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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THK

LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION OF
ROBERT BANKS,
ECOND EARL OF LIVERPOOL, K.G

LATE FIR.ST LORD OF THE TREASURY.

COMPILED FROM ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.

CHARLES DUKE YONGE,
REGIUS PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE QUEEn's COLLHGH, EELFA'^T :
AN'D AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH NAVY," "THE HISTORY OF FRANCE
UNDER THE BOURBONS," ETC.

IN THREE VOLUMES.— VOL. I.

ymtboiT :
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1868.
[The right of Trandation and Reprodiidioti is reserved-l

ADVERTISEMENT.
The following ¦work is founded almost entirely on the
correspondence and copies of correspondence left behind
him by Lord Liverpool, and now in the possession of
Colonel and Lady Catharine Harcourt, of Buxted Park,
Sussex, who have done me the honour of entrusting the
documents to me for the purpose of compiling an account
¦ of his most eventful career. From the suddenness of
the calamity which terminated his Administration his
papers were not found to be so completely arranged
but that some letters have been lost ; arjd for some of
those which he wrote to Mr. 'Vansittart (afterwards Lord
Bexley), and to Mr. C^qnii^g, I have been indebted to
the kindness of their representatives, Mr. John Thornton
and Lord Canning Burke, to whom I take this oppor
tunity of acknowledging the great obligations under
which their courtesy has thus laid me.
C. D. Y.

CONTENTS TO VOL. L

CHAPTER I.
Importance of the period at v^fhich Lord Liverpool became minister —
Early history of his father — His care of his son's education — Mr.
Jenkinson at Oxford — His friendship with Canning and others — He
travels on the Continent — Opening of the French Revolution — Mr.
Jenkinson is returned for Appleby — His maiden speech — He visits
the allied armies on the Rhine — Letters to his father from Coblentz —
Proceedings of the French emigrants — Feelings of the Austrians
and Prussians — He supports the -war -with France — He opposes Mr.
Grey's motion for Reform — He becomes a. member of the Indian
Board  

CHAPTER II.
He recommends a march upon Paris — His father is made Earl of
Liverpool — He (no-w Lord Hawkesbury) is serving -with his regiment
of militia in Scotland — His view of the progress of the war in
Germany and of our own position — Approves of the negotiations foi^
peace — Pitt's failing health in 1798 — Seditious associations in England
— Irish Rebellion and Union — Lord Hawkesbury's dissatisfaction with
our campaign in- Holland — The Catholic question — Scruples of
George III. — Pitt's resignation — Character of Mr. Addington — Lord
Hawkesbury becomes Foreign Secretary — Derangement ofthe King^
Negotiations for peace — Lord Cornwallis is sent to Amiens — His
interview -with the First Consul — Conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens
— Lord Hawkesbury's speech on it  33

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER III.

Buonaparte becomes Consul for life— His discontent with England-
Lord Hawkesbury's reply to his remonstrances — Mr. Hookham
Frere's description of parties in Spain — Bu6naparte's encroachments —
His preparations for war — He annexes Piedmont to France — Switzer
land implores the aid of Britain — Lord 'Whitworth is sent to Paris —
Negotiations with Austria and Russia — Meeting and character of the
new Parliament — Eagerness of the French for the maintenance of
peace — Buonaparte's intrigues in Russia — Sebastiani's mission to
Egypt — Buonaparte's overtures to Louis XVIII. — Corruption of
Buonaparte's family — Lord ¦Whitworth's interview with Talleyrand —
He leaves Paris . . ....  77

CHAPTER IV.
Renewal of the secret negotiations — Debate on the renewal of the war
— Pitt's disapproval of the ministers' policy — Great division in their
favour — Col. Crawford's proposal to fortify London — Lord Hawkes
bury is removed to the House of Lords — His opinion of the weakness
of the German and Russian Governments — Buonaparte's measures
towards Spain and Portugal — Portugal applies to us for aid — Plans
for the partition of Turkey — Peculiarities of the constitution of
Turkey — Buonaparte's colonial losses, and plans for the invasion of
Great Britain- — Death of the Due d'Enghien — Louis XVIII. applies
to Britain for an asylum — Renewed illness of George III. — General
discontent with Addington — Pitt writes to the King — The Volun
teer Bill — Pitt writes again to the King — Addington resigns, and
Pitt becomes Prime Minister — Lord Hawkesbury becomes Home
Secretai-y  Ii

CHAPTER V.
Lord Liverpool's accoUht of the formation of Pitt's second Administra
tion — Canning's attack on Lord Hawkesbury — They are reconciled—
The Additional Force Bill — A new Corn Bill — Lord Hawkesbuiy's
views of Free-trade — Disputes in the royal family — Trades Unions —
Rise of Mr. O'Connell — Lord Hawkesbury's advice to the Roman
Catholics— Reconciliation of Pitt and Addington— The attack on the
Spanish treasure-ships— Napoleon's letter to George III.— Alliance
with Austria and Russia . . . .  1,5

CONTENTS. ix
CHAPTER VI. PAGE
Lord Hawkesbury's speech on the Catholic question — Impeachment of
Lord Melville — Resignation of Lord Sidmouth — The King's sight
becomes affected — Sir Robert Calder's action — Pitt fails in negotia
tions with Prussia, and with the Opposition — Battle of Trafalgar —
Indignation of the King of Prussia at the violation of his territory —
Battle of Austerlitz — Death of Pitt — The King offers the Treasury to
Lord Hawkesbury — Gives him the 'Wardenship of the Cinque Ports —
Resignation of the Ministry — Lord Grenville becomes First Lord of
the Treasury — Lord Hawkesbury as leader of the Opposition — Lord
Hawkesbury's speech on the admission of Lord EUenborough into
the Cabinet— Comparison of the two Ministers — Death of Fox — Lord
Hawkesbury's conduct to Lord Grenville's Ministry — Dissolution of
Parliament — Conduct of the Ministiy on the Catholic question — Duke
of Portland's letter to the King — Resignation of the Ministry ... 185
CHAPTER VII.
The King sends for Lord Hawkesbury — The Duke of Portland becomes
Prime Minister — Lord Hawkesbury the most prominent member of
the new Administration — Debate on the change — Lord Hawkesbury's
speech — Maiden speech of Lord Aberdeen — Dissolution of Parlia
ment — Treaty of Tilsit — The expedition to Denraark — The Orders in
Council, and dissatisfaction of the United States — Quarrels between
the Prince and Princess of Wales — Arrival of Louis XVIII. as Comte
de L'Isle in England — His letters to the King and Lord Hawkesbury
— Plans of the Portuguese royal family — Debate and speech of Lord
Hawkesbury on the Danish expedition — Seditious conspiracies in
• Ireland — Lord Hawkesbury's policy in Ireland — Proposal for a com
mutation of tithes in Ireland — Lord Grenville moves for a Committee
on the Catholic question — Arrangements in Scotland, and Lord
Hawkesbury's rules for the distribution of his patronage . . . 227
CHAPTER VIII.
Napoleon's invasion of the Peninsula — Sir A. 'Wellesley is sent to
Portugal — Commencement of the Peninsular 'War — Lord Grenville's
attack on our policy in engaging in that war — Death of the first Lord
Liverpool — Lord Liverpool's defence of the Ministry — Conduct of the
French princes — Lord Liverpool's memorandum on the 'Walcheren
expedition — Quarrel between Lord Castlereagh and Canning — Resig
nation of the Duke of Portland — Letter from Mr. Perceval — He
becomes Prime Minister — Lord Liverpool becomes Secretary of State
for 'War and the Colonies — He recommends the evacuation of 'Wal
cheren — Contest for the Chancellorship of Oxford — Lord Liverpool's
views as to the^maintenance of the Peninsular 'War, and his letter to
Lord WeUington  267

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IX.

Lord Liverpool's labours as Secretary for the Colonies— State of Canada
—Lord Liverpool's estimate of the difficulties of the Ministry, and of
Lord Wellington in Spain— Lord GrenviUe's censure of the conduct
of the war— Lord Liverpool's defence— His panegyric on the spirit of
the Portuguese and Spaniards— Lord Grey's motion on Pariiamentary
Reform— Lord Liverpool's speech— The recent Reform Bill— Opinion
of Castanos on the war— Difficulties of providing specie— The loss of
Ciudad Rodrigo— Irritabihty of Wellington— Letter of Lord Liverpool
to Wellington   309

CHAPTER X.
Illness of the King — Violence of the Opposition — Discussions on the
Regency — Characteristics of Lord Liverpool's eloquence — Lord
Holland's opposition — The Prince of Wales becomes Regent ... 338

CHAPTER XL
Mr. Perceval continues minister — Increased strength of the Ministry —
Expectations of the Spaniards — New measures respecting the militia —
A Committee of the House of Commons recommends a retum to cash
payments — Lord Liverpool predicts a war between Russia and France
— Birth of the King of Rome — Operations in Sicily and in India —
Debate on the Catholic question — Resignation of Lord Wellesley —
Expiration of restrictions on the Regency — Lord Castlereagh becomes
Foreign Secretary — The Regent's cordiality towards the ministeis — He
makes overtures to Lord Grenville and Lord Grey to join the Cabinet
— The Catholic question — Lord Liverpool's predictions of some of the
results of emancipation verified in 1868 — Murder of Mr. Perceval —
Negotiations for fresh ministerial arrangements — Mr. Stuart Wortley's
address to the Regent for a strong Ministry — Discussions in Pariia
ment on the negotiations — Lord Wellesley's proposals to Lord
Grenville — Negotiations with Lord Moira — The old Administration is
replaced under Lord Liverpool .... . ... 359

CHAPTER Xn.
Pecuhar qualifications of Lord Liverpool for the lead in the Government
— The Cathohc question is made an open question — The policy or
impohcy of such an arrangement — Debate on it — Negotiations with
Canning — The lead of the House of Commons — Lord Chatham in
1766— Labours which fell to Lord Castlereagh's share, and his per
formance of them— Mr. Peel is made Secretary for Ireland— Original
difficulties and eventual triumphs of the Liverpool Administration . . 396

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XIIL

PAGE

The United States declare war — The Orders in Council — The right of
search — Concihatory conduct of Mr. Perceval on this subject — Mr.
Brougham's motion on the subject — Toleration Bill — Lord Liverpool's
feelings towards Dissenters — Riots of the Luddites — Fresh proposals
of Napoleon for negotiation — Lord Liverpool's language on Napoleon's
title — The battle of Salamanca — The battle of Borodino — Lord
Liverpool's comments on the state of affairs — Shght influence of the
Government on elections — The new House of Commons favorable to
the ministers — Mr. Peel's view of the state of Ireland . . . 428

CHAPTER XIV.
Tranquillity of the session of 1813 — Fresh disputes of the Prince and
Princess of Wales — Advice of the Council to the Prince — Some of
the Opposition take up the cause of the Princess — Discussions on
the American war — Renewal of the East India Company's charter —
Establishment of the bishopric of Calcutta — Appearance of Warren
Hastings in the House of Commons — Opinions delivered by him and
Sir John Malcolm on India — The charter is renewed with slight modi
fications — The battle of Vittoria — Wellington's invasion of France . 45 1

CHAPTER XV.
Necessity for new arrangements cai^sed by the fall of Napoleon —
Unreasonableness of our allies — General confidence in the Govern
ment — The allies offer to treat — Stubbornness of Napoleon — The
Comte d'Artois crosses over to Holland — The Duke of Clarence is
present with the allies in the Netherlands — Opening of the Congress
at Chatillon — Character of Alexander — Ambitious views of Bemadotte
— Lord Liverpool's views on the end most desirable, and on the line
to be adopted by Ae r^egotiator's — Differences among the allies — Dis
solution of the Congress — Wellington takes Bordeaux — The citizens
at Bordeaux acknowledge Louis XVIII. — Lord Liverpool's letter to
Wellington — The ^rfnch Senate dethrone Napoleon — Elba is assigned
to him — Lord Liverpool's language respecting the peace — Moderation
of England — The Slave-trade — Erection of the kingdom of the
Netherlands  . . ' 476

THE LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION

LORD LIVERPOOL.

CHAPTER L
Importance of the period at which Lord Liverpool became minister —
Early history of his father — His care of his son's education — Mr.
Jenkinson at Oxford — His friendship with Canning and others —
He travels on the Continent — Opening of the French Revolution —
Mr. Jenkinson is returned for Appleby — His maiden speech — He
visits the allied armies on the Rhine — Letters to his father from
Coblentz — Proceedings of the French emigrants — Feelings of the
Austrians and Prussians — He supports the war with France — He
opposes Mr. Grey's motion for Reform — He becomes a member of
the India Board.
The statesman whose memoirs I have undertaken to
present to his countrymen, having been a Secretary of
State for above ten years, governed this nation as Prime
Minister for fifteen more. Since the time of Lord Burleigh
no one, except the second Pitt, ever enjoyed so long a
tenure of power; with the same exception, no one ever
held office at so critical a time ; for the period at which
he was suddenly called on to wield the supreme authority
-was that at which the most momentous and arduous war
in which Britain had ever been engaged was assuming new
features, through the brilliant successes of 'Wellington in
Spain, and the gigantic invasion of Russia by Napoleon ;
,, VOL. I. B

2 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1811
both events calling for increased and extended exertions,
differing in character and in the capacity which they
required, but similar in the vast influence which, if well
directed, they were calculated to exert on the present and
future fortunes, not only of this nation, but of the whole of
Christendom. Our own warlike triumphs imposed on us
the necessity of redoubling the efforts by which they had
been gained, and of so strengthening the resources of our
invincible general as to enable him to reap and secure the
full fruit of his great achievements. The fresh and insane
aggressions of the French Emperor, turning into enemies
those who had previously been the most enthusiastic and
firm of his friends, no less re-opened to us the field of
diplomatic labour to confirm them in their hostility to
him, and thus to regain them to our side, and to reinforce
them with others who were not only still his allies, and
were at that moment furnishing one division of his invad
ing army, but who were also bound to him by family
connexions of the closest kind, which, but a few months
before, had seemed, as he clearly intended and expected
them to prove, indissoluble.
Nor when the generals, lavishly but judiciously supported,
and the diplomatists, sagaciously directed and carrying
out their instructions with consummate ability, had brought
the war to a termination of glory unequalled even in
the proudest days of Edward or of Anne, were the toils
and anxieties of the minister at an end. The return of
peace, glorious as it was, only brought with it cares and
labours of a different kind, not less burthensome than those
of war, and at least equally involving the reputation of the
statesman and the welfare of the people. So protracted and
vital a struggle as that through which the nation had passed
could not be suddenly brought to a close without its cessa
tion producing a perilous reaction. It was necessary to
revise the whole financial system of the kingdom ; and a
return to old principles and methods, however indispensable,
could not be effected without causing a great shock to

i827] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 3
interests and habits which had grown up during the long
period of their interruption. There was therefore inevitably,
as is now generally admitted, severe distress ; the distress
was, by an equally inevitable consequence, the parent of
fierce discontent (bordering on sedition) ; which could only
be allayed by a judicious mixture of firmness and con
ciliation, guided by a sagacious appreciation of the existing
influences which swayed the popular feelings, and by a
penetrating foresight of the future requirements of the
country, in order, by a timely and progressive development
of its resources, gradually to heal the wounds inflicted on
it by a war of unexampled length ; and to place it in a
position to secure its full share of that general prosperity
'which the re-establishment of peace was sure eventually
to open to the whole world. During the twelve years
which followed the restoration of peace all these ends
were secured. After more than one most perilous crisis
distress was extinguished ; discontent was appeased. Our
financiers, aided by our diplomatists, were active and
successful in opening fresh channels for our commerce ;
and the beginning of 1827 saw the kingdom in the enjoy
ment of a degree of present prosperity and renown which
had never been surpassed, and resting with a well-
grounded confidence on the hopes of a steady augmen
tation of even that felicity.
The chief means by which these great objects were
accomplished I shall attempt to describe in the following
pages. And one other preliminary remark will not be out
of place, that the minister who advised them is, with his
colleagues, fully and solely entitled to the credit of all
those measures, and all their fruits. He, does not divide
it with his opponents, nor with any party but his own.
He is the very last minister who has been able fully to
carry out his own political views ; who has been so strong
that in matters of general policy the Opposition could
extort no concessions from him which were not sanctioned
by his own deliberate judgment; the very last who, in
B 2

4 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [i770
the strict sense of the word, can be said to have governed
England. On that most brilliant statesman who succeeded
him, death laid his hand too speedily to allow any of the
designs which he may have formed for the internal govern
ment of the kingdom to be developed ; and the measure
for which Wellington's administration is now chiefly re
membered was forced upon him by events, sorely against
his -will -and convictions. Similar compulsion exacted
Lord Grey's assent to many of the details of the Reform
Bill, -which he was as far from approving as from having
premeditated ; and the Reform Bill, to the carrying of
which he devoted all his energies, and on which he staked
all his reputation, however well judged and fortunate in
many respects its results may have been, has unquestion
ably had the effect, which the Duke of 'Wellington seems
to have been the only statesman who foresaw at the
time, of rendering the Government permaiiently and
incurably weak ; so that since his day there has been no
prime minister who has not found himself compelled to
consent to, and even at times to adopt and promote
measures inconsistent with his previous professions, adverse
to his notions of general policy, and condemned, or at
least dreaded, by his dehberate judgment.
ROBERT BANKS JENKINSON, the eldest son of the first
Earl of Liverpool, was born on the 7th of June, 1770. His
father was not yet a peer, but was steadily making his way
to that promotion. During the administration of Lord
Bute he had been that nobleman's private secretary, and,
in the political struggles which followed on the resignation
of the favourite earl, he became an active member of the
small party known as the King's friends. The Duke of
Grafton made him a Lord of the Admiralty, and in 177^'
under Lord North, he rose to the more important and
laborious office of Secretary at 'War, undertaking his new
duties at the very moment -when the refusal of the Ame
rican Congress to treat for peace on any other conditions

1784] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 5
but those of a formal recognition of the independence of
the United States rendered it certain that the war would
shortly assume a sterner character ; while the surrender of
Burgoyne in the preceding year had greatly strengthened
the opponents of the ministry in Parliament, by the proof
which it supplied that, at so great a distance from home,
it was difficult to follow up success, while defeat must
lead to further and more ignominious disaster. 'When,
three years afterwards, it was at length acknowledged
that any further prosecution of the attempt to subdue
the colonists was hopeless, no one attributed our failure
to any want of energy on Mr. Jenkinson's part, who had
been unwearied in his efforts to furnish the army with
reinforcements and supplies, and as successful in his exer
tions as the distance to which they were to be sent
permitted. But the duties of this office were not those
most to his taste ; matters connected with finance and
commerce were his favourite study ; and it was greatly
to his satisfaction that, on the dissolution of the Coalition
Ministry, Mr. Pitt proposed to him to join his government
as a member of the Board of Trade. In framing the
commercial treaty which shortly afterwards was concluded
between Great Britain and the United States, he was the
minister's principal assistant ; and with his own fondness
for those subjects, and with the enlightened and liberal
ideas upon them which he shared with Mr. Pitt, he early
imbued his son, who, in more than one of his latest
measures, showed that he had not forgotten his teaching.
In 1786 he was raised to the peerage as Baron Hawkes
bury, and ten years later he received the further promo
tion of the earldom of Liverpool ; the title of Hawkesbury
descending by courtesy to his heir, who was known by
it during the earlier part of his official life.
Proud of the position to which he had raised himself by
his political exertions and abilities, he from the first seems
to have destined his eldest son to a similar career, esti
mating with a parental, but not exaggerated, partiality

6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1784
the talents of which he flattered himself that he saw the
promise, and being led by the expectations which he thus
formed of him to urge upon him with especial earnestness
the necessity of cultivating his abilities by the most diligent
study. When his son was old enough for a public school,
he placed him at the Charterhouse, and a letter which is
preserved from him to the boy when he was but little
more than fourteen is creditable to both of them : to the
father from the soundness of the judgment with which he
suggests to him both the benefits of general application
and the particular branches of study which he recom
mends ; to the son, because the tone of the letter, the
manner in which the father explains his different recom
mendations, fortifying them by appeals to his son's reason
and filial affection, shows that he conceived him to be
already imbued with no little sobriety of mind and stea
diness of principle ; and, if he follows up his advice on
grave matters with admonitions almost equally earnest on
the general appearance and manners which he desires his
pupil to cultivate, none but the most pedantic critics will
think such topics beneath the notice of a judicious parent
Nor will any one deny that these precepts also produced
beneficial fruit, who considers the personal difficulties
which beset his son when prime minister, and which were
only overcome, as they only could have been overcome,,
by the unvarying exercise of the most perfect tact and
courtesy. Addiscombe Place, November 4th, 1784.
My DEAR Bob,
I send you the enclosed letter, which I received from Sir Banks
Jenkinson ^ a few days ago, as you will see by the latter part
of it how much we are all of us interested in your welfare ;
and I hope it will serve as an inducement to you to pursue your
' Sir Banks Jenkinson was the head of the family ; an old Gloucester
shire baronet, whom Mr. Jenkinson himself succeeded five years after
wards in the baronetcy, which now belongs to the present Sir George
Jenkinson.

1784] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 7
studies with great industry, as you will thereby secure to your
self the affection and support of every part of your family. You
are so far advanced in your Latin and Greek that I have no doubt
that by the time you leave the Charterhouse you will be pro
perly master of those two languages ; but I wish you at present
to pay great attention to your exercises, in which you are
not very forward, and I have on this head but one piece of
advice to give you, which is, that you should not be satisfied in
doing your exercises just so as to pass without censure, but
always aim at perfection ; and be assured that in doing so you
will by degrees approach to it. I hope also that you will avail
yourself of every leisure moment to apply yourself to algebra and
the mathematics : you will thereby attain not only a knowledge
of those sciences, but by an early acquaintance with them you
will acquire a habit of reasoning closely and correctly on every
subject, which will on all occasions be of infinite use to you.
The hours which are not employed in the manner before men
tioned you will give to the reading of history and books of
criticism, and here the knowledge you have of the French
language will furnish you with many excellent books. I would
wish you for the present not to read any novels, as they will
only waste your time, which you will find not more than suf
ficient for the pursuit of more useful and important studies.
'What I have just pointed out to you are the principal objects
you should have in view ; but believe me, in addition to all
these it will be necessary that you should pay proper attention
to your person. Every failing in this respect creates disgust,
or exposes a man to ridicule in such a manner as to defeat the
advantages he would otherwise derive from his parts and learn
ing, or other accomplishments of greater importance. You will
recollect the advice I have of late repeatedly given you on this
subject, and I am sure you will attend to it, for you are just at
the age when improper manners and tastes are acquired, which
will become habitual if they are not now corrected. My letter
is a long one : I am persuaded, however, that you will impute
all I have written to the affection I bear you. Believe me, that
the principal happiness I shall expect to enjoy in the decline
of life is that which I shall derive from your prosperity and
eminence. If I mistake not, there are others of our family

8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1786
who, like me, look forward with anxiety to the figure you will
hereafter make in the world, and feel themselves 'interested
in the character you will bear. It is my earnest wish and fimi
persuasion that we shall not be disappointed. Lady Cope and
your cousins desire their love to you. I am, with great troth,
dear Bob Your affectionate Father,
C. Jenkinson.
From the Charterhouse in 1786 he went to Christchurch,
where, as his letters to his father show, he was far from
considering himself emancipated from the necessity of
following the advice which had been given him two years
before. On the contrary, he was a hard worker, and
dwells with actual pleasure, and comments with shrewd
discernment, on the different characteristics of the great
classic writers ; especially of those whose works elucidate
the histories of the Greeks and Romans, and the ideas of
government and policy entertained by them. Livy seems
to have been his especial favourite, since he speaks of
taking it up " as a lounging book" as a relaxation from the
severer efforts required fully to appreciate the conflict
between Demosthenes and his rival ; though his warmest
encomiums of all are reserved for Plato, whose beauty of
expression he esteems so greatly, that to call the language
of any of his treatises "the language of Plato" is so to
exhaust eulogy "that nothing more can be said in praise
of it ;" while his philosophy he rates even more highly,
affirming, with an enthusiasm which requires some de
duction, that " his tenets are the same that were afterwards
maintained by our Saviour, and such as were perfectly
unknown both to the Jews and heathens." He was careful
also to adhere to that admonition of his father which
many would have found harder to follow than any which
inculcate study and industry, and to keep a watch over
and break himself of any bad habits into which he had
fallen, or to which he was inclined. In one of his Oxford
letters he writes : " Though I had contracted a habit of
disputing in company during the two or three first terms

1788] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 9
I was here, I have been long since convinced of the bad
effects arising from that habit, and I have prevented these
bad effects in the most particular manner by avoiding as
much as possible all mixed companies, and living princi
pally with a few particular people  My tutor has
frequently thought that I have been too much run away
with by general ideas, and that I do not weigh and con
sider a book sufficiently. This I endeavour to correct."
A youth who at eighteen was thus patient of admonition,
thus candid and even severe in his judgment of himself,
had already made some progress in fitting himself for an
official career. And how steadily he was already training
himself for political life is shown still more plainly by
others of his letters, in which he proves himself a careful
and shrewd observer of public affairs both at home and
abroad. He was, as might have been expected, a warm
partisan of the ministry ; though, on topics on which his
father disagreed with Pitt, naturally preferring him for his
guide. In one of his letters he ventures even " to lament
the madness and folly of which Mr. Pitt had been guilty,"
in supporting Wilberforce's measures for the abolition of
the slave-trade ; for his father was vehemently opposed
to the introduction of any new law on the subject, from a
belief that the trade was necessary for the welfare both' of
our West Indian colonies, and of our navigation trade at
home ; and he himself advocated the same view in one
of the earliest speeches he addressed to the House of
Commons. On this subject, however, the young politician
grew wiser as he grew older ; and, by the time that his
opinion had risen to be one of influence and authority,
the cause of freedom, so inseparably connected with the
glory of the British constitution, had no more resolute
advocate. The letter which has been quoted speaks of his living
principally with " a few particular people ;" and two of
those so • chosen by him now continued to be united to
him, both by the closest ties of personal regard and also of

IO LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1789
political connexion, to the end of his life. One was Lord
Granville Leveson, whom, on another occasion, he extols
to his father as " equally conspicuous for the soundness of
his understanding, the excellence of his heart, and, above
all, for an industry not usual with people of his situation;"
and to whom he himself, in after life, afforded an oppor
tunity of justifying his early partiality by his discretion as
our ambassador at Paris in more than one trying crisis.
For his admiration of the other, so far as his abilities were
concerned, he can find no language sufficiently powerful ;
the readiness of his scholarship, the acuteness of his
argumentative powers, and his ceaseless flow of high
spirits and love of fun, seem, by turns, to have struck
him as his peculiar characteristic ; if he could discover,
or suspect, any fault in this friend, it was when he fancied
him somewhat prone to sacrifice graver considerations to
the wish to point a jest more keenly, or to show his wit at
the expense of his associates. Once, in later years, when
he himself was a Secretary of State, with his early friend
for one of his colleagues, he looked upon himself as
having been most unprovokedly singled out for the butt
of his sarcastic depreciation, and, for a time, keenly re
sented the unfriendhness of the aspersions cast upon him.
But both men were of too generous a nature to mis
construe one another for any lengthened period ; for the
other was George Canning. Judicious friends reconciled
them ; they continued colleagues, and, in subsequent years,
Canning had no warmer admirer than Lord Liverpool of
his oratory, which all admitted to be unequalled among
his contemporaries ; nor had Lord Liverpool any coadjutor
who more constantly and gratefully proclaimed his sense
of the support and assistance which the Prime Minister
afforded to every member of his administration.
In the summer of 1789 Mr. Jenkinson left Oxford, spend
ing the remainder of that, and a greater portion of the next
three years, in travelling abroad. The chief object which
influenced his father in adopting this plan for him was, as

1789] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 11
we see from the correspondence of both, that he might
extend his general political knowledge by informing himself
on the spot of the characteristics and resources of the dif
ferent countries which he was to visit, and by cultivating an
acquaintance with their leading men. And he himself,
fully coinciding in this view, showed his further inclination
for work, by taking with him a small but well chosen
library, and, even among the fascinations of Florence and
Naples, finding time not only for an extensive study of the
language of the country, but for a reperusal of Blackstone's
Commentaries, and a renewed dalliance with the more grace
ful attractions of Virgil and Horace. His classical recollec
tions did not, however, lead him to share the enthusiasm
which his favourite poets expressed for the beauties of the
country in which they sang. On the contrary, he tells his
father that " with respect to the country nothing can be so
disagreeable as the country about Rome. If I had never
been in Holland, I should say it was the ugliest country I
ever beheld ; indeed it is difficult to believe that the Romans,
who had the whole world to choose out of, should have
continued long to reside in a country so unhealthy and so
disgusting.'' The unattractiveness of the country about
Rome, however, only made him the more keenly alive
to the change of scenery which was presented to his eyes
by the Neapolitan territory. That he describes as "the
most beautiful country I ever beheld ; the richest cultiva
tion, the greatest variety of hill and vale, the most striking
points of view ; here I should say Saturn must have resided
during the golden age," forgetting, apparently, that his
favourite Virgil assured him that the chosen abode of the
old deity was that very district' which he had just con-
' " Haec nemora indigenas Fauni Nymphasque tenebant,
Gensque viriim truncis et duro robore nata :
Quis neque mos neque cultus erat ; nee jungere tauros,
Aut componere opes norant, aut parcere parto :
Sed rami atque asper victu venatus alebat.
Primus ab setherio venit Saturnus Olympo,
Arma Jovis fugiens, et regnis exul ademtis. [Is

12 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1789
demned as unworthy of even the mortals who worshipped
him. In other respects he took him for his guide. "I
have travelled," he adds, " with ^neas through the grotto
of the Sybil and the lake of Avernus; I have passed
with him from Tartarus to Cocytus, and from Cocytus
to Elysium. I have drunk Falernian wine in the villa of
Hortensius, contemplating from the same spot the Temple
of Venus, the houses of Cicero and Caesar, and the reputed
(though falsely so) tomb of Agrippina. I have visited the
baths of Marius and the famous ruin of the Temple of
Jupiter. Virgil has been my constant companion; I have
found him not inferior in geography to poetry, and I shall
in a few days pay my homage at the tomb of the divine
poet, remembering with a grateful heart the luxurious
moments his verses have so lately afforded me.'' But, if
Saturn had civilized the inhabitants of Latium in the days
of old, he found that either that civilization had not extended
into the adjacent province, or that it was sadly worn out
Nothing can be more dreary than the picture which he draws
of the universal indolence and filth of the lower orders.
On these points, indeed, he only coincides with other
travellers, but I do not know that any traveller has given
so terrible an idea of the propensity of the Neapolitans to
the most atrocious crimes as is conveyed in the following
passage of a letter written after a month's sojourn in that
outwardly beautiful city : " Nothing is more common than
assassinations in Naples: the week does not pass without
your hearing of four or five, and in cases of murder little
redress is to be found. The judges are so poor that they
are mostly liable to be bribed, so that, if the criminal has
any money, he is almost sure of escaping. I was told by
a gentleman of some consideration in this place that it was
computed that the king lost in the town of Naples above
Is genus indocile ac dispersum montibus altis
Composuit, legesque dedit, Latiumque vocari
Maluit, his quoniam latuisset tutus in oris." JEn.vm. 314.

1789] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 13
4,000 subjects every year by assassination, and that murder
was considered as a crime much inferior to theft." Of the
higher classes his picture, if less formidable, is not much
more attractive. " Among the higher rank of people there
are very few that are worth knowing ; they are not only
ignorant, but in general they despise every kind of know
ledge. The women are gallant, without being, for the most
part, either amiable or pleasing."
In the autumn of 1789 he was in Paris just after the
Night of Dupes,^ as Maury called the fatal sitting of the
4th of August ; when the politicians and financiers of the
city were agitated by the consideration of Necker's new
income-tax of 25 per cent, and the loan of 30 millions
which he had demanded avowedly as a temporary expedient
to give him time to mature a scheme to place the whole
revenue of the State on a better footing. For this most
narrow-minded though well-meaning statesman was so im
bued with the idea of the superior importance of finance to
all other matters, that he believed that all the discontent of
the nation at large, and all the appetite for change which
was manifestly the dominant passion of the Assembly,
would be at once allayed if he could only point out a sure
mode for the extinction of the pecuniary embarrassments
of the kingdom. But Mr. Jenkinson's report to his father
of the feeling of that body, and of the citizens in general
on the subject, was not calculated to inspire him with much
confidence in the minister's success. He wrote that though
"the Assembly had accepted Necker's system of finance,
they had only done so, de confiance en M. Necker, without
the least deliberation on. any subject, meaning by that
phrase, if it should not succeed, to' throw the whole blame
upon him. I have conversed," he continues, " with a
variety of people on this plan, and I find all who under
stand the subject condemn it. It appears almost impossible
' In his speech on Lord Lansdowne's motion on the state of the
country, November 30th, i8ig, he mentions that he "was present at
the capture of the Bastile."

14 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1789
to conceive that the provinces will consent to part with so
considerable a portion of their income, particularly as the
payment is required in eighteen months. France is at pre
sent in such a situation that I can easily suppose that the
nobility and men of property would readily consent to pay
part of their fortune for the positive security of the rest.
But for the sacrifice they are to make, according to the plan
of M. Necker, a temporary relief only is to be procured, and,
for what they know, they may be in as bad a situation a
twelvemonth hence as they are at present. M. Necker says
in his discourse to the Assemblie, Lemprunt remplit
lentelnent. I heard it yesterday asserted with great con
fidence by a person who pretended to be informed, that if
M. Necker could not procure a certain sum, which he almost
despaired of, before the 8th of this month,i the bankruptcy
would be declared on that day. This fact I will not answer
for. There have been great confusions in Paris in the course
of the last week. On Monday night the milice bourgeoise,
attempting to interfere in the Palais Royal, were repelled.
How this matter will end it seems more and more difficult
every day to determine. The next fortnight is considered
as important, but so has been every fortnight since I have
been here.''
The information contained in the above extract was
closely verified by subsequent events. But what is most
remarkable in them, considering that the writer was only a
youth of nineteen, is the care which it displays in the
collection of important facts, and the sober-minded caution
in forming an opinion on them. And his judgment was
equally acute and correct on home politics ; for the next
year, on the removal of Mr. Grenville to the House of
Lords, he writes : " I was very much surprised at the
promotion of Mr. Grenville ; it was what never entered my
head, nor that of any other person's, I believe, except Mr,
Pitt's and his own, who, I am convinced, have long had
' The date of the letter is October ist. The attack on 'Versailles
was already fixed for October 5th.

179°] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

IS

the scheme of bringing the business of the House of Lords,
as well as that of the Commons, entirely into their own
hands." The conclusion to which his conjectures led him
is the very same that is expressed by Pitt's biographer ;
and which, as we learn by the same authority, was also
formed at the time by the experienced Duke of Richniond.i
Still more important, as a proof of the innateness of those
principles of unswerving integrity and honour which were
the especial characteristics of his own administration, are
the sentiments which, a month or two afterwards, he
expressed on the subject of his father's continuance in
office. Among the objections to Grenville's promotion
which the Diike of Richmond had urged to the Prime
Minister, one, and that not the weakest, was that "he did
not imagine that Lord Hawkesbury would feel much dis
posed to act under him," and it would seem that such a
feeling was actually entertained by Lord Hawkesbury him
self, and that, with a view to allay it, Pitt proposed some
other arrangement bearing the appearance of favour and
promotion, which, however, was never carried out. Lord
Hawkesbury related to his son the fact of the negotiation,
its nature, and his own disinclination to agree to the pro
posals made to him ; and the young man's reply is to the
last degree positive and uncompromising. "You know
I always thought you entitled to that favour, so much so
that I do not think you should accept it on any conditions
whatever. The quitting your present situation for the
office that I conclude they offered to you would have been
highly disgraceful, and I agree with you entirely in think
ing it would be better to resign altogether than to acquiesce
on such conditions. However agreeable the profits of office
may be, they never are to be sought at the price of reputa
tion and honour ; and I would rather not inherit a fortune
at all than inherit one which in the course of honour and
integrity I never could have succeeded to."
It was not in those days unusual .for persons to be
' Stanhope's Life of Pitt, ii. 73, jj.

i6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1791
returned by constituencies before they were of age to take
their seats in Parliament, though Fox is probably the only
instance of a minor venturing to take the oaths and raise
his voice in debate. And, in accordance with this certainly
unconstitutional practice, in the course of the year 1790 the
authority of Sir James Lowther over the borough of Appleby
(the same which had the honour of giving Pitt himself the
first opportunity of displaying his precocious genius to the
Parliament of his country) was exerted to procure the
election of Mr. Jenkinson. He was not, however, as im
patient to hear his own voice as the great Whig statesman
had shown himself ; on the contrary, he did not rise in the
House till he had been for above a year a member of
it, though it is no slight proof how great was the ex
pectation which was already formed of him that, on
the occasion of Mr. Whitbread moving a censure on the
Government on the question known as that of the Russian
armament,! Pitt selected him to open the debate on his
side. Nor was the minister deceived in his judgment of him.
In what, for a maiden speech, might have been called a
most ambitious if it had not been a most successful display,
the young orator justified the measures which had been
taken by an extensive survey of the condition of all the
principal nations of Europe. He was mistaken, indeed,
when, adopting the views of Burke, who had predicted that
the language of future historians would be Gallos quoque in '
bellis foruisse audivimus, he pronounced "the strength
and influence of France at an end, so that we had no
further danger to apprehend from that once formidable
rival." But he was only proclaiming, for the first time, the
conviction which since that day has often prompted our
' Russia had lately gone to war with Turkey, and had taken the
strong and important towns of Ismail and Oczakov ; and Pitt, unahle
by negotiation to procure favourable terms for Turkey, suddenly aug
mented the navy, and brought down a message from the King to the
House of Commons that this additional armament was caused by the
possibility of open resistance to the encroachments of Russia becoming
necessary.

I79i] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 17
.foreign policy, when he added that "a Power had succeeded
to F"rance no less deserving of attention from its restless
politics and ambitious views, namely, Russia ; of which the
conduct proved her deep-laid designs on the territories and
independence of her potent neighbours. Her plans of
conquest against the Turks are notorious. Were she to
accomplish them, the balance of Europe would be totally
destroyed, to the manifest injury of every state in this
quarter of the globe." He justified Turkey for having
begun the present contest by a reference to " the manner
in which Russia had made herself mistress of the Crimea,
to her intrigues in Egypt, and to the haughty and unjust
claims which she had put forth to some of the fairest
provinces of the Sultan's dominions ;" and reminded his
hearers that Britain had once already mediated successfully
between those who were now at war. When he proceeded
to point out that " the sovereign whose position would best
enable him to stem the torrent of Russian aggression was
the King of Prussia, and that therefore it was the highest
wisdom in our Government to draw closer the bonds of
alliance with that potentate," he was taking a line of argu
ment which must have been especially acceptable to Pitt,
as being an indirect approval of his own father's policy at
the time of the Seven Years' War. And though, as he
drew towards the conclusion of his speech, he ventured on
one more assertion which was falsified by the subsequent
triumphs of the French armies, " that the present era was
not calculated for invasion or conquests ;" he carried the
whole House with him when he affirmed that "Great
Britain was constitutionally the foe of all wars of ambition
and wanton aggression, and that a stable peace was equally
her interest and inclination."
Our Parliamentary annals have recorded no maiden
speech which made so great an impression. Pitt himself
began his own harangue by pronouncing it " not only a
more able first speech than had ever been heard from a
young member, but one so full of philosophy and science,
VOL. I. C

i8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1792
Strong and perspicuous language, and sound and convincing
arguments, that it would have done credit to the most
practised debater and most experienced statesman that
ever existed." And for the next two or three days his
father was almost overwhelmed with letters of congratu
lation from the most eminent personages in the kingdom:
from Dundas and Burke, who had themselves heard the
speech; from the Primate, Lord Dover, Lord Bathurst,
and other peers, who could only judge from the report
of others, but who bore their unanimous testimony to the
fact that they had never heard a maiden speech so univer
sally extolled as one of the very highest promise.
In the summer of 1792 he resumed his travels, this time
taking his course through the Netherlands towards the
Rhine, and transmitting to his father a great deal of infor
mation, which was both curious and valuable, respecting
the conduct and objects. of the French emigrants, and the
light in which they beheld the course of events in Paris.
It is impossible to exaggerate the folly or the mischief of
their behaviour. He reached Brussels in the middle of
July, just at the moment when the unhappy and bewil
dered Louis was venturing on the only act of his career
which, if known, would have justified his enemies in the
imputations of bad faith with which they were unceasingly
assailing him : putting himself in communication with the
sovereigns whose armies were known to be preparing for
an immediate invasion of his kingdom. It was of the
most vital consequence to his interests that such a step,
and also the existence in his breast of the feelings which
had prompted it, should be kept most carefully secret
Yet at that very moment the Baron de Breteuil,! who was
universally known to enjoy the king's perfect confidence,
had the inexcusable imprudence to declare "that he had
authority to say that the sentiments of the king and
queen had never varied, and that the king only waited
for the entrance of the [Prussian] army into France and
^ He had only just ceased to be Ministre de la Maison du Roi.

1792] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

19

a proper opportunity to declare himself in its favour."
The Duke of Brunswick, the Prussian commander-in-chief,
though he did not show himself skilful in the field,
seems, from Mr. Jenkinson's account, to have displayed
more address in his saloon. " He treated the emigrants on
every occasion with marked civility and attention, but at
the same time uniformly resisted whatever they proposed."
From Brussels Mr. Jenkinson proceeded to Coblentz,
which was at that moment the head-quarters of the main
body of the emigrants. The French princes themselves
'were there, and with them M. de Calonne, the minister
whose rashness had very mainly contributed to bring
affairs in Paris into their existing condition, but who never
theless was still the chief adviser of the king's brothers,
the Comte de Provence and the Comte d'Artois. It was
also the point of rendezvous for the Austrian and Prussian
armies, so that Mr. Jenkinson had an opportunity of gain
ing much information as to the condition of the German
armies, with the character and views of the German
leaders ; and one or two of his letters to his father, who
was his principal correspondent during his travels, are
worth preserving, from the light which they throw on
these points, and also because it is interesting to see the
manner in which the different occurrences as they took
place struck so acute and impartial an observer. It
is singular to find him approving of the tone of the
Duke of Brunswick's manifesto, which is believed to have
been issued by him against his own judgment, in com
pliance with the authoritative demands of the king and
emperor, and which dealt out threats such as neither the
law of nations nor the customs of war had ever been
supposed to ju.stify. But, on other points, while his infor
mation was accurate, his judgment was sound ; and his
estimate of the relative strength of the Austrian and
Prussian monarchies, in spite of the superior discipline
which the great Frederick had introduced into the Prussian
army, and which, a."? will be seen, he appreciated at its full
C 2

20 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1792
value, was abundantly verified by the long stand which
Austria made against the might and genius of Napoleon,
while Prussia was struck down in a single campaign. Nor
is the light unimportant which he throws on the progress
of affairs in Paris itself For nothing can show more
clearly the extent to which the wrong-headed perverseness
of the emigrants enhanced the difficulties of the unhappy
king, and tended to destroy the last chance of his escaping
from the evils which surrounded him.
_ _ Coblentz, July 22d, 1792.
Dear Father,
I arrived at this place the day before yesterday, and found no
difficulty in procuring a lodging. There are at present very
few French here, as they were most of them obliged to leave
the to-wn on the arrival of the Prussians. The Comt€ d'Artois
and M. de Calonne will return here to-day ; the King of
Prussia and the Duke of Brunswick are likewise expected from
Mayence, where they had an interview with the emperor.
The last regiment will arrive to-morrow. I have not yet seen
the camp, which is situated at about a league from this town,
but I propose riding there this evening. It is expected that
there will be a grand review of the army on the 27th, and that
on the 28th or 29th they will proceed to the frontier of France,^
Frora my last letter you will easily judge that there is no direct
communication between the King and Queen of France and
the emigrant princes. Their confidence is completely placed
in the Baron de Breteuil. The king was very much displeased
that the projects which he had formed were abandoned by the
emigrants. His wish was to separate the princes, that the
Comte d'Artois should go to Madrid, Monsieur to Turin, and
the Prince de Condd should remain in this country.^ This
system, as we know, is directly the reverse of what has been
^ The invasion took place on the 30th. (Alison, x. § 15.)
^ Louis's reason for this suggestion was to be found in the quarrels
which divided his brothers, who had established rival courts, with a
mistress at the head of each, who agitated the whole society of the
emigrants with their wranglings ; while Calonne was jealous of De
Breteuil, and did his best to disparage him to the German princes,

1792] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 21
pursued. There is a complaint that the money which had been
procured from the different courts of Europe has been extremely
misapplied. Russia, Prussia, and Spain contributed very con
siderable sums. The intention certainly was that the whole of the
money should be made use of for the support of the emigrants.
Instead of this, however, a great part of it has been employed,
by the advice of M. de Calonne, in an attempt to excite com
motions in some of the frontier towns of France 
It is not easy to conceive the sovereign contempt with which the
Prussians of every description, soldiers as well as officers, treat
the French. If they are satisfied that you are not a French
man, they behave to you with the greatest civility ; to convince
them of this, however, requires considerable pains. The
French army consists of about 16,000 men. In this number
there are about 500 soldiers; all the rest are officers. There
are several persons who have been taken up as emissaries
from the National Assembly ; one of them, whose name I
forget, offered his services to the Princes for the purpose of
raising a body of men. The offer was accepted, but it was
afterwards discovered that he had been employed by the clubs
of Paris to raise these very men to fight against the emigrants.
About fifty Frenchmen were sent away from Mayence a few
days ago on suspicion of being democrats,
I remain, dear Father,
Your affectionate Son, R. B. J.
Coblentz, July 25th, 1792.
Dear Father,
I send you enclosed a copy of the manifesto^ which the Duke of
Brunswick has thought fit to publish previous to the commence-
though he knew him to be Louis's authorised agent. (See " Louis XVI."
" Marie Antoinette," &c., the collection of letters lately published by
M. Feuillet de Conches, Nos. 299, 594.)
Louis's real wish, with which, indeed, his interest coincided, was that
his brothers should return to France, and he had lately written to
entreat them to do so ; but they refused, replying that he was writing
under coercion, and not expressing his real sentiments. (Ib. 593, 598,
603, &c.)
' It was dated on the 25th, the day on which this letter was written.

