Gift of
Prof. Charles H. Smith
1910

THE

OUTBEEAK OF EEBELLIOX

CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.— I.

THE OUTBEEAK

EE BELLI O.N

sows G, NICOLAY
PRIVATE 8ECBETABY TO PBE6IDENT IjINCOUT

NEW YORK
CHAELES SORIBNEE'S SONS
743 AND 745 Bkoadwat
1881

COPTBIGHT BT
CHABLES SCEIBNEB'S SONS
1881

Trow's
Printing and Bookbinding Company
SOI-213 East llth Street
NEW YORK

PEEFAOE.

Upon urgent and repeated request from the publishers,
the author consented to lay aside temporarily a larger and
more important literary task, to write for them tMs initial
volume of the "Campaigns of the CivU War." Personal
observation and long previous investigation had furnished
him, a great variety of new material for the work ; and this
was opportunely supplemented by the recent publication of
the Official War Kecords for 1861, both Union and Confed-
erate, opening to comparison and use an immense mass of
historical data, and furnishing the definite means of verify
ing or correcting the statements of previous writers.
Under these advantages the author has written the pres
ent volume, basing his work on materials of unquestioned
authenticity — books, documents, and manuscripts — and, in
deed, for the greater part, on official public records. His
effort has been a conscientious and painstaking one, making
historical accuracy his constant aim. If, unfortunately, he
has committed any errors, he hopes they may prove' only

vi PREFACE.
such as from the meagreness or conflicting nature of the
evidence any one might fall into. He would gladly have
appended to his pages full references and citations, but want
of space absolutely forbade.
So many kind friends have encouraged and aided him,
that he finds it impossible to acknowledge their services in
detail, and therefore takes this occasion to retum to one and
all his sincere thanks. Govemment officials, especially, of
all grades, have with uniform courtesy afforded him every
facility in their power. Without free access to the various
departments and archives — and, above all, to the vast histori
cal treasures of the Library of Congress — it would have been
exceedingly difficult to gather and verify the numerous facts,
quotations, names, and dates, which his narrative required,
Washington, B.C.,
February 26, 1881.

COK"TEE^TS.

chapter i. page
Secession,  1
CHAPTER II.
Charleston Hakbok,  17
CHAPTER III.
The Confederate States' Rebellion, . . . .39
CHAPTER IV.
Lincoln,  , . . , 45
CHAPTER V.
Sumter,  56
CHAPTER VI.
The Call to Arms,  69
CHAPTER VII.
Baltimore,  ; . . 82
CHAPTER VIII.
WASHINaTON  91
CHAPTER IX,
Ellsworth  105

viii ¦ CONTENTS.
CHAPTER X. PAGE
Missouri,  115
CHAPTER XI.
Kentucky,  136
CHAPTER XII.
West Virginia,  137
CHAPTER XIII.
Patterson's Campaign,  155
CHAPTER XIV.
Manassas,  169
CHAPTER XV.
Bull Run,  181
CHAPTER XVI.
The Retreat,  •. . . . 197
CHAPTER XVII.
Conclusion,  206

LIST OF MAPS.

FAGB
Charleston Harbor, 31
Route of the Massachusetts Sixth through Balti
more, 85
Routes op Approach to Washington, 98
Field of the West Virginia Battles, 14'8
Patterson's Campaign, 159
Bull Run— The Field of Strategy, 177
Bull Run — Battle of the Forenoon, 184
Bull Run— Battle op the Afternoon, 189

THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.

CHAPTER L
SECESSION.
The fifth day of October, 1860, is the initial point of the
American Eebellion. Its conception, animus, and probably
its plans, lay much farther' back. It had been seriously
proposed once or twice before, but it was then that its for
mal organization was begun. On that day Govemor Gist,
of South Carolina, wrote a confidential circular letter, which
he despatched by the hand of a special messenger, to the
governors of what were commonly designated the Cotton
States. In this letter he asked an interchange of opinions
which he might be at liberty to submit to a consultation of
leading men of South Carolina. He said South Carolina
would unquestionably call a convention as soon as it was
ascertained that a majority of Lincoln electors were chosen
in the then pending presidential election. "If a single
State secedes," he said, " she will follow her. If no other
State takes the lead, South Carolina will secede (in my opin
ion) alone, if she has any assurance that she will be soon
followed by another or other States ; otherwise it is doubt
ful." He asked information, and advised concerted action.
North Carolina was first to respond. The people would
1

2 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
not, so wrote the govemor under date of October 18th, con-
sider Lincoln's election a sufficient cause for disunion, and
the Legislature would probably not call a convention. The
Govemor of Alabama, under date of October 25th, thought
Alabama would not secede alone, but would secede in co
operation with two or more States. The Govemor of Mis
sissippi, under date of October 26th, wrote : "If any State
moves, I think Mississippi will go with her." On the same
day the Govemor of Louisiana answered : " I shall not advise
the secession of my State, and I will add that I do not think
the people of Louisiana wiU ultimately decide in favor of
that course." The Govemor of Georgia, under date of Octo
ber 31st, advocated retaliatory legislation, and ventured his
opinion that the people of Georgia would wait for some
overt act. Florida alone responded with anything like en
thusiasm, but only after the lapse of a month. Her gover
nor said that Florida was " ready to wheel into line with the
gallant Palmetto State, or any other Cotton State or States,"
and thought she would unquestionably call a convention.
The discouraging tone of these answers establishes, beyond
controversy, that, excepting in South Carolina, the rebellion
was not in any sense a popular revolution, but was a con
spiracy among the prominent local office-holders and politi
cians, which the people neither expected nor desired, and
which they were made eventually to justify and uphold by
the usual arts and expedients of conspiracy.
Directly and indirectly, the South had practicaUy con
trolled the govemment during its whole existence. Excited
to ambition by this success, she sought to perpetuate that
control, The extension of slavery and the creation of addi
tional Slave States was a necessary step in the scheme, and
became the well-defined single issue in the presidential elec
tion. But in this contest the South for the first time met

SECESSION. 3
overwhelming defeat. The choice of Lincoln was a conclu
sive and final decision, in legal form and by constitutional
majorities, that slavery should not be extended ; and the
popular vote of 1860 transferred the balance of power irre
vocably to the'Free States,
In the political discussions throughout this presidential
campaign, as well as in preceding years, the South had made
free and loud use of two leading arguments, always with
telling effect : the first, to intimidate the North, was the
threat of disunion ; the second, to " fire the Southem heart,"
was the entirely unfounded alarm-cry that the North, if suc
cessful, would not merely exclude slavery from federal terri
tories, but would also destroy slavery in the Slave States.
The unthinking masses of the South accepted both these
arguments in their literal sense ; and Southern public opin
ion, excited and suspicious, became congenial soil in which
the intended revolt easily took root.
The State of South Carolina, in addition, had been little
else than a school of treason for thirty years. She was,
moreover, peculiarly adapted to become the hotbed of con
spiracy by the fact that of all the States she was least re
publican in both the character of her people and the form
of her institutions. She was exclusive, aristocratic, reaction
ary ; had a narrow distrust of popular participation in gov
emment, and longed for the distinctions of caste and privi
lege in society.
It would seem that, before the governors' replies were all
received, the consultation or caucus for which they were
solicited was held, and the programme of insurrection agreed
upon. Circumstances rendered a special session of the
South Carolina Legislature necessary. The election was
held during the month of October. Local fanaticism toler
ated no opposition party in the State, and under the manipu-

4 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
lation of the conspirators the prevailing question was, who
was the most zealous "resistance" candidate. To a legis
lature elected from this kind of material, Govemor Gist, on
November 5th, sent a defiant, revolutionary message — the
first official notice and proclamation of insurrection. He
declared that "our institutions" were in danger from the
hostility of the " fixed majorities '' of the North ; and recom
mended the caUing of a State convention, and the purchase
of arms and material of war.
A lingering doubt about the result of the presidential
contest appears in the formal choice by the Legislature, of
electors who would vote for Breckenridge and Lane. But
that doubt was short-lived. The morning of November 7th
brought the certain news of the election of Lincoln and
Hamlin on the previous day, and the rejoicings which
would have been uttered over their defeat became jubUa-
tions that their success offered the long-coveted pretext for
disunion. From this time forth everything was managed to swell the
revolutionary furor. The Legislature immediately ordered
a convention, made appropriations, passed miUtary bills.
The federal office-holders, with much public flourish of their
patriotic sacrifice, resigned their offices. Military companies
enroUed themselves in the city; organizations of minute-
men sprang up in the rural neighborhoods. DriUs, parades,
meetings, bonflres, secession harangues, secession cockades,
palmetto flags, purchase of fire-arms and powder, singing
of the Marseillaise — there is not room to enumerate the fol
lies to which the general populace, especially of Charleston,
devoted their days and nights. There was universal satis
faction : to the conspirators, because their schemes were
progressing; to the rabble, because it had a continuou.s
holiday.

SECESSION. 5
Amid unflagging excitement of this character, which re
ceived a daily stimulus from similar proceedings beginning
and growing in other Cotton States, November and the first
half of December passed away. Meanwhile a new govemor,
Francis W. Pickens, a revolutionist of a yet more radical
type than his predecessor, was chosen by the Legislature
and inaugurated, and the members of the Convention au
thorized by the Legislature were chosen at an election held
on December 6th. The South CaroUna Convention met at
Columbia, the capital of the State, according to appoint
ment, on December 17, 1860, but, on account of a local epi
demic, at once adjoumed to Charleston. That body was,
like the Legislature, the immediate outgrowth of the cur
rent conspiracy, and doubtless counted many of the conspira
tors among its members. It therefore needed no time to
make up its mind. On the fourth day of its term it passed
unanimously what it caUed an Ordinance of Secession, in
the following words :
"We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention
assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and or
dained, that the ordinance adopted by na in convention on the 23d
day of May, in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the Constitution of
the United States of Amerioa was ratified, and also all Acts and parts
of Acts of the General Assembly of this State ratifying amendments
of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed; and that the Union
now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the
name of the United States of America, is hereby dissolved."
Conscious that this document bore upon its face the plain
contradiction of their pretended authority, and its own pal
pable nuUity both in technical form and essential principle,
the convention undertook to give it strength and plausi
biUty by an elaborate Declaration of Causes, adopted a few
days later (December 24th) — a sort of half -parody of Jeffer-

6 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION..
son's masterpiece. It could, of course, quote no direct
warrant from the Constitution for secession, but sought to
deduce one, by implication, from the language of the Decla
ration of Independence and the Xth Amendment. It re
asserts the absurd paradox of State supremacy — persistently
miscaUed " State Eights " — which reverses the natural order
of governmental existence ; considers a State superior to the
Union ; makes a part greater than the whole ; turns the
pyramid of authority on its apex ; plants the tree of Uberty
with its branches in the ground and its roots in the air.
The fallacy has been a hundred times analyzed, exposed, and
refuted ; but the cheap dogmatism of demagogues and the
automatic machinery of faction peirpetuaUy conjures it up
anew to astonish the sucklings and terrify the dotards of
poUtics. The notable point in the Declaration of Causes is,
that its complaint over grievances past and present is against
certain States, and for these remedy was of course logicaUy
barred by its own theory of State supremacy. On the other
hand, aU its aUegations against the Union are conceming
dangers to come, before which admission the moral justifi
cation of disunion falls to the ground. In rejecting the
remedy of future elections for future wrongs, the conspiracy
discarded the entire theory and principle of repubUcan gov
emment. One might suppose that this exhausted their counterfeit
philosophy — but not yet. Greatly as they groaned at un
friendly State laws — seriously as they pretended to fear
damage or spoUation under future federal statutes, the bur
den of their anger rose at the sentiment and beUef of the
North. "All hope of remedy," says the manifesto, "is ren
dered vain by the fact that the public opinion at the North
has invested a great poUtical error with the sanctions of a
more erroneous religious belief." This is language one

SECESSION. 7
might expect from the Pope of Eome ; but, that an American
convention should denounce the Uberty of opinion, is not
merely to recede from Jefferson to Louis XTV. ; it is fiying
from the town-meeting to the Inquisition.
Nor can the final and persistent, but false assumption of
the South, be admitted, that she was justified by prescriptive
privilege ; that, because slavery was tolerated at the forma
tion of the govemment, it must needs be protected to perpe
tuity. The Constitution makes few features of our system
perpetuaUy obUgatory. Almost everything is subject to
amendment by three-fourths of the States. The New World
EepubUc was estabUshed for reform — ^not for mere blind
conservatism, certainly not for despotic reaction. The
slavery question, especially, was ever since 1808 broadly
under the control of the people. On the one hand, Congres^
had legal power to tolerate the African slave trade ; on the
other, three-fourths of the States might lawfuUy aboUsh
slavery, as was done near the close of the Kebellion. To
effect necessary and salutary poUtical changes, in the ful
ness of time, by lawful and peaceful election through con
stitutional majorities, as a prudent altemative to the violence
and horror of revolution, is one -of the many signal blessings
which repubUcan representative govemment confers on an
intelUgent nation.
The Ordinance of Secession of South Carolina was passed
in secret session, a Uttle after mid-day, on December 20th.
The fact was immediately made pubUc by huge placards
issued from the Charleston printing-offices ; and by special
direction of the convention, the event was further celebrated
by firing guns, ringing bells, and other jubilations. To
carry this studied theatrical effect to its fullest extent, a
session of the convention was held that same night, to which
the members marched in procession, where the formal sign-

8 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
ing of the Ordinance was sought to be magnified into a
solemn pubUc ceremony; after which the chairman pro
claimed South CaroUna an "independent commonwealth."
With all their affectation of legaUty, f ormaUty, and present
justification, some of the members were honest enough to
acknowledge the true character of the event as the culmina
tion of a chronic conspiracy, not a spontaneous revolution.
" The secession of South Carolina," said one of the chief
actors, "is not an event of a day. It is not anything pro
duced by Mr. Lincoln's election, or by the non-execution of
the Fugitive Slave Law. It is a matter which has been
gathering head for thirty years.'' This, with many similar
avowals, crowns and completes the otherwise abundant proof
that the revolt was not only against right, but that it was
without cause.
The original suggestion of Govemor Gist iri Jhjs circular
letter, for a concerted insurrection, fell upa^^' .itful soil.
jgPy^U fi.
The events which occurred in South Ci»^i ¦ '^ in sub-
stance dupUcated in the neighbormg -w^«^^_ Georgia,

Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Tnase States,
however, had stronger and more formidable unionjaiinorities
than South CaroUna ; or rather, if the truth could have been
ascertained with safety, they had each of them decided ma
jorities averse to secession, as was virtuaUy acknowledg-ed by
their governors' repUes to the Gist circular. But during the
presidential campaign, the three Southem parties, for fac
tional advantage, had vied with each other in their denuncia
tions of the hated " Black EepubUcans " — they had berated
each other as " submissionists " in secret league or sympathy
with the AboUtionists. The partisans of Breckenridge —
generaUy either active or latent disunionists — were ready,
positive, and relentlessly aggressive ; the adherents of BeU
and of Douglas were demoraUzed and suspicious. When

SECESSION. 9
Lincoln's election was, so unexpectedly to many, rendered
certain, they could not recover in time to evade the search
ing question which the conspirators immediately thrust at
them, "whether they would submit to Black Eepublican
rule." A false shame and the inexorable tyranny of South
em pubUc opinion made many a voter belie the honest con
victions of his heart, and answer No, when at the very least
he would gladly have evaded the inquiry.
The prominent office-holders, governors, senators, con
gressmen, judges, formed in each State a central clique of
conspiracy. The governors had official authority to issue
proclamations, to convene legislatures, to call out and com
mand such militia as existed. Had their authority been
wielded in behalf of the Union, no general revolt would
have been possible ; but, exercised without scruple or rest to
promote secession, insurrection began with an official pres
tige which swept the hesitating and the timid irresistibly
into the vortex of treason. Even then it was only by per
sistent nursing, management, and in many cases sheer deceit
that a semblance of majorities was obtained to justify and
apparently indorse the conspirators' plots. Legislatures
were convened, commissioners sent from State to State, con
ventions caUed, miUtary biUs passed, minute-men and vol
unteer companies organized. Deliberative bodies were ha
rangued by the conspirators' emissaries, and showered with
infiammatory telegrams. After the meeting of Congress the
fire-eaters of Washington held almost nightly caucuses, and
sent addresses, soUcitations, and commands from the capital.
Individual opinion was overawed ; the govemment was not
only silent, but constantly yielding ; legislative deliberation
became, in secret session, legislative intrigue ; pretexts were
invented to defer and omit all proper scrutiny of election re
turns. The " State " was the idol of the hour, " The State
1*

10 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
commands " was as despotic a formula as " The king com
mands " ; and the voter's personal judgment, the very basis
and life-giving principle of repubUcs, was obUterated between
the dread of proscription and the bUghting mUdew of the
doctrine of supreme State allegiance.
Certain features of the struggle deserve special explana
tion. The "irrepressible conflict" between North and
South, between freedom and slavery, was not conflned to the
two sides of Mason and Dixon's Une ; it found a certain ex
pression even in the Cotton States themselves. Most of
these States embrace territory of a radicaUy different quaUty.
Their southem and sea-coast front is a broad belt of sea-
islands, marshes, river-swamps, and low alluvial lands, ex
ceedingly unhealthy from malarial fevers in the hot season,
but of unsurpassed fertiUty, and possessing the picturesque
aspects of an exuberant half -tropical vegetation. This is the
region of the great cotton, rice, and sugar plantations which
have made the South rich and famous ; here the St. Clairs
and Legrees of real Ufe counted their slaves by hundreds,
and aspired to sybaritic lives in ample, hospitable mansions,
surrounded by magnificent and venerable live-oak and mag
nolia groves, avenues of stately palms, princely gardens of
native and exotic bloom, and illimitable hedge-lines of the
Cherokee rose ; a swarm of house-servants to minister to pam
pered indolence and dispense a lavish hospitaUty ; a troop
of field-hands to fill the cotton, rice, or sugar houses ; a blend
ing of Arcadian simpUcity and feudal pretension ; every plan
tation with its indulgent master, its exacting overseer, its
submissive slaves. These were the Ughts of the picture ;
abler pens have painted the horrible background of bloody
slave-whips, barbarous slave-codes, degrading slave-auctions,
yellow fever, cypress-swamps, the bloodhound hunt, and
the ever-present dread of servile insurrection. From such

SECESSION. 11
surroundings came the morbid dreams of an unholy league
between perpetual bondage and free trade, which should rear
a gigantic slave empire, before which the intellect, the
power, the splendor, and the govemment of all preceding
ages and nations should fade and wane.
The northem half of the Cotton States was very different ;
here were thin, sandy uplands of meagre productiveness ;
monotonous forests of pine and scrub-oak, running again in
to the more varied and romantic scenery of the subsiding
spurs of the Alleghanies ; blue crags, bright streams, shin
ing waterfalls, and the changing, deciduous foUage of the
North. Great slave-plantations could not flourish here ;
white population predominated ; agriculture was varied ; the
husbandman had a sterner struggle with nature ; and com
munities were burdened with aU the economic and social
detriments of the slave system, having none of its deUghts.
•A dense slave population and ultra secessionism were,
therefore, the rule in the southem, and white majorities and
union feeling in the northem districts of the Cotton States.
Therefore, also, political power lay in the slave region, which
again was allied to the com mercial interests clustering about
southem seaports. All the leverage was in the hands of
treason — offices, ostracism, advantage in representation, com
mercial ambition, party ascendancy. The wonder is, not that
secession succeeded in the struggle, but that there was any
serious contest at all. With all this, there is strong ground
for beUef that insurrection gained its ends at last only
through chicane, deceit, and fraud. Not a single Cotton
State but Texas dared to submit its Ordinance of Secession
to a direct vote of the people.
The struggle assumed its most determined phase in Geor
gia. She was the Empire State of the South, and, therefore,
indispensable to the conspiracy, in which distinguished citi-

12 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
zens of hers — Govemor Brown, Secretary Cobb, Senators
Toombs and Iverson, and others — were conspicuous ring
leaders. The more rabid fire-eaters desired that the Legis
lature should at once pass an act of secession ; Stephens and
other conservatives opposed this course. " The Legislature
were not elected for such a purpose," said he. " They came
here to do their duty as legislators. They have swom to
support the Constitution of the United States. They did
not come here to disrupt this govemment. I am, therefore,
for submitting aU these questions to a convention of the peo
ple." In due time a convention was called by unanimous
vote of the Legislature. Then followed a spirited campaign
to elect delegates. It early became evident that, whUe the
people of Georgia were irritated to the point of demanding
new guarantees for slavery, they were decidedly against dis
union. Thereupon the conspirators invented a bold trick.
"The truth is," explains Alexander H. Stephens, "in my
judgment the wavering scale in Georgia was turned by a sen
timent the key-note to which was given in the words, ' We
can make better terms out of the Union than in it.' ....
This one idea did more, in my opinion, in carrying the State
out, than all the arguments and eloquence of aU others com
bined. Two-thirds at least of those who voted for the Ordi
nance of Secession, did so, I have but Uttle doubt, with a
view to a more certain reformation of the Union." The
heresy of supreme State allegiance was, however, the flnal
and all-conquering engine of treason. Mr. Stephens him
self, in his memorable speech in defence of the Union, is
the striking illustration of Gulliver helpless in the cobwebs
of LilUput. To secede, he declared, was to break the Con
stitution. Good faith required the South to abide the elec
tion in peace. Lincoln could do her no harm against an ad
verse House and Senate. He adjured them not to rashly try

SECESSION. 13
the experiment of change ; for liberty, once lost, might never
be restored. These were words of sober wisdom, and, fear
lessly adhered to by a few firm men, they might have para
lyzed the revolt. Yet in the same speech he declared that,
if Georgia seceded, he should bow to the will of her people
— in other words, break the Constitution, break faith, and
lose Uberty. On this "easy descent" Georgia slid to her
ruin. Under such examples the convention passed the se
cession ordinance, 208 to 89.
While thus in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Ala
bama, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the conspiracy
made pretentious efforts to clothe rebelUon in the robes of
law, and hide it behind the shield of constitutional forms, it
pursued an altogether bold and unblushing course of usur
pation in the State of Texas. The famous and somewhat
eccentric . General Houston was governor. His own long
struggle to bring Texas into the Union made him loth to
join in its destruction. He resisted the secession conspir
acy; but his southem pro-slavery prejudices also imbued
him with the prevalent antagonism to the Eepublican party.
He therefore nursed a scheme to carry Texas back into inde
pendent sovereignty, and, with her territory and population
as a basis, to undertake the conquest and annexation of
Mexico. But the conspirators, ignoring all restraint, without a
shadow of legaUty, assembled a revolutionary State conven
tion, and on February 1st passed an ordinance of secession,
with a provision submitting it to a popular vote. Houston,
pursuing his side intrigue, approved a joint resolution of
the State Legislature (Febmary 4th) to legalize the conven
tion, but accompanied his approval with a protest that it
should have no effect except to elicit public decision- on the
single question of adherence to the Union. When in due

14 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
iime an alleged vote (taken on Febmary 23d) ratifying the
ordinance was submitted to him, he refused to recognize fur
ther acts of the convention ; whereupon the enraged conven
tion (March 16th) declared his office vacant, and empowered
the Ueutenant-govemor to seize the executive authority.
Meanwhile General Twiggs, commanding the Federal
troops in Texas, by treasonable connivance, on February
18th surrendered the military posts and property to a hasty
collection of about a regiment of rebels in arms, purporting
to act by authority of the convention, and set the various
scattered detachments of the army in motion to evacuate the
State. Before this had taken place, the newly inaugurated
Lincoln administration sent a messenger to Houston, who
was still reputed by public rumor to be loyal, and offered to
concentrate a strong body of the United States troops under
the new commander. Colonel Waite, form an entrenched
camp, and sustain his authority as govemor. Houston,
however (March 29th), refused the offer ; and having neither
the United States Govemment nor the people of Texas to
lean upon, the conspirators relentlessly pushed him into an
ignoble obscurity and transferred the State to the miUtary
domination of the Eebellion.
Thus, by easy stages and successive usurpations of author
ity, rebellion accomplished the first step of its operations
unmolested and unopposed. South Carolina, as we have
seen, seceded on December 20, 1860 ; Mississippi on January
9, 1861 ; Florida on January 10th ; Alabama on January llth ;
Georgia on January 19th ; Louisiana on January 26th ; and
Texas on February 1st. The various ordinances are in sub
stance that devised and adopted by South Carolina. All the
States put on the airs of independent repubUcs, though this
pretence was of short duration, as was designed and arranged
by the conspiracy.

SECESSION. 15
But the mere perversion of elections, the adoption of a
secession ordinance, and the assumption of independent au
thority, was not enough for the Cotton Eepublics. Though
they hoped to evade civil war by shrewd intrigue, they well
understood they had no certain immunity from it. It was ,
therefore essential to possess the arms and military posts
within their borders. There were in the seceded States one
quite extensive navy-yard, at Pensacola, Florida ; twelve to
fifteen harbor-forts along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, capa
ble of mounting a thousand guns, and having cost over five
millions ; half a dozen arsenals, containing an aggregate of
one hundred and fifteen thousand arms, transferred there
from northem arsenals by Secretary Floyd about a year be
fore, on pretence of danger from slave insurrections. In ad
dition there were three mints, four important custom-houses,
three revenue-cutters on duty at the several seaports, and a
variety of other miscellaneous property. This estimate does
not include the already mentioned public property surren
dered by General Twiggs in Texas, which of itself formed an
aggregate of eighteen miUtary posts and stations, and arms
and stores to a large amount and value.
This property had been purchased with the money of the
Federal Government ; the land on which the buildings stood,
though perhaps in some instances donated, was vested in
the United States, not only by the right of eminent domain,
but also by formal legislative deeds of cession from the
States themselves.
It was now assumed that the heresy of State supremacy,
through which the States pretended to derive their authority
to pass secession ordinances, also restored to them the right
of eminent domain, or that they had always retained it ; that
therefore they might, under the law of nations, jusfifiably
take possession, holding themselves responsible in money

16 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
damages to be settled by negotiation. The hypothesis and
its parent dogma were of course both palpably false and
absurd. The Govemment of the United States, unlike other
great nations, has steadily opposed the maintenance of a large
military force in time of peace. The whole regular army
amounted to only a Uttle over seventeen thousand men.
These, as usual, were mainly occupied in defence of the west
ern frontier against hostile Indian tribes. Consequently, but
three of these southem forts were garrisoned, and they by
only about a company each. An equal force was stationed
for the protection of the arsenals at Augusta, Ga., Mt.
Vernon, Ala., and Baton Eouge, La.
As a necessary part of the conspiracy, the governors of the
Cotton States now, by official order to their extemporized
miUtia companies, took forcible possession of these forts,
arsenals, navy-yard, custom-houses, and other property, in
many cases even before their secession ordinances were
passed. This was nothing less than levying actual war
against the United States, though as yet attended by no vio
lence or bloodshed. The ordinary process was, the sudden
appearance of a superior armed force, a demand for sur
render in the name of the State, and the compUance under
protest by the officer in charge — salutes to the flag, peaceable
evacuation, and unmolested transit home being graciously
permitted as miUtary courtesy. To this course of proced
ure three exceptions occurred : first, no attempt was made
against Fort Taylor at Key West, Fort Jefferson on Tortugas
Island, and Fort Pickens at Pensacola, on account of the dis
tance and danger ; second, part of the troops in Texas were
eventually refused the promised transit and captured ; and
third, the forts in Charleston Harbor underwent pecuUar vi-
cissitfldes, to be specially narrated in the next chapter.

CHAPTBE n.
CHARLESTON HARBOR.
Conspiracy was not conflned to South Carolina or the Cot
ton States; unfortunately, it had estabUshed itself in the
highest official circles of the national administration. Three
members of President Buchanan's cabinet — Cobb of Georgia,
Secretaiy of the Treasury, Floyd of Virginia, Secretary of
War, and Thompson of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior —
had become ardent and active disunionists. Grouped about
these three principal traitors were a number of subordinate
and yet influential functionaries, aU forming together a
central secession cabal, working, in daily and flagrant viola
tion of their official oaths, to promote the success of the
Southem conspiracy. After the meeting of Congress, on the
flrst Monday of December, the Senators and Eepresentatives
from the Cotton States were in Washington to counsel,
prompt, and assist this cabinet cabal, and the President was
subjected to the double influence of insidious suggestion
from within, and personal pressure from without his adminis
tration, acting in regulated concert.
No taint of disloyal purpose or thought appears to attach
to President Buchanan ; but his condition of mind predis
posed him in a remarkable degree to fall under the control
ling influence of his disloyal counsellors. He possessed the
opposing quaUties of feeble will and stubborn prejudice ;
advancing years and decreasing vigor added to his in-esolu-

18 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
tion and embarrassed his always limited capabiUties. In the
defeat of Breckenridge, whom he had championed, and in
the sweeping success of the RepubUcans, he had suffered
scorching rebuke and deep humiUation. Hia administration
was condemned, his poUcy was overthrown ; his proud party
was a hopeless wreck. He had no elasticity of mind, no
buoyancy of hope to recover from the shock. Withal he
had a blind disbeUef in the popular judgment ; he refused
to recognize the fact of an adverse decision at the baUot-box.
After his long affiUation with Southem men in thought and
action, he saw, as it were, through Southem eyes ; his mind
dwelt painfully on the fancied wrongs of the South. His
natural impulse, therefore, was to embarrass and thwart the
Eepublican victory by such official utterance and adminis
tration as would occur in his brief remainder of office ; and.
this was probably also the flrst and natural feeling of even
the loyal members of his Cabinet, who were prominent and
devoted Democratic partisans.
The presidential election decided, it was necessary to be
gin the preparation of his annual message to Congress,
which would convene in less than a month. Just about this
time came the thickening reports of Southem insurrection
and the ostentatious resignations of the Charleston Federal
officials. The first expressions from loyal members of the
Cabinet were that rebelUon must be put down. But this
remedy grated harshly on Buchanan's partisan prejudices.
He had aided these Southern malcontents to intrigue for
slavery, to complain of oppression, to threaten disunion.
To become the pubUc accuser of his late alUes and friends,
under disaster and defeat, doubtless seemed desertion and
black ingratitude. The Cabinet traitors had no such scm
ples. They were ready enough to desert the President, but
they wanted flrst to use him.

CHARLESTON HARBOR. 19
When, on December 3d, the President's message was laid
¦ before Congress, it was found to contain the most unjust
and indefensible allegations, the most glaringly inconsistent
and irreconoUable doctrines, the most childish and useless
suggestions. He charged that Southern discontent was
caused by " long-continued and intemperate interference of
the Northem people with the question of slavery in the
Southem States," in face of the well-known fact that South
em interference in free territory was the cause of the crisis.
He declared that, while a State had no right to secede, the
Constitution gave no right to coerce a State into submission
v^hen it had withdrawn, or was attempting to withdraw, from
the confederacy. This was raising a false issue. The ques
tion was not of acting against a State for either constitu
tional or unconstitutional efforts, but of suppressing insur
rection and punishing- indi viduals for violation of United
States laws. FinaUy, he argued that, to enforce United
States laws, a United States Court must flrst issue a writ
and a United States Marshal execute it ; and that where
judges and marshals had resigned, and a universal popular
feeUng opposed, such execution became impossible. In
this he ignored the fact that he had power to instantly
appoint new judges and marshals, and make the whole army,
navy, and miUtia of the nation a posse comitatiis to execute
their process ; and within one month after signing this mes
sage, he, himself, actually nominated a citizen of Pennsylva
nia CoUector of the Port of Charleston, in signal defiance of
his own theory. As a fitting cUmax to such puerile reason
ing, he urged an amendment of the Constitution that would
give slavery the very concession in repudiation of which the
people had just overwhelmingly elected Lincoln. As a
specimen of absurdity, stupidity, and wilful wrong-headed
ness, this message is not equaUed in American poUtical lit-

20 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
erature. For this extraordinary state paper, which effectu
ally tied the hands of the administration and opened to re
bellion a pathway free from obstruction or danger, the trio
of conspirators in the Cabinet, Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson,
may be reasonably held responsible. How they beguUed a
President of waning mental powers and naturally feeble pur
pose, may be easily enough imagined ; but how they sUenced
the honest logic of their loyal colleagues, is yet one of the
riddles of history.
The first and chief solicitude of the South CaroUnians was
to gain possession of the Charleston forts. To secede, to
organize their Uttle State into a miniature repubUc, was in
deed a vast achievenient in their own eyes ; but they were
shrewd enough to perceive that their claim to independence
and sovereignty would be ridiculed by the family of nations
if they could not control their own and only seaport. That
alone would give them a free highway to the world at large ;
with that they could offer the benefits of commerce, security
from tempests, refuge from the perils of war, to ships of
other nations; could negotiate advantageous treaties, and
perhaps conclude powerful aUiances. " We must have the
forts " was therefore the watchword of the secret caucus ;
and before long, from every street-corner in Charleston, came
the impatient echo, " The forts must be ours."
The city of Charleston lies on a tongue of land between
the Ashley and Cooper rivers ; from their confiuence the
bay extends eastward some four mUes to the open sea.
Three forts defend the harbor. The first and smaUest is Cas
tle Pinckney, an old-time structure of brick, and of insignifi
cant strength in modern warfare. It Ues one mile from the
city ; it was capable of holding a war garrison of 100 men ;
and its armament of twenty-two guns was at the time com
plete. Farther out is the second in size and importance,

CHARLESTON HARBOR.

21

Fort Moultrie, situated on Sullivan's Island, some four miles
from the city, very near the mouth of the harbor, on its
northern side. It dates back in name and heroic reputation
to the Revolution, when, however, it was Uttle else than an
extemporized battery of palmetto-logs and sand. In mod
ern times it has been rebuilt in brick, under scientific con
struction, and though lying disadvantageously low, it had
been changed into an effective channel defence, capable of
mounting fifty-five guns en barbette and holding a garri
son of 300 men. The third and most important work was

STAR OFTHE WtST
BATTERV

Map of Charleston Harbor.

Fort Sumter, also of brick, but of more imposing size. It
was situated about the middle of the harbor entrance, and
back half a mile from its mouth ; it was erected on a shoal

22 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
raised to an artificial island ; the walls were eight feet thick
and forty feet high, with two tiers of casemates ; it was five-
sided, enclosing a space of about 300 by 350 feet, and in its
casemates and on its rampart it was designed for 140 guns ;
its proper war-garrison was 650 men. In addition to these
forts in the harbor, there were two govemment buildings
in the city of Charleston : the Custom-House and the Uni
ted States Arsenal, the latter containing a total of 22,430
arms. To guard and hold possession of tliis property, there were
in the arsenal a military storekeeper and fourteen enlisted
men. Castle Pinckney was occupied only by an ordnance
sergeant and his family ; Fort Sumter by one or two engi
neer officers, employing one hundred and ten workmen in re
pairs; Fort. Moultrie alone, in addition to another party of
fifty workmen employed by the engineer officer in charge,
had a garrison of sixty-nine soldiers and nine officers under
Major Eobert Anderson, who had command of the whole
harbor and all the forts. The walls of Moultrie were low,
and at one place almost submerged in the drifting sand
banks of Sullivan's Island ; a storming party, the comman
dant reported, could run Uke rats over the ramparts. Par
ties of Charlestonians frequently visited it to spy out its
weak points ; volunteer companies were organized in the
city for the expedition of capture ; scaUng-ladders were pre
pared to make the attempt a certainty ; the talk of the street-
rabble and the newspapers made no concealment of their
exulting confidence that they held Moultrie in the hollow
of their hand. Hospitable fire-eaters went even so far as to
invite Major Anderson to comfortable dinners, and to teU
him, in confidential frankness over their wine, that they re
spected him as an officer and loved him as a Southerner, but
that they "must have the fort."

CHARLESTON HARBOR. 23
For the time being, however, the inner councils of the. con
spiracy seem to have frowned upon any rash or premature
attempt upon Moultrie, and to have sagely relied on obtain
ing possession through intrigue and negotiation, since the
latter method would not carry with it any danger of reprisal
or punishment. A most important advantage in this direction
had already been gained by Mr. Buchanan's adoption of the
doctrine of non-coercion ; the next essential step was to pre
vent any reinforcements from coming into Charleston Harbor.
Though not perhaps susceptible of historical proof, strong
inference warrants the beUef that Floyd, Secretary of War,
inspired by the Washington cabal of traitors, procured the
appointment of Anderson to the command with the hope that
as a Southem man he would lend himself to an easy surren
der of the forts. To Floyd, also, seems to have been com
mitted the further supervision of the intrigues respecting
them. He still avowed himself a unionist ; but he disproved
his pubUo declarations by a steady series of serrices and
favors to the rebeUion, of whose design he could not have
remained in ignorance.
Congress had met, the message had been delivered, the
fatal doctrine of non-coercion conceded by the President and
adopted as an administration poUcy. Under its protecting
promises treason not only proceeded with accelerated or
ganization in the Cotton States, but made its avowals, its
boasts, and its threats in Congress. South CaroUna and se
cession were the topics of the hour — Moultrie and Anderson
the central and growing objects of anxiety ; and at length
the North, through its senators and representatives, and stilF
more loudly through its newspaper press, began to bring its
influence upon the President for reinforcement and prepara
tion. At the same time the secessionists congregated at
Washington were no less alert and active ; they obtained

24 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
Buchanan's tacit promise that he would send no reinforce
ments unless Moultrie were attacked, and had hampered
Anderson with confidential instructions from Floyd, to take
no offensive measures until in the nature of things, through
a sudden assault, he would be overwhelmed and powerless.
These conflicting efforts brought on a Cabinet crisis and
forced the President to a direct official decision. General
Cass, the Secretary of State, had his home in Michigan ; and
feeling the stiffening influence of Northwestern sentiment,
and having, besides, his own somewhat sluggish though
patriotic blood roused by the high-handed and unchecked
intrigues of the conspirators, began to insist that reinforce
ments be sent to Charleston. Buchanan becoming also a
trifle anxious over the situation, sent for Floyd. Floyd,
suave and deceitful, dallied, evaded, pooh-poohed the danger,
had resort to chivalric bombast. The South Carolinians, he
said, were honorable gentlemen. They would scom to take
the forts. They must not be irritated. At length, finding
the President growingunusually obstinate in his new fancy,
Floyd sought refuge in the suggestion that General Scott be
consulted. Scott was a Virginian ; Floyd secretly thought
he would fall in with the current secession drift, and perhaps
officially adrise the surrender or evacuation of the forts to
" conciliate " South CaroUna.
Genera] Scott, scarcely able to rise from his sick bed in
New York, hastened to Washington on December 12th. Floyd
had hitherto with studied neglect kept him excluded from
knowledge of War Department affairs ; but now, for the flrst
time consulted, and recognizing the gravity of the situation,
the General heartily joined Cass in recommending that rein
forcements be instantly sent.
Floyd was surprised, disappointed, disconcerted. He
summarily rejected the advice of Scott, as he had opposed

CHARLESTON HARBOR. 25
that of Cass. Seizing adroitly upon a phrase of Buchanan's
message, which affirmed the duty of the President to protect
pubUc property, he said: True, it is simply a question of
property. You need no army to assert that. Place an ord
nance sergeant in the fort ; he wiU represent the sovereignty
and the proprietary rights of the United States as well as a
regiment. This was a subtle and skilful thrust. Mr. Bu
chanan's slow intellect was both flattered and confused by
having his own misstatement of a vital poUtical principle
quoted and turned upon him. He had not the wit to rejoin
that neither political sovereignty nor proprietary right were
longer complete if possession was once lost. Nevertheless,
Buchanan had a dim consciousness of treachery. He con
tinued to plead with his secretary that he ought to send re
inforcements ; warning him that a loss of the forts under
the circumstances would cover the name of Floyd "with
an infamy that all time can never efface."
Floyd was well nigh in despair. He turned upon the
President all his florid Southem rhetoric, all the final armory
of offended Southern dignity, and the ever-ready threats of
Southern resort to violence. Send troops to Charleston, ho
concluded, and the swarming and enraged South CaroUnians
would not leave one brick of Moultrie upon another. Nor
was Floyd content to risk the issue upon his own eloquence.
He gave the note of alarm to every prominent traitor in
Washington, and without delay they flocked around the
doubting, hesitating President — Hunter, Mason, Jefferson
Davis— the whole busy cabal of plotting, caucusing conspir
ators, filUng him alternately with such deceitful promises
of good behavior and such terrible visions of revolutionary
violence, that Mr, Buchanan was both frightened and soothed
into a reluctant compliance with their advice. It was the
scene of the wily Vivien and the yielding Merlin re-enacted ;

26 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
and while the Sage of Wheatland slept in doting confldence,
every conspiring secessionist cried " Fool ! " and wrought
"the charm
Of woven paces and of waving hands,"
to complete their secret web of conspiracy.
The issue was decided in the Cabinet meeting of December
13th ; after a spirited re-argument, the President told his
Secretary of State that he was sorry to differ with him, but
that he could not order reinforcements to Charleston ; where
upon General Cass tendered his resignation and retired from
official Ufe. Cobb had resigned from the Cabinet a few days
before. Black, the Attorney-General, was now made Secre
tary of State ; Thomas of Maryland, Secretary of the Treas
ury ; and Edwin M. Stanton appointed Attorney-General.
If Mr. Buchanan fiattered himseU that his concession to
Floyd, Davis, and the cabal, would stay the tide of disunion
in the South, he was quickly undeceived. At the very time
the Cabinet meeting was holding its flnal discussion of the
question of reinforcements, a mysterious paper was being
circulated for signature through the two houses of Congress,
and on the second day following, the newspapers which an
nounced the retirement of Cass also contained the first defi
nite and authentic proclamation- of concerted revolution by
the Cotton States, and the proposal to form a Southern re
public* It was a brief document, but pregnant with aU the
* " TO OUR constituents. " Washington, December 14, 1860.
"The argument is exhausted. All hope of relief in the Union, through the
agency of committees, congressional legislation, or constitutional amendments, is
extinguished, and we trust the South will not be deceived by appearances or the
pretence of new guarantees. In our judgment the Bepnblicans are resolute in
the purpose to grant nothing that will or ought to satisfy the Sonth. We are
satisfied the honor, safety, and independence of tlie Southera people require the

CHARLESTON HARBOR. 27
essential purposes of the conspiracy. It was signed by about
one-half the Senators and Eepresentatives from the States of
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Missis
sippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas, and is the
" ofiicial " beginning of the subsequent " Confederate States,"
just as Gist's October circular was the " official " beginning
of South Carolina secession.
On the fifth day after the publication of this manifesto, the
South Carolina Convention passed, signed, and published its
ordinance of secession, as already related ; and now it was
resolved to demand possession of the Charleston forts as an
incident of sovereignty and independence. It was assumed
that the President would not refuse to yield them up after
peaceful diplomatic negotiation, and upon an offer to ac
count for them as propei-ty in a regular business settlement
between the two governments. The convention, acting up
on this theory, appointed three commissioners to proceed
to Washington to treat for the deUvery of the forts, maga
zines, light-houses, and other real estate, for an apportion
ment of the pubUc debt, for a division of all other property,
and generally to negotiate about other measures and ar
rangements. AU this proceeded with the decorum and mock solemnity
organization of a Southern confederacy — a result to be obtained only by separate
State secession — that the primary object of each slaveholding State ought to be its
speedy and absolute separation from a Union with hostile States."
(Signed by :
Bepresentatives Pugh, Clopton, Moore, Curry, and Stallworth, of Alabama ;
Senator Iverson and Representatives Underwood, Gartrell, Jackson, Jones,
and Crawford, of Georgia ; Representative Hawkins, of Florida ; Represent
ative Hindman, ot Arkansas ; Senators Jefferson Davis and A. G. Brown,
and Representatives Barksdale, Singleton, and Reuben Davis, of Mississippi ;
Representatives Craige and Ruffin, of North Carolina ; Senators Sl'dell and
Benjamin, and Representative Landmm, of Louitiana ; Senators Wigf.iU
and Hemphill, and Representative Reagan, of Texas ; Representatives Bon-
ham, Miles, McQueen, and Ashmore, of South Carolina.)

