several States have seen fit to with
draw the delegation made to the Union of the
exercise of certain powers, convinced that not the
promotion of their welfare, but their injury, resulted
from the policy pursued by the Union. In doing
this, they did only what every constituent is com
petent to do. They withdrew a mandate which in
public law, as in the civil law, is a contract that can
exist only so long as the consent is mutual. And so
they dissolved with full authority a league which had
existed up to that time. By this act they did not
repudiate the liabilities incurred by the whole, during
their participation in the league, which they were
still bound to fulfill according to the well-known
rules of law respecting contracts between principal
and agent. This they declared themselves ready to
do, immediately upon their secession from the
Union.

SECESSION A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 33
Advocates of the doctrine of secession, as an in
contestable constitutional right, have not been con
fined to the Southern States. Ever since the estab
lishment of the Union this right has been admitted
by the great majority of the people in every State.
Statesmen, politicians, and jurists have alike pro
claimed secession to be a right under the constitu
tion. It is only in recent times, since the ' Republi
can Party ' which elected Mr. Lincoln has come into
power, and since the withdrawal of the Southern
States from the Union, that the right of secession
has been questioned.
William Rawle, an authority pf eminence, and at
one time Attorney-General of the State of Pennsyl
vania, has left us his views upon the constitutionality
of secession recorded in a work on the constitution.
He remarks : *
' If a faction should attempt to subvert the govern
ment of a State for the purpose of destroying its
Republican form, the paternal power of the Union
could thus be called forth to subdue it. Yet it is not
to be understood that its interposition would be
justifiable, if the people of a State should determine
to retire from the Union, whether they adopted
another or retained the same form of government, or
if they should, with the express intention of seceding,
* A View of the Constitution of the United States of America. By
William Rawle, Philadelphia, 1825, p. 289.
D

34 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
expunge the representative system from their code,
and thereby incapacitate themselves from concurring,
according to the mode now prescribed, in the choice
of certain public officers of the United States. . .
It depends on the State itself to retain or abolish the
principle of representation, because it depends on
itself whether it will continue a member of the
Union. To deny this right would be inconsistent
with the principle on which all our political systems
are founded, which is, that the people have in all
cases a right to determine how they will be governed.'
The same authority continues : *
'If the majority of the people of a State de
liberately and peaceably resolve to relinquish the
Republican form of government, they cease to be
members of the Union. If a faction, an inferior
number, make such an effort and endeavour to
enforce it by violence, the case provided for will have
arisen, and the Union is bound to employ its powers
to prevent it.'
Without stopping to enquire whether a faction
may not consist of a majority of the people of a
State, it is obvious that the authority of Rawle over-'
throws the assertions of those who contend that the
Union, having been formed by the unanimous consent
of all the States, can only be dissolved by the
unanimous consent of the same. But this argument
* William Rawle, loco citato, p. 292.

SECESSION A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 35
bears its contradiction on its own face. If it is true
that the States did unanimously assent to the consti
tution, it is not the less certain that each State gave
its adherence without reference to the others, and
that, had the number of assenting States not ex
ceeded nine, the Union would have existed for this
number. And by the same process of reasoning it
would appear that, should one or more States retire
from the Union, their action would not affect the
union of the other States, but the union would be
dissolved only between the seceding State or States
and the rest, not, however, between all the States.
The action of any one State could in this case be
binding only on itself. On this point Rawle is quite
clear.* ' Secessions may reduce the number to the smallest-
integer admitting combination. They would remain
united under the same principles and regulations
among themselves that now apply to the whole. For
a State cannot be compelled by other States to with
draw from the Union; and therefore, if two or more
determine to remain united, although all the others
desert them, nothing can be discovered in the con
stitution to prevent it.'
The same statesman observes at another place : f
' The secession of a State from the Union depends
on the will of the people of such State. The people
* William Rawle, 1. c. p. 299. t Ibid- P- 295-

36 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
alone, as we have already seen, hold the power to
alter their constitution.'
In confirmation of our statement, that the right of
secession was generally admitted, we shall quote
again the words of the Attorney- General of Pennsyl
vania. He says : *
' It was foreseen that there would be a natural
tendency to increase the number of States with the
anticipated increase of population, now so fully
verified. It was also known, though it was not
avowed, that a State might withdraw itself.'
No doubt now remaining as to the constitutional
right of a State to separate from the Union, it remains
to be seen how this separation may be effected. Un
questionably, the action terminating the connection
of a State with the Union must be the action of the
people of that State. In assenting to the constitution,
a convention in each State, specially chosen by the
people directly for that purpose, gave expression to the
will of the people. The action of such a convention
is binding, even above the laws of the State ; for it has
the highest sanctity of law possible, being the direct
expression of the sovereign will of the people. Such
action is final, and admits of no appeal. And if the
resolution of a convention so constituted was suffi
cient for assenting to the constitution, it follows that
a convention would be the proper organ through
* William Rawle, "1. c. p. 297.

ORDINANCES OF SECESSION. 37
which the people should express their determination
of withdrawing their assent to the constitution. Once
more let us see what Rawle says on this subject : *
' But in any manner by which a secession is to take
place, nothing is more certain than that the act should
be deliberate, clear, unequivocal. The perspicuity and
solemnity of the original obligation require corre
spondent qualities in its dissolution. The powers of
the General Government cannot be defeated or im
paired by an ambiguous or implied secession on the
part of the State, although a secession may perhaps
be conditional.'
By reference to the ordinances of secession of
those States at present constituting the Confederate
States, it will be seen that, so far from there having
been less solemnity in the acts of their conventions,
there was perhaps more than at the time of the adop
tion of the constitution. The formalities observed
were not less striking, and the acts were not hasty,
but the calm expression of the decided will of the
people of these States. From this side, then, no ob
jections can be urged against the constitutional
validity of the secession of the Southern States.
And now, turning to the past, we shall see that
steps had been taken as early as 1815, preliminary to
secession on the part of five of the New England
States, Maine forming the exception. The action of
* William Rawle, 1. c. p. 296.

38 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
the Hartford Convention is proof of this allegation.
For, although the proceedings of that body were to a
great extent kept secret, it is now known that a re
solution was passed to the effect that no further con
tributions of means for carrying on the war with
Great Britain should be allowed by these States, and
that no further contingents in troops should be sent
beyond their borders. At the same time a demand
was ordered to be made upon the General Government
to put an end to the war, or, that failing, a secession
was to be intimated as the eventual consequence.
For the rest, that State, which is now so loud in
its denunciations of the secession of the Southern
States, because its own material interests are at stake
— I mean Massachusetts — was the most disloyal of
the five New England States in 1815, and was the first
which sent commissioners to the Federal Government
at Washington to enforce the measures recommended
by the Hartford Convention. Moreover, on two
other occasion's has this same State threatened to
secede from the Union. We refer to the action of
Massachusetts on the admission of Louisiana into the
Union and on the annexation of Texas.
Is it not, then, an indication of the weakness of the
cause of the opposite party to stigmatise as revolu
tion, rebellion, or treason, that which others demon
strate to be a sacred constitutional right, especially
when no evidence whatever has been adduced to
invalidate the claim to this right ? ,

CAUSES OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION. 39

CHAPTER II.
CAUSES of the dissolution of the union.
I. Social Causes.
In the previous chapter we have endeavoured to show
from the early history of the colonies that the prin
ciple of State sovereignty was the fundamental notion
upon which the Union was based.
To discover the first causes of the dissolution of
the Union, it is necessary to go back still farther, to
the history of the colonists before their emigration to
America. The first permanent settlement in America was
that made in Virginia under a Royal Charter. As
early as the year 1619, we find a legislative assembly
existing there, which was formed after the model of
the English Parliament. The King was represented
by the Governor, the House of Lords by the council
of the Governor, and the House of Commons by the
House of Burgesses.* Accordingly Virginia was, in the
strictest sense, a royal province, colonised by subjects
* Tucker, vol. i. p. 24.

40 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
of the English Crown, who evinced their attachment
to the political institutions of the mother-country and
their loyalty to the Crown by the organisation of
their colonial Government and the adoption of the
Anglican Church. Herein is a striking proof ex
hibited that the settlers of Virginia belonged to the
Conservative party of England. Not the less true is
it that they were among the most devoted adherents
of royalty and the most steadfast friends of Charles I.,
who was executed in the course of the civil war.
When Cromwell became successful in England, a
large number of the noblest cavaliers of Charles I.
fled to Virginia. By the accession of these cavaliers,
the population of the existing colony of Virginia
was considerably increased. And it is well known
that most of the Southern States were peopled by
emigration from Virginia, and not by direct emigra
tion from Europe. A congenial population was then
already present in America to receive the Huguenots
on their arrival. Such was the origin of the popula
tion of the Southern States.
Between 1605 arid 1610, a religious sect left its
English home, self-exiled, to seek in Holland religious
freedom, and to escape persecution on account of
its religious creed. In the year 1620, about one
hundred of this religious sect, the Puritans, embark
ing at Leyden in Holland, landed in America on the
inhospitable shores of Plymouth. These persons were

THE CAVALIERS AND PURITANS. 41
mere adventurers, who had no right to the soil, much
less a charter authorising them to organise a govern
ment. Nevertheless they obtained afterwards a grant
of land from the already existing colony of Plymouth,
which was in possession of a Royal Charter, and in
this way they established themselves in New England.
From these Puritans the population of New England
is almost exclusively descended.
The zeal displayed by the colonists of Virginia in
support of the royal cause during the civil war in
England formed a strong.contrast to the behaviour of
the New England colonies. The presence of the
cavaliers in Virginia contributed to strengthen the
loyalty of the colonists there towards the Crown. And
they remained so unshaken in their fidelity to the
son of Charles I., whom they acknowledged as their
king during the vicissitudes of his misfortune, that a
force had to be sent out from England to reduce them
to submission. On the other hand, the Puritans had
espoused the cause of Cromwell with warmth from
the beginning, finding a double incentive thereto in
their hatred of the cavaliers and of the Established
Church. It was in this way that the same dissensions,
which long before had exercised their baneful influ
ence in the Old World, came to be propagated in the
New. In America a new sphere of action was thus
presented for these enmities. The Puritans, who, by
reason of the distance which separated them from

42 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
England, had nothing to fear, were enabled to display
more energy in the promulgation of their doctrines,
whereas the cavaliers, deserted by the English Govern
ment, were compelled to advocate their conservative
tendency unsupported.
It is remarkable that the Puritans, who had fled
from religious persecutions, soon became in America
the most cruel persecutors of religious freedom and
the most relentless bigots, whilst the Catholics, who
had come with Lord Baltimore to Maryland under
the same circumstances, were the first upon the
American continent to distinguish themselves by the
most decided tolerance of all religious creeds. ' While
the recollection of former persecutions induced the
Catholics in Maryland, the Baptists in Rhode Island,
and the Quakers in Pennsylvania, to grant freedom
of conscience to others, in Massachusetts, under
similar circumstances, fanaticism overpowered the
sense of justice.' * The same historian who relates this,
describes the Puritans most admirably as follows: —
' But in truth fellow-feeling for the suffering from
persecution could avail little against the fanatical
bigotry of the Puritans, which infatuation, confound
ing all moral distinctions, regards the most savage
cruelty as innocent, and converts lenity and modera
tion into crime.' f
Fanaticism in New England did not restrict itself
* Tucker, vol. i. p. 34. -j- Ibid.

FANATICISM OF 'THE PURITANS. 43
to the persecution of Dissenters. A frequent oc
casion for persecution, was presented by the delu
sion of witchcraft,* the first criminal prosecutions
for which took place in 1645, in Massachusetts,
where four persons were executed on this charge.f
Nearly half a century later, in the year 1690, this
delusion had only reached its culmination. J These
facts, taken from history, are cited to show the
character and tendency of Puritanism in America.
But nothing more characteristic of the spirit of that
puritanical fanaticism can be found than the 'blue
laws,' whose home was New England. One of these
declared it to be a crime for a mother to kiss her babe
on a Sunday.
Although these laws are no longer in force in New
England, still the spirit which produced them is at
present more rabid than at any previous time. And
more than ever are the hothouses and sanctuaries of
deluded fanaticism to be found at the firesides of New
England homes. The immoral and repulsive
doctrines of Free Love, Spirit-rapping, and Woman's
Rights, owe to Christian New England their ' divine '
origin. This puritanical fanaticism has in the present time
* Grahame, Colonial History, vol. iii.
t Hildreth, History of the United States of America, vol. ii. pp.
145-167. X Tucker, vol. i. p. 36.

44 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
selected as the most fruitful sphere of its zealous
activity the province of politics.
A natural consequence of this religious and political
fanaticism is the inextinguishable hatred between the
descendants of the Puritans, the people of New
England, and those of the cavaliers in the South,
which now appears to have reached its zenith.
This antagonism is not limited to the people of the
two sections, North and South, as entire communities,
but extends to the individuals of each section ; for
the influence of different origin, the essentially
different social and political institutions, and the
diversity of education, have rendered individual
character in New England and that in the Southern
States irreconcilably opposite.
No one at all familiar with the state of affairs in
America can fail to be impressed by the deeply-rooted
hate of New Englanders towards the Southerners,
whether or not it is to be attributed to the origin,
refinement, or accomplishments of the latter. And,
whereas the former are accustomed to regard the
Southerners with undisguised pride, these evince
always an unlimited contempt for them, on account
of their sordid worship of the dollar ; it is, therefore,
not strange that the appellation of Yankee should be
considered in the South as synonymous with whatever
is selfish and little.
Between these two people the antipathy is so great

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF DISSOLUTION. 45
that there appears to be no possibility of ever eradi
cating it. The developements of this war have made
it more appreciable than ever, showing, that these two
people have nothing in common but the language, that
they are not adapted to each other, and that therefore
they cannot continue to live united in peace any
longer. Not enough importance has ever been attached to
this fact, which has been orie of the most potent
influences that have caused the Union to be impos
sible.

II. Economic Causes.
Foreign commerce has ever been a fruitful source
of bitter dissension and jealousy between the North
and the South. Even before the adoption of the
' Articles of Confederation,' as well as before, and
at the time of the ratification of the ' Constitution,'
unmistakeable evidences of future troubles on this
account among the States of both sections became
manifest. In this quarter may be discovered one of
the causes of the repeated acts of injustice on the part
of the North towards the South.
It is well known that the North was physically
more favoured in natural harbours, and consequently
its people devoted themselves to commerce on the
seas. And finding this a source of great wealth, the

46 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
North has employed every means at its disposal to
encourage its shipping interest. Endeavouring to
obtain special facilities for this purpose, the North
has been utterly regardless of the interests, of the
other States, seeking only its own aggrandisement.
Hence we find that in the making of all treaties of
commerce, in the framing of navigation laws, in the
introduction of tonnage duties, and particularly in
arranging the regulations for the fisheries, the North
has never failed to secure its purpose, often to the
decided disadvantage or even injury of the South.
Indeed it is notorious that on several occasions the
North has been upon the point of involving the whole
country in a war with England, solely in its fishing
interest. With every facility at its disposal and every
advantage on its side, the North also soon came to
be the factors and carriers of the South, and all the
coasting trade, being in its own hands, was carried
on in its own ships.
On the other hand the South, not so well situated
for becoming a maritime country, particularly on
account of the want of such excellent harbours, found
it advantageous not to become a shipping community,
but rather to devote its energies to the cultivation of
the soil. The North, not possessing such a produc
tive soil as the South, turned its attention also to in
dustrial pursuits. And so the North has finally
attained such a point of excellence in them, that it is

TARIFF AND POLICY OF PROTECTION. 47
now only second to England in the manufacture of
cotton, whilst its iron manufactures have become
very considerable. An impetus having been given
to manufactures in the North by the war of 1812
with England, afterwards protection was sought for
the interests which had thus become engaged in
them. Still, the plea put forward was the necessity
of a revenue for carrying on the government. True
to this policy the North, particularly New England,
has ever since exerted itself to make the Federal
debt as heavy as possible, in order to increase the
duties on imports ; for it had been found that the
duties already imposed were far more than sufficient
to defray the expenses of the government. Now
with the immense difference in capital, population,
and ships, in favour of Europe, it is evident that the
infant manufactures of New England never could
have succeeded, had it been necessary to compete
with the old world in the home markets. Conse
quently a moderate protection was at first asked and
granted; but with this assistance from the Federal
Government, the demands of the North became more
exorbitant, till finally the South openly resisted
these encroachments. The history of the legislation
of Congress in favour of protection shows a series
of acts, each more unreasonable than the former,
tending to exclude the non-manufacturing States of
the Union from all direct trade with Europe.

48 THE SECOND WAR OF- INDEPENDENCE.
Naturally the South, being the producer of only the
raw material, wished to exchange its productions for
manufactures in whatever markets afforded the
greatest advantages. It is also obvious that Europe
offered more advantages, for reasons already stated,
than the North. In consequence of the protection
given to Northern manufactures, competition with
Europe was finally almost abolished, and by this
means the North enabled to grow rich at the expense
of the South. The South became the forced customer
of the North, and the Southerner was compelled to
let his money flow into the pockets of the Northerner,
who in return furnished commodities of a quality
inferior to those which might have been obtained at
a vastly lower price, had the Southerner been at
liberty to import them from Europe. In this way
the trade of the South has built up the wealth of the
North, enriched its cities, and given employment to
its poor classes. For the results of protection were
not favourable to the States as a whole, nor to the
general government. The advantages resulting from
it accrued solely to the population of the North.
It has been estimated that the amount of indirect
taxation to which the South has submitted for the
last few years has reached 20,000,000/. annually.
This estimation does not appear to be exaggerated.
Thus has the South been compelled to pay tribute to
the North, to enable the Northern manufacturer to . . .
compete with the European in its own markets.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH TO THE NORTH. 49
If it is true that the South, while it remained in the
Union, had always been a source of wealth for the
North, it will follow that the secession of the South
from the Union must have an important effect upon
the prosperity of the North. No further proof is
needed to establish this proposition, as we have
already shown the value of the South to the North
before the separation. It is, however, worthy of
mention, that the statements made in New York to
the effect that the prosperity of the North has in
creased since the commencement of the war, are
devoid of all foundation in truth. For the fact that
foreign imports have decreased, whilst the exports of
the North have increased, proves the contrary. This
results from the circumstance that, in consequence of
the secession of the South, the North has ceased to
supply the South both with its own and foreign com
modities. Naturally, then, the imports must have de
creased, whilst the tendency of the exports was to in
crease, for the North found it necessary to send abroad
what it formerly sent to the South, whether or not with
less advantageous results we do not propose to discuss.
Such attempts on the part of Northern men to
employ weak evidence in support of their assertions,
when the contrary is manifest, as well as the loud
and passionate denunciations of the so-called treason
of the Southern States, tend to produce the thorough
conviction that the North rightly fears the most

50 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
fatal results from a permanent separation from
the South.
Everyone is aware, however, that the tariff is a
question which has been limited neither to the past
nor to the present, but that from the commencement
of the existence of the Union down to the moment of
its dissolution, it has been a constant cause of strife.
As long ago as 1832, when South Carolina pro
claimed the tariff laws unconstitutional, this subject
had already obtained an importance that could not
be concealed. But for the last thirty years, the bit
terness engendered by this cause has been increasing
in intensity, till at last the South could bear no longer
the injustice of this system of exorbitant protection,
which amounted almost to prohibition. In the ' plat
form ' of the ' Republican ' party, which elected Mr.
Lincoln, the continuance of the policy of protection
was announced to be desirable and indispensable;
whereas the ' Democratic ' party, which had always
respected the rights of the South, characterized this
policy as both unwise and pernicious. The ' Repub
licans' have remained true to their political creed, and
have placed evidence of it on record in the notorious
Morrill tariff-bill, that few in Europe would be in
clined to question. Here was the culmination of the
efforts of the North for the last half century, against
which the South had never ceased to protest and
remonstrate, but with more energy and earnestness
during the last thirty years.