22 LIFE AND ADMINISTRA TION [1792
ment of the campaign, and wliich he pubhcly circulated in the
course of a day or two. Though I own it has been my opinion
that it would have been better to take no step of this kind, as
any manifesto must be in some degree a compromise, and as
any compromise under the present circumstances, when the
force is on their side, appears to me to be premature ; yet, if
it was determined to adopt a measure of this sort, a more
unobjectionable paper could not have been imagined. It is
moderate, and yet at the same time calculated to inspire terror.^
Indeed it is said that many of the emigrants consider it too
moderate.
The King of Prussia arrived on Sunday night, and this moming
reviewed the right wing of his camp. I was present at the
review, and I was surprised, as indeed every foreigner must be,
at the operations of the army. I had heard much of the dis
cipline of the Prussian troops, and of their coolness and com
posure even a few days before they know they are to be in
action. This therefore I could conceive : but the celerity and
precision with which all their movements are performed are
inconceivable to those who have not seen them. Every opera
tion they go through is mechanical. All other armies, for
instance, when music is played to them, are ordered to march
in time to that music. On the contrary, the Prussian soldiers
are obliged to march seventy-five steps in a minute, whatever
may be the time of the music. By this means their march
becomes a matter of exact calculation 
Dear Father, Your affectionate Son,
R. B. Jenkinson.
1 Among other things it declared that the inhabitants of towns,
boroughs, and villages who should dare to defend themselves against
his troops, should be punished on the spot, and their houses burnt and
demolished ; and that, if the least violence or outrage should be com
mitted on the King, Queen, or Royal family, and if provision were not
immediately made for their safety, preservation, and liberty, the Duke
would inflict a signal, rare, and memorable vengeance by delivering up
the city of Paris to military execution and total destruction. It is strange
that any degree of sympathy for the unhappy sovereigns, who were
now little better than prisoners in Paris, could have led an English
gentleman to regard these threats as moderate.

1792] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 23

Coblentz, July 26th, 1792.
Dear Father,
have at length had an opportunity of fully gratifying my curiosity
with the sight of the Prussian army. I should be at a loss to
decide whether this great body was most deserving of attention
from the choice of the individuals who compose it, from the
discipline and subordination that reign in every part of it, or
from the celerity and precision with which every military opera
tion is performed. It is a subject of astonishment even to
those most versed in military affairs that, after a march of nearly
seven weeks, the different regiments that have arrived here,
instead of being exhausted and fatigued, appear in the fullest
vigour and spirits, and in every respect prepared for the labours
of the campaign. I have had an opportunity of conversing
with several military men on the comparative state of this army
with that of the Austrians, and I find it universally agreed that
(except for the light troops) the Prussian army is indubitably
the superior. One reflection, however, necessarily occurs on
this subject. The population of the King of Prussia's dominions
is so small (scarcely exceeding five millions) that if, from any
relaxation of discipline or any unforeseen accident, his army
should decline, it would require such exertions to re-establish
it as under a prince of moderate capacity could scarcely be
expected ; and Prussia, from being the first military Power in
Europe, would in that case be reduced at best to the state of a
secondary Power. The population of the dominions of the
House of Austria is, on the contrary, so extensive, and the
people in much the greater part of these dominions are so
calculated by nature to form excellent soldiers, that, though
the Austrian army may be inferior at one period to what it has
proved itself at others, there is little danger of any considerable
alteration for the worse in that army ; and, if any such altera
tion should take place, so great are the resources of the
country that it might easily be re-estabhshed. The artillery
of the Prussian army is moderate. It is, I believe, however,
better than the Austrian. The French artillery was, before the
Revolution in that country, without comparison the best in
Europe. Since that period the greater part of the engineers

24 LIFE AND ADMINISTRA TION [1792
have quitted France, and most of them are now in this neigh
bourhood. At present, therefore, the preference is given to the
Prussian artillery.
I dined yesterday vrith the Duke of Brunswick. I found him
particularly civil, and not uncommunicative ; but, from the con
versation I had Avith him, I could easily judge how impossible
it would be to push him on any subject on which he was
desirous of remaining silent. You will have seen by the copy
of the manifesto which I have sent you that he disclaims, in
the names of the Eraperor and King of Prassia, all idea of
disraembering France. His conversation with rae was to the
same purport, and he added that it was the determination of
those sovereigns to receive nothing in compensation for the
expense they would be obliged to incur. This conduct must
be admitted by all pardes to reflect the greatest honour on
these two courts. In the course of the conversation I ridiculed
the idea of the Jacobins debauching the French army with
assignats of fifty sous. In reply to this he gave a most enter
taining account of a Prussian army. As to assignats, he said,
he coramanded men who were too stupid to comprehend how
it was possible that paper should have a value annexed to it ;
and as to women, he would defy all the beauty in the world to
make any impression on Prussian soldiers. He concluded with
observing, Ik sont grandes betes, mais pourtant ils savent bim
leur affaire. I endeavoured to sound hira on the affairs of
Poland, but I could get no opinion from him on that subject
His silence, however, may be considered as a confirmation of
what has been generally believed in this place, that that unfor
tunate country is devoted to destmction.^ The King of Prassia
is here with his two sons. The Prince Royal is well-informed,
modest, and uncommonly well-disposed. His appearance, how-
1 Stanislaus Augustus, the King of Poland, had just granted a new
Constitution to his subjects, preserving the elective disposition of the
crown, but combining with that principle a regulation which confined
the election to the Royal family. The arrangement, according to
Lacretelle, excited anew the jealousy of Catherine of Russia, and by a
treaty concluded between her, the Emperor, and the King of Prussia
at Pilnitz, a fresh partition of Poland was arranged, which was finally
accomplished when in the autumn of 1794 Suvarof captured 'Warsaw,
and made prisoners of Kosciusko and of Stanislaus himself.

1792] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 25
ever, is rather against him. Prince Louis, the second son, has
the advantage of an agreeable person in addition to all the
good qualities of his brother  I can perceive that the
Prussians are excessively dissatisfied with the conduct of Great
Britain respecting Russia. I have done all in my power to
convince them that, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, it was impossible for our Government to have acted in
any other manner ; but to persons who live under an arbitrary
government, who are unacquainted with the variety of interests
that must be consulted in a government constituted like ours,
all the reasoning that can be used is unintelligible.
The agreement between the Emperor and the King of Prussia,
that no volunteers should be accepted, has been most rigidly
adhered to.'- Prince Henry was very desirous of serving the
campaign, but was refused. He is so incensed at the conduct
of the King of Prussia, that he is determined to have no
further concern with military affairs. The hereditary Prince
of Orange has likewise been refused, and several of the
generals of the army have not been permitted to take their
sons as aides-de-camp. My dear Father,
Your affectionate Son,
R. B. Jenkinson.
.„ Coblentz, August 8th, 1792.
Dear Father,
I quitted this place the day after writing my last letter, and set
out for Mayence. From Mayence I went to Manheim. I found
the Austrians had passed the Rhine. I determined, however,
to follow them, and, understanding that they had marched
towards Spires, I immediately set out for that place. I found
them encamped not far from Spires, and discovered, from one
. of their officers, that they were to quit their camp at 1 2 o'clock
that night, and march to the frontier. I left Spires between
10 and II o'clock, and went to a village at the distance of
about a league from it; and I had there the satisfaction of
1 In a former letter he had told his father, " The French, whose
empressement you are well acquainted with, made several propositions
to him (the Duke of Brunswick) ; and among others, that they might
be allowed to serve in the Avant-Garde of the army. To this request
a very polite refusal was all they met with."

26 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1792
seeing five-and-twenty thousand Austrians within twelve miles
of the frontier, marching under the command of Prince
Hohenlohe. I never saw a more striking scene. They ap
peared elated with joy at the thoughts of attacking the French
the next morning  The Austrian army is apparently
very inferior to the Prussian. One of the striking features of
the Prussian army is, that amongst several thousand men you
will scarcely see one who is inferior to the rest, with such
extraordinary care are they chosen. I cannot say as much of
the Austrian array ; sorae of the troops are beautiful, but there
is a great difference distinguishable in every part of the army.
The Austrians hate the French at least as much as the
Prussians. I happened to say to one of their officers, " You ex
pect sorae of the French to join you in a few days?" His answer
was, "Nous n'en avons pas besoin, nous ferons bien notre
affaire sans eux." It is singular that the Powers of Germany
should be so particularly active in support of the aristocrats,
when, so far as I can judge, this is the country which had the
least to dread from the propagation of the new doctrines.
I have found in every place where I have been the most
marked contempt for French of all descriptions, both aristocrats
and democrats.
There exists the greatest animosity between the Austrian and
Prussian army. It is scarcely possible to conceive how they
hate each other. I have taken particular pains to ascertain
this fact, and you may depend upon the truth of it. I under
stand that the King of Prussia's expedition is very unpopular
in his own country ; the wish of his subjects was to assist the
Poles against the Emperor of Russia. It has been reported
here, but I will not answer for the tmth of it, that the Poles
are so offended with the conduct of the King of Prussia, who,
they say, has deceived them, that they are determined to throw
themselves, without any further resistance, into the arms of
Russia. Dear Father, Your affectionate Son, R. B. J.
Mr. Jenkinson had, as we have seen, accepted with
implicit and indeed unavoidable belief the Duke of

1792] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 27
Brunswick's assurances of the disinterested spirit which
prompted the German sovereigns to exert themselves for the
relief of their distressed brother the King of France. But
he had scarcely left Coblentz on his way back to England
when he found that he had been deceived ; and he was
forced to give his father a very different account of their
intentions : Bruxelles, August 23d, 1792.
Dear Father,
.... You will remember that, in a letter which I wrote to you
from Coblentz, I irfformed you that, from the tenor of the
Duke of Brunswick's conversation to me, I was led to sup
pose that the Court of Berlin, in their interference in the
affairs of France, had not only renounced every idea of con
quest and aggrandizement, but that it was their determination
not to accept of even a pecuniary compensation. This was
the tenor of the Duke of Brunswick's conversation to me and
to several of the persons at Coblentz. Since my arrival at
this place, however, I have come to the truth of the trans
action. A correspondence has passed on this subject between
the Comte de Schulemberg and the Baron de Breteuil. The
Comte de Schulemberg, in a letter to the Baron de Breteuil,
informed him that his master the King of Prussia would
expect to be reimbursed. The Baron de Breteuil, in his
answer, requested a particular explanation of the term " re
imbursed." To this it was replied that all the King of
Prussia desired was that the extraordinary expenses of the
campaign might be defrayed : but that his master expected
some declaration from the King of France on that subject.
The Baron de Breteuil then declared that, possessing full powers
from the King, he could promise a complete reimbursement of all
the expenses of the campaign, and that, if this were not sufficient,
he would engage to procure a declaration to this purport in the
King's handwriting. This answer of the baron's was considered
as satisfactory.
It will most probably appear extraordinary to you that the
Austrians should never have commenced their operations till
the entrance of the Prussians into France was fully ascer
tained. The mystery of the whole business is now, however.

28 LIFE AND ADMINISTRA TION [1792
unravelled. The Austrians were determined from the begin
ning to engage the Prussians as principals in the war. The
intrigues that were employed to accomplish this object would
be too numerous to state at present. One of their projects
is, if possible, to drain Prussia of her treasure. A campaign
of this kind is certainly not to be considered as a campaign
in Silesia, where the greatest part of the money expended
would return again into the coffers of the Government If
Prussia is fully reimbursed, according to the promise that
has been made, the projects of Austria will be defeated; but
it is impossible to place any certain reliance on a promise
made under the present circumstances, which perhaps it may
not even be in the power of the parties to fulfil. The account
that I gave you in a former letter of the animosity subsisting
between the Austrians and Prussians I have found confirmed
in every place I have passed through. An account was re
ceived last night of the capture of Longwy by the Prussians.
It is said that, on the entrance of the emigrant army into
France, Monsieur is to be declared Regent of the country.'
A report has been circulated to-day of a quarrel having arisen
between Monsieur and the Comte d'Artois 
Dear Father,
Your affectionate Son,
R. B. Jenkinson.
You will, of course, be cautious of disclosing the contents of
my letters from this place.
Four days later he writes in high praise of the judicious
and conciliatory conduct of the Duke, giving also a plan of
the operations of the invaders, which, as in the beginning
it was very accurately carried out, shows how correct was
his information : Bruxelles, August 27th.
My dear Father,
. . . The plan of the operations of the different arraies is
supposed to be arranged in the following manner. M. de
1 He actually did assume this title of Regent, and in that character
issued commands to the emigrants, accompanied with threats if they
should disobey them, which amounted to a complete ignoring of his
brother's rights as actual king.

1792] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 29
Clairfait, after having taken Longwy, was to proceed to
attack Monmedi ; the Prince Hohenlohe was to attack Thion
ville, and the Duke of Brunswick was to march on the 27th
towards Verdun, and, after having taken that place, was to
proceed with all possible expedition to Paris. The conduct
of the king and the Duke of Brunswick since their entrance
into France has been particularly well judged. They have
released all the National Guards, on pretence that, not being
taken under arms, they did not come within the meaning of
the manifesto. They have done all in their power to concihate
them, and, to all appearance, with complete effect. The
king, however, has at the same time declared that, if he
should find any of them either dressed in the national uni
form or with the national cockade,^ he shall immediately
make an example of them. The Prussian army on its first
entrance into the country was disposed to plunder, and to
behave with the greatest severity towards the inhabitants.
Several villages had suffered considerably from the enormities
which had been exercised. The King of Prussia went him
self into the villages, gave the people money as a compen
sation for their sufferings, and ordered two of his soldiers
who were principally concerned in these atrocities to be
executed. If he continues to pursue this line of conduct,
behaving with gentleness to those who are willing to submit,
and with severity to those who are disposed to resist, the
success of his operations will be extremely facilitated. You
probably know that the Baron de Breteuil received an invita
tion from the Duke of Brunswick some time ago to come to
him. I was in company with the baron last night, and it
was his intention to set out this day 
Dear Father,
Your affectionate Son,
R. B. Jenkinson.
It is evident that the habit which the writer had thus
acquired in his foreign travels, of procuring correct infor
mation by his own personal inquiries, and of balancing
' Perhaps this was the ground on which he detained Lafayette as a
prisoner.

3° LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1792
different reports, sifting them, and carefully reflecting and
commenting on those which he adopted as correct, was
good training for a politician, and especially for one who
would form a correct notion of the views and modes of
acting of foreign statesmen. And it was, therefore, cal
culated to be of special use to Mr. Jenkinson in the first
important office which he was called upon to fill.
The course which he took in the next session of Par
liament showed that the general result of his travels had
been to imbue him with a strong tincture of the feelings
with which, as he had reported, the Austrians and Prus
sians regarded the French. Parliament met on the 13th
of December, 1792 ; and when Fox moved an amendment
to the address, recommending the employment of "every
species of honourable negotiation" in order to save the
nation from embarking in a war with France, Mr. Jen
kinson took a prominent part in opposing it, advocating
immediate war in the plainest terms, on the ground that
a comparison of our financial position with that of France
proved us to be in a position to attack her at greater
advantage than at any recent period: and deprecating
with indignation the proposal to send an ambassador to
the French Republic at the very moment when " the band
of sanguinary ruffians " who were in the exercise of the
chief authority in that country were bringing their king
to trial, and sentencing him to death, and perhaps already
murdering him.^ He reiterated these opinions in the
great debate which took place in February, when, after
the death of the unhappy Louis, Fox renewed his efforts
to avert war, on the grounds that " the complaints which
had been stated against the French Government were not
of a nature to justify war in the first instance, without
our first attempting to obtain redress by negotiation;
' This speech was delivered December 15th. Louis had been
brought before the Convention on the i ith ; but after a day or two of
discussion the hearing of his counsel was postponed to the 26th. He
was put to death January 21st, 1793.

1793] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 31
that in the negotiations which had taken place the minis
ters had not taken the proper measures to obtain redress
without a rupture ; and that it was not for the honour
nor for the interest of Great Britain to make war upon
France on account of the internal circumstances of that
country." And in May, on a motion made by Mr. Grey
in favour of Parliamentary Reform, he made the raost
elaborate speech which he had as yet delivered, defending
the existing composition of the House of Commons on
general principles, as maintaining that variety among the
representatives of the people that was indispensable to
secure a proper advocacy of all the varied interests of
the nation. He affirmed that it worked well, fully an
swering the end for which it had been originally designed ;
and while he admitted that the House of Commons,
which he described as " the democratic part of the con
stitution," ought to be in a certain degree affected by
public opinion, yet he reminded his hearers that " its
first quality was that of a deliberative assembly, and that,
if public opinion was necessarily to affect its decisions
on every occasion, it would cease to be a deliberative
assembly, and the members would soon be degraded
into the position of mere delegates." Mr. Grey had
asserted that the national debt had originated from the
corruption of the House. Mr. Jenkinson replied (and
even in the vehemence of the debates which took place
on the subject after his death, the correctness of his
assertion was admitted by many of the chief Reformers)
that this was so far from being the case that the wars
which had caused the origin and increase of the debt,
the Spanish War, the Seven Years' War, the American
War, had all been agreeable to public opinion; that
the Spanish War in particular had been "entered upon
in compliance with the express requisition of the people,
and contrary to the avowed opinion of the Government
of the day." He insisted that the present administration
had not the confidence of the House of Commons more

32 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1793
completely than it had also the confidence of the people
at large ; and that, in short, constituted as the House
already was, public opinion had its due weight in the
deliberations of Parliament on every important question.
Of these two questions, the war with France and the
advisableness or danger of Parliamentary Reform, the
first continued for more than twenty years to be the chief
care and labour of every cabinet ; the second, though not
entirely allowed to slumber during the war, only began to
assume formidable proportions during the last years of his
own administration. On the first he so far modified his
opinions as, when the establishment of a settled govern
ment in France had in a great degree removed the danger
to be apprehended from the spread of revolutionary prin
ciples, to make himself a party to the conclusion of peace,
to which indeed, as we shall presently see, he had been
willing to consent some years earlier. On the second he
never materially altered his sentiments, but adhered to the
last to the opinion which he had now expressed, though, as
will be seen hereafter, he was not unwilling in cases of cor
ruption to substitute some other borough for that whose guilt
in that respect had been proved. On both points his feel
ings were in entire conformity with those of the Govern
ment ; and he had already so completely gained the ear of
the House, and established his reputation as a speaker and
debater of the first class, that Pitt became anxious to enlist
him in the administration, and offered him a seat at the
India Board, which he accepted, and thus began that
official career which, except during the few months of
Whig Government which ensued on the death of the
Great Minister, he never relinquished.
^ See the debates on the disfranchisement of Grampound in 1824,
infra, chap. 28.

1794] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

33

CHAPTER IL
He recommends a march upon Paris— His father is made Earl of
Liverpool — He (now Lord Hawkesbury) is serving with his regiment
of militia in Scotland — His view of the progress of the war in
Germany and of our own position — Approves o£ the negotiations
for peace — Pitt's faihng health in 1798 — Seditious associations in
England — Irish Rebellion and Union — Lord Hawkesbury's dis
satisfaction with our campaign in Holland — The Catholic ques
tion — Scruples of George III.— Pitt's resignation— Character of
Mr. Addington — Lord Plawkesbury becomes Foreign .Secretary-
Derangement of the King — Negotiations for peace — Lord Corn
wallis is sent to Amiens — His interview with the First Consul —
Conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens — Lord Hawkesbury's speech
on it.
During the next few years Mr. Jenkinson took no very
prominent part in Parliament. He had become Colonel of
the Kentish Militia, and, as the employment of a large
portion of our regular army on the Continent threw a good
deal of garrison duty on that force, he was but little in
London. He came up for some of the debates in which
the Opposition from time to time renewed their remon
strances against the further prosecution of the war, and
in these he took a prominent part, adhering to the views
which he had before expressed ; in one instance provoking
the ridicule of Sheridan and his followers by the expression
of an opinion that the soundest military policy would be to
strike at the heart of the enemy, and march upon Paris
itself Even now it may be questioned whether such an
enterprise would have been beyond the means of the
allies ; the ablest soldiers look upon it as certain that two
years earlier it would not have been so, and that the Duke
VOL. I. D

34 LIFE AND ADMINISTRA TION [1796
of Brunswick would have found no force able to resist him
if he had pressed on without hesitation after his first
successes on the frontier, and the capture of Longwy and
Verdun. But whether practicable or not in 1794, when
Mr. Jenkinson advanced the suggestion, it was too bold a
step for the contemplation of the somewhat pedantic
commanders of the allied army ; and, as the balance of
success soon began to incline to the side of the French, it
never was possible after 179S till it was adopted in the last
campaign of the war.
It is a mistake in young speakers to put themselves
forward too frequently ; and it may have been partly
the very rarity of his speeches which was gradually but
steadily raising his reputation in the House, and teaching
him to feel himself of some importance to his colleagues.
Lord Hawkesbury had- been very averse to Pitt's measure
of admitting American ships into the ports of our West
Indian Islands, and Mr. Jenkinson urged him strongly to
let his opinion be generally known, since he was deeply
"pledged to the public on that subject; if his father should
in consequence resolve on quitting the Government, he
had," he said, " made up his mind to resign also," but, he
added, " he did not think that Pitt would dare to part with
them." And, even should he do so, he himself should
think any loss of office " a slighter evil than a sacrifice of
opinion on such a subject." There proved, however, to be
no necessity for so strong a step as a resignation of their
offices. Pitt, who was unrivalled in his management of
refractory or discontented colleagues whenever he thought
them worth propitiating, succeeded in entirely appeasing
any dissatisfaction the father may have felt, and in 1796
the agreement of both father and son with his policy on
all important subjects was shown by the promotion of the
first to the Earldom of Liverpool, and of the second, now
become Lord Hawkesbury, to the more lucrative office of
Master of the Mint, which, many years before, his father
had filled under Lord North.

1 796] OF L ORD LI VERPO OL.

35

In the autumn of 1796 the Kentish Militia were
quartered at Dumfries, and one of Lord Hawkesbury's
letters from that town presents a not very attractive picture
of the Scotch fashions of that day, though nothing could
exceed the intended friendliness of their reception of the
regiment. Their invitations to dinner were as numerous as
the days of the week, but, he adds, " the style of living here
is rather gross, though very hospitable. The servants are
few, and very dirty ; but there is a great quantity of meat
put upon the table, and after dinner the bottle passes rather
quicker than I like." From the same letter (its date is
August 28) we learn that Pitt was already thinking of peace ;
in Lord Liverpool's opinion he was beginning to be dispi
rited at the results of the war. The news of the defeat
of the Austrians at Lonato had just reached England ;
Moreau had crossed the Rhine, and was pressing forward
towards Vienna, and it was not yet known how successful a
stand the Archduke Charles was making on the Maine.
Still Lord Hawkesbury himself " saw no cause, even under
those circumstances, for dejection. We are still," he
continues, " fortunate enough to possess the empire of the
sea, and the commerce of the world ; and, if that can be
preserved, I do not even now despair of the issue of the
contest." Any appearance of discouragement, " he was
convinced, would procrastinate peace rather than hasten
it." From this manly spirit he never swerved, but in later
years, even when the French successes seemed most
unalloyed and their progress most irresistible, when
Alexander had become the humble servant of Napoleon,
and his brother emperor, Francis of Austria, had even
given a daughter to his arms, he was as resolute an
advocate for continuing the struggle, and as hopeful of
ultimate victory, as when, while the Revolution was still in
its agony, he had recommended a march upon Paris.
Nevertheless he was now, with Pitt, willing to make peace,
if it could be procured on terms as honourable and advan
tageous as Great Britain had a right to expect. But, if the
D 2

36 LIBE AND ADMINISTRATION [1798
country were, as some indications seemed to show, " deter
mined for peace on any terms," he was clear that "Mr.
Pitt should risk his Government on the question, and not
allow himself to be the instrument of carrying on measures
which he disapproved." He drew, with sound discrimina
tion, the line at which a minister may without self-abase
ment consent to guide his conduct by the judgment or
momentary bias of the nation. On questions of inferior
magnitude it may " be very well for a minister to give up
his private opinion to the opinion of the public, but on
questions of this nature a man should stand or fall by his
own judgment. If this is not the case, how," he asks,
" can we ever expect the Government to be carried on
upon any one system of action ? We shall be liable at every
moment to be tossed about in consequence of the caprices
of a few foolish, weak-minded people."
With these feelings he approved of the attempts made
by Pitt both in 1796 and 1798 to terminate the war. And
when Lord Malmesbury's diplomatic address was foiled
by the insincerity and arrogance of the different French
Governments, he cordially supported and spoke with great
effect in defence of the minister's financial measures, espe
cially of the suspension of cash payments, and the bill for
the sale of the land-tax, which some of its opponents, with
a singularly perverse ingenuity, did not forbear to charac
terise, firstly as an " atrocious fraud," and secondly as a
measure wholly unconstitutional, since its object was to
perpetuate a standing army. " As if a standing army had
not been kept on foot for above a century, or as if any
danger to the liberties ofthe nation had ever arisen from it
In every debate in which the Opposition ventured to go
to a division they were beaten by large majorities; but
already the long continuance and violence of the parlia
mentary conflict was beginning to tell upon Pitt's constitu
tion. Lord Hawkesbury's letters of the autumn of 1798
are full of expressions of alarm at his manifestly failing
strength ; and, though he expresses a hope that perhaps a

1799] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

37

fit of the gout might relieve him, he, evidently speaking
from the information of Pitt's medical adviser, intimates a
fear that the disease may be more deeply seated. The
attention of Parliament during this and the following year
was occupied more by our domestic affairs than by the
progress of the war. As far as we were concerned, it had
ceased to have that kind of interest that arises from
suspense and anxiety. We had withdrawn our army from
the Continent, and by sea Lord Howe, Lord St. Vincent,
Lord Duncan, and Lord Nelson, had so completely
established our supremacy that it was acknowledged even
by the French themselves, who took care to risk no general
action after the destruction of their finest fleet at the mouth
of the Nile. But at home our affairs were in a position
that could not be regarded without the most painful
uneasiness. In England seditious societies and seditious
publications were more rife and more audacious than ever,
and were producing a dangerous spirit of disaffection among
the lower classes. A year or two before, the carriage of
the king himself was pelted in the streets, and fired at as
he went to open Parliament ; and this year a regularly
organized rebellion broke out in Ireland, which the French
endeavoured to support by an invasion of that country.
The rebels were routed, the whole force of the invaders
was captured, and the peril in which the whole kingdom
had been placed pointed out to Pitt the indispensable
necessity of uniting Ireland with Great Britain by a
measure similar to that which at the beginning of the
century had been passed with regard to Scotland. It is
unnecessary in this place to describe how warmly it was
opposed, or by what energetic and varied ability it was
at last carried. It was an achievement of itself sufficient
to immortalize the name of the minister who accomplished
it ; yet it led, as will presently be seen, to his retirement
from office, and opened a wider field than might otherwise
have presented itself for some time to the abilities of the
subject of this narrative.

38 LIFE AND ADMINISTRA TION [1799
Lord Hawkesbury at that moment was not altogether
satisfied with his leader. The same year, 1799, had beheld
the dispatch of a fresh British army to Holland, under the
Duke of York, to co-operate with a Russian force ; the
object of the combined army being to quell the revolu
tionary party in that country, and to re-establish the
Stadtholder in his ancient authority. The naval part of
the expedition, for the British army was accompanied
by an adequate fleet, succeeded completely; the Dutch
sailors, who were for the most part partisans of the old
Government, mutinied in our favour, and their Admiral,
Story, had no alternative but to surrender his whole fleet,
which Lord Duncan carried off to England, But the army
was less fortunate. The British soldiers, indeed, displayed
their usual indomitable valour, and on one occasion
repulsed the French General Vandamme with heavy loss ;
but the Russians, when they arrived, were less successful.
In the first general battle which took place after their
junction with our forces, their division was repulsed with
heavy loss, and its defeat compelled our regiments also to
retreat. Another action was attended with nearly the same
result ; and at last the Duke of York, finding that his
utmost efforts could only enable him to hold his ground
against his present enemies, and that heavy reinforcements
were on the point of joining them from France, while he
himself had no further succour to expect, concluded a con
vention with the French general, by which he agreed to
evacuate the country. Lord Hawkesbury, as will be seen
from the following extracts from his letters, was disposed
to be extremely indignant, and to blame not the general
who had failed, but the minister who had planned or
sanctioned the expedition ; and that not because it had
failed, but because, according to the information which
he could collect, it was impossible that it should have
succeeded. Thus he writes :

1799] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 39
October 17th, 1799.
Dear Father,
.... I have for some time looked to the expedition as not
likely to be ultimately successful, though I did not think its
termination would take place so soon. The day before I left
London, I met Colonel Twiss. . . . He told me he looked
upon the expedition as impracticable, if the French were able
to collect a tolerable army in the country : that, in the last
century, the Spaniards, with the best troops in Europe, had con
tended for nearly forty years for this very country, and were
uniformly baffled in their attempts to get possession of it ; that
they were successful in the countries which now compose
Belgium and French Flanders, but that they were unable to
make any impression on Holland. He regretted that the best
appointed British army^ that ever was collected should be
employed on a service so little likely to be profitable to the
country. I have heard that the Dutch who are here are of the
same opinion with respect to the part of the country where the
attack was made ; and that even Abercromby did not very
much like the expedition. I agree with you that our Govern
ment is completely disgraced ; for what can be more disgraceful
to a minister than to fail in an expedition, when your troops
have been uniformly victorious, in consequence of the impracti
cability of the country which you have chosen for your scene
of action. The consequence of it all has been, that we have
ruined the Orange cause, perhaps for ever ; that we have given
confidence to the French, and that we have already sacrificed
about 15,000" British and Prussian troops. If, however, success
would have led us to embark on a continental war, as principals,
to the extent you mention, I am inclined to think it is very
fortunate we never reached Amsterdam.
The next week he writes in something of the same
spirit, or indeed blaming the arrangements of the ministers
rather more, in proportion as the latest information received
led him to be less severe on the general. " If the account
' It did not, however, exceed 18,000 or 19,000 men,
2 This proved to be a great exaggeration.

40 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1799
in the papers of last night is true, the Duke of York's
convention is rather less disgraceful than was at first
imagined. I agree with you, however, that the whole
business is in the greatest degree discreditable. I am
curious to know on whom the public principally throw the
blame. The Duke of York is certainly not a fortunate nor
a popular commander. Will he ever be trusted again with
the command of a large army ? "
This last question events prevented the necessity of ever
answering. Before England again sent forth an army of
any magnitude to the Continent an employment had
been found for the Duke, for which it was soon seen that
nature had most admirably qualified him. And though
his repeated failures in Holland render it probable that he
would never have become a skilful general in the field, as
Commander-in-Chief of the whole army at the Horse Guards
he displayed a great capacity for organization, united with
an industry and energy which earned for him an honorable
fame and unsurpassed popularity in that office. But at the
moment we learn from another letter that the Cabinet itself
was divided in opinion on the subject: November 12th.
Dear Father,
.... I am not surprised that there should exist some difference
of opinion among your brethren on the late events ; yet their
mutual interest will probably keep them together. The friends
of the .Duke of York will, I have no doubt, make a common
cause of the whole business ; and Pitt (whatever his private
feelings may be) will certainly support them. I have seen
several officers who have come from Holland within these few
days, and I can perceive that there is a difference of opinion
in the army respecting the Duke's conduct. Some blame him,
others very strongly defend him. Most of the Guards are warm
in his praise. The officers I have seen speak highly of Aber-
crombyi and Dundas,^ and likewise of Moore ;^ but, though
^ Sir R. Abercromby, who fell at Alexandria.
^ Sir David Dundas, who in 1809 became Commander-in-Chief.
' Afterwards Sir John Moore, who fell at Corunna.

1799] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 41
the other general officers showed great courage, they give them
very little credit for knowledge of their profession. They all
agree in abusing the Dutch, who, they say, behaved as ill as
possible, and showed the most decided partiality to the French.
It is singular that for the first time, I believe, since the German
war, a sort of intercourse was kept up between our officers and
the French officers at the advanced posts of the two armies.
Some of the F'rench officers sent a present to ours of two
sheep, with orange ribbons in their ears.
The point which remains unexplained is the Duke of York's
convention.! It is agreed on all hands that the retreat of our
army might have been secured by inundating the country.
When Nelson was sent to Teneriffe, and the object was found
unattainable, in consequence of the unexpected force of the
Spaniards, he sent word to the governor that he would burn
the town, and cut his way through their army to his ships, if he
was not suffered to re-embark unmolested. This had the desired
effect. If he had been at the Helder, I have no doubt that,
instead of purchasing a disgraceful capitulation, he would have
made the French and Dutch restore him a proportion of
English and Russian prisoners as the price of his not destroy
ing the country. But all commanders are not Nelsons : would
they were !
It has been mentioned that Pitt's success in carrying the
Irish union, all-important as the measure was to the best
interests of both England and Ireland, proved the cause of
his retirement from office, which was never more honor
ably relinquished. He had not conceived it possible that
that measure should singly prove a panacea for the mani
fold evils which impeded the tranquillity and prosperity
of Ireland. In his eyes it was but a preliminary to
' On the 6th of October the Duke gained a decided advantage over
the French under Brune in the neighbourhood of Haarlem. But feel
ing the necessity of reinforcements and supplies, and the small proba
bihty that existed of obtaining them from any quarter before the end
of the next week, he concluded a convention by which he agreed to
evacuate Holland before the end of November, and to restore his
prisoners. As he had still 20,000 men under his command, sUch a step
certainly appears whoUy inexcusable.

42 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1799
other enactments, among which those stood foremost which
should deprive the Roman Catholics, then, as now, by far
the more numerous portion of the population, of what was
at least a plausible ground of complaint, by removing the
political disabilities under which they laboured, and by also
extinguishing, or at least abating, their discontent at the
Protestant Church Establishment through a State endow
ment of the Roman Catholic clergy. It is quite certain
that at that time, and for many years afterwards, both
measures would have been received with unanimous gra
titude by the professors of the Roman Catholic religion
throughout the whole island. Unhappily, the first was
postponed till it lost all its gracefulness through the circum
stances under which it was carried, circumstances which
gave it the appearance of being extorted from the fears
of England rather than cheerfully conceded by a sense of
justice ; while the resolution which, on the only occasion on
which the second was ever deliberately submitted to the
judgment of the House of Commons, that body by a large
majority recorded in its favour, even its advocates never
attempted to ratify by any formal enactment.^ But for this
postponement Pitt was in no degree to be blamed. The
justice and reasonableness of both measures was in his
eyes undeniable. It was notorious that the disabilities of
the Roman Catholics had been imposed on them not from
religious, but from political reasons ; because those who
held their doctrines were also desirous of replacing their^
co-religionists, the princes of the House of Stuart, on the
throne; and now that that race was practically extinct,"
and the House of Brunswick had no rival claimants of its
authority, it seemed reasonable that the disabilities should.
not survive the circumstances which had caused their
imposition. The equity, as well as the policy, of endowing the
Roman Catholic priesthood in Ireland seemed to the
' See infra, chap. xxix.
"^ The Cardinal York was the only descendant of James II. stilliving.

1799] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 43
minister to be equally maintainable by the soundest argu
ment. The Reformation in Ireland, if what had taken
place in that country could be called a reformation at all,
had been wholly different from the movement which had
almost extinguished Popery in England. The bulk of the
nation had never ceased to adhere to the Romish forms,
and the Reformation there had been simply a transfer of
the property of the Church to the Protestants, unaccom
panied by any corresponding change of belief in the people.
The wealthier classes had in most instances gradually
gone over to the dominant religion ; and the Scotch and
English settlers, who at different times had obtained grants
or made purchases in the different provinces, and especially
in Ulster, were all Protestants of one denomination or
another. So that the Roman Catholic priests, whom the
transfer of the Church property had reduced to a depen
dence on their flocks for support, drew their maintenance
chiefly from the poorest class in the island, the tenant-
farmers, agricultural labourers, and the tradesmen of the
small towns. It is needless to dilate on the evils to which
such a state of things must inevitably lead. They had
been painfully experienced in the rebellion which had just
been put down ; and in all his negotiations with the leaders
of the Roman Catholic party, which resulted in the most
influential members of that body supporting the Union,
the minister had taken care that his inchnation to follow
up thaf measure by others for the relief of the Roman
Catholics should be clearly seen. If positive assurances
of his intention were withheld, it was only because it was
thought that the meditated concessions would be more
efficacious in conciliating and tranquillising those who were
to be affected by them if they appeared to flow from a
spontaneous liberality of policy, than if they were granted
only as the fulfilment of a stipulated condition.^ More
1 See a letter from Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Pitt (Castlereagh Cor
respondence, iv. 8), and a paper drawn up by Lord Castlereagh on
Mr. Pitt's retirement from office (Ib. p. 34).

44 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1799
than one of Mr. Pitt's speeches on the details connected
with the Union gave, and was meant to give, an indication
of his views and intentions ; and, when the Union had
become the law of the land, he felt that, without being
guilty of some breach of faith, he could not delay to press
forward the other parts of his scheme which he had thus
allowed the Roman Catholics to see that he contemplated.
He was from the first aware that he should find diffi
culties in carrying the measures that he desired ; that
some of his colleagues were averse to them, and that
the king himself entertained, or at least had entertained,
scruples as to the propriety of his consenting to them.
This last difficulty, however, he had a right to conceive
to be not insuperable ; for he was aware that a year or
two before George III. had consulted the Chief Justice,
Lord Kenyon, and the Attorney-General, Sir John Scott, on
the subject, putting his perplexities before them in the form
of a legal question, whether he were not absolutely pre
cluded by the terms of the Coronation Oath from consenting
to any relaxation of the laws affecting the Roman Catholics.
Both of these great lawyers were, as politicians, strongly
averse to any relaxation, but they combined a sound
knowledge of their profession with uncompromising hon
esty, and unhesitatingly replied to the sovereign that his
oath did not forbid, and never could have been intended
to forbid, his giving his royal sanction to any law approved
and passed by Parliament. Indeed, a knowledge of law
was hardly required to establish that proposition ; for,
unless that principle were admitted, it would follow that
the Parliament which framed the Coronation Oath must
have had power to bind the whole Legislature for ever
on one point ; and, if on one, on all on which it desired
to bind it Pitt, therefore, might naturally have thought,
and probably did think, that the assurances of two men
of such eminence in their profession, for both of whom
George III. had a personal esteem and regard, must have
diminished, if not have removed, the king's reluctance

1799] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 45
to adopt such measures as his Government might deem
necessary for the welfare of the State, and for the pre
servation of their own honour. But unfortunately another
lawyer, Lord Loughborough, the Chancellor, had since
that time found an opportunity of discussing the matter
with his Majesty. He was a native of Scotland, in which
country feelings of animosity towards the Roman Catho
lics have always been particularly vehement ; and as he,
therefore, entertained the same opinions on the subject
of the disabilities as the king, he easily convinced him,
who was willing to be convinced, of the soundness of
his former scruples ; and, when he found that Pitt was
occupied in framing a measure of concession, he deter
mined to baffle him, hoping to secure from the royal
gratitude his own continuance in office in the event,
which he foresaw to be probable, of a general change in
the administration. Both Pitt and he had learnt the
best method of carrying a point with the king. To
gain the royal consent the minister would have proceeded
cautiously and gently, giving his Majesty abundant leisure
to contemplate the question in all its bearings, and secur
ing for himself time, by repeated discussions of details,
gradually to soften and overcome his objections. To
secure his dissent, the Chancellor knew the best way to
be to take him by surprise, and hurry him into a de
cision. Accordingly, before Pitt had mentioned the sub
ject to the king at all. Lord Loughborough showed him
a letter which he himself had just received from Pitt,
written in confidence as to a member of the Cabinet ;
and, skilfully adapting his law to the royal prejudices,
easily persuaded the king to prefer his exposition of
the law to that of Kenyon and Scott, and to believe
that he could not, without perjury, sanction a single con
cession of any kind to the Roman Catholics. The king
became greatly agitated. Nearly four months had still
to elapse before the meeting of Parliament when Lough
borough first disclosed to him the policy which was under

46 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1799
consideration, so that he had time to brood over it from
one point of view exclusively. He could talk of nothing
else ; he discussed the matter with his wife and daughters,
with his equerries, and even with casual strangers; he
would read over his Coronation Oath, and declare with
vehemence that no power could absolve him from the due
observance of every sentence of it, and that, if he should
violate it, he should from that moment cease to be a
lawful king. His crown, he said, would pass to the
House of Savoy. And, as the opening of Parliament
drew nearer, his anxiety grew so uncontrollable that he
could no longer wait for Pitt to broach the subject to
him, but opened it himself at a levee, putting a direct
question on the subject to Mr. Dundas, the President of
the Board of Control, and declaring that he should reckon
any one who proposed any relief of the Roman Catholics
his personal enemy. Dundas contented himself with
assuring his Majesty that he would find many people
favorable to such a policy who, he was well aware,
were not his enemies ; but so public a declaration of the
king's views had rendered any further delay on Pitt's
part impossible, and accordingly he at once wrote to
the king, giving an outline of the concessions which he
thought desirable, of their object, and their character.
The details of the bill by which they were to be carried
out he had not yet been able to mature. But he laid be
fore his Majesty arguments to prove the intended measure
to be as safe as it was necessary with a perspicuity and
brevity absolutely unparalleled in State papers ; and, while
abstaining from pressing his royal master for any im
mediate decision, expressed his conviction that, if the
repugnance which the king had already expressed were
insurmountable, it would be better that he himself should
retire from office. It was insurmountable. The king
offered indeed to content himself with Pitt's waiving the
question for the future during the remainder of his reign;
but when he found that the minister looked on a retention

'fOl 1799] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 47
of office, if purchased by such a silence, as incompatible
with his public duty, he acquiesced in his decision, and
accepted his resignation.
No minister had ever fallen so gloriously. It was not
easy to replace him, though Pitt magnanimously did
everything in his power to facilitate the new arrangements.
The royal choice fell on the Speaker, Mr. Addington, whom
the king had for some time admitted to a degree of inti
macy and political confidence, and whom, indeed, before
he received Pitt's letter, he had employed to dissuade the
minister from formally making the proposal of which he
had been warned. It was a singular selection, for Mr.
Addington had no official experience. Though he had
been extremely intimate with Pitt from his first entrance
into Parliament, his friend had evidently not considered his
talents such as would add strength to his ministry. And
though, as Speaker at a time when party spirit gave rise to
some scenes of unusual violence, he had raised his reputa
tion by the tact and temper with which he had maintained
the dignity of the House and the Chair, yet the qualifica
tions for that office were very different from those required
of him who was to preside over the councils of the country
at a most critical period ; when it was not only engaged in
a war of almost unprecedented magnitude, but when the
very circumstances under which the new minister, whoever
he might be, was to take office, increased the disarrange
ment of affairs, and added one more element of discussion
to those which already divided the different parties in the
State. As there was to be no change in any part of the
policy that had hitherto been pursued, Pitt exerted himself
with his colleagues to persuade them to retain their offices,
pressing on them earnestly that they were in no respect
bound to follow him in his resignation, and even in some
instances making it a matter of personal favour to himself
that they should not do so. Those who had not been
friendly to the intended concessions naturally saw no reason
why they should retire, and among them was Lord Hawkes-

48 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1800
bury, who, however, does not appear as yet to have
considered the question as one of any great importance.
He willingly consented to remain under Addington, and, in
the redistribution of offices which necessarily took place,
became a Cabinet minister, by a change which was deci
dedly for the benefit of the public service. The seals of
the Foreign Office had hitherto been held by Lord Gren
ville, a cousin of Pitt, but a man of more industry than
natural talent, of a style of oratory in which positiveness
and assertion were unusually more conspicuous than power
of argument, of unbounded vanity, of immoveable obstinacy,
and of a most unconciliatory and arrogant demeanour, which
he took no pains to soften even towards the king himself
They were now transferred to Lord Hawkesbury, and the
peace which followed almost immediately was the direct
fruit of the change in the department.
The changes, indeed, which had been arranged were
not immediately completed, and for a moment there
appeared a possibility that they might be avoided. The
agitation into which the whole transaction had thrown
George III. had brought back that derangement of intellect
from which he had before suffered, and which, on this occa
sion, was accompanied with greater danger to his life also
than had previously been the case. When he began to
recover he enjoined his physician to tell Pitt that he alone
was the cause of his illness ; and Pitt, greatly shocked, and
assured by Dr. Willis that it was of the most vital conse
quence to tranquillise the king's mind on a matter which
he identified with the preservation of the Church of
England, authorised the doctor to assure him that, whether
in or out of office, he could never revive the question. It
subsequently appeared that the same knowledge of the
impossibility of changing the king's mind on the subject,
and of mooting it at all without imperilling his understand
ing, and perhaps his life, led Fox, when invested with the
same responsibility of office, to form the same resolution.
And many of Pitt's adherents and personal friends, deeply

i8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 49
feeling how immeasurable was the distance between his
capacity and that of Addington, and how indispensable it
was, now that France was under the government of Buona
parte, that England also should have the ablest possible
guidance, pressed upon Pitt the propriety of recalling his
resignation. But, though he would probably have been
willing to consent to do so if invited, he felt that the pro
posal could not with decency come from himself And
on the 17th of March, 1801, the new appointments were
gazetted ; the only one, besides that of Lord Hawkesbury,
that could be looked on as an improvement relating to the
Great Seal, which, to the dismay of Lord Loughborough,
who must have wished he could recall his act of treachery
to his chief, and to the great amusement of every one else,
was taken from him and delivered to the Chief Justice of
Common Pleas, Lord Eldon.^
The negotiations for peace which were at once com
menced rendered Lord Hawkesbury's department the most
important in the whole administration. It is not impossible
that Pitt himself may have had some share in placing him
in it. For of all the new appointments it was the one of
which he pronounced the most marked approval in one of
the debates which necessarily arose on the subject of the
recent changes. He challenged those who would depreciate
the new ministry to point out a single member superior to
Lord Hawkesbury. "The transcendent talents" of Fox
he admitted indeed " to make him an exception to almost
any rule in everything which required uncommon powers.
But with that exception he knew no one superior to his
noble friend in capacity for business." And that capacity
for business was at once tested in the most arduous manner.
Addington had never taken an active part in politics, and
with finance he was especially unacquainted, though he had
succeeded Pitt as Chancellor of the Exchequer as well as
at the head of the Treasury. It was plain, even to himself,
that the only chance which he could have of discharging
^ Previously Sir John Scott, Attorney-General.
VOL. I. E