28 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
in which children play at kings and queens. The commis
sioners reached Washington on December 26th, and Mr. Bu
chanan, with all the curiosity and palpitation of an actor in
a new drama, seems to have looked upon it not as the miser
able farce of conspiracy which it was, but as a real piece of
govemment business. The commissioners immediately made
their presence known, and the President appointed an inter
view for them at one o'clock next day. Before that hour ar
rived, however, news of a totaUy unlooked-for event gave their
intended negotiation an entirely new direction and result.
That event was the sudden militaiy movement by Major
Anderson, transferring his entire garrison from Port Moul
trie to Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, on the night of
the commissioners' arrival in Washington, December 26.
Daily observation left him no doubt that Moultrie was to be
assaulted ; every day strengthened the design, increased the
preparation, augmented the drilled and undrUled forces to
be joined in the undertaking. There was no longer hope
that the President would heed his repeated calls and send
him reinforcements. There was, however, one resource yet
available. Sumter was the real key to the hai'bor. Cap
tain Foster and his engineer force of workmen and mechan
ics had now prepared it for occupancy, and could soon make
it ready for defence. Its guns commanded Moultrie. There
was no approach to it except by boats, and, for a time, at
least, he would be beyond the reach of the Charleston mob
and its improvised scaling-ladders. Thoughts Uke these,
long-present and familiar to his mind, were once more care
fully revolved and re-examined, when on Christmas night he
returned from a neighboring holiday merrymaking to his
somewhat cheerless quarters in Moultrie ; and before he re
tired to his sleep, he took his secret resolve to abandon
Moultrie and take post in Sumtor.

CHARLESTON HARBOR. 29
The 26th of December was a busy day for the comman
dant. There were vessels to be hired, and an excuse invented
to send away the famiUes, the baggage, the unnumbered im
pedimenta of the garrison. For this, one or two chosen staff-
officers must be let into the secret. Finally, boats must be
provided and concealed on the beach, in which to cross the
men. Anderson's personal care was extended to every detail,
and every item of preparation moved Uke clock-work. The
families and baggage were got off in the afternoon. A sunset
parade of the men was ordered, ostensibly to be on the alert
against assault, a species of exercise with which the garri
son had become somewhat sorely famiUar. The supper stood
smoking on the officers' mess-table, when Captain Doubleday,
second in command, was hastily called to Major Anderson,
who now for the first time told him that he must have his
company under arms and ready to march to the beach in
twenty minutes. Everything proceeded as had been ar
ranged, without delay and without accident ; even the rebel
guard-boats, which had recently been set to patrolling the
bay to render such a movement impossible, failed to make
any discovery. By nine o'clock that night the transfer was
an assured success ; the officers sat down to eat the supper
in Sumter which had been cooked for them in Moultrie. A
small detail of men and an officer were left behind to spike
guns, burn carriages, cut down the flag-staff, and to com
plete during the night the removal of needed supplies ; they
flnished their work and joined their comrades in Sumter a
Uttle after sunrise next morning.
This movement fllled the Union sentiment of the country
with the liveliest exultation. It was a spontaneous, uncalcu-
lating act of patriotism which will enshrine the name of An
derson in grateful recollection so long as American history
shaU be read. Advance news of the event was sent from

30 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
Charleston to the commissioners on the moming of December
27th; and they immediately communicated it to Mr. Bu
chanan, whom it threw into a most embarrassing perplexity.
He postponed the commissioners' interview, and summoned
his Cabinet to consider the situation. Floyd at once declared
the movement to be in violation of orders ; and the Presi
dent himself, in his chagrin that his Southem friends should
have a new burden of complaint, was half -inclined to peremp
torily order Anderson back to Moultrie. He was prudent
enough,, however, to suspend his judgment until Anderson
could be heard ; for he had lately become cognizant of the
equivocal and double-tongued instructions which Floyd,
without his knowledge, had sent him, and which he inferred
might at least technicaUy justify Anderson's movement.
On Friday, December 28th, he gave the commissioners
their promised interview. Mr. Buchanan, himself, writes
that " on their introduction he stated that he could recog
nize them only as private gentlemen, and not as commission
ers from a sovereign State ; that it was to Congress, and
to Congress alone, they must appeal. He nevertheless ex
pressed his wiUingness to communicate to that body, as the
only competent tribunal, any propositions they might have
to offer." He does not appear to have realized that this pro
posal was in reaUty a quasi-recognition of South Carolina's
claim to independence, and a misdemeanor meriting im
peachment. What is a thousand times more astounding, however, is
that, on their part, the commissioners were too stupid to
perceive the vast advantage of this concession and offer. It
would have placed the President before the public, and be
fore foreign powers especially, in the attitude of their apolo
gist, if not their advocate. It would have committed him to
refrain from any hostile action against South Cai-oUna dur-

CHARLESTON HARBOR. 31
ing the pendency of such debate as the proposition might
provoke in Congress. It would have thrust a flrebrand into
Congress, to compUcate and divide every faction and element
in politics except their own friends ; in short, it would have
made Washington City the principal centre of revolution.
Fortunately for the country, their bUndness lost to secession
its only possible chance of peaceful success.
Under the impression that Mr. Buchanan was completely
within the domination of the Cabinet cabal, the commis
sioners made an angry complaint against Anderson, and
haughtUy demanded "explanations," threatening that, if
these were not satisfactory, they would suspend their nego
tiations. Such a threat from applicants for recognition and
favor was the very acme of stupidity and maladdress.
Anderson Uttle suspected — perhaps never knew — ^how nar
rowly he escaped disavowal and disgrace by the President
of the United States, for his act of fideUty and patriotism.
The conspirators had shrewdly calculated on their influence
over Mr. Buchanan. For two days he hesitated, leaning evi
dently to the counsels of his secession advisers. There were
protracted Cabinet sessions, acrimonious debates, and a final
struggle between the President's disloyal counsellors from
the South and the loyal ones from the North, .over the pos
session and control of their temporizing, vacillating chief.
It was not till the latter were on the point of resigning that
the President was brought to a direct decision against the
conspirators ; even then, but for an outside complication,
the result might have been doubtful. For about a week
Floyd and Thompson had both been in bad odor. A trans
action, in which near a miUion dollars' worth of Indian
Trust Bonds were abstracted from a safe in the Interior De
partment and replaced by Floyd's premature acceptances,
looked so much like official theft that it was occupying the

32 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
attention of the courts and greatly exercising the mind of
the President.
The spell was finally broken on December 81st, when Mr.
Buchanan accepted Floyd's resignation, which the latter re
luctantly tendered on the 29th ; he also sent the commissioners
their definite answer, namely : that, whatever might have been
his first inclination, the Govemor of South Carolina had, since
Anderson's movement, forcibly seized Fort Moultrie, Castle
Pinckney, and the Charleston Arsenal, Custom-House, and
Post-Office, and covered them with the Palmetto flag ; that
under such circumstances he could not and would not with
draw the Federal troops from Sumter. This ended the rebel
mission. They departed abruptly for home, leaving behind
them an insolent rejoinder to the President's letter, charging
him with tacit consent to the scheme of peaceable secession.
Govemor Pickens (newly chosen by the Legislature, De
cember 14th) was perhaps the most daring revolutionist
in South CaxoUna, and as commander-in-chief of the State
forces he at once assumed and exercised dictatorial powers.
Within three or four days after his seizure of the forts he or
dered the selection of suitable points on the islands forming
the bay, and the commencement of batteries to command the
ship-channels against reinforcements. It was the beginning
of the long and eventful siege of Sumter. Moultrie was soon
restored to its offensive powers ; Castle Pinckney passed into
his hands undamaged ; with a working force of volunteers
impeUed by fanatical zeal, supplemented by the -more effi
cient labor of large gangs of slaves freely furnished from the
city and plantations of the neighborhood, battery after bat
tery rose around Anderson's stronghold, unmolested and un
checked for three long months, until, in an encompassing rino-
of fire, and under the sheer overweight of metal and num
bers, the proud flag of Sumter went down in temporaiy hu-

CHARLESTON HARBOR. 33
miliation. And that the drama should not lack its interludes
of grotesque farce, all through this continuation of contu
macy, insurrection, rampart-buUding, gun-planting, and ac
tual repeated firing on the flag of the United States, the "Ee-
' public " of South Carolina, through its govemor, its legisla
ture, its convention, and its partisans, clamorously insisted
and reiterated that the Govemment was waging war upon it.
The Cabinet crisis of December 31st, and the retirement of
Floyd, greatly changed the attitude of the Govemment to
ward rebellion. Holt was made Secretary of War, and be
came at once the Hercules of the national defence. Black,
though as Attorney-General he had in November written an
official opinion against coercion, was so far changed that he
now zealously advocated the reinforcement of Sumter. All
the unionists of the Cabinet — Black, Holt, Stanton, even
Toucey in a mild way, and not long afterward Dix with
memorable vigor — joined heartily in preparation to vindicate
the national authority. General Scott was placed in miUtary
control ; and the President, being for a period kept by loyal
adrice in a more patriotic mood, permitted various precau
tionary measures to be taken, among which, a well-designed,
though flnally abortive effort to reinforce Sumter, was per
haps the most noteworthy.
Various plans to sendmen and provisions to Anderson were
discussed, and it was at last decided to attempt stratagem.
A swift merchant-steamer, the " Star of the West " was char
tered in New York, loaded with the needed suppUes and two
hundred and fifty recruits ; thus prepared, she sailed on her
errand on the night of January 5, 1861. The effort to keep
the expedition an entire secret had not succeeded. Notice of
her departure went to Charleston from New York ; and in
addition to this, Thompson, the conspiring Secretary of the
Interior, who at the last moment learned the fact in Cabinet
3

34 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
meeting, also warned his Charleston friends of her~ coming.
Anderson does not seem to have received his notice, though
he gathered from newspapers that some such enterprise
was being matured. He was, therefore, not greatly sur
prised, when on the moming of January 9th he was hastily
informed that a strange vessel was entering the harbor,
and hurrying upon the rampart, saw her steaming up the
channel in the direction of Sumter. She presented no war
like appearance; men and supplies were hidden below decks.
But in these nine days of January the rebels had repaired
Moultrie, and completed one or two sand-batteries at the
harbor entrance, and, thoroughly informed of the character
and destination of the vessel, they began a vigorous fire
upon her as soon as she came within range. At this, finding
concealment no longer important, her captain ran up a large
United States flag, a signal which dispeUed aU doubts An
derson may have had that she indeed came to bring him the
wished-for reUef. He gave orders to man his guns and pre
pare to flre on the batteries ; meanwhile the steamer, though
hit ^nce or twice, had passed the flrst batteries without
serious damage. Now, however, the course of the channel
would oblige her to steam directly toward the ready guns
of Moultrie, and the sight of this new peril seems to have
daunted the courage of the officer in charge. Anderson saw
with deep chagrin that, just as he was ready to cheer and
greet the new-comer by returning the rebel fire, the steamer
suddenly slackened her speed, then put about, and ran once
more unharmed past the rebel batteries and through the hos
tile cannon-balls out to sea.
Anderson's blood was hot with the insult his own eyes had
witnessed to the flag and sovereignty of the United States.
He sat down and wrote a brief note to the Governor of South
Carolina, demanding to know if the firing on the vessel and

CHARLESTON HARBOR. 35
the flag had been by his order, and declaring that, unless the
act were disclaimed, he would close the harbor with the guns
of Sumter. It would have been better to have left the threat
unuttered. Governor Pickens was more than a match for
him in bravado; he immediately avowed and justifled the
act. Anderson in a second note so far receded as to say that
he had made up his mind to flrst ask his government for
instructions, and requested safe-conduct for a bearer of dis
patches. This emboldened the governor to a second trial of
bluster ; next day he sent Anderson a formal demand for the
surrender of Sumter. Anderson replied rather meekly that
he could not comply with the demand ; but that, if the gov
emor saw fit " to refer this matter to Washington," he would
depute an officer to accompany the messenger.
The Charleston conspirators, never at a loss to talk or
intrigue, were really not yet ready to fight. They caught
eagerly at this truce which Anderson offered them ; it would
renew the negotiations which their commissioners had so
unceremoniously abandoned ; above all, it would afford them
ample time to complete their harbor batteries and collect
troops against further expeditions of reinforcement or attack.
On January 12th, therefore, I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-
General of South Carolina, proceeded to Washington as an
envoy to carry to President Buchanan the governor's demand
for the surrender of Sumter, with authority to give in return
the pledge "that the valuation of such property will be ac
counted for by this State upon the adjustment of its relations
with the United States."
Hayne had, however, scarcely reached his destination
when a superior influence took control of him and his mis
sion. By the middle of January most of the Cotton States
had passed ordinances of secession, seized the undefended
miUtary posts within their limits, and were addressing each

36 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
other as independent States. But no amount of official va
poring or local ostentation could convince even themselves
of either dignity or power ; especially it could not, in the
eyes of the world, magnify petty cotton repubUcs into serious
importance or influence. However they might temporarily
paralyze the laws of the Union, the constitutional rights of
the nation were unbroken, and the miUtary power of the
Government slumbered like a mighty giant. To brave his
terrible awakening the necessity of early combination in
some system of common defence was too apparent to need ar
gument. The senators and representatives of seceded States,
though some of them had already withdrawn from Congress,
were yet lingering in Washington as the most central point
for observation and consultation. The formation of a South
em confederacy was, from the first, a recognized purpose,
announced in their manifesto of December 14th, and again
repeated in letters from a secret caucus held January 5th.
Indeed, the whole programme probably dated back to the
early days of the session, when it may be presumed the plan
was elaborated by a few of the leading spirits. So far,
though some of their combinations had failed, yet in the
main the scheme had moved on with ever-growing strength
from success to success. By the middle of January the con
spirators in Washington realized that they must hurry the
completion of their organization during the brief continu
ance of the expiring administration. Even the belligerent
Govemor Pickens was made to understand the advantage of
such a course. " Mr. Lincoln," he wrote, " cannot possibly
do more for us than Mr. Buchanan has done." When there
fore, most unexpectedly, South Carolina obtained through
Anderson's offer a new chance to propose negotiation, the
central cabal at Washington resolved to make it the means
of gaining time to set a common provisional government in

CHARLESTON HARBOR 37
motion, without on their part furnishing the pretext for any
military movement which might threaten or check their
plans. They therefore met in a caucus, and appointed a
committee consisting of Senators Fitzpatrick, Mallory, and
SUdell ; this committee began and carried on a dilatory cor
respondence with Mr. Hayne and with the President, which
they managed to prolong into February, all that while keep
ing open the Anderson truce by the assumption that nego
tiations were pending. Mr. Buchanan, always indisposed to
act, always welcoming any excuse to postpone decision, fell
easUy into the toils of this side intrigue for delay. Some of
his counsellors must have seen through the transparent
game with much impatiencej-for the whole affair was at last
rather abruptly ended. On February 6th, Secretary Holt
wrote for the President to Hayne, that neither the proposed
sale of Fort Sumter, nor its relinquishment under South
Carolina's claim of eminent domain, could for a moment be
thought of, since it was not a mere question of property, as
had been assumed, but involved political rights of the high
est national importance. This closed the correspondence,
and Hayne went home to report the second failure to obtain
the forts by diplomacy.
But the conspirators had gained their main point. This
negotiation paralyzed and postponed all the plans and prepa
rations to send help to Anderson, upon which some of the
Cabinet members had labored with zeal and earnestness;
while on the other hand, on February 4th, two days preced
ing Hayne's dismissal, the Provincial Congress of the rebel
States assembled at Montgomery, Ala., and by the 18th
of that month had completed and inaugurated the provi
sional government under which the local insurrections of the
Cotton States became an organized rebelUon against the
govemment of the Union.

38 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
Nor was this the only advantage which the conspiracy had
secured. Since the 12th of January a condition of things
existed in the harbor of Pensacola, Fla., similar to that
at Charleston. The insurgents had threatened, and the offi
cer in charge had surrendered the Pensacola Navy Yard.
Lieutenant Slemmer, of the army, with a Uttle garrison of
forty-six men, held Fort Barrancas. Finding he could not
defend his post, nor Fort McKee, also on the mainland,
he, with a loyal courage which wUl ever render his name il
lustrious, repeated the strategy of Anderson, and moved his
slender command, augmented by thirty ordinary seamen
from the navy yard, on the moming of January 10th, to
Fort Pickens, a large and more defensible work standing at
the harbor entrance, on the westem end of Santa Bosa Isl
and. The Government hurriedly sent a few ships of war
to assist him, while the rebels began gathering an army to
assault the fort. Under cover of the Hayne negotiation, Sen
ator Mallory managed to draW the President into an agree
ment, embodied in formal orders dated January 29th, that
Fort Pickens should not be reinforced unless it were as
saulted by the rebels, or preparations were made to do so.
The Hayne business disposed of, there was once more a
Uttle fiurry of war consultations at the Executive Mansion to
devise and dispatch a new expedition to reinforce Sumter.
This time a few small vessels belonging to the Coast Survey
were to be assembled and placed under command of Captain
Ward, of the navy, for that purpose ; the detaUs of the plan
do not appear to have transpired. But the President's ener
getic moods were lamentably short ; by the 23d of February
this scheme, also, was definitely abandoned, probably for
the overruling reason that but nine days remained of Mr.
Buchanan's presidential term.

CHAPTEE m
THE CONFEDERATE STATES' REBELLION.
Osr the fourth day of February, 1861, while the Peace Con
ference met in Washington to consider propositions of com
promise and concession, the delegates of the seceding States
convened in Montgomery, Ala., to combine and solidify the
general conspiracy into an organized and avowed rebellion.
Such action had been arranged and agreed upon from the
beginning. The congressional manifesto from Washington,
as far back as December 14th, advised that "we are satisfied
the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people
require the organization of a Southern confederacy — a re
sult to be obtained only by separate State secession." This
agreement of the Washington caucus was steadily adhered
to. The specious argument invented in Georgia, that " we
can make better terms outside of the Union than in it," and
the public declaration of Mississippi's commissioner in Bal
timore, that secession " was not taken with the view of break
ing up the present govemment, but to assure to her (Missis
sippi) those guarantees and principles of liberty which had
been pledged to her by the fathers of the Eevolution," were
but tricks of the conspiracy for local use and effect. The
managers well understood that if the States were once com
mitted to secession, the mere revolutionary momentum of
the crisis would carry them to whatever combination they
might devise.

40 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
The whole plan appears to have been more fuUy matured
and adopted in a Washington caucus held on the night of
January 5, 1861, at which time four important points were
arranged : 1st, the Cotton States should immediately secede ;
2d, that delegates should be chosen to meet in Montgomery,
" to organize a confederacy,'' not later than February 15th ;
3d, that the conspirators would remain in Congress as long
as possible, to obstruct coercive legislation; and 4th, that
Jefferson Daris, Slidell, and Mallory be appointed a com
mittee to carry out the objects of the caucus. Thus, more
than a month before his inauguration as rebel president, the
leader of the conspiracy was entrusted with the supervision
and management of the plot. The caucus programme was
executed with but slight deviation. The States seceded,
appointed delegates to Montgomery, and the conspirators
withdrew from Congress at the last moment to assume the
more active control of the rebelUon in their respective
States. As events progressed it became evident to the leaders that
it was important to complete their new govemment before
the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term. They understood
perfectly his temper and purpose. Though he denied them
the treasonable compUcity they had hoped and asked, and
discontinued the important concessions with which he began,
he stiU stood committed to non-coercion. What his successor
might decide was uncertain. Eepeated efforts had been
made to draw from Lincoln some expression of his intention
— some forecast of his policy, but they had been uniformly
unsuccessful. Accordingly the secession delegates met in Montgomery
on February 4th, instead of the 15th, as had been first ar
ranged, and organized a provisional Congress, and a few
days thereafter (February 8, 1861) adopted a provisional

THE CONFEDERATE STATES' REBELLION. 41
govemment, to be known as " The Confederate States of
America." There was little difficulty in arriving at this re
sult ; most if not all the seceders' State conventions had de
clared a wish that their proposed new government should be
modeUed on that of the United States.
From this they proceeded to the work of framing a per
manent constitution. This was a somewhat slower process,
though it was also completed and adopted by the provisional
Congress on March 11, 1861. Few changes fi-om the Con
stitution of the United States were made. The new consti
tution professed to be estabUshed by " each State acting in
its sovereign and independent character,'' instead of simply
by " We the people." It provided that in newly acquired
territory " the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists
in the Confederate States, shaU be recognized and protected
by Congress and by the Territorial Govemment " ; also for
the right of transit and sojoum for " slaves and other prop
erty," and the right to reclaim " slaves and other persons "
to sendee or labor. It did not, as consistency required, pro
vide for the right of secession or deny the right of coercion ;
on the contrary all its implications were against the former
and in favor of the latter, for it declared itself to be the
supreme law of the land, binding on the judges in every
State. It provided for the punishment of treason ; and de
clared that no State should enter into any treaty, alUance, or
confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin
money, lay duties, keej) troops or ships of war in time of
peace, make any compact with another State or with a foreign
power — a sweeping practical negation of the whole heretical
dogma of State supremacy upon which they had buUt their
revolt. The day after the rebel Congress adopted its provisional
govemment, it elected (February 9, 1861) Jefferson Davis,

42 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
of Mississippi, President, and Alexander H. Stephens, of
Georgia, Vice-President of the new Confederacy. The re
ported vote for Davis is unanimous ; but it is historicaUy
related by Stephens that HoweU Cobb and Eobert Toombs
were also aspirants, and that Davis himseU preferred the
chief command of the rebel armies. For the moment, how
ever, offices were plenty, and each of the leaders received a
prominent station. Cobb remained presiding officer of the
rebel Congress ; Toombs became Secretary of State ; and if
not completely satisfied, aU acquiesced in the distribution of
honors. Davis was sent for and inaugurated at Montgomery,
on Monday, February 18th. In his inaugural address he in
timated that they would permit the non-seceded Slave
States to join their confederacy ; " but, beyond this," he con
tinued, " if I mistake not the judgment and wiU of the peo
ple, a reunion with the States from which we have separated
is neither practicable nor desirable."
If the remotest doubt remained, from previous indications
and this official hint, that the whole purpose and animus of
the revolt was the estabUshment of a powerful slaveocracy,
that doubt was removed by the pubUc declaration of Mr.
Stephens, the new Vice-President. In a speech which he
made at Savannah, Ga., on the 21st of March, he defined
the ruling idea of the conspiracy in the foUovring frank lan
guage :
" The prevaUing ideas entertained by him (Jefferson) and
most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation
of the old constitution, were that the enslavement of the
African was in violation of the laws of nature ; that it was
wrong in principle, socially, morally, and poUtically. It was
an evil they knew not well how to deal with ; but the gen
eral opinion of that day was, that somehow or other, in the
order of Providence the institution would be evanescent and

THE. CONFEDERATE STATES' REBELLION. 43
pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the Consti
tution, was the prevailing idea at that time. The Constitu
tion it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the insti
tution while it should last, and hence no argument can be
justly urged against the constitutional guarantees thus se
cured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those
ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested
upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an
error. It was a sandy foundation, and the government built
upon it fell when the storm came and the wind blew. Our
new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea ;
its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great
truth that the negro is not equal to the white man ; that slave
ry, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and
normal condition. This, our new government, is the flrst in
the history of the world, based upon tliis great physical,
philosophical, and moral truth."
Mr. Stephens was no less enthusiastic in his estimate of
the material resources of the new confederacy. " We have
all. the essential elements of a high national career," con
tinued he. " The idea has been given out at the North, and
even in the Border States, that we are too small and too weak
to maintain a separate nationaUty. This is a great mistake.
In extent of territory we embrace 564,000 square miles and
upwards. This is upwards of 200,000 square miles more than
was included vrithin. the limits of the original thirteen States.
It is an area of country more than double the territory of
France or the Austrian Empire. France, in round numbers,
has but 212,000 square miles ; Austria, in round numbers, has
but 248,000 square miles. Ours is greater than both com
bined. It is greater than all France, Spain, Portugal, and
Great Britain, including England, Ireland, and Scotland to
gether. In population we have upwards of 5,000,000, accord-

44 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
ing to the census of 1860 ; this includes white and black.
The entire population, including white and black, of the
original Thirteen States was less than 4,000,000 in 1790, and
stiU less in 1776, when the independence of our fathers was
achieved. If they, with a less population, dared maintain
their independence against the greatest power on earth, shall
we have any apprehension of maintaining ours now ? "

CHAPTER IV.
LINCOLN.
From the false poUtical principles and the perilous official
neglect of the old administration — from the dissensions and
impotence of Congress, and from the threatening attitude
and the hostile preparations of the South, all parties and
persons now turned to the President-elect and the incoming
administration. During the winter many earnest but over-
hasty patriots had besought him to intervene by some pub
Uc declaration. But Mr. Lincoln preserved a discreet si
lence, though in confidential letters to responsible personal
friends of opposing poUtics he repeated his former assertions
that, while adhering tenaciously to the Eepublican doctrine
of " No extension of slavery," he bore no ill-will to the
South, meditated no aggression on her rights, and would on
the contrary treat her with Uberal indulgence in matters of
minor controversy.
As the day of inauguration approached, various legisla
tures of the Free States by formal resolutions invited him
to visit their capitals on his way to Washington ; a call which
his deep popular sympathy moved him to accept. Starting
from home on the llth of February, he accordingly passed
through the principal cities between Springfield and New
York, and between New York and Washington.
Unprecedented crowds came forth to see the new Chief

46 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
Magistrate. Could the quick inteUigence of the American
people be otherwise than intensely curious to behold this
remarkable man, whose strange career they had heard out
lined in the recent election speeches ? His obscure bu-th in
the deep seclusion of the Kentucky forests; how he read
Weems' Life of Washington by the fiickering fireUght in an
humble pioneer cabin in Indiana ; how, as a taU emigrant-
boy, he split rails to fence his father's clearing in Illinois ;
how, launching his soUtary canoe on the Sangamon, he sought
his own fortune, becoming flatboatman, postmaster, deputy
county surveyor, and captain of volunteers in the Black
Hawk Indian War; how, commencing with a borrowed
Blackstone, he argued cases before neighborhood juries, fol
lowed itinerant Circuit Courts from county to county, and
gradually became the flrst lawyer in his State ; how in a
primitive community, where poUtics dealt with every office
from postmaster to President, he rose in pubUc service from
Eepresentative in the Vandalia Legislature to President
elect of the nation.
The people had also heard how this elevation was tried by
the touchstone of sleepless rivalry, of unscrupulous criticism,
of a mighty political conflict of party and of principle. How,
in the momentous slavery discussion of the day, he was the
champion who had overcome Douglas, the hitherto victori
ous Philistine of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill ; his matchless
deflnition of the political injustice of slavery, appUcable to
all nations and ages : " When the white man governs himseU,
that is self-government ; but when he governs himself and
also governs another man, that is more than self-govern
ment — that is despotism ; " his irrefutable statement of the
natural right of every man "to eat the bread, without leave
of anybody else, which his own hand earns ; " his prophetic
statesmanship, in declaring that " the Union cannot perma-

LINCOLN. 47
nently endure half slave and half free," four months before
Wm. H. Seward proclaimed the " irrepressible conflict."
So much, the newspapers, campaign documents, and
stump speakers had told the country. The remainder, which
his intimate Hlinois neighbors could have related, the peo
ple half divined from what they heard. That he had risen
from obscurity to fame, from ignorance to eloquence, from
want to rulership, uncontaminated by vice, undefiled by
temptation, without schools, without family influence, with
out wealth ; championed by no clique, fraternity, or sect ;
clinging to no skirt of corporation, interest, or combination ;
conspicuous without affectation, winning popularity without
art, and receiving consideration without parade ; rendering
his party not only every service it requested, but, by his tal
ent, leading it from despondency to success, and from suc
cess to renown ; meanwhile, at every stage of his career,
walking among his feUow-men with such irreproachable per
sonal conduct, that his very name grew into a proverb of in
tegrity, and passed among the XDeople of his entire State as
the genuine coin-current and recognized token of social,
moral, and political uprightness.
MaUcious gossip and friendly jest had both, during the
campaign, described the " railsplitter " candidate as possess
ing great personal ugliness ; this was now seen to be an utter
mistake. The people beheld in the new President a man six
feet four inches in height, a stature which of itself would be
hailed in any assemblage as one of the outward signs of
leadership ; joined to this was a spare but muscular frame,
and large and strongly marked features corresponding to his
unusual stature. Quiet in demeanor, but erect in bearing,
his face even in repose was not unattractive ; and when Ut up
by his open, genial smile, or illuminated in the utterance of
a strong or stirring thought, his countenance was positively

48 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
handsonie. His voice, pitched in rather a high key, but of
great cleamess and penetration, made his public remarks
audible to a wide circle of Usteners. His speeches were
short ; but his pithy, epigrammatic sentences, fuU of logical
directness and force, presented the questions of the hour in
new and unwonted aspects, which the exhaustive discussions
of the campaign had not yet reached.
It would be impossible within any short space to give an
analytic summary of the twenty to thirty short addresses he
delivered on this journey. But, so long as the nation shaU
live, every American ought to remember his thrUUng key
note of that crisis, uttered in his very flrst speech at Indian
apolis ; an admonition equaUy valuable to statesmen or peo
ple in every emergency which the future may bring. " The
people," said he, "when they rise in mass in behalf of the
Union and the Uberties of their country, truly may it be said,
' The gates of hell cannot prevail against them.' In aU try
ing positions in which I shall be placed — and doubtless I
shall be placed in many such — ^my reUance wiU be upon you
and the people of the United States ; and I wish you to re
member, now and forever, that it is your business and not
mine ; that if the Union of these States and the Uberties of
this people shall be lost, it is but Uttle to any one man of
fifty-two years of age, but a great deal to the thirty milUons
of people who inhabit these United States, and to their pos
terity in all coming time. It is your business to rise up and
preserve Union and liberty for youi-selves, and not for me."
For one thing Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet should be re
membered with gratitude. All winter long there had been
fears and rumors that the conspirators were maturing a plot
to seize the capital, the pubUc buildings, and the archives,
forcibly prevent the inauguration of Lincoln, and thus make
themselves the de facto successors of the Buchanan adminis-

LINCOLN. 49
tration. There were indeed many threats, boasts, and warn
ings, to justify apprehension on this soore, but an investiga
tion held by a Committee of Congress, disclosed no traceable
combination. Under such apprehension, however, Mr. Bu
chanan authorized General Scott to assemble sufficient
troops at Washington to insure both a peaceable count of
the electoral votes on February 13th, and the peaceable in
auguration of the President-elect, which latter event took
place with due formaUties, and in the presence of great
crowds, on the 4th of March, 1861.
Mr. Lincoln's inaugural address made a frank declaration
of his policy on the leading points of controversy. He re
peated that he had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to in
terfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it
existed. But he also asserted that the Union is perpetual ;
that secession resolves or ordinances are legaUy void ; that
acts of violence, within any State or States, against the au
thority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolu
tionary ; and that to the extent of his ability he should cause
the laws to be faithfully executed in all the States. The
Union would defend itself, hold its property and places, and
coUect the duties and imposts ; " but, beyond what may be
necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no
using of force against or among the people anywhere."
There should be no bloodshed or violence, unless forced up
on the national authority. Temporary discontent he would
tolerate ; the exercise of offices in disaffected districts he
would forego ; he would continue to furnish the mails unless
repelled ; he would endeavor to preserve that sense of per
fect security most favorable to calm thought and renewed
allegiance. An unanswerable argument against disunion
and an earnest appeal to reason and lawful remedy, he fol
lowed by a most impressive declaration of peace and gopd-
4

50 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
wiU : " In your hands, my dissatisfled fellow-countrymen,
and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The
Govemment will not assail you. You can have no conflict
without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath
registered in heaven to destroy the Governinent ; whUe I
shall have the most solemn one to preserve, protect, and
defend it."
Unhappily the burden and difficulty of administration was
already heavier than he or the public were aware. He had
come into office sharing the general beUef that Major Tknder-
son was secure iri his stronghold of Sumter untU the rebel
batteries should become powerful enough to. drive him out.
On the contrary, a subtler and more unfaUing enemy than
the rebels — starvation — ^was rapidly forcing the brave Uttle
garrison to surrender. On the morning after inauguration
letters from Sumter were put into the President's hands,
showing that the fort contained provisions for only a Uttle
more than a month longer, and adding the professional
opinion of Andersort and his officers that a weU-appointed
fleet and an army of twenty thousand men would be needed
to raise the siege, so formidable had the encircling rebel
batteries already become.
Such a fleet and such an army were not in existence, nor
could they be organized for many months. After mature
consideration General Scott advised the President that it was
practically impossible to reUeve or reinforce Sumter, and
that, as a mere military question, it was necessary to order its
evacuation. To Mr. Lincoln, who had only a few days before pubUcly
promised the nation that he would " hold, occupy, and pos
sess, the property and places belonging to the Government,"
this was indeed a trying alternative, He ordered a re-ex
amination of the whole subject, aud Cabinet, military, and

LINCOLN. 51
naval officers joined in its discussion. Among the plans of
reUef was one urged by Captain G. V. Fox, who, even under
General Scott's adverse criticism, convinced the President
and a majority of the Cabinet that he could, by means of
open boats and small tugs, in a dark night throw a small
quantity of provisions and a few men into the fort. The po
Utical aspects of the case, however, remained still to be con
sidered. The President, therefore, on March 15th propounded
to his Cabinet the written question, "Assuming it to be
possible to provision Fort Sumter, is it wise under all the
circumstances of the case to attempt to do so ? " To this
the Cabinet made written replies, five members arguing
against the policy of attempting reUef, and only two in its
favor. The majority, led by Mr. Seward, argued that any
possible reUef would only be temporary, and that a disastrous
failure, and the eventual loss of the fort would produce more
damaging political results, than to give it up at once under
the imperative military necessity already existing, and for
which the new administration was in no wise responsible.
Two or three collateral questions connected- themselves
with the main one. The exposed situation of Fort Pickens
had become known to Lincoln, and one of his earUest official
acts was to order its reinforcement from the fleet ; but of the
conditions of the January truce he was not informed. He was
therefore waiting in painful anxiety to receive news that his
order had been executed and Pickens reinforced, for the suc
cessful strengthening of that point would have an important
influence in deciding the question of Sumter.
Another secondary consideration was the attitude of Vir
ginia. Eebel influences in her Legislature had ordered a
State convention, to which convention her people had elected
a large majority of professedly loyal members. Their loyal
ty, however, was of a qualified sort, deeply tinctured with

52 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION,
factional prejudice, and irritated with the imaginary wrongs
of the South. Upon this element, rebel intrigue and con
spiracy were working with teUing effect ; and instead of de
claring and practising frank and direct adherence to the
Govemment, tl^e union members were fulminating baseless
complaints, demanding impossible guarantees, and pleading
indulgent excuses for the course of South Carolina and the
Cotton Eepublics. And this condition of misdirected and
unstable loyalty was also wide-spread among the leaders and
people of the Border States of Maryland, Kentucky, and
Missouri. How to deal with such a morbid and disturbed pubUc sen
timent—how to treat this unnatural, contradictory, and haU-
hearted allegiance, was a problem of direct bearing on the
Sumter question. Mr. Seward, optimist by nature, beUeved
and argued that the revolution throughout the South had
spent its force and was on the wane ; and that the evacuation
of Sumter, and the manifestation of kindness and confidence
to the Eebel and Border States, would undermine the con
spiracy, strengthen the union sentiment and union majori
ties, and restore allegiance and healthy poUtical action with
out resort to civil war.
Mr. Lincoln shared Seward's pacific incUnations, but not
his optimism. He deferred his decision ; gathered informa
tion from Anderson, from Charleston, from Eichmond, waited
in anxious suspense for news from Pickens. No substantial
encouragement, however, reached him from any quarter.
Anderson had no faith in a relief expedition. AU union sen
timent had disappeared from South CaroUna. The Virginia
Convention was evidently playing fast and loose with treason ;
and finally, General SoOtt was so far wrought upon by the
insane cry for concession to gratify the morbid patriotism
which yet found expression in the South, that he advised

LINCOLN. 53
the evacuation of Pickens as well as Sumter. To crown all,
news came that the commander of the fleet at Pensacola had
refused to allow the reinforcement of Fort Pickens from the
ships, because of Buchanan's January truce, and of the tech
nical objection that General Scott's order had not come
through the regular channels of the Navy Department.
Amid these growing difficulties and dangers Mr. Lincoln
felt that the time for decisive action had arrived. On March
29th a second and flnal cabinet discussion was held, in which
there appeared a change of sentiment. Four of his seven
counsellors now voted for an attempt to relieve Anderson,
and at the close of the meeting the President ordered the
preparation of the expedition proposed by Captain Fox.
Three ships of war, with a transport and three swift steam-
tugs, a supply of open boats, provisions for six months, and
two hundred recruits, were fltted out in New York with all
possible secrecy, and sailed from that port, after unforeseen
delays, on AprU 9th and 10th, under sealed orders to ren
dezvous before Charleston Harbor at daylight on the morn
ing of the llth.
Coincident with this, the President, deeming the safety of
Fort Pickens no less essential than that of Sumter, at once
sent new and peremptory orders to the commander of the
fleet, and also ordered the secret preparation of another and
separate naval expedition to stUl further strengthen that
post. The simultaneous preparation of the two produced a
certain confusion and mutual embarrassment ; but the latter
was got off flrst, and, arriving safely, increased the garrison
of Fort Pickens, including those aUeady landed from the
fleet, to 858 men, with provisions for six months, thus ren
dering it impregnable to rebel assault.
If we may credit abundant indications, the authorities at
Montgomery did not beUeve they would need to resort to

54 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
their guns. As soon as the provisional govemment was or
ganized, three rebel commissioners were appointed to pro
ceed to Washington to negotiate for " recognition," for " ad
justment of differences," and for possession of the federal
forts. Two efforts to obtain Sumter by intrigue had failed ;
nevertheless, they still had faith a third attempt might suc
ceed with the new administration.
Through a conspirator who still professed loyalty, they
presented their application to Mr. Seward, Secretary of
State. Mr. Seward answered courteously, but decidedly,
that the new administration could have nothing to do either
with the rebel government or its emissaries; and to a written
paper sent to the State Department by the commissioners,
he wrote an unofficial "memorandum" reply of the same
purport. This properly finished the negotiation ; but the
commissioners, authorized to do so by the govemment they
affected to represent, sought excuse to delay their departure,
and Associate Justice Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the
United States, volunteered to act as an unofficial intermedi
ary in continuing to press their errand upon the Secretary of
State. Campbell had at tho beginning publicly opposed se
cession and still professed loyalty ; and in that friendly and
patriotic guise was admitted by the Secretary of State to an
intimacy he could never have gained under his true colors.
It seems that Seward, in this unofficial intimacy, did not hesi
tate to tell CampbeU of his own willingness to give up Sum
ter, and of his beUef that the President, upon the recom
mendation of General Scott, would order its evacuation.
This was about the time of the flrst Cabinet discussion of
the direct proposition, when five members voted for evacua
tion and only two against it, and the general situation of
affairs strongly supported Mr. Seward's course of reasoning.
Whatever may have been his language, a patriot could not

LINCOLN. 55
have misunderstood it. But Campbell had meanwhile be
come so far committed to the cause of the conspiracy, that
he conveyed his information to the commissioners as a vir
tual pledge of the evacuation of Sumter, and they sent tho
news to Montgomery in high glee.
As a matter of fact. President Lincoln had not at that date
decided the Sumter question ; he was following his own sa
gacious logic in arriving at a conclusion, which was at least
partially reached on the 29th of March, when, as we have
seen, he made the order to prepare the reUef expedition.
By this time, Campbell, in extreme impatience to further re
bellion, was importuning Seward for explanation ; and Sew
ard, finding his former prediction at fault, thought it best
not to venture a new one. Upon consultation, therefore, the
President authorized him to carry to CampbeU the first and
only assurance the Administration ever made with regard to
Sumter — namely — ^that he would not change the military
status at Charleston without giving notice.
This, be it observed, occurred on the 1st of April, about
which time the poUcy of Seward favoring delay and concilia
tion finally and formally gave way before the President's
stronger self-assertion and his carefully matured purpose to
force rebelUon to put itself flagrantly and fatally in the
wrong by attacking Fort Sumter.