PROTECTION UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 51
From this system of protection has resulted an in
direct taxation, which presses exclusively on the
South. This the South considers, and has always
considered, unconstitutional ; for such it is declared
to be by the provisions of the constitution [clause 1
of the seventh section of Art. I.]. This reads as
follows : —
' The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts
and provide for the common defence and general wel
fare of the Xfnited States ; but all duties, imposts, and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.' Does not the conclusion seem inevitable on exa
mining the purposes for which Congress can impose
duties, that it has no right whatever to impose
them for the aggrandisement of any one section
of the Union? If it is not in order 'to pay debts
and provide for the common defence and general
welfare,' Congress has no power to impose any duties
whatever. How much less has it, then, the right to
do so only for the advantage of a single section.
Moreover, these duties must be ' uniform throughout
the United States.' When, therefore, Congress lays
taxes or duties that weigh almost exclusively upon
the South, it does what it has no constitutional right
to do, and such act is unconstitutional.
Who will say, then, that the right is not here again
E 2

52 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
all on the side of the South? At least the South
erners are convinced of it, and have decided to submit
to this spoliation no more. The worst that can be
said is, that the Southern States have acted towards
the encroachments of the Union, as the thirteen
original States did towards England, when they
declared that no taxes could lawfully be imposed upon
them without their consent.
Because the North has tried to force these facts
into the background, let not Europe be deceived.
This was the great and chief cause of the secession
of the South ; and now Europe may judge whether
this grievance was well-founded.

III. Political Causes.
If, in comparison with Europe, America may be
said to possess no history, still a period of time has
already elapsed sufficient for the developement of
certain political maxims in the New World, which
have been transmitted to the present generation of its
inhabitants with all the sanctity and veneration
attaching to the traditionary past. These political
principles have a double importance for them, because
they constitute the foundation upon which their
dearest rights are based. By a vindication of them

WORTH OF POLITICAL MAXIMS. 53
these rights were first secured. Among all of these
political maxims, none is more cherished than that
one announced in the ' Declaration of Independence,'
and which proclaims ' that whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends (se
curity of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness),
it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute a new government, laying its founda
tion on such principles, and organizing its powers in
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their safety and happiness.'
The natural consequence of this principle, which
obtained a real validity through the combined efforts
of the thirteen original colonies, was to develope the
notion of State rights; and upon this fundamental
idea rested, as we have seen, the entire structure of
the Union. After so many sacrifices had been made,
and so much suffering endured to establish the so
vereignty of the individual States, it is self-evident
that every attempt on the part of the Federal Go
vernment to violate this principle must have been
regarded by the States as an injury not to be sub
mitted to.
At an early period commenced a series of acts on
the part of the general government, which have
resulted in rendering the Union impossible. At one
time we find the Federal Government asserting its
exclusive jurisdiction over the Indian lands situated

54 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
within the limits of certain States. This produced,
very naturally, a feeling of resentment on the part of
the States interested, which were Southern States, so
that on several occasions resort was about being
made to arms to defend their rights.
For a long time the South has been aggrieved by
the action of Congress respecting the district of
Columbia. It is well known that this district was
acquired from the States of Maryland and Virginia
for the seat of the Federal Government, under the
express conditions that no law should be made by
Congress for the government of the district which
might be hostile to the institutions of the above-
named States; unless, at least, these States should
give their express consent to the same. The Federal
Congress has continually exerted itself to escape the
fulfilment of these conditions. Efforts have con
stantly been made to abolish slavery in the district by
direct legislation of Congress, regardless of the self-
imposed condition not to interfere with it at all. We
say that Congress has tried to effect this result, for
in point of fact there never was a sufficient majority
in Congress to accomplish it, until the separation of
the South. But the recurring threats and attempts
to effect it had served to irritate the South greatly,
and to convince the Southern people that when the
party in the North hostile to their institutions should
obtain the supremacy in Congress, the Federal

THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 55
Government would not hesitate a moment to legislate
slavery out of the district, and then, going a step
further, would combat slavery and attempt its over
throw in the Southern States themselves. Yet every
body knows that Congress has no right to interfere
with the internal affairs of any State, least of all about
slavery, which was recognised by the constitution;
for this is not among the powers delegated to Con
gress. When ¦ Missouri sought admission into the Union
in 1820, having the requisite population, it was at
first refused by the Northern vote. At last the ad
mission was only allowed under the condition, that
for the future slavery should not exist in any terri
tory north of 36° 30'. This was a flagrant violation
of the constitution, which does not give to Congress
the right to refuse admission to any territory having
the required population, provided the constitution of
such territory be Republican. ' On that event,' says
Rawle,* ' the inhabitants acquire a right to assemble
and form a constitution for themselves, and the
United States are considered as bound to admit the
new State into the Union, provided its form of govern
ment be that of a representative. Republic. This is,
perhaps, the only check or control possessed by the
United States.'
At the time that Congress passed this unconsti-
* William Rawle, 1. c. p. 294.

56 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
tutional act, the Southern States - protested by their
votes against the measure, and proclaimed it to be
unconstitutional. The constant efforts that had been made to exclude
the South from the Territories, which are the common
property of all the States alike, aroused the indigna
tion of the Southern people most thoroughly. It
will not be pretended that the rights of one State in
the Territories were greater than those of another.
The citizens of the Northern States were at liberty
to take their property with them into the Territories
and were protected in their possession of it. Why
was it, then, that when the citizens of the Southern
States, emigrating thither with their property in
slaves, which were recognised as such by the consti
tution, claimed the same protection for their species
of property, as that accorded to other kinds of
personal property in the Territories, legal protection
was denied by the Federal Government ? Plainly it
was an act of injustice and usurpation in favour of
the North, and an attempt to exclude the South
from all participation in the Territories. A confir
mation of this is to be seen in the legislation of
Congress with respect to the public lands in the
Territories. The lands were squandered, or sold at
pitiably low prices, in order to attract the poor
classes of the North, and to direct the emigration
thither from Europe, it being known that the South

THE TERRITORIES AND SLAVERY. 57
could spare comparatively few of its citizens for
populating the new Territories. With what success
this has been carried out, let the election of Mr.
Lincoln by the foreign vote attest.
The interference of Congress with slavery was the
more uncalled-for, seeing that a territory, once
admitted, would have an unquestionable right to es
tablish slavery, or to abolish it, by changing its con
stitution accordingly. There is nothing in the con
stitution that prevents any Northern State from
introducing slavery within its limits, if it should
choose to do so. If Massachusetts should to-morrow
discover African slavery to be the most profitable kind
of labour for its manufactures, and if the people should
accordingly decide upon introducing it into that State,
there is no power in the constitution of the United
States which can prevent it. On the other hand,
there is no power in the same instrument which can
prevent any State from abolishing slavery at will.
As members of the Federal pact, it was incumbent
upon the States to act always, and strictly in good
faith towards each other in executing the provisions
of the constitution. A sense of honour alone should
have compelled them to do so. • Has this been the
way in which the North has acted towards the
South ? Let their ' Personal Liberty bills ' be the
answer. Judge Story, the eminent jurist, and cele
brated opponent of slavery, has stated that the Union

58 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
never could have been framed without the mutual
obligation of the rendition of fugitive slaves, as pro
vided for by the constitution. It was indeed a most
wanton violation of the constitution to attempt to
evade the performance of duties enjoined by it. But
when we consider that the rendition of fugitive slaves
was made obligatory upon the Northern States by
their own free assent to the constitution, the unceas
ing efforts made for a series of years to endanger the
rights of the South, by evading this obligation, appear
doubly wicked. The rendition of fugitive slaves was
one of the fundamental rights of the South, but in a
large number of the Northern States 'Personal
Liberty bills' were passed, which, making it punish
able by fine and imprisonment for citizens of these
States to assist in the capture of any fugitive, rendered
the execution of the constitution impossible. It is no
reply to this that, according to the census of 1850,
one slave escaped to each 2,527 held in bondage in
the border Slave States ; whereas, according to that of
1860, one escaped only to each 3,276. In a popula
tion of 1,638,297 slaves in these border States, this
is an average loss of 500 slaves, or a loss of 100,000/.
annually. To these political causes may be added those be
longing properly to the sphere of religion.
Americans are accustomed to regard religion and
everything pertaining thereto as one of the most im-

DISSOLUTION OF THE RELIGIOUS UNION. 59
portant and serious affairs of life. Until within a
few years past, religious societies had managed to keep
aloof from the arena of politics. The Methodists
were the first denomination that incorporated the
question of slavery in their religious creed, and there
by created two parties. Afterwards the Baptists,
and then the Presbyterians, followed their example.
Thus was a division made in religion, which, taking
a deep hold on the passions of men, was productive
of the most deplorable results. The opponents of
slavery characterized the system as the chief sin of
the human race, and declared it unpardonable to re
main in the same religious union with those enter
taining other views. In fact, when we consider the
full extent and significance of this event, we are led
to conclude that, with the dissolution of the religious
union on the question of slavery, all hopes for the
preservation of the political union were dissipated.
Another powerful lever for the dissolution of the
Union was the abuse of the sacred desk. The clergy
of the North did not consider it inconsistent- with
their sacred calling to declare their political senti
ments from the pulpit, and that in the most fanatical
way. The constitution which recognised slavery was
denounced as ' a league with death, and a covenant
with hell,' and in this way the right asserted to
disregard the constitution in its relations to slavery.

60 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Such impious doctrines met with greater approval,
because the piously inclined hearers were disposed to
receive as truth the maxims pronounced by their
clergy, with less criticism and examination, than if
they had been uttered by other teachers ; and so, the
wish of fanatical priests was confounded with the
word of God.
But on the growing youth such fanatical doctrines
exerted a more lasting influence, because the thus
educated representatives of the people and future
members of Congress, imbibing those heresies with
their mothers' milk, and rearing upon that sandy
foundation the edifice of their political faith, became
accustomed to consider the violation of the consti
tution as justifiable by the ' higher law.'
Also, the vehement abuse that has only too often
been uttered and written against the South, contri
buted not a little to widening the breach. Without
any foundation it has been asserted repeatedly that
the South violated the laws in regard to the slave-
trade ; but it is known that all the slave-ships fitted
out in America for the slave-trade between Africa
and the West Indies are Northern ships, with
Northern or foreign crews, which are sent out by
Northern capitalists, while the odium of breaking the
treaties for the suppression of this traffic is cast upon
the South. Moreover, this does not stand to reason
when we bear in mind that most all of the Southern

CALUMNIES HEAPED UPON THE SOUTH. 61
States have laws still in force, and in many cases ante
rior in date to the constitution, which forbid the impor
tation of African slaves from Africa into their borders.
With equal injustice has the North contended that
the notorious arrogance and insolence, which have
characterized the political intercourse of the United
States Government with foreign nations, were to be
attributed to the South. The only argument ad
vanced to support this assumption was the fact that
the former Presidents were chiefly those chosen by
the South; whereas, in 'the nineteen presidential
elections, sixteen of those that have been elected have
received more electoral votes in the North than in
the South. Sixteen have also received' a majority of
the electoral votes of the Northern States, while only
three were chosen in opposition to the North by
Southern States, in combination with a powerful
Northern majority.'* For the future at least the
South desires to see her interests represented in
Europe with that courtesy which is usual in other
countries, except in the North of America.
Here belong, furthermore, the calumnies propagated
against the South by the North. Among these was
the charge that the South encouraged filibustering
expeditions against Cuba, which, it was contended,
lying near to the South, and having the institution of
* Williams. The South Vindicated, London, 1862, p. 337. Some in
teresting comparisons of the presidential elections are to be found here.

62 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
African slavery, the South was anxious to annex.
The indefensibility of this reasoning shows itself at
the first glance at the fact, that the acquisition of
Cuba by the United States would have been dia
metrically opposed to the interests of the South ; for
this island would, in that event, have satisfied its
demand for labour, for slaves, by drawing its supply
from the Southern States, as in that case the laws
against the slave-trade would prevent their further in
troduction from Africa. But the Southhas not enough
of this kind of labour for itself, and therefore the loss of
its slaves by exportation to Cuba could not fail to be
most serious in its consequences to the Southern States.
Emigration from Europe also has contributed its
full share to the dissolution of the Union. The
greater part of these emigrants, particularly since the
year 1848, consisted of political malcontents, persons
without property, often fugitives from justice, fana
tical and embittered spirits, who brought with them
those socialistic ideas, only too much in consonance
with the red Republican doctrines of the Radicals in
the North. These persons pretended to see in the
prosperous slave-holding Southerners their hereditary
enemies, and therefore, looking at the question of
slavery from a purely ideal standpoint, helped to
fan into full flame the slumbering fires of discord,
using the dissensions of the two sections with a real
fanaticism for their own selfish ends, after receiving

SIGNIFICANCE OF LINCOLN'S ELECTION. 63
homes almost without cost at the hands of the Federal
Government. Finally, it may be added that the impression dis
seminated by the North, that the election of Mr.
Lincoln was the sole cause of the dissolution of the
Union, is absolutely false. This was the result of
consummate mabce on the part of the North, in order
to place the Southerners in a false light before
Europe, as rebels. We say this was done maliciously,
for never has it occurred to the South to dispute the .
constitutionality of Lincoln's election, at least as far
as the form of it is concerned. It is consequently false
when the North asserts that the South, spoiled by the
elections of its former presidential candidates in com
bination with the Democratic party of the North,
could not bear the galling idea of submitting to be
governed by a man who belonged to another political
party. No; it was not the unconstitutionality of
Lincoln's election, who, it is true, while receiving the
majority of votes in the Electoral College, only
received 1,857,610 of the 4,715,270 electoral votes
cast, but other reasons, which caused secession. It was
the well-founded apprehension that the advocates of
the principles of the ' Republican ' party, a party un-
disguisedly hostile to the South, would soon gain the
supremacy in Congress, and, in cooperation with
their political ally, the new President, would proceed
to trample under foot the rights of the Southern

64 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
States ; it was the apprehension that this party,
passing soon from words to deeds, would attempt to
execute their unconstitutional intentions with respect
to slavery, when it would have been too late to think
about withdrawing from the Union. Secession bad
long been viewed in the South as the last means at
command to prevent the destruction of constitutional
liberty and justice in America. And now, when
Lincoln was elected, the South realized that the long
¦anticipated time had arrived, and that it was necessary
to act before its independence and liberty were for
ever lost.
But indeed, what importance was to be attached to
the election of Mr. Lincoln? Lincoln was the victo
rious candidate of a purely sectional party. Nothing
similar to this had ever before occurred. A President
elected against the unanimous protest of every State
in the South, and elected solely by the votes of its
declared enemies. This was not the cause of secession,
but only the occasion of it.
Had the necessary guarantees asked for by the
South always been accorded, and had the North
always given sufficient grounds for confidence in the
conscientious observation of the constitution, as very
rightly demanded by the South, the Southern States
would have acquiesced in the election of Lincoln, and
there would have been no cause for secession. Had
the North been less abusive in its relations with

SECESSION COULD NOT BE DELAYED. 65
the South, it is not impossible that for a number of
years to come the South would have remained passive,
and suffered itself to be plundered, as had already
been the case for a long time.
Can any unprejudiced mind now doubt that the
time had come when the South, standing alone,
without ' any guarantees for the observation of the
constitution, was obliged to act ? On the contrary, an
examination of the numerous social, economic, and
political causes already recorded, all contributing in
a greater or less degree, perhaps unequally, to
jeopardise the existence of the Union, must establish
the conviction that the moment had really arrived,
when the liberty, the rights, the welfare, and the
honour of the South must compel it to dissolve those
now only external bonds, which united it to a Union
that had long since ceased to exist in the spirit of the
constitution.

66 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

CHAPTER III.

THE WAR.

I. Unconstitutionality of the War.
By the constitution it is expressly provided that
Congress alone shall have the right to declare war
and to raise and support armies. The power is also
given to Congress ' to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and rebel invasions.'* We have al
ready cited the authority of Rawle, f to show that it
is only in the event that a faction should attempt to
subvert the government of a State that ' the case
provided for (by this clause of the constitution) will
have arisen, and the Union is bound to employ its
power to prevent it.' It has been attempted to prove
that the withdrawal of a State, secession, from the
Union is not only the legitimate exercise of State
sovereignty, but also a constitutional right; it is there
fore neither opposition to the laws of the Union nor
* Constitution, Art. I. Sect. 8.
f William Rawle, 1. c. p. 292.

COERCION UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 67
rebellion. Hence it follows, that not even Congress
itself, least of all the President, had the right to
oppose to the secession of the Southern States armed
force. We direct attention here to the fact, that in
the debates of the Convention at Philadelphia in 1787
Madison observed :
' The use of force against a State would look more
like a declaration of war than an infliction of
punishment ; and would probably be considered by
the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous
compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped
that such a system would be framed as might render
this resource unnecessary, and moved that the clause
be postponed.' This motion was agreed to unani
mously* And never since that time has there been
a question of coercion.
In recent times, also, has this principle been
confirmed. Even President Buchanan has supported
it. He says :f
' The question fairly stated is — Has the consti
tution delegated to Congress the power to coerce a
State into submission which is attempting to withdraw,
or has actually withdrawn, from the confederacy?
If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the
principle that the power has been conferred upon
Congress to declare and make war against a State.
* Madison Papers, vol. ii. p. 761.
f President Buchanan's Message to Congress, December 3, 1860.
F 2

68 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
After much serious reflection, I have arrived at the
conclusion that no such power has been delegated to
Congress or to any other department of the Federal
Government. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the
constitution, that this is not among the specific and
enumerated powers granted to Congress; and it is
equally apparent that its exercise is not " necessary
and proper for carrying into execution" any one of
these powers. So far from this power having been
delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by
the convention which framed the constitution.
' Without descending to particulars it may be safely
asserted, that the power to make war against a State
is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the
constitution. Suppose such a war should result in
the conquest of a State, how are we to govern it
afterwards? Shall we hold it as a province, and
govern it by despotic force ? In the nature of things
we could not, by physical force, control the will of
the people, and compel them to elect senators and re
presentatives to Congress, and to perform all the
other duties depending on their own volition, and
required from the free citizens of a free State as a
constituent member of the confederacy.
' But if we possessed the power, would it be wise to
exercise it under the circumstances? The object
would, doubtless, be to preserve the Union. War
would not only present the most effectual means of

OPINIONS OF PRESIDENT BUCHANAN. 69
destroying it, but would banish all hope of its peace
able reconstruction. Besides, in the fraternal conflict
a vast amount of blood and treasure would be
expended, rendering future reconstruction between
the States impossible. In the meantime, who can
foretell what would be the sufferings and privations of
the people during its existence ?
' The fact is that our Union rests upon public
opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of
its citizens shed in civil war. If it cannot live in the
affections of the people, it must one day perish.
Congress possesses many means of preserving it by
conciliation ; but the sword was not placed in their
hands to preserve it by force.'
II. Commencement of the War.
The secession of the State of South Carolina in
1860 had been regarded beforehand as a possible
event ; nevertheless, public opinion in the North was
not sufficiently prepared to realize all the significance
attaching to it. On several previous occasions the
Southern States had threatened to resume the ex
ercise of their delegated authority, and consequently
the North, particularly New England, was disposed
to consider this last threat another bugbear.
When the Convention of South Carolina passed the
ordinance of secession, commissioners were despatched

70 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
to the Federal Government to commence negotiations
respecting the claims of both parties, and to agree
upon the terms of their adjustment. At the same
time a demand was made upon the Federal Govern
ment to withdraw its troops from the forts in the
harbour of Charleston. It is true that these forts
were Federal property, which had been acquired with
the consent of South Carolina ; this was not disputed,
but South Carolina demanded that the Federal
Government should evacuate them, pledging itself, in
the settlement of their mutual claims, to grant full
indemnity for the outlay that had been made in
constructing the forts. Now that South Carolina
had determined to undertake the protection of its
own coast, the Federal Government could no longer
pretend to any right to retain the forts ; for it was
self-evident that South Carolina could not submit to
the presence of foreign troops on its soil. President
Buchanan, however, refused to recognise these com
missioners as the representatives of a foreign State,
and declined to accede to their demand.
Nevertheless, the commissioners remained in
Washington, seeking to accomplish their purpose by
obtaining an acknowledgement of their claims ; they
limited their demands, however, for the moment to
the extent, that no reinforcements whatever should
be sent to Fort Sumter. On the other hand, they
agreed to permit the small garrison to remain in the

NEGOTIATIONS AFTER SECESSION. 71
forts, South Carolina binding itself not to attack
them, so long as the stipulation not to send rein
forcements should be observed by the Federal Govern
ment. President Buchanan acceded to this proposal,
and communicated the result to Congress in his
message of January 8, 1861. At the same time
he attempted to justify the promise made to the
commissioners, by the desire to avoid the commence
ment of hostilities; as South Carolina had given
assurance of its intention to regard any attempt to
send reinforcements to Charleston, or to change the
status quo of the forts, as a declaration of war on the
part of the United States. The President desired
the more to avoid a bloody collision, as he still
cherished the hope of restoring the Union by
moderation. When Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated as Mr.
Buchanan's successor, and took an oath before
assembled Congress to observe the constitution, he,
too, refused to acknowledge the commissioners from
South Carolina as the representatives of an inde
pendent State; still he caused Mr. Seward to enter
into a , correspondence with them, in which the
engagement entered into by Mr. Buchanan was
not repudiated, consequently silently acknowledged.
Mr. Seward favoured a peaceful adjustment of
the difficulty; and his influence, it is said, caused
Mr. Lincoln also to desire a peaceful solution in the

72 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
beginning. We are indebted to Governor Pickens of
South Carolina, however, for information respecting
the motives which induced President Lincoln, at the
expiration of a few weeks, suddenly to reverse his
policy. Soon after the commencement of hostilities,
Governor Pickens caused the history of the negotia
tions at Washington to be published over his own
name in one of the journals of the State.* We insert
this document, as tending to throw a great deal of •
. light upon the secret history of the war.
' State of South Carolina.
'Head-quarters; Aug. 3, 1861.
' I have every reason, from information received
by me in the most confidential manner (not forbid
ding publication, however), and through one very
near the most intimate counsels of the President of
the United States, to induce me to believe that the
following article was submitted, as a proof sheet, to
Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet ; that a proclamation, in
conformity with its general views, was to be issued ;
and that a change in the decision of the Cabinet was
made in one night, when exactly the contrary course
was adopted. It is asserted in this article (which
in all probability is a proof sheet from a confidential
New York paper), that if the President desired to
excite and madden the whole North to a war of
* The Columbia 'South Carolinian' of August 3, 1861.

SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR. 73
extermination against slavery, and in favour of the
absolute plunder and conquest of the South, he had
only to resolve that Major Anderson and his garrison
and Fort Sumter should perish, as it appears was well
known would have to be the case. Major Anderson
and his men were to be used as fuel, to be thrown in
to kindle the flames of fanaticism, and to force the
Northern people into a united war, which would give
the Abolition leaders absolute control over the Go
vernment and country. What must be the feelings
of the civilised world when it is known that the
President of the United States and his Cabinet did
so act, and with a view expressly to carry out this
policy of exciting the whole Northern mind ?
' Major Anderson had officially informed the former
Administration that he could hold Fort Sumter;
and, of course, if the object of that Administration
was to betray the Government into the hands of the
Secessionists, as is charged in the article, then Major
Anderson must have been a party to the treason;
and if he informed the new President, on the 4th of
March, as is said to be the case, that he could not
hold the fort, then he acted out his part fully in
aiding to place Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet exactly
where they were, and to compel them to evacuate
the fortress, or to use the garrison as victims, to be
slaughtered on the unholy altar of blind fanaticism
and mad ambition.

74 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
' I know the fact from Mr. Lincoln's most intimate
friend and accredited agent, Mr. Lamon, that the
President of the United States professed a desire to
evacuate Fort Sumter, and he (Mr. Lamon) actually
wrote me, after his return to Washington, that he
would be back in a few days to aid in that purpose.
Major Anderson was induced to expect the same
thing, as his notes to me prove. I know the fact
that Mr. Fox, of the United States Navy, after ob
taining permission from me, upon the express gua
rantee of a former gallant associate in the navy, to
visit Major Anderson " for pacific purposes," planned
the pretended attempts to rebeve and reinforce the
garrison by a fleet, and that Major Anderson pro
tested against it. I now believe that it was all a
scheme, and that Fox's disgraceful expedition was
gotten up in concert with Mr. Lincoln, merely to
delude the Northern public into the belief that they
intended to sustain and protect Major Anderson,
when, in fact, according to the article now published
for the first time, they decided to do no such thing,
and acted with the deliberate intention to let the
garrison perish, that they might thereby excite the
North, and rouse them to unite in this unholy and
unnatural war, by which the desperate and profligate
leaders of an infuriated and lawless party might
gratify their vengeance and lust of power over the

SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR. 75
ruins of their country, and amid the blind passions
of a maddened people.
' The document now published, and the peculiar
circumstances, show the basest and most infamous
motives that have ever actuated the rulers of any
people, except, perhaps, in the days of the first
French revolution, when history shows that whole
sale murder was often planned by insurrectionists in
Paris, under the deliberate guidance of malignant
leaders, whose whole objects were universal plunder
and murder, in order to exterminate one party and
ride into power themselves.
' A moment's review of the line of argument pur
sued in the article, will show that the policy finally
adopted in regard to Fort Sumter was intended and
desired by Mr. Lincoln and his advisers to lead to a
war, not to be regulated by the rules and usages
among civilized people, but to one of rapine, murder,
and utter extermination of the people against whom
it was intended to be waged, founded upon no prin
ciple of right, seeking not to reestablish any dis
puted authority, or establish any other object than
to gratify a lust for power and revenge.
' For the purpose of directly proving the motives
and impulses of the United States Government in
the inauguration of this war, it is only necessary to
make several extracts from the article in question,
as they will serve also to direct the special attention

76 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
of the public to those portions which most vividly
prove the unhallowed purposes of President Lincoln
and his advisers.
' One of the chief ends of the article seems to have
been the proof of treason on the part of President
Buchanan, and through all of it runs the oft-repeated
" alternative " left them by him of " permitting Major
Anderson and his command to starve within fifteen
days," or of ignominiously abandoning it to a nest
of " unprincipled rebels."
n? 3? ^r ife
'It was intended to show that the object of Pre
sident Lincoln was to preserve " peace," not to " make
war;" to "protect the sacred Constitution" confided
to his keeping, and to gain over, by his avowedly
peaceful objects, those who had defied that " Consti
tution " and broken its laws. It is asserted that
President Lincoln could not suppress the " tears " of
anguish which his signing the order for the evacua
tion of Fort Sumter called forth, and it is said, too,
that he desired to " discharge his duty to humanity; "
and yet he has chosen to " discharge " that " duty " in
the singular way of resolving on a policy which, in
his own words, he knew would " raise throughout
the mighty North a feeling of indignation, which
in ninety days would have emancipated every slave
on the continent, and driven their masters into the
sea."

SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR. 77
' The sacrifice was made ; Anderson and his com
mand were forced to become liable as victims to
fanaticism; Fort Sumter was wrapt in flames; and
yet, forsooth, they tell us that the only man who
could have prevented it was " resolved to discharge
his duty to humanity," and that his purpose was
" peace " — his aversion " war." His " purpose " was
changed, and he resolved to bring on this unhal
lowed war. It is a Government actuated with these
feelings that we are to defend ourselves against; it
is this kind of war, then, that the people of the South
are to meet; and under these circumstances it be
comes my duty to publish the article in question
for the information of the people of the Confederate
States, and for the cool and unbiassed contemplation
of the civilised world.
'A war thus inaugurated — from such motives and
under such circumstances — surely can never meet
with the favour of heaven. A people educated and
trained up to constitutional liberty can never, for
any length of time, sustain such a war.
' F. W. Pickens.'
ABANDONMENT OF FORT SUMTER.
NECESSITY knows no law.
' There are periods in the history of nations and
individuals, when the force of even this proverb is

78 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
illustrated. The law, or rather the demands of
justice, self-respect, national honour, and the vindi
cation of our nationality in the eyes of Europe, all
demand that we should retain possession of Fort
Sumter at any and every sacrifice ; and no man in
this nation is more deeply impressed with the para
mount importance of so doing, than is Abraham
Lincoln, the President of the United States. He feels
and recognises his duty in the premises ; but the law
of necessity steps in, "puts at defiance his wishes and
his duty, and sternly forbids his attempting to hold
or relieve the noble fortress so promptly snatched
from the hands of the rebels and traitors of Charles
ton, by the timely action* of Major Anderson.
Buchanan and his traitor Cabinet had debberately
planned the robbing of our arsenals, under the su
perintendence, and with the connivance of the mise
rable fellow Floyd, whose portrait now hangs so
conspicuously in the Rogue's Gallery of our City
Police ; and we all know, that when Major Anderson
took possession of Fort Sumter, Floyd demanded its
restoration to the rebels, and that Buchanan actually
yielded to the demand, until threatened with danger
to his person if he ventured upon any such act of
treachery. He yielded to a stern necessity ; but in
yielding he determined to accomplish by manage
ment and finesse what he had not the courage to
do openly. He accordingly refused to permit the

SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR. 79
fort to be reinforced, as it could have been in those
days, with the necessary men and stores to enable
it to hold out for a year at least against any force
which could be brought against it; and it was not
until after Morris's Island had been fortified, that he
sanctioned the abortive attempt at succour made by
the Star of the West ; and even countermanded that
order before it was carried into effect.
' From Christmas until March 4, the traitors and
rebels of Charleston and the cotton States, received
every countenance and support from Mr. Buchanan
which could be afforded them ; and when he retired
from office on the 4th instant, he gloated over the
conviction that he had fostered rebellion and treason
until they had become so rampant, that they were
beyond the control of his successor. And the one
great source of his glorification was, that Fort
Sumter was without provisions; and that of ne
cessity, the garrison must surrender from starvation
before it would be in the power of the Republican
Administration to relieve and reinforce it.
' Of course, Abraham Lincoln could know nothing
of this treason ; and when in his inaugural he spoke
of occupying the public forts and collecting the
revenue, he little dreamed that his predecessor had
treasonably arranged to make the abandonment of
Fort Sumter a political necessity. He was soon ap
prised, however, that the treason of his predecessor

80 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
had cunningly devised for him the most serious mor
tification that could be inflicted; and that he had
presented to him the alternative of permitting
Anderson and his command to starve or promptly to
withdraw them, and ignominiously permit the fort
to fall into the hands of the rebels. To reinforce
the garrison or to supply them with provisions is
equally impossible, for James Buchanan, and his
associate traitors, designedly refused to do so while
it was in their power to do it; and compelled the
commandant of the fort quietly to permit the con
struction of works in his immediate vicinity, and
under the range of his guns, which would effectually
prevent his being relieved when an honest man
assumed the Government on March 4. Buchanan's
final act of treason has been consummated. He
prevented the last Congress from passing a law
giving power to the Executive to call for volun
teers to occupy and recapture the public forts and
arsenals, and he designedly left Fort Sumter in a
position which renders relief physically impossible
without an army of from 10,000 to 20,000 men,
and the employment of a naval force greater than
we can command ; and he and his myrmidons now
exultingly and tauntingly say to the Republican
President: "Do your worst. We have designedly
withheld from you the means of relieving and hold
ing Fort Sumter, and we invite you to the pleasing

SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR. 81
alternative of permitting Anderson and his command
to starve within fifteen days, or of ignominiously
abandoning it to a nest of traitors and rebels, whom
we have nursed into existence as the only certain
mode of destroying the Republican party."
' Such are the simple facts of the case as they are
presented to the new President upon his assuming
the reins of Government; and we speak advisedly
and from knowledge, when we say that, while the
country has been wickedly made to believe that the
time of the Administration has been occupied with
the disposal of offices, four-fifths of all the hours
spent in consultation by the Cabinet have been de
voted to the consideration of the all-important
question — How to save Fort Sumter, and avert
from the Government the dishonour of abandoning
it to the miserable traitors who, for months, have
been in open rebellion against the authority of the
Government ? Generals Scott and Totten, and all
the military and naval chiefs at Washington, have
been consulted; every plan which military science
could conceive, or military daring suggest, has been
attentively considered and maturely weighed, with a
hope, at least, that the work of the traitor Buchanan
was not so complete as he and his associates sup
posed. But all in vain. There stands the isolated
naked fact — Fort Sumter cannot be relieved be
cause of the treason of the late Administration, and
G

82 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Major Anderson and his command must perish by
starvation unless withdrawn.
'What, then, is to be done? Could the President
leave them to starve? Cui bono? Would the sacrifice
of a handful of gallant men to the treason of thieves
and rebels have been grateful to their countrymen?
But, says the indignant yet thoughtless patriot,
" think of the humiliation and dishonour of abandon
ing Sumter to the rebels ! " We do think of it, and
weep tears of blood over the humiliation thus brought
upon the country by the traitor President, who has
just retired to Wheatland to gloat over his consum
mated treason. And we are assured, too, and do
not doubt the truth of the assurance, that when
Abraham Lincoln was compelled to yield his re
luctant consent to this most humiliating concession
to successful treason, he did not attempt to suppress
the sorrow and tears which it called forth. But he
had no alternative. " Necessity knows no law ; " and
to save the lives of the gallant men who have so
long held Fort Sumter against an overwhelming
force of heartless traitors and wicked and unprin
cipled rebels, whose treason has been steeped in fraud
and theft, vulgarly known as " Southern chivalry,"
the President of the United States, in the discharge
of a duty to humanity, has signed the order for the
evacuation of Sumter.
' Had war, not peace, been his object — had -he de-

SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR. 83
sired to raise throughout the mighty North a feeling
of indignation, which in ninety days would have
emancipated every slave on the continent and driven
their masters into the sea, if needs be — he had only
to have said : " Let the garrison of Fort Sumter do
their duty and perish beneath its walls; and on the
heads of the traitors and rebels of the slavery pro
pagandists be the consequences." Such a decision
would have carried joy to the bosoms of Phillips
and Garrison and their fanatical associates, who so
justly consider abolitionism and disunion synony
mous ; but it would have brought upon the country-
such scenes of horror as the mind shrinks from con
templating. Verily, the blood of the martyrs would
have been the seed of " Negro emancipation." For
every patriot soldier thus sacrificed to the revival
of the African slave-trade and the establishment of a
hideous slaveocracy at the South, ten thousand negro
slaves would have been emancipated, and as many of
their masters driven into the ocean to expiate their
crimes on earth.
' But Mr. Lincoln desired to rouse no such feeling
of revenge among the people of the free States. He
knew — no man knew better — that he had but to
hold on to Fort Sumter, agreeably to the plainly
expressed will of the people, and leave its gallant
garrison to the fate prepared for them by rebels and
traitors, to insure an uprising which would at once
Q 2

84 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
wipe out slavery from the face of the country, and
with it all engaged in this atrocious rebellion
against the Government. But his purpose is peace,
not war. His object is to restore, to rebuild, and to
preserve the Government and the constitution which
enacted it, and his great aim is, while maintaining
the constitution and enforcing the laws, to bring
back good men to their allegiance, and leave the
thieves, and rogues, and braggarts who compose the
great mass of the rebels, under the cognomen of
" Southern Chivalry," to the uninterrupted enjoy
ment of their own precious society, and the reflections
which time must awaken even in them. He is
mindful of his oath " registered in heaven," to pre
serve the constitution and enforce the laws ; and he
feels that his mission is to reclaim, and not extin
guish, or he would most assuredly have left Fort
Sumter to its fate, and that fate would have been
speedy, certain, and absolute annihilation to the
traitors now in rebellion against the Government,
and to the very existence of the institution of slavery
on the American continent. But he has been faith
ful to his oath of office and to the constitution ; and
by yielding to the necessity of the case and listening
to the cry of humanity, slavery has had accorded to it
its last victory over freedom and the constitution of
the United States.
' The deed has been accomplished; the sacrifice has

SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR. 85
been made ; traitors and rebels are again triumphant ;
and the stars and stripes are again to be dishonoured
in the sight of the nation and of astonished Europe ;
the flag of the Union is to be pulled down, and the
bloody banner of pirates, freebooters, rebels, and
traitors is to be run up to wave triumphantly over
Fort Sumter, and be saluted from hundreds of guns
in the rebel camp, amid the cheers of thousands
whose senseless gasconade and braggadocio vauntings
have long since disgusted brave men and honest
citizens. And yet we approve the act. A traitor
President rendered it a necessity, and humanity
demanded that Abraham Lincoln should sacrifice all
personal feelings, and gracefully yield to that neces
sity and the deliberately planned treason upon which
it is based. His countrymen will sustain him in the
discharge of a humiliating but an imperative duty ;
but, with him, they feel that the account is now
closed with treason. There is nothing now to yield
to traitors — nothing more to sacrifice in order to give
slavery and the slave-trade the odour of nationality.
In future the President of the United States has only
laws to enforce and a constitution to sustain; and
woe be to them who thwart him in the performance
of his duty, and to himself if he dares to shrink from
the performance of his whole duty.'
Conformably to the original desire of Mr. Lincoln
to evacuate Fort Sumter, the commissioners had

86 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
been quieted with the assurance that no effort would
be made to relieve that garrison ; but, as seen from
the foregoing, the President suddenly changed his
policy, and South Carolina, considering this as breach
of the peace, took measures for self-defence.
This unexampled want of good faith strengthened
the other Southern States in their distrust of Lincoln
and his party ; it revealed to them the character of
the ' Republican ' President with whom they had to
deal ; and thus nothing was more natural than their
secession from the Union.
The action of Lincoln must, then, be regarded as
a purely party manoeuvre, by which it was designed
to obtain permanent supremacy for his party, and
absolute control of the Government. The conception
of this plan by Lincoln was well devised; it was
foreseen that, in the immense popular excitement
sure to ensue, few persons in the North would stop
to question the constitutionality of his proceedings;
and that even those having the hardihood to do so
would be powerless to harm him, whilst the mob
sustained him in his course with its approval.
Everyone is aware of the success that attended
Lincoln's calculations ; Fort Sumter was bombarded
and forced to capitulate ; the cry for vengeance was
sounded throughout the length and breadth of the
land; and President Lincoln proclaimed the bom
bardment of Fort Sumter to be treason against the

CHARACTER OF THE WAR. 87
Union, while it was, in fact, only the beginning of
hostilities for self-defence that had been forced upon
South Carolina by an act of the Federal Government,
which, it was known, would be regarded as a de
claration of Avar.
The next important official act of the new Pre
sident, who had only a few weeks previously sworn
to observe the constitution, was a clear violation of
his oath and of the constitution, by raising an army
of 75,000 men to wage war against the liberty and
rights of the South. The administration thus com
menced by a reckless disregard of the solemn nature
of an oath, and by a violation of the constitution, has
continued to disgrace itself by a series of the most
flagrant violations of it, and has served to mark
President Lincoln as a man who has reduced it to
the perfection of a trade, to trample under foot with
despotic violence almost all the constitutional rights
of the once free American people.
III. Character of the War — on the part of the North, a
means for the acquisition of greater power;
on the part of the South, for securing its inde
pendence and liberty.
The former territory of the United States consisted
of two political divisions — the one comprising the
thirty-four States, the other the Territories. The