50 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1800
his new duties with credit lay in terminating the war ; and
though Buonaparte had succeeded in forming the combina
tion known as the Northern Confederacy to resist our inter
pretation of the maritime law of Europe, it was believed that
he too was desirous of peace.^ The chance, indeed, of the
Northern Confederacy long continuing to support his views
was more than problematical, since a fleet with Nelson on
board had already sailed for the Baltic, and there could be
little doubt of the issue of any action in which he was to
take a principal part. But the confident anticipation of
success in that expedition, which was reasonably entertained,
did not make any change in the eagerness of the new
administration for peace ; and accordingly, only four days
after he had entered on office. Lord Hawkesbury was
directed to intimate to the French Government " the dis
position of his Majesty to enter into immediate negotia
tions." Pitt had entertained the same idea in the previous
year ; and, intending once more to entrust the discussion of
terms to Lord Malmesbury, had submitted his plan to the
Cabinet, and had embodied the conditions on which he hoped
to conclude a treaty in the following Cabinet minute :
Sketch of a Plan of Peace settled at the Cabinet in 1800.
I. That the possession of the Cape, Ceylon, and Cochin, is to be
invariably insisted on as the sine qua non condition of any
treaty of peace, and that no modification is to be listened to on
this subject, nor any condition inconsistent with it to be even
made matter of negotiation.
2. That whatever places are restored to France or Holland on
the Continent of India are to be held as commercial factories
only, exercising power of internal jurisdiction, but so as not to
interfere with the general government of the British posses
sions, nor to be in any case nor under any pretence fortified.
3. That a free commerce to the British possessions in India
may be granted by treaty both to France and Holland, together
' The note conveying this intimation, dated March 21st, 1801, was
sent through M. Otto, at that time in England as Commissioner for
French prisoners.

i8oo] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 51
with such particular regulations about saltpetre and other
articles, as upon discussion shall be found just and practicable.
4. That all the other conquests made by this country may be
made matter of negotiation, and that, subject to the following
instructions, the restitution of such part of them may be stipu
lated for as shall be fairly compensated by the advantages to
result to this country from the Continental peace.
With this view it is to be observed that there are but two points in
which such compensation can be made to England. These are —
I. The evacuation of Egypt, should the French army not have
quitted that country either in consequence of the treaty signed
by General Kleber, or of the attacks now meditated by the
Turkish forces.
2. Such an arrangement of affairs in Holland and the Nether
lands as may rescue those countries from their present depend
ence on France, and afford to Europe some security for their
future independence.
In return for these points, and in proportion as they shall be
more or less satisfactorily arranged, we are enabled to treat
respecting the following objects, which comprise the whole of
what we have conquered during the war, except what is
specified in the first article of this paper.
We have taken from France, — Martinique, Ste. Lucie, Tobago,
Goree, St Pierre, and Miquelon, and the French factories in
the East Indies.
From Spain, — Minorca and Trinidad.
From Holland (besides what is above mentioned), — Surinam,
Berbice, Demerary, Essequibo, and the Spice Islands.
The extent of our cessions out of this list is to depend, as already
stated, on what we obtain on the two points above mentioned.
With respect to Egypt, the evacuation is all we have to ask, and
we are bound by the treaty of defensive alhance with Turkey
not to make peace without it.
With respect to Holland, it does not appear probable that any
sacrifice we could make would induce France to restore the
Stadtholder, and to place the government decidedly in his
hands ; nor would even that arrangement be secure or per
manent unless the independence of the Netherlands were
satisfactorily provided for.
• E 2

52 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1800
On the other hand, France can have no attachment to the actual
Directory or Constitution in Holland.
Some middle line raay therefore easily be found in this respect,
the real value of which will depend on the nature of the
arrangement respecting the Netherlands.
Four different arrangements raay possibly come in question in
this respect, supposing France to abandon the claim of retain
ing these provinces.
These are the following, stated in the order of preference as
they affect our interests :
I. The connecting the settiement of the Netherlands with the
exchange of Bavaria, or giving those provinces to the Elector,
in addition to as considerable a portion of German territory
as can be secured for hira in any general arrangement on
that subject that may take place.
2. The giving them to the Grand Duke of Tuscany in exchange
for that country, which might either be given to Austria, or
made by other arrangements the means of making a satisfactory
settlement of affairs in Italy.
3. The giving them to some less considerable prince, to hold
as a separate sovereignty under the guaranty of the Great
Powers, and possibly as annexed to the Germanic body.
4. The forming them into a separate and independent repubhc,
under a government formed as nearly as possible on the grounds
of their ancient constitution.
These are the different objects to be aimed at, and in this
order.
With respect to our conquests, we consider the restoration of
the Spice Islands and of the two settlements of Demerary and
Surinam to Holland as the least disadvantageous of all the
cessions we may have to make ; and, although those possessions
are of immense value and importance to Holland, yet the
king's Governraent does not think that, in consenting to their
restitution, even as the price only of the evacuation of Egypt
(but certainly if, with that, we obtain only the fourth of the
arrangements respecting the Netherlands), any considerable
sacrifice of the interests of this country would be made.
The negotiation raay more probably turn on the comparative
value of the arrangements to be made respecting our other

l8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 53
conquests, and respecting the Netherlands according to one
of the three first plans above mentioned.
If Martinique and Ste. Lucie can both be retained in the West
Indies, and Minorca in Europe, and Trinidad, Tobago, the
small Newfoundland Islands, and Goree, with the Indian
factories, restored in return for the third plan, this would be
considered as a very advantageous peace to England.
If we obtain either of the two former, we might consent to
substitute Trinidad and Tobago for Martinique and Ste. Lucie,
or we might ultimately accept one of these three islands
(considering, however, Tobago always as necessarily annexed
to Trinidad if we retain that island) together with Minorca, if
by so doing we can secure the first of the plans respecting the
Netherlands, or any other arrangement of those provinces
equally satisfactory to us with that.
In all other points our negotiator is to second the views of
Austria, and he is to stipulate for peace for Naples and
Portugal on the status ante bellum, no conquests having been
made by France from them.'^
Pitt's desire for peace was not diminished by his own
change of position. He at once communicated the minute
to Addington, and it served as a guide to the new Cabinet
in the proposals they made and in the concessions to
which they consented. The French Government, or, it
may save trouble to say, Buonaparte the First Consul (for
the other two consuls were from the first mere cyphers,
meant in some degree to disguise from the French for a
time the fact of their subjection to a single master), em
powered M. Otto to conduct the preliminary discussions,
and throughout the summer a brisk correspondence passed
between him and the British Secretary of State. But the
very first step taken by the French was calculated to
raise a suspicion of their insincerity. Otto proposed an
armistice, evidently with the hope that it might be in time
' The precise date of this document does not appear ; but the fact
that Malta is not mentioned in it proves the time at which it was
drawn up to be anterior to September 15th, 1800, when that island
was surrendered to Nelson's squadron.

54 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1801
to save the allies of France in the Baltic from the attack of
our fleet. The request came too late, for it was subse
quently learnt that on the 2d of April, the very day on
which it was made, Nelson had annihilated the Danish
defences at Copenhagen. But Lord Hawkesbury could
not forget the treacherous use which the First Consul had
made of the armistice into which he cajoled the Austrian
commander in the middle of the battle of Rivoli,^ and
declined falling into a similar snare. On particular subjects
M. Otto admitted that he was waiting for precise instruc
tions, but the two plenipotentiaries began at once to discuss
the general principles of the intended treaty, and the
Frenchman explained that " the point on which the nego
tiation would be likely to turn would be Egypt, and the
question for discussion would be whether France should
relinquish Egypt, Great Britain relinquishing the whole or
some part of her conquests, or whether France should
retain Egypt, Great Britain preserving her conquests. M.
Otto also stated that he was authorized to assure Lord
Hawkesbury, in consequence of what had passed at their
former interview, that the British Government could not be
more hostile to the principles of Jacobinism than the
First Consul" ^
' A part of the French army was defeated, and the whole was sur
rounded, with its retreat completely cut off, when Buonaparte sent a
flag of truce to Alvinzi, requesting an armistige for half an hour, as he
had some propositions to make in consequence of the sudden arrival
of a courier with fresh despatches from Paris. There was no such
courier ; but, as Alvinzi was weak enough to suspend his operations
for the time required, Buonaparte employed it to extricate his troops
from their difficulties, and to prepare an attack which proved fatal to
his dupe and the Austrian army. (Alison, xx. § 144.)
^ The passage within inverted commas is taken from a minute of a
conversation between Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto, held April 2d
The minute exists in the Liverpool Papers. And whenever a passage
is given in a similar manner (unless some particular statement respect
ing it is made), it is a quotation from some document preserved among
those Papers.
Buonaparte was sincere in his denunciations of Jacobinism, believing
that all the plots against his life, of which more than one had been

i8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 55
The retention of Egypt by the French, as well as
the permanence of the Northern Confederacy, had in
fact been already decided by events, though the news
detected, originated with the Jacobin party, till Fouchd convinced him
that the infernal machine conspiracy had been concocted by some of
the Royalists. But George III. had no idea that Jacobinism could be
extinguished except by means which Buonaparte was not inclined to
employ. I subjoin a brief but characteristic note written by him to
Lord Hawkesbury a day or two after the murder of the Czar Paul had
become known : — "Kew, 1st May, 1801, 50m. p.m.
" I am infinitely pleased with Lord Hawkesbury's attention in so
speedily transmitting the despatch from Lord Carysfort, which con
firms the good news from Egypt transmitted yesterday. I am anxious
to hear from Russia as to the line of conduct embraced by the new
emperor with regard to the royal cause in France ; for I own I think
there is no destruction of Jacobinism unless royalty is re-established
in that country, though I may have my doubts as to the person who
may best answer that purpose. " GEORGE R." •
I may add, since both in Lord Malmesbury's diary and in that of
Mr. Rose the king is represented as speaking slightingly of Lord
Hawkesbury's talents for business, &c. (though Mr. Rose admits that
on this point his Majesty subsequently changed his opinion), that
though no man was less in the habit of paying compliments than the
king, unless he fully meant what he said, his early letters to Lord
Hawkesbury are full of expressions of the warmest approval. On the
29th of April he writes to him, " I have signed the two warrants he
(Lord Liverpool) forwarded through my excellent Northern Secretary
of State," using the same form of description to which he had been
accustomed in the earlier part of his reign, before the duties of the
two chief secretaries were defined as they were afterwards. And a
few days later his sentiments are still more unmistakeable, when he
writes ; "Kew, May 9th, 1801, 20m. p. 7 A.M.
" The King is extremely pleased with the information he has received
from Lord Hawkesbury of the intention of sending Count Bernstoff
to settle the differences between this Court and that of Denmark ; the
more so as it cannot but place in the most advantageous light to the
public the conduct of the new administration, and more particularly
of Lord Hawkesbury, as he will have the treating with the Count, who
is a very warm man, and it will require the good temper of the Northern
Secretary of State to keep him in bounds. And it would seem that a
little stiffness and restraint is more likely to end the business with
credit than at first too much , appearance of desire of ending the
business. " George R."

S6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1801
had not yet reached Europe. On the 21st of March
Sir Ralph Abercromby had given Menou, who, on the
murder of Kleber, had succeeded that general as com
mander-in-chief of the army which Buonaparte had left
behind him, a decisive defeat at Alexandria ; and the only
real question with regard to France and Egypt was whether
the relics of the French army should be permitted to return
home with their arms in their hands, or should be detained
by the English general as prisoners of war Two months
before the preliminaries were signed, Menou himself con
fessed this to be the state of affairs, and was glad by any
sacrifice to purchase the permission of his conquerors to
rejoin his old commander as a free man. The French
occupation, therefore, of Egypt soon ceased to furnish a topic
for discussion; but it is probable, though the news of
Abercromby's victory had not yet reached England, that
Buonaparte had heard of it when, on the i6th of April, he
ordered Otto to interrupt the negotiation, with a state
ment that the instigators of the attempt, which in the
previous December had been made to assassinate him,
were living in England, and in the pay of the English
Government. He avowed his conviction that the English
ministry was incapable of having hired or encouraged the
assassins, but by a declaration that, if such an attempt had
been made in London and instigated by men who were
seeking shelter in Paris, he should at once arrest them, and
deliver them up to the British Government, he evidently
indicated a demand that the English minister would sur
render those whom he named. It was plain that, even while
disavowing any idea of imputing the least complicity in the
plot to the British Government, the First Consul did in fact
insinuate it ; and Lord Hawkesbury in his reply showed
that he felt such to be his intention, and reproved it with
"the warmest indignation." But, at the same time, after
reminding M. Otto that no proof beyond his mere assertion
had been furnished that any one implicated in any attempt
on the First Consul's life was to be found in England, he

i8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 57
did not shrink from avowing his willingness, if proof suffi
cient to fix any one residing in this country with the guilt
of such a crime should be afforded, to take the strongest
steps which our laws could permit to bring the criminals to
punishment. But it would seem that Buonaparte's sole design in
instructing Otto to make this complaint was to create a
sort of diversion. Delay was his real object, that he might
have time to try whether the events of the summer would
place him in a more favourable position for treating. He
was ostentatiously parading preparations for an invasion of
England, though it may be doubtful whether he as yet
ever seriously intended to undertake such an enterprise.
He had also excited the Spanish Government to make an
attack on Portugal, which at the end of June he seconded
by an invasion of that country with a French army, under
the command of his own brother-in-law. General Leclerc ;
and, now that Egypt was wrested from him, he hoped to be
able to set off acquisitions made at the expense of our an
cient ally against our own conquests in the East and West
Indies. If, however, he had formed any real design to at
tempt an invasion of this country. Nelson soon compelled
him to lay it aside ; and the corruption^ of his own generals
reduced the advantages he had hoped to extort from
Portugal to a very insignificant amount; so that he was
forced, after a brief delay, to continue the negotiation on
its original footing, with indeed a certain lowering of his
tone with respect to Egypt, his chance of retaining which
country by force of arms could no longer be pretended to
have any existence. At the same time, he tried to alarm
Lord Hawkesbury by the threat that, if peace were not at
once concluded, France and all her allies were ready to
concentrate their forces against England.^ But in the same
1 Alison (cxxxiv. 62) affirms that the French generals took large
bribes from the Portuguese Government, and that Leclerc himself in
this way obtained 200,000/.
* " La cour de Londres, si elle veut sincferement la paix, peut-elle,

S8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1801
despatch in which this menace was insinuated M. Otto
admitted that the acquisitions made by France on the
Continent justified some of the demands made by Great
Britain, though not the retention by her of Trinidad, Mar
tinique, Malta, Ceylon, and all the territories conquered
from Tippo Sahib. Perhaps Buonaparte's feeling of the
extent to which his position was altered by the defeats of
his army in Egypt was most clearly shown by the final
suggestion, that he might acquiesce in our preserving all
our acquisitions in India and restore Portugal to the status
ante bellum, if we, on our parts, would agree to the same
status ante bellum being re-established in the Mediterranean
and America.
Of the menace. Lord Hawkesbury in his reply very
properly disdained to take any notice. The status ante
bellum. for America he altogether rejected, pointing out
that this would involve not only a restitution of those
islands in the West Indies which we had wrested from
France, but of those which we had also taken from Spain
aujourd'hui que les allies sont en mesure de concentrer tous leurs
moyens contre elle, prdtendre k conserver des conquetes qu'elle doit en
grande partie aux ddsordres de la Revolution Fran9aise et aux efforts de
la coalition?" (Extract from a despatch of M. Otto, June i8th, 1801.)
But in fact France had as yet no ally bound to co-operate with her
against England but Spain and Holland ; and the result of St. Vincent
and the capture of most of the West India Islands showed how little
was to be apprehended from Spain. Otto's despatch proceeds, " Cepen-
dant on reconnait que les grands ^vdnemens survenus en Europe, et
les changemens arrives dans les limites des grands Etats du Continent,
peuvent autoriser une partie des demandes du Gouvernement Britan-
nique ; mais comment ce Gouvernement pourrait-il exiger la conser
vation de Malthe, de Ceylon, de tous les Etats conquis sur Tippo Saib,
de la Trinity et de la Martinique ? Le soussignd est autoris^ ^
demander de my Lord Hawkesbury si dans le cas ou le Gouvernement
Frangais acc^derait aux arrangemens proposes pour les Grandes
Indes par I'Angleterre, et adopterait Vante bellum pour le Portugal,
sa M. B. consentirait elle-mtoe k ce que le status ante helium fut
r^tabli dans la M^diterran^e et en Amdrique ? " " America" through
out this negotiation includes the West Indian Islands, nearly the
whole of which we had made ourselves masters of.

i8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 59
and Holland. He offered, however, as a recompense for a
¦return to the former state of affairs in Portugal, to agree
to the same principle with respect to Spain. And he
argued that the status ante bellum for the Mediterranean,
if adopted, would not only require from us the cession of
Malta, but from the French the restitution of those con
quests which they had made on the borders of the Mediter
ranean ; of the county of Nice and of the other territories
which had been wrested from the King of Sardinia ; with
the restoration of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the
rest of Italy to their former independence. In a subsequent
despatch he refuted by a reference to his former proposals,
which were in M. Otto's possession, the utterly false state
ment that, since the commencement of the discussions,
Britain had raised her demands ; though, as he also showed,
she had had a right to raise them carefully reserved to her
by a declaration which he himself had made in April, that
"in the event of the evacuation of Egypt by the French
previously to the signing of the preliminaries, he should
not consider himself as bound to adhere to their full
extent to the conditions," which he then proposed. He
reminded M, Otto that, from his sovereign's "invariable
anxiety to provide for the interests of his allies, and from
his sincere desire to facilitate the attainment of peace, he
had been authorised to offer, in addition to the restitutions
which he had already proposed, the island of Trinidad,"
which would secure a complete re-establishment of " the
status ante bellum for Spain, in consideration of the status
ante bellum for Portugal." If, as " the French Government
had distinctly admitted, his Majesty was entitled to a com
pensation out of his conquests for the important acquisi
tions which France had obtained upon the Continent," it
was impossible for him to propose to retain less than he
now demanded.
Otto, or rather his master Buonaparte, and his minister,
the celebrated Talleyrand, felt that they were getting
worsted in the argument. They began to appeal to our

6o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION ri8oi
moderation and " regard for the interests of humanity. A
distant island more or less could not be a sufficient reason
for prolonging the miseries of the world." And their
practical comment on this maxim thus laid down was
a demand that had never been made before, that, while
France should retain all her conquests except " the ports
of the Adriatic and of the Mediterranean belonging to the
Pope and the King of Naples,'' Britain should restore all
that she had made with the single exception of Ceylon ;
the only other advantage which she was to derive being a
restoration of Portugal to its former integrity. What was
particularly demanded was that Malta should be restored
to the Order of its ancient Knights (from whom, it will be
remembered, it was not the English but the French who
had captured it ; the English had only taken it from the
French), though M. Otto was willing to agree that its forti
fications should be destroyed. In reply. Lord Hawkesbury
declined entering into any " explanations relative to the
island of Malta," except on the condition of the French
Government agreeing to a reasonable "arrangement re
specting the West Indies conformably to the principle
which had been already recognised as the just basis of
negotiation." And his firmness on this point made the
French plenipotentiary alter his tone. Though on the 20th
of July M. Otto had required the absolute cession by Great
Britain of all her conquests in the West Indies, on the
nth of August it was "with sincere satisfaction'' that he
found the British Government resolved to retain some of
them ; and the hint that the acquiescence of France in
her so doing might be met on her part by a reconsidera
tion of the question of Malta " removed the only obstacle"
to a pacification.
Yet so innate was the spirit of insincerity and trickery
in the French Government, that in his very next communi
cation, made, as M. Otto informed Lord Hawkesbury, in
consequence of an express which he had just received from
Paris, it was proposed to confine the acquisitions which

i8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 6i
Great Britain should retain to the single island of Sainte
Lucie. The British minister, in reply, threatened to break
off the negotiations altogether. And once more his steady
adherence to his former declarations were rewarded. On
the 1st of October, only two days after he had written
that " if the French Government should persist in any
further demands there could no longer remain any pro
spect of the negotiation being brought to a happy conclu
sion," M. Otto was authorised to sign preliminaries, and it
was agreed that plenipotentiaries should be sent by both
Governments to Amiens to conclude a definitive treaty.
The minister whom our Government selected was Lord
Cornwallis, a nobleman of high character, who, if he had
not been very successful as a soldier in North America, as
Governor-General in India had shown considerable energy
and capacity, and as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland at the
time of the Union had proved himself possessed of great
patience and address. Lord Malmesbury, whom Pitt had
designed to employ the year before, had become afflicted
with deafness to such a degree that he was no longer de
sirous of diplomatic employment of so delicate a character ;
and the instructions drawn up by Lord Hawkesbury for
Lord Cornwallis were so precise as to render his want of
experience as a negotiator of but little importance. Indeed
most of the points which had been topics of dispute had
been so settled in the preliminary articles that they were
adopted without alteration. It had been agreed that we
were to retain Ceylon and Trinidad, and to restore the rest
of our conquests ; while, as a counterbalance to those great
concessions on our part, France was bound to withdraw her
troops from the dominions of the Pope and King of Naples,
and to guarantee the integrity of Portugal. Malta we con
sented to restore to the Knights of St. John, on condition
of its being further placed under the guarantee of the
Emperor of Russia. But, as this Order was at the time in
a state of disorganization, not having even a Grand Master,
it was evidently requisite to re-establish it on a proper

62 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1801
footing, that it might be in a condition to resume its
authority, before we could consent to withdraw from our
occupation of so important an island.^
So completely, however, was the signature of the pre
liminary articles regarded as practically the conclusion of
the treaty, that, when Parliament met at the beginning of
November, both parties agreed in looking on them in that
light, and debated their merits and the conduct of the
ministry in agreeing to them as unreservedly as if no
further negotiation of any kind had been pending. The
concessions which we had made in resigning so many of
our conquests, and in leaving France in possession of so
many of her acquisitions, were most vehemently attacked
in the House of Lords by the late Foreign Secretary,
Lord Grenville ; and in the House of Commons by his
brother, Mr. Thomas Grenville, and Mr Windham. It was
no slight proof that the objections made were specious
¦¦¦ There was no point, however, on which the French Government
insisted more strongly than that we should withdraw our troops at
once. A paper delivered in by M. Otto September 30th, the day
before the signature of the preliminaries, contains the following sen
tence : " II (le Gouvernement Frangais) ne consentira jamais k une
clause ou redaction d'oii il pourrait rdsulter que Malthe ne serait pas
dvacu^e par les troupes Anglaises immddiatement aprfes la ratification
du traitd ddfinitif. Le tems qui s'dcoulera entre la conclusion des pr^-
liminaires et celle du traitd ddfinitif sera suffisant pour que I'ordre et la
Puissance garante ayant pris leurs mesures pour assurer I'occupation
de Malthe." It was owing solely to the unyielding firmness of Lord
Hawkesbury that Malta was not evacuated with the precipitation thus
insisted on (in which event we should have found it difficult to reconquer
it), but that it remained in our hands at the renewal of the war. It
may be added that if we had evacuated it inconsiderately we should
only have been laughed at by Buonaparte himself for our simplicity.
He never seriously expected that we should relinquish it, and perhaps
his pertinacity as to the precise language of the articles relating to it
was dictated mainly by his desire to have a plausible pretext for future
rupture. De Bourrienne tells us, " Je ne cessais de dire au Premier
Consul qu'k la place des Anglais'il n'en ferait pas autrement, et je lui
prddis sans balancer que cette lie serait la principale cause de la rup
ture de la paix. II pensait comme moi." (Mdmoires de M. de Bourrienne,
vol. 4, xix. 303.)

i8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 63
rather than solid, that the policy of the ministry in making
peace on such conditions was supported both by Pitt and
Fox. Pitt argued that, after the dissolution of the con
tinental alliance by the Peace of Luneville, it was impossible
for us to pursue any other line of conduct but that of
making peace ; as to the conditions on which it was con
cluded, he was more anxious about the tone and character
of the peace than for any particular object ; and he thought
it wiser even to accept terms short of what the country
might be strictly entitled to than to risk the negotiation by
too obstinate adherence to any particular point. And this
was not only the language which he thought it becoming
to him to hold in his place in Parliament, in consideration
of the circumstances under which those who had concluded
the treaty had come into power; but his deliberate opinion,
as he expressed it in letters to his private friends. "^ And
Fox, differing from those of his followers who disparaged
Ceylon and Trinidad, affirmed them to be most important
acquisitions ; and " could not flatter himself that we could
have obtained peace on better terms. If too much import
ance," he truly said, " had been attached to trifles, we should
have risked another year of war, which in itself would have
been a great evil. He believed, indeed, that better terms
might have been obtained a year before ; but at present, as
to the terms and tone of the treaty, he fully coincided with
the ministry." But, from his position as the minister chiefly
responsible for it, the speaker whose language was most
carefully scanned was Lord Hawkesbury. As on the
debate which took place subsequently on the merits of the
definitive treaty, he naturally extended and amplified the
argument he used on this occasion,' it is sufficient to state
' Lord Stanhope (Life, vol. iii. p. 351) quotes a letter of his to Mr.
Long, dated October i, 1801, in which he says, " The terms, though
not in every point precisely all that one could wish, are certainly highly
creditable, and on the whole very advantageous."
^ His speech, however, on this occasion was one that made a great
impression on the House. In Lord Colchester's Diary (i. 376, seq)
different correspondents of the speaker are quoted as extolling it in

64 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [i8oi
now that the Opposition in the Lower House did not ven
ture on a division ; and in the House of Lords, where the
obstinacy of Lord Grenville forced one on, he was unable
to muster more than ten votes to support the opinions
which he advanced on the subject.
This failure of its opponents was, of course, no slight
encouragement to the Government to proceed in the course
it had already marked out for itself The negotiation
received a slight additional interest from the circumstance
that the discussions on the part of France were conducted
by the brother of the First Consul, Joseph Buonaparte, who
afterwards became King of Naples, and then of Spain, and
as such had a narrow escape of being brought to England
as a prisoner after the battle of Vittoria. On the first
arrival of Lord Cornwallis, Talleyrand proposed to transfer
the seat of negotiation from Amiens, the place which had
been originally fixed upon, to Paris itself; or, at all events,
to settle some of the most important points in dispute in
that city ; and Lord Cornwallis, who was highly satisfied
with the manner and language of Buonaparte when he was
presented to him, would not have thought such a step
objectionable, if it would have led to his discussing the
matters in question "in confidential interviews with the
First Consul himself" The language of the First Consul
himself, as he reported it to Lord Hawkesbury, was
studiously complimentary ; and in the exchange of such
courtesies the British negotiator was in respect no more
remiss.
the warmest terms. Mr. Corry says, " Lord Hawkesbury was able
and successful in his speech beyond former character.'' And of his
speech in a second debate the week after he says, " On the Convention
yesterday Lord Hawkesbury was excellent. His character in the
House of Commons rises daily and justly. His speech was better
than that on the peace;" and Wilberforce's friend. Lord Muncaster,
writes, " You do not need from me any character of the debate ; but
I cannot help saying to you that Lord Hawkesbury's was the most
chaste speech of a man of business I almost ever heard." Lord
Sheffield uses somewhat similar expressions.

i8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 65
Private.^ Paris, November 10, 1801.
My dear Lord,
It was with very sincere satisfaction that I received your despatch
of the 6th, as it has relieved me from the most delicate and
difficult part of my immediate business with the Chief Consul.
I have had this morning my first audience, at which Talleyrand
of course was present. Buonaparte was gracious in the highest
degree. He inquired particularly after his Majesty, and the
state of his health ; and spoke of the British nation in terms
of great respect, intimating that, as long as we remained friends,
there would be no interruption of the peace of Europe.
I told him that the horrors which succeeded the Revolution
had created a general alarm ; that all the neighbouring
nations dreaded the contagion ; that when, for the happiness
of mankind, and of France in particular, he was called on
to fill his present station, we knew him only as a hero and a
conqueror, but the good order and tranquillity which the
country now enjoyed, made us respect him as a statesman and
a legislator, and had removed our apprehensions of having
connexion and intercourse with France.
Lauriston informed me that the First Consul would see me with
out the presence of a third person before my departure for
Amiens ; but this information became less interesting to me
since the good news which you have imparted to me respecting
Hanover.
The concourse of people at the fireworks last night was very
great ; no carriages were allowed to pass but those of the
foreign ministers ; and as I drove through the streets I was
astonished to find such a multitude so perfectly quiet, and
heard nothing near my coach but expressions of civility.
I have the honour to be, &c. &c. Cornwallis.
When, however, he found that Talleyrand only desired
to keep the conduct of the negotiation wholly in his
own hands, instead of trusting it to Joseph Buonaparte,
he changed his mind as to the propriety of consenting
to any alteration in the first arrangement. Joseph, as
VOL. I. F

66 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1801
he wrote to Lord Hawkesbury, "had the character of
being a well-meaning, although not a very able man,"
and he hoped that "his near connexion with the First
Consul might perhaps be in some degree a check on
the spirit of chicanery and intrigue which animated the
Minister of the Interior." He therefore adhered to the
plan previously laid down for him ; and, though he had one
or two preliminary discussions on different subjects before
he left Paris, they were held with Joseph Buonaparte, and
were therefore of much the same character as they would
have been if they had taken place in Amiens. Mr. Jackson,
who was our minister at Paris while Lord Cornwallis was at
Amiens, and who was among those who took an unfavor
able view of the treaty, in talking it over with Lord Malmes
bury, who shared his views, attributed many of the stipula
tions or concessions with which he was dissatisfied to Lord
Cornwallis himself, " his drowsiness, and his total want of
practice and experience in matters of that kind ;"^ and, per
haps, had the plenipotentiary had more experience of the
diplomatic, and especially of the French diplomatic character,
his suspicions might have been in some degree awakened
by the earnestness displayed by M. Buonaparte in extolling
his own integrity before any imputations had been cast
upon it. He commenced his first interview by a declaration
" that it was his intention to deal fairly and openly, that
he was a stranger to the arts of negotiation, and should not
attempt to carry any point by cunning or chicanery ; " and
Lord Cornwallis, who coincided in the wish thus expressed
to conduct the conferences between them with frankness and
sincerity, implicitly believed him. More penetrating judges
would probably have thought differently at the time ; cer
tainly those who are acquainted with the absolute dominion
which the younger brother exercised over all his family,
and the almost invariably bad faith which characterised his
own dealings with other nations, will not be surprised to
hear that, at the end of a month, Lord Cornwallis found
' Diaries of Lord Malmesbury, iv. 71.

i8oi] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

67

that articles in the intended treaty, after they had been
formally agreed to, were surreptitiously altered ; that, in
some, important sentences had been omitted, in others
significant phrases had been inserted, in one a change of
the highest importance had been silently introduced ; and
that, finally, his secretary discovered that, after Lord Corn
wallis had believed the arrangements of the matters con
tained in those articles to have been fully concluded, the
document relating to them had been carefully revised by
the French plenipotentiary, who with his own hand had
made' a number of corrections " replete with matter and
expressions calculated to ensnare, to throw upon Lord
Cornwallis himself the odium of the delay, and upon the
whole to create confusion in all the proceedings."
One of the alterations thus dishonestly foisted in would
have represented us as agreeing to the placing of Malta
under the protection and guarantee, not of the Czar, who
was a prince sufficiently powerful to render them effectual,
but of the King of Naples, whom recent transactions had
proved to be completely at the mercy of, and therefore
under the influence of, the French. The trickery, however,
which was thus detected tended to defeat its own object. As
a matter of course, it strengthened the hands of Lord Corn
wallis ; and the neutrality of Malta, after we should have
evacuated it, was finally settled as we had proposed. In
another matter also he succeeded in carrying the views
of his own Government in opposition to the aims of the
First Consul. Buonaparte so completely ignored his allies,
even at the very moment that he was professing to be
acting in their interest, that he desired wholly to exclude
their representatives from the Conference at Amiens, leav
ing any terms which we might make with them, the Go
vernments of Spain and Holland, or, as the latter was now
styled, the Batavian Republic, to be settled in subordinate
and separate treaties. But Lord Hawkesbury, in a very
able and argumentative despatch, insisted that the treaty
about to be concluded should "be one general treaty of
F 2

68 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
peace, comprehending the interests of all the Powers
engaged in the war, and that there should not be distinct
treaties concluded with each state separately." He showed
by reference to the Peace of 1763, that this had been
the course adopted on similar occasions in times past,
and required that, if he had not such already, "the
French plenipotentiary should obtain from his Govern
ment the necessary full powers enabling him to con
clude a general treaty of that description." The result
of this resolution on our part was that those who had
been the allies of France in the war at once despatched,
as they were probably anxious to do, plenipotentiaries to
Amiens to act on their behalf, Senhor Azara being the
Spanish minister, and M. Schimmelpenninck the envoy of
the new Dutch Government. No further difficulty of any
importance occurred, and on the 27th of March the defini
tive treaty was formally signed.
There was a general belief that the pacification it had
effected would not be of long duration. The king himself
during the progress of the negotiation had more than once
intimated to Lord Hawkesbury his conviction that the " con
duct of the French could not be built upon ;" and after its
conclusion he expressed the same opinion to Lord Malmes
bury, calling it " an experimental peace, and nothing else."
It had been, however, he added, "unavoidable, because
he had been abandoned by everybody, allies and all."
And this feeling of the probable instability of the peace,
which more than one act of Buonaparte's during the nego
tiation had greatly increased,* was one of the greatest

' ''April %th.—Y\tt told Lord Malmesbury that ' he had, when the
preliminaries were signed, thought that Buonaparte had satisfied his
ambition, and would rest contented with the power and reputation he
had acquired ; . . . that, however, all that had passed since had con
vinced him that he had been in error, and that the electing himself
President of the Italian Republic, the attainment of Louisiana, the two
Floridas, and the island of Elba, left no doubt on his mind that he
was and ever would remain the same rapacious insatiable plunderer,

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 69
difficulties with which the Cabinet had to struggle in
the debate which ensued. In fact, the treaty contained
one article which it was well known it would be almost
impossible to execute strictly. It was stipulated that
the British forces "should evacuate Malta and its depen
dencies within three months from the exchange of the
ratifications, or sooner if possible ; " and that " at that
epoch it should be given up to the Order in its present
state, provided the Grand Master, or commissaries fully
authorised according to the statutes of the Order, should
be in the island to take possession, and the force which
was to be provided by his Sicilian Majesty" (who was to
be invited to garrison the different fortresses in the island
for one year) " should have arrived." But it was almost
certain that neither of these events, the arrival of a Grand
Master or of a Neapolitan garrison, could take place
within three months. There had been no Grand Master
at all for many years. The knights had dwindled in
number to a small force; their ancient spirit had fallen
in a still more conspicuous degree when they surrendered
the island to the French without striking a single blow
in its defence; and they had become objects of such
universal dislike to the native Maltese, and were so con
scious of their unpopularity, that it was not likely that
many of them would be induced to return at all. It
was, therefore, from the first, nearly certain that we should
be unable to evacuate the island by the time appointed
in the treaty, while it was almost equally sure, considering
the extreme persistency with which the First Consul had
tried every expedient to create and maintain for France an
influence over the island, that our failure to execute the
treaty on this point to its very letter would form the
ground of angry complaint.
with as little good faith, as he forraerly found him to be ; that still he
did not regret having spoken in favour of the peace : it was become a
necessary measure ; and rest for England, however short, was desir
able,"— Malmesbury's Diary, iv. 64.

70 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
This, however, though felt to be a difficulty by the
ministers themselves, was not much dwelt upon by the
Opposition in their attacks upon the treaty. It was re
markable that, while Pitt himself sincerely and energeti
cally supported it, those who put themselves in the first
rank of its assailants had been his colleagues till his
resignation, and were those who had most identified them
selves with him by following him in his retirement. Lord
Grenville in the House of Lords, and Mr. Windham in
the House of Commons, moved addresses to the king
censuring the peace as one which exposed the kingdora
to great danger, since by it we had made great sacrifices
without any compensating concessions having been pro
cured from France. In a biography of one who was at
that time a member of the House of Commons, we may
confine ourselves to the debate in that House, and prin
cipally to the part which Lord Hawkesbury himself bore
in it. Mr. Windham founded his arguments chiefly on
his opinion of the insatiable character of the existing
French Government (an opinion in which, as we have
seen, Pitt had lately felt compelled to coincide). He
maintained that the arrangements which had been made
with respect to Malta, however we might flatter ourselves,
were a virtual surrender of that island to France. If the
King of Naples should send a garrison to the fortresses,
the putting them into his hands, circumstanced as he was,
was an immediate introduction of the French. In the
same way he maintained that the restoration of the Cape
of Good Hope, to which also we had bound ourselves,
would prove a cession of that stronghold, the half-way
house to India, to the same all-grasping Power. He
equally disapproved of those articles of the treaty which
had allotted to France a portion of the Portuguese Guiana,
and the fertile province of Louisiana. He could draw no
distinction between the present form of government in
France and the Jacobinism which was rampant seven years
before ; and our naval victories, to which there had been

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 71
no interruption, ought to have saved us from a peace which
left, or rather made, France so formidable.
Lord Hawkesbury' himself undertook to reply to
Windham ; and, disdaining a mere avoidance of censure,
boldly challenged the approval of the House for what had
been done. He moved an amendment to the proposed
address, to the effect that "the House was fully sensible
that his Majesty had wisely consulted the interests of his
people in forming a definitive treaty on the basis of the
preliminaries ; that it relied on his Majesty's well-known
disposition to adhere with the most scrupulous fidelity to
his engagements ; but that it entertained a perfect confi
dence that he would be always prepared to defend against
every encroachment the great sources of the wealth, com
merce, and naval power of the empire. And that it was
firmly persuaded that his Majesty's faithful subjects would
be always ready to support the honour of his crown, and
the rights, laws, and liberties of their country, with the
same spirit they had manifested during the war which was
now happily brought to a conclusion." And he supported
his amendment with arguments which even his antagonists
admitted to be profound and able, and which his partisans
maintained to be irresistible. He reminded the House
that " at the very moment when the present ministry were
entering upon office, the country was losing its chief ally
upon the Continent, the only one which, from the position
of its dominions, and from its power, could be expected
to make a formidable resistance to the progress of the
French armies, by the Peace of Luneville. Previously,
Britain had been the head of a confederacy. That peace
placed her, instead, in the position of being the sole and
^ The Annual Register, which at this time was written with great
violence of party spirit, and was still under the influence of Dr.
Laurence, who had edited it till the close of the preceding century,
and who took a warm part against the ministry in this very debate,
describes Lord Hawkesbury's speech on this occasion as " by much
the ablest defence of the treaty which was made in either House of
Parliament." (Ann. 1802, p. 152.)

72 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [i8oz
unassisted mark for a hostile league. The enmity of the
Baltic Powers she defeated by her promptitude of action ;
and, having quelled them, we were able to negotiate with
France. But with her we could only negotiate for our
selves and Portugal, not for our allies in Germany, who
had already settled their own affairs at Luneville. And
for Portugal we did obtain good terms, even the restoration
of some of the territory of which France had previously
despoiled her. For ourselves, we retained two islands of
the highest value and importance, Ceylon in the East
Indies, Trinidad in the West. And though we did not
preserve Malta, the House would remember that we had
never intended to do so. We always designed to restore
it to the Knights of St. John. And henceforth their pos
session of the island was to be guaranteed to them by the
joint agreement of all the principal Powers of Europe.
Great stress had been laid by those who censured the
peace on the acquisitions made by France since the com
mencement of the wan It was true she had obtained
Louisiana from Spain ; but she had possessed that pro
vince before, and had willingly ceded it to Spain as a
settlement which had proved of but little value. And
in India she had lost ground : neither in the West nor
East Indies could her possessions be compared to ours,
either in extent or in prosperity. Her navy and com
merce, in every part of the world, was still less on a
footing of equality with ours. In the course of the war,
she had lost more than half her fleet, and all her com
merce. He maintained that a treaty that left us and
the French in such a relative condition, could not be con
sidered anything but honorable to us. He could never
agree with the doctrine laid down by some gentlemen that,
whenever any of the continental Powers became involved
in a quarrel with France, it was our business, without con
sidering how the question affected our own external and
internal interests, immediately to embark in a war. It was
not expedient for us to continue the war for Holland and

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 73
the Netherlands, much less was it justifiable to continue it
for Italy. And, indeed, those Powers which were more
nearly connected with that country than ourselves, Austria,
Russia, and Prussia, had approved or acquiesced in the new
constitution that had lately been established in Italy. As
to the faults of omission which had been alleged against
the present treaty, the principal stress appeared to be laid
on the non-renewal of certain other treaties, but the truth
was that the events of the war had so completely unhinged
the foundations of all former treaties, that it would be
almost impossible, if they were renewed, to bring them to
bear at all upon the present political state of Europe. If
we had sanctioned the Treaty of Luneville, for instance, we
should have made ourselves parties to the dismemberment
of the Germanic empire.^ At present we could say that,
if we had been unable to recover for continental Europe
all its rights, we had at least been no party to its wrongs.
It was true that no commercial stipulations had been
introduced into the treaty, but commercial treaties involve
so many subjects, and raise so many points of discussion,
that it would have caused great delay to have mixed up
such matters in the present treaty. The French would
find it impossible to prohibit our manufactures in a time of
peace as they had done in war, and, if it should come to a
war of prohibitory duties we had sufficient arms for our
defence in our own hands. , Prophecies had been ventured
on that the peace now made could not last. He could not
pretend to say that this treaty, or any other which might
be made at the present time, was secure ; but he could not
see that any additional security was to be gained by a
continuance of war. Any such security must be looked
^ By the Treaty of Luneville, which was concluded in February
1 801, between France and the Emperor of Germany, Belgium and all
the territories on the left or western bank of the Rhine were ceded to
France, and the princes who were dispossessed of their dominions
by this arrangement were proraised indemnifications in the more
central parts of the empire. At the same time the independence of
the Batavian, Helvetic, and Cisalpine Repubhcs was guaranteed.

74 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
for in the condition and disposition of France herself
That country now appeared to be returning to her old
maxims of religion and politics, and a renewal of the war
must be calculated to plunge her again into the revolution
ary system. It was wise to spare the resources and spirit
of this country as much as possible ; they had been in
some degree strained by the long duration of the war, and
required to be cherished by peace." He summed up his
speech by affirming that " he had proved that the interests
and honour of Britain had been preserved, that her allies
had not been neglected, and that no degrading or dis
honorable article had been introduced into the treaty,''
and moved his amendment, which expressed, as we have
seen, a full approval of the conduct of the ministry in
framing and conducting this treaty.
Neither of the great leaders, Pitt or Fox, spoke on this
occasion, but two of Fox's chief supporters, Mr. Sheridan
and Mr. Grey, expressed their approval of the peace,
though Sheridan artfully endeavoured to make it a ground
of censure of the previous ministry for rejecting the over
tures of the First Consul in 1800 ; and Mr. Grey com
bined his sanction of the peace with a repetition of his old
denunciations of the war. In the end the ministers found
their views of the transactions supported by an over
whelming and most unusual majority. Only twenty
members could be induced to countenance Windham's
judgment, while 276 proclaimed by their votes their
opinion that the honour and interests of the country had
been fully consulted. And there seems no doubt that the
decision thus adopted was correct. It is somewhat singular
that our treaties of peace have invariably been attacked in
Parliament ; that of Paris as severely as that of Utrecht,
though by it we recovered Minorca and secured Canada ;
that of Versailles with as much acerbity as the one which
was just concluded, though in 1783 we made no sacrifices
but those of claims which we had proved unable to enforce,
and terminated the most disastrous as well as the most

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 75
impolitic war in which we had ever been engaged. On the
whole the decision of Parliament in favour of the treaty
seems to have been well founded. Though we were to give
up Malta, our former history did not warrant our then
looking on it as of the importance which we have since
learnt to attribute to it. We had never possessed it before ;
we had not found our position injured by the loss of Minorca,
though since 1783 that island had been restored to an active
enemy; and, though the possession of Malta would have
been of great importance to us if we had not had Gibraltar,
as matters stood there seemed no reason to suppose that its
condition in neutral hands strong enough to hold it would
not be as advantageous to us as if we had the charge and
burden of defending it. Again, though we restored the
Cape, and several valuable conquests in the West Indies,
yet it might fairly be argued that we only restored what, if
peace continued, we could well dispense with, and, if war
were revived, we could without difficulty recover; as in fact
we did recover them. If, as the ministers did not attempt
or wish to deny, we had made some sacrifices, we had made
no concessions inconsistent with our honour ; and, on points
of but trifling importance, it was neither unmanly nor
unstatesmanlike to admit some abatement of our strict pre
tensions for the sake of peace. It was no slight argument
in favour of the present treaty that the leaders of the
Opposition declined to commit themselves by a condemna
tion of it. Pitt, in his defence of the preliminaries, had laid
it downi as the sound principle which should guide all such
negotiations that, " in selecting those acquisitions which we
desired to retain, it was our interest not to aim so much at
keeping possession of any fresh conquest which was not of
material value, as at retaining those acquisitions which from
their situation or other causes were the best calculated for
confirming and securing our ancient territories. The first
object which must naturally present itself to every minister
must be to give additional vigour to our maritime strength,
1 See his Speeches, vol. iii. p. 267.

76 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
and security to our colonial possessions.'' And his un
rivalled knowledge of every matter connected with trade
and finance gives irresistible weight to the opinion he
further expressed, that in that point of view the acquisi
tions which we retained in the East and West Indies were
of infinitely greater value than any stronghold in the
Mediterranean. On the value of Trinidad and Ceylon Fox fully agreed
with his great rival. And even the witticism of Sheridan,
which is better remembered than any of the longer
speeches, that it was a peace which every one was glad
of, though no one was proud of, is in itself an admission
that no one really saw in it anything incompatible with
the dearest interests of the nation, its good faith and
honour.