CHAPTER V
SUMTER.
Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, began about the 1st
of January to buUd batteries to isolate and reduce Fori
Sumter ; and the newly made General Beauregard was on
the 1st of March sent by the rebel govemment to Charleston
to assume direction of miUtaiy affairs and to complete the
preparations for its capture. The Govemor had been ex
ceedingly anxious that the capture should be attempted be
fore the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's presidential term —
that is, between the 12th. of February and the 4th of Mai'ch.
" Mr. Buchanan cannot resist,'' wrote the Govemor to Jeffer
son Davis, " because he has .not the power. Mr. Lincoln
may not attack, because the cause of quarrel wiU have been,
or may be considered by him, as past." But the rebel Presi
dent doubtless thought it unwise to risk offending and alien
ating his party friends at the North by placing the responsi
bility of such an affront and loss upon their administration.
Even when General Beauregard came, the Govemor was ad
monished that no attack must be attempted without mature i
preparation, as a failure would seriously demoralize and per
haps prematurely wreck the rebelUon.
Beauregard found, as he reports, that Sumter was natu
rally " a perfect Gibraltar," and that only the weakness of
the garrison rendered its capture reasonably feasible. He

SUMTER. 57
therefore set himself to work, flrst of all, to devise obstruc
tions and defences against expected reinforcements, and sec
ondly, to build battqjies to breach the walls. He was him
seU a skilful engineer ; many of the works were aUeady well
advanced ; there was an ample supply of guns and mortars ;
he had but to make requisitions to obtain unUmited slave
labor to do the drudgery of ditching and raising embank
ments ; his improvised volunteer army could give all their
time to driU and artillery practice ; and, most favorable of all,
this work went on in certain immunity from any molestation
except through the chance of a relieving expedition to come
by sea. The commander was ambitious, the men were en
thusiastic, and the Govemor untiring in his revolutionary
ardor and impatience. It is, therefore, Uttle wonder that,
after a month of laborious effort and co-operation, Beaure
gard telegraphed (April 1st) to Montgomery : " Batteries
ready to open Wednesday or Thursday. What instructions ? "
Up to this time the rebel government indulged the pleas
ing hope that Lincoln would give up the fort and save them
the dreaded ordeal of war. Justice Campbell had ingeni
ously misreported the sense and purport of Seward's conver
sations ; and the commissioners and their Washington cronies,
with equally blind zeal, sent rosy despatches on the strength
of exaggerated street-rumors. So confident were they of
such a result that Governor Pickens, Secretary Walker, and
General Beauregard found some difficulty in settling among
themselves the exact conditions upon which they would per
mit Anderson and his garrison to depart when the order to
evacuate Sumter should be sent him.
The illusion began to fade away on the 1st of April, when
Commissioner Crawford telegraphed to Governor Pickens :
" I am authorized to say this Government will not undertake
to supply Sumter without notice to you." This language

58 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
did not resemble the order for evacuation they had been im
patiently expecting, and the rebel authorities at once deter
mined to make Anderson feel the pressure of the siege.
Next day, orders were issued to stop all courtesies to the
garrison ; to prohibit all suppUes from the city ; to permit
no one to depart from the fort, and to estabUsh the rigid
surveillance of hostile lines.
Anderson himself, relying upon rebel rumors and Craw
ford's baseless despatches, appears to have made up his mind
that the garrison would be withdrawn; and he expresses
himself as being " greatly surprised " when on AprU 7th he
received a confidential letter, drafted by Lincoln, but copied
and signed by Cameron, under date of AprU 4th, informidg
him that a relieving expedition would be sent ; requesting
him to hold out, if possible, till its arrival ; stating also,
however, that the President desired to subject him and his
command to no unusual danger or hardship beyond those
common in military life, and therefore authorizing him to
capitulate when in his judgment it might become necessary.
One of the few faults chargeable to Anderson is that to this
thoughtful and considerate instruction, framed by Lincoln
himself (but which he supposed to be the language of Cam
eron), he repUed in a petulant and ill-natured spirit, writing:
"I frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is
to be thus commenced." His subsequent gaUantiy, and
steadfast loyalty, however, justify his countrymen in a Ub
eral forgiveness of the passing indiscretion. It turned out
curiously enough that Anderson's letter was, through a dis
honorable trick of the rebels, captured by them and sent
to Montgomery, where during the whole war it remained
buried in the Confederate archives, and hence the offensive
sentence never came to the knowledge of the kind-hearted
and generous Lincoln.

SUMTER. 59
Following the notice received through Crawford, the re
bels were for about a week in a tantalizing fever of sus
pense and uncertainty. The most contradictory telegrams
cair),e fi'om their commissioners and secret advisers in Wash
ington ; the most perplexing and misleading mmors reached
them from New York. The war powers of the Union were
clearly enough astir; troops were moving and ships were
loading ; but for what object? Was their destination Sum
ter or Pickens, New Orleans, or St. Domingo? Different
circumstances i^ointed to any or either of these places, but
the most subtle espionage failed to obtain the certain clue.
The mystery was flnally solved on the evening of April Sth.
A govemment messenger arrived in Charleston, reported
himself to Govemor Pickens, and was immediately admitted
by him to an interview at which General Beauregard was
present. The messenger read to them an official communi
cation, drafted by President Lincoln. It ran as follows :
" I am directed by the President of the United States to
notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort
Sumter with provisions only, and that if such attempt be
not resisted, no effort to throw in provisions, arms, or am
munition will be made without further notice, or in case of
an attack upon the fort."
The next morning after this notice was read to 'Governor
Pickens and General Beauregard in Charleston, the main
portion of the relieving expedition, under command of Cap
tain G. V. Fox, sailed from New York Harbor. It consisted
of the transport Baltic with the provisions and contingent
reinforcements, the war-steamers Pawnee, Pocahontas, Har
riet Lane, and the steam-tugs Uncle Ben, Yankee, and Free
born. The fieet had orders to rendezvous ten miles east of
Charleston Harbor on the morning of April llth. The in
structions to Captain Fox were short, but explicit ; " You will

60 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
take charge," wrote the Secretary of War, " of the transports
in New York, having the troops and supplies on board, and
endeavor in the first instance to deUver the subsistence. If
you are opposed in this, you are directed to report the fact
to the senior naval officer of the harbor, who wiU be in
structed by the Secretary of the Navy to use his entire force
to open a passage, when you will, if possible, effect an en
trance, and place both troops and supplies in Fort Sumter."
Lincoln's notice having been communicated to the Con
federate authorities in Montgomery, Jefferson Davis and his
compeers in revolution resolved to begin the war without
further delay. To permit provisions to be sent to Anderson,
after three months of battery-building, would jeopardize the
confidence and adhesion of the ultra fire-eaters, and suffer
the insurrection to collapse. The notice was received on
the evening of April Sth ; next day, the 9th, appears to have
been spent in deliberation and in verifying the situation by
inquiries from the rebel commissioners in Washington ; on
the 10th, Beauregard was instructed to demand the evacua
tion of Sumter, and, in case of refusal, to reduce it. At two
o'clock in the afternoon of the following day (April llth), he
sent two of his aids to make the demand, in answer to which
Anderson, with the unanimous concurrence of his officers,
wrote a prompt refusal. The occasion seems to have caUed
out some general conversation, in the course of which An
derson said to the aids : " I will await the first shot, and if
you do not batter us to pieces, we will be starved out in a
few days." The remark repealed to Beauregard and to
Montgomery, caused the impression that Anderson desired
to capitulate, and another message was sent him, offering to
permit him to do so at his own convenience, if he would
designate the time, and agree in the meanwhUe not to use
his guns against the rebels unless they should fire on Sum-

SUMTER. 61
ter. Anderson was shrewd enough to see that this would
leave their guns free to beat back the fleet, and shaped his
reply accordingly. He stated that he would evacuate the
fort by noon on the 15th of April, " and that I will not, in
the. meantime, open my flres upon your forces, unless com
peUed to do so by some hostile act against this fort or the
flag of my Govemment, by the forces under your command,
or some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act
showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort or
the flag it bears, should I not receive, prior to that time,
controlling instructions from my Government, or additional
supplies." This reply was, of course, unsatisfactory to the
rebels. The interchange of these several messages had consumed
the afternoon and night of April llth, and at 3:20 a.m., of
the moming of April 12th, Beauregard's aids handed Ander
son a note stating that he would open flre upon Sumter in
one hour from that time.
The inhabitants of Charleston had now for more than
three months foUowed the development of secession and re
belUon with unflagging zeal and daily interest, until they
began to regard the affairs of Sumter as their own pet and
exclusive drama. It had afforded them excitement upon ex
citement — speeches, meetings, drills, parades, flag-raisings,
bonflres, salutes, music, and banners ; reaching into their
social and family life, it had carried their fathers, sons,
brothers, and friends away into the camps and trenches.
Sumter had been their daily talk and nightly dream ; and
this interest grew into a morbid curiosity as the drama ap
proached its long-predicted climax. There had been little
or no effort to conceal the changing aspects of preparations
and orders during the last few days ; and, as a result, the
general populace of the city became informed, almost as weU

62 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
as the officers, of the precise hour when the bombardment
would begin. In the gray and yet uncertain twiUght of this
April morning, therefore, the Charlestonians of all ages and
sexes came thronging down the streets to the wharves of the
city, to find favorable locations for viewing the coming spec
tacle, in something of the spirit in wliich Eome of the
Csesars crowded to the CoUseum to witness the savage and
sanguinary combats of the arena.
At half-past four o'clock, on the moming of April 12th,
1861, while yet the lingering night lay upon the waters of
the bay, leaving even the outUne of Fort Sumter scarcely
discernible, the assembled spectators saw a flash from the
mortar battery near old Fort Johnson, on the south side of
the harbor, and an instant after a bombshell rose in a slow,
liigh curve through the air, and fell upon the fort. To the
beholders it was the inauguration of the final scene in 'their
local drama ; to the nation and world at large, it began a
conflict of such gigantic proportions and far-reaching conse
quence, that it will forever stand as one of the boldest land
marks in Mstory. Gun after gun responded to the signal,
until, in the course of another hour, all the encircUng rebel
batteries were in the heat and activity of a general bombard
ment. Universal wonder was created at the time, and continued
curiosity has been excited since, by the fact that this bom
bardment, ending in the surrender of the fort, should have
continued for the space of thirty-six hours without the loss
of a single Ufe in the besieged garrison. The apparent mys
tery is easily enough understood when we come to study
and comprehend the exact conditions and course of tho
fight. Fort Sumter was a work dating from comparatively recent
times, built of brick upon an artificial island formed in tho

SUMTER. 63
shallows nearly midway at the entrance of Charleston har
bor. It was a flve-sided structure, about three hundred by
three hundred and flfty feet in size; its walls were some
eight feet thick and forty feet high. It was capable of
mounting one hundred and forty guns, two tiers in case
mates and one behind the parapet. When Anderson took
possession of it the preceding Christmas, the casemates
were in an unflnished condition, and only a few guns were '
mounted. Captain Foster, the accomplished engineer of the
fort, had, however, since then, by the many expedients
Imown to military science, and by help of a considerable
force of workmen and laborers, pushed its defences forward
to a state of relative completeness, even with the limited
means and materials within the fort. Most of the embra
sures of the lower tier of casemates were closed. A total
armament of forty-eight guns was ready for use. Of these
twenty-one were in the casemates, and twenty-seven on the
rampart, en barbette. The garrison consisted of nine com
missioned officers, sixty-eight non-commissioned officers and
privates, eight musicians, and forty-three non-combatant
workmen, to whom, during the last ten days, the besiegeis
had refused permission to depart, in order that they might
help consume Anderson's small stock of provisions, and thus
hasten the process of reducing the fort by starvation.
The rebels had built their siege-works on the approaching
points of the islands forming the harbor. These lay in a sort
of triangle about the fort : Sullivan's Island, containing Fort
Moultrie, to the northeast at a distance of 1,800 yards ; Cum-
ming's Point, on Morris Island, to the south at a distance of
1,300 yards ; and on James Island, near old Fort Johnson, to
the west at a distance of 2,500 yards. Their total armament
embraced forty-seven guns.
Thus, in numbers, the armaments ai^peared about equal,

64 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
but the existing conditions created an immense disparity.
Anderson's flre was diffused ; the rebel fire was concentrated.
Anderson's barbette guns, more than haU his pieces, were
exposed ; most of the rebel guns were sheltered in bomb-
proofs of palmetto logs and sand ; some protected with slop
ing roofs of railroad iron. Anderson had only a garrison of
128 souls all told ; while a volunteer force of from four to
six thousand supported the rebel batteries. The greatest
difference, however, was in the quaUty of the ordnance.
Anderson's guns could only deUver a horizontal fire against
the besiegers' earth-walls and bomb-proofs. But seventeen
of the rebel pieces were mortars, deUvering what is termed
a vertical fire ; that is, throwing their bursting shells by
means of a high curve through the air, so as to drop down
upon the parapet and inside the walls of the besieged fort.
The garrison of Sumter, notwithstanding its tedious con
finement, was in excellent spirit, and, since the long appre
hended contest had finally come, was quite ready to make a
manful resistance. Even the forty-three non-combatant
workmen caught the impulse of fight and freely volunteered
their help. The needful preparations had been already
made, and since the 10th every one had by order changed
his quarters into the gun casemates. Here they were se
curely housed when at 4.30 a.m. the rebel cannonade began.
It was not yet daylight, and for some hours the fort made
no reply, but lay in the morning twilight as sUent and ap
parently as unconcerned as if it were tenantless. The ra
tions had aheady become uncomfortably short ; the last bar
rel of flour was issued two or three days before, and now
there was little left to subsist upon except pork and water.
On this mainly the command made a breakfast, and at about
seven o'clock Captain Abner Doubleday flred the flrst gun
from the fort at an iron-clad battery on Cumming's Point.

SUMTER. 65
EeUefs were stationed at other guns, and soon Sumter was
sending back a spirited reply.
The three hours of unopposed bombardment from the
rebel batteries had by this time already determined one im
portant phase of the flght. CarefuUy watching the effect of
the enemy's cannonade, it was apparent, without further ques
tion, that under the concentrated missUes of their guns, and
particularly because of the precision of their vertical fire, it
would be folly to expose the gunners on the rampart or the
open parade of the fort. Had Sumter contained a full war
garrison, new men could have replaced those kUled or dis
abled ; but, with his slender force, Anderson decided that he
could not afford this risk, and therefore at once ordered an
abandonment of all the barbette guns and a few mounted on
the parade to throw shells, restricting the men rigidly to the
casemates. Thus at one swoop his fighting armament was
reduced more than one-half. This, however, was not the
worst ; it practically annihilated the offensive strength of the
fort. Of the twenty-one casemate guns but four were forty-
two pounders , the rest only thirty-twos, a weight of metal of
Uttle avail against the enemy's strong earthworks and iron
roofs. In this way the cannonade went actively on during the
forenoon of April 12th, without much damage or effect, ex
cept upon the buildings in both Sumter and Moultrie, ordi
narily occupied as barracks and quarters. Sumter suffered
most in this respect : the balls striking the face of its walls
merely buried themselves in the brick-work, without passing
through ; but those which nearly or quite grazed the para
pet, in their faU took the buildings or wall in reverse, com
ing as they did from three sides. The men, however, while
sheltered in casemates, were beyond the reach of these mis
sUes. So too of the bombs. Falling on the parapet and the
5 7

66 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
open parade of Sumter and exploding, their destructive force
spent itself upon mere inanimate material.
About noon Anderson's men found they had been working
with too much ardor ; that their stock of 700 cartridges would
soon be exhausted. They set themselves to work to remedy
this deficiency, though with small speed, for they had only
sis needles in the fort with which to sew up cartridge-bags.
Toward one o'clock a new hope cheered them ; they saw
two ships, and soon after a third, bearing the stars and
stripes, appear off the harbor ; it was a part of the reUeving
expedition they had been warned to expect. Unfortunately,.
it proved unable to succor the fort either on that or the suc
ceeding day. Through a confusion of orders, the fiagship of
the squadron with its commanding officer, and the instruc
tions for this emergency, and having on board also the saU-
ors who were required to man the boats to carry the suppUes
and soldiers to Sumter, had been detached from this duty
and sent to the Gulf of Mexico. A severe storm delayed
some of the vessels, and prevented the tugs from reaching
the harbor ; and this storm also prevented the officers from
making use of the limited resources remaining. Therefore,
to their chagrin, they and their men were forced by these
untoward circumstances, and through no neglect of their
own, to remain for twenty-four hours little else than specta
tors of the bombardment to its close.
During the afternoon of the first day Sumter kept up its
fire, though with greatly slackened speed. Only six guns
were kept in action for the remainder of the day : two
against Cumming's Point on the south, and four against Fort
Moultrie and other batteries on Sullivan's Island to the
north. At nightfall even these ceased, as also did most of
the guns in the rebel batteries ; their mortars, however,
keeping up a sullen and steady discharge of bombs upon

SUMTER. 67
the fort at intervals of about ten minutes, the whole of the
dark and stormy night which followed.
On the morning of the second day, April 13th, the rebels
began their general cannonade with both increased vigor
and increased precision ; to whicli the garrison, after its
breakfast of pork and water, and having somewhat replen
ished its stock of cartridges, again made a " spiteful " reply.
It is impossible to estimate how long this mere interchange
of shot and shell might have continued, had not other ele
ments intervened to bring the combat to a close.
On three of the five sides of Sumter, just inside the walls,
stood long and substantial buildings used as barracks, offi
cers' quarters, and for other purposes. These had been sev
eral times set on Aire by hot shot during the flrst day, though
as often readily extinguished by the garrison. The rebels
had not faUed to notice the effect ; and on the second mom
ing their use of these missiles became more frequent. About
nine o'clock of the second day these buildings were once
more in a blaze, and this time the fire caught in a portion
of the roof of the officers' quarters which it was not imme
diately possible for the men to reach. The flames were
quickly beyond control ; and now the serious problem was
to remove as much powder from the magazine as might be
needed for use, before that proceeding should become im
possible. Fifty barrels were thus obtained and distributed
about the casemates, when it was necessary to close and se
cure the door of the magazine.
Thus, by noon of the second day, the inmates of the fort
were exposed, not alone to the peril of the enemy's shot and
shell, but also to the immediate discomfort and danger of a
serious conflagration. Within the Umited area of the fort
the heat became intense ; the air was fllled with floating
cinders ; and, blown downward by the current of the sea-

68 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
breeze, a stifling, bUnding smoke flnally drove the men into
the casemates, and even to these retreats the floating fire-
flakes pursued them. The situation became too dangerous
to keep the fifty barrels of powder rescued from the maga
zine ; by order of Anderson, all but five were rolled out of
the embrasures into the sea.
About one o'clock the flagstaff of the fort was shot away,
having been hit a number of times previously ; and, although
the flag was soon after again raised on a jury-mast on the
parapet, the clouds of smoke concealed it from the rebel
view. Seeing the great conflagration, the disappearance of
the flag, and a total cessation of flre from Sumter's guns,
they not unreasonably concluded that the garrison was
ready to surrender. The eccentric Senator WigfaU, doing
duty as a volunteer aid on one of the islands, -was sent by a
subordinate officer to ascertain the fact ; and, being brought
before the commander, with more grandUoquence thanau-
thority, offered to permit Anderson to name his own.t^rms of
evacuation. Anderson repUed that he would accjept the
terms offered him by Beauregard at the time of pis first
summons, on the llth. WigfaU thereupon ret^aaied to his
post, where, in turn, with more enthusiasm than memory, he
reported an unconditional surrender. Meanwhile', three aids
arrived direct from Beauregard, with an offer of assistance
to extinguish the flames, and the misunderstanding became
apparent. Anderson, in some anger, was disposed to renew his
flght ; upon suggestion of the aids, however, he waited tUl the
blunder could be referred to Beauregard. This commander
reconciled all difficulty by agreeing to Anderson's proposal ;
and at noon of the following day, Sunday, April 14, 1861, the
faithful commander and his faithful garrison, with an impres
sive ceremony of prayer and salute, hauled down the flag of
the United States, and evacuated Fort Sumter.

CHAPTEE VI.
THE CALL TO ARMS.
The assault upon Fort Sumter had doubtless been ordered
by the rebel govemment under the hope, if not the belief,
that it would not provoke immediate or widespread civil
war. It is probable that they anticipated it would bring on
miUtary movements and measures of a local and defensive
character ; but neither the size of the Federal army, nor the
very Umited war organization set on foot by the rebel con
gress, pointed as yet to hostilities on an extended scale.
The South well knew that the frontier could not be entirely
stripped of regulars; they assumed, or so pretended, that
existing laws authorized no call of the militia ; and, judging
from the neglect of Congress, at its recent session,, to pass a
force bill, they might reasonably infer that it would be dif-
flcult for the new administration to obtain coercive legisla
tion. Most of all, however, they relied upon a friendly feel
ing toward the South from their late Democratic party
alUes. Throughout the last presidential election, Northem
Democrats had magnified Southern complaints as insuffer
able grievances, and predicted the coming revolution as a
terror to obstinate voters. President Buchanan even went
so far in his annual message as to assert that a neglect of
Northern States to repeal their personal Uberty laws would
justify the South in revolutionary resistance. The news-

70 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
paper press was full of kindred echoes. Potent puftUc
voices had declared that the North would not entertain —
nay, would not permit, a policy of subjugation. Ex- Presi
dent Franklin Pierce — Buchanan's predecessor — had given
Jefferson Davis very broad confidential assurances on this
head. "Without discussing the question of right," wrote
he, January 6, 1860, " of abstract power to secede, I have
never beUeved that actual disruption of the Union can occur
without blood; and if, through the madness of Northem
Abolitionism, that dire calamity must come, the flghting
will not be along Mason's and Dixon's line merely. It [will]
be within our own borders, in our own streets, between the
two classes of citizens to whom I have referred. Those who
defy law and scout constitutional obligations wUl, if we ever
reach the arbitrament of arms, flnd occupation enough at
home." As the oracle of another faction, Douglas had made an
elaborate argument in the Senate to show that the President
possessed no right of coercion ; repeating the theory of Bu
chanan's message, that the army and navy and the militia of
the States could not move except behind a marshal with his
writ, and that both the tongue and the arms of justice were
dead in South Carolina. Similar encouragement came from
many individuals of lesser note. It even appeared that the
spirit of secession was flnding a lodgment in the North. A
member had declared on the floor of Congress that the Em
pire State would set up her own separate sovereignty ; while
in a still more radical ambition the Mayor of New York City,
in an official message, proposed the secession of that me
tropolis, and its assumption of territorial independence as a
" free city." The firing on the Star of the West, in Januaiy,
had in a slight degree touched the national pride, and some
what checked the gathering current of seditious utterance ;

THE CALL TO ARMS. 71
but there was no lack of cUques and coteries in the great'
cities of the North who secretly nursed plots and projects
contingent on possible insurrectionary commotions and
chances. One of the rebel commissioners to Washington, in
the interim during which Justice Campbell relieved them of
their labors of diplomatic intrigue, visited New York, where
he was waited upon by the spokesman of one of these North
em cabals, who poured into the ears of his credulous lis
tener the recital of a most marvellous scheme of local con
spiracy. Two hundred of New York's best citizens, he said,
were at that moment elaborating a plan to secede from both
the Union and the State, seize the navy yard at Brooklyn,
and the forts in the harbor, and declare New York a free
city. The informant was perhaps an adventurer anxious to
pocket a liberal subsidy ; yet, as an echo of Mayor Wood's
official proposition, the incident was not without its signifi
cance, and the eager commissioner repeated the tale by let
ter to Jefferson Davis, countersigned by his own personal
faith that there was " something in it."
Jefferson Davis was by far too shrewd a leader to look for
a literal fulfilment of any of these extravagant predictions
or projects ; but they afforded him a substantial basis for the
beUef that this class of sentiment would at least oppose and
thwart the new administration in any quick or extended
measures to suppress the " confederate " revolt.
On the part of the North, also, there had been grave mis
apprehension of the actual state of Southern opinion. For
ten years the Southern threats of disunion had been empty
bluster. The half-disclosed conspiracy of 1856 did not
seem to extend beyond a few notorious agitators. The more
serious revolutionary signs of the last three months — the re
tirement of Southern members from' Congress, the secession
of States, the seizure of federal forts, and the formation of

72 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
the Montgomery provisional govemment — ^were not realized
in their full force by the North, because of the general con
fusion of poUtics, the rush and hurry of events, the delusive
hopes of compromise held out by Congressional committees
and factions, and the high-sounding professions of the
Washington peace conference. More potent than all was
the imderlying disbeUef of the North that the people at
large in the South felt the. stress of any real grievance. The
loss of slave runaways was their most tangible accusation.
Would that evil be cured by moving the Canada Une down
to the Ohio ? If separate nationaUty was the object, could
ten millions overcome twenty milUons? — could precarious
Southem credit cope with the soUd accumulations of North
ern capital ? — could a monotonous Southem agriculture try
expedients with the famous mechanical skiU of the Free
States ? — could cotton crops feed armies Uke the great com,
wheat, hay, pork, and cattle regions ? — and finaUy, would the
great West permit a foreign fiag to close or cover the mouth
of the Mississippi ? The bare suggestion seemed, and was,
nonsense. They indeed saw clearly enough the ambition,
treachery, and desperation of certain Southem leaders ; but
the North did not beUeve that these leaders could, in Yan
cey's language, " precipitate the Cotton States into a revolu
tion " ; that passing chagrin over a lost election could goad
the whole Southern people, without substantial cause, into
the horror and ruin of a hopeless ciril war.
The firing on Sumter cleared up the poUtical atmos
phere as if by magic. The roar of Beauregard's guns
changed incredulity into fact. There was no longer room
for doubt. This was no mere emevte. Seven seceding
States, with their machinery of local govemment and the
crazy zeal of an inflamed reaction, stood behind the guns.
The cool deUberation of the assault betokened plan, pur-

THE CALL TO ARMS. 73
pose, and confldence. The conspiracy had given way to
revolution. The news of the assault on Sumter reached Washington
on Saturday, April 13th ; on Sunday moming, the 14th, tbe
President and Cabinet were met to discuss the surrender
and evacuation. Sunday, though it was, Lincoln with his
own hand immediately drafted the following proclamation,
which was dated, issued, telegraphed, and pubUshed to the
whole country on Monday morning, April 15th.

"PROCLAMATION
" BY THE PRESIDENT OP THE UNITED STATES.
"Whereas, the laws of the United States have been for some time
past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed in the
States of South Carolina, GPporgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Lou
isiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in
the marshals by law : now therefore, I, Abkaham Lincoln, President
of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Con
stitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call
forth the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate
number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combina
tions and to cause the laws to be duly executed. *
" The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the
State authorities through the War Department. I appeal to all loyal
citizens to favor, fa,oilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor,
the integrity, and existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity
of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough en
dured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the
forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts,
places, and property which have been seized from the Union ; and in
every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the ob
jects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or inter-
4

74 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
ference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any
part of the country ; and I hereby command the persons composing the
combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respec
tive abodes witliin twenty days from this date.
" Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an ex
traordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested
by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and
Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their re
spective chambers at twelve o'clock, noon, on Thursday, the fourth day
of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures
as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to de
mand. " In witness whereof , I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
Beal of the United States to be affixed.
" Done at the City of Washington, this fifteenth day of April, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and di the
independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.
"ABrAaM LINCOLN.
" By the President.
" William H. Sewakd, Secretary of State."
The possible contingency foreshadowed by Lincoln in his
Trenton address had come ; and he not only redeemed his
promise to " put the foot down flrmly," but he took care to
place it on a solid foimdation. NominaUy the caU of the
militia was based on the Act of 1795. But the broad lan
guage of the p:^oclamation was an " appeal to all loyal citi
zens to favor, faciUtate, and aid this effort to maintain the
honor, the integrity, and existence of our National Union, and
the perpetuity of popular government." The President had
taken care to so shape the issue — so to strip it of all provo
cation or ingenious excuse, as to show the reckless maUgnity
of the rebellion in showering red-hot shot on a starving gar
rison ; he now asked the people to maintain their assaulted
dignity and outraged authority ; touching not merely the
machinery of forms and statutes, but invoking directly that

THE CALL TO ARMS. 75
spirit of free government to preserve itself, against which in
his opinion " the gates of hell " could not prevail.
The correctness of his faith was equal to the wisdom of
his poUcy; for now there was seen one of those mighty
manifestations of national wUl and national strength that
mark the grand epochs of civiUzed history. The whole
countiy seemed to awaken as from the trouble of a feverish
dream, and once again men entered upon a conscious recog
nition of their proper relations to the Govemment. Cross-
purpose and perplexed counsel faded from the pubUc mind.
Parties vanished from politics. Universal opinion recog
nized but two raUying-points — the camps of the South
which gathered to assail the Union, and the armies of the
North that rose to defend it.
From every Goveteor of the Free States came a prompt re
sponse of readiness to furnish to the President the desired
quota of miUtia. In almost every county of the North was
begun the enUstment of volunteers. Meetings, speeches,
and parades voiced the pubUc exhortation to patriotism.
Flags and badges symbolized an eager and universal loyalty.
Munificent individual donations, and subscriptions, and Ub
eral appropriations from State Legislatures and municipal
councils, poured forth lavish contributions to arm, clothe,
and equip the recruits. More than double the number of
men required tendered their service. Before the lapse of
forty-eight hours, armed companies and regiments of volun
teers were in motion toward the expected border of conflict.
PubUo opinion became intolerant of dissent and cavil; in
many instances tumultuous mobs silenced or destroyed
newspapers which had ventured to print disloyal or treason
able language. There was not the sUghtest sign or move
ment of the predicted division of Northem sentiment. New
York joyfully ranged herself under the flag in a monster

76 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
meeting of two hundred thousand of her people. Before
the surging crowds that fllled the streets, and drowned aU
noises in their huzzas for the Union, the New York Herald
displayed the stars and stripes, and changed its editorials
from a tone of sneering lament to a fierce and incessant
war-cry. Every prominent individual in the whole North
was called or came voluntarily to prompt espousal of the
Union cause by public letter or speech. Ex-President
Buchanan, ex-President Pierce, Edward Everett, General
Cass, Archbishop Hughes, Mayor Fernando Wood, John A.
Dix, WendeU PhilUps, Eobert J. WaUier, Wm. M. Evarts,
Edward D. Baker, Darid Dudley Field, John J. Crittenden,
Caleb Gushing, Hannibal Hamlin, Democrats and EepubU
cans, conservatives and radicals, natives and foreigners.
Catholics and Protestants, Maine and Olegon, aU uttered a
common call to their countrymen to come to the defence of
the Constitution, the Govemment, and the Union. Of aU
these recognized public leaders, however, the most energetic
and powerful, next to Lincoln, was Stephen A. Douglas, who
in the late election had received 1,128,049 Northem votes,
and 163,525 Southem votes for President. As ah-eady men
tioned, he had, in a bold Senate speech, aimounced himseU
as opposed to a poUcy of coercion. But the wanton bom
bardment of Sumter exhausted his party patience, and
stirred his patriotic blood to fresher and healthier impulses.
On Sunday, April 14th, when the proclamation had not yet
been many hours written and /signed, he sought his life
long poUtical antagonist, Abraham Lincoln, now President of
the United States, and, in a long, oonfldential interriew, as
sured him of his readiness to join him in unrelenting war
fare against rebeUion. The next morning's telegraphic de
spatches gave the country an authorized notice of the patri
otic alliance. In a few days he started to his. home in Illi-

THE CALL TO ARMS. 77
nois ; and everywhere on his journey, and until his sudden
death a few weeks later, he scarcely ceased his eloquent ap
peal to his fellow-citizens to rise in vindication of good
faith, of system, of order in govemment ; declaring, with sen
tentious vigor, " every man must be for the United States or
against it ; there can be no neutrals in this war — only pa
triots and traitors.''
Such was the grand uprising of the North. The South,
aU-eady for three months past in the turmoil of insurrection,
was once more quickened to a new activity in her fatal enter
prise. She felt that the assault on Sumter was her flnal cast
of the die. Her people are proud and impetuous, stronger
in physical than in -moral courage, more prone to daring in
behalf of error than of suffering to sustain truth. This qual
ity v/as shrewdly recognized by one of the conspirators when
he gave his hesitating confederates the brutal watchword :
"You must sprinkle blood in the faces of the people."
Sumter was a bloodless conquest, but it nevertheless fiUed
the South with the intoxication of combat. AU sentiment
adverse to secession and Southem independence had long
since disappeared under the repression of a despotic public
opinion ; but now the fervor of a fanatical crusade transfused
the whole Southern population ; and their motley array of
palmetto banners, rattlesnake flags, and almost as eccentric
varieties of "stars and bars," became, in their wild political
lunacy, the symbols of a holy deUverance.
The Sumter bombardment, Lincoln's proclamation, and
the enthusiastic war-spirit of the North, left the Confeder
ate authorities at Montgomery no further hope of obtaining
peaceable separation by diplomacy or intrigue. In their
scheme of independence, while counting, with much greater
accuracy than outsiders, upon the latent military resources
of the South, they nevertheless seem to have based their

78 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
ultimate reliance upon foreign intervention in their behalf.
" Cotton is king," they argued ; Europe cannot exist without
it ; therefore, when American civil war locks up that daily
food of European looms, and takes the means of earning
daUy bread from foreign labor, dividends from foreign capi
tal, and activity from foreign commerce, European govern
ments must open our ports by recognizing and protecting
our flag, especially if, in addition to their needed manufac
turing staple, we tempt them with the commercial harvest
of free trade.
As the entering wedge to this poUcy, Jefferson Davis, on
the 17th of April, issued his proclamation, offering letters of
marque and reprisal, " under the seal of these Confederate
States," to armed privateers of any nation. The commercial
classes of England had, since the secession of South Caro
Una, manifested a strong sympathy for the rebelUon, and he
doubtless expected that the seas would soon swarm with pred
atory adventurers under shelter of the " stars and bars." A
few vessels of this character did, in the subsequent years of
the war, inflict incalculable damage upon shipping saiUng
under the Federal flag; but the extravagant scheme, of
which this privateering proclamation was the key-note, with
ered in an early blight. Two days after its appearance
President Lincoln issued a counter-proclamation, instituting
a rigid blockade of the insurgent ports, and threatening that
Jefferson Davis' privateers should be " held amenable to the
laws of the United States for the prevention and punish
ment of piracy '' — a warning which, from motives of pubUo
policy and the humane personal instincts of the President,
was not Uterally enforced. The imexampled increase of the
United States Navy, the extra'ordinaiy efficiency of the block
ade, the vigilant foreign diplomatic service of the adminis
tration, and, above all, its rigorous prosecution of the war,

THE CALL TO ARMS. 79
left foreign powers no sufficient excuse, and overawed all
passing temptations to intervene. And when the hour of
distress and trial flnally came to the industrial classes of
England, the noble devotion of the Manchester cotton oper
atives to universal Uberty put to shame and impotence the
greedy cupidity of the cotton merchants of Liverpool.
In addition to the six or seven thousand rebel troops as
sembled at Charleston to aid in the reduction of Sumter, and
the four or five thousand sent to Pensacola to undertake the
capture of Fort Pickens, Jefferson Davis' Secretaiy of War
had, in anticipation of the results of the bombardment, on the
Sth of April called upon the seceded States for a contingent
of 20,000, to which there was again, on the 16th of April, added
a further call of 34,000 volunteers.' In seizing the Southem
ai'senals the seceded States had become possessed of over one
hundred thousand "serviceable" arms; at least thu-ty thou
sand others had been secured by purchase from Secretary
Floyd. The arsenals also contained considerable quantities of
miUtary equipments. A variety of military stores were among
the property surrendered by Twiggs in Texas ; the seaboard
forts, particularly those in Charleston Harbor, furnished a
supply of heavy guns. Southern recruits were abundant ;
and out of these ready materials the Montgomery authorities
proceeded as rapidly as possible, with the assistance of many
skilful officers resigned or deserted from the Federal service,
to improvise an army. Diplomatic agents were sent in haste
to European courts. Measures were taken to thoroughly
fortify the coast ; permission was sought from the neighbor
ing States to blockade the Mississippi Eiver as high as Vicks
burg and Memphis. The Confederate Congress was con
vened in special session ; and on April 29th Jefferson Davis
sent them his message, announcing that he had " in the field,
at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. PhiUp,

80 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION^
and Pulaski, nineteen thousand men, and sixteen thousand
are now en route for Virginia.'' Also, that he further pro
posed " to organize and hold in readiness for instant action,"
an army of one himdred thousand men.
Between the faU of Sumter, however, and the date of this
message, the whole revolution had undergone a remarkably
rapid development, which essentially changed the scope and
character of the contest. Hitherto the Border Slave States,
as they were caUed — ^Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri — though from
the beginning also deeply agitated, had taken no decisive
action. Their people were dirided in sympathy and interest ;
they favored slavery, but they also loved the Union. Every
expression through a popular vote indicated strongly pre
ponderant loyalty ; but with one exception their State offi
cials were already secretly leagued with the secession con
spirators. Upon them, too, the bombardment of Sumter feU
like a sudden touchstone. The proclamation of President
Lincoln, and the requisition of the Secretary of War for
their quota of Union volunteers, left them no further chance
of concealment. Compelled to take sides, their various gov
ernors repUed to the call in an insulting and contumacious
refusal. From that time forward Virginia, North Carohna,
Tennessee, and Arkansas were practicaUy part and parcel of
the rebelUon, though some of these did not immediately
make a pretence of formal adhesion by ordinances or mili
tary leagues. It would be both tedious and needless to
detaU the various steps and phases of their seeming revolt ;
it is a record of bold conspiracy, shameless usurpation, and
despotic military domination, made possible by the sudden
rush of popular excitement and passion consequent upon^
the fall of Sumter. The three others, Maryland, Kentucky,
and Missouri, and also the westem half of Vh-ginia, were

THE CALL TO ARMS. 81
eventually saved to the Union, partly by the inherent loyalty
of their people, partly by the quick and sustaining presence
of the Union forces.
By these adhesions the revolution at a single bound aug
mented its area almost one-half, and nearly doubled its sup
porting population, its material resources, its claim to the
serious attention of foreign nations. Its chiefs and leaders
were, of course, correspondingly elated and hopeful. With
a territory nearly four times as large as France ; with flve
and a half millions of whites, and three and a haU millions of
blacks ; producing by her agriculture a single staple, cotton,
valued at two hundred miUion dollars annually ; with a greatly
diversified climate ; with a long sea-coast, with several impor
tant harbors and many navigable rivers ; with mountains, with
mines, with forests containing the most valuable ship-timber
in the world ; with a greater variety of field and garden pro
ducts than usually falls to the lot of a single people — they be
lieved that they possessed the substantial elements of a homo
geneous, prosperous, and powerful nation.
6

CHAPTER VII.
BALTIMORE.
Of all the Border Slave States, Virginia held the most
equivocal and deceptive attitude. Beyond all doubt a ma
jority of her people desired to adhere to the Union, and at
an election for members of a State convention held in Feb
ruary the majority of professedly Union men chosen was as
three to one. But when this convention met, it appeared
that many of these so-called Unionists had trifled with their
constituents, and flnally betrayed their trust; they were
Unionists only upon conditions to which the Union would
never consent. Govemor Letcher, of Virginia, also labored
in secret actirity to promote secession. There was a pestif
erous cUque of radical disunionists about Eichmond, and,
under an outward show of quaUfied loyalty, the conspiracy
was almost as busy and as potent in the " Old Dominion " as
in the Cotton States themselves. When Sumter fell, aU this
hidden intrigue blazed out into open insurrection. The
convention, notwithstanding many previous contrary votes,
held a secret session on AprU 17th, and passed an ordinance
of secession, eighty-eight to fifty-five. The gradual but sys
tematic arming of the State miUtia had been going on for a
year past. Governor Letcher insultingly refused the Presi
dent's call for troops on the 16th,- and immediately set mih
tary expeditions in movement to seize the United States

BALTIMORE. 83
Navy Yard at Norfolk, and the United States Armory at Har
per's Ferry. The convention made a pretence of submitting
the question of secession to a popular vote, to be taken on
May 23d following ~ and then, as if in mockery, entered at
once into a secret military league with the "Confederate
States " on April 24th, placing Jefferson Daris in control of
all her armies and military affairs, and filling the State with
"foreign" regiments from the South.
In the Border State of Maryland the situation was some
what different. The Unionists were also in the majority,
with an active and influential minority for secession. Here,
as elsewhere, conspiracy had been at work for months, and
gained many of the prominent leaders in politics. The Le
gislature was believed to be unreliable. Treason had so far
taken a foothold in the populous city of Baltimore, that a
secret recruiting office was sending enlisted men to Charles
ton. But all local demonstration was as yet baffled by the
unwavering loyalty of the Governor of Maryland, Thomas
HoUiday Hicks. He had refused and resisted all the subtle
temptations and schemes of the traitors, especially in decUn-
ing to call the Legislature together to give disunion the
cloak of a legal starting-point.
To understand correctly the series of sudden and startling
events which now occurred in quick succession, it is neces
sary to bear in mind that the ten miles square of Federal
territory known as the District of Columbia, in which the
capital of the country, Washington, is situated, lies between
Virginia and Maryland, and was formed out of the original
territory of those States.
In all wars, foreign or domestic, the safety of the capital,
its buildings, archives, and officers, is, of course, a constant
and a paramount necessity. To guard the City of Washing
ton against a rumored plot of seizure by the conspirators,

84 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
President Buchanan had in January permitted Secretary
Holt and General Scott to concentrate a small number of
regular troops in it. Some of these had ever since remained
there. As soon as President Lincoln decided to send pro-
risions to Sumter, he had, in anticipation of coming dangers,
ordered General Scott to take additional measures for the
security of the capital, and to that end authorized him to
muster into the serrice of the United States about fifteen
companies of District miUtia. When Sumter feU and the
proclamation was issued, as a still further precaution the
flrst few regiments were ordered directly to Washington.
To the Massachusetts Sixth belongs the unfading honor
of being the flrst regiment, armed and equipped for service,
to respond to the President's call. Mustering on Boston
Common, on Tuesday morning, April 16th, it embarked on
railroad cars on Wednesday evening, April 17th, and, after a
continuous popular ovation along the route, it reached Phila
delphia Thursday evening, April ISth. Friday, April 19th,
was the anniversary of the battle of Lexington, famous in
American history. Early that moming, after a short bivouac,
the regiment was once more on its way. It had been warned
of danger in Baltimore ; the unruly populace was excited by
a series of secession meetings ; part of an unarmed Pennsyl
vania regiment had, in its transit, been hooted and stoned
the evening before. As the train approached the city. Col
onel Jones, commanding the Sixth, ordered his men to load
and cap their rifles, and instructed them to pay no attention
to insults or even ordinary missiles, but to vigorously return
any attack with flrearms.
A misunderstanding existed about the method of proceed
ing. Colonel Jones expected that his regiment would march
in a body through the open streets, and had made his dispo
sitions accordingly. When, therefore, the train halted, he

BALTIMORE.