88 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
latter contain but a limited population; for being
situated mostly in the interior, with little or no
direct communication with the sea, they do not offer
the same attractions for emigration as many of the
States. Of the thirty- four States, fifteen are Southern,
the so-called Slave States; these comprise an extent
of territory as great as that of the other nineteen
States, having an area of more than 800,000 square
miles — a country possessing one of the most produc
tive soils of the world for agriculture, whilst abound
ing in almost inexhaustible treasures of minerals.
Thirteen of the Southern States have already formally
seceded from the Union ; another, Maryland, is com
pletely in the possession of a Northern army, and
prevented by force from joining the Confederate
States; while only Delaware, the smallest of all, has
remained in the Union.
The Mississippi river, which drains the entire North-
West, flows through the centre of the seceded States ;
its mouths and a great part of its extent are com
manded by these same States ; and thus the products
of the North-West, in passing over this natural com
mercial highway, have to traverse a foreign country.
The importance of the Mississippi for the North-
West is almost incalculable, and must cause that sec
tion to cultivate the most friendly relations with the
nation possessing its mouths ; for it is the only na
tural outlet for the varied and rich products of

PROPOSED OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 89
this fertile country. Without it, direct communi
cation with Europe would be cut off almost entirely ;
while it is at the same time the most convenient,
and the cheapest route for transportation to market.
The North is therefore compelled to prevent, if pos
sible, the West, the richest part of its territory, from
becoming dependent on a foreign nation for a natural
outlet for its productions. It is only by retaining
possession of this great river that the North-West can
remain commercially independent, and the war already
commenced is prosecuted with energy to secure this
result. The free population of the United States amounted
in 1860 to 27,477,090 souls; that of the Southern
States to 8,352,385, to which number must be added
3,952,738 slaves. Without the South the whole popu
lation of the North would amount to only 19,124,705
inhabitants; the war is therefore waged to retain
this entire population, which the North hopes to
control by its superiority in numbers.
The white and black populations of the South to
gether amount to 12,305,123 souls. But the South,
as we have seen, has always been the chief, and
almost exclusive market for the manufactures of
the North ; the war is carried on therefore to retain
twelve and a half millions of forced customers for the
products of Northern industry. The South has also
been made to contribute far more than its proportion

90 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
i
of the means for administering the Federal Govern
ment. This war is intended to secure not only the
control of a greater power, but along with it to
obtain, also, the chief means of its support.
Should the South succeed in achieving its inde
pendence, the North must submit to see the great
Southern trade, which formerly passed through its
cities, take new channels, and be carried' on directly
between Europe and the ports of the South. With
the loss of the Southern export and import trade
would vanish the Northern monopoly of the coasting
trade; while the shipping interest generally of the
North would suffer to an almost incredible extent.
Thus would perish the very foundations upon which
the commercial and industrial prosperity of the North
rested. A successful termination of the war alone
can avert all these evils from the North.
An inevitable consequence of the triumph of the
South would be additional secessions from the Union.
First of all the North-West would, for reasons already
intimated, withdraw from the Federal league; its
interests are too intimately identified with those of
the South for it to remain connected with the North;
the protective policy of the Union will be found to
be as inimical to the prosperity of the North-West, as
it was oppressive to the' South; and self-interest will
prompt this great section to leave the North and
join its fortunes with those of the South, or else,

OTHER SECESSIONS TO BE EXPECTED. 91
constituting itself into an independent State, to form
an alliance of friendship with the States having
control of the Mississippi. Nor must it be forgotten
that the North-West will, most probably, refuse to
pay any part of the enormous debt incurred for the
prosecution of a war, the unconstitutionality of which
will become evident to it with time.
On the Pacific Ocean as well, will the States there
situated form themselves into a confederacy; for Cali
fornia, Oregon, and the Territories of the far West,
being already geographically separated from the rest
by the Rocky Mountains, will naturally find it to
their interest to form a league among themselves.
Indeed, we might venture to predict that within a
not very remote period of time, all the States will
have withdrawn from New England, the original and
chief disturber of the peace ; and because New Eng
land apprehends this result from secession, it has
from the commencement of hostilities been loudest
in its denunciations of secession, and the most zealous
advocate of a vigorous war. At the same time, it
may be remembered that up to this moment the
contractors and manufacturers of New England have
reaped the principal benefits of the war. From the
above it will appear that nothing else could be ex
pected, than that the North should make every pos
sible effort to prevent the actual accomplishment of
separation by the Southern States.

92 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Having examined the nature of the war on the
part of the North, it follows, naturally, that South
resists these attacks in order to secure its inde
pendence and liberty. It has already been intimated
how much the North was favoured above the South
whilst the Union existed; how after the election of a
' Republican' President the apprehensions of the
South reached their culmination, lest it should be
handed over to the tender mercies of Northern plun
derers ; and how these apprehensions aroused the
feelings of the Southerners at the commencement of
the conflict, although they endeavoured, by every
honourable means in their power, to arrange the
difficulty without a resort to arms. The develope-
ments of the war have proven that these apprehen
sions were only too well founded, and that the fears
of the1 Southerners that their constitutional rights
and liberty would be trampled in the dust by a ' Re
publican' Administration, were equally well grounded.
It is notorious that the liberty of the press, which
had ever been regarded as the protector of the rights
of the people against tyranny, has been trodden
under foot in the North ; that more than eighty of
the most influential and respectable newspapers of
the North have been suppressed, because they dared
to advocate peace and moderation; that President
Lincoln has, without any authority, wantonly sus
pended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;

ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY LINCOLN. 93
that innocent men and defenceless women have been
arrested by lettres de cachet, and incarcerated in loath
some dungeons upon mere suspicion, without an idea
of the charge against them — in spite of the constitu
tion, which provides that no one shall be deprived of
liberty without ' due process of law;' that judges of
the courts have been imprisoned, because, as in duty
bound, they dared to vindicate the 'majesty of the
law.' The President has dispersed the legislature
of Maryland, a State proclaimed by himself to be
loyal, and imprisoned a number of its members,
because they presumed to assemble in the legitimate
way prescribed by law ; and he has suppressed the
voice of the people at the ballot-box by an armed
force, threatening to imprison all who dared to vote
against the candidates of his own party, and placing
soldiery at the polls to execute the threat. Cities
have been burned; towns and villages have been
pillaged; innocent men have been barbarously mur
dered ; the country has been ravaged ; harbours have
been destroyed ; and finally it has been attempted to
kindle a servile war by inciting the slaves to insur
rection. In a word, the South has seen constitutional
liberty perish in the North, and arbitrary despotism
and tyranny spring up to take its place.
In view of these facts, may it not justly be claimed
that the South is carrying on a war for order, and
for constitutional liberty and independence ? The

94 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
people of the Southern States are determined to be
independent, and, convinced of the justice of their
cause, are united as one man, resolved to perish all
together rather than submit to the tyranny of
Northern rule. If anything is potent to cause a
people to fight with confidence and perfect self-
devotion, it is the consciousness that they are fighting
for their liberty, their homes, and their honour. This
conviction pervades the entire people of the South,
and is fully attested by their unity, self-sacrifice,
and courage.
IV. Contradictions in the representations made re
specting the motives for waging the war.
It is not true that the abolition of slavery in the
South is the motive for the war waged by the North.
At no time has this been true; and there are no
facts in the case to sustain such an assumption.
From the beginning of the war, the Northern press
has, with the exception of the notoriously fanatical
sheets, never ceased to protest that there was no in
tention of interfering with the institution of slavery.
It is not denied, however, that the Radical portion of
the press has proclaimed, with equal emphasis, the
desire of the extreme Abolitionists to see slavery
receive its death-blow; but this has partaken, with
few exceptions, rather of the nature of a party ma-

MEANING OF ABOLITION IN AMERICA. 95
noeuvre to excite the mob, in order thus to acquire
an influence over the Administration, and has served
to avert attention from the fact that there was no real
occasion for the war.
The North does not even desire to see slavery
abolished throughout the Southern States ; but only
in the more northern of them — the Border States — as
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Ten
nessee, Kentucky, and Missouri. Even here, the
motive for desiring it is only to obtain fresh fields of
labour for the white working classes ; for it is known
that if the slaves were emancipated, in some of these
States at least, where the climate is temperate, white
labourers would drive them from the country. As
it now is, free labour is not able to compete with
slave labour in those States.
On the other hand, every obstacle is thrown in the
way of free negroes wishing to emigrate to Northern
States ; indeed, many of the States have special laws
preventing free negroes altogether from coming into
them to reside ; and President Lincoln has proposed
to Congress to acquire a piece of territory beyond the
limits of the United States, whither the whole Afri
can race in America may be transported. Briefly
expressed, the abolition of slavery in America means
nothing but more room and greater advantages for the
white labourer.
Philanthropy is not, therefore, the spring of action

96 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
with the Northern abolitionist, as is so ostentatiously
trumpeted forth to Europe, but self-interest ; for, in
deed, his philanthropy is so limited that he will not
associate, or work in company, with the negro.
But self-interest is sufficient to prevent the North
from really desiring to see slavery abolished through
out the South; without African slave labour in the
unhealthy climate of that section, where it is impos
sible for the white man to work, the cultivation of
cotton would cease, and, thus, the cotton manufac
tures of the North would perish if made dependent
upon cotton produced by the labour of free blacks —
a race that notoriously will not work without com
pulsion. The New England manufacturer is fully
aware of this fact, and feels that he has as great an
interest in the preservation of the system of Southern
labour as the planter. But, apart from this consider
ation, it is, in fact, only the extreme Abolition or
' Republican ' party that pretends to wage war upon
slavery; the 'Democratic' party, although not pro-
slavery, has ever respected the rights of the South.
Repeatedly has the Government at Washington
declared that it had neither the intention, nor the
wish to interfere with slavery; and Mr. Lincoln has
at different times given assurance that he did not
purpose attacking the institution, seeing that he had
no power to do so under the constitution ; but that
he made war for the preservation of the ' Union as

HYPOCRITICAL POLICY RESPECTING SLAVERY. 97
it was,' and along with it slavery. We know that
General Fremont was, for the sole reason that he had
presumed to declare the slaves of all ' rebel masters '
in Missouri free, deprived of his command by Presi
dent Lincoln.
During the summer of 1861, Congress, in declaring
that all slaves which had been employed for military
service by their 'rebel masters ' should be consi
dered free, did not dare to proclaim the emancipa
tion of all the slaves, not even when their owners
were serving in the ' rebel army.' Another evi
dence of the disposition of the North originally not
to meddle with slavery, may be found in the Act of
Congress of March 3, 1861, which provides: — ' That
no amendment shall be made to the constitution
which will authorise or give Congress power to abo
lish or interfere within any State with the domestic
institutions thereof, including that of persons held to
labour or servitude by the laws of said State.' Here
is a clear acknowledgement that no such power had
been conferred by the constitution upon Congress.
How false and hypocritical, then, has been' the
policy of the Washington Government in exerting
itself to produce the impression through its agents
in Europe, that the annihilation of the accursed sys
tem of slavery is the object of the present war ! No
one can fail to perceive the motive for such a policy;
it was in order to obtain in this way the sympathy

98 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
and moral support of Europe for a cause, which
¦ could not possibly recommend itself otherwise to the
European public.
The war-cry of the Federal Government at home
has- always been ' the Union.' What is the true
significance of the oft-repeated assertion, that ' the
war is waged for the preservation of the Union?'
The idea that the North is fighting for the Union
from an innate, patriotic love for it, is without any
foundation ; otherwise efforts would have been made
to preserve it by conciliation. The late Senator
Douglas, in a speech in the Senate of the United
States on January 3, 1861, observed —
' A war between eighteen States on the one side
and fifteen on the other is to me a revolting thing.
For what purpose is the war to be waged ? Certainly
not for the purpose of preserving the Union. You
cannot expect to exterminate ten millions of people,
whose passions are excited with the belief that you
mean to invade their homes, and light the flames of
insurrection in their midst. You must expect to
exterminate, or subjugate them, or else, when you
have got tired of war, to make a treaty with them.
No matter whether the war lasts one year, or seven
years, or thirty years, it must have an end at some
time. Sooner or later both parties will become tired
and exhausted ; and when rendered incapable of
fighting any longer, they will make a treaty of peace,

WAR FOR THE UNION ONLY A PRETEXT. 99
and that treaty will be one of separation. . . .
I don't understand, then, how a man can claim to be
a friend of the Union, and yet be in favour of waging
war against ten millions of people in the Union.
You cannot cover it up much longer under the pretext of
love for the Union . . . But where there is a
deep-rooted discontent pervading ten millions of
people, penetrating every man, woman, and child,
and involving everything dear to them, it is time for
inquiring whether there is not some cause for the
feeling.' If the expression, ' war for the Union,' has any
meaning at all, it must signify a war for the preser
vation of the territory and power of the United
States. A war for this purpose, as we have already
demonstrated, is both wicked and unconstitutional,
because it is aimed against State-sovereignty, the
fundamental principle of the Union. It must, then,
be a war of conquest, and a revolutionary war on the
part of the North, since it proposes the overthrow of
existing rights by violence. The South, by fighting
against these revolutionary ideas, gives proof of its
truly conservative policy.

H 2

100 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

CHAPTER IV.
CAPACITY OF BOTH PARTIES FOE CAEKYING ON THIS WAR.
I. Resources in Men.
Upon the commencement of hostilities, the Federal
Government warned the friendly powers of Europe
not to recognise the Southern States, as the rebellion
would be crushed in a few weeks ; and at home, too,
many proclamations in the same sense were issued to
the Northern public, in order to prevent sympathy for
the South from developing itself in their midst. It was
assumed that the North, having greater resources in
men and the material of war than the South, would
inevitably be successful in the contest.
Has the North fulfilled the engagement thus
entered into with Europe ? Not at all. On the con
trary, the condition of the Federal Government has
become worse with every day ; for the suppression of
the rebellion must take place in the insurrectionary
territory, and the Northern army can scarcely be
said to have more than set foot upon this up to the
present time. If the bold suppressor of rebellion

RESULTS OF THE FIRST CAMPAIGN. 101
is not able to invade the country in which the insur
rection rages, then the above-mentioned promise to
crush it must be regarded as unmeaning boasting ;
the incapacity of the North to execute these threats,
which manifests itself more clearly from day to day,
allows the enemy time to arm, to gain strength, to
erect works of defence, and to stand prepared with
means sufficient for resistance, whenever the moment
shall arrive in which the effort to crush 'the rebellion '
shall be attempted. Every day of delay only adds
strength to the rebels, whilst diminishing the chances
of success for the invader.
The results of the war up to this time may be
definitely ascertained by an examination of the two
campaigns now ended. The first ended with the
winter of 1861 and 1862, the second with the pre
sent winter. At the end of the first, which lasted
eight months, the North had already succeeded in
demonstrating its inability to subjugate the South ;
the Confederate army had successfully checked the
advance of the Federal forces along the whole line
from Missouri to Virginia, and had repulsed every
attempt of the invader to penetrate into Southern
territory ; at the close of the operations, the Federal
army retreated from Missouri to St. Louis, abandon
ing the entire State, with the exception of that
city, to the Confederates ; they also retreated before
the Southern army in Kentucky; after failing to

102 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
accomplish any result in Western Virginia, they were
forced to retire to the extreme limit of that State,
" and to go into winter quarters at Wheeling ; and,
after two gigantic efforts to penetrate into Eastern
Virginia, they were both times fearfully routed at
Bull Run and Ball's Bluff, and driven back to the
borders of Virginia, where they were at the com
mencement of the campaign. Thus it appears that
during eight months the South repelled invasion
from every part of its territory, recovering all the
ground which had been occupied by the enemy,
except certain forts that had been garrisoned by
Federal forces before the commencement of the war.
In the victories at Great Bethel, Bull Run, Spring
field, Lexington, Ball's Bluff, and Belmont, may be
perceived the successful resistance which was opposed
to the Northern invasion.
But what did the North accomplish during this
period? Beyond Hatteras and Port Royal, abso
lutely nothing. The first of these two points is only
a sand-bank, which was of no importance for the
enemy, not being tenable during the winter, on ac
count of the high tides and storms which prevail at
that season; and, without the occupation of the other
points of the coast of North' Carolina, this point
would not suffice to cut off communication with the
sea. Port Royal is the entrance to the harbour of
Beaufort, and the possession of it only serves to

RESULTS OF THE SECOND CAMPAIGN. 103
render the blockade of this port effectual. The occu
pation of isolated points on the coast brings little ad
vantage to the North, unless such points are to be
used as bases for operations against the interior.
Unfortunately for the North, its ships were not able
to sail on dry land; and with large armies it had
vainly attempted to achieve any results against
Southern troops, although, in all cases in which it
was essayed, the attending circumstances were far
more favourable to the North than to the South.
The second campaign opened with the movement
of the Federal land-forces under McClellan in the
East, and Buell in the West; while several naval
expeditions were sent against points on the coast,
and the fleet of gun-boats commenced to descend the
Mississippi. No success attended McClellan's at
tempt to advance on Richmond by Manassas, and
consequently his base of operations were changed to
Fort Monroe. At the same time two Federal armies
advanced under Fremont from Wheeling, and under
Banks from Winchester. These were both routed
and almost annihilated by the Confederate forces
under Jackson, who thereby freed a large part of
Virginia from invasion. The result of McClellan's
operations before Richmond are well-known ; and the
fate of the army under Pope at the second battle of
Bull Run needs no further mention. The Confede
rates, victorious at all points in Virginia, advanced

104 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
into Maryland, and captured Harper's Ferry with
its garrison and immense military stores. Subse
quently, a drawn battle was fought at Antietam,
which left the Federal army in almost the same con
dition as after the first battle of Bull Run, and no
further advanced into Virginia. In the West, the
campaign commenced under auspices peculiarly
favourable to the North; it had completed its fleet
of gun-boats for operations on the rivers, whilst its
army was composed of the best men, probably, in the
service, being chiefly trained German soldiers. The
advance of these combined forces was successful at
first: Fort Donnelson fell, and thus the way was
opened for the gun-boats to Nashville. The Con
federate lines were broken, and the sense of security
which had sprung up from the results of the first
campaign was impaired. Previously it had been the
policy of the Confederates to defend the entire extent
of their frontiers ; the local interests and demands of
the different States rendered this at first necessary.
It now became evident, however, that the North was
preparing for a long war ; the necessity of employing
their forces in the most available manner dictated to
the Confederates the expediency of changing the
general idea of the campaign; and it was, accord
ingly, decided to concentrate the forces dispersed
over such a great extent of country. With this
change in their plans, the Confederate forces succes-

RESULTS OF THE SECOND CAMPAIGN. 105
sively evacuated several positions in Kentucky and
Tennessee, retiring to the new lines of defence
further southwards. The Federals continued their
advance to Shiloh, where the western army received
a shock from the Confederates under Beauregard and
Johnson, from which it has never recovered. Since
that time the Federal army in the West, divided
into several corps, has been marching and counter
marching in that section — at one time pursuing, and
again the pursued. Although several battles have
been fought in that region since Beauregard's cele
brated retreat, they have generally been between
comparatively small forces on both sides ; and while
neither army has obtained complete possession of
Kentucky, the Confederates retain at least as much
as they possessed of that State at the commencement
of the war. The Federal forces which had advanced
under cover of their gun-boats into Alabama, have
been driven back entirely; and Tennessee is free
from the Federals, with the exception of Nashville
and country round Memphis, both of which are held
by gun-boats. West of the Mississippi the operations
have been attended with varied results for both
armies; but they have been unimportant by reason
of the small numbers engaged, thus effecting in no
way materially the final issue of the war.
Turning to the naval operations, we find that they
have been limited to the occupation of a number of

106 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
points of minor importance on the coast, which have
rendered the blockade more effective ; and to the
capture of New Orleans, and a part of the Mississippi
river, Vicksburg having resisted successfully all
attacks made upon it. Thus we see that after
another year of war, the North is as far from the
accomplishment of its object as at the commence
ment of hostilities; the conquest of the South is
no more nearly achieved than before it was at
tempted; the South has lost no points essential to
defence; communication between the States has
been maintained, and many new ways of communi
cation opened; no single State has been subjugated,
nor do the Federals rule over any portions of
Southern territory, except those actually occupied
for the moment by their forces ; in a word, nothing
essential to the success of the South has been lost,
and, indeed, the results of this second campaign are
largely in its favour.
On the breaking out of hostilities, the Govern
ment of Lincoln announced that by December 1,
1861, the Federal army would be in possession of
Richmond, Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, and
Nashville. Only two of these cities, New Orleans,
and Nashville, are occupied by the Federals, and
these were taken by the navy, not by the army.
Whence, then, this over-estimation of its means on
the part of the Northern? The response is that,

NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE BELLIGERENTS. 107

although the North is very rich, and contains a
larger population, the South is not without great
resources; while a variety of circumstances con
spire to render a large proportion of the Northern
population unavailable for an aggressive war.
In regard to the population of the two belligerent
powers, we extract the following from the official
census of 1860, published by the Department of
State at Washington. The entire population of the
South, with the exception of Delaware, is thus spe
cified : —

'

Free inhabitants Slave inhabitants

Alabama

529,164 .