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 77

CHAPTER III.
Buonaparte becomes Consul for life — His discontent with England —
Lord Hawkesbury's reply to his remonstrances — Mr. Hookham
Frere's description of parties in Spain — Buonaparte's encroach
ments — His preparations for war — He annexes Piedmont to France
— Switzerland implores the aid of Britain — Lord Whitworth is
sent to Paris — Negotiations with Austria and Russia — Meeting
and character of the new Parliament — Eagerness of the French
for the maintenance of peace— Buonaparte's intrigues in Russia —
Sebastiani's mission to Egypt — Buonaparte's overtures to Louis
XVIII. — Corruption of Buonaparte's family — Lord Whitworth's
interview with Talleyrand — He leaves Paris.
Those who doubted the permanence of the tranquillity
thus restored to the kingdom had not long to wait for
events which promised to justify their forebodings. The
ratifications had scarcely been exchanged when Buona
parte gave an indication of the extent of his personal
ambition by procuring first the extension of the Con
sulate to himself for ten years beyond the period ori
ginally fixed, without any mention of his colleagues,
whom every one felt to be mere cyphers, and before
the end of the summer the further prolongation of his
authority for his life. In all but name, he was now abso
lute sovereign of the nation ; and, though there was a
large party secretly indignant at these progressive en
croachments, very few ventured to give open utterance
to their discontent. Another prediction on which Wind
ham and his supporters had ventured seemed to be in
course of verification when our ministers learnt that a
commercial treaty was being negotiated between France

78 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION. [1802
and Spain, of which the chief aim was understood to be
to limit and embarrass the trade of this country. It
was still less a secret that the First Consul was busy in
encouraging the party of faction and insurrection at
Naples ; while, before the end of July, Mr. Arthur Paget,
our minister at Vienna, forwarded intelligence that a triple
alliance had been concluded between France, Prussia, and
Russia, which, even before he was able to learn its precise
nature, he was convinced was full of danger to Austria.
Mr. Paget himself, on making this communication, ven
tured on a prophecy, of which it has been reserved for
our day to see the fulfilment, when he added, " The threat
which has for a considerable time been held out to the
Court of Vienna by France, of establishing a rivality of
strength between Austria and Prussia, seems to be at
length accomplished : and, considering the relative situa
tion of the two countries at this present epoch, there is,
in rrxy opinion, every reason to apprehend that Prussia
will at no very distant period rise to be the first Power
in Germany.''
Austria, however, soon became aware of what had been
done, and behaved with strange, discreditable, and, as she
soon found out, most mischievous vacillation on the sub
ject. She first made a treaty herself with France, by
which she seemed to sanction the indemnities which were
to be given to Prussia for her provinces beyond the Rhine
which she had been compelled to cede to France ; and
then, a few weeks afterwards, when she found that Bavaria
too was to obtain territories which' she did not wish to
see in her hands, she put her troops in motion with a
precipitation which resembled pettish ill-temper more than
statesmanlike resolution. She soon found herself unable
to support the advance which she had thus made, and was
compelled to recede, and to consent to all that was being
done with an acquiescence which was too evidently the
result of weakness to earn goodwill or gratitude.
We, however, abstained from interfering in a matter

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 79
which the contracting parties and the German Diet had
a right to settle for themselves, and with which we had
no immediate concern ; and the first expression of dis
satisfaction came from France. There was no single idea
so firmly rooted in Buonaparte's mind as a hatred of the
press in all countries ;^ and because some of the English
newspapers and a journal conducted in London by a
French emigrant, named Peltier, spoke in disrespectful,
and sometimes contum_elious, terms of him, he made those
publications a ground of formal complaint, and directed
M. Otto, who was now residing in England as the envoy of
the French Government, to claim the punishment of the
publishers of these papers as men who, if they were not
infringing any positive law in England, were violating the
law of nations by disturbing the harmony which subsisted
between the two countries. Some weeks before Talley
rand, the Minister of the Interior, had complained to
Mr. Merry, our representative in Paris, of our affording
an asylum to the French princes, the French bishops, and
other emigrants, some of whom offended the eyes of
M. Otto by appearing before him " still decorated with
the insignia of French orders which no longer existed,"
while " the political principles and conduct of them all
must necessarily occasion great jealousy to the French
Government." And now he enjoined M. Otto to combine
with his demand for the chastisement of the journalists
another for the removal of the emigrants in question from
the British shores. In an elaborate note, M. Otto affirmed
to Lord Hawkesbury, without producing the slightest proof
in confirmation of his assertion, that these emigrants, and
especially the former bishops, distributed incendiary papers
through the maritime provinces of France ; that others
' " Je lui ai souvent entendu dire, ' Si je lui lache la bride je ne resterai
pas trois mois au pouvoir' " (De Bourrienne, iv. 19, p. 305). Presently
M. de Bourrienne imputes the attacks on England in the Moniteur to
the First Consul himself : — " II se vengea par de violens articles qui
furent insdrds dans le Moniteur.'''

8o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
held dangerous meetings in the island of Jersey. And he
explained that he had been instructed to demand the
removal of all these emigrants, the transportation of
another body to Canada, and even the dismissal of the
French princes themselves, by a recommendation, which
they would have no means of resisting, to retire to
Warsaw, where the head of their family, the Count de
Provence, was still residing. Lord Hawkesbury was
equally "surprised at the circumstances under which
M. Otto had thought proper to present such a note, at the
style in which it was drawn up, and at the complaints
contained in it." He recommended him to withdraw it,
which the Frenchman did not conceive himself authorised
by his instructions from Paris to do, though he consented
to make some alterations in its wording which the British
minister suggested. But, even when modified. Lord
Hawkesbury did not consider it becoming our dignity
to honour it with a formal reply, but preferred, as he
wrote to his father, to " instruct Mr. Merry very fully
as to the language which he was to hold in consequence
of it at Paris, while he himself should adopt those mea
sures which might be judged right because they are right,
and without any reference to the note."
The letter which, in pursuance of this plan, he wrote to
Mr. Merry, in order that he might communicate his senti
ments to the French Government, he first submitted to the
king himself and received his approval of it in the follow
ing characteristic note : Weymouth, August 29th, 1802.
It is impossible to pen a more weak and improper paper than the
one delivered by M. Otto, or a more suitable answer than the
one prepared by Lord Hawkesbury. The king never doubted
either of the evil disposition or impertinence of the French
Government ; but he trusts that firmness and temper will, for
some time, preserve peace, which can alone be kept by this
country holding a dignified language while treating with that
faithless people. George R.

i8o2j OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 8i
And the despatch well deserved the king's praise for its
conciliatory frankness combined with an unmistakeable
resolution to violate no English law, and offend no English
habit or feeling. Lord Hawkesbury was not ashamed to
avow his anxious desire to allay the irritation which he
admitted it to be natural for the French Government to
feel. He unreservedly admitted that improper paragraphs
respecting Buonaparte had appeared in the English
journals, and that papers still more indecent and vexatious
had been published by foreigners residing in England.
To chastise such, the French Government might fairly
have appealed to the English laws for redress, which they
would actually have obtained. But they had chosen, in
stead, to take the law into their own hands. They had
retaliated by libels on England, published in the authorised
organ of the French Government, the Moniteur} His
Majesty felt it beneath his dignity to complain of such
attacks, but it was impossible, when M. Otto had presented
such a note, to forbear calling Mr. Merry's attention to the
conduct of the French in this respect. Mr. Merry must be
aware (and he was at liberty to communicate to the French
authorities the whole of Lord Hawkesbury's note, and even
to put the substance of it in writing, as a memorandum of
the conversation he might hold with the French minister)
that " the king neither would nor could, in consequence of
any representation or menace from a foreign Power, make
1 In a letter on this subject to his son. Lord Liverpool says : " It
is positively asserted that Buonaparte is himself a writer of some
of the paragraphs that have appeared in the Moniteur, which
are certainly as offensive to our Government as any published in
our papers can be to him. It is said also that the French Govern
ment sent over an agent here to purchase what may be called the
goodwill of some of our newspapers." The first of these assertions is
almost certainly true. When Buonaparte had reproached Fouchd for
not detecting and arresting the author of a pamphlet entitled " Caesar,
Cromwell, and Buonaparte," Fouchd told De Bourrienne that the
author, who was Buonaparte's own brother Lucien, had shown him
the MS. full of corrections by Buonaparte hiraself (De Bourrienne)
iv. 13, p. 219.)
VOL. I. G

LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
¦ concession which could be in the smallest degree
Igerous to the liberty of the press, justly dear to every
tish subject. The British constitution admits of no
vious restraints upon publications of this descrip-
1. But we had courts of law, wholly independent of the
ecutive Government, capable of taking cognizance of all
jroper publications ; bound to inflict punishment on
inquents ; and which, in fact, often have punished
;ls defamatory of foreign governments. Our own
vernment has no other protection than that of these
tie laws ; and, while it is willing to give foreign govern-
nts every possible protection, it can neither consent to
v-model our laws or to change our constitution to
itify the wishes of any foreign Power. With respect to
; Alien Act, which we were asked to put in force to
pel those foreigners who were alleged to be the authors
these offensive publications, that law had only been
icted to enable the king to prevent the residence here
foreigners whose numbers or principles were calculated
endanger the internal peace of his dominions. It would
an abuse of it to exert it in the case of such individuals
those of whom M. Otto complained, and who, if they
i done wrong, were amenable to other laws.
'The demand for the removal of the French princes
i other emigrants was still more inadmissible. The
snch had urged that we had formerly demanded the
noval of the Pretender from France. There was a
.nifest difference between the cases. When Jam.es II.
;t fled from England, he retired to France ; and we
/er made the slightest demand for the dismissal of him
any of his family or adherents from St. Germain's, where,
fact, he lived and died. But when, after his death,
uis XIV., in direct violation of former treaties, formally
cnowledged his son as King of England, we could no
iger be indifferent to such an insult, and, in the Peace
Utrecht, we made it one of the conditions of the treaty
it the Pretender himself should not be allowed to reside

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 83
in France. But we never extended the demand to any
members of his family or any of his adherents, though
they were notoriously busy in exciting actual rebellion in
England. We never required the removal even of the
Duke of Berwick, who, from his talents and principles,
was the most dangerous man in the world to the interests
of the country and the Protestant succession. In the
present instance the demand for the removal of the
French princes and their partisans rested on no condition
of any treaty ; indeed, the 20th article of the recent treaty
especially limited the persons whom either Government
might claim to have surrendered to them, to criminals
accused on fair evidence of murder, forgery, or fraudulent
bankruptcy. If the bishops, of whom M. Otto com
plained, could be proved to have attempted to induce
the French people to disturb their existing Government,
or resist the new Church establishment, then his Majesty
would think himself justified in removing them from the
country (as, in fact, he was preparing to remove Georges
and some of his followers). But then proof must first
be given that they are making such attempts."
Finally, Lord Hawkesbury thought it important to
observe that the tone of M. Otto's note was "far from
conciliatory ; and that the practice of presenting such
notes could not fail to have the effect of indisposing the
two nations to each other, instead of consolidating and
strengthening the peace which was now happily estab
lished. It was the duty of a wise Government to en
deavour to allay feelings of irritation, rather than to
provoke them. The king was sincerely disposed to
adopt every measure for the preservation of peace which
was consistent with the honour and independence of the
country, and with the security of its laws and constitution.
But the French Government must have formed a most
erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation
and of the character of its Government, if it expected that
any representative of a foreign Power would ever induce
G 2

84 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [[802
them to consent to a violation of those rights on which
the liberties of the people of this country are founded."
And the Ministry did not limit its conciliatory disposi
tion to a courteous despatch ; but when Peltier, the French
writer of whom Otto had chiefly complained, proceeded to
publish articles which were not only defamatory of the per
son and character of the First Consul, but were even capable
of being construed as incitements to assassination, our
Government successfully instituted a prosecution against
him, without however pacifying Buonaparte himself, or in
ducing him to check the attacks which the Moniteur con
tinued to make on everything connected with England. The
First Consul even took upon himself to issue an order to
M. Lavalette, the French Postmaster-General, to disregard
the regulations which, by mutual agreement, had governed
the communications between the two countries since the
re-establishment of peace, and to prevent the conveyance
of passengers by the mail-packets, solely, as M. Lavalette
confessed to Mr. Merry, in order to retaliate on us in
another way the vexation which he felt at the comments
made on his conduct by the English press; and the
entrance of English newspapers and pamphlets into France
he absolutely prohibited.
The negotiation of the commercial treaty with Spain, for
which he was anxious, was interrupted for a time by the
refusal of King Charles to proceed with it till the French
Government should have discharged the debts owing to
some Spaniards whose property in France had been recently
sequestrated under circumstances of admitted illegality.
But this refusal, which, in the case of a more consistent and
independent Government, would have been dictated by a
proper sense of what was due to itself and to its subjects,
was, in the case of Spain, a mere burst of impotent
petulance. The Court and Government of Spain were at
this time in a most miserable condition ; and the character
of the principal personages, the king, the queen, and
Godoy, the Prince of Peace, had so great an influence on

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 85
the subsequent history of the whole Continent, that no
apology seems needed for inserting a letter from a very
penetrating observer, Mr. Hookham Frere, who was at this
time resident at Madrid as our ambassador, and who thus
describes them to the Secretary of State for the guidance
of our Government :
My Lord, Valentia, December 22d, 1802.
I take the advantage of this form of letter to forward to your
Lordship such notions respecting the state and character of
this Court as could not with propriety be entrusted to a public
despatch, and I must entreat your Lordship to bestow the
same care upon its security, or to destroy it as soon as it has
served the purpose of information for which it was intended.
I am the more anxious upon this point from knowing that,
wherever scandalous anecdotes are concerned, even though
they should involve the most important secrets, they do some
how find their way into public notoriety in a manner almost
unaccountable, and I am well aware that if any such anecdotes
should become current in London the)' will infallibly be referred
to me as their source, and will be attended with the worst
consequences to his Majesty's service.
The character of his Catholic Majesty had been for a long time
misunderstood ; it had been imagined that he possessed a
great deal of latent energy. The freedom of his carriage, the
impetuosity of all his movements, the abruptness of his ges
tures and tones of voice, all favoured this idea ; and it was
imagined that the passiveness which he had shown in many
instances proceeded rather from want of reflection and under
standing than from want of vigour and spirit, and that, when
ever a case should arise in which his honour and interests
should be decidedly and evidently implicated, he would at
last exhibit that firmness the want of which had been so
long regretted. These occasions have, however, presented them
selves too often to afford any hope from their recurrence, and
the character of this sovereign must, it is imagined, be classed
with that of other princes of his house, and with that of the
unfortunate Louis XVI. in particular, in whom the same tone
and manner were visible without being attended by those
mental energies which they usually indicate.

86 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
It is, besides, very generally apprehended that the king has,
by the suggestions of his consort, become a convert to a
perfect systera of political epicurism, and that they have
formed together a short of shocking calculation that the pre
sent system, carefully managed, may be raade to last their
time, and that the miseries which are to result from it must
be the concern of their successor.
The conduct of the queen had been for a long time notorious
to every individual in the country except the king, and it
was imagined that whenever the discovery was made his resent
ment would be terrible and fatal. It is, however, now past
a doubt that the king is no longer deceived, information
having been given him to which he could not shut his eyes.
I have it even from good authority, and from more than one
quarter, that the Prince of Peace had the audacity, some time
ago, to conceive the project of removing the queen into
confinement upon this accusation ; that he reproached her, in
the presence of the king, with the irregularity of her conduct ;
and concluded by saying that not as a punishment for what
was to be regarded as a natural infirmity, but for the avoidance
of scandal, and for the removal of bad example, she ought
to be sent away from the Court. He then appealed to the
Archbishop of Toledo and Seville, his brother-in-law, with
whom the scene had been concocted ; but, the archbishop's
courage failing hira, he concluded in a milder sense, and the
Prince of Peace was left in a violent altercation with the
queen at the one end of the room, while the king, looking
on, told the archbishop to see how they quarrelled.
It is supposed to be upon this principle that the present gallant
has not been suffered to attend the Court in its journey.
The situation of the Prince of Peace with respect to the king is
singular. I have been told, and I am disposed to believe,
that the king fears him. The Prince of Peace has certainly
been known to raake use of expressions which looked that
way. Immediately after the campaign in Portugal, the Prince
of Peace upon some occasion presented himself under the
windows of the palace with a train of one hundred and fifty
general officers and others. The queen was overheard to say
to the king, " This is too much ! " and yet they both came

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 87
forward to the balcony and returned his salute, and received
him with marked expressions of attention. General Morla (now
Governor of Cadiz), who attended the Prince of Peace, did
not take off his hat, though the prince told him to do so,
and reminded him that he was standing in the presence of the
king. Yet this insolence passed unnoticed.
The queen has long dreaded him ; but, whether from the remains
of old attachment, or from the extreme ascendency he has
acquired over her, she certainly overturned the scheme which
in Urquizo's Ministry had been prepared for his destruction.
It is a singular fact, and perfectly agrees with what I have
before mentioned, that, notwithstanding his seeming omni-
potency, he has never been able to unite in his person the
administration of the War Department and the command of
the army. The queen, who was alarmed at this union of
powers, prevailed upon the king to resist it ; the prince was
baffled, and the office has been held for this year and a half
in commendam by the Minister of Justice, who was bred a
lawyer, and is no more acquainted with military affairs than
other lawyers usually are.
He is certainly at this moment indisposed towards France,
though he entertains at the sarae time an excessive distrust of
the British Government, the effect of the former calumnies of
the French. I believe I mentioned to your Lordship once that
he was seriously persuaded that the British Government had
employed persons to poison or assassinate him. This notion,
which appears so absurd in England, is not so here, owing, as
I find, to the extreme frequency of the former crime.
This distrust is so powerful, that though I have reason to believe
that he proposes to send a secret mission to England, I am in
doubt whether I should venture to propose such a step for him
for fear of exciting some suspicion of collusion between me and
the person whom he might propose to employ. Suspicion and
distrust are, as I am informed, the characteristic qualities of
his nature, which betray themselves in the management of his
domestic concerns ; and in other matters of trifling import this
quality (as is naturally to be expected from his situation) is
daily gaining ground. His vanity, which was one of the chief
instruments which the French formerly made use of, by exciting

88 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
his jealousy of the reputation of the British minister, has now
taken an opposite direction, and has made him equally impa
tient of the celebrity of Bonaparte. There is, too, I beHeve, a
good deal in the physical antipathy which must exist between
two creatures of such opposite natures : the one gross, sensual,
and iUiterate, eating, drinking, digesting, and in the full enjoy
ment of animal life; the other valetudinary in constitution,
romantic and pedantic, and reraoved at an equal distance on
the other side of the line of propriety and good taste.
It is certain that he hates Bonaparte as much for the means by
which he has risen, as the other must despise him for those by
which he has done so. I was so persuaded of this that I
ventured to touch upon the point in the short conversation
which we had together, when he questioned me as to my
opinion on the continuance of peace. I answered, " Que
voulez-vous ? Qui peut rdpondre des volontes d'un homme,
qui ne boit ni ne mange, qui est agite par un malaise physique,
et qui ne peut rester en repos pour nous aprfes les sacrifices que
nous avons fait pour obtenir la paix? Vous pouvez etre sflr
que nous serious bien faches de les avoir fait gratuitement"
The way in which he received this convinced me that I was right
Supposing this jealousy and antipathy to have their full effect,
and the jealousy and distrust on the other side to be got over,
the Prince of Peace would still have to combat the intrigues
and influence ofthe queen, who would dread the idea of seeing
hira invested with such an authority as would be necessary for
carrying into execution any measure of vigour or effect, from
the well-grounded apprehension that the exercise of this
authority would shortly be directed against herself As far as
I can venture to judge, this is the obstacle the most likely to
prove fatalto any project for the emancipation of Spain. In
addition to this must be taken into consideration the levity of
the Prince of Peace's character, and the possibility that at any
tirae, in a moment of vanity or pique, he might suffer the most
important secret to escape hira ; which he would no sooner
have done than he would immediately set about to crush and
destroy his accomplices, in order to efface the suspicions which
his own imprudence had excited.
I ought not to omit to mention to your Lordship, that after

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 89
speaking with some feeling of the manner in which Azara had
been treated, he expressed to me his surprise that our ambas
sador at Paris should have put up with some slights which he
understood had been passed upon him. As the subject was one
upon which I had no information, I did not follow it ; but I was
struck with the circumstance of his expressing an anxiety for
the support of British dignity.
1 shall endeavour to point out to him the propriety of sending a
secret and confidential mission to Vienna, where the minister is
a mere sensualist and completely null. This step is no less
desirable than the mission to England, as it is evident that, if
Spain were to attempt to mutiny, even with the utmost assist
ance of Great Britain, she would only draw down ruin upon
herself, as the Government would not have the courage to bear
up against the first reverses which they must naturally expect,
nor the foresight to perceive that Spain, with the national spirit
which prevails in the country, with the antipathy to France, the
military passion of the people, and its various local advantages,
is, in fact, a country which can never be conquered, except by
the weakness or connivance of its Government. They would
probably, at the end of the first campaign, conclude a peace
which would leave the country a conquest in the hands of
France. In the present moment the suspicion of such an
intention would be attended with the most fatal consequences.
We must bear in mind that an attempt to rescue Spain from her
present situation is, in fact, a conspiracy against the established
authority of France, and that its discovery would be attended
with the same effects as the discovery of any other conspiracy;
namely, the ruin of every individual concerned in it. It must
therefore (if ever such a scheme can be set on foot) be treated
in the same manner; nothing, or at least as Htde as possible,
must be committed to writing, and everything must be con
ducted by the verbal communication of confidential persons.
I take this opportunity to mention to your Lordship that the
suspicion which was excited by a passage of Azara's letter, a copy
of which I transmitted from Lisbon near two years ago, is much
strengthened by what I have found to be the impression here;
namely, that our secrets have been betrayed. An emigrant
here, a relation of Portalis's, was constantly in possession of

go LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
good information, which he was understood, and which, I
believe, with the usual vanity of his nation, he professed to
derive through his relation with that source.
I will now proceed to give your Lordship some account of the
reraaining principal personages. The Prince of Asturias is
about eighteen years old, lively, affable, unembarrassed, and
pleasing in his manners, in countenance and complexion re
sembling his raother. His political sentiraents have not been
declared sufficiently to be spoken of with certainty, but he is
not known to have given any tokens of predilection for the
French ; and this alone, considering the circumstances of the
times, may be considered as a favourable symptom. He usually
speaks slightingly of the Prince of Peace, sometimes calling him
the " Garde de Corps" and sometimes the " Senhorito," which
is about equivalent to "foli Cceur" in French, or "pretty young
gentleman " in English. His innocence and simplicity on cer
tain points were so great as to have produced a very ludicrous
erabarrassraent on the occasion of his marriage. This however
will, in all probability, be soon effectually removed, as some
of his attendants are occupied in plying him with all sorts of
pestilent books upon this principle, which I give in their own
words : " Puisque enfin nous devons etre gouvem^s par les
feraraes, il faut d'abord lui gater le cceur." The princess his
wife is a little fair figure, seeraingly of a delicate constitution,
nearly handsome, much resembling the pictures of her mother,
said to be very observant, and sometimes satirical.
I will now conclude, entreating your Lordship to believe that I am,
with great truth and respect.
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant, H. Frere.
With such rulers there could be no long interruption of
the influence exercised over Spain by a neighbour of so
unyielding a will as the First Consul. In his eyes his
allies ceased to be friends the moment that they were
unwilling to be slaves ; and, though the whole course of the
negotiations of the preceding winter had shown him that
any new encroachments on his part would excite a feeling
of alarm which must endanger the continuance of peace,

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 9'
yet the ratifications were hardly exchanged before he began
to show that his appetite for a further extension of his
authority and for additional acquisitions of territory was
alike unsatiated and unchecked. Every month brought
forth fresh instances of his disregard for the spirit, and
often for the letter, of the recent treaty. He began by
exacting from the Sultan permission for French merchant-
ships to navigate the Black Sea on the same footing as
ships "of the most favoured nation." He even pressed
for such a liberty being allowed to French ships of war,
though armed ships of every other country were excluded,
and was with difficulty induced to recede from that pre
tension. And, at the very same moment that he was
demanding these favours from the Porte, there was reason
to believe that he was endeavouring to tempt others to
co-operate with him in the dismemberment of the Turkish
empire,^ that he might obtain a port in the Mediterranean
nearer to Egypt than Malta, in case he failed to recover
his influence over that island.
Mr. Merry next reported that he was equipping a power
ful fleet in Toulon. The preparation of a naval force could
hardly be meant to menace any other Power but ourselves;
and before the end of the summer fresh extensions of his
power along the Italian coast supplied additional evidence
what the object of that armament really was. In August,
as has been already mentioned, he procured the pro
longation of his consular authority for his life ; and though,
as Mr. Merry reported, the discontent which the measure
really produced in France was "smothered by fear," it was
' On the 1 6th of June Mr. Merry wrote to Lord Hawkesbury that
he had additional reason to believe the reports of a design having
been formed by the French Government for the dismemberment of
Turkey, and of such a plan having made a part of the discussions in
which the Russian minister had been so closely engaged. But M. de
Marcoff had lately received an answer on the subject by which the
Emperor of Russia appears to have disapproved the plan, and to have
expressed a desire that the integrity of the Turkish empire should
be maintained. According to the plan proposed, France was to have
had the Morea.

92 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
impossible for other countries to fail to see in such a
measure increased means of bending France to his absolute
will, and so making himself more formidable to his neigh
bours. Accordingly the next month witnessed the com
mencement of a series of encroachments which were
manifestly incompatible with the preservation of peace,
being in fact so many steps designed to strengthen him
for the renewal of the war on which he was bent. In the
beginning of September he issued a decree annexing Pied
mont to France, on the shameless plea that no article
in the treaties of Luneville or Amiens had forbidden him
to do so ; and he instantly began to secure his hold over
his new province by cutting new roads across the Alps. A
week or two later he seized on Parma and Piacenza, and
took possession also of Elba, that little island which after
wards became so conspicuous a monument of his fall.
The same month he dissolved the existing constitution of
the Batavian Republic by open force of arms, not because
its Legislature, which was indeed of his own creation, was
not sufficiently obsequious to his will, but merely that it
might be modelled for the future more exactly on the plan
of the French Republic. And in the first days of October
he despatched his favourite aide-de-camp. General Rapp,
to Lausanne, to announce to the rulers of the Helvetian
Republic that their Government also was dissolved, and
that the First Consul took upon himself to settle the
differences which existed between the different countries
by his own "efficacious mediation." The Swiss implored
the protection and assistance of Great Britain. But their
country was so placed that, had we been ever so much
inclined to aid them with troops, it would have been
impossible to do so. We could only remonstrate with the
French Government for its tyrannical interference with the
constitution of a free country, and promise the Swiss them
selves pecuniary succour in case they should resolve on
making an armed resistance, which they soon found to be
impracticable. Buonaparte sent Ney, one of the greatest

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 93
of his generals, to overrun and subdue the country, and at
the beginning of the following year promulgated a new con
stitution, which in fact made him master of Switzerland.
It was obvious that these manifold encroachments of
the First Consul, these extensions of the power of France
in every direction, had made so great a change in the
state of Europe since the signature of the Treaty of
Amiens as entirely nullified our obligation to complete
the cessions to which we had engaged ourselves. To
give additional force to the representations which we
decided on making on the subject, we replaced Mr. Merry
by an ambassador of higher rank. Lord Whitworth ;
and a despatch which Lord Hawkesbury addressed to
him on his appointment sets in the clearest possible light
the line of policy on which the Cabinet had resolved,
and the grounds by which our resolution to retain those
conquests which, under a different state of affairs, we
had been willing to restore, was abundantly justified.
Most secret and confidential. TO LORD whitworth.
My Lord, November 14th.
I take the first opportunity of communicating to your Excellency,
for the regulation of your conduct, the instructions which his
Majesty is pleased to give you on such points as are at present
subjects of difference between his Majesty and the French
Government, and to desire that you will endeavour to conform
yourself to them in all your conversations with the French
ministers.
You will lose no proper opportunity of expressing his Majesty's
earnest solicitude for the preservation of the peace which sub
sists between the two countries; his disposition to do every
thing in his power for that purpose which is consistent with the
honour of his crown and the interests of his dominions ; and
his regret at any circumstances which may have arisen to
interrupt that harmony and good understanding which is so
important to the welfare and happiness of both countries. You
will, however, state most distincdy his Majesty's determination

94 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
never to forego his right of interfering in the affairs of the Con
tinent on every occasion in which the interests of his own
dominions, or those of Europe in general, may appear to him
to require it. This right his Majesty possesses in common vrith
every other independent Power ; it rests upon general prin
ciples, and does not require the confirmation of any particular
treaty. It is nevertheless iraportant that you should observe
that the circumstances which led to the last peace, and the
principles upon which the negotiation was conducted, would
give his Majesty a special right to interpose in any case which
might lead to the extension of the power or influence of France.
In the comraunications which took place between the two
Governraents previous to the signature of the preHminary
articles, his Majesty proposed, as the basis of negotiation, that,
if the French Governraent would not relinquish the continental
acquisitions which they had obtained from other Powers in the
course of war, his Majesty would claim the right of keeping
a part of his conquests as a compensation for the important
acquisitions of territory made by France upon the Continent.
This principle was formally recognised by the French Govern
ment in an official note in the following words : " Cependant
on reconnoit que les grandes ^v&emens survenus en Europe et
les changemens arrives dans les territoires des grands Etats du
Continent peuvent autoriser une partie des demandes du Gou
vernement Britannique." The terras of the treaty of peace were
negotiated in conforraity to this basis ; and it appears therefore
clear that the then existing state of possession and of engage
ments as respects the Continent were the foundations of the
peace itself and that his Majesty has therefore an undoubted
right to interpose, in consequence of the treaty, in every case
in which the state of possession may appear to him to have
undergone any raaterial alteration, or in which the engagements
which were then subsisting have been violated to the prejudice
of his Majesty or of the other Powers of Europe. You will
proceed to observe that the annexation of Piedmont to France
since the conclusion of the definitive treaty makes a most
material difference in the state of the fixed and permanent pos
sessions of France. That the renunciation of the Duchy of
Parma in favour of France, a circumstance which was con-

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 95
cealed at the time of negotiating the peace, and which is
become of the greatest importance from its furnishing an
additional instance of that system of secret cession which is
totally inconsistent with any system of security for Europe,
makes a most essential difference likewise in the relative cir
cumstances of the two countries. That at the time of concluding
the peace the French Government were bound by the most
sacred engagements to respect the independence of the Helve
tian and Batavian Republics, and to ahow the people of those
countries to choose whatever form of government they might
think proper. That the violation of this right in the Swiss
people, and the invasions of their territory, notwithstanding the
representation made in their favour by his Majesty, makes a
most material alteration in the state of engagements since the
conclusion of the definitive treaty, and adds most considerably
to the influence and the power of France, to the prejudice of a
state which was then acknowledged as independent. That the
conduct of the French Government to the Batavian Republic
was not less objectionable ; that the independence of this
republic was acknowledged both by the Treaty of Luneville
and by the Treaty of the Hague ; the French Government were
permitted to keep garrisons in that country only till the time of
a general peace. That by a convention signed in August iSoi,
the French troops were to remain there till the conclusion of
the definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and France.
That the French troops have not to this period evacuated the
country, and that the First Consul is represented lately to have
declared, " That in the event of any differences among the
people of that country on the subject of their internal govern
ment, he would march with his whole army to suppress them.''
That this is an obvious violation of the independence of the
Batavian Republic, and that his Majesty has a peculiar right to
interpose on the present occasion, as he consented to make
numerous and most important restitutions to the Batavian
Government in the treaty of peace, on the consideration ol
that Government being independent and not being subject to
any foreign control.
It is unnecessary for me to recommend to your Excellency to
make these representations with moderation and temper. You

96 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
will attend very particularly to any explanations which may be
given you respecting thera, and you will engage to report such
explanations to his Majesty's Government.
You will avoid, with peculiar caution, committing his Majesty's
Government as to what may be their ultimate determination
upon all or any of these points ; viz. whether under any cir
cumstances an unsatisfactory explanation respecting them might
lead to war on the part of his Majesty ; whether it might in
duce his Majesty to claim some additional acquisition to coun
terbalance the acquisitions of France, or whether it might be
thought most prudent for the present to acquiesce. His
Majesty's conduct in this respect must be determined by a
variety of considerations, and particularly by the information
which he may receive of the sentiments and intentions of the
other European Powers.
It is natural to suppose that the French rainisters will take an
early opportunity of bringing forward, at least in conversation,
any grievance which they may choose to allege against his
Majesty's Government ; and I have no doubt the most promi
nent will be the complaints which they have so often advanced
already respecting the liberty of the press in this country, and
the conduct of the French emigrants who are resident here.
Upon these subjects it is unnecessary for me to do more than
to refer you to my despatch to Mr. Merry (No. 20), and to
desire that you would strictly conform yourself to the in
structions therein contained. In the event, however, of any
conversation upon this subject, it is material that you should
remark on the paragraphs which have lately appeared in the
Moniteur, calumniating his Majesty's Government, and that
you should dwell particularly on the distinction existing be
tween paragraphs of this nature appearing in a paper avowedly
official and the paragraphs in our English publications, over
which the Governraent of this country have no previous con
trol, and which have been. repeatedly and expUcitly disavowed
by his Majesty's Government.
If the French Government should enter into any conversation
with you on the subject of the Island of Malta, it is of great
importance that you should avoid committing his Majesty as
to what may be eventually his intentions with respect to that

i8o2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 97
island. It is evident that the arrangements stipulated in the
twentieth article of the definitive treaty cannot as yet be
carried into effect. That neither the Governments of St.
Petersburg or of Berlin have given any decisive answer to the
appHcation that has been made to them to become guarantying
Powers of the arrangement.
That according to the article the Grand Master must be chosen
before there can be any person properly authorised to receive
possession of the island. That Prince Ruspoli has declined
the situation of Grand Master, and that it will be necessary,
therefore, for the Pope to make some other selection.
I recommend to you, however, to avoid saying anything which
may engage his Majesty to restore the island, even if these
arrangements should be completed according to the true intent
and spirit of the tenth article of the Treaty of Amiens. His
Majesty would certainly be justified in claiming the possession
of Malta as some counterpoise to the acquisitions of France
since the conclusion of the definitive treaty ; but it is not
necessary to decide in the present moment whether his Majesty
will be desirous to avail himself of his pretensions in this
respect. It would be better, therefore, that you should not
bring the subject of Malta forward at present, unless it should
be first mentioned by the French ministers. You will then
conform yourself to the instructions above stated, and you will
be very particular in representing to me everything which may
pass upon this important subject.
I shall not fail to inform your Excellency from time to time of
the substance of the conversations which may take place between
General Andrfessi and myself, as it is of the utmost importance
that your language to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs
should correspond as much as possible with mine to the
French Ambassador. Yours truly, Hawkesbury.
Lord Hawkesbury, at the same time, entered into full
explanations with the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg,
v/hich were not without influence in the subsequent course
of events. But he doubted whether, even if those Govern
ments were to give the most open sanction and support
VOL. I. H

98 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1802
to our view.s, Buonaparte would be induced to recede in
the least from the path of aggressive ambition on which
he had entered. There was, as he wrote to his father,
perhaps some little encouragement to be derived from
the character of the new French ambassador. General
Andr^ossi, who succeeded M. Otto when Lord Whitworth
superseded Mr. Merry ; and whom Otto represented as a
man "of very moderate principles, and very strongly
inclined to the preservation of peace." Otto assured Lord
Hawkesbury that the General " would pay very littie
attention to Talleyrand, and that he had obtained the
privilege of corresponding directly with the First Consul,"'
while Lord Hawkesbury " had also reason to know that
Andr^ossi had expressed his disapprobation as to what
had been done in Switzerland, and had even said that
Buonaparte was aware that he had gone too far"
The Parliament which met on the i6th of November
was a new one, and a fortnight afterwards Lord Hawkes
bury began to entertain rather more sanguine hopes of
being able to preserve peace ; while, at the same time,
he thought the House of Commons inclined to judge
' Though of course this was not known to the English Cabinet, the
selection of General Andr^ossi had been the act of Buonaparte him
self, and was not at all approved by Talleyrand. De Bourrienne
relates an amusing scene between the First Consul and the minister
in connexion with the appointment. " Le soir meme M. de Talley
rand vint travailler avec lui ; nous Ations k la Malmaison. 11 fut
question de la nomination d'un ambassadeur en Angleterre : le Premier
Consul nomma plusieurs personnes, et dit ensuite, 'J'ai envie de
nommer Andr^ossi.' M. de Talleyrand, qui n'^tait pas bien dispose
pour ce choix, lui rdpondit d'un air spirituel et malin : ' Vous voulez
nommer Andr^ aussi ! Quel est done cet Andrd?' ' Je ne vous parle
pas d'un Andrd, je vous parle d'Andr^ossi ; est-ce que vous ne le con-
naissez pas? Pardieu, Andrdossi, g^n^ral d'artillerie.' 'Andr^ossil
ah, oui, oui, c'est vrai, Andr^ossi. Je n'y pensais pas ; je cherchais dans
la diplomatie, et je ne I'y trouvais pas. C'est vrai ; oui, oui, c'est vrai,
il est dans I'artillerie.' Le Premier Consul parla alors du G&^ral
Andrdossi de manifere k faire voir k M. de Talleyrand qu'il d^signait ce
gdndral d'artillerie pour I'ambassade k Londres." (De Bourrienne, iv.
32, p. 343-)

i802] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 99
favorably of and to support the Ministry, whatever might
happen. He writes to his father : —
The House was rather flat, but this I have observed is generally
the case with a new Parliament; a great proportion of the
members who attend being new members, who are unac
quainted with the ways of the House, and who cannot be
expected to give much encouragement to any party. There
is certainly much room for political intrigue, as there are
various parties in the House, and each of them inclined to
pursue a system of its own. I understand, however, from Mr.
Addington, that his assurances of support from country gen
tlemen are as satisfactory as he could possibly expect
The conduct of Government with respect to France is certainly
approved of in general, both in and out of Parliament. The
prevailing sentiment appears to be considerable irritation with
respect to the conduct of France, but a strong desire to avoid
war if possible. Our next debate will probably take place on
the army estimates. It is intended to vote very large estab
lishments : 35,000 men will be proposed for Great Britain,
25,000 for Ireland ; 5,000 for Jamaica, 10,000 for the Leeward
Islands, 8,000 for Gibraltar and Malta, 7,000 for North
America and Canada, and 14,000 for the East Indies.
Sanguine hopes are entertained that, from the flourishing state
of the revenue, a force to this extent may be kept up without
the necessity of imposing any new taxes, or at least without
imposing any that can be material. I do not hear when
Mr. Pitt is likely to come up 
The intelligence from St. Domingo in the Moniteur is certainly
far short of the tmth. Andr&ssi acknowledged to me that
they had lost fourteen generals. Lord Nelson told me yes
terday that he had had a private letter from Admiral Duck
worth, who is on the Jamaica station, and who says that, with
every effort of perseverance on the part of the French Govern
ment, it would require fifty years at least to restore the island
to anything like its former state of prosperity. And, for this
and other reasons, I am inclined to think that the French
Government will not be disposed to seek a quarrel with us.
But the extraordinary, and in some respects extravagant, cha-
H 2

loo LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
racter of Buonaparte makes all reasoning on this subject more
than usually doubtful. The ministers in foreign courts are all
aware of this. Andrdossi said to me the other day, "Dans
tout ce qu'on fait il y a beaucoup qui tient au personnel."
Lord Hawkesbury and his chief did not miscalculate
as to the inclination of the House to support the Ministry.
Fox indeed soon withdrew the aid which he had given
it in the debate on the peace, and expressed a decided
opposition to the increase in the war estimates : but he
was followed by so few, even Sheridan resolutely differing
from the views which he advanced, that he did not venture
to divide against it, and the general feeling seemed evi
dently to be that expressed by the old proverb, "Si vis
pacem para bellum," that to show a readiness for war was
the most likely mode to avoid being dragged into one.
And except that the Ministry, and especially Lord Hawkes
bury himself, began to feel uneasiness ,about Pitt's con
tinuance of support,^ the state of affairs at home looked
as promising as they could desire. The year 1803 opened
' As early as January 9th, 1803, Lord Hawkesbury writes to his
father, that "though Pitt professed himself friendly to Government,
and determined to continue his support of them, he certainly passes a
great part of his time with those who are hostile in every way to the
present Administration" (he means especially his own particular friend
Canning), " and who have succeeded in impressing him with the idea
that it is not for his credit to be supposed to be in the confidence of
Government and a party to their measures when he has no share of
either power or responsibility. I understand, however" (the letter
continues), " that he is decidedly adverse to the acceptance of office.
What all this will produce it is difficult to say. I confess I think it
scarcely possible that under a.n.y probable circumstances he is likely to
be induced to oppose Government, but it is possible he may be per
suaded to start doubts and take distinctions which would have the
effect of embarrassing Government, and of shaking the confidence of
the public in them." It is remarkable that in April of this year Mr.
Addington told the Speaker " that in January intimation came to him
on the part of Mr. Pitt that Mr. Pitt was less disincUned to retum to
power, and that Mr. Addington had told Steele, Perceval, and others
of Mr. Pitt's friends that he (Mr. Addington) would be no obstacle to
so desirable an end." (Diary of Lord Colchester, i. 413.)

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, loi
peacefully, and Lord Whitworth's account of the First
Consul's reception of the diplomatic body on New Year's
day reads like a narrative of similar assemblies of more
recent date. " The subject of his general conversation
turned chiefly on philanthropy. He congratulated him
self, as if he had in part contributed to it, on the improved
state of civilization and social happiness, not only in France,
but throughout Europe ; but lamented that every Govern
ment should have adopted more or less the pernicious sys
tem of maintaining such enormous standing armies, adding
that it was a pity they would not all agree to reduce them
at least two-thirds. I observed that one good example
would have more effect than the best reasoning." Lord
Whitworth became daily more and more convinced that
the great body of the French people, and especially of the
Parisians, were most strongly averse to a renewal of the
war. The hotel which had been taken for him he found
in need of considerable repairs, which he was now exe
cuting; and the citizens watched the works with the
greatest interest, judging of his expectation of the pro-
babihties of a continued peace by the willingness which
he might show to incur expense, which, if his embassy
should be brought to an early termination by hostilities,
would be wasted. Much, he thought, depended on our
coming to a good understanding with Russia, which had
a peculiar interest in the question of Malta, from the
proposal which had been made to the Czar, both by
France and England, to place that island under his
especial protection. And a naval officer of high repu
tation, Sir J. B. Warren, was sent to St. Petersburg to
endeavour to stir the Government of that country to an
early declaration of its resolution. But to obtain a
positive answer of any kind from the Russian Ministry
at that time was impossible. They feared France while
they hated it. A letter from M. Sablonkoff, a Russian
noble then residing at Paris, to the Count Alexander
Woronzow, the Russian Chancellor, whose confidence he

ICE LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
enjoyed, which fell into the hands of our Government,
showed them that this feeling predominated over every
other ;^ and Buonaparte spared no pains, by personal
caresses of and a show of confidence in the Russian
diplomatists and nobles in Paris, to gain them over to
his secret views, which were already as hostile to England,
and as ambitious and grasping, as when, four years later,
he was able to compel Alexander's adhesion to them
at Tilsit.
With this knowledge Lord Hawkesbury had no difficulty
in inducing his colleagues to delay the evacuation of
Malta ; and he received the King's approval in a curious
letter, which shows that, with all his straightforward honesty
and frankness, George III. was not a stranger to the diplo
matic arts of evasion and procrastination :
January 28th, 1803.
The King has read the proposed note to be delivered by Sir
John Warren to the Chancellor, Count Woronzow, in answer
to the one transmitted by him on the subject of Malta. The
great object of the answer should be to protract the evacuation
as long as possible, from the manifest views France nourishes
^ The date was February 9, 1803, and M. Sablonkoff 's language
seems to have been only a reflection of Woronzow's language to him.
He says : " Ce que vous m'avez dit de la France n'est que trop vrai.
Ce pays, quoique dans la misfere, est cependant bien k craindre. Un
peuple Idger et vicieux, dirigd par une bande de magistrals cupides
et liches, qu'un ambitieux fortune maitrise, est une hydro dont toutes
les tStes sont ^galement dangereuses. Je le r^p^te, la France est un
monstre qu'on ne saurait assez redouter." Further on the letter says,
" Le g^n^ral Hitroff a eu une presentation privde au Premier Consul.
II lui a remis une lettre de I'Empereur. Avec une lettre comme celle-
Ik on est sur d'etre bien regu. Je donnerai des ordres pour que tout
vous soit ouvert et montr^. II a tenu Hitroff pendant plus d'une heure.
II lui a, entr'autres choses, parld de son indignation contre la conduite
infdme des Anglais pendant leur coalition avec les Russes, et a fini le
dialogue par dire que la France et la'Russie dtaient trop eloign^es
pour se faire la guerre. Et qu'elles sont faites pour etre amies. ' Je
r^ponds qu'k nous deux nous donnerons la loi k I'Europe enti^re, au
globe entier.' Hitroff m'a paru enchant^ de son esprit, mais dtonnd de
son despotisme : toujoursy^, inoi, partout mon"

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 103
of fresh expeditions to the East. The King trusts this note
will open a tedious negotiation, which is certainly the line at
present most suitable to the tranquillity of the globe. It is
supposed that Lord Hawkesbury will give at a proper time
notice to Count Simon Woronzow'^ of the step which has been
taken, as his good or bad disposition towards the measure will
at the present moment have great weight at his Court ; and,
though it may be feared that no great activity can be expected
from the Court of Russia, it is desirable to get her as much
interested in the question, and as closely connected with this
country, as apparent cordiality from henc6 can effect. George R.
January did not pass without Buonaparte affording fresh
indications of how little sincerity there was in his pro
fessions of a desire to maintain peace, and fresh specimens
of his discourteous arrogance towards every other nation.
In the autumn he had sent M. Sebastiani, a general whose
abilities were not confined to his own profession, to Egypt,
nominally to re-establish the French commerce with that
country on the footing on which it had stood before the
war, but really to efface that impression of our superior
power which had been produced by the inglorious end of
his own expedition to that country, and to tamper with
the Pachas and other officers of the Porte. And he now
pubHshed in the Moniteur a report which the general had
just addressed to him, in the highest degree insulting and
injurious to England ; accusing the English Government
and diplomatists of intriguing against those Turkish
officials who were friendly to France, and the English
Commander-in-chief, General Stuart, of instigating his own
assassination; giving a most precise account of our force
in that country, but disparaging its condition and manage
ment in every particular, affirming that " a great mis
understanding existed between General Stuart and the
^ The brother of the Chancellor, and at this time the Russian
ambassador in London.