85

was surprised and disconcerted to flnd that the cars were
suddenly detached from the train and from each other, and,
with the troops still in them, were rapidly drawn by horses
through the streets on a track nmning from the Philadelphia
, depot to the Washington depot, the two being about a mile
\ apart. Himself and the regimental officers were in the flrst
car ; others followed, and, until eight cars had thus passed,
no detention or demonstration occurred. But an excited

WASHINGTON DEPOT

Boute of the Massachusetts Sixth through Baltimore,

crowd meanwhile gathered along the track ; the ninth car
was received with hootings and insults, was detained by
slight obstructions, and, before it flnally reached the Wash
ington depot, its windows were smashed by stones and
bricks, and some of its occupants wounded by gun- and
pistol-shots, the soldiers having also returned the scattering
flre. By this time the crowd, grown to formidable proportions,
and fully maddened, succeeded in placing more permanent

86 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
obstructions on the track — sand, paring-stones,". Jieavy an
chors from a wharf near by, and in one place had partiaUy
torn up a smaU bridge. Four companies still remained be
hind ; and these were now notified by the railroad employees
of the dangers ahead, and the impossibiUty of proceeding
in the cars as the preceding companies had done. The offi
cers thereupon consulted together, and determined to under
take the trip on foot ; and, placing Captain Follansbee in
command, they descended from their cars, formed deUber
ately on the sidewalk, and started forward.
Almost at the outset they encountered an improrised pro
cession of the mob following a secession flag, and in an in
stant there was a quick and short melee. Disentangling
themselves from this, the officers urged the men into a
double-quick, which, however, only encouraged the rioters,
who looked upon it as a sign of fear and flight. New and
increased crowds were soon met ; they were threatened in
rear and front, and a discharge of flrearms began from side
walks and windows. Then the order was given to return
the flre. There was struggle, confusion, smoke, hooting,
yells of "nigger thieves,'' " traitors," men dropping on the
sidewalk and falling from windows, and wounded soldiers
crawling feebly away under the feet of the rushing, howling
mob. Into the midst of this terror there suddenly came a Uttle
ray of hope and help. People began to shout, " Here comes
the Mayor ! " The city authorities, who had been waiting at
the Washington Depot, had heard of the riot and were has
tening to the rescue. The crowd feU back ; a man came up,
shook hands with Captain Follansbee, saying, "I am the
Mayor of Baltimore." Mayor Brown courageously placed
himself beside the captain, and, by voice and gesture, en
deavored to quell the tumult, but to little purpose. The

BALTIMORE. 87
struggling, fighting column pushed ahead doggedly a square
or two farther, the attack increasing rather than diminishing.
The Mayor's own patience and temper was exhausted, and,
seizing a gun from the hands of a soldier, he fired at and
brought down one of the rioters.
At this point. Captain Follansbee states, the Mayor disap
peared — most probably, as it would seem, because of the
fortunate arrival of more effective help. Marshal Kane,
chief of poUce, also hastening to the relief, here arrived on
the scene of conflict with a squad of fifty policemen. Tak
ing advantage of a favorable instant, he deployed his men in a
line across the street, opened their ranks to allow the troops
to pass through, and then, closing his Une again, confronted
the advancing mob with drawn revolvers. The movement
diverted a moment's attention and checked the onward rush ;
the barrier held fu-m, the column of soldiers passed quickly
on, and, though it met one or two slight additional attacks,
it made its way to the Washington Depot. Here also there
was a great crowd and excited tumult ; the men were got
into cars, and the train put into motion toward Washington
under much difficulty ; but no bloodshed occurred till at the
last moment, when a shower of stones or a pistol-shot pro
voked a return volley from a window of the rear car, killing
a prominent citizen. The number of casualties was never
correctly ascertained. The soldiers lost four killed and some
thirty wounded ; the citizens probably two or three times as
many. With the departure of the Massachusetts Sixth, the Chief
of PoUoe supposed his immediate troubles at an end. But
not yet ; he was again notified thalt a new riot was beginning
at the Philadelphia Depot. Hurrying there, he found that
the regimental band had been left behind ; and worse still,
that a large number of cars constituting the rear end of the

88 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
train, yet contained Small's Pennsylvania Brigade, number
ing some thousand men, aU unarmed. The former had
already been driven from their car and scattered ; the latter
were just beginning to debark, entirely ignorant of what
had happened. Gathering such of his poUcemen as were in
the neighborhood. Marshal Kane intervened actively and
with success for their temporary protection; and a hasty
conference having been held with the raiUoad officers, the
train was, by common consent, backed out of the depot and
speedily despatched on its return toward Philadelphia.
These events took place in the forenoon, between ten and
twelve o'clock. As the intelligence of the riot and its blood
shed was diffused through the great city, it caUed into im
mediate action the worst passions of the populace. For the
remainder of the day the city was virtuaUy at the mercy of
the mob. By good fortune no general or widespread dam
age or spoUation occurred ; but many minor acts of injury
and law-breaking were perpetrated with impunity. Persons
were maltreated, newspapers were mobbed, and stores and
gunshops were broken into and robbed of their contents.
The secession conspirators were prompt in their endeavor
to tum the incident to their own advantage. Under theu-
management a mass meeting was called to meet that after
noon, at four o'clock, in Monument Square, where, at the ap
pointed hour, an immense concourse assembled. AU the
sweeping tide of popular sentiment ran against the Union
and the North. There was not a National fiag to be seen.
The State flag of Maryland was displayed above the rostrum.
In substance, most of the speeches were secession harangues.
Denunciation of the soldiers, eulogies of the South, appeal
and protest against invasion and coercion, met stormy ap
plause. Govemor Hicks was called to the stand, and yield
ing to the torrent of treasonable fury, made a short address

BALTIMORE. 89
which chimed in with the current outburst of hostile feeling.
He intimated that the Union was broken, and that he was
ready to bow before the will of the people. He would rather
lose his right arm than raise it to strike a sister State.
Finding the Governor thus giring way, and the populace
of Baltimore rising in response to their revolutionary
promptings, the conspirators pushed forward their scheme
of insurrection with all diUgence, and succeeded in placing
Maryland in a state of thorough revolt against the General
Govemment, which lasted nearly a week. They prevaUed on
the Governor to caU out the miUtia, which, under officers
mostly inclined to secession, put all miUtary acts and au
thority directly against the Union. They induced him to
call a special session of the Legislature, and under the revo
lutionary terror of the hour, at a special election held in
Baltimore the following week, a farcical minority vote was
made to result in the choice of a city delegation to the Lower
House, from among the rankest disunionists. They con
troUed the City CouncU, which, under plea of public defence,
appropriated haU a milUon to purchase and manufacture
arms and gather the material of war. From Baltimore the
furor spread to the country towns, where companies wfere
raised and patrols estabUshed under the instructions and
command of the secession miUtia general of Baltimore.
Within a few days the United States flag practically disap
peared from Maryland.
Their most effective act remains yet to be noticed. Near
midnight of the day of the riot (April 19, 1861), the Mayor
and poUce authorities made an official order (secret at the
time, but subsequently avowed) to bum the nearest bridges
on the railroads leading into Baltimore from the Free States,
and immediately sent out different parties (the Chief of
Police himself leading one of them), to execute the order.

90 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
Before daylight next moming, the bridges at Melvale, Eelay
House, and CockeysviUe, on the Harrisburg road, and over
the Bush and Gunpowder Eivers and Harris Creek on the
Philadelphia road, were accordingly destroyed by fire, com
pletely severing railroad communication with the North.
The excuse was that they feared reprisal and revenge from
the Northem armies ; the real motive appears ±o have been
the stronger underlying spirit of insurrection. Mayor
Brown claimed that Govemor Hicks approved the order ;
the Govemor soon afterward pubUcly and officiaUy denied it.
Whether Mayor Brown was a secession conspirator seems
doubtful ; but it is hard to resist the inference that the revo
lutionists influenced his action. The controlling animus of
the deed is clearly enough revealed in a telegram sent out
that night by Marshal Kane :
" Thank you for your offer ; bring your men in by the flrst
train and we wiU arrange with the railroad afterward.
Streets red with Maryland blood. Send expresses over the
mountains and valleys of Maryland and Virginia for the rifle
men to come without delay. Fresh hordes wiU be down on
us to-morrow (the 20th) . We wiU flght them and whip them,
or die.'' This language at night, from the man who that
morning had risked his life to protect the Massachusetts sol
diers, sufficiently shows the overmastering outbreak of revo
lutionary madness.

CHAPTEE Vm.
WASHINGTON.
In celebrating the attack and the fall of Sumter at Mont
gomery by a congratulatory speech and an official salute,
the rebel Secretary of War ventured to predict that the Con
federate flag would float over the capitol at Washington
before the flrst of May. Whether this was to be accom-
23Ushed by plot, by open military campaign, or through
mere insurrectionary reversion, he did not explain. The
idea, however, by long nursing and repeating, had become
one of the flxed hopes of the rebelUon. When the news
of the Baltimore riot reached the South, the fulfilment of
the prophecy was believed to be at hand. The revolt,
which for a few days continually grew until it spread over
all Maryland, served to deepen the universal impression.
The Baltimore conspirators themselves were animated to
fresh daring by their flattering local prospects. They sent
at once to Eichmond for a supply of arms. Governor
Letcher responded with alacrity to their request. Senator
Mason hastened to Baltimore to give them encouragement
and advice. Two thousand muskets were forwarded with
all possible despatch for their use. Twenty heavy guns
were also ordered to be sent them a few days later, though
it does not appear that the order could be fully executed.
Meanwhile the Virginia rebels had possessed themselves of

92 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
Harper's Ferry and established a camp there, and from this
vantage-ground they arranged a system of oonfldential com
munication with Baltimore. Nor was Eichmond alone hope
ful. Even Montgomery became inspired by the apparently
favorable opportunity. Jefferson Davis telegraphed (April
22d) to Govemor Letcher : " Sustain Baltimore, if practica
ble. We reinforce you," and ordered thirteen regiments to
be concentrated in the " foreign country " of Virginia ; and
with all the confldence of a positive secret understanding,
the rebel Secretary of War issued his requisitions upon the
non-seceded Border Slave States to furnish a portion of this
force. In the North the bloody act of Baltimore raised the
already seething war excitement to a pitch bordering on
frenzy, and the public expressions of indignant wrath were
in many instances disfigured by intemperate clamor for
sweeping and indiscriminate vengeance upon that city.
These ebullitions of hot blood were, however, everywhere
wisely turned into increased ardor and effort to forward
speedy relief and ample reinforcement to the Federal capi
tal. The monster meeting of New York was held on the fol
lowing day, at which a Union Defence Committee was formed
from the foremost citizens of the great metropoUs ; and by
this committee, money, ships, supplies, and marching regi
ments were prorided and prepared to meet the threatening
requirements of the hour.
Troops were, however, already on the way. Brigadier-
General Butler, with the Eighth Massachusetts Eegiment,
reached Philadelphia on the afternoon of the riot. The
famous Seventh Eegiment of New York, under Colonel Lef-
ferts, also arrived there on the following morning. Here
the railroad officials gave the two commanders certain infor
mation of the burning of the raiUoad bridges and the im-

WASHINGTON.

93

possibility of reaching Washington, or even Baltimore, by
the ordinary route, adrising them, as an altemative, to pro
ceed by water to Annapolis,„and thence march overland to

\^^^  J

N H W

P\E

[•ittsburgh

{ ^s* jF* r

N

,|f fi^R g:#.i .n I Y^^

f
111

>&

f*!^
J^

Richn

^FT.MONROE

Eoutes of Approach to Washington
the capital. Acting as yet under separate State authority,
and unable to agree, the two regiments proceeded there by
different routes, one descending and the other ascending
Chesaj)eake Bay, Butler arriving in Annapolis harbor before

94 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
daylight, on Sunday moming, April 21st, and Lefferts join
ing him there next morning, Monday, AprU 22d.
On communicating with the shore, they were met by a
protest from Govemor Hicks, warning them not to land.
With aU his stubborn and ingrained loyalty, the Govemor
was of a timid and somewhat vacillating nature, and for the
moment the clamor of the Baltimore mob overawed his
cooler judgment. In this conflict between lawful duty and
popular pressure, he, too, caught at the flimsy plea of " State "
supremacy, and, in addition to presuming to forbid the
national flag on Maryland soil, wrote a letter to the Presi
dent, asking that the troops be ordered elsewhere, and
suggesting that Lord Lyons, the British Minister, be re
quested to mediate between the Govemment and the rebels,
a proposal which was at once answered by a dignified rebuke
from Mr. Seward.
The administration at Washington had not been unmind
ful of the dangerous condition of Maryland ; but great reU
ance was placed upon the discretion and loyalty of Governor
Hicks to avert danger. He had held several personal con
sultations with the President and Secretary of War; had
agreed to hold his people in check, and furnish four Mary
land regiments of picked Union men under the caU ; and to
make his compliance easier, the authorities consented that
these should not be ordered South, but kept on serrice in
theu' own State, or in the District of Columbia. The Gover
nor was frank enough to acknowledge his failure to keep his
engagement. " We were arranging and organizing forces,"
he wrote, "to protect the city and preserve order, but want
of organization, of arms, prevented success. They had arms,
they had the principal part of the organized miUtary forces
with them ; and for us to have made the effort under the cir
cumstances, would have had the effect to aid the disorderly

WASHINGTON. 95
element. They took possession of the armories, have the arms
and ammunition, and I therefore think it prudent to decline
(for the present) responding affirmatively to the requisition
made by President Lincoln for four regiments of infantry."
Unfortunately the disaster at Baltimore did not come sin
gle-handed. At the picturesque Uttle town of Harper's
Ferry, where the Potomac Eiver flows through one of the
gateways in the Blue Eidge, the United States had an exten
sive armory, containing much valuable machinery for the
manufacture of rifles and muskets, originally located there
because of the convenient and cheap water-power which the
river affords. -The town was famous as the scene of John
Brown's invasion and capture. The seizure of this place
with its works and its supposed strategical importance was
an essential item in the conspiracy. A smaU company of
regulars had been guarding it since Januaiy. One of Genr
eral Scott's first orders was to have a volunteer regiment
detached to reinforce it, a precaution which could not be
taken earlier because of the want of troops. With the quick
secession of Virginia, however, the proposed help came too
late. Governor Letcher pushed forward his State forces to
menace the place with such haste, that, on the night of April
18th, Lieutenant Jones set flre to the establishment and
withdrew his sixty men through Maryland into Pennsylva
nia. The Eebels immediately took possession, and though
the flre had done much damage, the principal part of the
machinery was rescued by them and afterward sent to Eich
mond. As already mentioned, a rebel camp was immedi
ately estabUshed, and its force in a few days augmented to
two thousand four hundred men — doubtless with a riew to
join rebellious Maryland in a descent upon Washington.
Serious as was the loss of Harper's Ferry, a sacriflce of
inflnitely greater proportions almost immediately followed.

96 TH3 OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
Near Norfolk, Va., was one of the principal naval stations
of the Government, the Gosport Navy Yard. This, too, was
one of the prizes coveted by the conspirators ; its build
ings, supplies, machinery, dry dock, and especially a number
of valuable ships, constituted a money value amounting to
many millions ; and the importance of theu' possession and
use to either the insurgents or the Government, in a rebel
Uon, was of course immeasurable. Beyond mere occupancy
by a few officers and a Uttle handful of marines, the place
was without substantial protection. The Lincoln adminis
tration had fully reaUzed its exposure, but for want of troops
could send it no early reinforcements. Such measures of
precaution as were possible had long since been taken. The
officers had been admonished to vigilance, and preparation
made to bring away the more valuable ships. It was Gen
eral Scott's design to advance troops to its support the
moment Fortress Monroe should be secure.
Under these circumstances occurred the sudden fall of
Sumter, the President's proclamation, the secession of Vir
ginia, and the immediate movement of Governor Letcher's
State forces against both Harper's Ferry and Gosport. As a
preliminary act, he thought to absolutely prevent the escape
of the ships by obstructing Elizabeth Eiver with small
sunken vessels. The derice did not completely succeed,
though it greatly enhanced the danger. It is possible that
all might yet have been ultimately saved, but for a contin
gency against which foresight was impossible. The ships
were ready to move out ; the most valuable of them — the Mer
rimack — had steam up and was on point of saiUng, when,
by the treachery and false counsel of his subordinate offi
cers. Commandant McCauley, of the navy yard, whose loy
alty had hitherto not been suspected, revoked his permission
to let her depart.

WASHINGTON. 97
The officers charged with the removal hurried to Washing
ton to obtain superior orders ; but their absence and the
necessary delay only rendered the situation worse. When
they returned with a ship-of-war and a regiment, they found
that, through a repetition of treasonable adrice, the ships had
been scuttled and were sinking. It was decided that neither
rescue nor defence was now possible ; and on the night of
AprU 20th, the officers of the relieving expedition undertook
to destroy the yard, property, and all the ships, except one,
in a great conflagration, to prevent then- falUng into rebel
hands — an attempt, however, which proved only partially
successful. Whether or not the actual emergency justifled
this enormous sacriflce, will perhaps always remain an open
question among miUtary experts. It was as necessary for
the Administration to confide to the officers this discretion,
as similar discretion in any military enterprise. They seem
to have acted in good faith and upon their best judgment,
and their action was accepted, perhaps with regret, but with
full acquittal of duty conscientiously discharged.
It may well be imagined that the authorities and inhabi
tants of the national capital watched the development of re
bellion in the neighboring States of Virginia and Maryland
with the keenest anxiety. Washington, in tradition, tone,
and aspiration, was essentially a Southem city. Slavery ex
isted and the local slave-trade fiourisEed here ; in latter
times the maintenance of the institution in the District of
Columbia formed a distinct plank in Democratic platforms.
Southern arrogance and Southern ambition had long domi
nated official society. All the cant and all the sneers of the
liaut ton of the capital were vented against mercenary Yan-
keedom, and the rustic and lororincial West, which had won
the late presidential election. The confusion and contro
versy of faction exhibited during the winter session of Con-
7

98 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
gress shook the faith of many a poUtical veteran. The se
cession harangues of conspicuous fire-eaters were openly ap
plauded from the House and Senate gaUeries. As the social
lights faded one by one from the Congressional corridors
and the promenades of Lafayette Park and Pennsylvania
Avenue, the social sympathies of Washington to a large ex
tent followed them into the ecUpse of their "foreign" con
federacy. These too, notwithstanding their complaints and
deflance, departed with an erident reluctance and regret
into a country without a capital, and whose social and offi
cial circles were yet in embryo. A few were so unguarded
as to distribute confidential nods and winks that they ex
pected soon to retum ; while no doubt aU nursed the long
ing hope that at no distant day they might reclaim and re
enter the city as their proper and natural heritage. It was
this almost universal Southem feeling which found expres
sion in the prediction of the rebel Secretaiy of War, that the
rebel fiag would fioat over the dome of the capitol before
the first of May.
There was, therefore, gTeat doubt about the disposition
and loyalty of the resident population ; and the startling
succession of disasters to the Union cause created a pro
found impression. Virginia's secession on the 17th; Har
per's Ferry lost on the 18th; Baltimore in ai-ms, and the
North effectuaUy cut off on the 19th ; the Gosport Navy
Yard sacrificed on the 20th — where would the tide of misfor
tune stop? Wavering Unionists found no great difficulty
in forecasting the final success of rebeUion ; sanguine seces
sionists already in their visions saw the stars and stripes
banished to the north of Mason and Dixon's line.
Whatever the doubt, there was no other present resource
but to rely largely upon the good faith and order of Wash
ington City, The whole matter had been under the almost

WASHINGTON. 99
constant investigation of General Scott and his subordinates
since January ; and officers of earnestness and good judg
ment assured him that the local miUtia would stand by the
Govemment and the flag. In that assurance flfteen compa
nies of volunteers had, since the 9th of April, been enlisted,
equipped, and armed for the defence of the city. A few in-
diriduals out of these companies refused, at the last moment,
to take the oath of enUstment, and were publicly disgraced ;
but the remainder went into the serrice cheerfully, and, so
far as is known, served their term loyally and honorably.
Chiefly, however. General Scott relied on some six com
panies of troops from the regular army, which he had con
centrated from various parts of the country in scattering
driblets, among them being two light batteries of exception
ally good discipline and drill. These, together with a small
force of marines to guard the marine barracks, were stationed
at the critical points in the city; secret instructions were
issued to designated officers to hurry, in case of alarm, to
the charge and command of various pubUc buildings spe
cially prepared to resist sudden ingress or capture, and
stored with ammunition and prorisions against temporary
siege ; and pickets and patrols were sent out to watch all the
leading roads and bridges.
To aid these, there had arrived in the city two detach
ments of volunteers from other States ; the flrst, some three
or four hundred Pennsylvanians, on the evening of AprU 18th,
who were armed and equipped after their arrival ; the second,
the compact and courageous Massachusetts Sixth Eegiment,
on the evening of April 19th, after 'haring, as aUeady de..
tailed, fought its way through Baltimore. This regiment
was at once quartered in the Senate Chamber at the Capitol,
which, with its extemporized barricades, began to take on
the frowning aspect of a fort.

100 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
From the officers and men of this regiment the President
and other authorities learned verbaUy the dangerous charac
ter and proportions of the Baltimore riot. This occurred on
Friday. Saturday brought him not only many letters and
telegrams setting forth the details and increasing signs of
disaffection, but a committee from the Baltimore authorities,
to verbaUy represent the unrestrained turbulence of the city,
and to urge that further bloodshed be avoided by stopping
the transit of troops. General Scott, to whom the request
was at once referred, desiring the speedy presence of volun
teers to defend Washington rather than to flght a battle in
Baltimore, suggested that they might be marched around,
instead of being brought through, that city. To this sugges
tion President Lincoln readily agreed, and the committee
assented to the arrangement. On the following day, Sunday,
however, local riot had risen to general insurrection in Mary
land, and the authorities of Baltimore, called to Washington
by the President, now put forth the request that no more
troops be brought through Maryland. This demand the
President and Cabinet summarily rejected. It was agreed,
however, that, if no resistance were offered to their march,
either around Baltimore or by way of AnnapoUs, they would
not be forced through the city, and with that assurance the
committee depa,rted.
Pending this discussion rumors came that a portion of the
Pennsylvania forces were advancing on Baltimore by way of
the route from Harrisburg, and the committee soon returned,
reporting a fresh turmoil in Baltimore, and an arming en
masse to resist theU" passage. The movement was unknown
to the President ; and to disabuse the Baltimoreans of any
possible imputation of bad faith, Lincoln ordered that the
detachment complained of should return to Harrisburg, and
come round by way of Annapolis ; also, however, giving the

WASHINGTON. 101
committee formal notice that he would not thereafter again
interfere to change mere miUtary details. This order was,
at the time, the occasion of much outcry against the Presi
dent from excited critics who totally misapprehended its
scope and spirit. It simply changed a dangerous, perhaps
impossible march, to one practicable and comparatively se
cure ; it did not surrender a general right, but only yielded
a non-essential point to gain a real miUtary advantage for.
Washington. The burning of the raiUoad bridges east and north of Bal
timore had permanently interrupted communication before
dayUght, on the morning of Saturday, April 20th ; on Sun
day idght, April 21st, the insurrectionary authorities in the
same place took possession of the telegraph offices and
wires, and Washington went into the condition of an isolated
and blockaded city. Both from the Virginia and the Mary
land side there came exaggerated rumors of gathering hos
tile forces, and preparations for a coup de main against the
capital ; and, though not actually or risibly threatened, the
city was in the very nature of things forced, into the priva
tions and inconveniences of a siege. Military arrangements
and miUtary regulations became everywhere the rule. The
pubUc buildings were hedged with barricades and guarded
by sentinels. The Uttle steamers on the Potomac, and the
stores of fiour and grain in the Georgetown miUs were
seized by the Government. Squads of cavalry dashed
through the streets. Business practically ceased; the Ufe
and bustle of the city was hushed. Mere sojourners, and
even many residents, took alarm, and hurried away by pri
vate conveyance. The hotels, which had a week before
been thronged to overfiowing, became deserted, or were
haunted by only a few mute and white-faced guests, who
looked like apparitions in contrast with their recent gayety.

102 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
As the gloom increased there began to be talk of general
military impressment for the defence of the city. This had
the effect of finaUy exposing the loyalty or disloyalty of
many Washington officers, clerks, residents, and habitues
who had maintained a dubious silence. On Monday, April
22d, quite a stampede took place into VUginia and the
South; some hundreds of clerks from the various depart
ments of Govemment, and a considerable number of officers
of the army and navy, hitherto unable to decide between
their treasonable inclinations and the attractions of their
salaries, flnaUy resigned, and cast then- fortunes with the
Eebellion. The routine work of the departments went on with its
machine-Uke monotony ; the cabinet members called on the
President and discussed chances and rumors ; General Scott
conferred with his subordinates, and made daUy oonfldential
reports to Lincoln. The situation, however, revealed noth
ing certain or deflnite. From the windows of the Executive
Mansion a rebel flag could be seen flying at Alexandria.
One rumor asserted that a hostile detachment was being as
sembled near Mount Vernon ; a second, that an attack on
Fort Washington was imminent ; a third, that an investing
force was being brought down from Harper's Ferry. Per
amtra, there came the welcome information that there were
ships and volunteers at Annapolis ; but it was clouded with
the rumor that their landing would be disputed and their
march obstructed by Baltimore roughs and Maryland miUtia.
A pioneer train reported the railroad safe to the Junction,
but nothing could be learned of its condition beyond ; whUe
several messengers, despatched to reach AnnapoUs, had re
turned unsuccessful. What was transpiring in the outer
world could only be surmised; whether danger lurked far
or near was a mystery incapable of present solution. Never-

WASHINGTON. 103
theless, the President and Cabinet were not only calm, but
hopeful, under General Scott's assurance that, with his pres
ent force, the city and all the pubUc buUdings were entirely
safe against ten thousand troops not better than the District
volunteers. In point of fact, after some diplomacy with the Governor
and Mayor, the Massachusetts Eighth and New York Seventh
had really landed at AnnapoUs on Monday afternoon, April
22d ; and, after still further delay in sifting threatening ru
mors, in a somewhat deliberate local reconnoissance, and in
repairing a disabled locomotive, the two regiments started
on theU march toward Washington, on Wednesday, the 24th.
A year or two later this would have been considered tardy
movement under the requirements of urgent danger; but,
considering the surprise, the anxiety, the suspicions and un
certainties, and the want of preparation amid which they
acted, there is much to excuse their caution and delay.
They had few rations and no transportation. Full of high,
patriotic zeal, they were new to the trials and privations of
an actual campaign, even of so mild a type. Once started,
however, they pushed ahead with pluck and perseverance,
and by daylight next moming reached Annapolis Junction —
a distance of some twenty miles — ^without opposition, haring
repaired the railroad track as they advanced. At the Junc
tion they found a raiUoad train in waiting, wliich, two hours
later, landed the famous " Seventh " at the capital. Then
came their hour of peaceful triumph, in which they forgot
their hunger and thirst, their bridge-building in the broiUng
sun, and their foot-sore scouting through the tedious mid
night hours. Debarking from the cars amid the welcome-
shouts of an assembled throng, and forming with all the
ready precision of their holiday drill, they marched with ex
ultant music and gayly fluttering banners up Pennsylvania

104 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
Avenue to the Executive Mansion, to receive the President's
thankful salute. With their arrival, about noon of the 25th
of April, all the gloom, and doubt, and feeling of danger to
the capital, vanished. In comparison with the unmurmuring
endurance that trudged through the Yazoo swamps, and the
unflinching courage that faced the dreadful carnage of the
Wilderness, later in the war, this march of the "Seventh"
was the merest regimental picnic ; but it has become historic
because it marked a turning-point in the national destiny,
and signified the will of the people that the capital of the
Union should remain where George Washington planted it.

CHAPTER IX.
ELLSWORTH.
It has aUeady been related in a previous chapter how
the incidents immediately following the fall of Sumter and
the President's Proclamation^ — the secession of Virginia and
the adhesion of other Border States — had doubled the
strength and augmented the war preparations of the Eebel
lion. Upon the Govemment and the people of the North
the experience of those eventful days was even more deci
sive. Whatever hope President Lincoln and his Cabinet may
have entertained at the beginning, that secession could be
controlled by the suppression of sporadic insurrections and
the reawakening of the slumbering or intimidated loyalty of
the South, necessarily faded out before the loss of Virginia,
North CaroUna, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and the dangerous
uprising in Maryland. Not alone prompt measures to save
the capital of the nation were imperatively dictated by the
sudden blockade and isolation of Washington, but wide
spread ciril war, waged by a gigantic army and navy, must
become the ineritable price of maintaining the Union. For
this work the seventy-flve thousand three-months mUitia
were clearly inadequate. It marks President Lincoln's
accurate diagnosis of the public danger, and his prompt
courage and action to avert it, that, as early as April 26th,
ten days after the flrst proclamation, the formation of a new

106 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
army had aUeady been resolved upon ; and the War Depart
ment began giving official notice that volunteers in excess of
the first caU could only be received for three years or during
the war, the detaUs of the new organizations, to consist of
42,034 volunteers, 22,714 regulars, and 18,000 seamen, being
pubUcly announced on May 3d. No express prorision of law
existed for these measures, but Lincoln ordered them with
out hesitation, because the exigency did not admit of even
the short delay of awaiting the assemblage of Congress. He
was too true a type and representative of the people to doubt
one instant their sure support and approval of a step which
the Constitution covered with its paramount authority, and
its imperative personal mandate to the President of the
United States to " preserve, protect, and defend the Consti
tution of the United States."
Following the march of the Seventh Eegiment, the An
napoUs route remained permanently open to the Union
troops from the North. Day by day vessels arrived in An
napoUs Harbor with volunteer regiments, \\'ith prorisions
and suppUes for their maintenance, with war material for
their equipment. These were transferred rapidly over the
repaired railroad to Washington City, and it was not long
before the National Capital resembled a great miUtary camp.
Troops found temporary lodgment in the various pubUo
buildings ; citizen recruits wrote letters home on the sen
ators' desks, spouted buncombe for pastime from the mem
bers' seats in the House of Eepresentatives, spread their
blankets for bivouac in the ample corridors of the Patent
Office ; clusters of tents filled the pubUc squares ; regimental
tactics, practice in platoon-firing and artillery-drUl went on
iu the surrounding fields ; inspection and dress parade be
came fashionable entertainments ; miUtary bands furnished
unceasing open-air concerts ; the city bloomed with national

ELLSWORTH. 107
flags. The presence of an army brought an influx of ciril-
ians that at once perceptibly augmented the floating popula
tion; and this Yankee invasion of a sleepy Southem city
gave Washington a baptism of Northem life, activity, busi
ness, trade, and enterprise, which, for the first time after
half a century of sickly pining, made the metropoUtan dreams
of its founder a substantial hope and possibiUty.
Under the vast enlargement of mUitary operations to
which the defence and maintenance of the Govemment was
now driven by inexorable events, the utility and employment
of the three-months volunteers became necessarily limited
and confined to a few local objects. The mature experience
and judgment of General Scott decided that it would be
useless, considering their very short term of service, to
undertake with their help more than the garrisoning of Fort
Monroe, the protection of the Potomac, the defence of Wash
ington City, the restoration of the mUitary routes through
Baltimore to the North and West, the political control of
Maryland^ and possibly the recapture of Harper's Ferry — a
progTamme forming practically one combined measure — the
defence of the miUtary frontier or line of the Potomac, from
the sea to the mountains. Larger projects must be post
poned for preparation ; ships must be improrised or built to
enforce the blockade ; a new army must be gathered to open
the Mississippi and restore authority in the South.
The rebels, though now seriously checked, were yet indus
triously working their local conspiracy in Maiyland to secure
the final complete insurrection and adhesion of that State.
The Legislature, apparently under their control, had met at
Frederick, and was derising legislation under which to set
up a military dictatorship. But the Administration at Wash
ington allowed them no time to gather strength at home, or
draw any cdhsiderable supplies or help from Virginia. - The

108 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
President authorized General Scott to suspend the pririlege
of the writ of 'habeas corpus within certain limits, and em
powered him to arrest or disperse the Legislature in case
they attempted treason. AnnapoUs was garrisoned and
Ughtly fortified ; a miUtary guard was pushed along the raU-
roads toward Baltimore simultaneously from the South and
the North; and, on May 13th, General Butler, by a bold,
though entirely unauthorized movement, entered the city in
the dusk of evening, while a convenient thunder-storm was
raging, with less than a thousand men, part of whom were
the now famous Massachusetts Sixth, and during the night
entrenched himself on Federal Hill. General Scott repri
manded the " hazardous " movement ; nevertheless, the Uttle
garrison met ' no further molestation or attack, and soon,
supported by other detachments, open resistance to the
Government disappeared from the entire State. Indepen
dent regiments of Maryland volunteers entered the Federal
serrice ; a sweeping political reaction also set in, demonstrat
ing that the Union sentiment was largely predominant ; be
tween which and the presence of Union troops the legisla
tive intrigue was bUghted, and the persistent secession
minority and almost irrepressible local conspiracy were ef
fectually baffled, though not without constant rigilance and
severe discipline throughout the remainder of the year.
While the Govemment was thus mainly occupied in re
storing its authority in Maryland, the rebels were busy in
military organization in various parts of Virginia. Among
the resignations from the Federal army were two officers of
especial prominence — Joseph E. Johnston, Quartermaster-
General, of the rank of Brigadier-General, and Eobert E.
Lee, lately promoted to be Colonel of the FUst Cavalry.
Lee was an officer of great promise, and a personal favorite
of General Scott, who at once conceived the idea of putting

ELLSWORTH. 109
him at the head of the Union army about to take the field ;
and, on Saturday, April 20th, an informal and unofficial ten
der of this honor appears to have been made to him by
Francis P. Blair, senior, as coming from President Lincoln.
In a letter written subsequent to the war, Lee says that he
declined this offer. That same evening he wrote a resigna
tion from Arlington, and on Monday hurried off to Eich
mond, where he was appointed by Govemor Letcher, and,
on April 23d, pubUcly installed to command the miUtary
forces of Virginia.
Lee did not share the radical clamor of many of the Eich
mond conspirators for an immediate advance to capture
Washington. He discouraged mere, reckless enthusiasm,
and urged a defensive policy and methodical and thorough
miUtary preparation. Carrying out this policy in his orders,
directions were issued, and offlcers sent to different localities
to call out and organize the State miUtia, to drill recruits,
and coUect materials and stores. Under his management
companies and regiments soon sprang up, and Virginia, Uke
the other Southern States, gradually became a general camp.
It was not a great while before the presence of a military
force at the principal points along the Potomac became evi
dent. Its concentration and offensive action either to close
the river to narigation, or, when sufficiently strong, against
Washington, was, of course, only a question of time. The
contact of hostile armies unavoidably provokes confiict.
These changing conditions of Virginia required new pre
cautions for the defence of Washington. As early as May
3d it was ascertained by the local officers and engineers that
the Capitol building was only three and a half miles from
ArUngton Heights on the Virginia side of the river, the
Executive Mansion and various department buildings but
two and a half, and Georgetown within one mile. The en-

110 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
emy already had a detachment quartered at Alexandria ; re
inforcements from the South might, in a single night, occupy
the heights and destroy the Virginia end of the bridges,
and, speedily erecting mortar batteries, could destroy the
city with bombs, unless they were attacked at a disadvantage
and dislodged. It was, therefore, decided that the Union
forces must occupy ArUngton Heights to insure the safety
of the city, though the necessary troops could not as yet
be spared from the operations to secure Maryland; and
by reason of various delays, three weeks more passed away
before the full preparations for the enterprise were com
pleted. Finally, at two o'clock on the moming of May 24th, three
columns crossed the Potomac and entered on the " sacred
soil " of the Old Dominion : three regiments by the Aque
duct at Georgetown, four regiments by »the Long Bridge
from Washington, and one regiment, EJtefea'th's^ouaves,
from their camp below the city direcLj^ i<ij*'3teamer to
Alexandria, the war steamer Pawnee bAing anchored off
shore to protect the landing. The movement met no oppo
sition; no considerable rebel force was stationed at the
bridges, and the detachment at Alexandria, excepting a smaU
troop of cavalry, which was captured, evacuated that place
on receiving a notice, sent without authority by the com
mander of the Pawnee, to surrender or retire.
It had been a beautiful moonUght night ; all the regi
ments were filled with an eager enthusiasm for the march ;
the preparations were careful, the officers to superrise it
intelUgent and competent, the movements promptly begun
and successfully completed. The whole enterprise seemed
on the very point of conclusion without an accident, ^when
sudden news of the assassination of Colonel Ellsworth not
only saddened the camps on both sides of the Potomac, but

ELLSWORTH. Ill
cast a new gloom, and spread a feeUng of bitter vindictive-
ness throughout every loyal State.
Colonel Ellsworth was a young man of twenty-four, who,
by the possession of a phenomenal combination of genius,
energy, and self-confidence, had won the attention and ad
miration of the whole country. But a few years ago, foiled
by misfortune in an attempt to begin professional Ufe in
Chicago, he had suddenly found himself without money or
friends — almost without bread. By the endurance of ex
treme privations, the pittance which he managed to eam
with some temporary writing kept off starvation. His ener
getic nature made active occupation a necessity ; and per
haps as much to consume the evening hours, as with any
other fixed purpose, he became interested in studying and
teaching others the manual of military drill. This led to the
formation of a little volunteer company of about sixty Chi
cago youths — clerks and business employees — under his com
mand. Into theU instruction he threw such a degree of
enthusiasm, such originality in remodelling and adapting old
methods, such a grasp of purpose, and such a genius of con
trol, that, after about a year's training, he not only carried
off the prizes for drill at the fairs and exhibitions in the
neighboring counties, but confidently formed the bold pro
ject of showing to the public of the great cities that he had
the best-drilled company in America.
They had no money, no commissariat, no transportation,
but a friendly railroad gave them free tickets from Chicago
to Detroit ; from there the proceeds of an exhibition drill
carried them to the next city, and so on. At every step of
their progress, their actual dexterity in the manual of arms
carried admiration and applause by storm. Arrived at New
York, they achieved a double triumph ; first before the imi-
formed city militia in the open field, and afterward at night

112 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
on the stage of the Academy of Music, before as fashionable
an audience as ever packed the walls or split their kid gloves
to encore the most famous prima donna. For three days the
metropolitan newspapers were full of descriptions of their
performance and their personal appearance and history — •
above all, of their youthful commander, Ellsworth, the risible
creator, embodiment, and inspiration of their admirable
accomplishment. Determined to leave no test unchallenged,
they went even to show their, proficiency to the miUtary
school at West Point, where the only criticism that could be
passed upon them was that they did not follow the " regu
lar " drill of the text-books. When they finally returned to
Chicago, after a full tour, in which they had reaped uninter
rupted encouragement and acclaim, the name and fame of
Ellsworth and his " Chicago Zouaves " were a part of the
just interest and pride of the whole country.
Nevertheless, no one appreciated better than Ellsworth
himself that this was but a possible beginning of better
things. He had no ambition to remain either a mere drill-
master or a raree showman, though his necessities had com
pelled him to make a somewhat spectacular beginning.
There is not room here to trace his higher purposes and
ideals of a general miUtia reform ; it is sufficient to say that
for the brain of a boy of twenty-four they were serious and
comprehensive. There was then no thought of war; and
when Lincoln became President, Ellsworth sought his favor
and was readily permitted to accompany him to Washington
as one of his suite. The inauguration over, the President
made him a second lieutenant of dragoons. Then came
Sumter and the call for volunteers, and Ellsworth saw his
opportunity. Hastening to the city of New York, he called
together and harangued the fire companies of the metropo
lis ; in three days he had twenty-two hundred names in-

ELLSWORTH. 113
scribed on his recruiting lists; out of these he carefully
selected a regiment of eleven hundred men, who chose him
their colonel, and, bearing half a dozen beautiful presenta
tion flags, one of them pubUcly donated by Mrs. Astor,
followed him to Washington, where they were mustered into
the serrice among the earUest three years volunteers.
It was at the head of this regiment that Colonel Ellsworth
entered Alexandria at daylight of May 24th. The rebels
received notice of his coming, and most of them retired with
sufficient promptness to escape capture. Having seen the
town securely occupied and pickets posted to prevent sur
prise, Colonel Ellsworth remembered the rebel flag which
had been for weeks flaunting an insulting deflance to the
national capital. It was hoisted over the Marshall House,
the principal hotel of Alexandria, and the Colonel was seized
with the whim to take it down with his own hands — a foolish
fancy, perhaps, when considered in cool judgment, but one
very natural to the heated enthusiasm of those early days of
burning patriotic ardor. " Whose flag is that flying over
this house ? " demanded he, as he entered and ascended the
stairs. "I don't know," was the only response he could ob
tain ; but the demon of a hellish purpose lurked under the
answer. He mounted to the roof with one or two compan
ions, cut the halyards, and started down with the treasonable
emblem on his arm. The stairs were narrow and winding —
they could descend only in single file — a soldier preceded
and followed him. As he reached the third step above the
landing on the second floor, a, side door flew open, and the
owner of the house, a man named Jackson, who had been
lurking there in concealment like a tiger for his prey, sprang
out, and levelling a double-barrelled shotgun, discharged it
full in the Colonel's breast — the fatal charge driving almost
into his very heart a gold presentation badge inscribed "Non
8

114 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
nobis sed pro patria." Ellsworth fell forward in death with
out even a groan ; but the murder did not go unavenged, for
in that same instant his assassin also expired by the double
effect of a musket-charge and a bayonet-thrust from Ells
worth's foremost companion.
If there remained a possibiUty of a sensational climax of
deeper import than Sumter and Baltimore, it was furnished
by this hideous tragedy at Alexandria. The North had sup
posed that the flrst exhausted the cold-blooded recklessness
of conspiracy. The second manifested the sudden fury of
sectional excitement. But this last opened an unlooked-for
depth of indiridual hatred, into which the poUtical animosi
ties of years between the North and South had flnaUy
ripened after four months of uninterrupted manipulation by
the conspiracy. Under this unwelcome revelation there was
no longer room to doubt the existence of widely pervading
elements of an enduring ciril war. Ellsworth was buried
vdth imposing honors, from the famous East Eoom of the
Executive Mansion, the President, Cabinet, and high officers
of Government attending as mourners ; and as the telegraph
filled the newspapers with details of the sad event, every
household in the North felt as if the dark shadow of a
funeral had lowered over its own hearthstone.