435,132

Arkansas

324,323 .

111,104

Florida

78,686 .

61,753

Georgia

595,079 .

462,230

Kentucky

930,223 .

225,490

Louisiana

376,913 .

332,520

Maryland

599,846 .

87,188

Mississippi

354,699 .

436,696

Missouri

1,058,352 .

114,965

North Carolina

661,586 .

331,081

South Carolina

301,271 .

402,541

Tennessee

834,063 .

275,784

Texas

420,651 .

180,388

Virginia .

1,105,196 .

490,887

District of Columbia

71,895 .

3,181

Total

8,241,965

3,950,940

To this must be added the territory of New
Mexico, the entire free population of which amounts
to 93,517 souls, which with the above 8,241,965
make a total of 8,335,482. But the entire free

108 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
population of the United States in 1860 was
27,477,090; so that, after subtracting the 8,335,482 t
inhabitants of the South, there remains a population of
19,141,608 in the North.
These numbers, 8,335,482 and 19,141,608 re
spectively, must not be assumed as absolutely ac
curate in the examination of the resources of the
two sections ; for there is, in certain of the seceded
States, a portion of the population disaffected towards
the South, as in Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and
small districts in Tennessee and Virginia, from which
contingents for the Northern -army have been taken;
while in several of the Northern States, there is a
large proportion of the inhabitants which sym
pathises with the Confederates, and has refused to
contribute soldiers for the war. Still it may be
assumed, without essential error, that the number of
the ' disaffected ' on each side is about the same,
although no troops have been furnished by Cali
fornia and Utah, and few by certain parts of In
diana, Illinois, and Delaware. It must be borne
in mind, however, that only a certain proportion of
these respective numbers are capable of bearing
arms; that these are persons of the age which
furnishes the principal class of labourers ; that, ne
cessarily, a large number of men capable of bearing
arms in the North must remain at home for the
cultivation of the soil; whilst in the South this

ELAVE AND FREE LABOUR. 109
labour is performed almost exclusively by the slaves,
whereby the entire male population capable of bear
ing arms can be spared for the army. Another
consideration of no little significance is the amount
of labour done by the negro slaves. In the South
the slaves of both sexes are employed, the females
working in the fields as well as ' in- doors.' The
negro children, too, are not left without employment
of a light kind. In the North, on the other hand,
the white females are employed only with their
domestic concerns, or in the factories, and the chil
dren must spend a part of their time in the schools. It
will thus be obvious, that the amount of agricultural
labour done by 4,000,000 of slaves in the South is,
ceteris paribus, much greater than that performed by
a white population of the same numbers in the North.
For these reasons, the difference in the number of
men that may be spared for the army from both
sections respectively is nothing like so great, as the
disproportion of population would, at first sight,
appear to indicate. II. The Navy.
It cannot be denied that the North possesses in its
navy an immense superiority over the South. Almost
the whole of the former navy of the United States
remained in the hands of the North; though its

110 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
efficiency was considerably impaired by the large
number of Southern naval officers that resigned upon
the secession of their respective States.
But little discernment is necessary to discover that,
with a navy like that of the North, under ordinary
circumstances, immense injury may be inflicted upon
another commercial power. From this point of view,
however, the South has but little to fear, not possess
ing a commercial navy which the armed navy of the
North might destroy. The action of the Northern
navy is, then, limited to two fields of operation ; the
one to maintain a blockade of the Southern ports,
the other for hostilities against the seaport cities.
One of the first measures of war undertaken by the
North was the proclamation of a blockade of the
entire coast of the seceded States. At that time the
navy was notoriously insufficient for keeping up an
effective blockade of a coast, with an extent of more
than 2,400 miles, abounding in bays and creeks, which
are navigable only for ships of light tonnage. The
difficulty of such an undertaking, with even a much
larger navy than that with which the North set the
blockade on foot, cannot fail to be perceived by
everyone; for the almost numberless points of en
trance for ships would render any but a navy of the
first class totally incompetent. According to the
international law of Europe, as laid down in the
protocol of Paris, a blockade to be binding must be

BLOCKADE AND THE FEDERAL NAVY. Ill
effective. That the blockade of the Southern States
for a long time could not pretend to be anything like
effective, is evident from the fact that, between the
proclamation of it and the following month of No
vember, more than five hundred ships of all sizes did
successfully pass through it; while the number of
captures made during the same period was altogether
inconsiderable. Was it not, therefore, pure forbear
ance on the part of the European powers to have
acknowledged and respected the paper-blockade for
so long a time? In the desperate effort to render the
blockade of the Southern ports real, by sinking ves
sels laden with stone in the harbours, a tangible evi
dence was afforded of the incapacity of the Federal
Government to accomplish what it had undertaken.
No comment is necessary upon the infamy of this
proceeding, which, by subjecting the North to the
just execration of the civilised, world, has been far
more injurious to its cause than to the harbours of
the South.
The Federal Government perceived at an early day
the advantages that might result from a fleet of gun
boats, operating on the great rivers that traverse the
South in every direction ; the navy-yards and docks
were in their own hands, and every facility for rapidly
constructing a river-navy was at their disposal.
Accordingly, we find that no time was lost in the
execution of this project; in less than a year a large

112 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
number of gun-boats, some iron-cased, started down
the Mississippi, cooperating with the land-forces.
The first victory achieved by this new arm of the
service was the capture of Fort Donnelson. But in
the meantime the regular navy of the North has been
increased to such an extent, that the blockade is no
longer a purely paper one, though certainly not per
fect; at all events, the favourable moment for ceasing
to respect it, when it was notoriously ridiculous, has
glided out of the hands of the Great Powers of Europe.
The indulgence accorded to an insolent power is now
reacting upon the nations that granted it.
For all purposes of naval warfare the South can
scarcely be said to possess any means of resistance
to the North. Still, important results for defence
have been achieved by the improvised navy of the
South. The exploits of the ' Virginia' (' Merrimac')
and ' Arkansas ' are familiar ; whilst the damage in
flicted on Northern commerce by the ' Sumter,'
'Nashville,' and 'Alabama' is clearly visible in the
rates of insurance demanded for Northern vessels.
Indeed, the insecurity of Northern commerce is
already so great, that trade between America and
Europe is being rapidly transferred to English
bottoms. Here, then, is the vulnerable part of the
Northern navy, and the South will endeavour to
profit by it. Nevertheless, the inequality existing
between the two belligerents in this branch of the

MATERIAL RESOURCES. 113
resources of war, is too great to justify the hope of
its being removed within any short period; yet the
South is making every effort to remove the difficulty
under which it labours.

III. Material Resources.
It has already been observed that in the North the
army has to be recruited from the male population
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years,
the, same body of men that constitute the usual
labouring classes. The whole of this population
must render military duty on occasion, it is true;
but the wealthy classes are virtually exempt, because
it is at their option to procure substitutes. Conse
quently, the soldiers must chiefly consist of actual
labourers. Now, these are composed of the agricul
tural classes, the operatives, and those in the cities
employed in various commercial callings. As regards
the quality of an army composed of such material,
it will be conceded that the strongest and ablest
soldiers are always those accustomed to out-door
pursuits — the cultivators of the soil. But just this
population is least of all represented in the Northern
army. The manner of recruiting makes this almost
inevitable. When a certain number of troops are to
be raised, they are apportioned to the different
I

114 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
States ; and the Governor of each State is then called
upon to raise the quota assigned to it. Hereupon
the Governor issues a call for volunteers ; and it is
only when these are not forthcoming that the con
scription is put in force. But as in time of war the
natural tendency of agricultural products is to become
dearer, the occupation of agriculture becomes more
profitable, and agricultural labour accordingly ad
vances in price. This circumstance tends to prevent
such labourers from enlisting in the army. On the
other hand, the numerous factories which have been
closed on account of the want of a supply of material,
and of markets for manufactured articles, have been
forced to discharge their operatives. Thus a very-
large class without employment has been thrown
upon the North ; and of these the army has, in a great
degree, been composed. Inactivity in trade, also,
has turned vast numbers out of employment in the
cities. Rather than starve, large numbers from these
two classes of the population have been induced to
enter the army to obtain a support. Yet this has
not been unattended with symptoms pregnant of
trouble for the Government. The recruits have in
many instances given.visible evidence of a disposition
to force the Federal Government to do more than
pay for their services. Meetings have been held;
and resolutions passed, declaring it to be the duty of
the Government to support the starving families of

FEDERAL CREDIT AND CONSCRIPTION. 115
its soldiers. Nor has the Government been able to
extricate itself from the difficulty; in the form of
unprecedented bounties, the Government has been
compelled to acquiesce in demands made upon itr
But the continuation of this is dependent upon the
ability to pay the bounties. As long as the Federal
Government has credit, it can continue to pay its
soldiers ; but as soon as this fails, it will be seen that
the patriotism of the North will not be sufficient to-
fill up the thinned ranks of its army. Conscription
may be resorted to, as already decided upon some
months since, but the obstacles to its execution will
be found almost insuperable. Wherever it has been
attempted to enforce it as yet, violent resistance has
been offered and bloody riots have occurred. Thus
all will depend upon the finances of the North. Love
for the Union may be never so strong in the North :
but men love their wives and children more ; they
will not leave these at home to starve, and the interests
of self-preservation will triumph. In this way the
North may find itself compelled to terminate the
war, in order to prevent revolution at home-
Trade is now stagnant, except in the necessaries
for carrying on the war. The finances of the North
are also tottering and must soon crumble; the ex
penses of the war are daily increasing, and no means
of defraying them have been devised. It is true that
the Federal Congress has passed laws for levying a
I 2

116 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
direct tax, but not a dollar has been raised in this
way as yet.
At the commencement of the war the banks were
the supporters of the Government ; indeed, they had
no choice, for their very existence was in the hands
of a lawless government. But, with an outlay of
20,000,000?. per month, the resources of the banks
were soon exhausted. Resort was then had to a
' popular loan,' which, with the duties raised by the
Morrill tariff-bill, still failed to supply the steadily
increasing demands of the Government. Long be
fore the expenses of the war became so enormous,
at the time of the discussion of the budget for the
financial year from July 1861 to 1862, Mr. Chase
estimated the necessary expenses at 109,000,000?.;
of this sum only 66,000,000?. had been provided
for by the ingenious devices of the Secretary of the
Treasury. According to Mr, Chase's statements,
he expected at that time a deficit of 43,000,000?. for
the first year of the war ; and he confessed that
only 6,400,000?. could be hoped for from duties.
But the patriotism, wealth, and banks of the North
were not sufficient. Mr. Chase was finally compelled
to propose a direct tax, which, it was calculated,
would yield 4,000,000?., and an income tax pro
ducing 2,000,000?. more. Still the execution of the
law imposing these taxes has not yet been attempted;
but when the taxgatherer does commence to make

FEDERAL FINANCIAL SCHEMES. 117
his calls, and put his finger in the pockets of the
Yankee, the latter will soon cry Peace, unless he
shall have changed his nature.
One of Mr. Chase's first schemes for raising a part
of the 43,000,000?. wanting, was to substitute for the
circulating medium of the banks a Federal currency
to the amount of 30,000,000?., which should be con
vertible into Federal securities.. It was proposed,
on the one hand, to substitute Worse securities for
the existing ones of the bank- currencies; whilst, on
the other, the destruction of the financial systems in
the individual States must have been the result.
How this plan could have improved the state of
affairs we have never been able to discover.
Finally, Congress made Federal paper a legal
tender with a forced circulation. Thus at last
Mr. Chase was enabled to meet his demands, finding
it incomparably easier to print money than to raise
it by taxation. Gradually the expenses of the war
have increased to such an extent that these facilities
for creating money do not suffice. At first this
system worked well enough, but repeated issues
of paper caused the new legal tender to depreciate.
Paper still retains its nominal value, if you please ;
but gold has advanced by reason of the ' cheapness
of money.' As might easily have been anticipated,
the result of such a reckless system of finance has
been to flood the country with a currency now worth

118 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
only about two-thirds of its nominal value, and to
drive gold and silver out of circulation.
According to the best means of judging, the
debt of the Federal Government already exceeds
400,000,000?., and is increasing at the rate of
20,000,000?. per month.; while no way of raising
an amount for paying the interest on it has been
discovered. Well may the financial system. of the
Federal Government be designated as reckless and
ruinous. It is attempted to obtain money for con
ducting the war by loan, or otherwise ; but no ade
quate measures are adopted for paying the interest or
gradually discharging the debt. Certainly it does
appear as if the Government only tried to satisfy
present want, leaving the future to take care of itself.
Sooner or later resort must be had to a foreign
loan; but this will.be attended with no result, for
the capitalists of Europe are not inclined to take
the risk of such a loan, made by the Federal Govern
ment upon the faith of thirty-four States, when,
under the most fortunate circumstances, it must be
borne by twenty States. There is no confidence
felt in Europe in the administration of the Federal
finances, for reasons just given; besides, all the
efforts made to dispose of Federal securities in
Europe since the war have proved fruitless. In
fact, the Government of Washington is already
bankrupt, although every effort is made to conceal

MEANS OF SUBSISTENCE IN THE SOUTH. 119
it. This state of affairs cannot last much longer, for
the true condition will ere long be known every
where. Moreover, who would be disposed to lend
money to the Union, when there is every reason
to believe that, in the event of a war with one of the
European powers, the private capital possessed by it
in American funds would be confiscated ?
What a different picture does the South present!
Here all personal interests are forgotten in the
sacrifices made for the public weal. The South
erners are firmly united, resolved, if necessary, to
sacrifice everything to the attainment of their in
dependence. None of the statements made about the starving
of the Southern people have any foundation in truth ;
for the South is an agricultural region which pror
duces not only enough cereals and other means of
subsistence for its own use, but exports, as every
well-informed person is aware, large quantities to
the North and abroad. The income from its exports
of meal, rice, beans, wheat, hogs, and cattle is very
considerable. Any one acquainted with the varied
nature of the soil of the South knows that it is
simply absurd to reason about the danger of the
South starving; more especially now that the ex
port of its productions has ceased, whereas the
quantity has increased, the war having had little
influence to derange the system of involuntary labour.

120 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Whoever may be disposed to doubt these statements
is referred to the statistics of the United States,
carefully collated by Mr. Hopkins* in his intro'
duction to the ' South Vindicated.' The South pos
sesses also minerals in abundance, as iron and lead;
as well as a number of excellent manufactories of
arms. The foundries of Richmond were among the
most celebrated in America, and the best cannon
furnished to the Federal Government were manu
factured there. These, with others in different parts
of the South, are now capable of supplying all the
necessities of the Government. The South, although
possessing considerable munitions of war on the
commencement of hostilities, was not as well pro
vided with them as the Northern Government then
asserted ; nor were these by any means sufficient for
a war of the magnitude of the present one. But
since that time large numbers of arms have been
imported from Europe, despite the blockade; these,
with the supplies manufactured at home, and the
enormous quantities captured from the enemy, leave
the South in no want of arms at this time.
No reference has been made to the armament of
the North before, because it was self-evident that
with its navy any quantity of munitions might be
obtained from Europe, as long as the peace was not
interrupted. Now, however, the 'Alabama' has
* Williams, 'The South Vindicated,' pp. xli.— xlv.

SELF-SACRIFICE OF THE SOUTHERNERS. 12l
appeared on the stage of action, by which event the
certainty of obtaining supplies from Europe has been
jeopardised. Indeed, it is' asserted that the .North,
having lost such immense military stores during the
war, is at present sadly in want of arms for its new
levies. All kinds of munitions are now manufactured
in the South, so that the blockade is incapable of
inflicting vital injury in that direction.
Undoubtedly, the South has suffered much from
the blockade ; but the representations made by the
North of the suffering in the Southern army for
clothing and the means of subsistence, are gross
exaggerations. For reasons already intimated, the
Southern soldiers demand only arms and support,
and a large proportion of them refuse to accept any
pay whatever from the Government ; while thousands
of wealthy officers and privates have united to defray
the whole expense of the organization and support of
entire regiments. Every house contributes to the
comfort of the soldiers, and there is no reason that
the army should suffer from any great want. Con
vinced that the war is prosecuted for their own
interests and welfare, the Southerners vie with each
other in the liberality of their contributions for the
support of their defenders, and for the aid of the
Government, in order to relieve it of as much ex
pense as possible. For it is quite indifferent whether
the means for the support of the army, or money for

122 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
obtaining them, be contributed ; in the first instance
the necessity for money is in a great degree obviated.
An example of the extent of the voluntary aid
afforded to the Government in the form of articles
of subsistence, may be seen in the contributions
from the city of New Orleans during the month of
October before its capture ; these amounted to
200,000?., and were designed exclusively for the
army in Virginia, account being taken of no contri
bution under the value of 20?. Articles of luxury
are, then, the principal things, of which much want
is felt.It has already been mentioned that the system of
involuntary labour in the South has not been de
ranged by the war. It may now be added that
before the commencement of hostilities, as constantly
since, the North has threatened the South with a
slave insurrection ; on the breaking out of the war,
or latest upon the approach of a Northern army, the
slaves, it was asserted, would rise, murder their
masters, and burn their houses. The Southerners
have never feared such a result; and experience has
confirmed their opinions, while proving the error of
the North. As long ago as- November 1861, the
' Journal of Commerce,' a New York organ of Lin
coln's party, confessed the hopelessness of expect
ing the cooperation of the slaves. It spoke as fol
lows : —

NO DANGER OF SLAVE-INSURRECTIONS. 123
' General Halleck has issued orders, that in con
sequence of important information respecting the
numbers and condition of our forces being conveyed
to the enemy by fugitive slaves, no such person shall
hereafter be permitted to enter the lines of any camp,
or any forces on the march, and any now within
such lines to be immediately excluded therefrom.
* * * At fortress Monroe too, it was discovered
very soon after the breaking out of hostilities that
the negroes were secretly giving information to the
enemy. If this is the way the black population of
the South serve the cause of the Union, the less we
have of them the better. * * * In the many dis
cussions which the slave-question has brought about,
there has not as yet been elicited a particle of evi
dence that the slaves of the South would accept
freedom and arms, or would fight for the Union
against their masters.'
Apart from the well-known devotion and attach
ment of the slaves to their masters, a slave-insurrec
tion would be impossible, on account of the absence
of all means of communication between the plan
tations ; but were a general conspiracy conceivable,
the execution of it would be impracticable, for the
slaves have no arms; and if they had arms, they
would not know how to use them. We do not deny
that in remote sections the presence of a Northern
army might be able to intimidate many slaves, and

124 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
induce others to commit barbarities, but these would
be rare exceptions. Moreover, the Northern army
has so far demonstrated its inability to penetrate
into the interior, in order to place arms in the hands
of the slaves.
Upon comparing the financial system of the South
with that of the North, we are struck with the con
trast between the amounts of their respective debts,
and the rates of monthly expenditure. The debt of
the Confederate States amounts to 69,000,000?.
against 400,000,000?. on the part of the United
States; the monthly expenditure of the former is
about 5,000,000?., while that of the latter is
20,000,000?. But the chief difference between the
two systems consists in the fact that the South has
resolved to raise by direct taxation the means neces-
sary for conducting the war. To this the Southerners
readily submit, because the nature of their produc
tions is such that they can support a much higher
rate of taxation than the North. A few years of
prosperity after the war will suffice to remove all
traces of the temporary sufferings produced by it.
In conclusion, the South is by no means in such a
forlorn condition as has been depicted ; but were its
condition never so bad, the Southerners are deter
mined to endure every privation, rather than submit
to the North ; they have made this a popular war,
in which every individual is directly interested.