I04 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
Pacha," and concluding with an assertion that "6,000
French would at present be enough to conquer Egypt."
Since it was evident that the attempt on Egypt thus
suggested, and, as the publication of the report showed,
not disapproved of, would be greatly facilitated by our
removal from Malta, it of course made us the more resolute
not to relinquish our hold on that important island while
matters remained in such a state of uncertainty ; and that
determination was strengthened by every fresh instance of
anxiety displayed on the subject by the First Consul. At
the same time Buo'naparte was taking a singular step with
a view to consolidate his own power, or rather to force the
way to his attainment of the higher rank which he coveted,
by seeking to bribe the Count de L'Isle, as the next brother
of the last king was now styled, into a resignation of his
rights as legitimate heir to the French throne, by the offer
of a princely establishment in some other country,^ which
* The proposal and the reply made by the French prince are recorded
by Alison, xxxv. § 84. But that author, who mistakes the place of
Louis's abode at the time, does not seem to have been aware that the
King of Prussia pressed its acceptance on Louis, was willing to gua
rantee the performance of the conditions, and expected to be able to
prevail on the Czar to add his guarantee also. In spite of the desire
of Louis to keep the transaction secret, it soon became known to Lord
Hawkesbury, who received copies of the correspondence ; and the
following letter of Louis to his brother (afterwards Charles X.) on the
subject will not be without interest : — " A Varsovie, ce 2 Mars, 1803.
" Voici, mon cher frfere, un incident auquel j'imagine que vous ne
vous attendiez gu&res. B. P. g4td d'un cotd par la fortune, sentant
de I'autre combien peu solide est une usurpation opposde k d'impr^-
scriptibles droits, a osd croire qu'il pourrait nous determiner k vendre
les notres. Le Roi de Prusse, auquel il s'est ouvert sur ses projets, n'a
pu se dispenser de me transmettre cette ouverture. Ici pour m'dpargner
des details je laisse parler les pieces'' (a copy of the proposal and of
the reply made in writing by Louis to M. le President de Meyer, who
had been sent from Berlin with the proposal, and had just opened
himself on the subject to the Abbe Edgeworth).
'• Je n'essayerai pas de vous peindre les divers sentimens qui se sont
eieves en moi. Vous les eprouverez. Vous jugerez, comme moi, qu'il
y aurait de I'avantage k publier tout ceci. Mais souvenez-vous que les

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. loj
should be guaranteed by the King of Prussia. Though
both parties desired to keep it secret, it could not long be
concealed from us; and the knowledge of Buonaparte's
disappointment rather increased Lord Hawkesbury's ex
pectations of being able to avoid a rupture .without
relinquishing Malta, which he had now entirely resolved,
at least for the present, not to do. This belief was further
strengthened by a step of M. Otto, which it was impossible
to suppose had been taken without the privity of the
First Consul He was now at Paris ; and availed himself
of his previous official acquaintance with the Secretary
for Foreign Affairs to write him a private and confidential
letter (as if a minister in Lord Hawkesbury's position
could possibly receive one of such a character from a
diplomatist in the employ of the French Government).
Avowing his sole object to be the maintenance of peace,
he sought to coax the English minister over to his, or
rather to Buonaparte's, views ; assuring him that " Malta
could not be retained by England without becoming the
justes egards dus au Souverain qui me donne asile m'ont determine k
garder le silence ; et imitez ma reserve. J'excepte cependant de cette
loi votre fils cadet, et MM. le Due d'Orieans, le Due de Montpensier,
le Comte de Beaujolais, le Prince de Conde, et le Due de Bourbon. Ceci
n'est pas une simple confiance d'amitie entre fr^res. Si jamais le mot
de feu M. le Prince de Conty, ' La couronne nous appartient k tous,
notre atne la porte,' fut applicable k un cas, c'est k celui-ci, et vous
voyez par ce que votre fils aine a ecrit au bas de ma note que je I'ai le
premier instruit de I'affaire. Je n'ecris point en particulier k chacun
des autres, cela est inutile, puisque je vous charge de leur faire part
de ce qui se passe. Prescrivez leur egalement silence et en mon nom.
Quant aux reponses k la proposition, soit qu'elles soient faites en
commun, soit que chacun fasse individuellement la sienne, il faudra
me les addresser, mais doubles, afin que j'en garde une, et que je fasse
passer I'autre en original au Roi de Prusse.
" Vous n'avez pas besoin de conseil, mais je ne puis me refuser k
une reflexion, c'est que la moderation dans les formes accroit la force
du fonds. Le tems, mon ami, devoile tout : ceci sera done connu un
jour, et j'ose me flatter que ce chapitre ne defacera pas notre histoire.
" Adieu, mon cher fr^re, je vous aime et vous embrasse de tout mon
cceur. " Louis Antoine."

io6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
immediate cause of war : this was the firm opinion, not
only of the First Consul, but of every man in the (French)
Administration, and, he might add, of every French citi
zen who loved his country, and who felt any regard for
the dignity of its government. In fact, the Treaty of
Amiens resolved itself into a convention about Malta." ,
An underhand attempt like this on the part of the First
Consul to carry his point by private solicitation naturally
led to the suspicion that he was more unwilling to have
recourse to hostilities than he wished us to believe. Lord
Whitworth's report of the general state of feeling in France
was very different from M. Otto's account of it. The
ambassador reported "that the general opinion of the
most sober and sensible people, particularly in the class
of senators, was decidedly against the First Consul. That
they were persuaded that England was right ; and that,
if we were forced to have recourse to hostilities, we should
be driven to that necessity by his restless and mad ambi
tion." And in the middle of March, on the very same
day on which Buonaparte had collected a Court in his
wife's apartments, for the express purpose of publicly
attacking the British ambassador on the subject,^ Lord
Whitworth received a most singular proof that even those
most nearly connected with the First Consul differed from
the resolution which he entertained, or at least expressed,
on the subject. The occurrence was so extraordinary
that he would not venture to send his report by his own
messenger except in cypher :
Most secret and confidential. Paris, 14th March, 1803.
My Lord,
A person entirely in the confidence of M. Lucien Buonaparte has
commissioned a gentleman ^ who frequently visits me, and in
1 " Au cercle de Madame Buonaparte il a saisi I'occasion d'exprimer
sa juste indignation devant une assembiee faite pour donner de I'eclat
k ses paroles." — Correspondance de Napoleon I. viii. 250 (Letter to
General Hedouville, dated March 16, 1803).
^ M. Huber, a Swiss gentleman.

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 107
whom I place confidence, to suggest to me the possibility of
engaging the First Consul to consent to our keeping possession
of Malta ; that is to say, his family might perhaps be induced, for
a valuable consideration, to obtain his consent to our retaining
that possession. It is not meant that the First Consul would
sell us Malta. But his relatives, who have such an interest in
preserving the peace, might, by such means, be engaged to
exert their influence over him for that purpose. And, in order
to satisfy the First Consul, and to palliate the transaction, at
the same time that a sacrifice of money is made to their avarice,
some offer might be made to the pride of the First Consul,
such as the acknowledgment of any Government not yet
acknowledged, or assistance in shipping, or any other way in
the recovering his authority at St. Domingo.
I throw this out to your Lordship as it was thrown out to me. In
the present state of the business it cannot be kept too secret ;
and I should very much recommend that it be communicated
only to Mr. Addington and Lord Liverpool. I am sure that
your Lordship would feel the inconvenience of its being
submitted to the Cabinet. I have, &c. &c. Whitworth.
It must be added that, though he had no doubt of
the sincerity of Lucien in the matter, and indeed there
could be but little question of the eagerness of every
member of the First Consul's family to promote the success
of any transaction calculated to enrich themselves,^ Lord
Whitworth had no great confidence in the efficacy of the
means proposed. Three days afterwards he writes, that
though "such an advantage could not be too dearly
purchased," and though " in such a matter parsimony would
defeat its own end, he was, however, at the same time far
from satisfied that the thing was practicable. Those who
undertook it would have to contend with every obstacle
which pride and revenge could oppose to them." At the
^ The Memoires of De Bourrienne, which indeed are corroborated
by more than one passage in the Napoleon Correspondence, are full
of stories proving the inordinate rapacity of all Buonaparte's relatives
and connexions.

io8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
same time he was " persuaded that, after the First Consul
had vented his ill-humour, and- when he should come to
reflect on the little advantage to be gained by a war
with England, and on the slender means he possessed of
engaging in it, we should find him more tractable." Cir
cumstances, however, varied every day, and our ambas
sador's opinion of them was necessarily subject to the same
fluctuations. A week after his first letter, he forwarded
another despatch, using the same precautions for secrecy,
and reporting that " It was now thought that the family
of the First Consul would not be strong enough to stand
alone the brunt of his violence and obstinacy. It had
been judged, therefore, that the gaining over Talleyrand
would be more likely to ensure success." He was to be
sounded in a day or two, and Lord Whitworth thought
that, " when his personal interest was so strongly engaged,
we might depend on his zealous support." Lord Hawkes
bury, in his reply to the first intimation of this plan, had
intimated a willingness to give Lucien 100,000/. This
Lord Whitworth thought would be far too small a sum,
but added, though as yet the parties had not specified
what they expected, that, even though the expense should
prove considerable, we were at least sure that that of one
campaign, or even a long continuance of the present
demonstration, would be infinitely greater ; and he there
fore hoped Lord Hawkesbury would be prepared to meet
any terms he might have to propose, on the calculation
rather of the money saved than of the money expended.
The acknowledgments^ at first suggested as likely to
influence the First Consul Lord Whitworth had on further
consideration abandoned, partly as too inconsistent with
our previously avowed principles of policy, and partly
lest "by such a step we might indispose Russia irrecon
cilably to our views."
A day or two later he had more precise intelligence
to furnish. The member of Buonaparte's family to be
' Of Governments recently established in Italy.

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 109
bribed was not Lucien, but Joseph; who "had been
sounded, and was well-disposed." Not that Lucien was
not equally willing to be "well-disposed," but Joseph, it
was thought, "would unite more cordially with M. de
Talleyrand than Lucien ;" and Lord Whitworth had become
more anxious than ever "to impress upon Lord Hawkes
bury that this business should not be marred by any
parsimony. It might be necessary to dazzle these people
by the fortunes they may make. It must not be con
sidered as a common bribe, or as common secret-service
money, but rather as a grand operation of state. . . .
It must be considered that many persons are to be
gained ; all in the very first situations, and all partaking
the pillage of this country [France] ; consequently above
the temptation of a common bribe." Lord Whitworth's
ideas of what might be necessary, if not beyond Lord
Hawkesbury's expectations, were at all events too grand
for Mr. Addington. "I have no fixed idea," he continues,
" of what may be necessary ; but in calculating what we
may expend in one month of war, the sacrifice of a million,
or even of two millions, would be economy." Lord Whit
worth's private letters of this date are strongly indicative of
the uncertain character of the whole policy of the French
Government at the time, influenced as it was partly by the
singular character of the First Consul himself, so strangely
made up of impulse and of patience, of arrogance and
violence, combined with and often bridled by the most far-
sighted calculation. At one moment the British ambassador
was driven to the conclusion that " we should never be able
to keep possession of Malta without fighting for it, and was
equally persuaded that by giving it up we should not avoid a
war unless we had made up our minds to see the Corsican
take possession of Egypt, and cut and carve as he thought
proper; and, even in that case, he feared for Portugal."
At another moment he repeated his belief that " the French
Government, at the same time that it endeavoured to
put a good face on the matter, was seriously occupied

no LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
in devising expedients by which to give us the security
we required as a preliminary to the evacuation of Malta."
He added, " In talking this matter over, Talleyrand made
use of an expression which had not yet escaped him,
' Quand est-ce done que votre gouvernement prononcera
un si ? Nous evacuerons Malthe si.' . . They evidently
wish we should propose some modification, and we may
be sure that the firmer our tone the better will be the
terms, should we be willing to consent to any."
At the end of another week Lord Whitworth was able
to report that he had made some progress in negotiation
with Joseph, which however, in one sense, he admitted
to be no progress at all ; but his despatch is sufficiently
interesting and curious to deserve to be given without
abridgment :
Secret and Confidential. Paris, March 31st, 1803.
My Lord,
Before I proceed to give your Lordship an account of my inter
view with Joseph Bonaparte, I should inform your Lordship
that, it having been judged absolutely necessary to the success
of the transaction to gain M. Talleyrand, I had, the day
before, by means of M. Huber, who first suggested to me
the possibility of establishing such a party ; who brought me
the first inforraation from the friend of Lucien ; and who, from
his habits of intimacy with many considerable people here,
and particularly with M. Talleyrand, possesses the means of
rendering himself highly useful, sounded him on the subject
He immediately started all those difficulties which might be
expected from one who is daily in the habit of witnessing
and suffering from the violence of the First Consul, and
repeatedly declared that he would hear of nothing short of
the execution of the Treaty of Amiens in all its points. When
he had exhausted this topic, and was told that a party was
actually formed, the object of which was to combat this
determination of the First Consul; that Lucien and Joseph
Bonaparte, and in all probability Madame Bonaparte, would
act in concert with him; and that very considerable pecuniary
advantages raight be derived from it to hiraself; his tone was

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. iii
softened. He expressed great surprise, but no reluctance to
afford his assistance ; he desired, however, two days to con
sider. M. Huber then told him it was absolutely necessary I
should see Joseph Bonaparte, that I felt the advantages which
might result from a direct communication of this kind, but that
I am scrupulous of taking any indirect road, being, as I was,
so perfectiy satisfied with my oflfitial intercourse with him, and
had therefore determined to avoid it unless it should meet with
his concurrence. This I did in order to give a proof of my
wish to conciliate, and because I am as much persuaded of
the advantage of gaining his co-operation as I am of the diffi
culties he might throw in our way were he to be against us.
He expressed himself perfectly satisfied with my intention of
seeing Joseph Bonaparte, and on the whole gave us reason to
suppose that the time he has desired will confirm him in the
disposition we could wish.
I yesterday, therefore, saw Joseph Bonaparte; and although this
interview produced nothing sufficiently decisive to justify any
very sanguine expectation of his successful interference, yet I
think he said as much as he could say consistently with his
situation and with the delicacy of the transaction. It has so
happened that, partly with a view to the assistance I might
receive from him in an emergency like the present, and partly
on account of his personal good qualities, I have cultivated
his acquaintance more than that of any other individual, so
that we were both relieved from our natural embarrassment.
I began the conversation by telling him (it had been - pre
viously agreed that I should not allude to any private transac
tion) that, if I importuned him by talking of our affairs, he
must impute it to the sincere desire I had to avert the calami
ties of war, and to effect a perfect and permanent good under
standing between the two Governments ; that I applied to him
rather than to any other because I knew him to be the friend
of peace, because it was he who negotiated the peace, and
who consequently could distinguish better than any other
what was the letter and what was the spirit of the Treaty of
Amiens. He here took up the conversation to assure me that
I judged him rightly, that he was anxiously desirous of peace,
and that there was nothing he would not do, consistently with

12 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
the good of the country, to preserve it, but that he saw no
means of effecting that purpose unless we were disposed to
execute fully and unequivocally the treaty we had entered
into; that by the treaty we were bound to evacuate Malta;
and the First Consul would not, and indeed could not, consent
to its being infringed. On this I appealed to him in his
capacity of negotiator of that treaty, endeavouring to draw
the line between the letter and the spirit, and maintaining that
if we hesitated in this instance to fulfil the former, the latter
had been infringed by the First Consul from the very moment
of its execution to the present time. I then went over the
old ground, enumerating the acquisitions which had been made
by France since the peace, and I assured him that, although his
Majesty's ministers had not thought themselves justified in
breaking off the negotiation, as they were very much tempted to
do, yet it could not but be naturally expected that the conduct
of the French Government had excited such mistrust and
jealousy, as must break out on the first occasion. This occa
sion had unfortunately soon been given by the manifestation
of the First Consul's views on Egypt ; that this was a point
on which it was impossible we could be indifferent, since it
could be considered in no other light than as a direct attack
upon ourselves ; that fortimately those views had been pub
lished before we had evacuated the island of Malta, and con
sequently it became incumbent on his Majesty's ministers, as
a means of defence, to keep possession of it until confidence
could be restored. This naturally led to a repetition of the
same assurances which I have on different occasions received
from M. de Talleyrand, of the total renunciation, on the part of
the First Consul, of any project he might have had in contem
plation, to which of course I paid but little attention. I did not
scruple to tell him that there was not a man at all conversant
with politics in any country, and even in this, who did not
believe that the First Consul would invade Egypt at every risk
the moment we were out of the Mediterranean ; and that, im
pressed with such a belief, he must be sensible we could not
relinquish the only point from whence such a project might
be defeated. That in our hands Malta was but a point of
defence. It was far from our intention to distress the trade of

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 113
this country in the Mediterranean; we were, on the contrary,
ready to come to any understanding on that subject. That
Malta was necessary to us as a safeguard to Egypt, and in no
other point of view.
After talking over this matter at some length, he assured me that
Malta was not, as we supposed, the real cause of the difficulty
on the part of the First Consul ; were there no other, it might
perhaps be got over. But that which never could was the
sense of shame and loss of reputation which must result from
his acquiescence on this occasion, more particularly after the
measure which had been resorted to in England. He was
very warm on this subject, repeating those phrases which are
constantly in the mouth of the First Consul : that he does not
live for the present, that he exists for posterity; that his
honour is dearer to him than his life ; that, if he forfeits that,
he forfeits the only hold he has on the confidence of this
country; and many more sentiments of this nature, which
cannot but appear, on a very small retrospect, somewhat
extraordinary. In opposition to these feelings, I endeavoured
to place the danger to which he would expose this country, his
own situation, and that of his family and friends, all involved in
the same fate. He admitted the whole force of this argument,
but still insisted on the determination of the First Consul, to
which, however, he was almost disposed to apply the term of
obstinacy, not to recede from the full execution of the Treaty
of Amiens. I regretted that a mere point of punctilio should
be put in competition with the numberless misfortunes to which
a renewal of hostilities might, and most probably would,
expose this country, and consequently the individual interests
of the First Consul and his family. I endeavoured to make
him sensible of the great disadvantage under which they would
now renew the contest ; that we should, it is trae, have the
burthen of a war to support, but that would undoubtedly be
home with the same patience, and with the same loyalty, which
had animated his Majesty's subjects during the whole of the
late conflict. France had the same, and still greater, pecuniary
difficulties to contend with, with the addition of an unsettled
Government, a disputed title, and a formidable party always
ready to avail itself of the first opportunity of giving effect to
VOL. I. I

114 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
its malevolence. This would naturally be considered by the
First Consul and his family, and, when put in the scale against
a mere sacrifice of punctilio, would, I tmsted, leave no room
for hesitation. In reply to this, he adverted to the means
by which the First Consul had attained his present situation ;
that he owed it all to his character; that that alone main-
• tained him ; and that, if he once gave that up, he exposed
himself to greater danger than he could possibly incur by a
recourse to war, which would only prove still stronger to the
country that it had no resource but in his military talents.
Your Lordship will perceive from this sketch of ray first con
versation that no great hope is given of a change in the First
Consul's determination ; but a direct and confidential inter
course is established with Joseph Bonaparte, who has free
access to hira when he pleases, who certainly has, if not great
influence, at least all the advantages which temper and modera
tion raust always have on violence and passion. I cannot,
therefore, but think that the business is in a fair way, suppos
ing it raay be judged expedient to accomplish it by the means
I have pointed out. We must, however, in that case, make
up our rainds to be more than liberal, for I repeat again that
sraall considerations avail but little in great objects, and when
they are to be attained by persons in great situations. I think,
therefore, we raay reasonably expect to carry our point, whether
we choose to abide by the effect of our demonstration, or to
employ the means to which this despatch has a reference.
The one raight be attended with some risk, and certainly vrith
great loss of tirae and raoney; the other may be equally
effectual, with the advantage of expedition and economy.
I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,
Whitworth.
On one point the Cabinet at home differed from the
views expressed by their ambassador. They would not
refuse to gratify Buonaparte by the acknowledgment of
the Italian states, which Lord Whitworth had first sug
gested, but of which he had subsequently, as we have
seen, discarded the idea. On the contrary, at a council

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 115
held on the 3d of April, and attended by every member
of the Cabinet, they addressed a minute to the King, stating
that "they were unanimously of opinion: firstly, that if
Malta could be retained, and the Levant and the Turkish
empire thereby secured, it would be desirable to facilitate
such an arrangement, by acknowledging, what we cannot
prevent, the new Italian states. And secondly, that if
the French Government were determined to oppose the
retention of Malta, they should be called upon to propose
some equivalent security for those objects which would be
endangered by the removal of his Majesty's forces from
Malta under the present circumstances. It was their
opinion likewise that no time should be lost in bringing
the present discussions to an issue ; and that, if the French
Government should decline all negotiation. Lord Whit
worth should be instructed to leave Paris."
There could be no doubt whatever of the wisdom of the
decision intimated in the last sentence, for the feverish
state of uncertainty in which the kingdom had been kept
for some months was worse even than war itself; and
instructions in accordance with this minute were sent to
Lord Whitworth, to make a formal offer that, on condition
of " Malta remaining in perpetuity in the possession of his
Majesty, and of the French troops evacuating Holland and
Switzerland, we would take on ourselves the indemnifica
tion of the knights of St. John, would confirm the acqui
sition of Elba by France, and acknowledge the King of
Etruria, and the Italian and Ligurian republics.", Lord
Whitworth fulfilled his orders, as, indeed, he always did,
with great ability ; and, in the conversation which he had
with Talleyrand on delivering to him the paper containing
these proposals, he did not refuse to forward a counter-
memorandum by the French minister, which, however, con
tained no definite proposal, but merely expressed a general
willingness to agree to " anything which might tend to put
an end to the present difficulties, or be agreeable to the
English Government, and which should not be contrary
I 2

1 1 6 LIFE AND A DM I NIS TRA TION [ 1 803
to thfe Treaty of Amiens ; " explaining to Lord Hawkes
bury in his public despatch that his motive for consenting
to forward such a paper was an idea that it was just
possible that Buonaparte might be led to consent to our
retaining temporary possession of Malta for a fixed term
of years. But in his private letter he expressed a fear
that he could no longer " hold out any sanguine expecta
tion of concluding this discussion on our own terms with
out having recourse to hostilities. Nevertheless he should
still continue his secret dealings with Joseph Buonaparte
and Talleyrand, feeling assured that the First Consul's
family, ministers, and the public at large all felt the
danger of war ; so that he firmly believed that, if it were
left to the decision of any individual in France, except the
First Consul himself and a few of his rapacious generals,
Malta would not be suffered to stand for an instant in
the way of peace." Though he had forwarded Talley
rand's counter-proposal, he " had not given him the least
hope that anything short of the permanent possession of
Malta would do." But the First Consul himself he looked
on as a most " intractable character.'' The funds were
falling from the anticipation of war, and he was vainly
endeavouring to bolster them up by sending his brothers
to buy stock with ostentatious openness. But the more
his subjects showed their disinclination to war, the more
willing he seemed to be to renew it. Each day increased
Lord Whitworth's conviction of the obstinacy of Buona
parte himself, but at the same time each day also confirmed
his kiiowledge of the accessibility of all about him, his
brothers and all, to bribes. Talleyrand and Joseph Buona
parte were those who set the greatest value on their ser
vices ; but " the venality of all," he reported, " was beyond
all imagination ; he could not but think that, if we had
tempted it in the negotiation at Amiens, we should not
now be negotiating on the present differences:'' and even
now he would not absolutely despair, if money could be
forthcoming in sufficiently large sums. Money, however.

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 117
Mr. Addington was apparently unwilling to provide to the
amount expected : and, indeed, there were difficulties in
the way of his doing so which, ob\-ious as they were,
escaped Lord Whitworth in his anxiety to terminate the
dispute between the two nations peaceably ; the chief
one being that it would be impossible for the ministers
to disclose how they had expended it, and, in all proba
bility, equally impracticable to induce the House of Com
mons to sanction such an expenditure in the dark. Even
had the money been furnished, it is probable that it would
have been useless, since, before the end of April, Talleyrand
informed Lord Whitworth from the First Consul that " no
consideration on earth should induce him to consent to
a concession in perpetuity of Malta in any shape what
ever ; he would never suffer Great Britain to acquire a
possession in the Mediterranean." And a day or t\vo
after the same minister stated that he was equally resolved
not to hear of our keeping even " temporary possession "
of it. It was to no purpose that Lord Whitworth re
minded the Frenchman that in fact we had possession,
and that "the recent conduct of the French Government
had rendered it so necessary for our security " that, " rather
than abandon it, we were prepared to go to war." Talley
rand offered us Lampedosa, without, it must be supposed,
the slightest expectation that we should accept it, even if
it had belonged to France to bestow, which it did not.
We refused it; and, after one or two more interviews, in
which the French minister made one or two other proposals,
manifestly only to gain time. Lord Whitworth demanded
his passports, as he had been ordered to demand them,
and on the 12th of May quitted Paris to return to
England,

ii8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803

CHAPTER IV.
Renewal ofthe secret negotiations — Debate on the renewal ofthe war
— Pitt's disapproval of the ministers' policy — Great division in their
favour — Col. Crawford's proposal to fortify London — Lord Hawkes
bury is removed to the House of Lords — His opinion of the weakness
of the German and Russian Governments — Buonaparte's measures
towards Spain and Portugal — Portugal applies to us for aid — Plans
for the partition of Turkey — Peculiarities of the constitution of
Turkey — Buonaparte's colonial losses and plans for the invasion of
Great Britain — Death ofthe Due d'Enghien — Louis XVIII. applies
to Britain for an asylum — Renewed illness of George III. — General
discontent with Addington — Pitt writes to the King — The Volun
teer Bill — Pitt writes again to the King — Addington resigns, and
Pitt becomes Prime Minister — Lord Hawkesbury becomes Home
Secretary.
Yet even now so intense was the eagerness of Joseph
Buonaparte for his expected bribes, that he once more
had recourse to the same agent, who had been originally
employed, to convey to Lord Whitworth an intimation
that he might perhaps still be able to avert war, and yet
leave us in possession of Malta, if we would acquiesce in
the First Consul making an arrangement with the King of
the Two Sicilies, by which he might become master of
Otranto and Taranto. M. Huber found that Talleyrand
had entertained the same views, and indeed that he had
even sent a messenger to London to propose such a com
promise. The simple Swiss gentleman assured the wily
minister that he thought the proposal might be accepted;
but the British Cabinet rejected it without a moment's
hesitation. The King of the Two Sicilies might not be

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 119
strong enough to resist the cession which Buonaparte was
inclined to extort from him, but it could not become us to
make ourselves parties to such an act of spoliation, alike
devoid of all reasonable pretext and contrary to all national
law.i Lord Hawkesbury looked on this proposition, thus
made at, or even after, the last moment, as a mere repetition
of the attempt to gain time, which, indeed, was of great
importance to the First Consul. For Buonaparte had been
so accustomed to see everything yield to his will, he had
been allowed to dictate with such absolute authority to all
the sovereigns on the Continent, that he could not con
ceive that we should really prefer war to submission ; and
therefore, thinking that hostilities would not recommence
till he himself should choose, he had allowed his army to
fall into considerable temporary disarrangement. A great
many men in every regiment were on furlough ; his cavalry
wanted remounts ; and the branch which he had looked on
with peculiar favour, the artillery, was in a particularly
defective state, the old guns which had been worn out in
his recent campaigns not having been replaced, because he
had ordered a series of experiments to be gone through
before fresh ones were cast.^ The result was that for above
' The Cabinet very becomingly say, " Neither England nor France
has a right to dispose of a town or port belonging to an independent
sovereign, and that his Majesty will never participate in the smallest
degree in any system of spoliation." (Lord Malmesbury, iv. 252.) Lord
Malmesbury, however, represents the French proposal as merely one
to allow France to occupy Otranto [by itself] for the same period
[probably ten years] as we were to retain Malta for. But M. Huber,
in his letter to Lord Whitworth, twice says expressly that their demand
was for Taranto as well as Otranto, and makes no express mention
of these towns ever being restored, though the term he uses is certainly
only " occuper.''
" If the views which, according to Las Casas (Memoires, v. 8),
Napoleon explained in a conversation at St. Helena, were those which
he had really entertained at this time, he had desired to continue at
peace with England till he had settled the whole of the affairs of the
Continent according to his own inclination, till he had raised an army
and fleet which we should have found absolutely irresistible with our
smaller population (i 5,000,000 of Enghsh against 40,000,000 of French,

I20 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
two years he was comparatively inactive, arming indeed
against us once -more the hostility of Spain and Holland,
but augmenting his own enemies in a still greater degree :
increasing his personal rank by the assumption of the
imperial title, and crushing his domestic foes by the
banishment of some, the public execution of others, and,
it can hardly be doubted, the private assassination of at
least one ; but at the same time alienating the most honest
of his own subjects (to say nothing of the offence given
to all Europe) by the lawless seizure and destruction of a
prince who had never offended, nor had the means of
offending, him. And meanwhile waiting for blows from
others instead of inflicting them ; blows which came surely
and heavily ; for, before he had gained a single victory on
land, his fleet was annihilated, and all hope of prosecuting
the conquests of which he had dreamt in the East, or
of inflicting the slightest injury on Britain except through
the sides of her allies, was for ever dissipated.
The Ministry and the Opposition in England must, of
course, both have foreseen that the war on our side would
be carried on mainly by sea ; and neither party could have
doubted what would be the result of battles fought there
by Nelson and his pupils. But no consideration of that
kind influenced the Parliament for a moment in the decision
to which both Houses speedily came on the momentous
subject of the renewal of the war. More than one question
was raised in the debates which occupied their attention
the week after the King had announced to them that he
had withdrawn his ambassador from Paris, or, in other
words, that he was about to embark in war. One point
raised was, whether under existing circumstances the war
was justifiable ; a second, which, it could not be denied,
as he stated the difference), and by roads and canals had organized
such a complete system of internal communication as would enable
him to concentrate his whole force, or any portion of it which he
might consider sufficient, at any point of the coast without our being
aware of his movements.

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 121
might be considered independently of the former, was
whether the conduct of the ministers had been prudent in
allowing the negotiations, the failure of which was the
immediate cause of war, to assume the complexion which
they had ultimately presented ; whether, in short, at an
earlier stage of them the necessity, the cruel necessity, of
renewing hostilities could not have been prevented. On
the first it may be almost said that there was no difference
of opinion. From some accidental mismanagement, which
enabled the general crowd of ordinary visitors to obtain
seats in the galleries of the House of Commons to the
exclusion of the reporters, very little is known of the debate
on the address, which was moved by Lord Hawkesbury
himself in reply to the royal message.^ His speech, how
ever, was so conclusive as to the impossibility of avoiding
war unless, by the surrender of Malta, we would place our
selves absolutely at the First Consul's mercy, that even
Mr. Grey, the steady partisan of the Jacobin party in
France, could not refuse to support the Crown in the
impending war, though he moved an amendment censuring
the conduct of the ministers. Nor could Fox, though he
adopted Grey's view and several of his arguments, refrain
from condemning many of the demands which Buonaparte
had put forward. He did, indeed, extenuate the First
Consul's desire to obtain Egypt so far as to deny that it
afforded a sufficient cause for going to war, arguing that
former Cabinets had felt that it did not do so, since sixteen
or seventeen years before we had made a commercial treaty
Avith France at the very time when M. de Vergennes, then
Prime Minister of that country, was known to be pre
paring to send forth an expedition against Egypt. Indeed
he attacked Pitt, who in the earlier part of the debate had
approved the war, and had exhorted the ministers to pre
pare to commence hostilities with vigour, even more fiercely
^ Pitt's speech, pronounced by some of his hearers to have been the
finest (it must have been among the finest) that he ever delivered is
' unreported for this reason. (See Lord Stanhope's Life of Pitt, iv. 46.)

122 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
than he criticised- Addington. But he could convince only
a small number of even his own friends. Windham openly
denounced his speech as one which sought an unworthy
popularity by supporting selfishness against patriotism,
and by opposing private considerations to grand views of
national policy ; and at last, after a debate of two nights,
the Ministry had a triumphant majority of 398 against dj ;
that small number being all that their Whig opponents
could muster.
But the main conflict took place ten days later, when in
the House of Peers Lord Fitzwilliam, and in the Commons
Colonel Patten, moved a long series of resolutions, con
demning the Government for having failed to keep
Parliament from time to time informed of the state of
affairs, of the conduct of France, and of the steps taken
by themselves in consequence of that conduct ; and, again,
for not having made " timely and adequate representations "
against those acts of France with which they were dis
satisfied, representations which, it was contended, would
either have arrested the aggressions of that country, or, if
France would not desist from them, would have prevented
his Majesty from reducing his forces and surrendering his
conquests, especially the Cape of Good Hope, and would
thus have placed him in a better position for renewing the
war. The resolutions were wordy and prolix in a most
unusual degree : they were supported by the Grenvilles,
who in the former debate had approved of the war ; and
Pitt, who on that occasion had strongly advocafSd an
unanimous agreement to the address, now no longer sup
ported the ministers, though he still abstained, in words,
from blaming them ; and moving the previous question,'
^ Pitt had made up his mind to this course some days before. On
the 1 8th of May Lord Malmesbuiy records : "Canning early; little
to say. Pitt, who, he says, thinks as he does, will attend on the 24th
to give his opinion ; means to fire over the heads of the Government,
i.e. not to blame or praise them, but to support war measures
(iv. 254). This second debate took place June 3d.

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 123
declared that he did so because, while he could not concur
in the extent of the charges involved in the proposed
resolutions, he could not, on the other hand, affirm that the
explanation afforded by the ministers, upon general points,
was so clear as to justify a decided negative of them. He
alleged, as apparently his chief reason for abstaining from a
formal censure of the ministers, that " he was aware of the
inconveniences which would result from such a measure
as the present motion, unless the clearest necessity existed
for it, unless such interference by Parliament could be
justified by some extraordinary exigency of affairs." He
intimated, indeed, by implication, that he saw " considerable
grounds for dissatisfaction at their conduct," but he con
sidered that to pass a vote of censure on them now, which
would be tantamount to a vote of removal, must, "by
unsettling the whole system of government, diminish our
means of sustaining the struggle in which we were engaged,
and of calling forth those resources necessary for our
defence." Not only would a change of the Administration
be a temporary suspension of the functions of the executive
Government, but the new ministers who might succeed
would feel themselves for some time in a delicate situation,
which must disable them in some degree from a satisfactory
discharge of their duties. He declined " entering into any
detailed discussion of the papers " which had been laid
before Parliament. " Things more urgent, more important,
demanded our care ;" and he would prefer to see the House
" keeping the Parliamentary pledge which it had given by
showing its determination to support his Majesty with
their lives and fortunes ; and the ministers showing them
selves alive to and equal to the situation in which they
found themselves by presenting a strong bill of supply,
providing resources not merely for every demand of the
public service, but adequate to every scale of execution : a
measure that would display and call forth the means
of sustaining the struggle, not merely for one year, but
till we should have brought it to a successful issue ; some

124 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
measure by which we should be enabled to complete our
army, and to call into action the national strength, and
give activity to all the military skill, discipline, and ex
perience we possess.''
Addington himself was the only minister who had spoken
before Pitt, and he had probably not anticipated the course
which his predecessor and patron was about to take ;
though in fact it was chiefly at him that Pitt's remarks had
been aimed, since what Pitt doubted was not so much the
propriety of what had hitherto been done, not even of the
restoration of the Cape to the Dutch, as Addington's finan
cial competency to provide the necessary means for the
energetic warfare which he described as indispensable. As
usual the brunt of the battle for the defence of the Ministry
fell on the Foreign Secretary, and he at once followed Pitt,
refusing to accept his amendment as less of a censure than
the original resolutions. He argued with great force, that
when a direct vote of censure had been moved, the question
was of too great importance to be shirked by passing on,
as Pitt had proposed, to the orders of the day ; ministers
were entitled to demand a direct decision, negative or affir
mative, a direct acquittal or condemnation. He dwelt with
great force on Pitt's avoidance of details : " On such a
question the Ministry had a right to expect details, to
require that he should point out especially what parts of their
conduct he disapproved. It was not impossible that in a
long and arduous negotiation some points of their manage
ment might afford grounds for difference of opinion even
among their friends. But in a country like this he always
considered it to be the first principle both of support and of
opposition to ministers, that those who agreed or disagreed
with them should do so on a general view of their whole
conduct. It could not be expected that all should approve
of every particular point, but members should overiook
minor differences for the sake of giving effect to the general
scheme of policy which they approved." He appealed
with great effect to Pitt's own conduct on the question of

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 125
the Russian armament, when Pitt himself declined to meet
a vote of censure by any evasive motion such as that of
the previous question, but the charge was met boldly and
directly negatived. Pitt's present motion was " a censure in
disguise, under delay ; but ministers could not, would not,
acquiesce in the discredit of a suspended censure. They
had no such desire to retain their places at all hazards as
could lead them to submit to such a compromise with con
demnation. Neither he nor his colleagues desired to remain
in office longer than they could be useful to their country.
For himself, if he felt that he was reduced to that situation
in which he could not serve his country with advantage, he
would carry the seals to the feet of his gracious sovereign,
and entreat him to appoint a successor more worthy. It
was because he would not remain in office discredited and
useless that he opposed the previous question, for he would
not retain it one hour after he had reason to think that he
had forfeited the confidence of the House and the good
opinion of the country."
There can be no doubt that Lord Hawkesbury was cor
rect in the view which he thus expressed of Pitt's amend
ment. It looked like the motion of one " willing to wound
and yet afraid to strike :" and Lord Hawkesbury's course
of insisting on treating it as a vote of censure not less dis
tinct than the resolutions themselves seemed more manly,
and as such commended itself both to the House and to
the country.^ In a description of the debate which he
transmitted to his father he explained Pitt's conduct, which
he characterised as " certainly most extraordinary and
most unaccountable," by his belief that " he had been
' The Annual Register, at this time, as has been mentioned before,
wholly in the interest of the Opposition, admits : " It is but justice to
say that the manly and spirited manner in which the latter (Lord
Hawkesbury) rejected the species of compromise recommended by
Mr. Pitt, heretofore his great friend and patron, and his calling on
the Senate for either direct acquittal or condemnation, gained, as it
deserved, considerable respect and approbation."

126 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
worked upon by such of his personal friends as were
enemies to the present Government, till his mind had
become completely unhinged. He looked," he continued,
" dreadfully ill, and his physician said that his nerves had
been completely shaken by the state of agitation and un
certainty in which he had been lately kept.' The line
which Mr. Fox took," the letter adds, " was a singular one.
He voted with us on the question of the orders of the day.
He abstained from voting on the second question; and
stated that, with respect to the general tendency of the
resolutions, since they must be considered as going to effect
a change of administration, he was hostile to them, though
he disapproved of the conduct of ministers in some re
spects. He did not wish to see them removed, because he
did not think they were likely to be succeeded by any set
of men who were more pacifically disposed. There were,
however, several facts in the resolutions which he was not
prepared to negative, and, as he was not ready to move any
amendment, he should go away without voting. Sheridan
and Erskine voted with us throughout."
The result of the division proved more favorable to the
ministers than probably any one of either side expected.
A majority of nearly 300 supported them on the .amend
ment, and, many members having retired before the second
division, one equally great in proportion voted with them
on the main question of the resolutions.^ Finding themselves
thus supported they proceeded to increase the regular army ;
to encourage the formation of strong corps of volunteers ;
and to equip a fleet overpowering in numbers, and still
more irresistible from the tried skill of the great officers who
1 " Mr. Abbot records, as the key to Pitt's conduct, that different
circumstances had led him to believe that Addington was secretly
indisposing the King towards him, and playing falsely ; and that this
irritation, fomented by Canning and the Grenvilles, made him dis
posed to enter the Cabinet by force, and treat Mr. Addington as a
perfidious friend." — Lord Colchester's Diary, i. 430.
2 The precise numbers were : — On the amendment, 333 v. 56 ; on
the resolutions, 275 v. 34.

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 127
served in it ; and in all their measures, even in one so novel
to the constitution and practice of the nation as the raising
an army of reserve by compulsory ballot, they received the
almost unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament :
perhaps the most remarkable feature in the debates which
arose on the different details being a suggestion put for
ward by an independent member. Colonel Crawford, that
steps should be taken to fortify London, our great naval
arsenals, and some other places which he looked on as at once
peculiarly important and peculiarly accessible, such as the
mouth of the Humber and Newcastle ; and also to construct
some lines of fortification for the internal defence of the
country in the event of an enemy making good his landing
on any part of the coast. Pitt, who on all recent occasions
had supported the Ministry, warmly advocated this pro
posal also, as a sort of supplement to their plans ; adding,
with prescient sagacity, a suggestion of his own, that for the
defence of portions of our coast it might be well to multiply
our smaller vessels, " and mount them with guns of heavy
metal and carronades," so as to form a kind of floating
battery. The Ministry, as a body, opposed it ; and perhaps
a time of actual war may not be the season at which the
construction of such extensive fortifications is most prac
ticable. But the present generation has seen the idea
adopted, and Pitt's proposition of floating batteries re
garded, by those most competent to judge, as not the least
efficacious portion of the scheme.
It has been mentioned that Pitt's objections were really
to the Minister's financial measures, some of which he com
pelled him in some degree to remodel. And the general
opinion of the country was scarcely concealed that Ad
dington was unequal to the office which he was filling in a
time of war. Yet so unconscious did he seem of his diffi
culties that, at the end of the session, he weakened himself
in the House of Commons by removing Lord Hawkesbury
to the House of Lords. It was a singular and ill-judged
step, for the eloquence which at times he had to encounter

128 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
in the House of Commons was the most formidable that
had ever assailed a Government : leaving Pitt, whose sup
port was now but occasional, out of the question. Fox,
Canning, Sheridan, and Grey, were adverse to him on
almost every question ; and Lord Hawkesbury was the
only speaker of any power or weight whom he had to
oppose to them, while in the House of Lords Lord Gren
ville was the only opponent who could at all be considered
formidable, and for him the Chancellor was more than a
match. The promotion, for such in some sense it must be
considered, was not in accordance with the wishes and
judgment of Lord Hawkesbury himself, and still less with
those of his father, who already began to look forward to
his becoming Prime Minister. Lord Liverpool was con
vinced that Mr. Addington could not stand, and that, even
if Pitt should return to office for a time, his health must
inevitably prevent his long continuance there (a prediction
but too fatally verified). In such a position of affairs he
pointed out to his son that the ball would be at his feet ; that
all " Pitt's old friends would be very happy to serve under
him ; that, as he had good reason to believe, many even of
the partisans of Fox would not be unwilling to fight under
the same banner ; that though the Grenvilles would be in
opposition, they were so self-important and troublesome
that it was better to have them as enemies than as friends ;
but that his chance of carrying on the affairs of the kingdom
with due energy and a fair prospect of success would be far
better if, in the beginning at least, he were in the House of
Commons than elsewhere." Lord Hawkesbury fully coin
cided in the justice of his father's views ; but he felt that
he could not refuse the wishes of the Prime Minister, part
of whose plan was the introduction of Mr. Tierney into the
Government as Treasurer of the Navy, a measure which,
as Tierney had formerly fought a duel with Pitt, seemed to
the world in general a complete barrier to Pitt's resumption
of office ; and its being so regarded was not perhaps its
slightest recommendation in Addington's eyes. That Lord

i8o3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 129
Liverpool did not overrate the popularity of his son with
all parties, and the high esteem in which his abilities as a
speaker and a man of business were held, is proved by the
circumstances ' under which he was subsequently called to
the head of affairs ; but, though Lord Hawkesbury lost
neither reputation nor influence by the removal, it is equally
certain that it was a false step on the part of Addington
himself, who more than once must have greatly regretted
the loss of his aid in the debates of the ensuing session.
Meantime the French ruler was weakening rather than
strengthening himself by his first measures, in spite of the
appearance of success which they bore. He overran Han
over, and occupied Hamburg and Bremen ; but this last
step, and the subsequent closing of the Elbe and Weser
against all commerce with Britain, were such violations
of the rights of neutral Powers that they awakened deep
discontent among the chief nations of Germany. As long,
however, as that feeling exhaled in weak remonstrances,
Buonaparte could afford to regard it with indifference, and
no exertions of our Foreign Secretary could rouse those
Powers to any stronger measures. As he wrote to his .
father, " The Court of Vienna appeared to be very feeble,
that of Petersburg very flat, and that of Berlin very false ;"
and it was not till still greater violations of all established
usages, and encroachments more immediately menacing to
themselves, had warned them that they could no longer
temporize with the potentate who was guilty of them, that
the two former could be roused to an active resistance, while
Prussia, increasing in falsehood, fell to such a depth of base
ness as to seek the alliance of the despoiler of her German
brethren, in the hope of being allowed to share in their spoils.
On the other side of France affairs for a moment seemed
likely to lead to operations that would have anticipated
the war which for years afterwards filled the whole Penin
sula. Buonaparte felt that, in preparing for a war such
as he hoped to be able to wage, his first want was money.
To provide it he first sold Louisiana, which had been ceded
' Vide infra, c. xi.
VOL. L K

I30 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1803
to him by the Treaty of Amiens, to the United States, for
a sum exceeding 3,000,000/. sterling. And as his next step,
though not yet insisting that Spain should openly declare
war against us, which he was well aware could only ruin her
without injuring us, he began to e.xert a pressure on that
country and Portugal to compel them to pay him large
monthly sums of money, exacting them from the first as
an old ally, from the second as a nation which could only
thus be prevented from being an enemy. Spain, Mr. Frere
reported, was greatly irritated by the terms demanded
of her ; so greatly that he believed it not impossible that,
by judicious bribes and compliments to the Prince of Peace
and the principal ministers, we might even detach her from
the side of France. And in Portugal the Prince Regent
formally applied to us for assistance and support in order
that he might be enabled to resist the exorbitant demands
made upon him and his people. Our Cabinet was not dis
inclined to comply with the request, coming as it did from
a people with whom we had been so long connected by
treaties of alliance. But it was rightly judged necessary in
the first place to ascertain what micans Portugal possessed
of helping herself And with this view Lord Hawkesbury
submitted to the King the advice of the Cabinet, that an
officer of skill and reputation should be despatched to
Portugal to see whether the native army corresponded to
the account which M. Souza, the Prince Regent's minister,
gave of it ; and, if it should prove in such a state as to
numbers and efficiency that, with moderate aid from us,
there might seem a hope of its making effectual resistance
(for it was clear that no large French force could be spared
to compel Portugal to compliance), then Lord Hawkes
bury and his colleagues were prepared to send four or six
thousand men, including a strong division of cavalry, to
reinforce the Portuguese army, and to enable it to resist
the invasion of any French force of moderate strength. It
need hardly be said that George IIL fully concurred in the
expediency of the plan thus submitted to him ; but at the
same time he did not conceal his conviction that the result

l8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

131

of an investigation of Portugal's power to protect herself
would show it to be useless to try to help her in the manner
proposed. "He feared that it was impossible for troops
to be in a more helpless state than the Portuguese were at
the present moment.'' And, unless our aid were likely to
be effectual, he expressed a reasonable unwillingness "to
diminish the means of defence both in this island and
Ireland ; as in both much must depend on our having
cavalry, that being a branch which the enemy could not
bring over to any great extent." His fears proved well
founded: the Portuguese were so weak at the moment that
the 6,000 men whom we might have furnished them would
have been the largest half of their army ; and Buonaparte
gave them no time to strengthen themselves. Before the
close of autumn they were compelled to follow the example
of Spain in agreeing to contribute a large yearly sum towards
the expenses which France would incur through the war.
The proposal of partitioning Turkey which France had
made to Russia has been already mentioned. And the
Turks themselves were aware of it, but regarded it with their
usual indifference. Our ambassador, Mr. Drummond, wrote
to Lord Hawkesbury in September: "The Russian drago
man has very lately, by order of M. Italinski, made a full
avowal to the Porte of the proposition made by France for
the partition of this empire. It was strongly recommended
to them at the same time to take the measures of precau
tion which I had been long recommending [to increase the
army in the Morea]. The answer which was made on
this occasion by the Turkish Ministry was a little singular.
It evinced much confidence, if it did not show consummate
wisdom. They observed that it was very extraordinary
that Buonaparte should presume to parcel out the Turkish
empire without the permission of their magnificent em
peror: that they defied Russia and France together to put
such a scheme into execution ; but that they could not
understand why one of these Powers should not try to take
the^ whole for itself without making another a partner in
the spoil." Mr. Drummond expressed his conviction that
K 2

132 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
the Turkish empire was declining fast, and that the enemy
which it had really to dread was Russia and not France,
though Russia at this moment seemed to be its protector
from France. And the whole course of subsequent trans
actions in that country has shown the soundness of this
opinion. The greater part of his despatch refers to matters
of which the interest was but temporary ; the character
of the Turkish ministers, and of the different ambassadors
and envoys residing at Constantinople. But one paragraph
is worth extracting, as giving a different idea of the Turkish
constitution from that which is generally entertained.
"We are generally taught to believe in England thatthe
Ottoman empire is governed by a despot whose will is
law, and whose minister, or favourite, disposes of the whole
power under the authority of his sovereign. This is by
no means the case. If indeed the Sultan desired to cut off
the head of any one individual in his realm, there is no law
against it, and there would probably be no opposition to it,
provided the offender had no army under his command.
Personal property and personal security, so well protected
and so well defined by the law of England, are undoubtedly
left at the mercy of the strongest in Turkey. But in all
affairs of state, in all measures which comprehend the
general politics of the country, the Sultan is not despotic;
nor are his ministers possessed of much authority. The
constitution of this Government is in fact oligarchical ;
and that may be the reason why it is not judged to be
the best in the world. The supreme council consists of
about ten or twelve members, and it is in this council
that the most important measures are determined. The
authority of the Sultan is indeed nominally paramount;
but it is felt by all parties that it is not really so. The
influence of the Ulemah^ is on the other hand omnipotent.
No measure can be safely proposed without the concurrence
of this powerful body, and none carried into execution
without their express consent. Several of these chiefs have
seats in the supreme council, and any disrespect shown to
^ The body of priests.