CHAPTER X.

MISSOURL

CoNSPiEACT had been working with untiring persistence in
every Slave State since, and even before, the formal seces
sion of the Cotton States in January, and had everywhere
made considerable advances, notably in the State of Mis
souri. Govemor Jackson, of that State, had leagued himself
with the secession plot, though still concealing his purpose
with outward professions of loyalty. Many subordinate of
flcers and members of the Legislature were secretly aiding
him. Together they were leading Missouri through the
usual and well-established paths to ultimate treason, by
means of official recommendations from the Govemol- and
various shrewdly derised laws passed by the Legislature.
They made a serious miscalculation, however, in the stereo
typed and hitherto always successful expedient of a State
Convention. When that body was elected and met (Febru
ary 2Sth), it showed such an overwhelming majority of Union
members, that the plotters of treason were quite willing to
hide their defeat in joining certain pointed declarations by
the convention against secession, and adjourning its sittings
to the following December, trusting their chances to a more
pliant and treasonable legislature ; hoping to bring about
a policy of arming the State under pretence of local de
fence, and committing it to a neutral attitude under plea of

IIG THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
local security. In all their efforts, however, they met the
constant and determined watchfulness and opposition of
zealous and fearless Unionists, among whom Frank P. Blair,
junior, was a conspicuous leader.
It so happened, also, that in this State a smaU detachment
of the regular army was, for the first time, rendered useful
in thwarting the local development of disunion. At the
city of St. Louis was an arsenal belonging to the United
States, containing a considerable quantity of arms and am
munition. To obtain these was from the beginning, as in
other States, a prime object of Govemor Jackson and his
co-conspirators. They had in Januaiy, as they beUeved,
perfected an intrigue for the surrender of the arsenal, by
the officer in charge, into their hands and control. That
arrangement was soon blighted by the arrival of reinforce
ments ordered there by General Scott to protect the place,
under command of an officer afterward famous — Captain
Nathaniel Lyon, of the Second United States Infantry.
Lyon was a man of outspoken anti-slavery principles, of
unswerving loyalty to his flag, and of unsleeping rigilance
over his post and the Government interests. By the middle
of February enough recruits had been added by General
Scott to his own company of eighty trained regulars to raise
his force to four hundred and eighty-eight men.
Holding the same poUtical conrictions and patriotic im
pulses, Lyon and Blau- became quickly united in an inti
mate personal friendship ; and very soon, also, Lyon's regu
lars and Blair's " Home Guards " sustained each other in a
mutual reliance and protection. Their common watchful
ness over the arsenal was by no means wasted. Govemor
Jackson was determined to establish by force what he had
failed to accomplish by intrigue. He sent two trusty agents
to the Eebel President to soUcit help in arms and ammuni-

MISSOURI. 117
tion. "After learning," wrote Jefferson Daris, in reply,
April 23d, " as well as I could from the gentlemen accred
ited to me, what was most needful for the attack on the ar
senal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should
be furnished with two twelve-pounder howitzers and two
thirty-two-pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for
each. These, from the commanding hills, wUl be effective,
both against the garrison, and to breach the enclosing walls
of the place."
Encouraged by this co-operation, the Governor, as his
next step, instructed one of his mUitia generals, D. M.
Frost, a West Point graduate, to assemble the available or
ganized and equipped volunteer companies of the State in
a camp of instruction at St. Louis. The Governor had also
convened his Eebel Legislature to meet in extra session on
May 2d. The day following. May 3d, began the assembling
of the militia in " Camp Jackson," so named in honor of the
Govemor. Two regiments and part of a third soon arrived ;
and though some of the companies were either without po
litical bias, or of Union sentirhent, a general spirit of seces
sion pervaded the camp, and its avenues were christened
"Daris" and "Beauregard." The object of the organiza
tion soon became unmistakably known to Lyon, Blair, and
the Union Safety Committee, who, by the aid of skilful de
tectives, gained information of all its movements. On the
night of May Sth, the cannon, ammunition, and some mus
kets furnished by Jefferson Davis, were landed from a New
Orleans steamer, in boxes marked "marble," and immedi
ately loaded upon drays and hauled out to the camp.
Under this threatening disclosure, the Unionists felt they
could no longer dally with the conspiracy. Already three
weeks before, the United States Arsenal at Liberty, Mo.,
had been robbed of its arms by the disunionists, and Jeff.

118 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
Thompson was known to be actively drilling rebel com
panies at St. Joseph. They could not afford to allow a con
centration of these and other treasonable forces. In the
meanwhile the Washington authorities, receiring Govemor
Jackson's insulting refusal to fumish troops, had ordered
the enlistment of Blau-'s "Home Guards" into the United
States service, to the number of four regiments, which order
was soon increased to ten thousand men.
With this force Lyon felt himself strong enough to crush
the budding insurrection. On the moming of May 9th he
disguised himself in female garb, and, seating himseU be
side a friend in a barouche, was driven out into Camp Jack
son, personally and leisurely inspecting its strength, situa
tion, and miUtary approaches. The next day the arsenal
and the various volunteer aimories were alive with mihtary
preparation, and, at two o'clock in the afternoon, Lyon, at
the head of his battaUon of regulars, with six pieces of ar
tiUery and six regiments from the lately organized Missomi
Volunteers and Eeserve Corps (as they were respectively
called), marched rapidly through various streets of St. Louis,
in two columns, concentrating at Camp Jackson. Before
General Frost was well aware of the coming event, these
regiments had surrounded his camp and posted the batteries
on commanding elevations. The camp thus invested, with
batteries and arms ready for instant action, Lyon sent Frost
a note, stating that his command was regarded as hostile to
the United States, and demanding an immediate surrender,
" with no other conditions than that all persons surrendering
under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated,"
and allowing half an hour's time for compUance. The cir
cumstances left Frost no alternative, and before the expira
tion of the half-hour he gave notice of his unconditional
suiTender.

MISSOURI. 119
So far everything had gone as harmlessly as if the affair
were merely a gala parade ; but now a most deplorable oc
currence succeeded. The march, the halt, and the capture
greatly excited a vast crowd which the occasion drew to
gether; and scarcely had the homeward march with the
prisoners begun, when the troops were assailed by secession
rowdies with abusive language, stones, missUes, and finaUy a
pistol shot or two. This last provoked a retum volley with
out orders from one or two companies, by which, and the
desultory shots succeeding, fifteen to twenty innocent by
standers and several soldiers were instantly killed. The
imtoward incident caused a dangerous ferment in the city,
but the courageous efforts of the poUce prevented a general
riot. The telegraphic news of the capture of Camp Jackson
threw the Governor's revolutionary cabal and disloyal legis
lature sitting at Jefferson City into the utmost consternation.
The Govemor immediately sent out and caused a bridge on
the railroad from St. Louis to be burned, to prevent any
sudden descent by Lyon upon the capital ; and during the
afternoon and night, the Legislature in secret session rushed
through several acts specially designed to promote rebelUon,
which they had before been concocting with more circum
spection. A few days later, a miUtary bill, virtually making
the Governor an irresponsible military dictator, was formally
passed ; and having thus, as the conspirators thought, made
all necessary legal preparations, the session was flnally ad
joumed on May 15th.
General Harney, the ranking officer in the Department of
the West, who had been temporarily called away, returned
to St. Louis the day after the Camp Jackson affair, thus super
seding Lyon in command. It must be explained that events,
and particularly antecedent conditions, had most unfortu-

120 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
nately divided the Missouri Unionists into two bitterly an
tagonistic factions, which, indeed, continued throughout the
whole four years' war. The Eadicals, embracing the large
German population of St. Louis, and who formed the bulk
of the Home Guard, were mainly of democratic antecedents,
and strong anti-slavery sentiment ; these followed the leader
ship of Blau- and Lyon. The Conservatives, more generally
of American natirity, belonging rather to the wealthy and
the business classes of the city, largely of Whig antecedents
and strongly tinged with the " EJiow-Nothing " prejudices of
former years, and holding very tolerant if not actuaUy
favorable sentiments toward slavery, grouped themselves
about General Harney. The Eadicals believed in defending
the Government with steel and lead; the Conservatives
trusted to reclaim their erring brethren with forbearance and
moral suasion. Cold after-criticism finds both factions
chargeable with extremes of feeUng and speech ; but if the
former were prone to excessive zeal, the latter were yet more
culpable in a stupid over-caution. Such deep local antago
nisms, however, of nationality, class, and Ufe-long poUtical
prejudice, can hardly be expected to act with moderation in
the blinding atmosphere of revolution.
Hamey was a loyal and courageous soldier, but lacked the
quick, instinctive judgment of the statesman. Beset by noisy
clamor on both sides, he vibrated to acts of conflicting
rather than consistent administration. His first impulse was
to order the disbandment of the Home Guards. Convinced
that this was beyond his power, he soon after (May 14th)
issued his proclamation justifying the capture of Camp
Jackson, denouncing the Military Bill as an indirect seces
sion ordinance, and declaring that " Missouri must share the
destiny of the Union.'' He also announced his determina
tion to uphold the Govemment of the United States " at all

MISSOURL 121
times and under all circumstances;" but his measures to
carry out this loyal poUcy were not chosen with wisdom.
Governor Jackson had at once proceeded to organize the
miUtia of Missouri under his dictatorial miUtary bUl ; and
Frost's miUtary laurels having withered at Camp Jackson,
the Governor made ex-Govemor Sterling Price his general-
in-chief. Price was less scrapulous in poUtical strategy
than Hamey, and within a week he had entrapped the un
wary Union commander into an agreement which tied up
the Government forces in a role of mere idle lookers-on,
whUe Governor Jackson's Missouri miUtia should without
hinderance place the State in active insurrection.
" General Price," so ran the agreement, signed on May
21st, " having by commission full authority over the militia
of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of
the Govemor of the State, aUeady declared, to direct the
whole power of the State offlcers to maintain order within
the State among the people thereof; and General Hamey
publicly declares that, this object being thus assured, he
can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make miUtary
movements which might otherwise create excitements and
jealousies, which he most earnestly desires to avoid."
This was to be done " in subordination to the laws of the
General and State Governments ;" but it gave the conspira
tors the right of initiative, and left them for a season the un
controlled, and even unobserved masters of the whole State
outside of St. Louis. Govemor Jackson and General Price
made such prompt use of their time, that before the end of
the month reports of outrageous indigiUties upon Union
men came from aU parts of the State, and finaUy the threat
ening rumor that a rebel invasion from the Arkansas border
was being encouraged and rapidly formed; and as fast as
Harney brought the facts to the notice of Price, that dis-

122 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
sembUng conspirator waved them aside with an unvarying,
deUberate, and mendacious denial.
This state of affairs was terminated on May 30th. Mis
souri matters had been watched with intense and daily soUci-
tude at Washington. Each of the Union factions of that
State had a spokesman in the Cabinet, Postmaster-General
Blair favoring Lyon and his friends, Attorney-General
Bates those of Hamey ; and the President therefore heard
the complaints and justifications of both sides. Acting thus
on full information, Lincoln, on May ISth, entrusted Frank
P. Blair, junior, with a confidential discretionary order to
reUeve Hamey whenever he might deem it necessary. On
May 30th, amid the thickening perils from the conspiracy,
Blair felt himseU justifled in acting upon this discretion;
Hamey was reUeved, and Lyon once more placed in com
mand under a newly issued commission as brigadier-general
of volunteers, a position to which the. flrst four Missouri
regiments had unanimously chosen him.
With Lyon once more in power, the conspUators felt that
the crisis of their intrigues had come. Govemor Jackson
and General Price therefore solicited an interriew with the
new commander, which being granted, and a safeguard be
ing furnished them, they visited St. Louis on June llth, and
were met by Lyon and Blair, in a conference of several hom-s'
duration. As might have been expected, theu- riews and
objects were utterly at variance. The Governor proposed to
neutralize Missouri by excluding United States troops and
disbanding the Home Guards ; Lyon, on the contrary, insist
ed that the Govemor should disband his Missouri militia, and
give the Govemment forces full liberty of inovement and con
trol throughout the State. Separating upon these irrecon
cilable propositions. Governor Jackson and General Price
hastened back to Jefferson City that same night, burning the

MISSOURL 123
railroad bridges behind them to prevent pursuit ; and on the
following day, June 12th, the Govemor issued a revolution
ary proclamation, calling fifty thousand militia into active
serrice to "repel invasion."
Lyon evidently expected Uttle else from the rebellious
Govemor, for he seems to have been ready with plans and
preparations to act against the open insurrection that func
tionary so defiantly proclaimed. The Missouri Eiver fur
nished a convenient military highway to the capital of the
State ; and by the afternoon of June 13th, Lyon had an ex
pedition of three swift river steamers, containing a company
of his regulars and several battaUons of volunteers, in mo
tion. They arrived before Jefferson City on the 15th of
June, landed without opposition, occupied the town, and
once more raised the Union flag over the State House.
Govemor Jackson and his Secretary of State precipitately
fled, carrying with them only the great seal of the State, to
use in certifying theu- future publications under the pre
tended authority of Missouri.
Leariiing at Jefferson City that the Govemor and General
Price were gathering a force and preparing to make a stand
at Boonrille, a town flfty miles farther up the Missouri
Eiver, Lyon, on June 16th, the day following his arrival,
learing but a small guard at the capital, again hurriedly
embarked his men, numbering about two thousand, and
pushed energeticaUy ahead, determined to leave the enemy
no time to recruit an army. The steamers passed over the
intervening distance during the night, and early next morn
ing (June 17th) Lyon made an unopposed landing four miles
below BoonvUle. The Governor's rallying call had indeed
already been responded to by several thousand Missourians,
being, however, almost totally without organization, and
very poorly armed. Half-way from his landing-place to the

124 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
town Lyon found a rebel Une strongly posted ; a spu-ited
fusillade quickly ensued, and for about twenty minutes the
Union advance, composed of perhaps five hundred men, was
held in check. The enemy could, however, not long with
stand the fire of a regular battery which was brought up,
and which, with the well-delivered volleys of the better-
drilled Union volunteers, soon routed them in a general
panic and flight. General Price early retu-ed from Boon
vUle on plea of illness ; while Governor Jackson, who riewed
the battle from a convenient hill some two mUes off, seeing
the disastrous result, once more betook himself to flight.
Two on the Union, and flfteen on the rebel side, were re
ported killed, with the usual corresponding number of
wounded. Twenty prisoners, two six-pounder guns, two se
cession flags, and the various suppUes of the rebel camp,
furnished the Union force substantial trophies of victory.
Moving cautiously forward, Lyon occupied the town of Boon
vUle, and issued a quieting proclamation to its terror-stricken
inhabitants, while the immature and boyish prisoners he had
captured were released on parole. This battle of BoonviUe
ends the administration of Governor Jackson — he had long
before forfeited his honor and authority by covert treason ;
from henceforth his role is not only that of an open traitor,
but also of a mere fugitive pretender.
The insurrection and flight of the State officers left Mis
souri without local govemment. It happened, fortunately,
that the State Convention, when in March it took a recess to
the foUowing December, empowered a select committee to
call it together at any time upon a pressing emergency.
The emergency having thus come, the committee issued its
call ; and the convention, minus some of its disloyal mem
bers, but yet haring a full constitutional quorum, met once
more in Jefferson City, on the 22d of July. It proceeded by

MISSOURI. 125
ordinance to declare the State offices vacant, to abrogate the
MiUtary BiU and other treasonable legislation, and proride
for new elections ; and flnaUy, on the 31st of July, it elected
and inaugurated a provisional government, which thereafter
made the city of St. Louis its official headquarters. Hamil
ton E. Gtamble, a Conservative, was made Govemor ; he an
nounced his unconditional adherence to the Union, and his
authority was duly recognized by all those portions of the
State which were not under military control of the rebels
during the fluctuating fortunes of the local guerilla warfare
by which Missouri was so long tormented and desolated.

CHAPTER XI.
KENTUCKY.
The Alleghany or Appalachian mountain chain, a himdred
miles broad and a thousand mUes long, extending from New
York to Alabama, naturally separated the country into two
principal miUtary dirisions : that of the East, comprising
the Atlantic Coast and the Atlantic States ; that of the West,
comprising the Mississippi Eiver and its tributaries, and the
whole immense territory of the Mississippi VaUey. In the
East, the Une of hostiUty quickly estabUshed itself along
the Potomac Eiver, with Washington as its strategical cen
tre ; this grew partly out of the paramount necessity of de
fending the capital, but also largely from the fact that the
line from the sea to the mountains was not more than a hun-
;Jred miles long, and could therefore be occupied and ob
served without delay. In the West the distance from the
mountains to the Mississippi Eiver was nearly ten times as
great. This alone would have retarded the definition of the
military frontier ; but the chief element of uncertainty and
delay was furnished by the peculiar poUtical condition of
the State of Kentucky, which of itseU extends the whole
distance from Virginia to Missouri.
It cannot perhaps be affirmed with certainty that Govemor
Magoffin of Kentucky was a secession conspirator ; but his
own language leaves no doubt that in opinion and expecta-

KENTUCKY. 127
tion he was a disunionist. He had remonstrated against the
rash and separate movements of South Carolina and the
Cotton States; but since their movement was made, he
looked upon it as final and irrevocable, and committed him
self unqualifiedly against coercing them back to obedience.
More than this, he argued that Kentucky was no longer
safe in the Union, and declared she "will not and ought
not to submit to the principles and poUcy avowed by the
Eepublican party, but will resist, and resist to the death, if
necessary.'' In tMs view, he recommended to the Legislature, which
met in January under his call, the project of a "Sover
eignty " State Convention, appropriations to purchase arms,
and the immediate and active organization of the miUtia.
None of these suggestions were, however, adopted by the
Legislature, which contented itself for the present by pro
testing against coercion as imwise and inexpedient, and rec
ommending a call for a national convention. WhUe Ken
tucky sentiment was deeply pro-slavery, and business and
commerce bound her strongly to the South, the patriotic
example and teachings of Henry Clay had impressed upon
her people a love and reverence for the Union higher and
purer than any mere passing interest or selfish advantage.
Nevertheless, as rebeUion progressed, the State became
seriously agitated and dirided. When Sumter fell and the
President issued his call for troops, Govemor Magoffin in
sultingly refused compliance. This action in tum greatly
excited the people of the three Border Free States of Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois, who thus beheld a not remote pros
pect of haring ciril war brought to their own doors. They
therefore looked immediately to the protection and control
of the Ohio Eiver. Their enthusiastic response to the Presi
dent's call had filled, their capitals with volunteers, which

128 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION,
were being armed and equipped by the Govemment. Ohio
hurried off her earliest levies to Cincinnati ; those of Indi
ana were sent to her several exposed river towns. At the
extreme southem point of Illinois was the city of Cairo,
smaU in population and commerce, but in a miUtary point
of view the commanding centre and key of the whole west
em .river system. Its value was comprehended both east
and west. No sooner had the Border Slave State Governors
forwarded their disloyal refusals, than Secretary Cameron
(April 19th), by telegraph requested the Govemor of Illinois
to send a brigade of four regiments to occupy it. There
was not yet that total of miUtia in the whole State; but
within forty-eight hours an improvised expedition, number
ing five hundred and ninety-five men and four six-pounders,
started from Chicago to carry out the Secretary's orders,
arriving at Cairo on the moming of Apiil 23d, where they
were speedUy reinforced to the requUed numbers.
Under the Sumter bombardment, the President's caU, and
Magoffln's refusal, Kentucky was, for the moment, simply
in a hopeless bewUderment, irresolution, and conflict of
opinion. A strong minority, arrogating to itseU much more
than its numerical importance through noise and seU-asser-
tion, labored with zeal and energy for secession, but could
make no substantial progress against the overwhelming un
dercurrent of Union sentiment ; and these opposing factions,
with the ultimate hope of influencing and gaining the waver
ing or undecided, joined somewhat unavoidably in an en
deavor to commit the State to an attitude of strict neutraUty.
Govemor Magoffin and his personal adherents were ready
to lend their official influence to cany the State into rebel
lion. The Govemor sent an agent to the Governors of
Arkansas and Louisiana to soUcit armsj and by way of
justUying the act, he made a similar appUcation to the

KENTUCKY. 129
Governors of Indiana and of Missouri. No substantial suc
cess, however, attended these efforts; and the Governor's
appUcation to the banks for money also resulted, in the
main, in a discouraging refusal, largely due to the domi
nating Union sentiment, which suspected him of treasonable
designs. A second endeavor to influence the Legislature
remained equally barren. That body, which had only ad
joumed on the 5th of April, was by proclamation once more
caUed to meet in a second special session, beginning May
2d. The Governor's message, reciting the startUng events
which had occurred, stigmatized the President's defence of
the Govemment as "extraordinary usurpations, "'the enthusi
astic patriotism of the loyal States as " the frenzy of fanati
cism," and asserted with dogmatic stubbornness that " the
late American Union is dissolved;" recommending, as be
fore, a State convention, miUtary appropriations, and organ
ization of the miUtia. He also sent a messenger to ask the
Governors of Ohio and Indiana to join him "in an effort to
bring about a truce between the General Government and
the seceded States ; " to which Governor Morton worthily
responded, "I do not recognize the right of any State to
act as mediator between the Federal Govemment and a re
bellious State."
The Unionists had a controlling majority in the Legisla
ture, and, considering the deep agitation and serious diri
sions in Kentucky, used their power with great moderation
and tact, doing as much both to aid the Govemment and to
emban-ass the conspirators as was perhaps practicable under
the circumstances. To stiU the prevailing neutrality clamor,
the House of Eepresentatives, on May 16th, passed resolu
tions declaring that Kentucky " should, during the contest,
occupy the position of strict neutrality," and also approring
Governor Magoffin's refusal to furnish troops. In substan-
9

130 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
tial legislation, however, the Govemor received Uttle aid or
comfort. His most active lieutenant in contemplated trea
son was Simon B. Buckner, who about a year before had
succeeded in obtaining the passage of a rather energetic mili
tia law, under which the Govemor appointed him Inspector-
General and ranking commander in the State. It was his
and the Governor's project to put into the field and manip
ulate the " State Guard " which this law authorized, so as to
precipitate Kentucky into rebellion.
The Legislature, ignoring the Governor's request for a
State Convention, addressed itself mainly to the task of
turning the influence and support of the miUtia system from
secession to union. A bill was framed and became a law
May 24th, authorizing a loan of one milUon to purchase
arms and munitions, but associating a controlling Union
Board of Commissioners with the Governor to regulate its
disbursement and the distribution of arms ; authorizing
the formation of Home Guards for local defence ; and while
it prorided that the arms and munitions should not be used
against the United States, nor against the Confederate
States, unless to protect Kentucky against invasion — ^it re
quired that both officers and men of the Home Guards and
State Guards should alike swear to support the Constitution
of the United States and of Kentucky — the former law hav
ing required such an oath from the officers alone.
While Kentucky was thus settUng down into an attitude
of official neutrality, active popular undercurrents were busy
in contrary directions. The more ardent secession leaders
who raised companies to serve in the field, despairing of ob
taining commissions, arms, and active duty from Govemor
Magoffin, quietly departed to obtain enUstment in the
various rebel camps of the South. On the other hand, there
were many unconditional Unionists in Kentucky who

KENTUCKY. 131
openly scouted the policy of neutrality, and who from the
flrst were eager that the Govemment should begin enlist
ments and gather an armed force to support the Union sen
timent in the State. Colonels Guthrie and Woodruff opened
a recruiting office on the Ohio side of the river, and as early
as May 6th mustered two regiments into service, nominally
as the First and Second Kentucky Volunteers, though in
reaUty the men were principally from Ohio and Indiana.
Notwithstanding the contumacious refusals of the Gover
nors of the Border Slave States, President Lincoln was not
disposed to give up those States as lost. We have seen that,
both in Maryland and Missouri, he authorized direct enUst-
ments under the supei-rision of United States officers. Lead
ing men haring informed him of the actual state of Ken
tucky sentiment, he, on May 7th, specially commissioned
Major Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, to proceed to Cincin
nati and muster into service all loyal volunteers who might
offer themselves from Kentucky and West Virginia. Nor
was he content with such merely negative encouragement.
He felt a deep solicitude to retain Kentucky on the Union
side. Very soon also the leading Kentuckians, who at the
beginning had been most pertinacious to insist on neutrality,
saw that it would be impossible for the State to maintain
such an utterly absurd attitude. Mr. Lincoln, therefore,
with their knowledge and consent, by the middle of May
sent flve thousand muskets to Kentucky in charge of
Lieutenant William Nelson, and a committee of prominent
Union leaders superintended theu- distribution to companies
of loyal Kentucky volunteers which were being secretly
formed in various parts of the State ; and since this venture
proved successful, larger shipments soon followed. As yet
all this was done quietly and secretly; for an election
was pending in the State, and the Unionists wished to avoid

132 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
the animosities which open warlike preparations would be
sure to create. The elections once over, however, further
disguise was thrown off, and at the beginning of July Lieu
tenant Nelson openly estabUshed "Camp Dick Eobinson"
in Central Kentucky. Into this he quickly gathered several
thousand Union volunteers already previously recruited. Be
fore Secessionists or neutral Conservatives were well aware
of the fact, he had formed a self-sustaining military post af
fording a secure raUying-place and support to Kentucky
loyaUsts. Govemor Magoffin wrote an official letter to
President Lincoln, urging the removal of this and other
Union camps from the State ; but the President repUed that
the force was composed exclusively of Kentuckians defend
ing their own homes, and that, in accordance with the evi
dent popular sentiment of the State, he must decline to
order them away.
Under these various influences the hopes and schemes of
Govemor Magoffin and his conspUing secession adherents
withered and failed. The "State Guard" of Buckner lan
guished, and the loyal "Home Guards" grew in numbers
and effective military strength. So far it had been a contest
of quiet, but very earnest poUtical strategy, and the result
was in exact conformity to the dominant popular sentiment
manifested in the late elections by decisive Union majorities.
Sustained by this sentiment, the effort could not weU have
failed ; but failure was rendered impossible, and the result
greatly hastened, by the constant presence of a considerable
number of Northem troops at Cairo, Cincinnati, and mter
mediate towns on the border, ready to intervene with active
and decisive force, had the necessity at any time become
imminent. Meanwhile sun-ounding events were rapidly maturing to
force Kentucky from her neutral attitude. Not only had

KENTUCKY. 133
hostUities commenced east of the AUeghanies, but active
minor campaigns, closing with somewhat important battles,
had taken place on each side of Kentucky. Eastward the
rebels were driven out of West Virginia with disaster during
July ; while, to the west, a serious invasion of Missouri was
checked in August by the hardy, though over-daring courage
of Lyon, who threw back a combined rebel column moving
from Arkansas northward, unfortunately at the costly sacri
flce of his own lUe. Unlooked-for success at Bull Eun had
greatly encouraged the rebelUon, but it felt the menace of
growing danger in the West. Fremont had been sent to St.
Louis, and, with a just pride in his former fame, the whole
Northwest was eager to respond to his summons, and follow
his lead in a grand and UTesistible expedition down the
Mississippi Eiver in the coming autumn, which should
open the Father of Waters to the Union flag and sever the
territory of the Confederacy — a cherished plan of General
Scott. The rebel General PUlow — somewhat wordy, but exceed
ingly active, and as yet the principal mUitary authority in
Tennessee — had long been warning Jefferson Daris to pre
pare against such an enterprise. He had been working with
great energy to fortify Memphis, and, by the middle of
May, reported that he would soon have twenty pieces in bat
tery. But at the same time he prophesied that " an effort
wUl be made to effect a lodgment at Columbus, foi-tify that
place, and, with a strong invading column, tum my works,
attack them in reverse, crush my supporting force, capture
the guns, and open the river. The northem portion of Ten
nessee is unfavorable, from the extent of open country.''
He said he had asked Govemor Magoffin for permission to
fortify Columbus, adding : "If he should withhold his con
sent, my present impression is that I shall go forward and

134 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
occupy the work upon the ground of its necessity for pro
tecting Tennessee."
But Jefferson Davis had too great hopes of Kentucky to
create enmity by forcing her neutraUty, and PiUow's scheme
was necessarily postponed. As the autumn approached,
however, Kentucky was clearly lost to the " Confederates."
Of the members of Congress chosen at the election held
June 20th, nine out of ten were loyal. At the general elec
tion held on the first Monday of August, the Unionists
gained three-fourths of the members of each branch of the
Legislature. Meanwhile the danger of a great Mississippi
expedition from the North grew formidable. The lower
Mississippi fiows generally between level shores, and offers
few points where the stream may be effectually obstructed
by fortifications. It was, therefore, desirable to secure aU
that were available, and the Eichmond authorities now re
solved to seize and hold Columbus, notwithstanding the fact
that it lay in "neutral" Kentucky.
Since July 4th the defence of the Mississippi Eiver had
been specially entrusted to General Leonidas Polk, formerly
a bishop in the Protestant Episcopal Church, b]it who, since
the outbreak of the rebellion, preferred to utilize his early
West Point education, by laying aside his clerical functions
and accepting a major-general's commission in the Confed
erate service. On September 5th he began moving his
forces northward, violating the neutraUty of Kentucky by
occupying the town of Hickman, on the Mississippi, within
that State. The movement did not pass unobserved; the
Union commander at Cairo had, with equal vigilance, been
studying the possibilities of the river system in his neigh
borhood. On the following day, Brigadier-General Grant
proceeded, with two gunboats and an infantry force, to take
possession of the town of Paduoah, at the confiuence of the

KENTUCKY. 135
Cumberland and Tennessee Eivers with the Ohio — a move
ment which bore important fruit a few months later. Gen
eral Polk, on his part still marching northward, reached and
occupied Columbus, on the Mississippi, on September 7th.
Having hastily procured the endorsement of this step from
Jefferson Daris, General Polk, on the 9th, formally notified
Govemor Magoffin of his presence in Kentucky.
By this time also, the Unionists of the State had com
pleted and compacted their organization and authority, and
demonstrated their strength and predominance. A new miU
tary department, consisting of Kentucky and Tennessee,
and named the Department of the Cumberland, was, on
August 15th, created at Washington and placed under the
command of General Anderson, and since September 1st
that officer had made Louisrille his headquarters. On the
other hand, Buckner had abandoned his professed neutrality
and his miUtia command, and formally entered the rebel
service as a brigadier-general. Stationing himself just
within Tennessee, south of Middle Kentucky, he was collect
ing the rebel members of his "State Guard" for a hostile
expedition against the homes of his former friends and
neighbors. Another rebel force gathering under ZoUicoffer,
in East Tennessee, was watching its opportunity to advance
into Kentucky through Cumberland Gap.
Under these threatening aspects Governor Magoffin com
municated to the Legislature, then in session. General Polk's
announcement of his an-ival at Columbus. The altogether
illogical and false rSle of Kentucky neutrality was necessari
ly at an end. The Legislature, by express resolutions under
date of September 14th, instructed the Governor to demand
the unconditional withdrawal of the rebel forces from Ken
tucky, while other resolutions called on General Anderson to
enter at once upon the active defence of his native State. A

136 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
Uttle later, Kentucky still further and flnaUy identified her-
seU with the loyal North. Enlistment under the Confede
rate flag was by law declared a misdemeanor, and the inva
sion of Kentucky by Confederate soldiers a felony, and
heavy punishments were prescribed for both offences. And
since the Home Guards had only been organized for local
protection, the Legislature now formaUy authorized the en
Ustment of forty thousand volunteers to " repel invasion,"
proriding that they should be mustered into the serrice of
the United States, and co-operate with the armies of the
Union,

CHAPTER xn.
WEST VIRGINIA.
PiUGE to 1861, the State of VUginia — the " Old Dominion ''
— extended from Chesapeake Bay westward to the Ohio
Eiver. This broad limit, however, gave her a defective
boundary. The AUeghany Mountains, running through the
very middle of the State, from northeast to southwest, com
pletely bisected her territory into two dirisions somewhat
unequal in size, and greatly different in topographical fea
tures and character. East of the mountains, the land rises
from a broad, low tide-water belt on the sea-coast, in a tolera
bly regular gradation of plains and plateaus, first to the
Blue Eiidge, then to the main Appalachian chain ; west of
the diriding crest, the country retains its mountainous
characteristics, a succession of ridges and a medley of hills,
tiU it reaches the Ohio Eiver. Not alone through earlier
settlement, but also by reason of climate, soil, and situation.
East VUginia remained the region of large plantations, heavy
slave population, and profitable agriculture, especially in
production of tobacco ; West Virginia, on the other hand,
became the home of hunters, pioneers, lumbermen, miners,
and in latter times the seat of a busy manufacturing indus
try — developing a diversified agriculture for local consump
tion, rather than the production of great staples for export.
With preponderant population and wealth. East VUginia

138 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
absorbed political power, and selfishly laid and expended
taxes to her local advantage, so that West Virginia was made
to stand in the relation of a tributary province, rather than
an integral and equally favored part of the commonwealth.
So too grew up essential differences in social tradition and
aspiration. The tide-water population developed famUy
estates, pretentious manor-homes, aristocratic exclusiveness,
ancestral pride — peculiarities which could not thrive in
hunters' camps, or the shanties of miners and lumbermen.
The whole world over, and in all ages, mountain and forest
life has bred a spirit of self-reliance, of personal indepen
dence, of the recognition of indiridual equaUty, and rights
of simple manhood.
More than anything else, however, the system of slavery
antagonized the two sections of the State. By the census of
1860, East Virginia contained 472,494 slaves ; while West
VU-ginia, with half as much free population, embraced a total
of only 18,371 slaves. It is therefore not surprising that se
cessionism was rampant in the east, and that unionism pre
vailed in the west. Of the 55 final votes against the secret
Ordinance of Secession in the Virginia Convention, 32 were
cast by the V\?'est Virginia delegates, 14 others were con
tributed from other mountain counties ; the populous plains
and lowlands of the east suppUed only 9. As in other parts
of the South, the fungus of treason grew rankest in the hot
beds of the heavy slave counties ; the poison of conspiracy
infected the centres of accumulated wealth, of inherited
family pride, of over-fattened political ambition ; it was the
Tylers, the Wises, the Floyds, the Masons, who, stuffed to
repletion with political benefits, turned with ungrateful
hearts to destroy the temple of government, wherein as
selfish and hypocritical priests they had conducted a dis
sembling and perverted worship.