DISCIPLINE OF THE FEDERAL ARMY. 125
IV. Army-Organization.
One of the principal causes of the numerous de
feats which the Northern army has experienced, and
of the corresponding successes of the Southern army,
lies in the difference of their respective organiza
tion. In the North the suppression of the ' rebellion '
was at first regarded as a thing of no great difficulty,
as seen in the fact that Lincoln limited his first call
for men to seventy-five thousand. It will be remem-.
bered how volunteers flocked to Washington, in
response to this call, for a three months' service in
the district of Columbia in defence of the capital.
The behaviour of these volunteers, a few days before
they were led on Manassas, is familiar to all. Several
regiments ran away the day before the battle, and
others still left the field during the battle, and
marched home, because their term of service had
expired on that day. The North profited by this
experience, and recruited its subsequent levies for
three years; but still the other great defects of
organization were not remedied by this act.
We repeat only the statements of the press, and of
the officers of the regular army of the North, when
we characterize the discipline of the Federal army as
entirely unworthy of respect. There exists a lawless
spirit throughout, and an impatience of subordination

126 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
that amounts too often to mutiny. Between the
officers and soldiers of the old regular army and
those of the militia, there is an irreconcilable enmity;
and constant difficulties are arising out of the impla
cable hatred between the native-born and naturalized
soldiers. ' The Northern Government asserts that the
men composing its army are not to be surpassed in
the qualities proper to a soldier; whereas throughout
the army the absence of subordination and respect
for superiors, and the want of warlike pride and a
military spirit, are notorious. The prevalence of
drunkenness, the general disposition to dissipation,
and the slight appreciation of the point of honour, so
indispensable to the soldier, are qualities appertaining
to the majority of the Northern soldiers. From the
beginning of the war there has been notoriously a
great want of competent officers for training the
troops; the volunteers are commanded chiefly by
civilians and politicians, who have entered the army
to acquire political influence; the ignorance of the
men in the use of arms constitutes a serious difficulty
in the way of rapid organization ; and, finally, the
men are not influenced by that determination and
self-devotion which animate the hearts of those
fighting for their homes. Mob-rule, and the fact
that the army consists chiefly of men destitute of
means, and without employment, who must be paid
extravagant bounties for fighting, as well as the:

CHARACTER OF THE FEDERAL ARMY. 127
established incapacity of the generals and field
officers, are sufficient reasons for considering an
army, so organized, totally incompetent for subju
gating the South. As might well be expected of such
an army, it brings robbery, theft, violence, and murder
in its train, and has left the most infamous traces
of barbarism behind it, wherever it has appeared.
In fact, the notion of the essential requisites of a
soldier seems to be entirely unknown in the North.
When the war broke out, the North was entirely
without any commissary-department and train of
importance; and the Federal Government had to
contend with unusual difficulties in supplying the
army with arms, clothing and the means of subsist
ence, because it was the prey of numberless specu
lators, and plunderers of the public treasury. Nor
was it possible to send to Europe for better and cheaper
materials, until after the last home-made articles had
been exhausted ; for the mob of Northern contractors
and manufacturers would submit to no competition.
If we compare the Southern army with that of the
North, it is not because the comparison is justifiable,
but merely to exhibit the immeasurable difference
between them. With few exceptions, the Southern
army has consisted all the time of troops enlisted
for the war; there has been no necessity for con
scription, except to regulate the number of men to

128 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
be taken from the different States and counties, for it
was discovered at an early day that entire districts
were in danger of being depopulated. The Con
scription Act as passed, and carried into operation in
the South, proposed only to make the burden of
military service uniform.
There has been no lack of competent and able
field and regimental officers in the Southern army.
Formerly there was a large number of Southern
officers in the Federal army, but these remaining
loyal to their respective States, resigned their com
missions, and entered the service of the Confederate
States. It is not denied, even by the North, that the
best officers of the old regular army were these same
Southerners. Little need be said about the skill of the Southern
generals. This has formed the theme of admira
tion in Europe ever since the breaking out of the
war ; and they have won the respect of the most
distinguished military men in the whole world. Their
ability has been attested most fully in the results
of the battles that have been fought.
A well-known assertion of the North was that the
Southerners would not submit to strict military dis^
cipline. Experience has proved the contrary, and
the South exhibits in its army, consisting to a great
extent of the best and wealthiest citizens, a picture
almost without a parallel in history. The Southerners

DISCIPLINE OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 129
have, from infancy, been accustomed to the use of
arms, and to hve a great deal in the open air ; habit
uated to govern their slaves, they have learnt the
importance of subordination, and therefore subject
themselves with the greatest ease and willingness to
the severe discipline of the army. Mutiny and every *
thing approaching to it are unknown in the Southern
army; whereas it is notorious that, in repeated in
stances, entire regiments in the Northern army have
been disarmed and disbanded on this account; and
the Northern press, fettered as it is, still gives fre
quent information of instances in which soldiers or
officers have shot their superiors. Cases of this kind
are unheard of in the South.
Although the want of a train has been felt in the
South, still the necessity for it is not so great as in
the North. The want has partially been supplied;
to this the stores captured from the enemy have con
tributed no inconsiderable part. Unfortunately, the
seat of war is on Southern soil, but this obviates the
pressing necessity for a train adapted to the wants of
an invading army; moreover, the network of rail
roads which form the internal means of communica
tion and transportation, supply to a considerable
degree the ordinary demand for a train.
In connexion with the enthusiasm of the Southern
army, there exists on the part of the troops unlimited
confidence in the capacity of their leaders, as well as
K

130 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
in their own superiority over the Northern soldiers.
Nor have the results of the two campaigns now ended,
in which the North has accomplished nothing of im
portance, failed to establish an immense superiority
for the South. The capacity of both armies will,
however, be judged by their performances ; and from
this point of view the Southern army has no reason
to envy the army of the North.
V. Duration of the War.
From the foregoing considerations, it may be as
sumed, we think, that, although the South must
necessarily suffer many disadvantages from a war of
such magnitude, yet it possesses the capacity and the
means for conducting a war of defence for an almost
unlimited time. The North, on the other hand, is
forced to terminate the war in a decided manner
within a short period, for its finances will soon be
exhausted. Signs of future troubles already manifest them
selves unmistakably between the ' Democratic ' and
'Republican' parties; and the best interpreters of
public opinion in America declare that the late tri
umph of the former party seals the doom of Lincoln
and his political associates.
There is no unity of counsel and of purpose in the
cabinet of President Lincoln, the members of which

WHY THE WAR MUST SOON TERMINATE. 131
are in open opposition to each other as regards the
object of the war and the means to be employed in
conducting it. Generals are promoted and, when
defeated, are degraded, perhaps to be promoted and
degraded again.
Socialism has raised its head in New England, and
among the foreign population of the North.
> The depressing moral influence of repeated reverses
in the field and of constantly increasing poverty
offers a good occasion for the developement of discord,
and incites the parties against each other, causing
the one to attribute their misfortunes to the other.
These raging domestic dissensions indicate already
clearly enough the growth, and not remote outbreak,
of a revolution in the North.
Long campaigns in the South are impossible, on
account of the climate ; because during the excessive
heats of summer warlike operations are attended by
the most fearful mortality; whereas, in the more
northern parts, the roads are rendered impassable for
artillery and baggage almost in the beginning of
winter. On the other hand, the extent of the coun
try is so great, and its population comparatively so
thin, that a short war is absolutely necessary for the
invader, if anything at all is to be accomplished.
From this examination it becomes evident why the
Federal Government, in fault of an inspiring idea for
the war, as exists in the South, resorts to all kinds

132 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
of false pretexts to excite the popular passions, and
produce an enthusiasm for the war. So we find that
on the one hand the Minister for War proposes to
arm the slaves, and turn them loose against their
masters; on the other, the demagogues proclaim to
the people that nothing can be accomplished by the
war without the emancipation of the entire African
race in America. This is a very open confession, but
has no importance except for exciting the popular
feeling. And now that the emanc ipation of the slaves
has, in reality, been decided upon by the Republican
President, the act can only be regarded as the ex
pression of a spirit of diabolical revenge, and as an
indication of unpardonable puerility, since its execu
tion is impossible. Finally, it was for the same
reason that the Washington Government spared no
pains to produce the false impression among the
Northern people, that the majority of the people in
every Southern State, South Carolina probably ex
cepted, were devoted to the Union, but were over
powered by an armed faction, and would welcome
the approach of a Federal army. Without resort to
such means of exciting the popular feeling, or with-<
out speedy victory, Lincoln will before long be com
pelled by the conservative party in the North to
conclude a peace.
The South is aware of these facts, and knows that
it has nothing to fear from a long war, because its,
enemy will be utterly ruined by it.

133

CHAPTER V.

ISSUE OP THE WAR.

Few indeed will have the hardihood now to assert
that the causes of the antipathy between the North
and the South can be removed by the present war.
On the contrary, the war has aroused all the just
indignation of the Southerners, and excited their
passions to the highest point; and not only has the
former limited confidence in the North been de
stroyed, but, in the place of their former antipathy
for the Yankees, a deadly and inextinguishable hate
has sprung up.
Should the South be re-incorporated into the Union
by force, it cannot be expected that the people that
hpve waged such a ruthless war against the South
erners would ever allow them the exercise of their
former constitutional rights; or that those who are
now designated as traitors would ever be permitted,
if so disposed, to sit in Congress, and take part in
the councils of the Union with those whose loyalty
has never been impeached. With the triumph of
the North would vanish the former constitutional

134 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
character of the Federal Government, which was based
upon 'the consent of the governed.' The South,
foreseeing this, and having learned its strength in its
victories, is determined to offer resistance, if neces
sary, ' till every valley from the Rio Grande to the
Potomac shall overflow with blood, till every hill
top shall be bleached with the bones of Southern
warriors.'' The war of 1812 with England demonstrated the
impossibility of holding such a vast territory in sub
jection : nor will the difficulty be less for the North
than it was for Great Britain.; for the North is not
now in such a condition to wage war against the
South, as Great Britain was at that time to carry on
war with the United States. The occupation of any
point whatever will not put an end to the war; and
should the Southern army be annihilated, of which
there is little danger, the real difficulties will then
only commence. A Guerilla would be instituted, by
which, the North would finally be compelled to make
peace. At the present moment, the Government of the
Confederate States of America is conducted with
order and dignity. In the individual States the
different functions of government are exercised as
quietly as before the breaking out of the war. It
has not been found necessary to suspend the privi
lege of the writ of habeas-corpus, to suppress news-

INTERVENTION NOT DESIRED. 135
papers, or to arrest and imprison individuals without
trial, for the sake of preserving order.
The Confederate States exhibit the picture of a
well-organised Government, which exists not only
de jure, as we have tried to show, but also de facto.
No intervention of the European Powers is desired
by this Government to secure its permanence. It
is strong enough to maintain its independence
unassisted.

136

CHAPTER VI.

I. General Observations.
Twenty negroes, which were brought to Virginia in
a Dutch man-of-war from Africa in 1620, formed the
germ of the slave-population in the North American
Republics. From this time the trade in slaves be
tween Africa and America was continued till the
year 1807. During this period slavery was intro
duced into all of the original thirteen States.f The
entire number of slaves imported into the United
States from Africa is estimated at 330,000. They
belonged chiefly to the tribes of the Mandingoes,
Koromantyns, Fidahs, Eboes, Fantis, Ashantis,
* We take pleasure in acknowledging our indebtedness to the excel
lent work of the Hon. T. R. R. Cobb, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro
Slavery in America (Philadelphia and Savannah, 1858), for much accu
rate and scientific information respecting the history and laws of slavery
in America. Those disposed to pursue their inquiries in this direction
will find much that is valuable in this work to repay the trouble of con
sulting it.
f It is not unusual to hear it asserted that slavery never existed in
Massachusetts. According to the census of 1754, there were in that
State 2,448 slaves over 16 years of age, of which 1,000 were in Boston,
See also Hildreth, History of the United States, vol. i. p, 419.

THE SLAVE TRADE. 137
Krumen, Quaquas, andCongoes, and were held in bond
age in their native country. In coming to America,
these savages only exchanged barbarian for civilized
masters. It is scarcely necessary to speak of the
sufferings of the ' middle-passage ' and other enormi
ties with which the slave-trade was attended. Within
the last half century the evils committed during the
two previous centuries have found their condemnation
among the nations that caused them. It is true, the
advantages of the cruel system had been reaped, but
it was better to abandon the 'nefarious traffic' late
than never.
After the recognition of the independence of the
United States, it was proposed by the Convention that
framed the constitution, to abolish the trade in slaves
between Africa and America. It was objected, how
ever, that the shipping interests of the Northern
States would suffer to too great an extent, should
the trade be stopped suddenly. Massachusetts in
sisted most strongly, along with Georgia and South
Carolina, that the trade should be continued for a few
years to come. In conformity with this proposition,
the year 1808 was fixed upon for the termination of
the slave trade. It did actually cease in 1807, one
year earlier than originally intended.
Vermont was the first State to decree the abolition
of slavery within its limits; and by the Bill of Rights
adopted in 1777 slavery was excluded from that

138 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
State. In 1790 there were only seventeen slaves in
Vermont to take advantage of this generous measure.
Slavery was abolished successively by all the States,
until the institution was limited to the fifteen Southern
States. Nevertheless, as late as 1840 there were
five slaves in Rhode Island, seventeen in Connecticut,
one in New Hampshire, sixty-four in Pennsylvania^
four in New York, and six hundred and seventy-four
in New Jersey.* Slavery was abolished in all the
Northern States by ' gradual emancipation,' a period
having been fixed upon, after which all issue of the
slaves were to be free. These plans, being all pro
spective, allowed ample time for transporting the slaves
from the North to the Southern States, where, in fact,
most of them were sold. Care was also taken to
fix the dates of emancipation sufficiently distant, to
avoid the depreciation in value that would have
resulted from forcing the entire slave-population of
the North upon the Southern market within too
short a space of time. It is well known that the
gradual abolition of slavery in the North was not
the result of philanthropy; but it took place purely
from considerations of expediency; partly because
the climate had been found unadapted to the negro;
and partly on account of the comparatively limited
extent of the real estate in the hands of single in
dividuals, which rendered the employment of small
* United States Census of 1840.

EXPEDIENCY THE CAUSE OF NORTHERN ABOLITION. 139
numbers of slaves less profitable than in the South,
where organised labour on the plantations was ex
tremely remunerative. Another motive was the
sufficiency of white labour in the North, which by
competition made slave labour too dear ; whereas the
scarcity of white labour in the South made the
demand for slaves very great. Nor did the abolition
of slavery in the North propose conferring upon the
negroes an equality with the free white citizens, but
consisted only in the prohibition to hold slaves after
a specified time; consequently, the majority of the
slaves found masters in the South, and the few that
were emancipated never obtained the right of citizen
ship, except in Vermont. The number of slaves
have increased to 3,952,801 according to the census
of 1860.
Nothing is more natural than the repugnance of
Europeans of the present day for the word slavery.
When, however, the actual condition of the African
slaves in the Southern States is examined, much of
the antipathy to the system of slavery in America
will be discovered to be unfounded.
Slavery in America may be considered from two
points of view — on the one hand, as a social, on the
other, as a political relation. Regarded from the
first point of view, slavery is decidedly patriarchal.
The head of the family is the slaveowner or master,
while the slaves are incorporated into the family.

140 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
The wife and children excepted, the slaves claim the
chief care and attention of the head of the family.
Interest and feeling unite to induce the master to
bestow the greatest kindness and protection upon his
dependents ; and, in this way, a more intimate bond
of affection is created than is possible between the
master and hireling in any country. The master is,
at the same time, the protector, confidant, and friend
of his slaves, and must afford them clothing, support,
medical attention, and religious instruction. The
children of the slave-proprietor grow up with those
of the slaves, so that from the earliest youth there
exists a mutual affection between the future master
and his slaves. This is the secret of the wonderful
attachment of the slave, on the one hand, to his
master, and of the disinclination of the master, on
the other, to part with his slaves. It is, indeed, a
common thing for masters to sacrifice property of
every kind, rather than be separated from their negro
slaves. A tangible evidence, too, of the contentment
and devotion of the slaves is to be found in the fact,
that only one insurrection worthy of the name has
ever taken place among then. This occurred in Vir
ginia, as long ago as the year 1800, and was insti
gated by Northern abolitionists, but divulged by
faithful slaves.* The world has witnessed the
* See documents in the Richmond Recorder of the 3rd, 6th, and 9th
of April, 1803.

MILDNESS OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY. 141
behaviour of the slaves during the present war ; and
we venture the assertion, that not only nine-tenths of
the slaves would voluntarily fight for their masters
against the Yankees, but that the masters would feel
no hesitation or apprehension in placing arms in the
hands of their slaves for defence, should it be found
necessary. Nor can it be beheved that any similar
population of the same numbers, in any part of the
world, would have remained so faithfully attached to
their superiors, when so many and so constant incen
diary attempts had been made to seduce them from
their loyalty.
A consequence of this patriarchal relation is that
the separation of, the family is rendered incom
parably more difficult, and less seldom among the
negro slaves than among any other labouring class
of the world. A proof of the mildness of the system
of slavery in the Southern States is afforded by the
rapid increase in the number of the slaves; from
330,000, they have become 4,000,000, and when we
take all the circumstances into consideration, it
appears that their rate of increase has been fully
equal to that of the white population. If we look
at the free black population of the North, we shall
find that it falls far behind. According to the
seventh census, the increase of free blacks, from 1840
to 1850, was under 1^ per cent, per annum; while
that of the negro slaves was but a fraction under

142 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
3 per cent, per annum. The same authority shows
that the longevity of the Southern slaves is far
above that of the free negroes of the Northern States;
while there are ' three times as many deaf mutes,
four times as many blind, more than three times
as many idiots, and more than ten times as many
insane, in proportion to numbers, among the free
coloured persons, than among the slaves.' The
same holds good with respect to the free blacks of
Liberia. Few, probably,' will be found to dispute
the assertion that the condition of the negroes under
the beneficent system of American slavery, is in
finitely better than that of their own race in the
land of their origin. Although their intellectual
developement in slavery has been very much ad
vanced, the negroes never lose the characteristics
of their race. But, above all, the moral condition
of the negroes has been improved by the ameliorating
influences of slavery. Though gay, affectionate, and
grateful, they always retain their disposition for
lust, falsehood, and theft; and while many are
consistent Christians, they never lose their super
stitious nature, and can scarcely be made to ap
preciate the immoral nature of certain acts.
It is not unfrequently objected by the opponents
of slavery, that the education of their children is not
left to the slaves. However true this may be in
theory, it does not hold true in the case of the

SLAVE-BREEDING UNKNOWN. 143
African slaves. For, although the master allows
the slave-parents the general management of their
children, his authority is necessary both to give
effect to that of the parents, and to interpose in case
of negligence or cruelty, which are characteristic.
But for this the children would only too often be the
victims of the passion of their parents.
It is not denied that the objection, that marriage
between the slaves is not recognised by law, is better
founded ; still the separation of man and wife is by no
means of such often occurrence as is generally be
lieved in Europe; and it is almost unknown when
both husband and wife are the property of the same
master. Moreover, the general tendency of legisla
tion in the Southern States is to prevent, as far as
possible, the separation of husband and wife, without
injury to the master, by depriving him of the right
to rid himself of an unruly or insubordinate slave.
Prominent among the calumnies against the South
which have unfortunately obtained credence in Eu
rope, is the reproach of 'breeding slaves,' heaped upon
the Southerners by their enemies, the Northern Abo
litionists. We content ourselves here with stigma
tizing this assertion as a malicious calumny; for not
only is 'slave-breeding' entirely unknown in the
South, but no such thing has ever existed except in
the fertile imaginations of the slanderers of the
Southern people.