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 133
their opinion, when once given, would be productive of the
most fatal consequences. Among the Ulemah are found
the men most versed in the law, the faith, and the training
of the Mussulmans ; consequently the men whose minds
have imbibed the greatest number of prejudices, and are
the most perverted from common sense." It never occurred
to Mr. Drummond as possible that half a century later
France should be induced to unite with Great Britain to
protect the Sultan from the very Power whom she now
invited to join her in oppressing him ; nor that a prince
seated on the Ottoman throne would become so enligh
tened, and so sure of his authority, as voluntarily to in
troduce reforms of the character most distasteful to the
Ulemah ; that he would accept an order of Christian
knighthood, and visit the chief nations of Christendom with
a view not only of cultivating their goodwill towards him
self, but of learning to improve the habits and ameliorate
the condition of his subjects in general.
For many months after the renewal of the war the
First Consul had almost ceaseless reason to repent his
obstinate rejection of all our proposals. We were able
to dispense with his consent to the retention of Malta ;
though we had restored the Cape to his ally, we had not
given back Pondicherry to himself, and the West Indian
islands which we had given up were recovered one after
another; two being taken by us of which we had not
previously been masters. His army in St. Domingo
was reduced to surrender, and he was unable to retaliate
on us in any quarter. His only consolation for the ac
cumulated defeats which he was sustaining at our hands
lay in forming plans, and making preparations on a more
extensive scale than before, for the invasion of these
islands, which kept our Government in a state of constant
watchfulness, if not of apprehension. The ostentatious
parade which he made of these preparations was probably
intended to incline us to revive the negotiations for peace,
which were rather suspended than wholly given up. At
the time of the final rupture we had still intimated a

134 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
disposition to listen to the mediation of Russia, if that
Power should be willing to interpose it. And though the
Czar still hung back, it was possible that at any moment
he might become desirous of putting an end to a state
of things which was injurious to every nation in Europe.
He was, hov/ever, personally offended with the First Consul,
who, on one occasion, had lately insulted his ambassador
at Paris, the Count de Marcoff, with almost as much rude
ness as he had displayed to Lord Whitworth, openly
accusing him, and the Russian Cabinet in general, of an
unfair partiality to England.^ And, as such charges have
a tendency to verify themselves, Alexander made a strong
and formal remonstrance to Talleyrand against several
parts of Buonaparte's conduct in which he saw proofs
of a contempt for the rights of all nations but France ;
and at the same time, by repeated acts of attention and
kindness to our countrymen who chanced to be in his
dominions, he gave indications of a rising desire to cultivate
friendly relations with our nation. He was especially
desirous that our Government should be fully informed
of " great military preparations making by the French
upon the coasts of the Adriatic Sea, the object of which
was, without doubt, the Turkish empire," in order that
a conviction of their designs might " make us more ready to
take measures by means of our naval forces to oppose the
enterprises of the First Consul in that part of the world.'"'
He was still, however, apparently watching for some
opportunity of mediating with effect, when he might be
able to procure the removal of his own causes for dissatis-
^ The First Consul came up to him at the levee, and said, " Je sais
que le Comte de Woronzow n'est pas favorable aux Frangais, qu'il
aime les Anglais ; et qu'il n'a pas fait tout ce qui depend de lui pour
empecher la guerre ;" and presently, " II y a du double dans ceci, et si
le Comte de Woronzow I'avait voulu il aurait pu con tenir I'Angleterre ; "
and again, " Si I'Empereur comptait observer une conduite si vague
vis-k-vis de la France, pourquoi lui a-t-elle jamais demande des
services ?" (Malmesbury, iv. 266.)
^ Despatch from Count Woronzow to his brother Count Simon
Woronzow, the Russian ambassador in London.

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 135
faction, as well as ours, when the First Consul's crowning
outrage, in his seizure and slaughter of the Due d'Enghien,
broke off not only every prospect of peace, but every
desire to conclude one with a tyrant who could be guilty
of so atrocious and unprovoked a crime.^
The following letter from the Prince de Cond6, the father
of the Due d'Enghien, to the King of Sweden, will not
be without interest : Wanstead House, le 18 Avril, 1804.
Au Roi de Suede,
Aprfes avoir payd le premier tribut de larmes que nous devons 'k
la mdmoire de I'infortund Due d'Enghien, et dont la source ne
tarira jamais, notre premier soin, notre premier sentiment est
de mettre aux pieds de V. M. notre vive et respectueuse recon
noissance de tous les soins g^ndreux et touchans, qu'elle a
bien voulu se donner, pour prdvenir cet horrible assassinat ;
votre grandeur d'ame. Sire, et votre sensibility (qualit^s si rares
aujourd'hui) viennent de se manifester dans cette cruelle occa
sion, d'un manih'e k vous attacher tous ceux qui mdritent
le nom d'hommes. Oh, Roi compatissant, et si noblement
digne du rang que vous occupez, vous avez voulu sauver les
Condds ! . . . le Ciel ne I'a pas permis. . . . Puisse au moins
votre illustre exemple dveiller I'Europe, et faire sentir aux
souverains k quel point il leur importe d'opposer enfin une
resistance insurmontable par son ensemble et par son but, au
torrent de crimes, dont un seul homme, si e'en est un, se
propose d'inonder I'univers. Votre illustre pfere, Sire, vouloit
prdvenir toutes les horreurs de la Revolution en I'attaquant \
force ouverte (helas, que n'a-t-il ^te dcoutd, nous n'aurions pas
k le pleurer lui-meme) ! C'est peut-etre k I'dnergique sensi-
bihtd de V. M. qu'est reservde la gloire de sauver le monde
^ Dumouriez, who was at this time in London, regarded the trans
action at first, when it was only known that the Duke had been seized,
in a singular point of view. He writes to a friend (the Baron de Bulen)
at Munich : " On dit le Due d'Enghien relache. Je n'en crois rien. Je
n'ose pas vous parler d'un fait qui deshonore I'Allemagne, et qui ne
peut tourner qu'k la gloire de Buonaparte s'il excite sa clemence, ou k
une terreur universelle s'il consulte sa rigueur et sa justice. Je reste
pdtrifie, non par la tete de Buonaparte-Meduse, mais par celle des
tStes i perruques qui lui sont opposees." (Extract from a copy of the
Letter in the Liverpool Papers.)

136 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [i8o4'
entier, en d^cidant par ses pressantes sollicitations les puissances
de I'Europe k seconder par la force le vceux des trois quarts de
la France, qui n'aspire qu'k rentrer sous I'obeissance de son
roi legitime, en secouant le joug d'un monstre, qui ne connoit
plus de moyens de prolonger son usurpation qu'en faisant
couler les flots de sang et de larmes. J'oserais vous le repeter.
Sire, une noble resistance clairement annoncee dans son seul
but, imposante par la force de ses moyens, pure dans ses
principes et dans ses suites, et prete k s'arreter dfes que le Roi
de France, present aux armees, pourroit reprendre avec surete
les renes de son royaume : voilk les seuls moyens de rendre le
calme k I'Europe ; si je m'e'gare en ce raoment, raon excuse est
toute prete, et I'univers I'admettra ; comment ne pas se hvrer
k de grandes idees quand c'est au digne heritier des Gustave
qu'on ecrit.
Daignez, Sire, recevoir avec bonte nos plus sincferes et nos plus
respectueux remerciments des genereuses demarches que V. M.
a bien voulu faire en faveur de I'interessante victime, que le
tyran du monde vient d'immoler k sa rage ; la reconnoissance
que nous vous devons. Sire, est profond ement gravee dans nos
coeurs par I'amour paternel et I'admiration de vos vertus ; I'em-
preinte en est ineffagable.
Je suis avec un profond respect.
Sire, de Votre Majeste,
Le trfes-humble et trfes-obeissant Serviteur,
Louis Joseph de Bourbon.
The folly of this most infamous action was, as Fouche
is reported to have said, more than equal to its wickedness.
And it was more impolitic than even Fouche was quite
aware, for, at the moment when it was committed, the King
of Prussia was so dissatisfied with our continued claim to
exercise our right of search over all vessels which entered
our ports,^ even when belonging to neutral Powers, that he
1 " Le droit de visite que I'Angleterre se propose d'exercer indis-
tincteraent sur tous les vaisseaux neutres qui arrivent dans ses ports
est une nouvelle mesure arbitraire dont il n'a jamais ete question, et qui
outrepasse dans leur plus grande etendue les principales stipulations
des derniferes conventions de 1801." (Extract from a despatch from
the King of Prussia himself to his minister at St. James's, of which a
copy is in the Liverpool Papers.)

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 137
was greatly inclined openly -to break with us, and to
range himself on the side of France, when even his selfish
and sordid timidity was roused to a momentary feeling
of indignation by the insult offered to the whole body
of German princes in the violation of the Baden territory,
and the still more terrible wrong done to royal blood by
the murder of one whose relationship to kings was his
sole offence.
The head of the Bourbons, the prince who afterwards
remounted the throne of his ancestors under the title of
Louis XVIII., and whom his faithful adherents never
ceased to regard as their king,, was at this time at Rome.
But, even before the slaughter of his cousin, he had begun
to think that city neither a sufficiently secure asylum, nor
the Pope a sufficiently powerful protector, so manifest was
the intention of the First Consul to reduce every authority
in Italy to a state of subjection. He was resolved, indeed,
to remain at Rome as long as possible, flattering himself
that, little as Buonaparte cared either for considerations
of religion or the rights of princes who could not support
-them with an army, even he would shrink from infringing
the privileges of the Pope, and violating the sacred terri
tory of the Church.^ But, in order to be prepared before
hand for any emergency, he applied to the Court of Vienna
for an asylum in the event of his finding himself compelled
to quit Rome. Near as was the relationship which bound
them together, the Emperor of Austria felt himself unable
to afford the fugitive prince efficient protection, and was com
pelled to decline receiving him. And Louis, grieved rather
' " Ce ne sera qu'k I'extremite que Sa Majeste se resoudra k aban-
donner ce sejour, dans I'espoir surtout que I'horreur qu'inspirerait k
tous les souverains et k tous les peuples la violation d'un asyle sacre,
fonde sur le droit des gens, eioignera le Premier Consul de se porter
k cet extreme; quoiqu'il soit possible, d'un autre c6te, qu'on doit
s'attendre k tout d'un Gouvernement immoral." (Letter of Count Rossi,
chamberlain of Louis XVIII., date March 3d, a singular proof of the
general belief in the utter lawlessness of Buonaparte's character, if it
be remembered that it was written nearly three weeks before the death
of the Due d'Enghien. The entire" letter, whicb is in cypher, is like
others on the same subject in the Liverpool Papers.)

138 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
than surprised, then turned to the one Power which neither
feared the as yet invincible French general, nor ever suffered
any consideration to interfere with her proud privilege of
sheltering all unfortunate princes. The Count de Front,
who was his most trusted agent in England, apphed to
Lord Hawkesbury, who without hesitation expressed the
willingness of his own royal master to extend the hospi
tality of any part of his dominions to his brother sove
reign ; and, as De Front thought Malta the most convenient
place if Louis should be compelled to a sudden retreat,
at once despatched orders to the authorities in that island
to be on the watch for his arrival, and to receive him with
all the honours due to his birth. For some weeks all the
partisans of the Bourbons were in great anxiety for his
safety ; reports had reached the French Royalists that
Buonaparte had some suspicions of what was in agitation,
and had caused his uncle, who was a cardinal of the
Roman Church, to insist on the Pope exerting his vigi
lance to prevent the departure of Louis ; but, as no French
ship dared to show itself in the Mediterranean while Nelson
was watching Toulon, the Pope had no means of restrain- .
ing the King's movements, save by the employment of
actual force ; and Louis was thus assured of a safe retreat
and efficient protection if ever he might find himself in
need of it. -
Meanwhile both England and France were in a state of
internal agitation. France, first, from the announcement of
the discovery of an extensive conspiracy, which in all pro
bability had no real existence, against the power, perhaps
even the life, of the First Consul ;i then from the murder
^ Bourrienne, than whom few had better opportunities of informa
tion, altogether denies the existence of any conspiracy.- According to
him, Fouche by his secret agents induced Pichegru, Georges, and the
rest to come to Paris, that he might make a merit with the First
Consul of revealing the fact of their being there, and so procure, as he
did, his own restoration to the office of chief of the police. But " Ces
messieurs etaient venus sur le Continent, non pas pour conspirer contre
la vie du Premier Consul, mais pour examiner I'etat des choses, et
pouvoir dire d'une maniere certaine aux princes de la maison de

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 139
of the Due d'Enghien, to which few even of Buonaparte's
warmest admirers give any other name ; and, last of all,
from his movements to the attainment of the summit of
his ambition, the imperial crown. England was unsettled,
though in an inferior degree, from the conviction that was
growing up on all sides that neither as a financier nor as
director of the general policy of the kingdom at such a
time was the Prime Minister equal to his office. Even
his own colleagues were aware of his incapacity ; and in
the autumn of 1803 one or two changes were made in
different departments, which did not strengthen the
Cabinet as a whole, and left the principal evil untouched.
But the urgent need of a strong Ministry was increased
at the beginning of the next year, when the King had a
return of his old mental complaint, and it seemed probable
that it might become necessary to appoint a regency.
Such a conjuncture increased the zeal of the Whigs to
displace the whole Cabinet,^ and at the same time led Pitt,
on the King's recovery (for his illness did not last long), to
show, for the first time, such a willingness to resume office
Bourbon ce qu'ils devoient penser," &c. &c. (Memoires, v. 19, 284.)
The Count de Front, writing to Rossi (March 23d), says : " Comme
vous verrez dans les gazettes frangaises beaucoup d'inculpations contre
Sa Majeste Britannique et ses ministres k regard de la conspiration
qui a ete decouverte en France, . . . . je crois devoir vous en dire mon
opinion particulifere, et c'est que le ministfere anglais n'a eu aucune
part quelconque dans le plan, vrai ou faux, de conspiration qui doit
avoir ete forme par une partie de ceux qui sont presentement en France ;
mais en meme teras je n'ai aucun doute que si le General Pichegru,
ou quelqu'autre des principaux chefs, eiit reussi k former un parti ca
pable d'amener un autre ordre de choses en France, il aurait ete puis-
samment seconde d'ici. Cela aurait ete d'autant moins extraordinaire
qu'on sait qu'il yak Paris un Club de Revolutionnaires Irlandais,
pr^ts k faire, avec le secours de la France, en Irlande, ce que ferait
un parti soutenu par I'Angleterre en France."
^ Lord Malmesbury says, " During the King's illness Opposition
increased both in violence and numbers" (iv. 286) ; and Fox writes,
" It makes him, the doctor (f.e. Addington), more and more contemned
every day ; indeed the contempt, both with respect to the degree and
the universality of it, is beyond what was ever known . . . ;" and in
another letter, " Let us first get rid of the doctor is my first principle of
action." (Lord Russell's Memorials of Fox, iii. 244, iv. 24, &c.)

I40 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
that he wrote to the King to explain his views on the
state of the nation, and of the measures which ought to
be adopted. He even himself brought forward one motion
on the state of the navy, which, as he justified it by de
claring that, "considering the extent of the danger that
now threatened the kingdom, our means of repelling it
by our naval efforts were more inadequate than at any
former period," was a direct censure on the Administration.
A proposal which he made a few weeks afterwards to
increase the army of reserve, in direct opposition to the
plan brought forward by the Minister, indicated the same
conviction of the incompetency of Addington to fulfil the
just expectations of those who felt the importance of
the existing crisis. And his disapproval of Addington's
financial schemes was even more positive.
In the fierce debates which took place in the House of
Commons in the early part of the session the Prime Minister
must have greatly missed the aid of Lord Hawkes
bury, but in the House of Lords the Foreign Secretary
fully confirmed the reputation he had previously earned,
and showed himself competent to lead it by making far
the ablest speech that was made in either House on the
Volunteer Bill. Apart from the effectiveness of his argu
ments and the well-chosen neatness of his language, the
facts which he stated were highly creditable to the public
spirit of the nation, and calculated to inspire the most
desponding with reliance on our resources. Though we
had within the four seas the largest regular army of troops
of the line and militia which had ever been assembled,
more numerous by 40,000 men than had been serving
only three years before, the threats of invasion had added
to that great host no fewer than 330,000 volunteers ; and,
though attempts were made by the Opposition in both
Houses to deny their efficiency, it was remarkable that
those members who, as professional soldiers, were the most
competent to judge of it, were those who spoke most highly
of it, and who expressed the greatest confidence in the
service which might be expected from such an armament.

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 141
The objections to this part of the Government scheme
for the defence of the kingdom were certainly ill-founded.
The public spirit which could enlist such a band of all
ranks to stand forward voluntarily and gratuitously to
undergo the fatigues and restraints of a military life, was
in itself a feeling to be encouraged rather than repressed ;
and we may still look on it with a closer interest than
attaches to many bygone measures, since the noble force
thus assembled, prodigious as it was, if the population of
the kingdom at the time be considered, was the father of
the magnificent army which now voluntarily musters in
every county, and which, by rendering any attempt to
invade Britain as desperate as it was felt to be then, has
already at least once had a powerful influence in pre
venting the interruption of peace, and has thus earned the
gratitude of Europe at large, as well as the admiration
and attachment of its countrymen.
But though on this subject the plan of the Government
was both judicious and successful, for their bill was carried
by great majorities in both Houses, Addington saw clearly
that he could no longer hold his ground as Prime Minister.
The attacks upon his Administration, proceeding sometimes
from Pitt and his adherents, sometimes from the Whig side
of the House, became more frequent, and the divisions on
them grew less and less favorable. In those days, for a
Cabinet not to be supported by a large majority was re
garded as a defeat, and on more than one occasion in the
course of April the supporters of the Administration scarcely
outnumbered its opponents by more than twenty. Fox
had given notice of a motion on the defence of the country
for the 23d of April, and on the 17th, the day after the
majority for the Government had dwindled on a question
relating to the Irish militia to twenty-one, Addington
opened a negotiation with Pitt, sending a message to him
to ask whether he was willing to communicate his opinion
concerning the existing state of affairs, apd the best mode
of carrying on the government. Pitt, as he replied, did
not think it consistent with his respect for the King to

142 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
express views tending to a change in his Majesty's Govern
ment to any one but the King himself, nor to volunteer
them to the King ; but he added that, if his Majesty should
desire him to do so, he was quite prepared to state his
feeHngs on every matter of public policy without delay.
And having, we may suppose, received such an intimation
from his royal master, a day or two afterwards he
addressed a letter to his Majesty, explaining his own past
conduct towards the Administration, and the motives which
had actuated him ; and this letter was followed by another,
nominally addressed to the Lord ChanceUor, but in reality
also to the King, since it was to be laid before his Majesty,
in which he indicated his notion of the general line of
policy to be pursued on the leading questions of interest,
and also his views of the principles on which a new Admini
stration should be formed.
On the first subject (since Pitt fully observed his promise
made three years before, to waive all mention of the laws
affecting the Roman Catholics) there was probably no
difference of opinion between him and his royal master,
.but on the second they were not equally well agreed. Pitt
had expressed his conviction that it was " more important
than perhaps at any former period in the history of the
kingdom to give the greatest possible strength and energy
to the Government, by uniting in the King's service as large
a proportion as possible of the weight of talents and con
nexions, drawn, without exception, from parties of aU
descriptions, and without reference to former differences
and divisions. He saw reason to hope that the circum
stances of the time were peculiarly favorable to such an
union, and that it might now be possible, with his Majesty's
gracious approbation, to bring all persons of leading in
fluence, either in Parliament or the country, to concur
heartily in a general system formed for the purpose of
extricating the country from its present difficulties, and
endeavouring, if possible, to rescue Europe from the state
to which it was reduced." And he especially named Mr.
Fox and Lord Grenville as members of the Opposition, to

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 143
which he had never considered himself to belong, whom he
thought it particularly desirable to include in a new Admi
nistration. Both were especially unpalatable to the King.
With respect to Lord Grenville, in his reply to Pitt's letter
George III. declared that that nobleman had strongly allied
himself with the Roman Catholics (subsequent events proved
how well founded this statement was), and mentioned also
his political obstinacy. But his feelings towards Mr. Fox
were even more bitter. He recalled " the whole tenor of
Mr. Fox's conduct '" since the days of Lord North, the
necessity which had arisen for his expulsion from the Privy
Council, and " expressed his astonishment that Mr. Pitt
should for one moment have harboured the thought of
bringing such a man before his royal notice." He added
a hope that, " so far as the public service would permit, he
might have the benefit of the further services of the ma
jority of Addington's colleagues." Pitt, therefore, was pre
cluded from availing himself of the co-operation which Fox
was willing to afford him. For once in his life Fox behaved
with magnanimity and a freedom from party spirit, and
endeavoured to prevail on the ablest of those whom he
looked on as his personal adherents to join the new
Ministry. Grenville's conduct was different. As to him,
the King withdrew his prohibition ; on which, as if to show
his own sense of his own importance, Grenville refused to
take office in an Administration formed on a principle of
exclusion ; of the exclusion, that is to say, of Fox, to whom
till within the last few months he had been fiercely op
posed during the whole of his public life. It is absolutely
impossible to justify this refusal. In one sense every
Government must be formed on a principle of exclusion :
of the exclusion, that is, of those whose views of policy
differ from those of the intended Cabinet ; and, though
rejection by the Sovereign on personal grounds is cer
tainly a different thing, yet it was impossible to deny
that George III. had sufficient reasons to justify his
decision both in Fox's general conduct, and especially in
the language in which that statesman and his companions

144 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
habitually indulged respecting himself It was even more
unquestionable that Grenville was one of the last persons
in the kingdom in whom a desire for P'ox's co-operation
could at that time have been expected, or who was entitled
to demand it. Nor indeed, though the willingness to unite
with Fox on this occasion was undoubtedly an instance of
the sincerity of Pitt's patriotism, can it be looked on as
equally a proof of the soundness of his judgment. For the
coalition of 1782, though far less indefensible on the part
of Lord North than in Fox, had certainly in some degree
damaged the elder statesman's reputation also : and a repe
tition of such a step now would have compelled Pitt to
concessions scarcely inferior to those to which his prede
cessor had consented. Such an union could only have
worked well by both parties postponing every question of
domestic policy, and agreeing to concentrate the whole
energies of the Government and the country on the prose
cution of the war. And such a postponement might plau
sibly have been represented, as in some quarters it certainly
would have been represented, as a subordination of political
principle to a desire for office. This, as we shall presently
see, was the opinion entertained by Lord Hawkesbury.^
But it was not that held by Grenville ; and his refusal to
rejoin his old colleagues, because the idea of a coalition
with their old antagonist was abandoned, was defensible on
no ground of either precedent or principle. The truth would
seem to be that he had adopted the idea that neither Pitt
nor the King could do without him. Pitt, however, was as
proud as himself, and with better reason ; he resolved to
show him that he could dispense with his aid ; and when,
at the beginning of May, Addington formally resigned
office, he carried out the King's wishes by selecting his col
leagues mainly from among those who had been members
of Addington's and of his own former administration.
It was almost a matter of course that Lord Hawkesbury
continued a Secretary of State, but he did not remain
in his old post. Pitt had hoped to secure the assistance
^ Vide infra, p. 201.

l8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 145
of Lord Moira, who, besides that he was himself a man
of considerable ability, was of special importance from his
intimacy v/ith and influence over the Prince of Wales ; and,
as no place seemed so suited to his abilities as the Foreign
Office, to strengthen the Ministry Lord Hawkesbury
consented to give it up, it being at first settled that he
should instead take the management of war and the
colonies.' But, as the arrangements went on, he was ulti
mately transferred to the Home Office, chiefly, it seems
probable, because, according to the usage of that day, when
the Prime Minister was a commoner, the Home Secretary,
if a peer, was the leader of the Upper House, and partly to
comply with the fancy of the King himself, who desired
such an arrangement, alleging as his reason that the Home
Secretary was the officer with whom, next to the Prime
Minister himself, he was brought into the most frequent
contact, and that there was no one with whom he found
it so pleasant to transact business as Lord Hawkesbury.
As far as personal feelings were concerned. Lord Hawkes
bury would have preferred remaining where he was ; but
he knew that, in the formation of a new Ministry, it is
often necessary to make sacrifices. And some of the
reasons for which the change was proposed were, as we
have seen, of a nature so complimentary and gratifying as
greatly to contribute to reconcile him to it, though, as
matters were eventually settled, the motive which had
originally suggested any change at all, disappeared ; since
Lord Moira, after a good deal of vacillation, declined
joining the Ministry : and the seals of the Foreign Office
were given to Lord Harrowby.
^ It is remarkable that in the very copious narrative of these trans
actions contained in Lord Liverpool's letters, which will be given a few
pages further on, this appointment is not mentioned ; but among the
Liverpool Papers I find the following note :
" St. James's Palace, May 13th, 1804.
" The King desires Lord Hawkesbury's attendance here at four this
day, to take the custody of the seals of the Colonial Department."
VOL. I. L

146 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804

CHAPTER V.
Lord Liverpool's account of the formation of Pitt's second Administra
tion — Canning's attack on Lord Hawkesbury — They are reconciled
— The Additional Force BiU— A new Corn Bill —Lord Hawkesbury's
views of Free Trade — Disputes in the royal family — Trades Unions
— Rise of Mr. O'Connell — Lord Hawkesbury's advice to the Roman
Catholics — Reconciliation of Pitt and Addington — The attack on
the Spanish treasure-ships — Napoleon's letter to George III. —
Alliance with Austria and Russia.
The whole of the details relating to the formation of the
new Administration ' have been narrated before by dif
ferent writers, and of course from different points of view ;
but, as the truth is only to be arrived at by the comparison
' The new Ministry was eventually composed of the following
members : —
First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of Exchequer, Mr. PiTT.
Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon.
Lord President, Duke of PORTLAND.
Lord Privy Seal, Earl of Westmoreland.
Home Secretary, Lord HAWKESBURY.
Foreign Secretary, Earl of Harrowby.
Colonial Secretary, Earl of Camden.
First Lord of Admiralty, Lord MELVILLE.
President of Board of Control, Lord CASTLEREAGH.
Master of the Ordnance, Earl of Chatham.
President of Board of Trade, Duke of MONTROSE.
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, Earl MuLGRAVE.
Lord Castlereagh being the only member of the House of Commons
besides Pitt himself in the Cabinet. But Canning, whose great
eloquence was becoming generally acknowledged, was Treasurer of
the Navy ; and one of the new secretaries of the Treasury was a man
who subsequently obtained the highest reputation for his thorough
knowledge of all commercial and financial subjects, Mr. W, Huskisson.

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 147
of as many accounts as possible, provided they proceed
from persons in a position to acquire accurate knowledge,
I will add here a relation of the whole circumstances, con
tained in three letters from Lord Liverpool to his cousin.
Dr. Cornwall, bishop of Hereford, which, as the writer's
information was of course derived in great part from his
son, may be very nearly taken as the account of Lord
Hawkesbury himself Addiscombe Place, July 8th, 1804.
My DEAR Lord,
I have now been in the country about two months. I have seen
here very few people ; I have not even seen Hawkesbury but
twice. When I left London, Administration was changing, and
it has since been changed. I have learned, however, authenti
cally, the principal events that have passed ; and I mean now,
in the course of two or three letters, to send you an account of
these transactions ; and I do it at the desire, and with the
approbation, of Lord Hawkesbury.
Mr. Pitt made himself the instrument of producing a change in
the Administration ; for this purpose he wrote letters to the
King, which I have seen. His only charge against the late
Administration was weakness and imbecility. He did not state
a single fact in proof of it, nor has a single fact been brought
forvs^ard in either House of ParHament, or even in public
conversation. The majority in either House was not great, but
full as great in the House of Commons as Mr. Pitt had upon
his Defence Bill. Mr. Addington and his colleagues thought
fit, however, to give way, and some persons of importance
think them wise in doing so. The King offered Mr. Addington
an earldom and a pension of 4,000/. a year, which he refused,
though pressed to accept these favours by the King and others.
In the meantime a Court intrigue was going on. The Queen
and the Duke of York were in open hostility with the Prince
of Wales, and had no intercourse whatever. The dukes of
Cumberland and Cambridge attached themselves to the Duke
of York, the Duke of Clarence to the Prince of Wales, and the
Duke of Kent acted a doubtful part between them. The
Queen and Duke of York were apprehensive that the Adminis-
L 2

148 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
tration which then existed was not sufficient to support them, in
case of events, 'against the heir apparent, and wished therefore
that it should be strengthened, particularly by Mr. Pitt. They
therefore contributed to bring about the change, though the
King was always firm in support of Mr. Addington.
The state of the King's health was then, and continues to be,
precarious ; according to the physicians, his bodily health is
such as to promise a long life, and they are of opinion they
shall cure him of any raental derangement, if he wih comply
with what they shall advise. The notes which he writes (of
which I have seen a great number) are not only wise and
discreet, but excellent. His conversation, also, and behaviour
are perfectly good when he is in the company of those for
whora he feels any respect. But when he gets into the com
pany of the female part of his family, or among his servants in
the stables, his conversation is not certainly such as it ought to
be ; and he marked this particularly in the only visit he has
paid to Windsor ; so that he is to go there no more, and I
believe he will live principally at Kew. He has promised to
conform to the rules prescribed by the physicians, and I incline
to think he will now do so.
On the other hand, the Prince of Wales has never seen his
father, mother, sisters, or brothers, that are attached to that
part of the royal family. He obtains, however, information of
what passes amongst them, as is supposed, through the Duke of
Kent, and probably through other quarters. He declares him
self in direct hostility to the Government that has been formed,
and, by way of making friends, gives great dinners to all that
he thinks may be gained. He professes that he will not take a
temporary regency, but that he must have it for good, and
without limitation, if he has it at all. He propagates unfavor
able accounts of his father's health, and calls upon certain
persons now in power, even by letter, not to trust to the reports
of physicians alone, but to bring the business before Parliament.
He is, as I take it, very much in the hands of Lord Moira and
Mr. Fox; but I do not think that any ofthe others, though they
wish to avail theraselves of his influence for the destruction of
those who are now in power, are much connected with him.
I now revert to Mr. Pitt. This gentleman proposed to form an

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 149
Administration of all the parties that assisted in the two Houses
of Pariiament, excluding Mr. Addington. He has had some
personal quarrel with the person last mentioned. The secret is
supposed to be in the hands of Mr. Steele,^ and perhaps of a
few others. I am totally unacquainted with it. Mr. Addington
told me expressly he never would disclose it. Mr. Pitt proposed
with earnestness that Mr. Fox, as well as others, should be
taken in the Administration. I doubt whether he was ever
sincere, or indeed thought that an Administration could be
formed in which Mr. Fox and the others could bear a part.
The King firmly rejected Mr. Fox, to which Mr. Pitt at last
gave way, insisting, however, on taking in Lord Grenville. The
King, though disinclined to his lordship, acquiesced. Mr. Pitt
went then to Lord Grenville, and made the proposition to him.
Lord Grenville would not consent to become a part of an
Administration from which Mr. Fox and his friends were
excluded. He confirmed this determination by a letter which
you must have seen in the newspapers. Mr. Pitt then took the
resolution of forming an Administration of his own friends, and
of such of the late Administration as he approved of
In my next letter I will send you an account of the share which
Lord Hawkesbury has had in this transaction, and I shall
afterwards convey to you some curious anecdotes, which it is
proper you should know. I have the pleasure to tell you that
my health continues full as well, perhaps rather better, than it
was when you saw me in London.
All the family desire their best compliments to you and your
family. I am, with sincere regard, my dear Lord,
Your Lordship's faithful Servant, Liverpool.
My DEAR Lord,
In my last letter I promised to give your Lordship an account of
the share which Lord Hawkesbury had in the late change in
the Administration. When Mr. Pitt determined to form an
Administration out of his own friends and of a certain number
of Mr. Addington's coadjutors, he sent Mr. Charies Long to
Lord Hawkesbury to propose a meeting with him. At this
1 Secretary to the Treasury.

ISO LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
conference Mr. Pitt said that Lord Hawkesbury was to con
tinue Secretary of State, but asked hira if he would have any
objection to change his department if Lord Moira could be
gained, and he should prefer to have the Foreign Department.
Lord Hawkesbury, who is attached to this department, and the
members of which were much attached to him, objected, and
stated his objections, but at last gave way if Lord Moha could
be gained. When Lord Hawkesbury told me of this, I did not
much object to the consent he had given if the change was
founded on the acquisition of such a person as Lord Moira,
who, from his connexion with the Prince, was of great import
ance. The experiment was tried, by letters written to Lord
Moira, but it wholly failed. Mr. Pitt then saw Lord Hawkes
bury again, and said that he could not bring Lord Harrowby
into his Cabinet unless he made him Secretary of State for the
Foreign Department, for his health was so infirm that he could
not execute any other, and that Lord Hawkesbury must con
tinue to have the management of the House of Lords. Mr.
Pitt assigned no other reason. Lord Hawkesbury again objected
as before, but in the end acquiesced, for the reason stated to
him. When Lord Hawkesbury acquainted me with this, I
expressed great dissatisfaction, for I did not think that Lord
Harrowby was a man either of the importance, the talents, or
the knowledge of business, that Lord Hawkesbury was to leave
his office merely for his lordship's accommodation. The point,
however, had been decided, and nothing further could be said.
I had, in truth, some presentiment of what afterwards happened.
Lord Hawkesbury went, however, into the Home Department
The King was, I am persuaded, informed of the sentiments
which I entertained on this subject, and on this account he
first conveyed to me, through Sir Joseph Banks, that he pre
ferred having Lord Hawkesbury in his new situation ; that he
thought it a situation of more iraportance, and that it brought
him more frequently into his Majesty's presence, so that he
should be more nearly connected with hira. Shortly after this,
his Majesty further marked his confidence in me, and his wish
to reconcile me to the change, by sending me all the corre
spondence which had passed between Mr. Pitt and others, in
consequence of this change of Administration; and I had reason

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 151
to conjecture that the King placed very great personal confi
dence in Lord Hawkesbury.
Before I proceed, it is necessary I should observe that Lord
Hawkesbury insisted with Mr. Pitt on preserving his friend
Mr. WaUace in the office he then held, whom Mr. Pitt intended
to dismiss, from personal impressions against him made by
Mr. Canning and others. This act of friendship on the part
of Lord Hawkesbury stirred up against him the enmity of many
of the little persons who environ and influence Mr. Pitt.
Lord Hawkesbury was the means of preserving Lord West
moreland, whom Mr. Pitt wished to dismiss, notwithstanding
the long personal friendship which had existed between them.
I beHeve that Hawkesbury performed this office in compliance
with the wishes of the King.
When it was known that Mr. Wallace was to be continued in
office, Mr. Canning and his little connexions began to spread
unfavorable reports to Lord Hawkesbury; and when the
Defence Bill came to be debated, Mr. Canning made use of
expressions in the House of Commons of a very hostile nature
to Lord Hawkesbury. It was evident that every word of his
speech was prepared. It was replied to by several, particularly
by Mr. Bragge, who told Mr. Canning that he had first been
introduced into business by Lord Hawkesbury, that he now
enjoyed one of the most profitable offices ^ under Government
in consequence of that introduction, and yet he had thought
fit unjustly to censure Lord Hawkesbury. Mr. Canning did not
deny this fact or say a word in reply. Even Mr. Pitt was
so sensible of the offence which had been given that he
endeavoured to bring Mr. Canning to an explanation, but
without success, and Mr. Pitt said himself what was not in fact
true. He concealed the real motive of the change, as stated
by himself to Lord Hawkesbury, and assigned another reason
for it.
Lord Hawkesbury, very much offended with the whole of this
transaction, took four-and-twenty hours to consider what he
should do. After full deliberation. Lord Hawkesbury v«ote a
letter on the twentieth of last month to Mr. Pitt, resigning his
' Mr. Canning, who had been Under-Secretary of State in Pitt's first
Administration, was Treasurer of the Navy in this his second Ministry.

152 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
office as Secretary of State, assigning as his reasons for it what
I have already stated, and which I need not therefore repeat,
but professing in the strongest terms his personal attachment to
the King. Mr. Pitt immediately replied to this letter, and tried
to diminish the offence which had been given, but begged of
Lord Hawkesbury not to proceed, or say a word of this trans
action, till he had had a conference with him, expressing in
strong terms how sensible he was of the mischief that would be
done to the existing Administration if any knowledge should
get abroad of what had passed on this occasion. The next
day Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Pitt had a conference, in
which, after a long discussion, and much art on the part of
Mr. Pitt, Lord Hawkesbury continued firm; and then Mr. Pitt
offered to remove the person who had been the occasion
of what had passed in the House of Commons relative to
himself if he made a point of it. Lord Hawkesbury took a
day to consider of this, when he returned for answer that he
would not suffer that any one should be dismissed, or even
resign his office, on his account. But after having stated to
Mr. Pitt, in very clear and explicit but temperate terms, the
impropriety of his own language, he required that Mr. Pitt
should take sorae opportunity of stating the real trath of what
had passed between thera when he consented to change his
situation ; viz. that he gave his consent merely for personal
accommodation. Mr. Pitt in answer proraised to do what
Lord Hawkesbury insisted on if an occasion should offer, and
expressed in strong terms his opinion of the talents and abilities
of Lord Hawkesbury, and his most sincere and earnest desire
that they might act together on the most cordial footing of
political confidence and personal friendship. When Lord
Hawkesbury sent his letter to me, I advised him to be satisfied,
and everything is going on well ever since. There are, how
ever, some other little anecdotes, which I shaH make the
subject of another letter ; but I shall not be able to write to
you for a day or two, as Mr. Lock is going to leave me.
I am, with the sincerest regard, my dear Lord,
Your Lordship's faithful Servant, Liverpool,

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 153
Addiscombe Place, i6th July, 1804.
My DEAR Lord,
Previous to what passed as related in the latter part of my last
letter, Lord Hawkesbury had told me that Mr. Canning's in
fluence over Mr. Pitt was greatly diminished; but when this
gentleman heard of Lord Hawkesbury's resolution to resign, he
appears to have been very much alarmed. He came three times
to seek Lord Hawkesbury, who twice refused to see him ; the
third time he forced himself upon him. I am informed, from
Mr. Canning's ovra account, Lord Hawkesbury treated him
very coldly ; he made many apologies, denying his intention to
give any offence. At length Mr. Canning offered to resign his
office if Lord Hawkesbury required it. Lord Hawkesbury was
then more civil to him, but dismissed him without any assurance,
but returned his answer in the letter he afterwards wrote to
Mr. Pitt, in which, as I said before, he declared that he would
not suffer any one to resign on his account. I am assured
that Mr. Canning and all his little squad are in very low spirits,
and it is certain that Mr. Pitt has never told the whole of
what passed to any of these gentlemen. I think it is probable
that they will work in every way they can to the prejudice
of my son : whether they will succeed it is impossible to
foretell ; but I think he acts perfectly right in setting them
at defiance. He must destroy their influence, or they must
destroy him.
I have thus given your Lordship a short history of the late change
in the Administration, and of some incidents that have occurred
in consequence thereof The late Administration were charged
with imbecility, and yet, neither in Mr. Pitt's letters to the
King, nor in any speech or proceeding in either House of
Parliament, has any one single act of imbeciHty been imputed
to them, or any charge brought against them. This is a most
extraordinary circumstance. If we compare the individuals of
which the late Administration was composed with those of the
present, we shall find the present much weaker than the pre
ceding one, except in the single case of Mr. Pitt. He certainly
is, in oratory at least, superior to Mr. Addington. Lord
Melville is certainly not a better First Lord of the Admiralty

154 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
in public estimation than Lord St. Vincent ; and no one of the
new members of the present Administration can be compared
to Mr. Yorke as a man of business. The Duke of Montrose,
Lord Camden, and Lord Mulgrave are wretched indeed. Lord
Harrowby has some parts, but the weakness of his mind,
and the consequent weakness of his health, almost disqualify
him for a man of business, and still more for a speaker. Mr.
Pitt has not a single member in the House of Commons
qualified to give him material support in debate ; while he
has to contend with opponents distinguished by talents of
every description : Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Windham, Mr.
Tierney, and others. There are other circumstances which
may put an end to his Administration. The King's health is
precarious, and even that of Mr. Pitt disqualifies him from
taking so vigorous and active a part as he did when he was
before in the same situation ; his popularity has also much
declined, particularly in the western and northern parts of
England. And, though he has some zealous friends among the
merchants of the City, the enthusiasm which once prevailed
shows itself no longer in his favour. If the King's health was
to decline, and the Prince of Wales to become regent, Mr.
Fox, in conjunction with Lord Moira, will become the efficient
ministers- If Mr. Pitt's health was to decline so as to prevent
his continuing in office, Mr. Addington would be his successor,
and return to his former situation. He has risen, since he
retired, very much in public estimation ; and, in tmth, men of
his character will always recover the good opinion of the
public when they are out of office, though they are neither
praised nor sufficiently respected as long as they retain their
power. He is calm, sensible, cautious, and has shown himself
of late to be very disinterested, though he has in fact but 2,200/.
a year to live on, except the office he gave his son, and he
will give no offence by the conduct he wiU hold while he may
be said to be in opposition. The Grenville party, though it
contains some men of ability, is not very numerous, and the
persons of which it consists are universally unpopular. The
heads of this party are considered by every one as violent in
their principles, and to the last degree selfish.
I have thus, my dear Lord, opened to you the whole of my

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 155
sentiments on the present state of affairs. Hawkesbury is in
perfect health and spirits.
I am, with sincere regard,
Your Lordship's faithful Servant, Liverpool.
It will here be seen that in one of these letters is a
brief mention of a disagreement with one of the subor
dinate, but very important, members of the Ministry. The
new Treasurer of the Navy, Canning, was a man of pre
eminent ability, of clear judgment, of rapid decision, of
large and liberal views, and of an eloquence second only on
his side ofthe House to that of Pitt himself. He was also
connected by terms of close intimacy with Lord Hawkes
bury. Their friendship, as has been already mentioned, had
commenced at Oxford, and they had since been connected
by parliamentary and official intercourse. Canning having
been Under-Secretary of State during the latter years of
Pitt's first Ministry. When, on Pitt's resignation. Lord
Hawkesbury was raised to Cabinet office, Addington would
gladly have secured the assistance of Canning also ; but he
entertained a strong opinion on the propriety of removing
the restrictions from the Roman Catholics, and followed
Pitt into retirement, though Pitt, rating service to the
country more highly than a show of personal attachment
to himself, strongly advised, and even entreated, him to
continue at his post. He, however, persisted in his resig
nation : but, though thus far proclaiming his resolution to
act on Pitt's example rather than by his advice, he was
far from imitating him in his subsequent conduct. During
the whole of Addington's government, he was its most un
wearied and versatile opponent, attacking both Administra
tion and Minister with speeches in and lampoons out of the
House ; and descending, on at least one occasion, to some
thing too like treachery and intrigue, to induce Pitt to take
measures to withdraw his support from the Ministry, and to
overthrow it before he had seen any reason to be dissatis
fied with its proceedings. The truth was that Canning had

156 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
one great fault during the early part of his career, though,
seeing how it had marred both his usefulness to his country
and his personal advancement, he afterwards had the good
sense to cure himself of it. The fault was an extreme rest
lessness. Conscious of the possession of great powers,
he was inclined to deny the credit of any ability to those
who came into competition with him, to disapprove of
everything which he had no share in doing. Accordingly,
although it would be doing him great injustice to compare
him, as to expansion of mind and lofty designs, with Lord
Grenville, yet in respect of the first transactions of the
Government which he had refused to join, he followed the
guidance of his former chief at the Foreign Office rather
than the wiser, better-tempered, and more self-denying
judgment of Pitt. He denounced the peace publicly and
privately, professing to regard it as the arrangement of
Addington himself not of " Hawkesbury, who had merely
held the pen,"' and as in itself justifying his unwillingness
to serve under such a principal. And now, when he had
returned to office under Pitt, he could not restrain himself
from not only still aiming his sarcasms at his predecessors,
but even from assuming that Pitt so fully agreed with, and so
completely deferred to the objections which he had formerly
made to the Peace of Amiens (though, as has been seen,
Pitt publicly supported and privately approved of it),
that the change which had been made in the department
of the Foreign Office had been adopted in consequence of
those objections ; and, in the debate on the Additional
Force Bill in the middle of June, he affirmed, by way of
vindicating his own consistency on now taking office with so
many colleagues who had been members of the previous
Ministry, that there was a great and general change of
system. Especially had it been changed in those points
on which Addington's measures had been unsatisfactory
to himself, and in the front he placed the foreign policy.
^ See his letter to Lord Boringdon, October 29th, 1801, in "George
Canning and his Times," p. 69.

j8o4] of LORD LIVERPOOL, 157
"I objected," said he, "to the administration of foreign
affairs : that has been changed ;" giving additional sting to
the assertion by his next sentence: "I objected to the
naval administration : that has been changed ; " the want
of energy and vigilance in the naval department having
been, as we have seen, selected by Pitt himself as the most
prominent object for censure.
Such a statement was well calculated to arouse Lord
Hawkesbury's indignation. He looked on it as tantamount
to an assertion that the speaker had not consented to take
even an office which did not give a seat in the Cabinet
without stipulating for such a change in our foreign policy
as required the removal of the former Foreign Secretary ;
and that that removal had therefore been caused by the
Prime Minister's acquiescence in the propriety of that
change. Canning afterwards disclaimed in the strongest
manner any intention of conveying such a notion, but the
comments made on his language, as soon as he sat down, by
Sheridan and others, showed that Lord Hawkesbury was
not unwarranted in the interpretation which he put on it.
Nay, Pitt himself must have regarded it in the same light ;
so pointedly, in the course of his own speech, delivered at a
later hour of the same evening, did he allude to Canning's
expressions, and so carefully did he give a different colour
to the recent arrangements. " There was not the slightest
ground," he affirmed, " for imagining that a noble friend of
his, whom he had always esteemed and loved, was degraded
by taking the Home instead of the Foreign Department,
though he confessed that there were some parts ofthe foreign
system which he did not approve, of which it was not neces
sary to say more. Those who knew the circumstances knew
how far that change was from any motive that could infer
degradation." Nor did he forbear to administer a sharp
rebuke to him whose (to say the least) unguarded language
had made it necessary for him to allude to the subject at
all. " Indeed he could not see in what view such a thing
could be mentioned at all, unless it were for the purpose

158 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
of sowing jealousies and dissensions among the present
ministers ; and as such it deserved his severest animad
version." Angry, however, as Lord Hawkesbury was, with his
habitual self-command he determined (as he wrote word
to Lord Liverpool) "to take no step in the business tih
after twenty-four hours' consideration." But at the end of
that time he wrote to the Prime Minister himself, reminding
him that " the change from the Foreign to the Home De
partment had been proposed by Pitt solely on the ground
of personal accommodation. That he himself had plainly
declared it to be contrary to his own wishes and feelings,
which, however, he was willing to sacrifice for the con
venience of Pitt himself in making his arrangements ; and
that from the first he had been fully aware of the construc
tion which would be given to this transaction in the world,
and of the advantage which any Opposition might be ex
pected to take of it. These consequences he had then
been prepared to disregard. But now, after this construc
tion had been publicly sanctioned by a member of the
Government supposed to possess a considerable share of
Pitt's personal confidence, he felt that, consistently with
what he owed to his own honour and reputation, he could
no longer continue a member of the Government." He
added also, as a proof that he was not deciding too hastily,
or under the impulse of annoyance at a single expression,
which might not mean so much as it seemed to convey,
that he knew that " the imputation thus publicly made had
been circulated from the same quarter for some time past
in private society." At the same time he assured Pitt that
his withdrawal from office should make no difference in his
resolution to give all possible support to his Government.
Pitt's reply would have been amply satisfactory to any one
who was not rendered peculiarly sensitive by a feeling of
wounded honour He declared that " it was scarcely
possible that any circumstance could arise which on every
personal account could give him- individually more pain."