WEST VIRGINIA. 139
While the Convention of Virginia was carrying on its ec-_
centric and fluctuating poUtical intrigues under guise of
public deliberation, one of the West Virginia members of
fered resolutions making a somewhat startling, but entirely
germane application of the heretical theory of secession.
" The right of revolution," he wrote, " can be exercised as
well by a portion of the citizens of a State against their State
government, as it can be exercised by the whole people of a
State against their Federal Government." "And that any
change of the relation Virginia now sustains to the Federal
Government, against the wishes of even a respectable
minority of her people, would be such an act of injustice
perpetrated upon the rights of that minority as to justify
them in changing their relation to the State Government by
separating themselves from that section of the State that
had thus wantonly disregarded theU- interests and defled
their will."
The conspirators in the convention wilfully shut their
eyes to the pertinency of this logic, but among the people
of West VUginia it remained a quick and pervading princi
ple of action. The Convention at Eichmond passed its
secret Ordinance of Secession on April 17th ; within a week
popular movements were already on foot in the towns and
populous counties of West Virginia, looking to a division of
the State. Numerous causes contributed to this result.
PoUtical jealousy and injustice, though a powerful influ
ence, was not everything. Geography had already ordained
separation by a formidable mountain-barrier. Her people
felt themselves an integral part of the Great West. The,y
responded to the impulse of its commercial ambition, its
material development, its expansive business energy. Wheel
ing aspired to rival Pittsburg and Cincinnati, not Eichmond.
They acknowledged neither tobacco nor cotton as kings;

140 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
lumber, coal, iron, salt, petroleum, were their candidates
for supremacy in trade. Their commerce foUowed their
streams into the Ohio. The Mississippi Valley was a
broader market than the Atlantic sea-coast. Their busi
ness reached out for St. Louis, St. Paul, and Denver, as
well as Memphis and New Orleans.
The effort, therefore, of the tide-water slaveholding aristo
crats to carry them into a cotton confederacy, met an in
stantaneous and almost unanimous protest. The proposi
tion was hardly a subject for discussion. To secede from
secession was the common wish and determination. The
only question was how to put their negative into effective
operation. Eapid popular organization foUowed ; the Gov
emment at Washington was appealed to, and promised
countenance and support ; and on May 13th, delegates from
twenty-five counties met at WheeUng to consult and derise
further action whereby they might fully and finally repudi
ate the treasonable revolt of East Virginia.
CUcumstances favored theu- design. Under President
Lincoln's call, the large and populous State of Ohio, West
VU-ginia's nearest neighbor, was organizing thUteen regi
ments of three months volunteers. This quota entitled her
to a major-general; and to this important command Gov
ernor Dennison appointed a young officer of thorough West
Point training and varied experience — Captain George B.
McClellan. He was also a personal favorite of General
Scott, who had such confldence in his abiUty that he soon
(May 3d) placed him in command of the MiUtary Depart
ment of the Ohio, created to include the three States of
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, with headquarters at Cincin
nati, and to which West Virginia was not long after attached.
The blockade of Washington, and other incidents, had served
to keep Westem quotas of troops on the Ohio line, and the

WEST VIRGINIA 141
Unionists of West Virginia thus found a substantial miUtary
force at once in theU immediate vicinity, with a command
ing officer instructed to give them encouragement and sup
port, and carefully studying the possible opportunities of
serrice in their midst.
Although the convention proceedings must have made
the Eichmond authorities acquainted with the prevaiUng
union sentiment of West VUginia, it is probable that they
did not anticipate a general disaffection; not only did
Governor Letcher's proclamations for State miUtia include
that section with apparent confidence, but he at an early
day despatched officers there to collect and organize it.
Eelatively, population was sparse and the country moun
tainous and hilly; there were, therefore, two principal
locaUties, or lines of transit, travel, and business, where
concentration could be best effected — one the line of the
Baltimore and Ohio Eailroad, the other the valley of the
Great Kanawha Eiver — and to these districts Governor
Letcher sent his agents. Discouraging reports were, how
ever, soon returned : that feeling was very bitter ; that
union organizations existed in most of the counties ; that
that section of the State was " verging on actual rebelUon."
Fragments of rebel companies were indeed here and there
springing up, but it became evident that no local force suffi
cient to hold the country would respond to the Confederate
appeaL On the other hand, the open disaffection, and the
ominous gathering of forces at several points along the Ohio
side of the river, pointed to a short tenure of Confederate
authority. The Eichmond officials were, however, unwilUng to lose
their control without a straggle, and, in default of local
miUtary support, determined to maintain themselves with
forces from East Virginia. To that end they now sent a

142 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
few available companies, with some extra arms and supplies,
from Staunton at the southern end of the Shenandoah Val
ley, by the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, a tolerably
direct route, over the mountains, a distance of seventy-flve
to a hundred miles to Beverly, from which point they might
menace and overawe Grafton, the junction of the main stem
of the Baltimore and Ohio EaiUoad with its branches to
Parkersburg and Wheeling.
But the reaction against secession, the reawakening of
union feeling, the growth and organization of the party
which favored a permanent division of the State, largely
outran aU the conspirators' efforts and measures. Coun
ter-revolution being positive and aggressive, was not only
stronger, but more active than the revolution which had
given it bUth and opportunity. The inhabitants showed
more alacrity to take up arms for the Govemment than for
Letcher and Lee. A West Virginia regiment, formed by
Colonel Kelly to fight for the Union, gathered recruits
more rapidly at WheeUng, than the rebel camps which
Colonel Porterfield had been sent to command and con
centrate between Beverly and Grafton.
It will be remembered that the Eichmond Convention
had appointed the 23d of May (that being also a general
election for members of the Legislature) as the day on
which the people of Virginia should vote to ratify or reject
the Ordinance of Secession. A curiously sophistical and
Pharisaical argument and appeal, published by Senator
Mason in behalf of ratification, shows conclusively that
the conspUators were in great apprehension lest theu-
treason should be repudiated at the polls. But, with the
State transformed to a camp, and filled with Jefferson
Daris' "foreign'' regiments, the result could hardly be in
doubt. Under complete military domination. East Virginia

WEST VIRGINIA. I43
voted to ratify ; West Virginia, comparatively free, voted to
reject the Secession Ordinance.
This event both justified and sustained the movements
of the West Virginia Unionists and the Government. If
General McClellan had needed any further reasons for an
active military interference, they were furnished by the fact
that Porterfield began burning bridges on the Baltimore
and Ohio Eailroad. Eealizing that delay was becoming
dangerous, and prompted by directions from Washington,
McClellan, on the 26th, ordered two regiments to cross the
river at Wheeling, and two others at Parkersburg, and to
simultaneously move forward by the branch railroads from
each of these points to their junction at Grafton. Owing to
the necessity of repaUing burnt bridges, their progi-ess was
cautious and slow. This gave ample time for Porterfield
to become fully informed of the movement ; whereupon
he retired with his small command, stores and spare arms,
to PhiUppa, on a country road, about fifteen miles directly
south of Grafton, hoping to find there a secure retreat
about which to gather a sufficient force to retum and more
thoroughly cut, harass, or control, the railroad.
But the Union forces, being in superior numbers, and as
sisted with ready information by friendly local sentiment,
gave the rebels little respite. General McClellan had for
warded additional regiments to Grafton, with Brigadier-
General Mon-is, an educated West Point officer, to command ;
and he now adopted and completed an expedition already
projected before his arrival by Colonel Kelly, who, with his
West VUginia regiment, had a thorough knowledge of the
country. Under pretence of an advance on Harper's Ferry,
Colonel Kelly, at the head of about two regiments, started
eastward by rail on the morning of June 2d ; that evening a
similar detachment under Colonel Dumont started west-

144 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
ward ; both columns, however, soon left the cars, and by dif
ferent roads began a rapid march southward against PhUip-
pa. A furious rain-storm during the night greatly impeded,
but also completely concealed, theU unexpected advance.
They arrived on opposite hills commanding the town, almost
simultaneously at daylight of June 3d, though, by a mistake
of the proper route, not in a position to cut off retreat
Here they found Porterfield's command, something over a
thousand strong, carelessly awaiting the anival of morning
and the abatement of the storm, to begin a retreat which the
rebel officers had informally resolved on the prerious even
ing. The surprise was complete, and the attack so sudden
and sharp as to force the rebels to disperse in utter rout
and disorganization. TheU loss in killed and captured was
small, owing to the fatiguing night march which left the
Union troops too thoroughly exhausted to make pursuit.
The complete success of this first dash at the enemy not
only had the happiest effect in inspiriting the Union troops,
but it also encouraged and fortified the West Virginia
Unionists in their political scheme of forming a new State.
On the day after the " PhiUppa races," as the skirmish was
facetiously nicknamed, a preriously concerted agreement to
elect delegates was carried out. These, representing about
forty counties lying between the crest of the Alleghanies and
the Ohio Eiver, met in a formal convention at Wheeling, on
June llth. Its first step (June 13th), was to repudiate the
treasonable usurpations of the Eichmond Convention and
Govemor Letcher, to pronounce their acts without authority
and void, and to declare as vacated all executive, legislative,
and judicial offices in the State held by those " who adhere
to said convention and Executive." The second step was
the adoption of an ordinance (June 19th) reorganizing the
State government. On the following day the convention

WEST VIRGINIA. 145
appointed F. H. Pierpoint Govemor, with an adrisory
councU qf five, to wield executive authority. A legislature
was constituted by calling together, on July 1st, at WheeUng,
such members chosen at the election of May 23d as would
take a prescribed oath of allegiance to the United States and
the restored government of VUginia, and providing for fiUing
the vacancies of those who refused. A similar prorision con
tinued or substituted other State and county offlcers. After
adding sundry ordinances of urgent necessity to this
groundwork of restoration, the convention on the 25th took
a recess tiU August. The Legislature, however, met ac
cording to caU, and took up the difficult task of derising
legal enactments suitable to the revolutionary crisis ; and
on July 9th, it chose two United States Senators, who, four
days later, were admitted and took part in the national legis
lation. So far, the work was simply a repudiation of secession,
and a restoration of the usurped government of the whole
State. But the main motive and purpose of the counter
revolution was not allowed to halt or fail. In August the
Wheeling Convention reassembled, and on the 20th adopted
an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha, and pro
riding for a ratifying popular vote to be taken on the ques
tion in the following October. It is not the prorince of this
volume to follow further the poUtical transformation of the
" Old Dominion," thus inaugurated, except to add that the
proposed " State of Kanawha " became the " State of West
Virginia," and was duly admitted to the Union about two
years later.
Governor Pierpoint, the head of the prorisional govem
ment thus organized at Wheeling, made a formal applica
tion under the Constitution, to the Govemment of the
United States, for aid to suppress rebeUion and protect thf
10

146 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
people against domestic violence ; and in furtherance of this
object General McCleUan ordered additional forces into the
State from his Department. Local enlistments had also by
this time increased West VUginia's own contingent to three
regiments under his command. In addition to affording
protection to Union sentiment, this miUtary occupation was
designed to insure the safety of the Baltimore and Ohio
EaiUoad, not alone of Grafton as a strategical point, but
also of the valuable raiUoad bridge across the Cheat Eiver,
and numerous important timnels in the mountains imme
diately east of it. The precaution was nowise superfluous ;
for the Eebel Govemment had some weeks before ordered
a special expedition to destroy them and permanently break
this important line of communication. General Lee stiU had
his eye on such a possibiUty, and wrote to his new com
mander, under date of July 1st, " the rupture of the raiU-oad
at Cheat Eiver would be worth to us an army."
To effect this, and to hold West VUginia — or at least to
prevent the Union forces from penetrating through the
mountains in the dUection of Staunton — the rebel authori
ties now sought to repaU- the PhiUppi disaster by sending
two new commanders to that region : Ex-Governor Henry A.
Wise, invested with the rank of brigadier-general, to the
Kanawha Valley, and General Garnett, formerly a major in
the Federal Army, to Beverlj', to gather up and reorganize
the debris of Porterfield's command, which they also took
immediate measures to reinforce.
Garnett, arriving near the end of June, found that Porter
field had retreated across an outlying mountain range into
the Cheat Eiver VaUey, in which Beverly is situated. The
turnpike from Staunton to Beverly is the central and prin
cipal mountain route within a long distance, both to the
north and to the south. From Beverly northwestward the

WEST VIRGINIA. 147
turnpike branches, one line going to Buckhannon through a
pass over Eich Mountain, the other going to Philippi
through a pass in the same range, but which is there named
Laurel Hill, the latter being some seventeen miles farther
north. " I regard these two passes," wrote Garnett, "as the
gates to the northwestern countiy." Here, then, he proposed
to fortify himself, to forage on the country beyond, and to
leisurely watch his chance of breaking the railroad. His
circumstances were not the most favorable. The troops
which he found at HuttonsriUe on his arrival were " in a
miserable condition as to arms, clothing, equipments, in
struction, and discipline." " The Union men," he also
wrote, " are greatly in the ascendancy here, and are much
more zealous and active in theU cause than the Secession
ists. The enemy are kept fully adrised of our movements,
even to the strength of our scouts and pickets, by the coun
try people, while we are compelled to grope in the dark as
much as U we were invading a foreign and hostile countiy."
Nevertheless, he began a rigorous reorganization ; Lee im
mediately sent him reinforcements. In a short time he had
Colonel Pegram estabUshed in the pass at Eich Mountain,
with a regiment and six guns, while he himseU held the
pass at Laurel HiU with three or four regiments, leaving a
detachment at Beverly.
This was the situation when, early in July, General McClel
lan resolved to take the offensive and drive the rebels from
West Virginia. He had airivedTon the scene of action about
the same time with Garnett ; and though he had a largely
preponderating force in the State, it was considerably de
pleted by the local garrisons necessary to protect the rail
road, and to give confidence to Unionists in exposed towns.
For the immediate work in hand General Mon-is had flve or
sis regiments at Philippi, confronting Garnett ; McClellan

148

THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.

Field ot the West Virginia Battles.

WEST VIRGINIA. 149
dUected him to take an advanced position within two miles
of the enemy's works at Laurel HUl, to give an impression
that he intended the main attack, and to be ready to pursue,
should they retreat.
Meanwhile McClellan himself moved to Buckhannon with
some seven regiments, with the design of turning th©
enemy's position on Eich Mountain. On the evening of
July 9th he pushed forward to Eoaring Creek, two miles
from Pegram's entrenched camp. A reconnoissance on the
10th showed the enemy strongly posted in a mountain deflle,
where, with the large force he was supposed to have, a direct
attack in front could only be made at great sacriflce. That
evening Brigadier-General Eosecrans proposed a plan to
tum the position, and McClellan (with some reluctance, it
is said) permitted him to attempt it.
At dayUght of July llth, Eosecrans, with portions of four
regiments — a total of nineteen hundred men — set out, and,
amid a well-nigh continuous rain-storm, by eleven o'clock
cut and cUmbed their way through a pathless forest and
thicket to the very crest of Eich Mountain. Their ascent
was made south of the turnpike, while Pegram was expect
ing the attempt on the north. To guard against either con
tingency, however, as his own camp and entrenchments were
near the west base of the mountain, Pegram had sent a de
tachment of three hundred and ten men and two guns back
to where the turnpike crosses the summit, two miles in his
rear. There, at the farm of a man named Hart, they had
scarcely had time to throw up some slight entrenchments
for theU guns, when Eosecrans' force, advancing toward the
road from the south, encountered them. The rebels made a
plucky resistance, but the Unionists had such advantage in
numbers that the contest was quickly decided. " We formed
at about three o'clock," reports Eosecrans, " under cover of

150 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
our skirmishers, guarding weU against a flank attack from
the direction of the rebels' position, and after a brisk flre
which threw the rebels into confusion, carried theU- position
by a charge, driring them from behind some log breast-
woi-ks, and pursued them into the thickets on the mountain.
We captured twenty-one prisoners, two brass six-pounders,
flfty stand of arms, and some com and prorisions. Our loss
was twelve killed and forty-nine wounded." He also places
the reported burials of the rebels kiUed at one hundred and
thirty-flve, with about twenty wounded.
McClellan had moved all his force up to Pegram's front,
and was waiting to begin a dU-ect assault when he should
leam that Eosecrans had commenced the attack on the rear.
But Eosecrans' flght on the very top of Eich Mountain dis
concerted the arrangement. The messenger sent to com
municate between McClellan and himself rode unsus
pectingly up to a rebel picket-guard, and was captured.
McClellan waited all day in vain for the rear attack to be
gin ; for when the engagement on the mountain was over,
the day was aUeady so far advanced, and Eosecrans' men
were so thoroughly worn out with theU toilsome ascent pre
ceding the flght, that it was deemed most prudent to go
into bivouac on the fleld of battle. McClellan was not in
formed of the flght and its result imtil the foUowing day,
July 12th, when it was also ascertained that the whole rebel
camp and position had been precipitately evacuated; he
was therefore now able, not only to secure theU- abandoned
guns and supplies, but to push without opposition along the
turnpike entirely over the mountain and occupy Beverly.
Pegram had, on the llth, personaUy gone to the moun
tain-top — only, however, to witness the defeat and disper
sion of his Uttle detachment. Seeing himself thus in a trap,
with McClellan in front and Eosecrans in secure possession

WEST VIRGINIA. 151
of the road behind him, he returned to his camp, and spiking
his four guns, abandoned his camp and equipage and under
took to escape, with the remainder of his command — about
six hundred men — by marching northward along the moun
tain to join Garnett at Laurel Hill. For the moment he suc
ceeded in eluding both the Federal commanders, and after
a laborious eighteen hours' march over an almost impassable
route, found himseU within three miles of LeedsriUe. Here,
however, he received news that Garnett had also retreated,
and that a strong Union column was in pursuit. Thus he
was once more caught between two Union armies ; and see
ing no further avenue of escape, he that night, July 12th,
sent a proposal of surrender to General McClellan, who, on
the following moming (July 13th), received Pegram and his
command, a total remainder of five hundred and sixty men
and thirty-three officers, as prisoners of war, at Beverly,
where the half-famished rebel fugitives were only too glad
to once more receive comfortable quarters and rations.
The earUest fugitives who escaped from the battle of Eich
Mountain, on the afternoon of July llth, carried the news
of that disaster to Beverly, enabling the rebel regiments
stationed there to retreat southward, and also, as is prob
able, communicating the intelligence to Garnett at Laurel
Hill. That officer, already seriously threatened by General
Morns in his immediate front, thereupon perceived that his
position was no longer tenable, and ordered an immediate
retreat. When Garnett reached LeedsriUe on the afternoon
of the 12th, and heard that McCleUan was at Beverly, he
saw that his own further retreat to the south was also cut
off. There was now no resource left but to adopt the rather
desperate altemative of turning to the north and attempting
to reach St. George and West Union by a rough and difficult
mountain road. His command of thirty-three hundred men

162 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
and cumbrous trains thereby necessarily became very much
scattered and disorganized. Although he had some flfteen
hours the start of the Union pursuit, an advance column of
three Federal regiments, led by Captain Benham of the En
gineers, gained rapidly on the fugitives. Notwithstanding
every effort of the rebels to impede them by felUng trees in
the nan-ow mountain deflles, the Union advance came up
with their wagon-train at Carrick's Ford, one of the crossings
of Cheat Eiver, twenty-sis miles northwest of Laurel Hill,
about noon of July 13th. Here Garnett in person faced
about his rear-guard (a single regiment, according to the
rebel report), and taking post on a favorable and precipi
tous elevation of the right river bank, flfty to eighty feet
high, planted three guns to command the ford and approach
ing road, and prepared to defend his retreat.
Steedman's regiment, with two guns, was leading the Union
advance, and came up on the low, narrow approach, within
close musket-range, before they discovered the rebel line.
A brisk engagement at once ensued, and the other two regi
ments soon arrived. Owing to t^«ft-estricted space, MiUoy's
regiment was obliged to take positiort^here it could only
deUver an oblique flre and at a greater distance. Dumont's
regiment was thereupon ordered to advance and scale a diffi
cult height in order to tum the enemy's left flank. Two
companies had well-nigh gained the coveted position, when
Benham received a mistaken report that the ascent was im
practicable. He therefore ordered Dumont to return, to
march his regiment along the very base of the hill on which
the rebels were posted, to their right flank, and make the
ascent there. The manoeuvre was gallantly executed, and
scarcely had Dumont begun mounting the height, when the
rebel line broke and fled, abandoning one of their guns.
Eetreat and pursuit were once more commenced ; and at

WEST VIRGINIA 153
the next ford, perhaps a quarter of a mile farther on, there
occun-ed an interchange of desultory skirmish-fire between
small parties of sharpshooters, in which Garnett himself was
killed. At this result the Federals abandoned further pursuit,
satisfied with the capture of the baggage-train, one gun, two
stands of colors, and fifty prisoners ; the casualties being thir
teen killed and forty wounded of the Federals, and twenty
killed and ten wounded of the rebels. McCleUan had
ordered yet another column to be gathered up along the
raiUoad to intercept the flying enemy at West Union ; but
no substantial result followed the effort, and the remainder
of Gamett's command escaped.
Counted according to mere numbers, the battles of Eich
Mountain and Carrick's Ford fall into a ridiculous insigni
ficance in contrast with the great battles of the rebeUion
during the next three years. Hundreds of engagements, of
greater magnitude and much more serious loss of Ufe, pre
ceded or followed the main contests of the war, of which
history will hardly make a note. But this petty skirmish
with three hundred rebels on Eich Mountain, and this rout
of a Uttle rear-guard at Carrick's Ford, were speedily fol
lowed by large political and miUtary results. They closed
a campaign, dispersed a rebel army, recovered a disputed
State, permanently pushed back the military frontier. They
enabled McCleUan to send a laconic telegram, combining in
one report * the scattered and disconnected incidents of
* " IIOTTONSTILLE, Va., July 14, 1861.
"Colonel Townsend:
" Garnett and forces routed ; his baggage and one gun taken ; his army demoral
ized ; Garnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia, and
have lost thirteen killed, and not more than forty wounded. We have in all
killed at least two hundred of the enemy, and their prisoners will amount to at

154 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
three different days and happening forty mUes apart, which
(without exaggerating Uteral truth except as to the Union
losses and number of prisoners) gave such a general impres
sion of professional skill and achievement as to make him
the hero of the hour, and which started a train of circum
stances that, without further victories, made him General-in-
Chief of all the Armies of the United States, on the fijst
day of November follovring.
McClellan's campaign in West Virginia ends with the
death of Garnett and the dispersion of his army. About a
week afterward he was called to a new field of duty at Wash
ington City. There is not room in this volume to further
describe military operations in West VUginia during the
remainder of the year 1861. Various movements and enter
prises occun-ed under command of Wise, Floyd, and Lee, on
the rebel side; and under Cox, Eosecrans, Milroy, and other
gallant officers of the Union army. With somewhat fiuctu-
ating changes, the rebels were gradually forced back out of
the Great Kanawha Valley; and the aggregate result left
West Virginia in possession of the Federal troops, her own
inherent loyalty haring contributed largely to this condi
tion. The union sentiment of the people was evei-ywhere
made more and more manifest, and the new State govem
ment was consoUdated and heartily sustained, ending, as
has already been mentioned, by her ultimate admission as a
separate member of the Federal Union, in June, 1863.
le.ist one thousand. Have taken seven guns in all. I still look for the capture
of the remnant of Garnett's army by General Hill. The troops defeated are the
crack regiments of Eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and Caro
linians. Our success is complete, and secession is killed in this country.
"Geo. B. McClellan,
'* Major-General Commanding."

CHAPTER Xm.
PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN.
Undbb the President's three months call the State of Penn
sylvania was required to fumish sixteen regiments. This
entitled her to two major-generals, and one of these, ap
pointed by the Governor, was Eobert Patterson. He had
served with credit as a lieutenant and captain in the war of
1812, and as a major-general ih the Mexican War ; General
Scott regarded him as "an excellent second in command;"
his selection seemed, therefore, natural and proper. Not-
¦vvithstanding he had now reached the age of sixty-nine, he
entered at once with alacrity on the task of organizing the
three months volunteers in the city of Philadelphia. After
the Baltimore riot and the Maryland uprising, it became
necessary to create the military " Department of Pennsylva
nia," comprising Pennsylvania, Delaware, and part of Mary
land, and Patterson was assigned to its. command, with dU-ec-
tions to co-operate in restoring Union authority in Maryland.
Sundry joint miUtary movements projected to accomplish
this object, were happily soon rendered unnecessary by the
rapid accumulation of troops at Washington, Butler's occu
pation of Baltimore, and the sweeping poUtical reaction in
Maryland. But, meanwhile, the rebels had established a
strong camp at Harper's Feiiy, and Patterson's close atten
tion was thus very naturally transferred to that point. The

156 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
three months troops could not be used in distant undertak
ings. Here, however, was a worthy enterprise at the very
threshold of Pennsylvania, which, successfully prosecuted,
would protect Maryland, relieve the Baltimore and Ohio Eail
road, encourage Virginia Unionists, and recover lost prestige.
Patriotic pride, poUtical security, and miUtary advantage
seemed, to the minds of both Patterson and Scott, to present
combined reasons for an early recapture of Harper's Ferry.
For this purpose, Patterson, about the first of June, con
centrated his available troops at Chambersburg, Pa., and
on the third of that month issued an address to the regi
ments under his command, announcing that "you wiU
soon meet the insurgents." Orders from General Scott,
however, held him back until strong reinforcements could
be sent, and an important diversion organized to aid him ;
and while thus assisting, the General also admonished him
to every prudence, reminding him that his expedition was
" well projected, and that success in it would be an impor
tant step in the war ; but, there must be no reverse.''
With the increase of his force, and a closer survey of his
task, Patterson's own estimate of his enterprise grew in mag
nitude. " Eemember, I beseech you," he wrote to the Sec
retary of War, under date of June 10th, " that Harper's Feny
is (as I have said from the first) the place where the first
great battle will be fought, and the result will be decisive of
the future. The insurgents are strongly intrenched, have
an immense number of guns, and will contest every inch of
ground  The importance of a victory at Harper's
Feny caimot be estimated. I cannot sleep for thinking about
it  I beseech you, therefore, by our ancient
friendship, give me the means of success. You have the
means ; place them at my disposal, and shoot me if I do not
use them to advantage."

PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 157
With such professions of a fighting spirit, the Administra
tion looked with some confidence for an offensive campaign,
and sent its best regiments and officers to take part in it.
Both General Scott and General Patterson were, however, de
ceived in their expectation that the rebels meant to risk a bat
tle at that point. With a total force of something over seven
teen regiments, Patterson at length began his forward move
ment ria Hagerstown and WilUamsport. But so leisurely
were his preparations and advance, that the rebels had every
knowledge of his coming; and when, on June 15th, he
flnally reached the Potomac Eiver, he found, instead of the
"desperate resistance" which had been looked for, that
Johnston had hastily evacuated Harper's Ferry after destroy
ing the raiU-oad bridge and spiking his heavy guns, and had
retreated upon Winchester.
Patterson and his officers were greatly mystified by this
withdrawal of the enemy. "I beUeve it is designed for a
decoy," wrote Fitz John Porter, Chief of Staff, to Oadwala-
der, second in command. " There may be a deep-laid plot
to deceive us." " The whole affaU is to me a riddle," wrote
Cadwalader back to Porter. Advancing with a painful over-
caution, as if Johnston were the invader, a part of the army
crossed the Potomac on the 16th of June.
Finding the ramor of the evacuation trae, Patterson took
sufficient courage to report a rictory. " They have fled, and
in confusion," he wrote. " Their retreat is as demoralizing
as a defeat; and, as the leaders wiU never be caught, more
beneficial to our cause. Harper's Feny has been retaken
without firing a gun."
"What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy, do you
propose to make, consequent on the evacuation of Harper's
Feny?" asked General Scott by telegraph. "Design no
pursuit; cannot make it," replied Patterson. That deter-

158 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
mination necessarily ended this flrst part of the campaign ;
and General Scott thereupon ordered the extra reinforce
ments back to Washington.
If the evacuation of Harper's Ferry was a mystery to Pat
terson, it was a plain and common-sense necessity to the
rebel commander. Occasionally an idea finds a tenacious and
almost ineradicable lodgment in the public mind, without
a shadow of reason or trath to justify it. Because the fan
atic John Brown selected Harper's Feny as the scene of his
wild exploit, the public mind jumped to the conclusion that
that spot was a natural stronghold, a Gibraltar, a Thermo
pylae. Now, the single mountain-line caUed the Blue Eidge,
crossing the Potomac Eiver at Harper's Ferry, is as far from
being a mountain stronghold as a straight line of picket-
fence across a brook is from being a block-house. John
Brown was as unsound in war as in poUtics. But it would
seem that, even in highly ciriUzed nations, there lingers a
remnant of the savage superstition that insanity is inspUa-
tion ; for strong minds caught at the suggestion that he had
recognized in Harper's Feny a negro Thermopylse.
This was apparently the light in which the rebel authori
ties regarded the place, and its occupancy and retention was
made a prime object at the beginning. Jefferson Daris him
self sent Johnston, one of his best officers, to command it.
"My conversations with General Lee, in Eichmond," says
Johnston, "and the President's [Jefferson Daris] oral in
structions to me in Montgomery, had informed me distinctly
that they regarded Harper's Ferry as a natural fortress, com
manding the entrance into the Valley of Virginia from Penn
sylvania and Maryland, and that it was occupied in that idea,
and my command not that of a military district and active
army, but of a fortress and its garrison."
When Johnston arrived, however, and made a personal in-

PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN.

159

Patterson's Campaign.

160 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
spection of the neighborhood, he at once recognized the
error of this assumption. "There is no danger of attack in
front," he wrote (May 26th), "but the position is easily
turned by crossing the river above or below. The present
force is not sufficient for defence against a superior one at
tacking from the Virginia side. Eelief, in case of invest
ment, could not be furnished. Considered as a position, I
regard Harper's Feny as untenable against a strong enemy.
We have outposts at the Point of Eocks, near the ferry at
Williamsport, and the bridge at Shepherdsto'wn, the extreme
points being at least thU-ty miles apart." Two days later he
repeated his statement, his engineer reporting that " to hold
this post, then, either as a fortress, a point d'appui, or as a
condition of the defence of the Virginia VaUey, we requUe a
force of from twelve to fifteen thousand men."
Lee did not reUsh the alternative ; he sent him two addi
tional regiments, and wrote him that the abandonment of
Harper's Feny " would be depressing to the cause of the
¦ South." But Johnston held stubbornly to his opinion, and
wrote on June 6th, that, though the abandonment of Harper's
Feny might be depressing to the cause of the South, the loss
of flve or six thousand men would be more so. "And if
they remain here," he added, " they must be captured or
destroyed very soon after General McClellan's arrival in the
valley." The opinion was eridently based on the cunent
rumors that McCleUan would bring Western troops to join
Patterson. This decided warning had its effect on the rebel authori
ties, and under date of June 13th they authorized Johnston
to retU-e upon Winchester, after destroying everything at
Harper's Feny, "whenever the position of the enemy shall
convince you that he is about to turn your position." But
they coupled the permission with another strong reminder :

PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 161
"The position of Harper's Ferry, as has been heretofore
stated, is deesoaed valuable because of its relation to Mary
land and as the entrance to the Valley of Virginia, the pos
session of which by the enemy will separate the eastern and
western sections of the State from each other, deprive us of
the agricultural resources of that fertile region, and bring in
its train political consequences which it is well beUeved you
cannot contemplate without the most painful emotions."
With Patterson on the point of moring against him, how
ever, Johnston allowed political consequences to take care of
themselves, destroyed Harper's Ferry on June 13th and 14th,
and retired even before his permission was received. " We
are twelve miles in advance of Winchester," he reported on
the 17th ; " my only hope from this movement is a slight
delay in the enemy's advance. I beUeve his force to be
about eighteen thousand ; ours is six thousand five hundred."
Patterson admits that he had seventeen regiments — a force
fuUy capable of the brilliant and important blow he had
been ambitious to strike, but which he had neither the skiU
nor courage to dUect.
The succeeding two weeks fumish no incidents worthy of
note in this connection. Practically the two armies re
mained in observation, inactive, and without deflnite plans.
When General Scott withdrew the temporary reinforcements
he had given Patterson to enable him to flght a battle, the
latter once more retired to the north bank of the Potomac.
For the moment military attention was dUected elsewhere.
McClellan was preparing his campaign in West Virginia ;
McDoweU was strengthening the Federal occupation of
ArUngton Heights and Alexandria; the President and
General S(Jott were deUberating upon possible operations
against Manassas. In this interim Johnston remained in
camp about Winchester, pushing his picket-line close up
11

162 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
to the Potomac, and keeping himself weU informed by scouts
and spies. Meanwhile the Confederate authorities, still
anxious to hold the Shenandoah Valley, and having also in
view a possible junction with Beauregard at Manassas, sent
forward reinforcements which raised Johnston's army to the
effective strength of nine thousand, besides twenty-flve hun
dred local mUitia in process of organization.
Toward the end of June a movement against Manassas was
resolved on at Washington. As a prehminary. General Scott
once more suggested a deflnite task to Patterson. "Ee-
main in front of the enemy," he telegraphed on June 25th,
" while he continues in force between Winchester and the
Potomac. If you are in superior or equal force, you may
cross and offer him battle.'' Two days later he gave further
emphasis to the suggestion by saying, " I had expected your
crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the enemy." But
Patterson complained that Johnston outnumbered him, and
clamored for reinforcements and batteries. Eeinforcements
and batteries were ordered to join him, and he was also in
formed of the intended movement on Manassas ; upon which
he again put on a bold front and crossed the Potomac at
WilUamsport, moring to Martinsburg, with sufficient oppo
sition to bring on a smart skirmish at Falling Waters, the
enemy retiring toward Winchester as he advanced.
From this point, during the short time he yet remained in
command, Patterson's miUtary conduct becomes the subject
of criticism and controversy. It is miUtary usage — perhaps
military necessity establishes the usage — ^that orders and di
rections from superior to subordinate officers are conveyed in
brief words expressing or suggesting only the objects to be
accomplished, and learing methods largely at the discretion
of him who has to perform the task. Following this estab
Ushed usage. General Scott, by his orders and dUeotions

PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 163
from July 1st to the 13th, informed Patterson that McDowell
would make an advance against Beauregard, and that John
ston must be defeated or detained in the Shenandoah Valley,
in order that their two armies might not unite and defeat
McDowell. " I telegraphed to you yesterday," was Scott's
language, "U not strong enough to beat the enemy early
next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the
vaUey of Winchester ; but if he retreats in force toward
Manassas, and it be too hazardous to follow him, then con
sider the *oute ria Key's Ferry, Leesburg, etc." That Pat
terson coneotly understood the order is shown by his reply :
" I have thus far succeeded in keeping in this ricinity the
command under General Johnston, who is now pretending
to be engaged in fortifying at Winchester, but prepared to
retUe beyond striking distance if I should advance too far.
To-monow I advance to Bunker Hill preparatory to the other
movement. If an opportunity offers, I shall attack ; but, un
less I can rout, shall be careful not to set him in full retreat
upon Strasburg."
But the wishes of the Administration and General Scott
were not allowed to depend alone on the customary orders.
Patterson's former indecision and hesitancy had created a
doubt of his disposition to flght ; and a similar hesitancy
was once more manifesting itself in his complaints, requests,
and especially in his growing exaggeration of his antago
nist's strength. It is always deemed hazardous to change
commanders on the eve of battle, and therefore the alterna
tive was adopted of sending General Sandford to him with
additional reinforcements ; who, waiving his rank, should
take command under Patterson, and prompt him in pushing
forward the army. Sandford, accepting the duty, reported to
Patterson with four regiments from Washington, about July
10th ; the independent column under General Stone also

164 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
joined him immediately afterward, so that Patterson's army
now numbered eighteen thousand two hundred according
to his own estimate, or over twenty-two thousand according
to the estimate of others, opposed to the rebel army, which,
altogether, Johnston states to have been less than twelve
thousand men.
It would appear that at this time two impulses struggled
for mastery in Patterson's mind. Apparently he was both
seeking and avoiding a battle. He had caUed a council of
war at Martinsburg on the 9th ; and verifying the miUtary
adage that a council of war never flghts, his officers had ad
rised him that he was on a " false Une," and that he could
most advantageously threaten Johnston from Charlestown.
Accordingly, on July 12th, Patterson asked permission to
transfer his forces to that line ; while a dispatch from Gene
ral Scott of the same date, in reply to a former letter, in sub
stance accorded him the permission, but accompanied it
with the signiflcant reminder : " Consider this suggestion
well, and except in an extreme case do not recross the Poto
mac with more than a sufficient detachment for your sup
plies on the canal."
Such a movement upon Charlestown, made promptly at
that date and under the then eristing conditions, might have
been judicious. But Patterson's dispatches show that from
this on he found nothing but reasons for fear and justifica
tion for inaction and retreat. He wanted a regiment of reg
ulars ; he said the time of the three months regiments was
about to expire ; that his men were barefooted ; that the
enemy was reinforced and fortified ; that " to attack under
such circumstances, against the greatly superior force at
Winchester, is most hazardous."
Under these renewed manifestations of timidity General
Scott's patience began to give way, and he now sent Patter-

PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 165
son two prompting telegrams, which ought to have warmed
the sluggish blood of even sixty-nine years to action. " Do
not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in
front," he telegraphed July 17th, " whilst he reinforces the
[Manassas] Junction with his main body. McDowell's first
day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court
House. The Junction will probably be carried to-morrow.''
And again on the following day : " I have certainly been ex
pecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had
felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by threats
and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and
I suppose superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march
and sent reinforcements toward Manassas Junction ? A
week is enough to win victories." Unfortunately, Patterson,
even before he received the first of these, had already com
mitted the fatal military blunder of a retreat. But the
questions were so searching, and so plainly conveyed a rep
rimand, that he replied in a tone of offended dignity : "The
enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him
actively employed, and, by threats and reconnoissances in
force, caused him to be re-enforced. I have accompUshed in
this respect more than the General-in-Chief asked, or could
well be expected in face of an enemy far superior in num
bers, with no line of communication to protect." The
answer was admirable in form and spirit, but it lacked the
essential element of correctness. The enemy did not out
number him — was, in fact, only two-thirds as strong — and
was at that moment actually making a rapid " stolen march "
to Manassas, which Patterson did no^disoover till two days
afterward. Understanding fully, both from General Scott's telegrams
and General Sandford's personal explanations, that an ad
vance against Manassas Junction was in progress, which

166 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
would lead to a heavy battle between McDowell and Beaure
gard, Patterson had moved from Martinsburg on July 15th,
directly toward Johnston at Winchester, as far as Bunker
Hill, within nine miles of the enemy. On the following day
he ordered a sUght reconnoissance. Until the night of the
16th it was believed by his officers that the advance meant
fight. Every one understood that the critical moment had
come, or was at hand. The time for elaborate strategy or
new combinations had passed. Confronting the enemy
there were but three alternatives admissible under his im
perative duty : to hold him, to fight him, or to follow him.
It is sad to relate that, with the complete advantage of
numbers and position, he did neither. In justice to him,
however, it should always be remembered that his personal
instinct was right, and that he was led into his fatal en-or
mainly by the influence of his chief-of-staff, Fitz John Por
ter. His senior aid-de-camp, in his testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, relates the cU-cum-
stances under which he took his flnal decision :
" At one time. General Patterson had given an order to
move from Bunker Hill to Winchester. He was very unwU-
ling to leave Johnston, even at Winchester, without attacking
him ; and 6n the afternoon before we left Bunker HiU he
decided to attack him, notwithstanding his strong force.
" Question. Behind his intrenchments ?
" Answer. Yes, sir ; it went so far that his order was
written by his assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Porter.
It was very much against the wishes of Colonel Porter, and
he asked General Patterson if he would send for Colonel
Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas, and consult them on the
movement. General Patterson replied : ' No, sir ; for I
know they will attempt fto dissuade me from it, and I have
made up my mind to fight Johnston under all cUcum-

PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 167
stances.' That was the day before we left Bunker HiU.
Then Colonel Porter asked to have Colonel Abercrombie
and Colonel Thomas sent for and consulted as to the best
manner to carry out his wishes. He consented, and they
came, and after half an hour they dissuaded him from it."
With his intentions thus changed, Patterson late that
night ordered a retrograde movement; and the next day,
July 17th, his army marched to Charlestown — nominally as a
flank inovement, but practicaUy in retreat, since it about
doubled the distance between himself and the enemy. It
adds neither excuse nor credit to himself or his adrising
subordinates that, as a partial justification, they had gulped
down an absurd rumor about the enemy being forty thou
sand strong, without taking any efficient means to ascertain
its conectness. And so Ufeless and inefficient had the
whole army become under such influences and management,
that not tiU July 20th did Patterson leam the humiliating
fact that he had wrecked the fair miUtary reputation of a
Ufetime by permitting the enemy to escape through utterly
• inexcusable lack of energy and want of judgment. And if
that reflection could be still further embittered, it was done
by the early reaUzation that his stupendous blunder had lost
to the Union cause the flrst important battle of the war.
Johnston was at Winchester, in daily anticipation of Pat
terson's attack, when, a Uttle after midnight of July 17th,
he received orders from the Confederate authorities to go at
once to the help of Beauregard. Just twenty-four hours had
elapsed since Patterson's order to retreat, and the Union
army was already at Charlestown. By nine o'clock on the
moming of July ISth, Johnston's scouts brought him reports
indicating clearly the actual situation. At noon of that day
he had his whole effective force of nine thousand men on
the march ; at nightfall his advance passed through Ashby's

168 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
Gap of the Blue Eidge; by eight o'clock on the 19th it
was at Piedmont, the nearest station of the Manassas Gap
Eailroad, and embarking here in cars, seven regiments were
in Beauregard's camp, at Manassas, that afternoon. John
ston himself, with another detachment, anived at Manassas
at noon of Saturday, July 20th ; and most of the remainder
of his force reached the battle-fleld of BuU Eun in the nick
of time to take a decisive part in that famous conflict, about
three o'clock on Sunday, July 21st. It was these nine thou
sand men of Johnston's army which not merely decided, but
principally fought the battle. Patterson could and ought
either to have defeated or held them at Winchester. Only
a Uttle more than a month had elapsed since he had written
to the Secretaiy of War, "Give me the means of success.
You have the means ; place them at my disposal, and shoot
me if I do not use them to advantage." He would have
fared UI under a Uteral enforcement of his own offer.