144 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
At the same time, the enemies of the South urge
that without 'slave-breeding' there would be no
material for the 'internal slave-trade' between the
Southern States. But this is not true; for the in,
ternal slave-trade is limited partly to the sale of
insubordinate slaves to other masters, as a penalty,
which are thereby often rendered obedient and docile;
and partly to emigration. In this case, where land
has become too dear for the small proprietor in
certain sections, he either disposes of his slaves to
employ free labour, or emigrates to a new section,
taking his slaves with him. Indeed, in many States
there are laws prohibiting the introduction of slaves
from other States, unless accompanied by their
masters. The relative increase of the white and slave
populations in certain States, and the corresponding
slow increase of both in certain so-called 'slave*
breeding States,' is a confirmation of this proposition.
On the other hand, what is the effect of slavery
upon the slave-owner ? It follows as a matter of
course that, in so far as the master is not prohibited
by the law, his relation to his slaves is such that he.
may be guilty of inhuman treatment. In another
place we shall see how far the slave is protected
against the arbitrary treatment of the master, Here
it is sufficient to remark that, apart from all legal
restraints, self-interest is as potent to prevent abuse
of the slaves, as of any other kind of property, and

HUMANITY CHARACTERISTIC OF MASTERS. 145
that cruel treatment of slaves finds as little favour
with public opinion as in the eyes of the law. No
character would be less agreeable to a Southerner
than the reputation of inhumanity towards his slaves.
To suppose the contrary, were to assume that the
Southern slave-holders are less civilized than others
of their species in Europe. It is immaterial whether
or not the master is in a position to abuse his slaves,
if he should in passion impose no restraints upon his
actions, when we reflect that in fact the case rarely,
if ever, occurs; for in communities where slavery
does not exist, similar cases constantly occur, as
attested by the criminal returns. In both cases such
unfortunate instances may be considered the result
of accident. But, in truth, the slave-holder, who is
accustomed to govern from his infancy, knows the
necessity of moderation and kindness, in order to
preserve subordination and respect among his slaves ;
and for this reason the slave-holder of the Southern
States is, in an eminent degree, humane and for
bearing. The relation of the slave-holder guarantees him a
purely independent position — allows him leisure
for devoting his time to literature, science, and
poUtics — affords opportunity for improvement of his
tastes — enables him to reap the benefits of elevated
social intercourse — and developes in him a more
acute appreciation of what is noble, while producing
L

146 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
a superior degree of refinement. The spirit of pure
independence, which within proper limits can only
be ennobling, is what essentially distinguishes the
Southerner from the Northerner. The celebrated
statesman, Burke, in speaking of the influence of
slavery upon the Southern people in regard to their
love of liberty, remarked —
' Where this is the case, those who are free are by
far the most proud and jealous of their freedom. I
cannot alter the nature of man. The fact is so ; and
these people of the Southern colonies are much more
strongly, and with a higher and more stubborn
spirit, attached to liberty than those to the North
ward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths,
such were our Gothic ancestors, and such in our day
were the Poles. Such will be all masters of slaves
who are not slaves themselves. In such a people the
haughtiness of domination combines itself with the
spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible.'
When we reflect that the greatest statesmen of
America — as Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Mon
roe, Calhoun, and others — were slave-holders, and
that they were distinguished by their moderation and
mildness, as well as ardent attachment to freedom,
we may well entertain a doubt that the influence of
slavery upon the dominant race in America has
been pernicious; but the question arises, whether
slavery is not rather a school for the developement of

SLAVERY NOT INJURIOUS TO THE WHITES. 147
virtue in the white race? But we have been told
that ' there is no difficulty in tracing the injury in
flicted by the system upon the master, upon the whole
white population, or the sinister shadow which it
casts over the face of society.' And, again, that
' there is an absolute injury sustained by the whole
white community, apparent to any observer, and the
more striking when contrasted with its condition in
the neighbouring free States.' We beg for indul
gence for our presumption, if we choose to challenge
the truth of this sweeping charge. Is the ' injury of
the system' visible in the refinement, intelligence,
energy, courage, self-sacrifice, and perseverance of
eight millions of Southerners, contending for their
independence, under untold sufferings, against a
remorseless, but more numerous enemy? Is it ap
parent in their regard for order, liberty, and the
usages of civilization ? Does this evince any degene
ration ? Or is ' the absolute injury sustained by
the whole white community ' observable in the pro
portionately greater number of colleges, schools, and
churches in the South than in the North ? Or is it
rather to be ' observed ' in the fact that the South has
less than one-fifth as much crime and pauperism, in
proportion to population, as the North ? But, per
haps, as it is not visible in the moral or social condition
of the Southern people, the ' injury of the system '
may be found in its effects upon the agricultural

148 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
products of the country. Let European industry,
supplied by it, furnish the reply. It would seem as
if 'no reasoning, no statistics, no profit, no philo
sophy,' could avail against the '¦instincts' of those
who, while professing to know the condition of the
Southern people, deliberately make such unfounded
statements. We hope that we may be borne with, if, in the
examination of the objections to slavery, our reflec
tions should lead us into some details, otherwise out of
place. No end is heard of the assertion of the Northern
Abolitionists, that one of the results of slavery is the
unchastity of the female slaves, accompanied by a
corresponding want of virtue on the part of the slave
holders. We do not deny that, in so far as the
master abuses his power over his female slaves, to
make them yield to vicious desires, he is responsible
and reprehensible. But we do maintain that the
notorious unchastity of the female slaves is not the
consequence of slavery, but of their natural disposi
tion for lust, which renders force superfluous. Every
well-informed American knows, too, that cases of the
application of force on the part of the master to
seduce his slaves are unheard of, and that no instances
are known of an abuse of power for such a purpose.
The cause for this unchastity of the female slaves
lies deeper : it is to be sought in their natural lewd
ness. Who does not know that the sacred obligations

SLAVERY AS A POLITICAL RELATION. 149
of man and wife are not respected among the slaves
themselves? Still more is this true of their race in
Africa. Indeed, we find a still lower moral condition
among the free negroes of the Northern States, where
marriage between the whites and blacks is either pro
hibited or unknown, than among the slaves, although
neither the scorching sun of the South is there to
develope the passion of lust, nor the ' lascivious slave
holder ' to accomplish his desires by violence. Ac
cording to the United States Census of 1850, of each
100 persons of the free coloured population, there
were in Maine 51, New Hampshire 54, Massachu
setts 34, Connecticut 30, and Rhode Island 24,
mulattoes. In Liberia and Sierra Leone the same
thing is notorious.*
As a political relation, the slavery of the Southern
States is a conservative element in the State. First
of all, the effect of it is to equalize more nearly all
classes of the dominant race. There are certain
kinds of menial labour which are never performed
by the whites, although not slave-holders. Then,
too, the slave owes a certain respect and obedience
to every white person, poor or rich. Consequently
every white man, be he a slave-owner or not, has
the consciousness that he belongs to the superior
race. Hence it is that there is no conflict between
classes in the South. * Bowen, ' Central Africa,' p. 32.

150 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Moreover, there is no conflict between capital and
labour, for the labourer is himself capital. Among
the systems of labour in use in Europe this conflict
is perpetually going on. Brilliant theories have
been devised to remove the ever-present enmity
between these two great forces of human progress;
but all have been of no avail. The difficulty
has as yet been obviated only by slavery.
Again, little attraction is offered for emigration
to the Southern States, for only capitalists, who may
acquire property in slaves, find it to their interests
to emigrate thither. By this means the South has
been protected from the outpourings of the dregs
of European society.
It has been remarked that the situation of the
slave-owner qualifies him, in an eminent degree, for
discharging the duties of a free citizen. His leisure
enables him to cultivate his intellectual powers, and
his condition of independence places him beyond
the reach of demagogues and corruption. In this
way he is preeminently suited for filling the highest
political stations in the Government. Therefore,
such positions are not coveted for the income they
yield, but only out of a patriotic ambition. When
the slave-owner occupies an official position, he
receives the acknowledgement of his fellow-citizens,
who have all the same interests and the same
opinions as himself. Consequently he does not fear

SLAVE AND FREE LABOUR COMPARED. 151
to be subverted by the intrigues of demagogues ; and
political humbug is unknown.
Slavery is, also, a great protection against pauper
ism ; for the labouring class, being slaves, must by
law be supported by their owners.*
Need it be said that it is not in consequence of
slave labour, as asserted by Northern Abolitionists,
that the soil of the South is soon exhausted? The
kind of crops produced, known as ' clean crops,' cause
the soil in the South soon to become impoverished,
unless much attention is paid to enriching it. For
the naked-ploughed soil is exposed to the scorching
southern sun for a considerable part of the year,
which, as every agriculturist is aware, has a most
deleterious effect upon it. This would hold equally
true, whether free or slave labour were employed.
The generally accepted law that free labour is
cheaper than slave labour, finds no application in the
South. There is no doubt that where the labouring
population is very dense, as in certain parts of Europe,
where the free man must work or starve, free labour
is cheaper than any other; for no capital is then
needed to be employed in owning labour. In this
case free labour must and will drive out involuntary
labour. But the question assumes quite a different
* An interesting example is afforded by the Abstract of the Seventh
Census, p. 28, according to which, in 1850, Rhode Island, with 147,545
inhabitants, had 2,560 paupers, while Georgia, with a population of
524,503 free whites, had only 1,036 paupers.

152 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
phase when we attempt to apply the principle to
labour in the South. In the first place, there is no
such abundance of free labour to be had there ;. while
the climate makes it almost throughout impossible
for the white man to work. He cannot support the
damp hot atmosphere and the miasma of the Sa
vannas. Were it, however, possible to acclimatize the
whites in that region, and were a thick white po
pulation to be obtained, such free labour would not
be adapted to the cultivation of the Southern pro
ducts, such as rice, sugar, tobacco, and cotton. A
species of labour is needed for these productions,
which is not liable to be disturbed by ' strikes ' or
accident. It is indispensable to have a system of
organized, regular, and uninterrupted labour, in order
to make the production of rice, sugar, tobacco, and
cotton profitable. If the negro slaves were free, we
know full well from experience that they would not
work without compulsion. As long, therefore, as the
climate of the South remains an insuperable obstacle
in the way of the white man, and as long as no means
can be devised for counteracting the natural indolence
and want of self-respect of the negro, which prefer
theft to industry, involuntary or slave labour must
remain the only possible labour for the South, and,
therefore, the cheapest that can be employed for its
products. The labour of the South is chiefly of a
nature which requires physical strength, endurance,

THE SLAVE ALSO A PERSON. 153
and uniformity, without the capacity for judgement,
as in skilled labour. For such labour the African
slave is alone adapted.

II. Status of the Slaves.
With the Romans, the slave was considered as a
chattel (res). As such the Roman slave was deprived
of the right of personal liberty, and the right of
property. The power of life and death, 'jus vitas
hecisque,' also belonged to the master.
The status of the slave in the Southern States is,
on the contrary, a double one. On the one hand,
the slave is a chattel ; but, on the other, a legal pro
tection has been accorded to him, through the instru
mentality of Christianity and the developement of
human civilization, by which his condition has been
ameliorated materially. The slave is, therefore, by
reason of his thus modified condition, also a person,
and his legal person is by no means so subordinate as
is generally supposed in Europe. Prominent is the
protection accorded to life and to limb.
Throughout all the States where slavery exists,
the homicide of a slave is made by law to be murder.
In the case of the killing of a slave by his master, or
any other person, the slayer incurs the same penalty
as if the slave had been a free white. Consequently,

154 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. '
it appears that there is no difference at all in the
legal protection accorded to the life of a slave and of
a* free citizen. The presumption of mabce, also, holds
in the case of the homicide of a slave, and the rule
with regard to the burden of the proof is identically
the same as in the homicide of free white persons.
It will be evident that this rule of the law must react
with great severity upon the slayer, in cases where
there are no competent witnesses to the deed, as may
most likely occur from the private relation of the
master to his slave, separated from the public view
on his plantation. Although this legal protection
of life and personal security is accorded to the slave,
and becomes thereby a quasi right, his natural con
dition, as owing obedience and subordination, does
not justify him in repelling force by force to the
same extent, as in the case of a freeman. Still the
law in its mercy does justify the slave in using
force to repel force when his life or bmb is endan
gered, even if in defence he slays the aggressor.*
To this extent, then, the rule of the civil law — ' vim
vi defendere, omnes leges omniaque jura permittunt'
— is applicable to slaves.
The slave enjoys the protection of the law not only
with reference to life, but also against violent and

* The State v. Will, a negro, 1 Dev. and Bat. 121-165 — a celebrated
case, decided by Judge Gaston ; the case decided by Judge Thatcher ;
and others cited by Cobb, vol. i. p. 94.

CRUELTY TO SLAVES PUNISHABLE BY LAW. 155
cruel treatment. The decision of what constitutes
cruelty must, in many instances, be left to the de
cision of the jury. ' The general principle would be,
that the master's right to enforce obedience and sub
ordination on the part of the slave, should, as far as
possible, remain intact. Whatever goes beyond this,
and from mere wantonness or revenge inflicts pain and
suffering, especially unusual and inhuman punish
ments, is cruelty, and should be punished as such.
And though the statute creating the offence specifies
particular acts of cruelty, yet it has been held, that
other acts of cruelty, though of a minor grade than
those specified, were indictable under the general
description of cruel punishments.' *
It is also held that, where a slave is unduly excited
by the cruel treatment of his master, this circum
stance is sufficient to extenuate the offence com
mitted under the provocation; and if a homicide
be committed under these circumstances, the pro
vocation serves as a rebuttal of the presumption of
malice, f
Legal counsel is afforded the slave in all cases
where he is accused. The laws of many States
make it the duty of the Court, ipso jure, to appoint
counsel for the accused slave; in many others the
master is required to provide counsel, where he is
* Cobb, p. 98 ; and the cases there cited.
f Ibidem.

156 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
not a party ; and, this failing, it is made incumbent
on the Court. Here the slave is regarded as a ward
of the Court.
Having found that the slave is protected as to his
life and personal security, it remains to be seen how
far the third great right of a free citizen under the
Common Law — the right of personal liberty — is
affected by the condition of slavery. Herein is
visible the great inferiority of the slave to the free
man. This is what constitutes him a slave; he has
no liberty but that allowed him by his master.
Without this quality he would, in fact, cease to be a
slave. But while admitting this fact, it must not
be forgotten that the slave does enjoy a certain
amount of liberty in the leisure granted to him
during the Sabbath, the holidays, and the night.
When his day's labour is over, the negro slave is
free to enjoy himself in any legitimate way he may
choose, there being no cares for the morrow to
impair his pleasures. In fact, the slave does in this
way enjoy as much, or more., real liberty than the
free white labourer of the same class in Europe. It
is hardly necessary to observe that the master has
a legal right to capture his fugitive slave at any
time, and wherever he may find him. This right is
not subject to the prescription of time.
As to the nature of the punishments inflicted
upon slaves convicted of offences, it may be remarked

OF OFFENCES COMMITTED BY SLAVES. 157
that, as the slave, from his nature, cannot be reached
by the ordinary penalties of fine and imprisonment,
having neither property nor Hberty of which he
may be deprived, his body offers the only means of
inflicting punishment. Consequently all offences are
made to fall under two categories, — capital offences
and offences punishable by whipping.* The opera
tion of this principle is to make the punishment for
many offences much lighter, while, on the other
hand, some offences are punished with more rigour
than in the case of free citizens. The policy of the
law makes this often necessary, and it is exemplified
in the fact that rape of a white female, arson in
towns, attempts to poison, and insurrection, are made
capital crimes. Investigation will show, however,
that the relation of the master to his slaves, by
giving him a certain police authority over them,
is most beneficent to the negro race. Crime is
prevented more effectually, and the rigours of the
law are made to press less heavily upon the slave,
than in the case of free negroes, while the general
benefit accruing to society is incalculable.
With regard to the jurisdiction of the Courts over
crime, it is provided by law that the highest Circuit
Courts are alone competent to take cognizance of
the acts of slaves accused of capital crimes ; while the
* The exceptions to this rule are Virginia and Maryland, which have
laws inflicting transportation for certain offences committed by slaves.

158 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
accused must have a fair trial by a jury ; in which
case the procedure is identical as in the trial of free
citizens, with the single exception that negroes — free
and slave — are competent witnesses for or against
slaves. The good character of an accused slave
may also be offered in evidence, and works a rebuttal
of the presumption of guilt ; but his bad character
cannot be taken into consideration, except in the
same cases as with free white. Less value must also
be attached to the confessions of a slave tending to
incriminate himself, because of his habits of obedience.
Although the master is entitled to claim obedience
and subordination from his slave, he dare not kill or
maim him to enforce them. But in all the States
the infliction of moderate corporal punishment is
placed in the power and discretion of the master.
Insubordination, insurrection, and rebellion, are
crimes which are punished by the State.
As a consequence of the inferior position of the
slave as a person, there are, necessarily, many dis
abilities attaching to his condition. One of the prin
cipal of these is the incapacity to be a witness. This
is not, however, absolute, as the slave is capable of
giving evidence, both for and against other slaves
and free negroes. Still, under no circumstances can
a slave be a witness for or against a white person
in any Southern States ; and this right on principle.
It is not difficult to understand that the time-

THE SLAVE AS A WITNESS. 159
honoured maxim, requiring a witness to be a free
man, ' liber et legalis homo,' acquires increased force
when it is a question of conferring the privilege of
testifying upon a race, held in subjection, accustomed
to obedience, and notorious for its mendacity. That
making the negro ' othesworth ' would be most un
fortunate for the race, as well as for the masters, is
conceded by even the most uncompromising enemies
of slavery,* on account of ' the general presumption
against his moral character, more especially in the
article of veracity.' f The same rule incapacitating
slaves for testifying where free whites are concerned,
is not bruited to the Southern States, but holds in
every State of the old American Union. J Again,
in several of the Northern States this abridgement
of the credibility of slaves as witnesses has been
extended to both free-born and emancipated negroes.
So we find that in Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Ohio,
no person of the negro race can be a witness for or
against whites, but only in the case where slaves or
free negroes are parties.
The slave cannot, by law, acquire property: all
that he gains becomes the property of his master.
The rule with respect to villains in England formerly,
' quicquid acquiritur servo acquiritur domino,' § as
* Stephen, on West Ind. Slavery, vol. i. p. 177.
| Ibidem.
I See Case of Winn. Adm., &c, versus Jones, 6 Leigh, 74.
§ Co. Litt. Lib. ii. § 172.