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 159
And in this he was undoubtedly sincere ; for, as has been
already mentioned, in the first arrangement of Addington's
Cabinet he had singled Lord Hawkesbury out for especial
commendation. He pointed out how promptly and de
cidedly he had himself alluded to the subject in order to
efface the construction which others showed an inclination
to put on Canning's words. And he corroborated most
fully Lord Hawkesbury's own statement that the recent
changes "had been proposed and acceded to solely on the
ground of personal accommodation." He did more. For
when Canning, who had neither wished nor expected his
words to be taken so seriously, and who, when he learnt
what deep offence he had given, expressed to Lord
Hawkesbury and to Pitt his desire rather to resign his own
place than to embarrass the Government by allowing Lord
Hawkesbury to retire, Pitt, without at all concealing how
useful Canning's aid was to himself in the House of
Commons, declared that, if he were driven to such an alter
native, he must accept his resignation rather than that of
Lord Hawkesbury.
Such a declaration, while it was only just, inasmuch as
Canning was certainly the offender in the dispute, and only
in accordance with what Lord Hawkesbury was entitled to
by his seat in the Cabinet, a rank to which Canning had
not yet risen, was also in itself so high and practical a
compliment and proof of the value the Prime Minister
set upon his services, that, as we have seen in his father's
letters to Bishop Cornwall, he consented to withdraw his
resignation. In the winter the matter was for a moment
re-opened by the mischief-making tattle of officious friends
on both sides, but was speedily set at rest by candid per
sonal explanations and the judicious mediation of a comme n
friend. Lord Morpeth. Of course the outline, though not
the details, of what had taken place was generally known,
and the anticipations which Lord Hawkesbury expressed
to his father when he first communicated to him his resig
nation of his office, that "so far as it was a personal

i6o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
question, what had happened would not turn to his disad
vantage in the eyes of the world," was verified ; for the
world in general, and especially the world of politicians,
looks with favour on a man who is prompt to vindicate his
own honour, so long as his conduct in vindicating it is
marked with forbearance and good temper. And in
another way the transaction redounds to the credit of both,
of Canning as well as of Lord Hawkesbury. For it is only
with men of really fine and generous dispositions that a
reconciliation, after a dispute of so serious a kind, can be so
complete as to leave no soreness behind it. But it was such
in this instance. They at once returned to their former
habits of cordial intimacy : which was never again inter
rupted. Even their difference on the question which, after
the termination of the war, was, till its final settlement, the
cardinal point of domestic politics, led to no diminution of
their personal" regard for each other And on all other
points, as no one could better appreciate the brilliancy of
Canning's genius or the soundness of his views than his old
friend and colleague, so no one could exceed Canning in
the frankness and warmth with which he at all times ac
knowledged the assistance that he derived in carrying out
those views from his confidence in the steady support and
straightforward advocacy which he was sure to receive from
the Prime Minister.
Before his resumption of office Pitt, as we have seen,
had shown his dissatisfaction with the measures, both naval
and military, which had been adopted for the further prose
cution of the war. One of the first bills which, still under
the influence of this feeling, he introduced as minister was
that known as the " Additional Force Bill ; " by which he
hoped to remove the difficulties which had lately been found
to impede the recruiting for the regular army, and to aug
ment the army of reserve, which hitherto had never reached
the number intended. And he calculated on attaining both
these objects by a reduction of the militia to its former
amount, which of late had been greatly exceeded. The

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. i6i
bill was vehemently attacked not only by Fox, but also
by Windham and Addington ; but it passed the House
of Commons by a majority of above 40. In the Upper
House it encountered equally earnest opposition from Lord
Grenville ; from Lord Moira, who, as we have said, was
closely connected with the Prince of Wales ; from Lord
Hobart, who had been one of Addington's Secretaries of
State, and from others ; but it was efficiently advocated by
Lord Hawkesbury. His argument rested very mainly on
the ground that the original establishment of the army of
reserve having not only been a judicious, but also, as was
proved by the results, an eminently successful measure,
the present bill was in fact but a necessary correction of
and supplement to it. In some points the former Act had
been found to press both heavily and, what was worse,
unequally on those whom it most affected. This bill
redressed the inequalities, and removed the pressure. Lord
Grenville had objected to it as unconstitutional, since
it tended to establish a large standing army in time of
peace. So old an argument, if indeed it could be called
one at all, admitted of being easily disposed of by the most
cursory reference to the length of time during which a
standing army had been kept on foot in the kingdom.
And it was evident that the principle was not affected
by the number of men employed ; but Lord Hawkesbury,
moreover, contended and proved that the force to be
established by the present bill was wholly free from any
unconstitutional element, inasmuch as it would be as en
tirely under the control of Parliament as any description
of force that could be conceived. Above all, he recom
mended the measure as one calculated to save us for the
future from those embarrassments which hitherto had
always crippled us at the commencement of a war, arising
from the want of men.
His speech on the whole was so conclusive that the bill
passed the House of Lords by a majority of 154 to 69, or
more than two to one. And he was equally successful, or
yOL. I. M

i62 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
even more so (since the opponents of the measure did not
in this instance venture to divide at all), in persuading the
House to agree to a bill for regulating the corn-trade; making
the conditions under which grain might be exported or im
ported dependent on the average price of corn (for the year)
in the maritime districts of the island. The object was
stated by him in the House of Lords to be : " First to render
the prices of corn steady, and to counteract, as far as legis
lation could effect it, the dangers and inconveniences of
frequent fluctuation, with which their Lordships could not
fail to be impressed when they recollected that within a
few years the price of wheat had been on one occasion
43J. a quarter, and at another time had risen to the enor
mous price of 156J. ; and the other object aimed at was
to encourage agriculture by adopting such measures as
might afford the farmer a fair profit for his labour and
capital." It is probable that, in advocating the measure.
Lord Hawkesbury was in some degree yielding his own
judgment to that of his colleagues, and that it may have
been owing to this circumstance that his language was
unusually guarded. "He would not," he said, "then go
into an examination of the view urged by some of the
most respectable and most enlightened men in the country,
whether it would not be wiser to abstain from all legis
lation, and to leave the trade in corn as free as it was
in any other commodity." And it is certain that, at
a somewhat later period, when, in consequence of an
apprehended scarcity of the potato crop in Ireland, the
Secretary for Ireland, then Sir A. Wellesley, suggested
a fresh, even if only a temporary, alteration of the
law, not without some apparent anxiety for the adoption
of his proposal. Lord Hawkesbury expressed to him
a very decided opinion " of the difficulties which must
arise from any interference of the Government or Legis
lature on the subject," as calculated "to derange trade,
and give an impulse to unhealthy speculation." And
in the re-arrangement of our financial and commercial

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 163
legislation, rendered necessary by the termination of the
war, we shall find that he was a general advocate for the
greatest abstinence from interference with trade and com
merce that the complicated interests and established habits
of a country like Great Britain seemed to permit. If not the
earhest champion of free-trade, he was certainly the first
who, with any of the responsibility of the Government on his
shoulders, supported such a principle. And it was no idea
taken up by him hastily, or on light grounds, but one to
which he consistently adhered throughout his whole career,
and the more steadily the more he had the power to give
effect to it. Those who, in our own generation, lavish
panegyrics not undeserved on the financial abilities dis
played, and the financial and commercial reforms achieved,
by Sir Robert Peel, should bear in mind that he imbibed
the principles on which those reforms were founded from the
statesman who introduced him into the Government. The
giving the royal assent to the bill was the last act of the
session. And the vacation, acceptable to all the ministers,
was more welcome to none than to Lord Hawkesbury, who
required leisure to make himself acquainted with the duties,
and to enable him to grapple with the perplexities, of his
new office.
And, if not so imposing in appearance as the labours of
the Foreign Secretary, on whose management the mainte
nance of friendship and alliance with foreign Powers and the
peace or war of the world often depended, they were equally
multifarious, almost equally important at the moment,
often even of more real and solid consequence, as being cal
culated to exert a more permanent influence on the internal
policy of the kingdom and condition of the people. The
very question of peace and war was not wholly unconnected
with the Home Office at the time, from the expectation
which generally prevailed that the first operation attempted
by the enemy would be the invasion of this island ; and
much of Lord Hawkesbury's correspondence with the King
during the recess of 1804 refers to the measures which
M 2

1 64 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
he would be required to take, in the event of any landing
on our shores being effected, to preserve the tranquillity
of the kingdom.' Both his royal master and himself
believed that the review which the new Emperor held
at Boulogne in the middle of August, in honour of him
self and his namesake, the new Saint Napoleon, whom
he had just called into existence as a compliment to
himself was but a rehearsal of the grand attempt which
was to follow immediately. But when, in a skirmish which
took place before the end of the month under the eyes of
Napoleon himself the new Emperor found that a British
frigate and three small sloops were sufficient to repel ninety
of his brigs and gunboats, he became convinced that no
flotilla of small vessels, however numerous, would be
sufficient to protect his transports, and he adjourned the
enterprise till the following year, when the plan of naval
operations which he had formed would, he hoped, give him,
at least for a time, the command of the Channel
But, besides the possible chances of the war, questions of
the gravest character were surrounding the Home Secretary
on every side. In a country such as Britain, even the
most private affairs of the royal family are not without
an influence on public politics ; and this had never been
the case in a greater degree than during the present reign ;
nor perhaps ever so much in that as at the time of which
we are speaking, when the eyes of the nation were directed
to three generations at once, and the arrangements neces
sary for the education of the future heiress of the kingdom
might affect the course of events for the greater part of
the century. The King himself, as was not unnatural,
conceived that he had, as sovereign, a right to the principal
' August 14th, two days before the review at Boulogne, Lord
Hawkesbury writes to his father : " From intelligence which has lately
reached us we are inclined to believe that the attempt of invasion
will soon be made. Their preparations are very great ; and they have
stopped building, which looks as if they considered them complete.
They have about 3,000 vessels of different descriptions, and 180,000
men between Ostend and Cherbourg."

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 165
voice in the settlement of those arrangements ; his right
being certainly, in the general view, strengthened by the
unhappy terms on which the parents of the young princess
were living. And it was hardly possible for either of them
to behave with greater impropriety than. their conduct now
displayed. The Prince made the most ostentatious parade
of his differences with his father ; abstaining from attend
ing the levee on his birthday, driving by the palace at
the time as if on purpose to show that no cause but in
clination kept him away; afterwards, when he had agreed
to wait on his father at Kew, changing his mind, and
desiring to intimate his change of purpose by a message
couched in terms so disrespectful that the chancellor re
fused to convey it. While the Princess of Wales, acting
with more than usual flightiness, sent messages to those
in charge of her daughter, in the King's name, of which
he had no knowledge, and the obedience to which took
him wholly by surprise, and threw him into great and
dangerous agitation. However, after a discussion of some
months the Prince gave way, in appearance at least ;
and, though he still spoke most irreverently of his father
in private society, and dwelt with the exaggeration of evi
dent satisfaction on the infirm state of his mental health,
he consented to allow him the sole and exclusive care of
his daughter ; and the selection of her abode and of her
different attendants and teachers was made by the King
himself with great anxiety and most judicious discern
ment. Unhappily, the arrangement which was now con
cluded did not terminate all the differences in the royal
family ; and when Lord Hawkesbury's interference was
next called for, the necessity for it arose from disputes
between the Prince and Princess which were still more
distressing, because still more discreditable.
Another matter to which Lord Hawkesbury's attention
was called in the autumn of this year was of a nature
which at more than one subsequent period has attracted
notice ; but never so much as lately, since the atrocities

i66 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
to which the system of the Trades Unions is calculated
to lead had never been fully comprehended till they were
disclosed by the recent investigations.
In 1804 these unions were of recent growth, the first
societies of the kind having been apparently established
in imitation of the different political associations to which
admiration of the principles of the French Revolution had
given birth. But they had already grown to such a head,
and the workmen had adopted steps to procure their objects
which were so unquestionably illegal, that the masters, who
saw every proper principle of trade attacked by them, and
their own means of livelihood imperilled, petitioned the
Home Secretary to take the matter into his own hands,
and to institute a Government prosecution of the chief
members of the Union. Lord Hawkesbury very naturally
referred the petition to the Attorney-General, Mr. Perceval,
celebrated afterwards as the only lawyer of professional
eminence who, since the Revolution, has ever become
Prime Minister. And the opinion which he received in
reply is worth preserving, as probably the earliest pro
nounced by any lawyer or minister on a question which
is now assuming such great importance. October 5th, 1804.
My Lord,
I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the
2 2d ult., accompanied with several papers relative to the com
bination formed by the boot and shoe makers in the metropolis,
which your Lordship thereby submitted to the consideration of
the Solicitor-General and rayself, who were requested to state
an opinion as to the steps raost proper to be taken thereon.
These papers contain a statement of a very extensive combina
tion existing amongst the boot and shoe makers in the me
tropolis, who are in correspondence, by means of delegates,
committees, and otherwise, with similar combinations, or rather
branches of the same combination, in different parts of the
kingdom. The systera seems to be established upon the plan
acted upon by the Corresponding Society, and other united
Societies, which have been found to act with such mischievous

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 167
concert in England, Scotland, and Ireland, upon political
points which were the objects of the union ; and there appears
to be no doubt that the plan of the present combination is
capable of being applied in support of any object to which
they may be disposed to direct it. The present objects seem
to be the increase of wages, some regulation with respect to
the nuraber of apprentices, and imposing an obligation upon
the masters to employ no journeyman who, as not being a
member of the combination, or refusing to comply with its
rules and submit to its authority, has made himself obnoxious
to its raembers. This latter object, it is plain, is immediately
directed to the establishment of the strength of the society, by
putting into their hands the means of compelling every journey
man in the trade, and, through the journeymen, every master
in the trade, to submit to their terms under peril of ruin, by
loss of employment to the journeymen, and loss of workmen
to the masters. The general evidence of the existence of such
a system seems to be very strong and convincing ; but it is
not given with that detail and particularity with regard to
individuals as to enable me to point out to your Lordship the
persons whom (if it should be thought fit for Government to
take it up as a subject on which they would direct a prosecu
tion) it would be proper to select as objects of that prosecution.
But the papers contain the offer of more information, and I
think it may be reasonably concluded, from what they contain,
that sufficiently particular information against individuals might
be procured.
Upon the point of lav\', I have no difficulty in stating to your
Lordship that the combination is illegal, and that the parties,
if particularized by such evidence as I above suppose to be
within reach of being procured, are liable to be prosecuted for
a misdemeanour.
With respect to the policy of Government's instituting such a
prosecution, my mind is in too great a degree of doubt to
permit me to state any opinion, or to do more than to submit it
to your Lordship and his Majesty's Government to determine it,
suggesting some of the considerations which create my doubts.
If the effect of prosecuting or not prosecuting by Government
was to begin and end with this case alone, it perhaps might be

i68 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
immaterial who carried on the prosecution. The source of
evidence is opened to Government, and the pubHc prosecutor
would probably be able to procure sufficient evidence to
convict. But as it will be viewed as a precedent of what the
masters in this trade, and in others, will expect Government to
do in future, it seeras to me to deserve very serious considera
tion. For it is not only to be collected from these papers,
but it is otherwise too notorious, that similar combinations exist
in almost every trade in the kingdom. And if Government
attends to this application on the part of the boot and shoe
makers, similar applications must be expected from every other
trade, and it will lead to an opinion that it is not the business
of the masters of the trade, who feel the injury, to prosecute,
but that it is the business of the Government. And it seems
to admit of no doubt, but that either as regards the authority
and weight of the raasters, or the facility of securing evidence
to prosecute with effect, such prosecutions had better be in the
hands of the masters than of Government. It must be ad
mitted, indeed, that the offence has grown to such a height,
and such an extent, as to raake it very discouraging for any
individual to institute a prosecution ; as the persons whom he
would prosecute would be supported at their trial, and during
their imprisonment, by the contributions of their confederates,
and his own shop would possibly be deserted by his work
men. But then it is clear that it is owing to the inertness and
timidity of the masters that the conspiracy has reached this
height, and it may well be feared that this inertness wiU be
rather increased than diminished by the interference of Govern
ment. The same timidity which disposes each at present to
wish to leave it to sorae other parties to prosecute, lest by
prosecution they should lose their workraen, wiU dispose them
to leave to others the equally, if not more, obnoxious duty of
informing ; and when they once think the punishment of such
offences to be the business of Government, they wiU think
it also the business of Government to procure the evidence,
and not theirs to give it ; so that the future detection and
prosecution of such offences would probably be rendered
more difficult. Besides, in all these cases there are always,
whether well founded or not, complaints on both sides, and the

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 169
impartiality of Government would be awkwardly tested if,
after undertaking a prosecution, at the instance of the masters,
against the conspiracy of the journeymen, they were to be
applied to on the part of the journeymen to prosecute the
same masters for a conspiracy against their men.
These are some of the considerations which lead me to doubt
whether it would or would not be politic to institute a prose
cution by the public in this case ; and I take leave to submit
them to your Lordship's better determination. Upon the ille-
gaHty of this conspiracy I have had an opportunity of knowing
that the Solicitor-General agrees with me, but not having been
able to see him since I have read the papers myself, and being
pressed by the persons who submitted these papers to your
Lordship not to delay my opinion upon them, I have reflected
upon the whole of the case without waiting to confer with the
Solicitor-General upon the expediency of Government engaging
in the prosecution. I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,
Sp. Perceval.
Mr. Perceval's opinion was, almost as a matter of course,
acted on by his colleague who had invited it. Lord
Hawkesbury declined to institute such a prosecution as
had been requested. And the matter dropped for a time :
the workmen abating some of their pretensions when they
learnt (for the Attorney-General's opinion seems to have
become known to the parties principally concerned) that
their combination, carried out as they intended to carry
it out, was such a violation of the law as might expose
them to punishment.
In Ireland there were difficulties of a more serious
nature : some affecting the political tranquillity of the island,
and likely, in their complications, to involve that of Great
Britain also; others affecting the character of the judi
cial bench and the administration of justice, on which
hitherto no political agitation had even cast a suspicion.
That at so unquiet a moment, when the insurrection that
had just been quelled had inevitably left behind it a still

I70 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
sweUing under-current of discontent, libels should have
been published on those concerned in the punishment of
the rebels could hardly be unexpected. But, after the
printer of one of the most virulent attacks on the Lord
Lieutenant, the Lord Chancellor, and other high officers
of the Crown had been brought to justice, it was found
that the author of the libel was actually one of the judges.
Even in Ireland so discreditable a state of things as now
ensued had not previously been seen. Two of his col
leagues so resented the conduct of which they believed
a third to have been guilty that they refused to sit on the
bench with him. The fourth took his part : one-half the
Queen's Bench broke off all intercourse, both official and
private, with the other half and threats of actions at law
for libel and slander were freely bandied between those
who were appointed to be the dispensers of justice to
others. The question, too, which had broken up Pitt's former
Ministry was revived, and that under the peculiarly em
barrassing circumstance of those who brought it forward
being men of deservedly high reputation and influence in
Ireland. Lord Fingall, Lord Gormanstown, Sir Edward
Bellew, and others, some country gentlemen, some mer
chants of affluence, and some barristers, among whom was
one, Mr. Daniel O'Connell, who afterwards rose to great
celebrity by his ultimately successful advocacy of the
question, at the beginning of the year had formed
themselves into a committee for the purpose of pressing
on the Government the propriety of repealing the laws
affecting the Roman Cathohcs, to which body they ah
belonged ; and they were now preparing a petition to be
presented to both Houses of Parliament ; while at the very
same time certain information reached the Government
of a very extensive disaffection in the southern and western
counties, and of a large party being in negotiation with
the French to induce them to invade the island. The
French were lavish of, and probably sincere in, their

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

171

promises to comply with the invitation : but it is remark
able that, according to the intelligence which was received
by the ministers, they had resolved not again to try the
western coast, where the misadventures of General Hum
bert and Commodore Bomparfi were still fresh in their
recollection ; but they proposed instead to venture up
St. George's Channel, and, while a Dutch fleet sailed
round towards the Donegal coast to draw off our attention
to that quarter, to endeavour to land a force in the neigh
bourhood of Dublin and surprise the capital. Lord
Hawkesbury failed, as we shall see hereafter, in his
endeavours to induce the Roman Catholics to postpone
their movement to a more favorable time. His advice
may have been suspected, since his having held office in
Addington's Ministry raised a presumption that he was
opposed to the removal of the restrictions complained of.
But when he urged upon them, as he was evidently
authorised to do by the Prime Minister, that "whatever
might be Pitt's opinion on the merits of the question itself,
it would be impossible for him, under the present circum
stances, to take any other line than that of resisting it to
the utmost of his power, and that it was certain that any
expectation of carrying the question at that time would be
completely disappointed," it would have been wise of them
to listen to him ; for he was acting rather as a friend than
as an adversary when he argued that it was impolitic to
a degree " little short of insanity for the Catholics to think
of pressing their claims at that time, since the consequence
would infallibly be that many persons would be committed
against them who, under other circumstances, might come
to a different conclusion ; but who, having once taken their
line upon the question, might be disposed on that account
ever after to adhere to it." He added : " The agitation of
' A few weeks after General Humbert's surrender. Commodore
Bompart, with a squadron consisting of a ship of the line and eight
frigates, having 3,000 men on board as a reinforcement for the general,
had all his ships but two taken by a squadron under Sir J. B. Warren.

172 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
the question at this time may influence the opinions of
many likewise on the merits of the question itself It
will impress them with a conviction of the malus animus
of those who bring it forward, as the removal of the exist
ing disabilities would not practically benefit ten persons in
the whole country, and the conduct of the Catholics will
appear to arise from a desire on their part either to
embarrass Government by the agitation of the question
at a most unseasonable time, or to make this measure,
when carried, the foundation of further claims and pre
tensions of the most alarming nature to all who are
attached to the existing constitution in Church and
State."! If, in speaking of those who might be led to conceive
an unfavorable impression of the objects of the Roman
Catholics and their general loyalty to the constitution
by their pertinacity in thus pressing their claims at this
moment, he included himself; and if he, not having pre
viously made up his mind on the principle, but being now
compelled to make a sudden and hasty selection, was thus
led to embrace that side of the question which was hostile
to their emancipation, as it was subsequently called ; it was
indeed a most unfortunate mistake for themselves and for
the kingdom at large which the Roman Catholics now
committed. For in that case it seems probable that, by
alienating one who subsequently enjoyed the chief power
in the State for such a length of time, they eventually post
poned the attainment of their demands, and kept the whole
kingdom in a state of agitation for many years. A mistake
of policy at this moment it undoubtedly was, because it
can never be prudent to endeavour to push forward a claim
at a time when circumstances render its success impossible.
And Pitt's repudiation of it, coupled with the motive
which led to his taking that line, clearly showed that at
! These opinions are expressed in a letter to the Lord Lieutenant,
written " to be made use of by him, as he might think proper, in his
further communications with any members of the Catholic body."

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 173
the moment concession was absolutely impracticable. The
Roman Catholics indeed may in all candour be excused
for disregarding the dictates of strict prudence on the
subject, not only from their firm conviction of the reason
able and rightful character of their claims, but because it is
undeniable that the Ministry which carried the Union had
led them to expect an immediate recognition of them. So
that they were smarting under the double injury of restric
tion and disappointment. But it is not so easy to acquit
those politicians who in the next session of Parliament
made themselves their organ ; though they were as well
aware as Pitt himself of the impossibility of obtaining the
King's consent, and of the danger of agitating and un
settling his mind by pressing for it ; and though one of
them, when, a few months later, he found himself in Pitt's
position, abandoned the advocacy of the question from the
very same motive which had influenced that minister.
One cause of anxiety to both the Ministry and the nation
was removed in the course of the winter by the thorough
re-establishment of the King's health, to which his recon
ciliation with the Prince of Wales no doubt greatly con
tributed. In November the Prince visited his father at
Windsor ; and for the first time for many years the father
and son slept under the same roof : though Lord Hawkesbury
feared that it was but an apparent and temporary har
mony, an apprehension in which the King himself coincided.
Before the end of the year Lord Hawkesbury himself
had the good fortune to be able to contribute further to the
royal comfort, under circumstances very flattering to him
self, and showing beyond all cavil or contradiction how very
high his own character and influence stood with both the
late and the present minister. In a letter to his father on
the subject of the Catholic claims he had mentioned his
belief that Lord Fingall and his party were secretly
encouraged in the prosecution of them by the Grenvilles ;
and after discussing its probable bearing on the different
parties in the State, and on the King's feelings towards

174 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
each, added, evidently from a wish that was father to the
thought, that it might perhaps " bring Pitt and Addington
again together." ^ To Lord Hawkesbury's mind it was, of
course, no slight reason for desiring such a reconciliation,
that it would add considerable strength to the Government,
which, in the latter part of the past session, Addington's
connexions had opposed with a zeal that seemed to have
its foundation in pique and personal animosity ; and, as soon
as the idea had occurred to him, he began to attempt to
carry it out. He first opened a communication with Ad
dington, judging that, since he was deeply annoyed by the
circumstances under which he had been compelled to resign
the Treasury, it was necessary to ascertain whether he was
willing to receive an overture from his successor in good
part, before compromising Pitt by inducing him to make one
which might not be listened to. The result, as he reported
to his father, was encouraging ; and circumstances so far
favored the negotiation that just at the time a vacancy
was caused in the Cabinet by an accident which happened
to Lord Harrowby, of a nature so serious as to compel him
to retire from office. Lord Hawkesbury, having thus suc
cessfully sounded Addington, opened the matter to Pitt,
who, as a matter of etiquette, since such a reconciliation
as was proposed of necessity involved some alterations in
the Ministry, first applied to the King for his sanction,
which was never more willingly granted, and then gave
the answer, which had been confidently calculated on,
' In other narratives which mention this reconciliation. Lord
Hawkesbury is spoken of as if he had been merely Pitt's agent, em
ployed by him to sound Addington " early in December " (Lord
Stanhope), "the 12th of December" (Lord Colchester). But the
date of the letter from which extracts are quoted as above is Novem
ber 6, showing conclusively that the first person to whom the idea
occurred was Lord Hawkesbury himself. And an extract from a letter
of Addington's, quoted by Dean Pellew (Life of Lord Sidmouth, ii.
325), corroborates this idea, by showing that he had heard from Lord
Hawkesbury before the end of October, evidently on the subject of re
conciliation, to which at first Addington was not very greatly inclined.

1804] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 175
authorising the friendly mediator to begin his proposed
work of political benevolence. The matter may be said
to have been decided from the first, though the arrange
ment of the details took a little time to complete. The
Duke of Portland, who was a great sufferer from ill health,
was anxious to retire ; and therefore Lord Hawkesbury's
plan was that Addington should be raised to the peerage,
and succeed the duke as President of the Council, with the
lead of the House of Lords, which he himself was willing
to resign to him : but Addington naturally stipulated for
the admission of some of those whom he looked upon
as his especial friends and adherents into the Government
as well as for his own ; indeed, for his own he was less
anxious, since he considered his fortune unequal to support
the dignity of the peerage. It was obvious, however, that
a consideration of the office which he had lately filled, with
the reasons of his original promotion to, and of his subse
quent resignation of it, would make it inconvenient in the
extreme for him to become, as he at first proposed, a
Secretary of State, and remain in the House of Commons.
Lord Hawkesbury felt that there were other reasons also
which would militate against the success of such an arrange
ment ; and, considering the experience which he had already
acquired in both Houses, and his subsequent position as
Prime Minister, the opinion which he expresses of the
qualities respectively necessary for a Prime Minister and
for a Secretary of State in the same House with the Prime
Minister is very curious. As he writes to Lord Liverpool,
the day after his first interview with Addington, " He never
would be able to keep up his credit as second in the House
of Commons, attacked as he would be by Opposition ; he
is much more qualified to be first, as he was before ; for good
sense, good manners, dignity, and a reasonable speaking
will carry a man through the former situation when he
has all the advantage of authority ; but no man can be of
any consequence in the second situation in such a body
as the House of Commons who is not an able debater

176 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
in detail, and has not, above all, the talent of quick
reply." Before Christmas the two, now willing to be reunited,
met at Lord Hawkesbury's, and had a long conference, at
which the chief points were amicably settled. As what had
been going on was of course widely known, their interview
had been expected with great curiosity and interest by
many, and by none with greater than by the King. From
the first Lord Hawkesbury had kept his Majesty informed
of the general character of the communications which he
received on both sides ; and now, the day after the King
knew they were to meet, as he had not heard from Lord
Hawkesbury since, he wrote him the following character
istic note of commendation and inquiry :
Windsor Castle, December 24, 1804.
The King has the greatest satisfaction in expressing to the Lord
Hawkesbury his thorough approbation of the judiciousness
and fairness of his conduct in the arduous task of bringing
Messrs. Pitt and Addington together, who both are certainly
attached to his Majesty, and that will be the real bond of their
union, and will rekindle in their breasts the friendship which
has from a very early age consolidated thera, and which false
friends and backbiters had for a time apparently destroyed, but
there is good reason to believe had not in reality effected.
The King is most desirous to know bow the raeeting ended yes
terday, and whether Lord Hawkesbury augurs well from this
fhst interview. George R.
And the next day, having received the intelligence he
hoped for, he showed his approval of their conduct to the
two principals in the way which he explained to Lord
Hawkesbury in a second letter :
Windsor Castle, December 25, 1804.
Lord Hawkesbury is too well acquainted with the King's senti
ments not to feel the gratification that has arisen in his
Majesty's mind on the account of the two meetings' of
' They had a second meeting at Addington's house on the day after
the first.

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. ^yj
Messrs. Pitt and Addington having proved perfectly satis
factory. This gives the more pleasure as attachment to their
king and country are the real ground on which these interviews
have been founded. The King will, with great pleasure, see
Lord Hawkesbury, who has been the happy instrument of
effecting the reconciHation of two men who ought ever to have
been friends, and may now easily remain so, either of the days
he has proposed. To secure, if anything is wanting, the con
tinuation of the cordial intercourse now effected, his Majesty
has prepared letters for each of the parties, going no further
than his thanks to both for having reunited for the good of his
service. And, indeed, that is one of the greatest eases to his
mind that, in a political view, could have been effected.
These Lord Hawkesbury, after perusing, is to transmit to each
of them. George R.
The chief difficulties that arose in the course of the nego
tiation were raised, not by either of the principals, but by
their adherents, who tried, on the one side, to persuade
Addington that the consideration shown for his wishes in
the proposed arrangements fell short of that which he was
entitled to expect ; and, on the other, to suggest to Pitt
that he was sacrificing his own dignity by giving any share
in the actual Government to Addington before he had
atoned for his recent opposition by at least an equal period
of support out of office. But besides that the political
advantages to each were manifest, both were men of too
kindly natures to be easy under the estrangement. And
Pitt was certainly expressing his real feelings on the subject
to the most intimate of his private friends, Wilberforce,
when, in allusion to the attacks that were made upon him
on the subject, he said, " I think they are a tittle hard upon
us in finding fault with our making it up again, when we
have been friends from our childhood, and our fathers were
so before us." '
By the arrangements finally made, Addington was raised
to the peerage as Viscount Sidmouth, and succeeded the
! Life of Wilberforce, iii. 2ii.
VOL. I. N

178 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [18
Duke of Portland as President of the Council. Lord
Mulgrave was transferred to Lord Harrowby's office ; and
Addington's friend. Lord Buckinghamshire, who, as Lord
Hobart, had been Secretary for the Colonies in his Adminis
tration, became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Among the subjects of negotiation, it had been stipulated
that Addington and his party were to support the war
with Spain ; an event which, from the circumstances that
had caused it, an attack made by a British squadron on
some Spanish galleons on their way from South America
while the two countries were still at peace, was sure to
be singled out for attack by the Opposition. Pitt, however,
had had no difficulty in satisfying his recovered friend that,
however strong in appearance were the arguments likely
to be brought forward against so irregular an act, the
reasons which had influenced the Cabinet in directing the
attack were stronger still. They were founded on the
absolute subserviency of Spain to France ; on the con
sequent certainty that the vast treasures with which the
galleons were freighted would be employed for French
objects ; and also on the fact, which could not be ques
tioned, that the only chance of such an attack being
successful lay in perfect secrecy. With such reasons
Addington was abundantly satisfied ; and the Ministry,
strengthened by his accession in numbers and general
popularity, since the circumstances under which he had
originally become Minister naturally caused his return to
office to be looked on as an additional security to the
Protestant Church, prepared with confidence to encounter
the conflicts of the coming session of Parliament.
That session is surrounded with a certain melancholy
interest, as being the last of Pitt's life. His health and
strength had been so evidently failing for some years
(we have seen the beginning of the decay noticed by
Lord Hawkesbury nearly seven years before) that the
end can really have taken but few by surprise. Nor,
almost till the last, was any deficiency apparent of that

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

179

energy of character which marked him out as a man
pre-eminently fitted to rule ; of that lofty yet winning
eloquence which could persuade all but the most stub
born or self-seeking antagonists, and win applause even
from them ; of that exquisite temper and engaging address,
which often made those who differed from him surrender
their doubts, and those who were resolved not to do so
dread being drawn within the circle of his fascinations ; '
of that fertility of resource, and (its child) that happy
sanguineness of disposition, which knew not how to despair,
and could often extract comfort and even fresh grounds
for hope out of the most disappointing or most adverse
circumstances. Yet, though the man himself was still un
altered even by the deadly inroads of secret disease of which
he can hardly have been unconscious, the features of this
his last campaign were sadly changed from those which
had marked his former years of Parliamentary conflict.
And the chief differences were such as could not fail
to weigh him down with great personal vexation. It
was a severe disappointment to him to find how hollow
was the reconciliation which had just re-united him to
Addington. It was a mortification of the most painful
character to be compelled to acquiesce in the impeachment
of one of his colleagues on charges affecting his personal
integrity and honour, and to remove his name from the
Privy Council. And, though it was in some degree a
triumph that his own reputation for pre-eminent ability
and spotless honour -was so firmly established that neither
of these events, each of which might have overturned
another Administration, failed to shake his, the unusually
painful character of the conflicts of this session was
probably not without its share in accelerating the decay
of his strength.
1 " He begged me not to write, but to state in conversation what
I wished to say. I told him that I was afraid of that, for his
manner a good deal affected me."— Lord Sidmouth to his Brother
(Life, ii. 361).
N 2

i8o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
The war, it need hardly be said, continued, and was
carried on, as far as our own exertions were concerned,
in the same manner as in previous years, solely at sea.
But before Parliament met, the ruler of France (a his
torian may call him the Emperor Napoleon, though during
his lifetime the British Government never recognised his
imperial rank) made, or professed to make, an effort to
restore peace; As if his genius raised him above the
necessity of observing the etiquette usual among sovereigns,
he did not trust his ministers with the task of opening a
negotiation, but with his own hand wrote to King George,
whom he called his " Brother," and, in a rhapsody of sen
timental argumentation, " conjured his Majesty not to deny
himself the happiness of giving peace to the world, not
to leave that sweet satisfaction to his children."'
Five years before he had adopted a similar course, and
Lord Grenville, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had pre
vailed on the Cabinet to let him draw up an elaborate
answer, raising topics for argument in a manner which Was
certainly useless when the general purport was a refusal to
treat under existing circumstances. It was now seen that
such a style was a mistake, and, after a careful consideration
of the matter by the whole Cabinet, a reply was forwarded
(addressed, as on the former occasion, by our Foreign
Secretary to M. Talleyrand, who still filled the same office
in France), expressing in the most generalterms the King's
willingness and even eagerness to restore peace, provided
it could be " founded on bases not incompatible with the
permanent security and essential interests of his dominions,''
but reminding M. Talleyrand that his Majesty had allies
on the Continent whom he must consult before he could
"¦ answer more particularly to the overture that had been
made to him." It is impossible that Napoleon could have
expected, it is highly improbable that he desired, any other
' " Je conjure Votre Majesty de ne pas se refuser au bonheur de
donner elle-meme la paix au monde. Qu'elle ne laisse pas cette douce
satisfaction h. ses enfans."— Nap. Corr. vol. x. p. 100.

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. i8i
answer. He was now far better prepared for war than he
had been two years before. He had made gigantic pre
parations for the invasion of Britain, and had great confi
dence in the success of his naval combinations which were
to facilitate it. While, if it should fail, he was, as the
result showed, almost equally prepared to turn the forces
which he had collected in another direction, in the hope, if
he were unable to overcome or even attack ourselves, of
at least wounding us through the side of our allies, and
counterbalancing our empire of the sea by establishing an
equal predominance for himself on the Continent.
We, on our part, as the reply to his overture intimated,
were not indifferent to the interests of the continental
nations, with which indeed our own interest was inseparably
connected, since it was obvious that our chances of bringing
the war to an honourable termination must be augmented
in exact proportion to the number and power of the allies
whom we could range on our side. And with this con
viction Pitt, amid all interruptions and all other causes
of anxiety, was steadily pursuing the great object of his
foreign policy, the enlisting the co-operation of Austria and
Russia against France. Both countries were equal to
France in population and most of those resources which
have the greatest weight in warlike operations. If Austria
had of late been forced to submit to hard conditions, on
the other hand the greatest disaster which had befallen
France on land since the first outbreak of war had been
inflicted on her by a Russian commander.' And there
seemed no reason to doubt that the two countries, united
and aided by the treasures of England, of which the
Government was willing to be wisely lavish in such a cause,
would be able to establish a superiority which must compel
the ambitious warrior on the French throne to a peace
which was then only likely to be durable when he should
have learnt to his cost that war could not always be, as he
boasted that hitherto it had been, "consistent with his
1 Suvarof s defeat of Macdonald at Novi.

1 82 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
glory." Before the end of the summer the great minister
fully succeeded in his negotiations.' By his own address,
his liberality, and the evidence which his measures gave of
the absolute unselfishness of his and his country's policy,
he armed against the enemy a force which required nothing
but a judicious use of it to render it irresistible. And he
could not foresee that the utter incompetency and imbecility
of one general, and the rashness of another, would neu
tralize the superiority unquestionably in their hands, and
in a few weeks prostrate the two empires in deeper humi
liation than ever at the mercy of their conqueror.
Parliament met in the middle of January, and as before,
though Lord Hawkesbury had proposed to resign the lead
in the House of Lords to the new President of the Council,
it was considered more expedient that he should himself
retain it, and the chief management, therefore, of the
debates there was still entrusted to him. As events turned
out, it was a most fortunate arrangement, since it would have
been very injurious to the Government to have had at first
but a half-hearted support from its leader among the peers,
and before the end of the session to have been deserted
by him. The battle between the two parties was at first
carried on with equal vigour in both Houses. On the
capture of her galleons Spain had declared war against
England, and it was not to be expected that the Oppo
sition would allow an act of so questionable a character
as an attack on a squadron belonging to a nation with
which we were at peace to pass uncriticised. The unhappy
circumstances which accompanied the attack (one of the
Spanish ships having blown up, with the destruction of
nearly all her crew) were owing to the weakness of the
' " During the whole of this year Pitt was negotiating his great
alliances with Russia and Austria. . . . Never was any measure (as
far as human foresight can go) better combined nor better negotiated.
Its failure was solely in the execution, and for this either the precipi
tancy of Austria herself, or the treachery and imbecility of her com
manders, are solely responsible." — Lord Malmesbury, iv. 339.

i8o4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 183
force which was sent against them, the Spanish captains
thinking it inconsistent with their honour to submit to the
orders of a squadron only their equal in number and
equipment. Had it been, as it should have been, so over
powering as to compel an unresisting submission,' though
war might not have been averted, we should have been
saved the most unfortunate part of the transaction. Lord
Grenville, unwearied in his hostility to the Government,
and in his displays of fidelity to the principles of his new
alliance with the Whigs, undertook the task of denoun
cing the act which had been committed, but made the
defence of the Government easier by the blind furiousness
of his language when he described it as " an atrocious act
of barbarity, which stamped indelible infamy on our name,"
and by the positiveness with which he laid it down as
his conviction that any war with Spain " might have been
prevented by common prudence on our part." For Lord
Hawkesbury had no difficulty in leading the majority of
his hearers to agree with him that Spain was so completely
subservient to France that the French Government was
reckoning on her resources as its own ; in proving that
French men-of-war were actually in the fort of Ferrol at
the time of the attack, only waiting till a Spanish squadron,
which was being equipped in the same port, should be
ready to join them ; that some French regiments had also
been received at the same place ; and that now, as in 1762,
Spain was in fact only waiting for the arrival of her
' It is curious that no one but Nelson saw this. Orders were sent
to Admiral Cornwallis to detach two frigates against them, and to
Nelson to send some frigates, without specifying the number. He
instantly sent Sir R. Strachan with a ship of the line and four frigates,
and with further orders to add to that force any other ships he might
meet on his way. But Sir R. Strachan did not arrive at Cadiz till too
late ; and of the four ships that engaged the Spaniards, two, the
Medusa and the Amphion, had joined those from the Brest fleet two
days before by mere accident. Had they not, we might have had the
disgrace of being defeated. (See the Author's History of the British
Navy, c. xxviii.)