CHAPTER XIV.
MANASSAS.
On the 23d of May, 1861, according to the conspUators'
programme, VU-ginia was put through the dumb show of
indorsing the Secession Ordinance by a nominal popular
vote; and almost immediately thereafter, about June 1st,
the Confederate seat of govemment was transferred from
Montgomery to Eichmond. The reasons for this course
were palpable; it gratified the local pride of the Old
Dominion secessionists; it gave the reins of local miUtary
domination definitely into Jefferson Daris' personal grasp ;
it placed him on the most advantageous frontier to meet the
expected Union advance from Washington. This, as preri
ously related, had already seized upon Alexandria and Ar
lington Heights, which were now being extensively fortified.
Making a short speech to a serenade on the evening of June
1st, the rebel chief announced that Virginia was "to become
the theatre of a great central camp, from which wUl pour
forth thousands of brave hearts to roU back the tide of this
despotism.'' The local campaign had aUeady taken shape before his
anival. Since Lee was placed in command he had followed
a poUcy which looked less to the capture of Baltimore than
to the obstraction of the Potomac. His first and principal
task had been to organize the volunteers which Gover-

170 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
nor Letcher called into sei-vice; and the earUest leries of
Northern VUginia were posted at Manassas Junction, where
railroads from Eichmond, from Alexandria, and from the
Shenandoah Valley met. On examination, its strategical
value was found to be much greater than was suspected at
the beginning; Colonel Cocke, the local commander, first
pointed out to Lee its important relation to the Shenandoah
Valley. " These two columns," he 'writes, under date of May
15th, "one at Manassas and one at Winchester, could readUy
co-operate and concentrate upon the one point or the other,
either to make head against the enemy's columns advancing
down the valley, should he force Harper's Feny ; or, in case
we repulse him at Harper's Feny, the Winchester support
ing column could thfow itself on this side of the mountains,
to co-operate with the column at Manassas."
With the great increase of Federal troops at Washington,
and their seizure of Alexandria and ArUngton Heights, the
post at Manassas Junction became of such prominence and
importance, that Beauregard was sent to take command of it
about June 1st. Beauregard was an officer of curiously un
equal merit : thoroughly educated, and highly skiUul in the
science and art of miUtary engineering, he had Uttle capacity
for administration, or sound judgment in the conception of
large field-operations. Giddy to intoxication with laudation
for his cheap victoiy at Sumter, he now inrited upon his
own head the contempt of the world, and of history, by pub
Ushing a proclamation in which, without provocation, he
charged the Union armies to have abandoned " all rules of
civilized warfare," and to have made "Beauty and Booty"
their war-cry. His next exploit was to excite the distrust of
the Eichmond authorities upon his miUtary abiUty, by pro
posing a series of aggressive movements intended to annihi
late the Union armies and capture Washington ; liable, how-

MANASSAS. 171
ever, to the objection, noted thereon by Jefferson Daris, that
"the plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible
supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated
and motionless, untU our forces could effect junctions to
attack them in detail." Meanwhile he rendered his superi
ors a real serrice in pointing out that the defence of his
position should be made, not with earthworks at Manassas,
but with troops on the Une of Bull Eun, and for this he was
urgent in demanding large reinforcements.
As has been aUeady mentioned, it was General Scott's
opinion that the Govemment ought not to engage, in any
mUitary imdertakings with the three months volunteers, be
yond those to which these forces had been aUeady assigned
and distributed, namely : to protect Washington and fortify
Arlington Heights ; to garrison Fort Monroe and, if chance
should offer, recapture the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk ;
to hold Baltimore and Maryland ; to prosecute Patterson's
campaign against Harper's Ferry ; to recover West VUginia
through McClellan's campaign ; to guard the Ohio line, and
control Kentucky and Missouri. Larger and more distant
operations, he beUeved, ought to be undertaken only with
new armies formed of the three years volunteers, giving the
summer to driU and preparation, and entering on combined
movements in the favorable autumn weather.
Important reasons, partly military, partly poUtical, con
flicted with so deUberate a programme. As events had
shaped themselves, it seemed necessary to aid Patterson.
The possibility that Beauregard and Johnston might unite
their armies was clearly enough perceived ; hence, a column
to threaten Manassas was proposed. Indications were also
manifesting themselves that rebel batteries at nanow places
might soon seriously embarrass the narigation of the Poto
mac. Chiefly, however, the highly excited patriotism of the

172 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
North, eager to wipe out national insult and vindicate
national authority, was impatient of what seemed tedious
delay. The echoes of the Sumter bombardment were yet in
the aU;'the blood on the Baltimore paving-stones was cry
ing loudly to heaven. For haU a century the nation had
felt no close experience of war. The conquests of peace had
grown almost mUaculous in speed and certainty. Eivers
and mountains, distance and time, had become the obedient
ministers of creative ingenuity and bold enterprise. Forget
ting that the achievements of peace encountered the oppos
ing obstacles, not of man, but of nature alone, the North de
manded speedy as weU as signal redress. It saw rebelUon
enthroned in the capital of Virginia; it saw a numerous
Union army gathered at Washington ; the newspapers raised
the cry of " On to Eichmond ; " and the popular heart beat
in quick and well-nigh unanimous response *to the slogan.
Latterly a detachment sent out by General Butler from
Fortress Monroe had met a repulse at Great Bethel, and near
Washington a raiUoad-train under General Schenck had run
into an ambush at Vienna station ; both were trifling losses,
but at the moment supremely Uritating to the pride of the
North, and the flres of patriotic resentment once more
blazed up with fresh intensity.
General Scott's flrst project of an expedition against
Manassas was made about the beginning of June, the object
then being not to flght a battle, but merely make a threaten
ing diversion to aid Patterson. There were at that time only
some six thousand rebels at Manassas, according to Beaure
gard's report. Before the design could take flnal shape,
Johnston had evacuated Harper's Feny, and Patterson's
flrst movement was thereby terminated. This occuned
about the middle of June.
From that time on, the plan grew into the idea of a larger

MANASSAS. 173
and more decisive movement. Beauregard was receiving
large reinforcements ; nevertheless, the strength of the
Union army at Washington was such that it seemed entUely
possible to proride every chance of success. McDowell,
raised in rank from the grade of major to that of brigadier-
general, and placed in command at ArUngton Heights, sub
mitted a formal plan, at the request of the General-in-Chief,
about June 24th. His plan assumed that the secession forces
at Manassas and its dependencies would number twenty-flve
thousand ; that they would unavoidably become apprised of
the movement, and every effort would be made to increase
Beauregard's strength ; but that " if General J. E. John
ston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson,
and Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his
ricinity (Fortress Monroe), I think they wiU not be able to
bring up more than ten thousand men." Against such an
array he proposed to move with a force of thirty thousand of
all arms, and a reserve of ten thousand.
The project was elaborately discussed, and flnally agreed
upon, at a council of war at the Executive Mansion, on June
29th, in which President Lincoln, his Cabinet, and the prin
cipal military officers took part. As already mentioned,.
General Scott was opposed to the undertaking ; but, after it
was once resolved upon, he joined -with hearty good-wUl in
every effort to make it a success. McDoweU was emphatic
in his protest that he could not hope to beat the combined
armies of Johnston and Beauregard; upon which Scott gave
him the distinct assurance : " If Johnston joins Beauregard,
he shall have Patterson on his heels." With this understand
ing, the movement was ordered to begin a week from that
day. The enterprise did not escape the usual fate of unforeseen
delay ; it marks great energy in McDowell that his expedi-

174 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
tion was only defened a Uttle over a week beyond the ap
pointed time. On the 16th of July he issued his orders to
march that afternoon. His army was organized as follows :
First Division, commanded by T'eleb: an aggregate of
9,936 men, dirided into four brigades, respectively under
Keyes, Schenck, Sherman, and Eichardson.
Second Dirision, commanded by HtmrEE : an aggregate of
2,648 men, dirided into two brigades, under Porter and
Burnside. ThUd Dirision, commanded by HEDtTZELMAN : an aggre
gate of 9,777 men, dirided into three brigades, tmder Frank
lin, WUcox, and Howard.
Fourth Division, commanded by Eunyon : an aggregate of
5,752 men ; no brigade commanders.
FUth Division, commanded by Miles : an aggregate of 6,207
men, dirided into two brigades, under Blenker and Daries.
Thus, the total of his command, not including four regi
ments left in the Alexandria and Arlington forts, was 84,320
men. From this number, however, Eunyon's dirision may
at once be deducted ; it was left behind to guard his com
munications, its most advanced regiment being seven mUes
in rear of CentreriUe. McDowell's actual moving column
may therefore be said to have consisted of 28,568 * men, in- !
eluding artiUery, a total of forty-nine guns, and a single bat
taUon of cavalry.
* Prom this number it is entirely just to make yet another dednction. The
period of enlistment of the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment, and of Captain Va-
rian's Battery of (New York) Light ArtUlery having expired, they were dis
charged by official order at Centreville, July 20th, the day before the battle.
It will thus be seen that. Instead of the thirty thousand he asked for, McDowell
had, perhaps, less than twenty-eight thousand men, with forty-nine guns ; and
official reports show that, instead of the thirty-five thousand rebels he expected
to meet at Manassas, there were on the field thirty-two thousand men, with
fifty-seven guns— less than his estimate, but about three thousand more than his
own army.

MANASSAS. 175
Of all machines, an army develops, perhaps, the greatest
inefficiency from mere friction, or the greatest usefulness
from action and thoroughness of organization. The valuei
of a veteran consists as much of his habitual expertness in
the routine of camp and march, as of coolness and confldence
under fire. Two prir^xsipal causes rendered the advance
very slow. The first was the want of practice in marching.
"They stopped every moment to pick blackberries or get
wjter," says McDowell ; " they would not keep in the ranks,
order as much as you pleased ; when they came where water
was fresh, they would pour the old water out of theU can
teens, and fill them with fresh water ; they were not used to
denying themselves much ; they were not used to journeys
on foot." The second cause was, perhaps, yet more potent.
" The affair of Big Bethel and Vienna had created a great
outcry against rushing into places that people did not know
anything about. I think the idea of every one was that we
were to go into no such things as that — that we were to feel
our way," again says McDowell. Precaution on this point
was particularly emphasized in his instructions. " The three
following things," says his marching order, " will not be par
donable in any commander : 1st, to come upon a battery or
breastwork ¦without a knowledge of its position; 2d, to be
surprised; 3d, to fall back.'' Moring forward with such
painful wariness, a surprise of the enemy was, of course,
equally out of the question. In obedience to Beauregard's
orders, his outposts everywhere retU-ed, though, in several
instances, -with such precipitation as to leave their tents,
knapsacks, and even their freshly cooked rations behind.
Manassas Junction lies thirty-flve miles southwest of
Washington, on a high, open plateau ; there the rebels had
some sUght fleld-works, armed with fourteen or flfteen
heavy guns, and garrisoned by about two thousand men.

176 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
Bull Eun flows in a southeasterly direction, some three
miles east of Manassas, with wooded heights coming gen
erally close up to its west bank. The stream is winding and
sluggish, and, though here and there it has steep, sometimes
precipitous and rocky banks, it is fordable in many places.
Beauregard's main army, increased now to over twenty thou
sand, was posted at the various fords of Bull Run, in a line
some eight miles long, and extending from the Manassas
Railroad to the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton turnpike.*
* At Union Mills Ford, Swell's brigade of threa regiments ; at McLeaTi'a Ford,
Jones' brigade of three regiments; at Blackbum''8 Ford, Longstreet'a brigade
of five regiments ; above Mitchell's Ford, Bonliam's brigade of tive regiments ;
at Lewis" Ford, Cocke's brigade of portiona of six regiments; at Stone Bridge,
Evans' demi-brigade of a regiment and a half ; Early's brigade of four regiments
was posted as a reserve in rear and support of Longstreet and Jones. AU the
above, together with. som.e seven other regiments and portions, not brigaded, con
stituted Beauregard's "Army of the Potomac." His official report states the
total effective, on the morning of the battle (July 21st), to have been 21,833, and
29 guns.
Holmes' brigade, an independent command ordered up from Acquia Creek,
coni-isted of two regiments, reported by Beauregard at a total of 1,355, and 6
gunp. It was posted as a support for Ewell.
Johnston's "Army of the. Shenandoah" consisted of Jackson's brigade of five
regiments, posted as a support for Bonham ; and Bee's brigade of four regiments,
posted as a support for Cocke. These had arrived and were in camp on the
morning of the battle (July 2lBt). Beauregard reports their round numbers,
ready for action, at 6,000 men and 20 guns. In addition, there arrived at
Manassas about noon, and on the battle-field between two and fonr o'clock,
Fisher's Sixth North Carolina, 634, and Kirby Smith's brigade (afterward led by
Elzey), of 1,700 men and 2 guns ; and also Hill's Vii^inia Regiment, 550.
Men. Guns.
Recapitulation; Beauregard's array  21,833 29
Johnston's army  8,884 23
Hohnes' brigade  1,355 6
32,072 57
To which may be added sundry detachments, the numbers of which are not given
in official reports.

MANASSAS.

177

It was McDowell's intention to turn this position on the
South. To conceal his purpose, and create the impression
of a contemplated attack in front, he dUefcted his march upon
Centreville on the Warrenton turnpike. On Thursday morn-

.'""'

"~'-N

i

1

JSiidlev
1 S'ord J  1
\ ""^^^1
\battle \U

^^M'

\ / \

'
/

P<3
\
%
[o^* mUlrc Lean's
1 ^^/^"l / Ford
i
''s^,^^^,,,,,^'***^*' Manassas |N
^
A
\
'^
Bull Bun— The Field of Strategy.
ing, July 18th, Tyler moved upon Centreville, but, arriving
there at nine o'clock, he found that it, too, had been evacu
ated, and that Beauregard's entire army was behind Bull
Eun. Centreville being situated on a hUl, Tyler could see
the whole vaUey spread out before him, with Manassas on
13
175 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
the high plateau beyond. The main body of the enemy, he
learned, had retUed down the road nmning dUectly toward
that point, crossing the stream at Mitchell's and Blackburn's
fords. Tyler's unopposed advance had perhaps inspUed him and
his officers with an over-confidence or undue elation ; per
haps it suggested the beUef that the enemy did not feel
strong enough to make a stand. Under instructions to
" observe well the roads," but to bring on no engagement,
it occurred to him to make a reconnoissance in the dUection
of the retreat.
As often happens under such cUcnmstances, the spirit of
combat overcame discretion. Accompanied by Eichardson,
one of his brigade commanders, Tyler flrst went out with
a squadron of cavalry and two companies of Ught infantry.
Finding a favorable situation to try artiUery, they sent back
for a battery, and Eichardson's brigade to support it. About
noon of the 18th they were within a mUe of Blackburn's ford.
Then followed the ever-recurring experience of such affaUs.
FUst, an experimental cannonade from a couple of field-
pieces, before which the enemy's guns retUed; next the
advance of a skirmish-Une, before which the enemy's skU-
mishers retUed ; then an advance of some of the field-pieces
and the planting of a stronger battery ; the posting of a
regiment to support the skUmishers, and, soon after, the
posting of the entUe brigade to support the regiment, fol
lowed by calling up a reserve brigade to support the first.
Thus the afternoon's work drifted qtiickly from a reconnois
sance to a skUmish, and from a skUmish to a preUminary
battle. It was not until some sixty men had fallen, untU
the two exposed field-pieces were with difficulty extricated,
until one regiment had retreated in confusion and the other

MANASSAS. 179
three were deployed in Une of battle to make a new charge,
that Tyler heeded his instructions, and withdrew his reluc
tant officers and men from the fight, partly demoralized and
generally exasperated, and returned to CentreviUe. In point
of fact, the loss, the damage, the demoralization, had been
equal on both sides. The rebel reports show that three regi
ments of Longstreet's brigade, which bore the first assault,
were so much shaken that Early's reserve brigade of three
fresh regiments was called up and relieved them, that one of
these regiments was thrown into confusion, and that the rebel
loss was sixty-three killed and wounded. Undecisive as it was,
the battle of Blackburn's Ford had an important effect. It
confirmed Beauregard in his previous impression that the
principal Union attack would be made at that point on the
centre of his long line. On the other hand, McDowell, receiv
ing from his officers reports of rifle-pits and breastworks, be
came convinced that a direct assault was unwise. The afiair of
Blackburn's Ford thus proved something more than a pre
liminary defeat ; it augmented the causes of a great disaster.
Upon hearing the cannonade, McDowell had immediately
ordered all the divisions forward to Centreville. He had
already in his own mind given up the plan of turning the
enemy's right, because of the unfavorable nature of the ground
and roads. The necessity of finding an unfortified crossing
seemed now also demonstrated. Meeting his division com
manders at Centreville, that same night of Thursday, July
18th, McDowell informed them confidentially that he had
abandoned his original plan, and had resolved to make the
attack by marching northward and turning Beauregard's left
flank instead of his right.
As an incident of this resolve, however, it was even more
essential than before to continue to threaten the enemy's

180 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. ,
centre ; and thus Eichardson's brigade was once more posted
in the dUection of Blackburn's Ford. Meanwhile the engi
neers were busy aU of Friday and Saturday in efibrts to flnd
an unfortified ford over Bull Eun. They were not success
ful till a late hour on Saturday ; and this delay deferred the
main battle till Sunday, July 21st. Could a simUar attack
have been made a day earUer, the result would probably
have been altogether different.

CHAPTER XV.
BULL RUN.
At Centreville, on Saturday night, McDowell called his
offlcers togethpr and announced to them his plan of battle
for the following day. The Warrenton turnpike ran almost
dUectly west from Centreville to GainesvUle station on the
raiUoad. He was yet unaware that Johnston had joined
Beauregard, and sought to prevent such junction by seizing
GainesviUe. Beauregard's army lay in detachments behind
Bull Eun, at five different fords, along a Une of eight miles.
His left and northernmost flank was at the stone bridge
where Warrenton turnpike crosses BuU Eun, though Mc
Dowell supposed it to extend to the first ford above. The
bridge was a solid stone structure of two arches, of consider
able size and height, connecting the precipitous and rocky
eastern bank of the stream with a broad piece of level bottom
land on the west. The bridge was thought to be defended
in force, and said to be prepared for blowing up. The en
gineers had information, however, that Sudley Ford, two or
three miles above, could be readily carried and crossed by
an attacking column. McDoweU therefore ordered that
Tyler, with the heaviest division, should advance from Cen
treville directly to Stone Bridge, three and a half miles dis
tant, and make a feigned attack ; while Hunter and Heintzel-
man should make a secret and circuitous night march north-

182 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
ward, cross Sudley Ford, and, rapidly descending on the
enemy's side of BuU Eun, should clear away the batteries at
the stone bridge by a rear attack, and thus enable Tyler's
division to cross and join in the combined march on Gaines
ville, or continue the attack on Beauregard's left. If the
stone bridge were blown up, the engineers had timbers
ready to repair it. The division of Miles should remain in
reserve at Centreville, and the brigade of Eichardson con
tinue to threaten Blackburn's Ford.
In the rebel camp, the Confederate commanders were at
the same time equally intent on a scheme of theU own to
attack and surprise McDoweU. No sooner had Johnston
arrived at Manassas with the second detachment of the Army
of the Shenandoah, about noon of Saturday, July 20th, than
Beauregard explained to him the character and course of
Bull Eun, and the situation of the five principal fords be
hind which his various brigades were posted ; and since a
practicable road from each of these five fords converged upon
Centreville, he proposed a simultaneous advance and attack
on the Union army, in its camps, early Sunday moming.
Johnston, who now as ranking officer assumed command,
adopted Beauregard's plan. Part of the Army of the Shen
andoah had arrived before and with him ; the remainder was
expected that night. He had every reason to suppose that
Patterson would promptly follow him to join McDoweU.
To secure the fruit of his own movement, he must therefore
crush McDowell before Patterson could arrive. The orders
for such an advance and attack were duly written out, and
Johnston signed his approval of them in the gray twiUght
of Sunday morning.
An hour or two, however, revealed to him the uselessness
of these orders, on which the ink was scarcely dry. At sun
rise he heard Tyler's signal-guns, and soon received notice

BULL RUN. 183
that McDowell had taken the offensive. The remainder of
his Army of the Shenandoah had not arrived, as he hoped.
Under these cUcumstances his plan of attack must be aban
doned. Beauregard thereupon proposed a modification of
the plan— to attack with theU right from the region of
Blackburn's Ford, and to stand on the defensive with theU
left in the neighborhood of the stone bridge. This sugges
tion, again, Johnston adopted and ordered to be carried out.
But the Union forces had aUeady taken the initiative. A
Uttle past midnight McDowell's army was astU, and the
three designated divisions started. Unluckily, at the veiy
outset, Hunter and HeintzeUnan were delayed two or three
hours by the flrst division not getting out of its camps in
time, and faiUng to clear the road for them. The route
proved unexpectedly long ; it was nine o'clock when the ad
vance reached Sudley Ford. The crossing, however, was
not opposed, and was easily effected. From the ford the
Sudley road ran south toward Manassas, crossing the War
renton turnpike at right angles about a mile and a quarter
west of the stone bridge. A Uttle stream, called Young's
Branch, also crosses both roads at this intersection, makes a
circle to the northeast, and, returning, flows to the southeast
into Bull Eun. This was the destined battle-fleld.
It happened that the stone bridge was but slenderly de
fended. The timber had been felled to form a heavy abattis
behind the bridge ; but Evans, the rebel officer in charge,
had only a regiment and a half, with four guns, for his en-
tUe guard. Tyler appeared in force before the bridge, and
began his demonstration ; but made it so feebly that Evans
soon became convinced no real assault was intended; and
having learned the actual crossing at Sudley Ford, he at
about nine o'clock withdrew all but four companies and two
guns from the bridge, and hastened to the rear to throw

184

THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.

himself across Hunter's path. The Union approach having
become plainly discernible, Evans posted his eleven com
panies on the ridge immediately north of the Warrenton
turnpike and Young's Branch, his left resting on the Sud
ley road, with one gun at his left, and the other some dis-

BuU Kun — Battle of the Forenoon.*

tanoe behind his right, on the point of a hUl south of
Young's Branch.

* In these maps the topographical features are copied from the accurate official
maps published by the Engineer Bureau of the War Department. The position
of the troops is of course only conjectural, but based on the descriptions and
inferences in the official reports of both armies.

BULL RUN. 185
,At ten o'clock Hunter's advance emerged from the woods
into open fields, about a mile north of the Warrenton turn
pike, the scattering shots of the skirmishers having aUeady
opened the confiict. On both sides everything was raw "and
awkward — officers and men, staff and line. There was
undue excitement and impetuosity, mixed with unnecessary
confusion and delay. None of the reports specUy how the
battle began ; the mere momentum of the march seems to
have carried the advance regiments under the first shower of
rebel sheUs and bullets at distances varying from flve hun
dred to one thousand yards. . A preliminary artillery duel
sprang up, under which Burnside led his four regiments
after his battery into the fields to the left of the Sudley
road. With a little more deliberation and a united onset,
these would easily have brushed away Evans' thin line ; but,
in the delay incident to the first actual experiment of battle,
the rebels gained opportunity to bring up substantial rein
forcements. Four regiments and two companies of John
ston's Army of the Shenandoah, under General Bee, hurried
up and formed to the right and a little in advance of Evans'
original line, while Imboden's battery of four guns took
position on a hill in the rear, south of the Warrenton turn
pike. Thus disposed, with Uttle disparity in strength be
tween attack and defence, the first stubborn contest of the
day appears to have taken place, lasting perhaps from eleven
o'clock till noon. The Union troops pressed forward with
determined courage ; the rebels resisted with such spUit
that Burnside became apprehensive for his Ehode Island
battery, and Sykes' battalion of regulars was sent to
strengthen his left. By this time Hunter had sent Porter's
brigade into the fields to the right of the Sudley road,
where Griffin's battery could engage the rebel field-pieces ;
Heintzelman was hurrying up with an advance regiment and

186 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION.
Eicketts' battery. Under this combined pressure the Con
federate Une wavered, yielded, and finally broke. Their left
retreated stubbornly down the hill, and, rallying again,
endeavored to make a stand behind a stone house at the
intersection of the two roads ; but a vigorous Union charge
down the Sudley road completed their dispersion. The
whole first formation of the enemy was swept southward
more than, half a mile, entirely across and out of the valley
of Young's Branch. But the advantage was not won with
out considerable damage to the Union troops, the demoraliza
tion of several regiments, and the serious loss of valuable offl
cers. General Hunter himseU was wounded by a sheU at the
very beginning of the action, compelling his retirement from
the front, and devolving the command of his division on Porter.
McDowell, who came upon the field by way of Sudley Ford
as the battle began, had already sent back word to Tyler to
press his attack at the stone bridge. Such an attack, how
ever, was now no longer necessary. We have seen how Evans
had withdrawn to oppose Hunter ; and the ionrf companies
he left behind had also retired southward. Avoiding the
bridge with its abattis, Tyler led Sherman's and Keyes' bri
gades across Bull Eun half a mile above, where the stream
was fordable for infantry, and, marching over a mile of level
bottom-land, so directed theU course by the firing that they
effected a safe junction with Hunter's division, Keyes remain
ing on the extreme left. They approached the morning's bat
tle-fleld from the northeast ; Sherman reported to McDoweU,
and joined the general pursuit, directing his march to the right.
Keyes remained on the left, and under Tyler's personal orders ;
and thus it turned out that this single brigade became and re
mained an independent detachment during the whole day, sep
arated by a wide interval from the main battle in the afternoon,
and not being in a position to receive orders from McDoweU.

BULL RUN. 187
It has been explained that the first rebel line was com
posed mainly of Johnston's troops. As they retreated up
the hUl south of Young's Branch, Jackson's brigade of flve
regiments, also of Johnston's army, was just arriving there
on its way to guard the stone bridge, and only at that mo
ment lea.ming the true state of affaUs. This hill south of
Young's Branch was a higher and stronger position than
that from which Evans and Bee had been driven. Its crest
ran in a westerly curve from the Eobinson house, near the
Warrenton turnpike, past the Henry house near the Sudley
road, both being within the southeastern angle of the inter
section. The two roads cross in the valley at Young's Branch,
and from their crossing ascend gently to the east, west,
north, and south.
On this crest, Jackson, with the ready instinct of combat,
formed a new Une. His five regiments and two batteries,
stretched from the Eobinson to the Henry houses, formed
a soUd-looking protection, behind which some of the flying
rebels gathered courage and rallied in little driblets. Bee's
flve regiments had shrunk to about four companies, and the
remaining fugitives were moving in hopeless panic down the
Sudley road toward Manassas, spreading dUeful tidings of
disaster. Jackson's line was rendered yet stronger by hav
ing Hampton's battaUon — that moming arrived from Eich-
mdnd — on its extreme right in the turnpike before the
Eobinson house; and behind these, Bee's fragments were
gathered into a sheltering ravine.
At this period of the day, a Uttle after noon, the advan
cing Union columns had theU best co-operation and strong
est momentum. Keyes' brigade was advancing on the left
toward the Eobinson hill. Sherman was moving diagonally
across the centre of the morning's fleld. Porter's still
aggressive brigade was pushing down the Sudley road.

188 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
The compact brigades of Franklin and Wilcox were coining
to the front on the right. Moreover, Griffin's and Eicketts'
batteries had obtained favorable positions near the Dogan
house, with an enfilading fire against Hampton. Toward
two o'clock two regiments of Keyes' brigade made a charge
up the Eobinson hill and drove Hampton out of the tangle
of fences and hedges about the Eobinson House, though
newly planted rebel batteries farther to the rear made it
impossible to hold the position. The whole Union Une
swung forward to the Warrenton turnpike ; and whUe the
rebel reports pass it over with the merest aUusions, it seems
probable that, Uke Hampton, other portions of Jackson's Une
were moved somewhat farther back, to flnd better shelter
from the annoying fire of the Union batteries. This mid
day Union success seemed, and was, sweeping and complete ;
but it proved seriously deceptive in the further operations
of the afternoon, which it naturaUy suggested and provoked.
A little before this time the Confederate commanders woke
up to the true nature of the conflict. Beauregard was yet
waiting impatiently to hear that his right was advancing on
CentreviUe, when, toward eleven o'clock, word came that,
through a miscarriage of orders, that enterprise was just
being commenced. Eealizing now that McDoweU's attack
was not a mere feint, they countermanded the CentreviUe
movement, ordered all available reserves forward to the
main battle, and themselves hurriedly gaUoped to the front.
Here they now put theU personal exertions, encouragement,
and example, into the somewhat unpromising task of miti
gating a disastrous defeat,' rather than with even remote
hope of turning the scale to victory.
The Confederates had been Uterally driven into the woods,
the edge of which formed a sort of semicUcle on the second
ridge south of Warrenton turnpike and east of the Sudley

BULL RUN.

189

road. But this reverse brought certain important advan
tages. TheU retreat not only concentrated theU regiments ;
it also, for the first time during the day, concentrated their
artiUery, thirteen pieces of which were posted near together
to the centre and right, so as to give a partial cross-fire at

REBEL
HEADQUARTERS

Bull Earn— Battle of the Afternoon.
a distance of three hundred to six hundred yards over the
whole open plateau or hill about the Henry house and to
ward the Eobinson house. Under the personal dUections
of Johnston and Beauregard, they now formed theU line
along this semicircular edge of woods, with the advantage
of a fringe of second-growth pines in theU front to afford

190 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION,
them almost perfect concealment. TheU right extended
to where the hill descends to Young's Branch; theU left
reached nearly to the Sudley road. It is needless to specify
the several corps in detail ; the nearest reinforcements were
already arriving ; Johnston's report sums up the strength of
this completed line at twelve regiments, twenty-twb guns,
and two companies of cavalry. The formation weU begun,
Beauregard took personal command, while Johnston, as
chief, returned to the rebel headquarters to keep his eye on
the entire field.
Eeduced by losses, McDowell's numbers were now little,
if atiy, superior to the enemy ; for the brigade of Keyes was
separated from him, working its way southward along
Young's Branch in the hope to make a flank attack on the
rebel right; in reality it rendered no further substantial
help. Howard's brigade, held back as a reserve, was not
yet at hand. McDowell's effective force consisted of the
brigades of Porter, Franklin, WUcox, and Sherman, a total
of fourteen regiments, but several of which were aUeady
seriously demoralized ; these were massed in sheltered situ
ations in the valley along the turnpike and Young's Branch,
mainly west of the intersection of the roads. AU the advan
tages of position during the day had been with McDoweU ;
now they were suddenly turned against him by the very
success he had gained. The enemy was on the height, he
at the foot of the hUl. The enemy needed only to defend a
stationary Une ; he must move forward under a prepared
fire. They were concealed in chosen positions ; he must
mount into open view. They could repel in combination ;
he must risk successive assaults. His men had been under
arms since midnight — most of them had made a march of
ten miles through the sweltering July heat. They were
fiushed with victory, but also lulled thereby into the false

BULL RUN. 191
security of thinking theU work accomplished, when in reaUty
its sternest effort was merely about to begin.
The situation naturally dictated an attack on the rebel
centre and left flank, and, had this been unitedly and solidly
made, it must unquestionably have succeeded even against
the disadvantage aUeady mentioned. But right here the
want of proper staff organization and discipUne, and the
rawness of the troops in manoeuvre, proved a fatal defect ;
and the severe conflict of the next hour and a half resolved
itself into a somewhat spasmodic and intermittent struggle
on both sides.
When, at about half-past two o'clock, the batteries of
Eicketts and Griffin were ordered to move forward from the
Dogan heights across the valley to the top of the Henry hill,
they did so with the feeUng that the two regiments ordered
to follow and support them were tardy, inadequate, and un
reliable. Other regiments, moving forward to the flank at
tack, could not well be observed, because of the uneven
ground and the intervening woods and bushes. The rebels
had disappeared ; there was a complete lull in the battle.
But danger was no less at hand. Hardly had Eicketts taken
his post before his cannoneers and horses began to fall
under the accurate flre of near and well-concealed rebel
shai'pshooters. Death puffed from bushes, fences, buUd
ings ; and yet the jets of flame and ¦wreaths of smoke were
the only visible enemy to assail. Officers and cannoneers
held on with a desperate courage ; some moved to new po
sitions to foil the rebel range. Griffin's battery came and
took place alongside ; eleven Union guns and thirteen Con
federate guns were confronted at short range in a stubborn
and exciting duel. But now the rebel regiments, seeing the
dangerous exposure of the Union batteries, were tempted to
swarm out of their cover. They pressed cautiously but

192 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
tenaciously upon Eicketts. Griffln, absorbed in directing
the flre of two of his guns against the rebel batteries, was
suddenly startled at seeing a regiment advancing boldly on
his right, in open view. TheU very audacity puzzled him.
They could hardly be friends, he thought ; yet was it pos
sible that foes were so near and would take such a risk ?
Instinctively he ordered his guns to be charged with canister
and trained upon them. Yet at the dreadful thought of
pouring such a volley upon a Union regiment, he once more
hesitated, and held a brief coUoquy with Major Barry, chief
of artillery. "Captain,'' said Barry, "they are your battery
support.'' " They are Confederates,'' repUed Griffln, in in
tense excitement ; "as certain as the world, they are Confed
erates." " No," answered Barry ; " I know they are your
battery support." Griffin spurred forward, and told his
officer not to fire. The mistake proved fatal. During this
interval of doubt the Confederate regiment had approached
to point-blank range, and levelled theU muskets just as
Griffin gave his order to desist. Griffin's canister would
have annihilated the regiment ;. but now the tables were
turned, and in an instant the regiment's volley had annihi
lated Griffin's and Eicketts' batteries. Officers and men feU
smitten with death and wounds, and horses and caissons
went tearing in wild disorder down the hUl, breaking and
scattering the ascending line of battle. Under this sudden
catastrophe the supporting regiment stood a whUe spell
bound with mingled astonishment and terror. They were
urged forward to repel the advance on the guns ; but the un
expected disaster overawed them ; under the continued and
still advancing volleys of the same rebel regiment, they fired
their muskets, turned, and fled.
These disabled batteries, visible to both armies, now be
came the centre and coveted prize of an Uregular contest,

BULL RUN. 193
which surged back and forth over the plateau of the Henry
hill ; but, whether because of confusion of orders, or the
broken surface of the ground, or more probably the mere
reciprocal eagerness of capture and rescue, the contest was
carried on, not by the whole Une, but by single regiments,
or at most by two or three regiments moving accidentaUy
rather than designedly in concert. Several times the flght
raged past and over the prostrate body of Eicketts, lying
wounded among his guns, and who was flnaUy carried away
a prisoner to Eichmond. The rebels would dash forward,
capture the batteries, and endeavor to tum the pieces on the
Union lines ; then a Union regiment would sweep up the
hill, drive them back, and essay to drag the guns down into
safe possession. And a similar shifting and intermitting
flght went on, not merely on this single spot, but also
among the low concealing pines of the middle ground in
front, as well as in the oak-woods on the Union right, where
at times friend became intemUngled with foe, and where
both sides took occasional prisoners near the same place.
In this prolonged and wasteful struggle the Union strength
was slowly and steadUy consumed. Arnold's battery crossed
the valley to the support of Griffln and Eicketts, but found
itseU obUged to again withdraw. The Ehode Island battery-
took part in the contest as well as it might from the hUl
north of Young's Branch. Brigade after brigade — Sher
man's, FrankUn's, Wilcox's, and flnally Howard's reserve,
were brought forward — regiment after regiment was sent up
the hill — three times the batteries were recovered and
again lost. It speaks volumes for the courage of the raw,
undisciplined volunteers, that, in the face of these repeated
failures, they continued to go perseveringly against what
seemed to them a hidden and unattainable barrier, untU a
stronger wave of rebel bullets or bayonets, surging suddenly
¦  13

194 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
forward in the pine thicket, would meet and force them
back. In the endeavor to outflank and envelop the rebel left,
the Union right had become so strongly turned southward
that it was nearly paraUel to the Sudley road. Near the
beginning of this final contest, Johnston received notice that
the long-expected remainder of his Army of the Shenan
doah had at length come ; and before it was haU over, Elzey,
with KUby Smith's brigade of three regiments, arrived near
the battle-fleld from Manassas by the Sudley road. By
this time, too, four other regiments, two from Cocke's and
two fr'om Bonham's brigades, also came up from the nearer
fords. These seven fresh regiments, thrown opportunely by
the rebel commander into the woods west of the Sudley
road, dUectly against the exposed Union right flank, created
a numerical overweight, which affords sufficient explanation
of the Union repulse at that point.
But now, at haU-past four in the afternoon, when the
Union reinforcements were exhausted, the rebel accessions
stiU continued : Early with thi'ee regiments arrived from the
lower fords ; Holmes with two regiments, and Ewell with
three others, were rapidly approaching. Before the arrival
of these last the battle was aUeady decided. Early's brigade
was sent cautiously through the woods, stUl farther to the
rebel left, and suddenly appeared with Beckham's battery
on the heights near the Chinn house, three-quarters of a mile
west of the Sudley road, and entUely beyond and in the rear
of the Union right.
The Union troops, having approached the second stage of
the battle in such a flush of success, and with such an appar
ent assui-ance of victory, could not for a time realize the
stem fact that the contest was turning against them. Offi
cers of experience and sagacity, indeed, became seriously

BULL RUN. 195
alarmed for the flnal result, when Griffin's and Eickeits'
batteries were destroyed ; but for the greater part it was
looked upon as an untoward accident, and operated rather
to inspire the aUeady related efforts for theU recovery. The
feeUng of course gradually changed with the successive fail
ures to gain and permanently hold the hill. As brigade
after brigade melted away in the repeated efforts, even the
men in the ranks could not omit to note the rapid diminu
tion of the available strength. Some of the repulsed regi
ments kept theU organization and returned heroically to the
charge. Others, on the contrary, not having that slowly
acquired force of discipline which makes cohesion a second
nature of the soldier and creates an instinctive reliance on
mutual support as the surest means of safety, considered
theU duty done with a single charge, and, once driven back,
went to pieces like the adjournment of a mass meeting. In
this shortcoming, officers were as culpable as the men, for
war combines art with science, and the superior work of the
veteran comes through long years of practice. It must be
remembered that these were only three months volunteers,
and besides, as such, the most impulsive and independent
men in theU several communities, whose innate promptness
of thought and action had brought them to the very fore
front of the civU war. Lacking long driU and discipline,
they acted upon individual judgment and impulse, rather
than as organized bodies merely executing the orders of
theU officers. This explains to us the remarkable statement
of Captain Woodbury, that ,"at four o'clock, on the 21st,
there were more than twelve thousand volunteers on the
battle-field of Bull Eun who had entUely lost their regi
mental organization. They could no longer be handled as
troops, for the officers and men were not together. Men
and offlcers mingled together promiscuously; and it is

196 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
worthy of remark that this disorganization did not result
from defeat or fear." One other fact must be remembered
in extenuation : that with the long night march, the burning
heat of the day, and the new and intense excitements of the
battle-field, the men, famished with hunger and thUst, were
becoming physicaUy exhausted.
When, therefore, at half-past four o'clock, the two fresh
Confederate brigades had repulsed the Union flank attack
west of the Sudley road, and Early's rebel brigade with
Beckham's battery suddenly burst through the woods near
the Chinn house, stiU farther to the west, with a vigorous
and startUng attack on the Union flank and rear, throwing
into quick confusion and retreat a detachment of Union
cavalry stationed in apparent retirement and safety, the
battle came to a speedy termination by a sort of universal
consent; a reaUzation and acknowledgment of coming de
feat pervaded the whole army, and found instant expression
in increased disorganization and immediate movement to
ward a general retreat. Whatever may have been the other
discouragements, the main impulse of this movement came
from the universal belief that Johnston's army had now
arrived, and that success had thereby become hopeless.
The question of Johnston's possible presence in the battle
had run through the Centreville camps, and there were
rumors of his coming on Saturday night; but the aimy
apparently had no suspicion that it was fighting him all
day Sunday, till the moment of the attack on the extreme
left by one of Beauregard's brigades. That attack from an
unexpected quarter seemed convincing proof of the presence
of a new and additional force, and therefore roused the
quick instinct of retreat, not so much in acknowledgment of
actual defeat, as in prudent avoidance of irresistible slaugh
ter or capture by overwhelming numbers.