160 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
announced by my Lord Coke, holds with regard to
the slaves in the Southern States. Nevertheless, a
'peculium ex gratia domini' is allowed in all the States,
and, exceptionally, by statute in Louisiana. And no
master would ever think of depriving his slave of
any property gained by labour in his leisure hours,
or acquired by accident or gift. To do this would
be sufficient to exclude such a master from good
society wherever it should be known. In many
ways the slaves do acquire considerable means for
extra comfort, as it is the custom to permit them
to cultivate a part of the soil for their own be
nefit during their leisure hours. The products of
such labour are sold with the crops of the master, or
paid for by him, and the proceeds given to the slaves
for their individual use. Custom, in this way, allows
the slave the actual enjoyment of that which he
cannot claim by law.
Furthermore, the slave is incapacitated to con
tract; and contracts when made with slaves cannot
be enforced. The Roman slave also laboured under
the same disability; but there was this slight dif
ference — that contracts made by the Roman slave
could be enforced to the extent of his peculium, and
after manumission he could demand the fulfilment
of engagements entered into during his former
servitude. A consequence of the disability of slaves to contract

THE SLAVE CANNOT CONTRACT. 161
is their inability to contract marriage at law. But
still there exists a state of matrimony, which is
solemnized by the church, and considered as binding
between the parties. It is a kind of contubernium,
which is mercifully recognised by the law in cases of
offences between parents and children, so far as it
is a question of the motive. It results from this
contubernial relation that the laws of several States
absolutely forbid the separation of slave-parents and
children; — and the general tendency of legislation in
the South is to prevent, as far as possible, the sepa
ration of families.
The slave may act as the agent of his master with
his authorization, in which case the master is respon
sible for his acts. In only a few cases do exceptions
to this rule occur, where it would be impolitic to
place the slaves in a position to inflict injury upon
others. It follows, also, from the incapacity of a slave to
contract and acquire property, that he cannot be a
party to a suit in a Court of Law. There is one ex
ception only — the suit for freedom, actio de liberali
caussa — which may be brought by a slave, who is free,
but unlawfully deprived of his freedom. This action
is purely personal, and cannot, therefore, be instituted
by anyone else than the slave interested ; it is not
subject to the 'limitation of actions;' and even
in case that the slave entitled to freedom allows
M

162 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
himself to be sold without making mention of the
fact, this cannot bar his right to bring the action at
any future time.
We have attempted above to give a brief idea of
the protection thrown around the slave by the law,
as well as of his disabilities. No effort has been
made to depict the condition of the slave in the
Southern States as better than it is ; and while ad
mitting the duty of the Southern people to direct
legislation so as to avoid, the most possible, any
abuses that might arise from accidental circum
stances, we maintain that the condition of the slave
is at present far from being oppressive, and that
servitude in the South is free from the greater evils
attaching to other systems of slavery with which we
are acquainted.

III. Manumission and Emancipation.
The manumission of slaves in America is almost
coeval with the introduction of slavery upon that
continent. Individual cases of it have always been
allowed, and there have never been wanting persons
to bestow the gift of liberty on their slaves. Too
frequently has the right to manumit been abused
in America ; and this has resulted in the enactment
of laws in certain States, by which restraints are

RESTRICTIONS UPON MANUMISSION. 163
placed upon it. Obviously it is contrary to the
public policy to permit a numerous class of indolent
and vicious persons to be cast as a burden upon the
State. To prevent such a deplorable result, re
strictions have, very properly, in some States been
imposed upon the right of manumission. Among
these is the enactment, that liberated slaves be
required to quit the State. It has also very wisely
been forbidden to free the aged, young, decrepit,
and sick, who would be unable to provide for them
selves, and thus become a burden and expense to
the Commonwealth ; and the obligation to care for
such slaves is made incumbent upon the master.
Consequently, in some instances, a certain age is
fixed by law, before and after which manumission
shall not be permitted. On the other hand, the
master has not the right, under any circumstances,
to free his slaves with intent to defraud his cre
ditors. With the exception of these restrictions,
there is no impediment to manumission of the slaves
in the Southern States.
The forms to be observed in liberating slaves
are not unnecessarily strict. Manumission may be
effected in presenti, in futuro, by parol, by writing,
and by inference. In some States, however, it is
not allowed to free slaves by testament directly,
as in Alabama, Maryland, and Mississippi; but even
here it may be accomplished indirectly when the

164 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
testator imposes it upon his executor testamenti in
his wilL
It must not, however, be supposed that the slave,
in becoming free, thereby acquires the rights of a
citizen. With the exception of a few Northern
States, the free negro nowhere enjoys the privilege
of citizenship ; and, as was decided in the Dred Scott
case,* the negro cannot become a citizen of the
United States. Ln the Southern States the con
dition of the free negroes is not very different from
that of the dedititii among the citizens of Rome; they
are under the supervision of the police, are not
allowed to bear arms, and, from considerations of
public policy, are not permitted to hold property
in slaves. The free negro must also have a prochein
ami or patronus in the South, who contracts for him.
The amalgamation of whites with blacks operates
to disqualify the issue for the rights of free citizens
in the entire South and in many Northern States.
One of the most interesting and instructive fields
for investigation is furnished by the examination of
the influence of liberty upon the race of African
negroes. Experiments have been made in the Northern
States, where slavery was abolished years ago, in the
West Indies and in Africa. The results in the Northern
States, as stated by Northern men, and confirmed
by the census returns, are furnished by Cobb in his
* Seott versus Sanford, 19. Howard, S. C. 1.

RESULTS OF NORTHERN EMANCLPATION. 165"
excellent work, to which reference has already been
made. We extract the following:* —
' The number of negroes emancipated in the United
States were comparatively small, but the effects do
not vary materially, as to their condition, from those
already noticed. The fact of their limited number,
as well as the additional facts, that previous to their
emancipation they were employed but little in agri
cultural pursuits, and that the nature of the agri
culture of the Northern States of the Union was illy
suited to this species of labour, protected the pros
perity of those States from the depressing influences
experienced elsewhere from the abolition of slavery.
That their physical condition does not compare
favourably with that of the slaves of the South, is
evident from the decennial census of the United
States, showing a much larger increase in the latter
than in the former. No surer test can be applied.
' In order to obtain accurate information, I sent a
circular to the Governors and leading politicians of
the non-slaveholding States. I received answers as
follows : —
' Maine, Hon. I. J. D. Fuller.
' Vermont, Hon. J. Meacham.
' Connecticut, Gov. Pond, and Hon. 0. S. Seymour.
' Rhode Island, Hon. B. B. Thurston.
' New Jersey, Gov. Foot.
* Cobb. ch. xv. p. cci. et seq.

166 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
iNew York, Hon. S. G. Haven.
1 Pennsylvania, Hon. E. D. Ingraham.
* Indiana, Gov. Wright.
'Illinois, Gov. Matteson, Hon. W. A. Richardson.
'Iowa, Judge Mason, Hon. Mr. Hern.
'Michigan, Gov. Parsons.'
A. With Reference to the Physical Condition.
Maine. — ' The' condition of the negro population
varies ; but is very far below the whites.'
Vermont. — ' Their condition and character have
great varieties. They are not in as good a condition
as the whites.'
Connecticut. — Gov. Pond says ; ' The condition of
the negro population, as a class, is not thrifty, and
does not compare favourably with the whites. There
are many, comparatively speaking, who are indus
trious.' Rhode Island. — i They are, generally, industrious
and frugal.'
New Jersey  ' Their condition is debased ; with
few exceptions very poor; generally indolent.'
New York  ' The condition of the negro is diver
sified, — some prosperous, some industrious. They
have no social relations with the whites. Generally
on about the same level that whites would occupy
with like antecedent.'

ft:
RESULTS OF NORTHERN EMANCIPATION. 167
Pennsylvania  ' I deem the condition of the
negro population in this State to be that of a de
graded class, much deteriorated by freedom. They
are not industrious.'
Indiana — ' They are not prosperous. The ma
jority of them are not doing well. We have sent
off thirty or forty this year to Liberia, and hope to
send off one hundred or more, next year, and finally to
get rid of all we have in the State, and do not intend
to have another negro or mulatto come into the State.'
Illinois. — ' As a class, they are thriftless and idle.
Their condition far inferior to that of the whites.'
(Gov.) ' About the towns and cities, idle and disso
lute, with exceptions. In the rural districts, many
are industrious and prosperous.' (H. Richardson.)
Iowa  ' Very few negroes in Iowa. Far above the
condition of those met with in our Eastern cities.'
Michigan — 'Tolerably prosperous. Far behind
the white population.'
B. With Reference to the Intellectual Condition.
Maine. — ' Admitted into the public schools with
the whites. Very far below them in education.'
Vermont. — ' Generally able to read and write ;
a few are Hberally educated; not like the whites.'
Connecticut  : ' Fall much below the whites in
education.'

168 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Rhode Island. — ' Some are educated in the district
schools. Compare well with the whites of their
condition.' New Jersey. — ' Generally ignorant. Far below
the whites in intelligence.'
New York. — 'Generally very poorly, or but
little educated.'
Pennsylvania. — ' Not educated. It is remarkable
that almost all the decent and respectable negroes we
have, have been household slaves in some Southern
State.' Indiana. — ' Not educated.'
Illinois. — ' Ignorant.' ( Gov. )
Michigan. — ' Not generally educated. Far below
the whites.' C. With Reference to the Moral Condition.
Maine. — ' Far below the whites.'
Vermont. — ' Not as good as the whites.'
Connecticut  ' Does not compare favourably with
the whites.' (Gov.) ' They are, with us, an infe
rior caste; and in morahty fall much below the
whites.' (Seymour.)
New Jersey  ' Immoral ; vicious animal propensi
ties ; drunkenness, theft, and promiscuous sexual in
tercourse quite common. One-fourth of the criminals
in the State prison are coloured persons ; while they
constitute only one twenty-fifth of the population.'

EMANCIPATION IN THE NORTH. 169
New York. — 'Diversified; some moral.'
Pennsylvania. — 'Immoral. I am satisfied, from
forty years' attention to the subject, that the removal
of the wholesome restraint of slavery, and the conse
quent absence of the stimulus of the coercion to
labour of that condition, have materially affected
their condition for the worse. They exhibit all the
characteristics of an inferior race, to whose personal
comfort, happiness, and morality, the supervision,
restraint, and coercion of a superior race seem abso
lutely necessary.'
Indiana  ' In many instances very immoral.'
Illinois. — ' Thriftless, idle, ignorant, and vicious.'
(Gov.) 'In towns and cities dissolute, with excep
tions.' (Richardson.)
Iowa. — ' Of a fair character.'
Michigan. — ' Tolerably moral. Far below the
whites.' ' Notwithstanding the very laboured efforts made
for their intellectual improvement, taken as a body,
they have made no advancement. Averse to physical
labour, they are equally averse to intellectual effort.
The young negro acquires readily the first rudiments
of education, where memory and imitation are chiefly
brought into action, but for any higher effort of
reason and judgement he is, as a general rule, utterly
incapable. ' His moral condition compares unfavorably with

170 THE. SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
that of the slave of the South. He seeks the cities
and towns, and indulges freely in those vices to
which his nature inclines him. His friends inveigh
against " the prejudice of colour," but he rises no
higher in Mexico, Central America, New Grenada,
or Brazil, where no such prejudice exists. The
cause lies deeper : in the nature and constitution of
the negro race.
' The emancipated negroes do not enjoy full and
equal civil and pobtical rights in any State in the
Union, except the State of Vermont. In several of
the States they are not permitted to vote,* in some
under peculiar restrictions. f In almost every State
where the matter has been made a subject of legis
lation, inter-marriages with the whites are for
bidden.;}; In none are such marriages at all com
mon. § In many they are forbidden to serve as jurors,
or to be sworn as witnesses against a white person,||
or hold any elective office.^[
' The criminal statistics of the slaveholding and
non-slaveholding States show that the proportion of

* Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa,
Michigan. \ New York.
I Maine, Rhode Island, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan.
§ Connecticut. — Issue cannot vote. New Jersey.— No legislation, and
no cases of such marriage. New York. — Issue considered as blacks.
Pennsylvania. — Issue considered as blacks. Iowa. — No such cases.
|| Connecticut, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa.
^] Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan.

EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF EMANCIPATION. 171
crime committed by negroes in the former does not
reach the ratio of this population as compared with
the whites,* while in the latter the ratio is much
greater. The same is true of the statistics of mor
tality and disease. The apparent disproportion in
the former case is greater than the truth, as many
petty crimes by slaves do not reach the courts;
and in the latter, it may be truly said that the
Southern climate is more favourable to the health
and longevity of the negro. But making due allow
ances in both cases for these causes, it is still true,
that the negroes are less addicted to crime, and more
healthy and long-lived, in a state of slavery than of
freedom.' f
In spite of the skill of the British philanthropists,
all efforts to save the free negroes in the West Indies
have proved vain; Jamaica and the other English
islands are retrograding at a pace that astonishes
even the enemies of slavery. Hayti affords a picture
of barbarism already attained ; while little more can
be said in favour of Mexico. Liberia and Sierra
* Judge Starnes, of Georgia, published several articles, giving statistics
on this point, worthy of a more lasting existence than derived from the
columns of a newspaper.
¦j" In giving my conclusions as to the free negroes of the North, I have
relied on numberless authorities, combined with personal observation. I
subjoin only a few : Paulding, on Slavery ; ' Abolition, a Sedition,' by
a Northern Man ; Bishop Hopkins's ' American Citizen,' p. 135 ; ' Sea
board Slave States,' p. 125 ; 'Reports of American Colonization Society ;'
' Report of Naval Committee of House of Representatives on Establishing
a Line of Mail Steamers to Liberia' (1850) ; ' Negromania,' by John
Campbell : being a Collection of Papers by distinguished men.

172 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE;
Leone corroborate the conclusions at which we have
arrived in regard to the African negroes in the New
World. And the history of the race in Africa con
firms the experience of modern times. This has been
expressed most briefly by a distinguished French
authority as follows : — ' Ni les sciences de l'Egypte,
ni la puissance commerciale. de Carthage, ni la domi
nation des Romains en Afrique, n'ont pu faire pen£-
trer chez eux la civilisation.' *
On the other hand, it seems well established that
the negro approaches more nearly a state of civili
zation, experiences the greatest happiness, and attains
the highest degree of developement of which his nature
is susceptible, in a state of bondage. And, though
the race may be thus elevated to a semi-civilization
while in a state of slavery, as soon as it is eman
cipated, it commences instantly to relapse in that
hopeless barbarism from which the superior race had
raised it. Charles Hamilton Smith, an Englishman,
says of them, ' They have never comprehended what
they have learned, nor retained a civilization taught
them by contact with more refined nations, as soon
as that contact had ceased.' f Again, Carlyle, in
addressing himself to the emancipated slaves of the
West Indies, gives an excellent common-sense view

* Levavasseur, ' Esclavage de la Race Noire,' p. 77.
t Charles H. Smith, * Natural History of Human Species : its Typical
Forms,' &c, p. 196.

OBSTACLES TO EMANCIPATION IN THE SOUTH. 173
of the question. He says, ' You are not slaves now !
Nor do I wish, if it can be avoided, to see you slaves
again ; but decidedly, you will have to be servants to
those that are born wiser than you, that are born
lords of you ; servants to the whites if they are (as
what mortal man can doubt they are?) born wiser
than you. That you may depend on it, my obscure
black friends, is and was always the law of the world
for you and for all men to be servants, the more
foolish of us to the more wise  Heaven's
laws are not repealable by earth, however earth may
try.'* With history and experience to enlighten us,
no room seems left to doubt the baneful influence of
liberty upon the negroes, whether it be in their own
Africa, or in the midst of the white race.
From the moment of the breaking out of the war,
the question of the emancipation of the slaves in the
Southern States has not ceased to be agitated. For
the Southerners, and for Europeans too, this question
has a practical side. First of all, the enquiry pre
sents itself, Is a general emancipation possible ? No
reasonable person will contend that under any cir
cumstances emancipation could be advocated, without
indemnification for the parties interested. The first
insurmountable obstacle, then, to be encountered is
the amount of property represented by the slaves.
The number of these is about 4,000,000 ; and if we
* Letter on Rights of Negroes.

174 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
calculate their average value at 125?. per head, a low
estimate before the commencement of the war, we
shall find their total worth to be 500,000,000?. Now
Mr. Lincoln has proposed to Congress to pass a law
for the indemnification of slave-holders in those
States that might be disposed to abolish slavery.
But if it could be supposed that the Southern States,
intimidated by Lincoln's proclamation of emancipa
tion, should suddenly become ' loyal ' to the Union,
and then determine to abolish slavery, how would it
be possible for Congress to obtain any considerable
part of the sum of 500,000,000?., in view of the fact
that the Federal Government is already almost a
declared bankrupt ? Can the idea be entertained for
a moment that the Northern people would impose a
tax upon themselves, necessary to raise this amount,
out of love for the negroes ? The manner in which
the free negro is treated in the North will furnish
the best reply.
Should slave labour be abolished in the South,
the landed property that would thereby become
valueless or unprofitable may be estimated at quite
half of the value of the slaves. Thus we should have
for the entire immediate interests, which would be
ruined by emancipation, the respectable amount of
750,000,000?.— a sum just 37i times as large as that
paid by England for emancipating her slaves in the
West Indies.

OBSTACLES TO EMANCIPATION IN THE SOUTH. 175
Another point for consideration is the probable
effect of emancipation upon the industry, commerce,
and prosperity of the world. The influence of slave
labour for the advancement of the civilization and
prosperity of the world has been incalculable. The
universal suffering that has already resulted from
the interruption of the supply of the products of
slave labour, during the present war, may serve as
a slight indication of that general misery which
would be felt throughout the civilized world, and
nowhere more than in England, should these pro
ducts be cut off permanently, by the destruction of
the organized system of labour in the Southern
States. The third and not least important point to be
examined is the condition of the 4,000,000 of slaves,
after emancipation. Amalgamation is out of the
question; for not only does the ineradicable an
tipathy of the white race in America for the negro
place this result beyond the possibility of ac
complishment, but, if practicable, it would be only
a scheme for degrading our nature to the lowest
point of barbarism. Rejecting this idea of a mixture
of the races, we should find that emancipation would
not obtain social or political equality for the negroes.
Never will the Southern people consent to accord
these to a race so far beneath themselves in the scale
of human developement. Thus there would be a

176 THE SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
class in the State, neither citizens nor slaves, which
would not labour without compulsion, and soon
would commence a conflict of races and of classes,
that would terminate only in the extermination of
one or the other. Can any one doubt which side
would be victorious ? Are the philanthropists willing
and prepared to accomplish the liberation of the
negro slaves at the price of the annihilation of their
race in America? Is, indeed, the benefit worthy of
the sacrifice ? Can any reasonable man, then, he
sitate to oppose general emancipation, as being im
practicable and unwise? From the foregoing con
siderations we think ourselves justified in asserting
that a general emancipation of the 4,000,000 of
slaves in the Southern States is not only impossible,
but would be the greatest misfortune for the slaves
themselves, and an incalculable evil for mankind in
general. Should, however, slave labour in the South cease
to be the most profitable, or should the products of
the South become unnecessary to the civilized world,
or should the slaves be changed, either by a miracle
or by the influence of slavery, so as to become capable
of enjoying liberty, slavery will disappear of itself.
All history teaches us that no people have ever been
retained permanently in bondage, if they were fit for
freedom. Until, therefore, these results shall be
accomplished, slavery will remain a benefit to the

MISCONCEPTION OF SOUTHERN POLICY. , 177
slaves, a necessity for the human race, and the inhe
ritance of the Southerners. If slavery is ever to be
abolished in the South, the future will provide the
means at the proper time.
In conclusion, it is to be regretted that the impres
sion has been produced in Europe, that the Confederate
States would be willing to enter into an engagement
with the powers of Europe in relation to slavery, as
the price of recognition. For what are the people of
the Confederate States making such sacrifices, and
submitting to such sufferings at present? What is
the object of the war, if not to vindicate the right to
govern themselves as they think proper? They may
not 'desire a state of permanent conflict with the
opinions of all the great civilized powers,' but it is
simply absurd to suppose that they would carry on such
a war, in order to make a surrender of their inde
pendence, as soon as achieved, by submitting to any
dictation whatever from foreign powers in relation to
their municipal regulations.

LONDON
J TED BY SPOTTISWOODE
N E1V-STREFT 5QOATCT