CHAPTEE XVI.
THE RETREAT.
The suddenness of theU victory was entUely unexpected-
by the rebels. Signs of disaster to themselves were as
strong as to the Federals' to the very last. Intense curiosity
and soUcitude had brought Jefferson Davis from Eichmond.
It is related that, as he was riding to the battle-fleld from
Manassas, at about four o'clock that afternoon, he met such
a stream of panic-stricken rebel soldiers, and heard such
dUeful tidings from the fr-ont, that his companions were
thoroughly convinced the Confederates had lost the day, and
implored him to tum back for personal safety. He went on,
against theU ad-vice, to find that the conflict was already
over, and to leam, with mingled amazement and joy, that
the Union army had, by a sudden and unexplained impulse,
ceased flghting, and half marched, half run fr-om the fleld.
McDowell was no less astounded at his o-wn overwhelming
reverse. A Uttle before Elzey and Early appeared on his
right to outflank him, there had been a lull in the Confed
erate firing that led him to hope the enemy was giving way.
At the very worst there seemed no doubt of his ability to
hold the Warrenton turnpike and stone bridge and main
tain fr-ee communication with CentreviUe. For this abun
dant resources were yet available. Bumside's brigade had
remained in reserve on the morning's battle-field, and, after

198 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
four hours' rest, was yet capable of effective service. Keyes'
brigade beyond the hill, on his left, was substantially un
harmed. Schenck had an almost fresh brigade at the stone
bridge. Miles had a brigade at Centreville, which could be
replaced from Eunyon's division near Vienna. The engi
neers had cleared away the abattis at the stone bridge. The
hills north of the Warrenton turnpike were excellent defen
sive positions. It needed but morale among the troops to
hold the battle-ground, and holding this would have com
pelled the enemy to retreat.
Unfortunately the Union army had lost its morale. The
mere disorder of the final repulse was sUght ; but the de
moralization and loss of discipline had been growing during
the whole afternoon, until, of a sudden, the. army was haU-
dissolved. The impulse of retreat once started, there was
no checking or controlling it. Despite the efforts and ap
peals of McDowell and his offlcers, the various detachments
began moving from the field. The commander yielded to
necessity, made the best dispositions he could to cover the
retreat, and passed the word to reassemble in the old camps
at Centreville, not doubting that he could there make a
rally. The way thither by the Warrenton turnpike was open and
straight ; the distance four and a haU mUes. But, through
the perversity of fate, each detachment now retreated by the
same road over which it had oome. Thus the bulk of the
army — the brigades of Porter, Burnside, Franklin, WUcox,
and Howard — went back over the long detour of ten miles
round by Sudley Ford; these had with them, as yet, two
batteries — a total of ten field-pieces ; for only the batteries
of Eicketts and Griffin were lost in the main battle. Sher
man's brigade, on the other hand, marched eastward, over
the ground of the morning's conflict, and recrossed BuU

THE RETREAT. 199
Eun at the ford, haU a mile above the stone bridge, by
which they had approached. Keyes' brigade, becoming
aware of the general retreat, also returned by that route.
These two, with Schenck's brigade, soon reached the War
renton road, making a comparatively easy march to Centre-
vUle. It also becomes necessary to mention here that, while the
main battle of the afternoon was going on, a second engage
ment had been fought at Blackburn's Ford. The brigades
of Eichardson and of Davies were sent there in the moming,
to make such demonstrations as would mask McDoweU's
real movement. In the afternoon, however, theU purpose
became apparent ; and to reUeve the stress of the main bat
tle, the Confederate commander sent orders to Jones' bri
gade to cross BuU Eun and make a demonstration. At about
four o'clock, Jones, with his three regiments, crossed at
McLean's Ford, and endeavored, by a flank movement, to
capture Hunt's battery stationed -with Davies' brigade. Da
vies quietly watched the oncoming rebel regiments, rear
ranged his lines, and held his flre in reserve tUl the enemy
were deploying to form Une of battle. They had advanced
within five hundred yards, only, however, to find themselves
embarrassed by woods and broken ground. In this situa
tion and dUemma Davies ordered Hunt's battery of six guns
to open upon them with grape -and canister. The rebel of
ficial report characterizes it as a "murderous shower,'' and,
no doubt, correctly. It scattered the attacking colunm as if
by enchantment ; in thirty minutes there was not a soldier
of them to be seen, and Jones modestly reports a loss in the
affair of fourteen killed and sixty-two wounded.
It was now near sundown. Miles, commanding at Centre-
vUle, either through Ulness or drunkenness, had become in
capable of duty — a situation whose serious consequences

200 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
were averted by the prudence and good beha-vior of the
three brigade commanders. But, feom this cause, prema
ture orders were received by the two brigades of Da-vdes and
Eichardson to faU back on Centre-yiUe ; whUe to Blenker
the more judicious order was given to advance his brigade
toward Stone Bridge, which he did, deploying it in Une of
battle across the Warrenton turnpike, haU-way between
CentreviUe and Cub Eun.
As soon as Johnston and Beauregard had sufficiently re
covered from theU astonishment at seeing the Union army
in unmistakable retreat, they ordered pursuit to be made,
but, as it would seem, -with the greatest caution. In truth,
McDoweU's vanquished brigades marched from the imme
diate battle-fleld only half -disbanded ; there remained, in
most instances, a Uttle nucleus at least of each organization,
which yet, for a time, held together, whUe several of the
brigades were nearly intact. Thus it happened that, whUe
the battaUon of rebel cavalry under Stuart was ordered to
pursue along the Sudley road, they found the Union forces
generaUy so compact, and the rear so weU protected, that
they could only dash in here and there and pick up or scat
ter isolated squads of stragglers. Another reserve battaUon
of rebel cavalry under Eadford was sent in pursiut from the
-vicinity of BaU's Ford up towaj^d the turnpike ; whUe John
ston also sent orders to Bonham to take the remainder of
his own and Longstreet's brigades, and move against the line
of retreat at CentreviUe. Eadford, like Stuart, saw that the
retreating brigades of Sherman, Keyes, and Schenck were
too formidable to attack ; and Bonham, on nearing Centre-
-vUle, found the brigades of Blenker, Eichardson, and Da-vies
so weU posted, and so superior in numbers, that he was quite
content to stop with a mere reconnoissance, and at nightfall
returned to his camps behind MitcheU's and Blackburn's

THE RETREAT. £01
Fords. MeanwhUe, though the Confederate pursuit could
nowhere venture a serious assault, an accident served to
greatly enlarge theU harvest of trophies.
The business of war was such a novelty, that McDowell's
army accumulated an extraordinary number of camp-fol
lowers and non-combatants. The vigilant newspapers of the
chief cities sent a cloud of correspondents to chronicle the
incidents of the march and conflict. The volunteer regi
ments carried with them personal sympathies and compan
ionships unknown to regular armies. Congress had met in
special session ; and senators and representatives, full of tho
patriotic hope and pride of theU several States, no less than
theU own eager political solicitude, in several instances
joined in what many rashly assumed would be a mere tri
umphal parade. McDowell's unopposed and apparently U-
resistible advance through the enemy's outposts lured them
on to Centreville in a false security; and the unUormly
favorable reports which went back to Washington even
brought out a fresh accession of the same material on Sun
day morning of the battle.
By that time, however, the situation had become more
serious, and generally made the non-combatants somewhat
circumspect. Only a few of hardier courage followed to
the battle-field ; most of them remained at Centreville until
the cannonade announced the beginning of the fight, and
then drifted gradually down the turnpike toward the stone
bridge, not nearer than a mile and a half to the actual fight
ing, but where they could hear the volleys, see the smoke
and dust, and perhaps the occasional manosu-vres of Schenck's
and Keyes' brigades. In a certain sense they were under
fire, because the long-range shells of the field-pieces ren
dered even that locaUty somewhat dangerous. From this
situation were written many highly sensational, but purely

202 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
imaginary and most grotesquely confused accounts of ihe
battle, first pubUshed in the newspapers. A famous corre
spondent of the London Times, who earned the sobriquet of
" Bull Eun Eussell," wrote his description of the affair for
European readers, after a leisurely lunch at Centreville, and
a stroll of perhaps a mile toward Stone Bridge, taking his
departure with the earliest fugitives.
It also happened that on the afternoon of the battle a
considerable number of provision, baggage, and ammuni
tion wagons, together with some private vehicles of the
non-combatants heretofore mentioned, had been sent down
the Warrenton turnpike from Centreville, toward the stone
bridge. When finally the first wave of fugitives brought
unfavorable news from the front, these began a general
movement in return, which unavoidably produced quick
confusion and blockade ; and it was chiefly among these
that the disgraceful panic and flight, which has furnished
the nearly universal theme of criticism of the battle, flrst
broke out. Naturally the tide of disaster rose quick and
high; the retreating brigades, and nearer approach of can
nonade and musketry, soon confUrmed the worst fears of
overwhelming defeat and pressing pursuit, and started a
veritable scramble and stampede for safety. Ai-ms and
clothing were thrown away by those on foot ; wagons were
abandoned, and even ambulances with wounded soldiers
left standing in the road, while the frightened teamsters
rode away at headlong speed, on horses unhitched or cut
out of their harness.
It would seem that things had already come to this pass
before the columns which were retreating around the long
detour by way of Sudley Springs and Ford once more came
in sight of the Warrenton turnpike, at a point between
Stone Bridge and Cub Eun. Cub Eun seems to have been

THE RETREAT. 203
a difficult Uttle stream, provided -with a "suspension bridge"
of some kind where the turnpike crosses it. Eadford's cav
alry had not only been hovering along and occasionally dash
ing in on the turnpike, but a rebel Ught battery succeeded
in establishing itself where it commanded the " suspension
bridge." When the retreating colunm from Sudley Ford
came in sight, they found to theU consternation that it was
necessary to run the gauntlet of this artiUery flre. " The
enemy opened flre," says Burnside's report, "upon the re
treating mass of men. Upon the bridge crossing Cub Eun,
a shot took effect upon the horses of a team that was cross
ing. The wagon was overturned directly in the centre of
the bridge, and the passage was completely obstructed.
The enemy continued to play his artillery upon the train,
carriages, ambulances, and artillery wagons that fllled up
the road, and these were reduced to ruin. The artillery
could not possibly pass, and five pieces of the Ehode Island
battery, which had been safely brought off the field, were
here lost." The four pieces of Arnold's battery were also
abandoned here from this cause. Four pieces of Carlisle's
battery were apparently lost in the same neighborhood,
though from a charge of Eadford's cavalry. This " suspen
sion bridge" over Cub Eun was distant some three miles
from the main battle-field, and it was here that the enemy
made his largest capture of guns and wagons.
It may be imagined that at Confederate headquarters that
night the -measure of satisfaction was well-nigh full. Yet
that their rejoicing was tempered with a serious alloy of
rebel danger and losses, is also clearly enough revealed in
Jefferson Davis' telegraphic bulletins. " A terrible battle is
raging," said his flrst. "We have won a glorious, though
dear-bought victory," was the language of his second. In
his third he repeated, "Night has closed upon a hard-

204 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION
fought fleld. Our forces have won a glorious victory." He
forbore to add, what the official reports and correspondence
afterward developed, namely : that not only was the field
" hard-fought " and the victory " dear-bought," but they
were by no means confldent it was final. On the contrary,
the rebel headquarters was in serious apprehension lest
McDowell should tum feom CentreviUe and once more
assail the Confederate right fiank at or below Blackburn's
Ford. To meet this reported danger, EweU and Holmes
were that night ordered post-haste back to Union Mills.
" You wiU not fail to remember,'' afterward wrote Jefferson
Da-vis to Beauregaird, "that, so far from kno-wing the enemy
Was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you, in
the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our
right, and the next day's operations did not fuUy reveal what
has since been reported of the enemy's panic."
When McDowell left the battle-fleld his intention and
orders were to rally at CentreviUe. But, arriving there, he
found the conditions less favorable than he anticipated. It
had been designed that Blenker's brigade should, during
the day, throw up intrenchments ; this was not done, because
the necessary tools did not get forward as expected. Next
he found that Davies and Eichardson had left theU stations
at Blackburn's Ford and were falling back. " Great God I
Eichardson," exclaimed McDowell, on meeting that officer,
"why didn't you hold on to the position at Blackburn's
Ford ? " " Colonel MUes ordered me to retreat to Oentre-
-ville, and I obeyed the order ; Colonel MUes is continually
interfering with me, and he is drunk, and is not flt to com
mand," was the reply. The officer stood justifled, for Mc
Dowell had aUeady suspended Miles from command. The
retrograde movement was stopped, the brigades were faced
about and put in the best possible line of defence, with

THE RETREAT. 205
orders to hold the position. Eepairing again to Centreville,
McDoweU found stiU further discouragement in the loss of
the thirteen guns at Cub Eun and the increased disorder
among the troops. When, toward nine o'clock — just about
night-faU for that season — ^the laSt brigade reached Centre
viUe, and the various commanders were called together, it
was generally agreed that it was unwise to undertake to
make a stand, as contemplated. " The condition of our
artillery and its ammunition,'' says McDowell's report,
" and the want of food for the men, who had generally
abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day
before, and the utter disorganization and consequent de-
moraUzation of the mass of the army, seemed to all who
were near enough to be consulted— division and brigade
commanders and staff — ^to admit of no altemative but to faU
back." If these reasons might be questioned, there was
still another absolutely conclusive. The enlistment of the
three months men was expiring. The Pennsylvania Fourth,
which had insisted upon and received its discharge that very
moming, whUe the army was advancing to battle, " moved to
the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." "In the next
few days," continues McDowell, " day by day I should have
lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and
disciplined troops in the army.'' The practical logic of war
is stern and s-wift. Even while the officers were deUberating,
the disorganized fugitives, in a contagious and increasing
panic, were already on the march. Toward ten o'clock Mc
Dowell began to distribute his orders to retire from Centre
ville ; and a Uttle after midnight Eichardson's and Blenker's
brigades marched away from that -village in a deUberate and
orderly retreat, maintaining their organization as a steady
and effective rear-guard till they once more reached the
Potomac camps.

CHAPTEE XVH
CONCLUSION.
The official reports show a loss to the Union side in the
battle of Bull Eun of 25 guns (the Confederates claim 28),
481 men killed, 1,011 men wounded, and 1,460 wounded and
o:her Union soldiers sent as prisoners to Eichmond. On
the Confederate side the loss was 387 kiUed, 1,582 wounded,
and a few prisoners taken.
These simple flgures prove the engagement to have been
weU contested and fought -with equal courage and persist
ence by both sides. Greatly ridiculed and denounced
when it occurred, the battle of Bull Eun is graduaUy find
ing its vindication. General Sherman says it was " one of
the best-planned battles of the war, but one of the worst-
fought,'' and that "Hboth armies were faUly defeated." Gen
eral Johnston says : " If the tactics of the Federals had been
equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten.'' To
the mUitary student. Bull Eun, -with its extended field of
strategy, its quick changes of plan, its fiuctuating chances
and combinations, and its rapidly shifting incidents and ac
cidents, is a most interesting, and Ukely to become a typical,
" game of war " between volunteer armies.
The loyal people in Washington were rejoicing over a -vic
tory, steadily reported during the greater part of the day,
when suddenly, at about five o'clock, came the startUng tele-

CONCLUSION. 207
gram : " General McDowell's army in full retreat through
Centreville. The day is lost. Save Washington and the
remnants of this army." General Scott refused to credit the
astounding and unwelcome intelligence. Nevertheless he
put the Alexandria and Arlington camps into activity, sent
confidential notice to Baltimore, called reinforcements from
Harrisburg and New York, and suggested to McClellan to
" come down to the Shenandoah Valley with such troops as
can be spared from Western Virginia." By midnight, officers
and ci-vilians who were lucky enough to have retained
horses began to arrive, and the apparent proportions of the
defeat to increase. It was a gloomy night, but yet gloomier
days followed. Next day, Monday, the rain commenced
falling in torrents, and continued for thirty-six hours with
but sUght intermission. Through this rain the disbanded
soldiers began to pour into Washington City, fagged out,
hungry, and dejected, and having literally nowhere to tum
their feet or lay their head. History owes a page of honor
able mention to the Federal capital for its unselfish gener
osity on this occasion. The rich and poor, the high and low
of her loyal people, with one quick and entirely unprompted
impulse opened their doors and dealt out food and refresh
ment to the footsore, haggard, and half-starved men, whom
ill-luck rather than their own delinquency had so unexpect
edly reduced to tramps and fugitives.
The evU was, however, quickly remedied. By Monday
noon the full extent of the disaster, though not yet certainly
kno-wn, could be reasonably estimated, since indications be
gan to show that the enemy had not pressed their pursuit
in force. But, in due preparation for the worst, and in addi
tion to all possible precautions for local defence. General
McClellan was called to Washington to take command, Mc
DoweU being continued in charge of the defenses on the

208 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
VUginia side of the Potomac. Patterson's time ha-ving ex
pired, he was mustered out of the service ; Banks was sent
to Harper's Ferry, Dix put in command at Baltimore, and
Eosecrans in West Virginia.
Coming to Washington under the favorable acquaintance
ship and estimate of General Scott, and with the prestige of
his recent success in West VUginia, McClellan's arrival was
hailed by officials and citizens with something more than
ordinary warmth and satisfaction. This good opinion was
greatly augmented by the General's own personal conduct.
He exhibited at once a promising energy and industry in
repairing the shattered army organization; cleared Wash
ington City of stragglers ; established a more perfect mUitary
discipline than had hitherto been maintained; displayed
great tact in his first intercourse -with both junior and senior
officers ; was free, affable, kind, patient, and attentive to all ;
manifested great talent and unceasing watchfulness in the
details of miUtary administration ; and being young, vigi
lant, cheerful, intelUgent, and apparently possessed of great
professional skill, he reaped, almost at a single harvest, a
well-nigh universal popularity.
It is in its political aspects that BuU Eun becomes a great
historical landmark. To say that the hope and enthusiasm
of the North received a painful shock of humUiation and
disappointment, is to use but a mild description of the popu
lar feeUng. This first experience of defeat — or recognition
of even the possibiUty of defeat — was inexpressibly bitter.
Stifling the sharp sorrow, however, the great pubhc of the
Free States sent up its prompt and united demand that the
contest should be continued and the disgrace wiped out.
Impatience and over eagerness were chastened and repressed ;
and the North reconciled itself to the painful prospect of a
tedious civil war all the more readily because of the necessity

CONCLUSION. 209
of bending every energy to immediate preparation on a
-widely extended scale.
If the North was cast down by the result of Bull Eun, the
South was in even a greater ratio encouraged and strength
ened. Vanity of personal prowess is a weakness of Southern
character ; and Bull Eun became to the unthinking a demon
stration of Southem invincibility. To the more cautious
leaders the event was yet sufficiently flattering to inspUe
them -with fuU confidence in idtUnate success. Perhaps the
most potent influence of the battle was upon foreign nations,
who now looked upon the Confederate States as a belligerent
of " great expectations ; " while speculative foreign capital
turned somewhat eagerly to this promising new fleld of con
traband trade.
An important event, so silent in its operation that the
public was scarcely conscious it was occurring, now became
the pivot and controlling force of military operations.
This was the disbandment of the three months volunteers.
Within a few weeks almost the whole seventy-five thou
sand men were mustered out and returned to their homes.
Only a few regiments re-enUsted with organizations even
approximately unbroken ; but out of the whole number of
troops thus suddenly dissolved a considerable proportion
immediately entered the three years service as indi-viduals,
and in many instances theU drill and experience secured
them election or appointment as officers in the new regi
ments. Thus the disappearance of an army brought a cer
tain compensation ; it not only furnished the new volunteers
a quickening leaven, but that portion which went home to
every Free State, and to some of the Border Slave States,
served to greatly strengthen and correct pubUc opinion in
theU several locaUties.
The three years quota, and the increase of the regular
14

210 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
army, called by President Lincoln in advance of strict au
thority of law at the beginning of May, had so far progressed
that garrisons and camps suffered no serious diminution.
Congress, being convened in special session, now legaUzed
their enUstment, perfected their organization, and made
Uberal pro-vision for their equipment and supply. It author
ized an army of five hundred thousand men, and a national
loan of two hundred and fifty mUlions of doUars ; it prb-
-vided an increase of the navy to render the blockade -vigi
lant and rigorous ; and enforcement, revenue, confiscation,
and piracy laws were enacted or amended to meet the exi
gencies of active rebelUon.
Pending the change and transformation of the volunteer
forces from the three months to the three years service,
miUtary operations necessarily came to a general cessation.
Washington City, especially, and the fortified strip of terri
tory held by the Union armies on the Virginia side of the
Potomac, once more became a great miUtary camp. Here,
under McClellan's personal supervision, grew up that famous
Army of the Potomac, about which future volumes of this
series will have much to say. But in its formation, organi
zation, complete equipment, and thorough drUl the second
half of the year 1861 passed away. A few intensely exciting
incidents occurred, of which the BaU's Bluff disaster was,
perhaps, the chief; but their consideration in detaU does
not fall -within the scope of the present volume.
In the rebel camps, also, inaction was both a policy and a
necessity during the remainder of the year. The trophies of
Bull Eun having been gathered up, and its glory vaunted in
Southem newspapers and stump speeches, the rebel com
mander once more advanced his outposts to the positions
held before the battle, while the bulk of his army turned
Manassas into a fortified camp. Some of the earUest rea-

CONCLUSION. 211
sons for this course are explained by Johnston with blunt
frankness. " The Confederate army," he writes, " was more
disorganized by -victory than that of the United States by
defeat. The Southem volunteers beUeved that the objects
of the war had been accompUshed by theU victory, and that
they had achieved all that their country required of them.
Many, therefore, in ignorance of theU military obUgations,
left the army, not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit
the trophies picked up on the field ; others left their regi
ments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, fre-^
quently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns.
Such were the reports of general and staff officers and rail
road officials. Exaggerated ideas of victory prevailing
among our troops cost us more men than the Federal army
lost by defeat."
It would appear that, about a month after the battle of
Bull Eun, the rebel commanders invited Jefferson Davis to
Manassas to discuss a plan of active operations for the
autumn. Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith
proposed " the concentration there of all the available forces
of the Confederate States, crossing the Potomac into Mary
land at the nearest ford with this army, and placing it in rear
of Washington. This," -writes Johnston, " we thought would
compel McCleUan to fight with the chances of battle against
him. Success would bring Maryland into the Confederacy,
we thought, and enable us to transfer the war to the north
em border of that State, where the defensive should be re
sumed." Da-vis' conclusive reply was, " that the whole coun
try was applying for arms and troops; that he could take
none from other points for that army.''
Of the larger aspects of the civil war during the fall and
winter of 1861, this volume does not afford further room to
give even a summary. Starting with a series of favorable

212 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.
accidents in the spring, the rebellion had confidently ex
pected to hold every slave-holding State. So far feom real
izing this hope, the end of the year witnessed the substantial
loss to the conspiracy of the four important Border States of
Maryland, West VUginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. This,
together with the effective blockade instituted on the sea
board, and the lodgment gained by the briUiant naval vic
tories at Hatteras and Port Eoyal, already presaged the fate
of disunion. In a rough and hasty measurement of strength
and unity, political and miUtary, the relative proportions of
population, wealth, and skill, and the no less potent elements
of devotion to freedom, justice, and humanity, had aUeady
so far turned the scale as to foreshadow, with unerring cer
tainty, that the seceding States would ultimately f aU in theU
desperate appeal from the baUot to the buUet. For the
present, however, both the contestants remained confldent,
determined, and unceasingly active in gathering the huge
armies destined, in the coming spring, to renew the nughty
conflict.

II^DEX.

Abeeceombie, Colonel, 166
Alabama, attitude of with regard
to secession, 3, 8 ; secession of,
14
Alexandria, Ta., 102 ; fortified, 167
Alleghany Mountains, 136, 137
Anderson, Major Robeit, 32;
transfers his forces to Fort
Sumter, 28 et seq. ; his letter
to Governor Pickens, 35; his
reply to President Lincoln's
letter, 58 ; his reply to Con
federate authorities, 61, 131,
135
Annapolis, 100, 103 et seq. ; route
by, to the capital, 106 et seq.
Arkansas, 80, 121
Arlington Heights, Va., occupied
by Union forces, 110 ; forti
fied, 169
Ashby's Gap, 168
Bakeh, Edward D.,76
BaU's Bluff, engagement at, 310
Baltimore, 83 ; attack on the Mas
sachusetts soldiers in, 85 et
seq., 98 ; authorities burn R.R.
bridges, 89
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 141
Bates, Attorney-General, 132

Banks, General N. P., 308
Barrancas, Port, 38
Beauregard, General G. T., 56; di
rects operations against Fort
Sumter, 57, .59 ; placed in com
mand at Manassas, 170 ; his
first measures, 170, 171 ; his
plan for the battle of BuU
Run, 176 et seq. ; composition
of his army, 176, note
Beckham, Captain, 198
Bee, General, 185
Bell, adherents of, 8
Benham, Captain, 152
Beverly, H2, 146, 151
Black, Secretary, 26, 33
Blackburn's Ford, 176, note ; en
gagement at, 178
Blair, Francis P., 109
Blair, Frank P., Jr., 116 et seq.,
122
Blair, Montgomery, 132
Blair's Home Guards, IIS
Blenker, General L., 174
BoonviUe, battle of, 123
Border Slave States, 80
Breckenridge, John C, Southem
electoral votes cast for, 4, 8
Breckenridge party, character of, 8
Brown, John, 158

214

INDEX.

Brown, Governor, of Georgia, 12
Brown, Mayor, of Baltimore, 86,
89 et seq.
Buchanan, James, President, char
acter of, 17 et seq., Southem
sympathy of, 18 ; his message
to Congress, 19, 33 et seq. ; in
terview with the Sonth Caro
lina Commissioners, 38, 30, 31 ;
correspondence with the Wash
ington Cabal, 37 ; justifies the
revolution of the South, 69 ;
his Union sentiment as ex-
president, 76
Buckhannon, 147
Buckner, Simon B., 130, 133, 135
Bull Run, 133 ; position and course
of, 176 ; battle of, 181 et seq. ;
its effects, 3U6, 308
Burnside, General A. E., 174
Bunker HiU, Va., 163
Butler, General B. P., 92 et seq ,
108
Cabinet, decision of, with regard
to Fort Sumter, 51
Cadwalader, General, 157
Cairo, 128, 133, 134
CampbeU, Justice, 54 ; his treach
ery, 35, 57, 69
Carrick's Ford, 152 et seq.
Cass, General, Secretary of State,
34 ; resigns, 26 ; supports the
Union cause, 76
Centreville, Va., 177
Charleston, S. C, situation of, 20,
79
Cheat River, 146, 152
Chinn House, the, 194
Chambersburg, Pa., 156
Cincinnati, 133, 140
Clay, Henry, 127

Cobb, Secretary Ho-well, 13, 17, 20,
26, 42
CockeysviUe, 90
Columbia, District of, 83
Columbus, 134 et seq.
Confederacy, Southern, first for
mal proposal of, 26 ; estab
lished, 41 ; miUtary resources
of, 79 ; sends diplomatic agents
to Europe, 79 ; natural resour
ces of, 81
Confederates resolve to begin the
war, 60
Constitution of the Confederate
States adopted, 41
Cox, General J. D., 154
Crawford, Commissioner, 57
Crittenden, John J., 76
Cub Run, 200
Cumberland, Department of the,
135
Cumberland Gap, 135
Cummings Point, 63 et seq.
Gushing, Caleb, 76
Davies, General T. A., 174
Davis, Jefferson, 25 et seq., 40;
elected President of the Con
federacy, 41 ; opposes the at
tack on Fort Sumter, 56 ; be
lief of Northern aid, 71 ; offers
letters of marque and reprisal,
78 ; caU for volunteers, 79 ; his
message to Governor Letcher,
92 ; letter to Governor Jackson,
117, 158 ; speech of, at Rich
mond, 169
" Declaration of Causes " by South
Carolina, 5 et seq.
Dennison, Governor, 140
Dix, Secretary John A., 33, 76,
308

INDEX.

215

Doubleday, Captain (afterward
General) Abner, 39, 64
Douglas, Stephen A., adherents of,
8 ; hia interview with Presi
dent Lincoln, 76
Dogan Heights, 191
Drake, Captain, 117
Dumont, Colonel, 143, 153
Ellsworth, Col. B. E., 110 et
seq. ; shot at Alexandria, 113;
buried from the White House,
114
EUsworth's Zouaves, 110
Elzey, General, 194
Evans, Colonel, 183
Evarts, Wm. M., 76
Everett, Edward, 76
Fallinq Waters, W. Va., skir
mish at, 163
Federal HUl, Baltimore, 108
Field, David Dudley, 76
Fitzpatrick, Senator, 37
Florida, attitude of, with regard to
secession, 3, 8 ; secession of, 14
Floyd, Secretary, 6, 17, 30, 33 et
seq., 36, SO ; his malfeasance
in office, 31 ; resigns, 33
Follansbee, Captain, 86 et seq.
Foster, Captain, 38, 63
Fox, Captain G. V., 51 ; sails in
command of expedition for re
lief of Fort Sumter, 59
Franklin, General W. B., 174
Fremont, General J. C, 133
Frost, D. M., 117 et seq.
Gainesville, Va., 181
Gamble, Hamilton R., 125
Garnett, General, 146, 154

Georgia, attitude of, with regard
to seoession, 2,-8, 13 ; seces
sion of, 13 et seq.
Gist, Governor of South Carolina,
his circular letter, 1, 8, 37
Gosport Navy Yard, destruction
of, 96 et seq.
Grafton, 142 et seq., 146
Grant, General U. S., 134
Great Bethel, Va. , engagement at,
172
Green, Captain, 117
Griffin, Captain, 188, 191, 192
Guthrie, Colonel, 131
Hagerstown, Md., 157
Hamlin, Hannibal, 76
Harney, General, 119 et seq.
Harper's Ferry, United States Ar
mory at, 83 ; capture of, by
rebels, 95, 98 ; retaken from
the rebels, 157; weakness of,
¦ 158 ; destroyed by Johnston,
161
Harrisburg, 100
Hayne, I. W., 35, 37
Heintzelman, General S. P., com
mands Third Division on ad
vance to Manassas, 174
Henry House, the, 187
Hickman, Ky., 134
Hicks, Governor, 83, 88 et seq. , 94
Houston, Governor, his scheme of
independent sovereignty for
Texas, 13 ; deposed from office,
14
Holt, Secretary, 33, 37, 84
Howard, General O. O., 174
Hughes, Archbishop, 76
Hunter, General David, 35 ; com
mands Second Division in the
advance on Manassas, 174

216

refDBX.

HuttonsviUe, 147
Illinois, 137
Imboden, General, 185
Indiana, 137 ; volunteers, 128
Iverson, Secretary, 13
Jackson, Camp, 117 ; captured by
General Lyon, 118 et seq.
Jackson, Port, 79
Jackson, General T. J. ("Stone
waU"), 187
Jackson, Governor, 115 et seq.,
119, 131 et seq., 134
Jackson, murderer of Ellsworth,
113
Jefferson City, 123
Jefferson, Fort, on Tortugas Island,
16
Johnston, General Joseph B., re
signs from Federal army, 108 ;
in command at Harper's Ferry,
1.58 ; destroys Harper's Ferry,
161; movements of, before Pat
terson, in the Shenandoah Val
ley, 163 et seq. ; his march to
Manassas, 168 ; in command at
Bull Run, 183 et seq. ; opinion
of , on the battle of Bull Run,
211
Jones, Colonel (of the Massachu
setts Sixth), 84
Jones, Lieutenant, 95
Kanawha, proposed State of, 146
Kanawha River, the Great, 141 ;
valley, 146
Kane, Marshal, 87, 88 et seq.
Kelly, Colonel, 143 et seq.
Kentucky, 80; attitude of, with
regard to secession, 52, 139 et

seq. ; Union L^slature of,
130 et seq., 134
Keyes, General B. D., 174
Key's Ferry, Va., 163
Laurel Hill, 147, 151 et seq.
Lee, General Robert E., 108; ap
pointed to command of Vir
ginia forces, 109 ; his plans in
W. Va., 146 ; plans of, 169, 170
Leeds viUe, 151
Leesburg, Va., 163
Lefferts, Colonel, 93 et seq.
Letcher, Governor, 82, 91, 109, 141
Lewis' Ford, 176, note
Liberty, Mo., United States Arse
nal at, 117
Lincoln, Abraham, election of, 4 ;
his progress to Washington,
45 et seq.; his early career,
46 ; his character and per
son, 47 et seq. ; his speeches
before inauguration, 48 ; in
auguration of, 49 ; anxiety
about Fort Sumter, 50 et seq. ;
orders the reUef of Forts Sum
ter and Pickens, 53 ; his final
resolution with regard to Fort
Sumter, 55 ; his letter to Ma
jor Anderson, 58; communi
cation to Gov. Pickens, 59
his first war proclamation, 73
interviews with Douglas, 76
blockades the insurgent ports,
78 ; interview with Baltimore
committee, 100 ; issues a sec
ond caU for volunteers, 106;
his orders to P. P. Blair, Jr.,
122 ; his measures to save the
Border States, 131
Liverpool cotton merchants, 79
Longstreet, General, 179

INDEX.

217

Louisiana, attitude of, with regard
to secession, 3, 8 ; secession of,
14
LouisviUe, 135
Lyon, Captain Nathaniel, 116 et
seq., 133 et seq., 123
Lyons, Lord, 94
Magoffin, Govemor, 126 et seq.,
132, 134 et seq.
Mallory, Senator, 37 et seq., 40
Manassas, first movement against,
162 et seq. ; description of, 175
et seq.
Manchester, Eng., cotton opera
tors of, 79
Martinsburg, W. Va., 163, 163
Maryland, attitude of, with regard
to secession, 52, S3, 80; rebel
conspiracies to gain, 107, 108 ;
Union enlistments in, 131
Mason, Senator, 25, 91, 142
Massachusetts Eighth Infantry,
92, 103
Massachusetts Sixth Infantry, 84 ;
attack upon, in Baltimore, 85
et seq. ; map of its route
through Baltimore, 85, 99
McCauley, Commandant, 96
McCleUan, Gen. George B., placed
iu command of Dept. of the
Ohio, 140; in West Va., 143,
146 et seq., 153 et seq. ; ap
pointed to command the army
of the Potomac, 207, 308
McDowell, General Irvin, in com
mand at Arlington Heights,
173 ; his plan and movements,
173 et seq. ; his report cited,
1T5 ; plan of battle at BuU
Run, 177 ; change in his plans,
179, 181 ; his action during

and after the battle, 181-305 ;
iu charge of the Virginia de
fences, 208
McLane's Ford, 176, note
McRee, Port, 38
Memphis, 133
Miles, General D. S., commands
Fifth Division on advance to
Manassas, 174 ; misconduct
aud suspension of, 199, 204
Militia, first caU for, 73 et seq.
MUroy, Colonel, 152 et seq.
Milvale, 90
Mississippi, attitude of, with re
gard to secession, 3, 8; seces
sion of, 14
Missouri, attitude of, with regard
to secession, 53, 80, 115 ;
Unionists of, 120 ; without lo
cal govemment, 134 ; rescued
from secessionists, 135, 131, 133
Mitchell's Ford, 176, note
Montgomery, 93
Morgan, Fort, 79
Morris, General, 143, 147, 1.51
Morton, Governor, 139
Moultrie, Fort, 31 et seq., 38;
seizure of, 33
National property in the South
ern States, 15 ; seizure of, by
secessionists, 16 ; S. Carolina
Commissioners treat for deliv
ery of, 37
Nelson, Lieutenant WUliam, 131
et seq.
New York City, proposition for
secession of, 71 ; war meeting
in, 93
New York Seventh Infantry, 103
Norfolk Navy Yard, S3 ; destroyed,
96

218

INDEX.

North CaroUna, attitude of, with
regard to seoession, 1, 80
North, its misapprehension of
Southem opinion, 71 et seq.
Ohio levies, 128
Ohio, Military Department of the,
140
Ohio River, 137
Paducah, 134
Palmetto flag, 33
Parkersburg, 142
Patterson, General Robert, 155 ;
map of his campaign, 159 ;
indecision of, 161 ; Scott's or
ders to, 163 et seq.
Pawnee, the, 110
Pegram, Colonel, 147
Pensacola, 38, 79
Pennsylvania, Military Depart
ment of, 155
PhUippa, 143 et seq. ; battle of,
144, 146 et seq.
Phillips, WendeU, 76
Pickens, Fort, at Pensacola, 16,
38, 51, 53
Pickens, Francis W., Govemor of
South Carolina, 5, 32; de
mands surrender of Port Sum
ter, 35, 56 et seq., 59
Pierce, ex-President, 76
PUlow, General, 133, 134
pinckney, Castle, 30 ; seizure of, 33
Polk, Qeneral Leonidas, 134 et seq.
Plprter, (general Andrew, 174
Portej:, General Fitz-John, 157, 166
Portgrfield, Col,onel, 143 et seq.,
' 14§ '
Potomac ^ivei, 126
price, gterUng, 121 et seq., 124

Provincial Congress of the rebel
States, 37, 39 et seq.
Pulaski, Fort, 80
Pierpont, P. H., Govemor, 145
Rebellion, the beginning of, 1 ;
first formal proposal of, 36
Belay House, 90
Richardson, General J. B., 174,
178
Richmond, 93 ; Confederate seat of
government transferred to,
169
Rich Mountain, 147, 151, 153
Ricketts, Captain, 188, 191, 192
Roaring Creek, 149
Robinson, Camp Dick, 133
Robinson House, the, 187
Rosecrans, General W. S., 149, 154,
308
Runyon, General Theodore, com
mands Fourth Division in ad
vance to Manassas, 174
RusseU, Dr. W. H., 302
Sandford, General, 163
Santa Rosa Island, 38
Schenck, General R. C, 74
Scott, General Winfield, at Wash
ington, 34, 49; views on the
reUef of Fort Sumter, 51 ; or
ders the reinforcement of Har
per's Ferry, 95 et seq. ; concen
trates troops in Washington,
99 et seq.; protects St. Louis,
116 ; orders and suggestions to
Patterson, 163 et seq. ; his
campaign plans, 171, 173
St. George, W. Va., 151
St. Louis, 116
St. PUlip, Fort, 79

INDEX.

219

Secession, causes of, 1 et seq. ;
passage of ordinance of, in
South Carolina, 5 et seq., 14 ;
true character of, 8 ; cabal in
Washington, 17, S3, 36
Seventh Regiment of New York,
93 et seq.
Seward, Secretary, opposes reUev
ing Fort Sumter, 51 ; his idea
of the conspiracy, 53 ; his re
ply to the rebel commission
ers, 54 ; interview with Judge
CampbeU, .54, 94
Shepherdstown, 160
Sherman, General W. T., 174
Slavery, false assumption of th^e
South with regard to, 7 ; the
corner-stone of the Confeder
acy, 43
Slidell, Senator, 37, 40
Slemmer, Lieutenant, 38
SmaU's Pennsylvania Brigade, 88
Smith, General G. W., 311
Smith, General Kirby, 194
South Carolina, attitude of, with
regard to secession, 1; seces
sion of, 5, 14
South Carolina Commissioners
have an interview -with Presi
dent Buchanan, 30; their
blindness to their opportunity,
31
Southem States, their differences
of territory, etc., 10 et seq.
Stanton, Edwin M., 36, 33
"Star of the West," 33
State supremacy, doctrine of, 6
Staunton, Va., 143, 146
Steedman, Colonel, 152
Stephens, Alexander H., 13;
elected Vice-President of the
Confederacy, 42

Stone Bridge, the, over BuU Run,
176 apd note
Stone, General, 163
Strasburg, Va.,163
Sudley Ford, BuU Run, 183
Sudley road, the, 187
SulUvan's Island, 31 et seq.
Sumter, Fort, 31 et seq. ; expedi
tion for the relief of, 53 ; Pres
ident Lincoln's decision with
regard, to, 55; preparations for
the siege of, 56 ; its evacua
tion demanded, 60 ; siege be
gun, 62; strength of, 63; its
disadvantages in the siege, 65 ;
surrender of, 68 ; the effect at
the North of the attack on, 73
Taylor, Fort, at Key West, 16
Tennessee, 80, 133 et seq. ; East,
135
Texas, course of the conspirators
in, 13 ; ordinance of secession
submitted to popular vote, 13 ;
attitude of, -with regard to se
cession, 13 et seq. ; secession
of, 14
Thomas, Secretary, 26
Thomas, Colonel, 166
Thompson, Jeff., 118
Thompson, Secretary, 17, 30, 30,
33
Toombs, Senator, 12, 43
Toucey, Secretary, 33
To-wnsend, Colonel, 153
Twiggs, General, treachery- of, 14
Tyler, General Daniel, commands
First Division in the advance
on Manassas, 174 ; his advance,
177, 178
Union MiUs Ford, 176, note

220

INDEX.

Vaeian, Captain, 174
Vernon, Mount, Va., 103
Vienna Station, Va., ambush at,
172
Virginia, attitude of, with regard to
secession, 51 et seq., 80 ; seces
sion, 98 ; extent and character
of, 137 et seq., 169
Virginia, East, 137 ; vote on Seces
sion Ordinance, 142
Virginia, West, 131, 133, 137, 141 ;
vote on Secession Ordinance,
143 ; organized as separate
State, 144 et seq. ; map of
West Virginia battles, 148 ;
admitted into the Union, 1.54
Volunteers, first enUstment of, 75 ;
new, caUed for, 106
Walker, Secretary, 57, 91
Walker, Robert J., 76
Ward, Captain, 38
Warrenton Turnpike, the, 176
Washington, 83 ; character of, 97 ;

defence of, 98 et seq. ; threat
ened, 101 ; arrival of the Mas
sachusetts Sixth and New
York Seventh regiments at,
103 et seq. ; becomes a camp,
106 et seq.
Washington, Fort, 103
West Union, W. Va., 151
WheeUng, 139, 143 et seq.
WigfiU, Senator, 68
Wilcox, General O. B., 174
WUliamsport, Pa., 157
Williamsport, W. Va., 163
Winchester, Va., 157, 160
Wise, ex-Govemor Henry A., 146,
154
Wood, Mayor Fernando, 71, 76
Woodbury, Captain, cited, 195
Woodruff, Colonel, 131
Young's Branch, 183
ZOLLICOPFER, General, 135
Zouaves, EUsworth's, 110

MESSRS. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
have much pleasure in announcing that an undertaking which
they have had in progress for several years is now completed ;
and that they have begun the publication of a work which they
believe will prove the most important of recent contributions
to American History.
Under the general title of THE
Campaigns of the Civil War,
they will issue a series of volumes, contributed at their soli-
ciation by a number of leading actors in and students of the
great conflict of l86l-'6s, with a view to bringing together,
for the first time, a full and authoritative military history of
the suppression of the Rebellion.

The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which every
doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a possibility
only of the future. But it is a matter for surprise that twenty years
after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when a -whole generation
has grown up needing such knowledge, there is no authority which is
at the same time of the highest rank, intelligible and trustworthy, and
to which a reader can turn for any general view of the field — for a
strong, vivid, concise but truly proportioned story of the great salient
events. The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materi
als of value for special passages, require, for their intelligent reading,
an ability to combine and proportion them which the ordinary reader
does not possess.. There have been no attempts at general histories
which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part of the public.
Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as would be especially
welcome to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very
great dass of readers; — and there has seemed to be great danger that

the time would be allowed to pass when it would be possible to give
to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from personal
recollection. These facts led to the conception of the present work. Its possi
bility depended first of all on the consent of the circle of authors to
whom, only, the publishers could look to carry it out viforthily : — ^bnt
the cordial reception which the suggestion at once received from them
and from all others consulted, speedily removed all doubt upon this
subject. From every department of the Government, from the officers of the
army, and from a great number of custodians of records and special
information everywhere, both authors and publishers have received
every aid that could be asked in this undertaking ; and in announcing
the issue of the work the publishers take this occasion to convey the
thanks which the authors have had individual opportunities to express
elsewhere.

The volumes of the series will be duodecimos of about 250
pages each, illustrated by maps and plans prepared under
the direction of the authors. They wiU appear, as far as
possible, in the chronological order of the Campaigns of
which they treat; and by their preliminary and concluding
chapters will be so far connected that the completed work
will practically cover the entire field of the war. The price
of each volume will be $1.00.

The following volumes are now ready, or far advanced in
preparation, and will appear at short intervals :
I.— THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. By John G.
Nicolay, Esq., Private Secretary to President Lincoln; late
Consul-General to France, etc. Nnw ready.
^ A preliminary volume, describing the opening of the war, and covering the
period from the election of Lincoln to the end of the first Battle of Bull Run.

II.— FROM FORT HENRY TO CORINTH. By the Hon.
M. F. Force, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnati ; late
Brigadier- General and Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V., commanding
First Division, 17th Corps ; in 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the
20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh ; Treasurer of
the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. Now ready.
The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to May, i86z ;
covering the capture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the Battle of Shiloh, etc., etc.

III.— THE PENINSULA. By Alexander S. Webb, LL.D.,
President of the CoUege of the City of New York ; Assistant
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, 1861-62; Inspector
General Fifth Army Corps; General Commanding 2d Div.,
2d Corps ; Major-General Assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army
of the Potomac. Ready November 20.
The history of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment to the
end of the Seven Days* Fight.
IV.-THE ARMY UNDER POPE. By John C. Ropes,
Esq., of the Military Society of Massachusetts, the Massa
chusetts Historical Society, etc. Ready November 20.
From the appointment of Pope to command the Army of "Virginia, to the appoint
ment of McClellan to the general command in September, 1862.
v.— THE ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG. By
Francis Winthrop Palfrey, late Colonel 20th Mass. In
fantry, and Bvt. Brigadier Gen'l U.S.V.; Lieut. Col. of the
20th Massachusetts at the battle of the Antietam ; Member of
Military Society of Massachusetts, of the Massachusetts His
torical Society, etc.
From the appointment of McClellan to the general command, Sept. i86z, to the
end of the "Battle of Fredericksburg.
VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG. By
Abner Doubleday, late Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A. ; and Major
Gen'l, U.S. v.; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg,
etc.
From the appointment of Hooker, through the campaigns of Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee after the latter battle.

VII  THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. By Henry
M. Cist, Brevet Brig Gen'l U.S. V.; A.A.G. on the staff of
Major Gen'l Rosecrans, and afterward on that of Major Gen'l
Thomas, Corresponding Secretary of the Society of the Army
of the Cumberland.
From the formation of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of the battles at
Chattanooga, November, 1863.
IX.— THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. By the Hon.
Jacob D. Cox, Ex-Governor of Ohio ; late Secretary of the
Interior of the United States; Major General U.S. V., com
manding Twenty-third Corps during the campaigns of Atlanta
and the Carolinas, etc., etc.
From Sherman's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to" the beginning of
the March to the Sea.
X.— THE MARCH TO THE SEA— FRANKLIN AND
NASHVILLE. By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox.
From the beginning of the March to the Sea to the Sur.-ender of Johnston —
including also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee.
XI.— THE CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT IN VIRGINIA.
By Andrew A. Humphreys, Brigadier General and Bvt.
Major-General, U.S.A.; late Chief of Engineers; Chief of
Staff, Army of the Potomac, i863-'64; commanding Second
Corps, i864-'65, etc., etc.
Covering the -Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and '65, to Lee's surrender.

VIII  THE MISSISSIPPI,
and one other volume, completing the series, are in course of
preparation, and their contents and authors will be announced
in a short time.

*j,i* The above books for sale by alt booksellers, or ivill be sent, post-paid, upon
receipt 0/ price by
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS,
743 and 745 Broadway, New York.