1 84 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1804
treasure-ships to throw off the mask. In the presence of
these facts, the omission to give warning of our intentions
by a formal declaration of war, and that practically still
graver error of entrusting the enterprise to a squadron so
weak as to provoke, indeed to compel, resistance, were
overlooked ; and the feeling in favour of the Government
on the whole transaction was so unequivocally demon
strated that Lord Grenville did not venture to divide, and
the House silently sanctioned conduct which, in some parts
at least, no member of it could have entirely approved.
After being so successful in a weak case. Lord Hawkes
bury was not likely to fail when he had both policy and
justice on his side; and, in three debates which arose on
motions of the Opposition, which (ostensibly proposing to
improve the system of recruiting, to add to the effective
ness of the militia and the army of reserve) were in fact
so many motions of censure on the Government, and were
designed to compel its retirement from office, he not only
carried with him overwhelming majorities (a result which
must be admitted to be owing to the general feeling
of the House in favour of Pitt), but fully established his
own superiority as a debater to every peer on either side ;
even those who were most opposed to the Government
(with the single exception of Lord Grenville, who never saw
any merit in those who differed from him) confessing the
admirable temper and consummate judgment with which
he maintained the principles of the Cabinet, without
embittering their defeat to his opponents by a single taunt
or sarcasm. These, however, were questions of temporary
interest. But immediately after Easter one was brought
forward which had never been discussed in Parliament
before, but which was henceforth destined to exercise a
predominant influence on both parties in the State and on
the tranquillity of the whole kingdom for a quarter of a
century; embarrassing the formation of more than one
Ministry, disuniting others, and at last only settled under
the imminent dread of insurrection and civil war.

¦i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 185

CHAPTER VL
Lord Hawkesbury's speech on the CathoHc question — Impeachment
of Lord Melville — Resignation of Lord Sidmouth — The King's sight
becomes affected — Sir Robert Calder's action — Pitt fails in negotia
tions with Prussia, and with the Opposition — Battle of Trafalgar
— Indignation of the King of Prussia at the violation of his terri
tory— -Battle of Austerlitz— Death of Pitt — The King offers the
Treasury to Lord Hawkesbury — Gives him the Wardenship of the
Cinque Ports — Resignation of the Ministry — Lord Grenville becomes
First Lord of the Treasury — Lord Hawkesbury as leader of the
Opposition — Lord Hawkesbury's speech on the admission of Lord
EUenborough into the Cabinet — Comparison of the two Ministries
— Death of Fox — Lord Hawkesbury's conduct to Lord Grenville's
Ministry — Dissolution of Parliament — Conduct of the Ministry on
the Catholic question — Duke of Portland's letter to the King —
Resignation of the Ministry.
The Roman Catholics in Ireland had disregarded Lord
Hawkesbury's advice to postpone urging their claims for a
removal of their political disabilities to a more propitious
season. They drew up petitions to both Houses, and even
besought the Prime Minister himself to take charge of that
addressed to the Commons, though they were no strangers
to the fact of his having pledged himself to the King to
abstain from any further advocacy of the subject, at least
during the lifetime of his Royal Master. It was no
unworthy sacrifice of opinion for the sake of office to do
so ; since, whatever may be his opinions on the abstract
policy or justice of any measure, no statesman, and least of
all one who is responsible for the tranquil government of a
kingdom, is bound to urge proposals which he knows can
not be carried ; much less those of which even the agita-

i86 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
tion may produce great mischiefs. And, after the avowed
resolution of the King to renounce his crown rather than to
consent to any modification of the laws of which Lord
Fingall and his friends complained, such was beyond all
question the case in the present instance. So notorious
indeed was the impossibility of carrying any motion for
the rehef of the Roman Catholics, and the likelihood that
a renewal of the discussion might throw the King into
the same state in which its first proposal had plunged him
in 1801, that the next year Fox, when he had on his own
shoulders the same responsibility which now weighed on
Pitt's mind, imitated his conduct, and declared that he
would not agitate his sovereign by bringing the question
forward. At present, however, when his object was to em
barrass the Administration, he had no such scruples. He
and Lord Grenville gladly undertook the patronage of the
cause ; presented the petitions, and made them the subject
of formal motions in both Houses. The debate in the
House of Lords took place on the loth of May. Except
when he contended that the causes which had originally
led to the enactment of the restrictions complained of had
no longer any existence, but had passed away with the
death of Charles Edward, Lord Grenville weakened his case
by narrowing it to the condition of the Roman Catholics in
Ireland. He panegyrized their uniform loyalty, and, from
the forbearance of the Scotch since their union with Eng
land to endeavour " to substitute their own religion for the
Episcopacy of the English Church," he drew an argument
that the Irish Roman Catholics, if placed on a footing
of political equality with their Protestant fellow-country
men, would contentedly acquiesce in the predominance
of the Church of England. No argument could have been
worse chosen, for in fact the Episcopacy of the Church
of England had been suppressed in Scotland ; but Lord
Hawkesbury in reply disdained to avail himself of its
weakness, preferring to argue the question on broader
grounds. A more appropriate opportunity for considering

i8os] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 187
the merits of the whole question will arise hereafter. But
though some of his arguments were prompted by or based
on the circumstances -of the moment, as when he con
cluded " that as long as the Catholics refused to take the
oath of supremacy they should be deprived of political
power; and there was never a moment when adherence
to such a principle was more necessary than now, when all
Catholic Europe was nearly subjected to France, and the
Pope was placed in a state of absolute subjection to that
country;" he rested others on general principles, urging
that the maintenance of the existing tests was a necessary
safeguard to religion. And that " if it was a fundamental
principle of the constitution as established by the Bill of
Rights and the Act of Settlement, that the King must be
in communion with the Church of England, the same
limitation ought to apply to the advisers and officers of
the Crown. To remove the restrictions (and of course it
was plain that they could not be retained on Protestant
Dissenters after they had been abrogated in the case of
the Roman Catholics) would be to give to those who were
the greatest enemies of the Church of England power to
interfere with its patronage. At an earlier period in our
history the ruin of the Church and the monarchy had ac
companied each other, and, as his principle was to uphold
the estabhshment of both, he must resist the motion."
It is evident that these principles, on which he relied to
justify the maintenance of the restrictions complained of,
were so general that they seemed to pledge the speaker
to a perpetual retention of them, though it afterwards
appeared that he did not look on them as debarring him
from consenting to any relaxation whatever of the exist
ing laws.' Whether his present feelings were in any
degree influenced by the considerations which he had
urged the previous year to Lord Hardwicke cannot be
known ; but it seems probable that the belief which forms
his principal argument in that letter, that many of those
' See infra, p. 381.

i88 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
who advocated a compliance with the prayer of the pre
sent petition did so with a view to making it a stepping-
stone to further changes, had its weight with him, and
contributed to induce him to express his opinion in a
manner from which he could not afterwards personally
recede, though, as we shall see hereafter, he was unable so
to adhere to it as to maintain it as the unanimous opinion of
his Cabinet. Some of those peers who followed him in his
vote on the present occasion assigned grounds for their
votes which were avowedly founded on the existing cir
cumstances of the kingdom, and, as such, did not fetter
their course on the same question at a subsequent period.
But those who looked on the removal of the restrictions at
any time as dangerous, and those who thought it at the
present moment impolitic or impracticable, were, when
united, so numerous, that Lord Grenville could only
muster 49 supporters, against 178 who voted with the
Government. And thus, at all events, the sagacity of
the advice which Lord Hawkesbury had given the year
before was fully vindicated, even in the interests of the
Roman Catholics themselves, whose cause was certainly
injured for the moment by this display of the numerical
weakness of their advocates. The King himself, as may
well be supposed from the feeling which he had shown on
the subject in 1801, was greatly pleased at the greatness
of the majority. He wrote the next morning "to Lord
Hawkesbury, that " he was most highly gratified : he
trusted that the division would show so strongly the sense
of the House of Lords, that there would never again be
any difficulty in resisting the Catholic question, which,
the more it is examined, the more unreasonable it must
appear. One could not but lament that the peerage
should produce S i members to support such a question."
And he wrote again the next day to express equal satis
faction at the result of the debate in the House of Com
mons, where Mr. Fox had been defeated in an unusually
full House by 336 to 124. " It showed," he said, "the true

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 189
sense of the nation on the Catholic question, and, one must
hope, would make it lie dormant. At all events, it was
highly advantageous that it had had a full discussion in
both Houses of Parliament, and that the question of
toleration would now stand on its true legs, and not be
pretended to mean more than any wise Government could
possibly admit."
Before this debate took place. Lord Hawkesbury had
been nearly relinquishing the leadership of the House by
exchanging his Secretaryship of State for the office of
First Lord of the Admiralty. The proposal that he
should do so originated in the only transaction which, in
his long career, inflicted on Pitt personal mortification and
distress. A commission of inquiry into the condition
and administration of the navy, which had been appointed
some time before, had brought to light the fact that, some
years before, when Lord Melville, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, had been Treasurer of the Navy, his deputy
treasurer, a gentleman named Trotter, had been in the
habit of making use of the funds in his hands, which, of
course, belonged to the nation, for his personal benefit.
There was reason to think that Mr. Dundas (for at that
time he had not been raised to the peerage) was cognizant
of Mr. Trotter's conduct. And it was even imputed to him
that there had been occasions on which large sums of the
public money had been placed to his account at his
bankers', and that he had derived a profit from the use
of them. It was not alleged that a single farthing had
been lost to the nation, but it was argued that by such
practices the nation had been exposed to the risk of loss,
and that such transactions were clearly in violation of
the law.
No charge involving an offence of that character had
been brought against a minister of the Crown since the
time of the South Sea Bubble. Nor is there any one
thing of which England has at all times been more jealous
or more justly proud than of the unsullied integrity
of her public men, above su-spicion as above corruption.

19° LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
It was not strange, therefore, that the mere whisper of
such a charge having been made, on at least plausible
grounds, against one who had since become a Cabinet
Minister, should have universally produced a most painful
impression, or that the Opposition should have eagerly
seized upon it as a means of at least embarrassing and
distressing the Ministry, if not of overthrowing the minister.
Lord Melville declined to give any very satisfactory
explanation of the matter, alleging that, as many years
had elapsed since he had ceased to fill the post of treasurer,
he was no longer in possession of the vouchers which would
enable him to render any accurate account; and insinuating
also that the sums which had, as was proved, been at times
placed to his own credit had in fact been so placed that
they might be employed in the secret service of the
country, without leaving it possible to trace their appli
cation. It is very likely that this was the real truth ; and
Mr. Whitbread subsequently admitted that he had never
suspected Lord Melville of having personally enriched
himself by these transactions ; but his language at the
moment was hardly so candid. He was intimately con
nected with some of the leaders of the Opposition, and, to
promote the political views of his party, at the beginning of
April he, as a member of the House of Commons, brought
forward an elaborate motion, founded on the report of the
commission of enquiry, which he assumed to be of itself a
sufficient proof of Lord Melville's guilt, and censuring him
in the plainest and strongest terms. The Ministry had
held more than one meeting to decide upon the way in
which this motion should be met. Pitt himself would have
encountered it with a direct negative ; but, though Canning
agreed with him, no member of the Cabinet was prepared
to recommend so bold a course. One or two were probably
influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by personal motives.
Lord Sidmouth hated Lord Melville, from the belief that
he had had a great share in bringing Pitt to act with
vigour against him while minister in the preceding spring,
and he now openly urged Pitt to abandon his cause as

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 191
untenable, with the threat, if he did not do so, of him
self withdrawing from the Administration. Lord Hawkes
bury, though far from agreeing with Lord Sidmouth,
thought a simple negative to the vote of censure too
hazardous, as one which went too directly in the teeth of
the report of the commissioners, and which might conse
quently wreck the Ministry without saving their colleague.
He therefore suggested the attempt to stave off the vote of
censure by a proposal to refer the matter to a select com
mittee of inquiry. He was supported by the President of
the Board of Control, Lord Castlereagh, who, as Irish Secre
tary, had had a share, second only to that of Pitt himself, in
carrying the Irish Union ; who had since that time been
steadily and rapidly rising in the estimation of Parliament
as a first-rate man of business ; and who, being the most
intrepid of men, was certainly most unlikely to recommend
any measure which savoured of compromise if he did not
judge that there was in fact no alternative. In a motion
for such a committee Lord Sidmouth was willing to
acquiesce; and it was finally decided that the course to
be adopted by the Ministry should be a proposal to
substitute such a committee for Whitbread's proposal of
censure without further inquiry. Pitt himself moved for
the committee as an amendment to Whitbread's motion,
but was defeated. When the House came to a division,
the numbers were found to be equal, 216 on each side ; and
the Speaker gave his casting vote for Whitbread's motion,
in so doing following the usual etiquette, though he chose
also to assign for his decision a statement that " the charges
of violation of the Act of Parliament, and of Lord Melville's
connivance at Mr. Trotter's conduct, were confessed and
established, and fit for the immediate judgment of the
House." It is unnecessary here to go minutely into the subse
quent steps of this unfortunate affair; Lord Melville of
course resigned his office in the Government, and with his
own consent was removed from the list of Privy Council
lors. Whitbread wished to procure an address from the

193 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
House to remove him from the King's councils and pre
sence for ever ; but such a course (before any formal con
viction, or even trial) bore too clearly the marks of personal
animosity and violence to be tolerated by the feeling of
the House, and he was forced to withdraw his motion. It
was right that a man so far under suspicion as to have
been the subject of such a report as that which the com
missioners had presented should no longer be a minister or
privy councillor of the Crown ; but the report, however un
hesitating might be its language, could not be said actually
to establish his guilt ; he had as yet had ho opportunity of
making his defence again.st it, and, till the accuracy of the
report was legally proved, it was obviously unjust to put him
under a perpetual ban of exclusion. In fact, that this was
the case was practically admitted by Whitbread himself
when, on a subsequent day, he moved for his impeachment.
Another member, of the name of Bond, one of Lord Sid-
mouth's party, and who as such was bound to support the
Government, proposed instead a criminal prosecution ; and
the House of Commons vacillated in a strange and discredit
able manner. One day they adopted Mr. Bond's plan, the
next day they rescinded that vote and decided on an im
peachment,' which was instituted in the following session.
It was conducted with great energy and ability by Whit
bread himself, who acted as prosecutor, and also tendered
himself as a witness, and by Sir Samuel Romilly, who in
the new Administration which in the interval had succeeded
to office had been appointed Solicitor-General. But Lord
Melville was acquitted of every article of the impeachment
by decisive, and of many by overwhelming, majorities ; and,
^ There was a doubt of the propriety of their former vote. Lord
Hawkesbury writes to Lord Liverpool, " The proceedings in the Court
of King's Bench against a peer upon so important a charge can cer
tainly not be defended on any sound constitutional principles. Serious
doubts are entertained whether it is not a breach of our privileges.
Cowper" [the chief clerk of the House of Lords] '' strongly inclines
to this opinion. The House of Commons might have addressed the
King to direct the Attorney-General to prosecute ; but in this case
they have done it not by address, but by their own order!'

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 193
as far as absolving him from any personal corruption, the
\'erdict has been generally approved. That he had been
guilty of the grossest carelessness, which in such a matter
is but little short of criminality, is beyond all question ;
but that he had himself made the verj- slightest profit by
Mr. Trotter's irregularities there seems no reason to believe.
The most immediate consequence of the transaction was
the retirement of Lord Sidmouth from the Administration
in a way which does little credit to that statesman's disin
terestedness. It became of course necessary at once to fill
up Lord Melville's place, and ]\Ir. Pitt's first idea was to
place Lord Hawkesbury at the head of the Admiralty.
" He was not," as he wrote to his father, " at all desirous of
the change. It would bring with it considerable anxieties,
and cost him some sacrifices ; but, at the same time, he was
of opinion that, if it were urged upon him, he could not,
under all the present circumstances, creditably decline it. It
was certainly the office, next to that of Prime IVIinister, of the
most importance, and of the greatest pow er and responsi
bility, and it was of the utmost consequence that it should
be filled by some person who enjoyed a due portion of public
esteem and confidence, and who would be able to keep down
that party spirit which had of late been spreading itself very
widely in the profession of the Navy." But Lord Liver
pool was far from approving of his willingness to accept
it. He admitted, indeed, the paramount importance of
the office at a time \\hen we were engaged in a war
^\hich was carried on by us almost ^\-holly on the seas.
But for that very reason he thought the First Lord like!}-
to be made the scapegoat for every kind of shortcoming.
He pointed out to his son (with great truth) that it \\2S
" an office in which no man yet had gained credit." He
was also \'ery^ averse to his giving up the lead in the
House of Lords, which he would have done if his suc
cessor at the Home Office had been a peer. And this
last objection seems to have been the one which finally
weighed with Pitt, and induced him to abandon his first
VOL. I. O

194 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
plan, and to appoint Sir Charles Middleton, an old admiral
who had been greatly in Lord Melville's confidence, and
had been his chief adviser in the professional part of his
duties. Sir Charles became a peer under the title of Lord
Barham ; and, during the short period for which he retained
the office, amply justified the selection which had been
made. But Lord Sidmouth most absurdly took his ap
pointment as a personal offence. Though himself by no
means of a grasping or arrogant disposition, his relations
and chief partisans were most insatiable jobbers ; and he
had pressed the transfer of Lord Buckinghamshire to the
Admiralty in order that his own brother, or brother-in-
law, might succeed to the Chancellorship of the Duchy, for
which either of them was so far qualified that it made no
call on the ability of the occupier. He actually resigned
his own office, and induced Lord Buckinghamshire to
follow his example. Once more Lord Hawkesbury inter
posed as a peacemaker, and persuaded him to recall his
resignation : but the breach was only healed for a time ;
Lord Sidmouth was still sore, and his more self-seeking
kinsmen were incurably discontented. In the debates which
ensued on different questions relating to Lord Melville, his
brother, Mr. Hiley Addington, and one of his chief con
nexions, Mr. Bond, took every opportunity of showing the
most marked hostility to that nobleman, Mr. Bond, as
has been already mentioned, even putting himself forward
to move the House to proceed against him by a criminal
prosecution ; and the conduct of the whole party gave such
offence to the chief body of Pitt's original supporters, that
Lord Hawkesbury saw that it would be impossible for him
any longer to prevent a rupture ; he thought indeed that
their pretended support and real opposition to the Govern
ment was more embarrassing than their open hostility.
The King made no secret of his displeasure at their con
duct,' and Pitt at last remonstrated openly with Lord
1 Lord Sidmouth's biographer believes that Lord Sidmouth was
offended by Pitt's volunteering to him the statement that he could no

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 195
Sidmouth on their behaviour, and declared that it had ren
dered it impossible for him to give places under Govern
ment such as they coveted.
It was not to Lord Sidmouth's credit that he sanctioned
their factious conduct by repeating his resignation and
adhering to it ; Lord Buckinghamshire again following his
example. Nor, indeed, did Pitt now endeavour to retain
them. In fact it is a sufficient proof how incompatible
their continuance in office had become with the preserva
tion to the Administration of the character of an united
Government, that Mr. Fox had already ventured to open a
communication with Lord Sidmouth, the object of which
was evidently to induce him to desert Pitt by holding him
out the lure of a coalition with himself in the event of his
longer provide for his friends ; when he might instead " have silently
deferred the fulfilrnent of his engagement for a time." But a letter
of Lord Hawkesbury's to Lord Liverpool seems to show that Lord
Sidmouth, in spite of Bond's violent conduct, demanded an immediate
provision for him. Lord Hawkesbury writes (July 5th) : " There is
reason to believe Lord Sidmouth will not remain unless Bond is imme
diately provided for, and Mr. Pitt feels the strongest objections, after
the part which Bond has taken, and above all the hostile manner in
which he took it, to open an office for him till some proofs have been
given of returning cordiality. Between ourselves the King has said
that, if Mr. Pitt should propose Mr- Bond to him, he should at the
present moment object to it. How it will all end it is difficult to say.
I have not heard a word frora Lord Sidmouth on any confidential
subject for two months ; and in truth he is wholly in the hands of
.other persons." On the 7th, Lord Sidmouth resigned, and wrote to
his brother in the evening with great complacency - " I had an
audience of two hours, and everything passed as I wished." He
might have been less self-satisfied if he had known the impression he
left on the mind of the King. He almost forced the key of the council
box in his care into the King's hand, in spite of his Majesty teHing
him it should be delivered to Lord Hawkesb^ury. Though the King
wished to end the audience, he alrnost forced his Majesty to listen to
him for an hour, and so fatigued and displeased him that when the
King returned to his family he said, " That  has been plaguing
me to death." (Lord Malmesbury's Diary, iv. 339.) And he afterwards
told one of his attendants that "never since the days of George Grenville
had he been tormented by so fatiguing an interview." (Jesse's Life of
George III. iii. 437.)-
O 2

196 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
hereafter having the authority to form a Ministry.' It
was necessary for Pitt at once to fill up the vacancies
caused by these resignations; and, apparently, he enter
tained a behef or at least a hope, that the late decisive
divisions on the Catholic question had laid it finally to
sleep, and had thus removed some of the difficulties which
had previously hindered his efforts to form an Administra
tion on a more extended basis. With this feehng he now
made arrangements which were of a manifestly temporary
character, combining for the moment two Cabinet offices,
removing Lord Camden from the War Department to
the Presidency of the Council, and uniting his office to
that which Lord Castlereagh already held at the Board
of Control. But, whatever arrangements he may have
contemplated, he was not spared to effect them. A few
days afterwards, on the 12th of July, the Parliament was
prorogued. He never met it again. When it re-assembled
he was on his death-bed ; and the efforts which he had
made in the defence of his accused friend were the last
occasions on which his voice was heard in the House of
Commons. The prorogation itself was remarkable for
another circumstance, eminently calculated to enlist the
whole people in sympathy for their sovereign, and to
strengthen the general wish to spare him all anxieties
but such as were inseparable from his position. For almost
the first time in his reign, George III. did not attend in
person to thank the Houses for their labours, for he could
not have read the speech which was prepared for that
purpose : his sight was affected. A cataract had recently
formed in both his eyes ; increasing with unusual rapidity,
though not at first supposed likely to produce permanent
blindness. Indeed his oculist for some time confidently
1 Lord Sidmouth informed his usual confidant, Mr. Abbot, that
" Mr. Fox sent him a message by Tierney to the effect that it was a
great misrepresentation of his sentiments to say that he had expressed
any idea of excluding Lord Sidmouth from any Administration on a
broad basis." (Life of Lord Sidmouth, ii. 370.)

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

197

asserted that he should be able to cure him, though the
operation for that purpose could not be performed till the
blindness had become total. The King was not at first
informed of the nature of the disease ; and in a letter to
Lord Hawkesbury, written towards the end of July, he
intimates a belief that it was a mere temporary malady.
The hope he implies of an early recovery is very touching,
when it is remembered how incurable the affliction hang
ing over him really proved, and how many years he was
destined to pass under what is probably the greatest of
all deprivations. The writing is scarcely legible ; the
signature and part of the postscript absolutely undecipher
able from the way in which the one is written over the
other, while the confusion of the first sentence shows how
unable the writer was to read what he had said :
The King cannot refrain from the pleasure of acquainting Lord
Hawkesbury that an accidental inflammation in the worst eye,
with the remedies ably used by Mr. Phipps, has proved of
great advantage to the use of that eye. Mr. Phipps says that
he had a similar instance the last year with the eyes of Lord
Melbourne, where a cataract had been expected, but had since
completely disappeared 
P.S. — We have just received .... Lord Nelson has destroyed
.... enemy. Heaven has granted us this success. George R.
The royal signature had indeed become so undistinguish
able at all times that the ministers were thinking of having
a stamp made for him to affix to State papers, and con
sulted the lawyers on the proceedings which would be
necessary to give such a mode of signature validity. But
presently the disease seemed for a time to be arrested,
and some years elapsed before the poor old man became
absolutely incapable of distinguishing objects.
The attention of the whole kingdom was at this time
absorbed, above all matters, on the movements of Nelson,
to which the King's postscript alludes. The intelligence

198 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
which had reached Weymouth, whatever it may have
been, proved delusive, though four days before Sir Robert
Calder had fallen in with Villeneuve, who was flying from
Nelson, and had inflicted on him a defeat sufficient to
compel him to a total change of his plans, though not so
decisive as to satisfy the expectations that had been raised
in England of the success to be achieved by any English
fleet which should encounter a French one, however
superior in number. The circumstances under which Sir
Robert had fallen in with the enemy at all were eminently
creditable to the energy of the new First Lord of the
Admiralty ; who, when on the 9th of July the brig
Curieux reached England with intelligence from Nelson
that Villeneuve had returned from the West Indies to
Europe, and with the further news that she herself had seen
him on her homeward voyage too far to the northward to
render it probable that a return to the Mediterranean was his
object, despatched her back the very same day with orders
to the squadrons before Rochefort and Ferrol, to unite and
intercept him. The comparison drawn by the nation
between what Calder had actually done and what it was
presumed Nelson might have done led, as is well known,
to Sir Robert being tried by a court-martial, and repri
manded for an error in judgment and want of sufficient
vigour. It may well be doubted whether the defence
which he made, founded on the necessity of guarding
against the Rochefort squadron coming out to reinforce
Villeneuve, to whom he was already far inferior in numbers,
was not a sufficient justification of his apparent slackness.
But a letter of Lord Hawkesbury to his father on the
subject shows that he was not, as other commanders had
been, sacrificed to a popular clamour, but that, on the first
blush of the case, his fellow-seamen formed an opinion on
his conduct unfavorable to him. For the very week that
his despatch arrived. Lord Hawkesbury's comment on it
to his father is that " The intelligence from the fleet is
not satisfactory, and Lord Barham has, I believe, by this

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 199
time written to Sir Robert Calder to demand an explana
tion of his proceedings. The City, in particular, is very
much out of humour at what has passed, and the officers
of the navy seem in general to think that it will not be
possible for him to justify himself"
Whatever may be thought of his conduct, the action
which he had fought, indecisive as it was, had the effect of
terminating all the apprehensions that had been entertained
of a French invasion of this country. Napoleon himself,
from the moment that he learnt that Villeneuve, instead of
proceeding onwards to the Channel, had been driven down
to Ferrol, abandoned the idea.' And Pitt, relieved from
' The invasion of England had been no favourite with the French
army. Among Lord Hawkesbury's papers is the following song.
Marmont was the commander of one large division of the army of
invasion. CHANSON DE L'ARMEE FRAN(;AISE EN HOLLANDE,
AoUT 1805.
Sur I'air, Marlbrook s'en va-t-en guerre.
Marmont s'en va-t-en guerre,
Miroton, ton, ton, Mirontaine.
Marmont s'en va-t-en guerre ;
Dieu sait s'il reviendra
De ce pays Ik-bas
Qu'on norame I'Angleterre,
Qu'on veut subjuguer
Et qu'on veut subjuguer
Pour Monsieur Buonaparte.
Ce n'est pas notre affaire.
Miroton, &c.
Ce n'est pas notre affaire
Que d'aUer naviguer
Pour un gueux d'^tranger
Qui n'est Roi de la France.
Miroton, &c.
Qui n'est Roi de la France
Que pour la ddsoler.
Pour nous faire enterrer.
Que le diable I'emporte
En Corse ou il est tx6 [D'un

200 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
any further necessity of watching over the safety of our
own coasts, bent his mind with greater earnestness than
ever to confirming the inclinations of Austria to join the
alliance which had been concluded with Russia some
months before. He succeeded, and Sweden also was won
on terms similar to those for which Austria had stipulated ;
each country being entitled to receive a large subsidy from
Britain in proportion to the number of men she was to
bring into the field. The only quarter in which Pitt's
address failed was Prussia, which, faithful to the maxims of
Frederic II. to make acquisitions of territory, by whatever
means they might be obtained, her chief object, preferred
the chance of despoiling King George of Hanover, and
with this view courted the friendship of the Ruler of
France. He was less successful in the negotiations by which he
endeavoured to strengthen his Ministry. It had been his
hope, that as different topics of disagreement were gradually
eliminated, those who had refused to join him before might
become more willing to unite with him ; and, wholly
governed by one absorbing idea, to serve his country most
effectually, he was willing to make many sacrifices to
secure to it the benefit of the services of those of whose
solid talents he had a high opinion. Relationship still kept
him partial to Lord Grenville. The memory of their many
conflicts, of the exhaustless fertility, the logical subtlety,
D'un greffier ruind.
Ce n'dtait pas la peine
De I'avoir couronnd
Contre notre bon gr^.
Morbleu, mes camarades
Revenons au pass^
Ou, Louis Bienaim^
Nous menait k la gloire
Sans nous faire noyer.
It is clear Buonaparte was not more popular than his project of
invasion with this division of his army. But it is curious to find them
going back to contrast him with the infamous Louis XV. even when
Saxe was his general.

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 201
the indomitable energy with which Fox had often defied
his sarcasm or retorted his arguments, made him still more
eager to have the benefit of his aid against the common
enemy. Unhappily, the slightest expectation of an over
ture from him made both advance pretensions to which it
was irnpossible for him even to listen.' Even if he had
brought himself to yield the slightest portion of the de
mands which they were inclined to make he would have
gained nothing, for he would have lost the co-operation
of those of his existing colleagues, whom he most valued.
Lord Hawkesbury writes to his father at the end of Sep
tember, at the very time that Pitt was at Weymouth, whither
he had gone expressly to consult the King : " I am convinced
from all I see and all I hear from a variety of quarters, that
any project of coalition on a broad basis would be most
injurious to the country, and most fatal to the reputa
tion of Government. If such a project should be enter
tained, I am determined to have nothing to do with it."
And the King himself had the same feeling. He had
indeed no idea of the arrogance of the claims which the
Opposition leaders were prepared to put forward, as neither
had Pitt ; but he declared to more than one person a
resolute determination to admit none of them into the
Administration, observing, with a peremptoriness that ad
mitted of no discussion, that "he could not trust them, and
they could have no confidence in him." ^ One of those to
whom he made this declaration, Mr. Rose, attributed the
fixedness of the resolution which his Majesty thus expressed
mainly to the influence of Lord Hawkesbury himself, who,
a favourite from the first, had been steadily rising in the
' " Canning told me that all attempts to gain the Grenvilles had
failed through the influence of Tom Grenville, who would not hear of
a separation from Fox." (Malmesbury's Diary, iv. 343.) " As we learn
from Fox's familiar correspondence at this time, he intended to insist
on the condition that Pitt should resign the Treasury, and that some
friend of Fox, as Grey, or Lord Fitzwilliam, or Lord Moira, should be
placed there in his stead." (Stanhope's Pitt, iv. 335.)
2 Diaries of the Right Hon. G. Rose, ii. 200, seq.

202 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
King's opinion. Whatever may have been the cause, it was
evident that Pitt had no alternative but to obey, to drop
all idea of gaining strength from the accession of other
parties, and to continue to conduct the government with
his original adherents, and such additional supporters as
the perception of his superiority, both in patriotism and
ability, to his opponents, might from time to time win over
to him.
Meanwhile the whole kingdom, and, above all, the
Ministry, were agitated and perplexed with anxieties about
the issue of the continental campaign, and by the con
tinual arrival of reports uncertain, and often contradictory.
Lord Hawkesbury's letters to his father at this time are
full of scraps of intelligence, which he receives and reports
without any great reliance on their accuracy, and which,
even when proceeding from sources apparently trustworthy,
subsequently proved to have no foundation whatever. To
give a single instance : on the 3d of November, a vessel
arrived at Harwich from Holland, relating that the greatest
joy prevailed at Amsterdam on account of a defeat of the
French by the combined Russian, Austrian, and Prussian
armies, in a battle which had lasted four days, and which
had cost Napoleon 28,000 men. Lord Hawkesbury, in for
warding a copy of the captain's statement, for which he
declines to vouch, expresses himself nevertheless the more
inclined to believe that soniething important must have
happened, because, for the first time since the commence
ment of hostilities, many days had elapsed without any
intelligence through the regular channels, or any foreign
newspapers having reached Downing Street.
Important events had indeed occurred, though not of
the nature the sea-captain's intelligence implied. The
very next day all Britain was alternately lamenting and
rejoicing at the greatest exploit that even a British fleet
had ever performed ; exulting in the contemplation of
a most brilliant and decisive victory, and, to its honour,
amid all its joy at the prostration of the enemy, doubting

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 203
whether the glory had not been too dearly purchased ;'
for the hero, whom all loved as much as they admired
and trusted him, had achieved it at the expense of his
own life. Nelson was dead.
The statesmen of the Cabinet, however, had other
drawbacks to their feeling of triumph at the success of
our own arms. We had done our work completely, and
for the rest of the war, last as long as it might, we were
to remain undisputed masters of the sea. But the same
day which brought the news of Trafalgar counterbalanced
it in some degree by certain information of the disgrace
ful surrender of the Austrian army under Mack at Ulm.
Lord Hawkesbury's reflections on the two events, with
the account of the honours already fixed as to be paid
to Nelson's memory, are contained in the following
letter to his father :
T-, T^ Whitehall, November 6th, 1805.
Dear Father, ' ' -"
I enclose the Gazette of Lord Nelson's victory. There is perhaps
no example of so glorious and decisive a victory. The French
fought uncommonly well, and Villeneuve is, I understand, in
astonishment at the result. Poor Nelson's death is worthy of
his life. He lived long enough to know the event of the
action. It is a singular circumstance that this victory took
place on the very day^ of the capitulation of Ulm, and almost at
the very time that Buonaparte was declaring that ships, colonies,
and commerce were all that he wanted. I have vsritten to
the King to propose a general thanksgiving. Nothing is yet
finally determined about the honours and provision for Nelson's
family; but I believe it will be decided to make his heir an
I Lord Malmesbury's statement has been often quoted ; but it is so
honorable to the whole nation that it may be repeated here : " The
first impression was not joy .... I never saw so little public joy.
The illumination seemed dim, and, as it were, half clouded by the
desire of expressing the mixture of contending feelings. Every com
mon person in the streets speaking first of their sorrow for him, and
then of the victory." (Diaries, iv. 342.)
''^ This seems to be a sHght mistake. Trafalgar was fought October
2 ist, and, according to Alison, Mack laid down his arms on the 20th.

204 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1805
earl, to double . the present pension, and to settle it upon the
title for ever. Collingwood will be created a peer. I trust this
event will have its effect upon the Powers of the Continent, and
will prove to them how much their honour and safety depends
on their own exertions. We have nothing new from thence,
and have now been in utter darkness (except what we hear
from France and Holland) for a fortnight.
Your affectionate Son,
Hawkesbury.
The concluding sentence of this letter seems to show
that the capitulation of Ulm was not at first thought
an occurrence of decisive importance ; and indeed, that
it was such is rather because it was an indication of the
divisions and utter want of energy which characterised the
councils of Vienna at that time, than from its intrinsic mag
nitude. It certainly was not a misfortune which might not
have been retrieved ; and it was not unreasonable to expect
that the very means by which it had been wrought, the vio
lation of the Prussian territory by the French army, might
prove also the means of its retrieval, by determining the
King of Prussia to form the confederacy against a potentate
who had shown, at his expense, so profound a contempt
for all the recognised rights of nations. Our minister
at Berlin, Mr. Jackson, wrote word that the intelligence
of Bernadotte's march through Anspach, "which was
received at Potsdam while Baron Hardenberg [his prime
minister] was with the King, violently affected his
Majesty, who directed Baron Hardenberg to assemble
a council composed of the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal
Mollendorf, and Count Schulenberg. Their report, which
was unanimous, and recommended by the most speedy and
decisive measures, was sent to the King on the afternoon
of the 17th. . . . Baron Hardenberg informed him [Mr.
Jackson], and the Austrian and Russian ministers, that a
day or two must elapse before he could communicate to
them the King of Prussia's determination; but that they
might be assured that he would fully vindicate the honour

i8o5] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 205
and dignity of his crown and sovereignty." An express
was sent off to the Emperor of Russia to accept the
proposal which he had made, of an interview with
the King at Berlin, and Mr. Jackson reported further
that "the prospect of Prussia joining the allies against
France had excited the most universal joy among the
military and every description of persons not avowedly
devoted to France." And these anticipations would have
been verified, had it not been for the prodigious celerity
and success of Napoleon's operations. At the interview
at Berlin, the King of Prussia definitively consented to
join the allies, only postponing his formal declaration
of his intention till he could receive from the French
Government an answer to a proposal of a Prussian media
tion, which, as Lord Hawkesbury explained to Lord
Liverpool, "was, in fact, little more than a pretence for
delay, till Prussia could bring up her different armies to
the frontier ; since the terms were such as it was impos
sible for France to accept." As all expected, France
rejected them ; but before the day on which Prussia was
to declare war against her arrived, the battle of Austerlitz
had crushed the spirit of both Austria and Russia ; and
Prussia, thus bereft of her expected supporters before
she had committed any act of open hostilit}^, was glad
to withdraw from the treaty which she had just made,
and to fall back on her former plan of enriching herself
at the expense of her third ally, and obtaining Hanover ;
though, as her intention to join the enemies of France
was no secret, she was now forced to purchase it by
exchanging for it some of her southern provinces.
Lord Hawkesbury was with Pitt at Bath when the
news of the battle of Austerlitz reached England, repre
sented, as he reports to Lord Liverpool, "in the worst
colours" by our minister at Vienna, Sir A. Paget, whose
despatch " was evidently the letter of a man discontented
with the Government to which he is accredited." It has
been said by more than one person professing to be well

2o6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1806
informed, that the intelligence, involving the failure of
the confederacy which he had formed with such labour
and address, killed the great English minister. But,
though it was no doubt a heavy disappointment, the first
account given of him after the news reached him is more
favorable than some of those of an earlier date. He had
been "laid up with a fit of the gout, but it was now
going off, and he hoped to be able to drink the waters for
a week before he returned to London."
It had been originally intended that Parliament should
re-assemble on the 7th of January, 1806, but before that
day arrived Pitt had become so seriously ill, that it was
deemed more expedient to postpone the meeting till the
Tuesday, the 2^st. It yyas not at first apprehended that
his illness would have a fatal termination, and he fluc
tuated so much that, even as late as the afternoon of
the day on which Parliament was to meet. Lord Chatham
brought word to Lord Hawkesbury that he was "much
better than yesterday morning." It had, however, by
that time become almost evident, as Lord Hawkesbury
wrote to Lord Liverpool, that " even in the event of his
complaint taking a favorable turn, there could be very
little chance of his resuming public business during the
active part of the session." But Lord Hawkesbury did
not as yet despair that he and his colleagues might be
able to continue to conduct the business of government.
Their plan was " to endeavour to gain time as to any
essential business, and try to make as strong a muster
of their friends as possible." Pitt's name, however dis
abled he might be for a time, while he lived was still a
tower of strength to his party. No man was so honoured ;
so trusted. But Lord Hawkesbury did not conceal from
himself that " the situation of the King and of the country
might become most critical, and it made the rest of the
ministers anxiously resolve in their minds what might be
best to be done."
He himself in Pitt's absence, had been the chief framer

i8o6] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 207
of the King's speech, which, as he was not ashamed to
state to the House of Lords, the members of which by this
time well knew the circumstances to which he alluded, had
been intentionally couched in such language as to create
no difference of opinion as to the terms of the address which
would be presented in reply to it. That end was answered,
as the leaders of the Opposition abstained from proposing
any amendment, and both parties rested on their arms,
waiting to see what turn the Minister's illness might take.
They were not long kept in suspense. Before daybreak on
the 23d Pitt died. Lord Hawkesbury conveyed the melan
choly news down to the King ; and reported his interview
with his Majesty to Lord Liverpool in the following letter :
Secret. St. James's Square, Thursday.
Djsar Father,
I am just come from home for dinner, not having been five
minutes alone the whole of the day, and being under the
necessity of attending a Cabinet this evening. I have had a
very long and distressing conversation with the King. He was
much better, however, at the end of it than he was at the
beginning. He has returned to Windsor to-night, and pro
mised to remain there quiet till he hears from us, which will
probably be on Saturday morning. He has desired that we
would, each of us (after the subject has been thoroughly
discussed), send him our opinion in writing of what is best
to be done. I do not believe there will be any material dif
ference of opinion, as far as I can judge at present ....
Your affectionate Son,
Hawkesbury.
On Saturday morning the King returned to London, and
Lord Hawkesbury had a second and still longer conference
with him. The result of the deliberations of the Cabinet
on the two previous days had been that, under the exist
ing circumstances, they should be unable to carry on the
government successfully.
In truth the suddenness of the loss which they had sus
tained (for till very recently no suspicion had been enter-

2o8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION . [1806
tained that Pitt's life was in danger) and its real magnitude
both contributed to make the Ministry, thus deprived of its
leader, seem weaker than it really was. For Pitt had been
pre-eminently suited to his office. Equally sound and
brilliant, he was the most consummate financier that the
world had, or yet has, seen ; the most fertile and original in
resource ; and the most eloquent expounder of his plans
and principles of action ; dauntless amid dangers, clear
headed in perplexities, and ever consistent in his views and
maxims, but at the same time too practically wise to refuse
to adapt his policy to the circumstances of the time. And
the achievements of his Administration had been worthy
of his talents. He had commenced the liberation of trade
and commerce from their old shackles ; he had brought
forward a plan of parliamentary reform admirable alike in
its extent and its moderation ; thus, though the war into
which he was drawn with France compelled him afterwards
to suspend his plans for the reform of abuses and the
amelioration of the State, setting an example to future
statesmen, which has since borne abundant and salutary
fruit. The greatest of all measures of domestic reform,
the Union with Ireland, he carried in the face of unpa
ralleled difficulties ; nor, as we have seen, was it his fault
that it was not made a complete measure. As an arranger
of alliances he was not less successful, nor has greater
political skill been often evinced than that by which, in the
last year of his life, he united Austria and Russia in the
league against France, a league which nothing but the
incredible mismanagement of the allies thus united could
have rendered barren. The loss of such a chief might, for
a moment, well dismay his followers ; the King, indeed,
did not share their opinions, and earnestly pressed Lord
Hawkesbury to keep the Ministry together, and to take the
chief post himself But Lord Hawkesbury had not formed
his opinion without the most careful consideration of
every circumstance ; he knew that his colleagues had been
equally cautious before they decided on their inability to

i8o6] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 239
maintain themselves ; he therefore felt he had no alterna
tive but to adhere to what had been their unanimous
decision ; and, unpalatable as he was aware that such advice
must be, he urged on his Majesty the necessity of now
readmitting Mr. Fox to his' councils.' From one act of
kindness to himself George III. would not be dissuaded.
He had formerly insisted on Pitt's accepting the Warden-
ship of the Cinque Ports as an act of obedience to himself,
and he now, in like manner, conferred it on Lord Hawkes
bury ; overruling all his objections, and evidently determined
to regard that post as his one private piece of patronage.
The adherence of his existing ministers to their resolu
tion of retiring naturally compelled him to have recourse
to the Opposition. He determined, to quote Lord Hawkes
bury's language, "to swallow a bitter pill," but "to do
it in the most dignified manner, and to put the whole on
grounds which, if they should fail, would secure the good
opinion and support of the whole country." He felt indeed
that, after what had passed two years before, he could not,
without loss of dignity, make a personal application to Mr.
Fox ; but he at once sent for Lord Grenville, and authorised
him to form a new Administration, volunteering an express
consent to his consulting Fox on the subject. Indeed,
Pitt's death and the withdrawal of his colleagues rendered
it impossible now to exclude one whom all agreed in con
sidering the man of the greatest ability in the nation. If
indeed there was any who might have been expected not
to wish for his presence, it was Lord Grenville himself,
who not three weeks before had affirmed the existence of
cardinal and unextinguishable differences between himself
and that statesman on the most important subjects.^
However, they speedily agreed to take office together;
' See vol. iii. p. 148.
^ He wrote to his brother, Lord Buckingham, January 7th, 1806 :
*' What is all this to lead to ? ... A joint Government of Fox's friends
and ours, who, the very first day that we meet in Cabinet, shall pro
bably differ on the leading question of our whole policy, that of resis
tance or submission." (Court and Cabinets of George III. iv. 9.)
VOL. L P

2IO. LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1806
and, as if the disagreement between themselves on the
topics Lord Grenville had alluded to were not sufficient,
they took into their deliberations a third statesman. Lord
Sidmouth, who was certainly not supposed to agree with
either of them, and who, while himself a minister, had
been at least as much the object of Lord Grenville's
hostility as Lord North had formerly been of Fox's. But
the King accepted all their arrangements without demur ;
though not without first having a long conference and dis
cussion with those inembers of his retiring Ministry in whom
he still placed his chief confidence. Lord Hawkesbury and
the Chancellor. They, however, gave him none but the
most loyal advice ; and on the 5th of February the greater
part of the new appointments appeared in the Gazette.
Lord Grenville was First Lord of the Treasury ; but, as
had happened at the end of the last reign, when the late
minister's father, the first William Pitt, held the seals of
the Foreign Office, Fox, who now took the same post, was
universally considered as the Prime Minister. He had just
added to the disfavour with which the King regarded him
by a singular piece of bad taste, as well as of opposition
to what he could hardly doubt to be the King's wishes :
opposing the address which, four days after Pitt's death,
the House voted by an overwhelming majority, for a
pubhc funeral and a monument to the deceased minister.
But, after he was installed in office, his conduct changed,
and he rendered himself more acceptable to the King
than most of his colleagues by the attentive and respectful
demeanour which he carefully and uniformly observed
towards his royal master. Lord Hawkesbury was now
called upon to fill a new post, that of leader of the
Opposition, which brings into action different qualides
from those who are required of a minister. The latter
is the commander of the garrison, generally standing
on his defence ; at all events, never provoking hostile
demonstration by wanton sallies. The former is the chief
of the besieging army, which expects him to let slip

i8o6] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 211
no opportunity of attacking their adversaries when it can
be done with advantage ; but to unite with that constant
vigilance a prudence which shall abstain from all fruitless
assaults, from any attempt to deliver blows on unimpor
tant points ; above all, from every enterprise the failure of
which may be turned to their discredit or disadvantage.
These duties Lord Hawkesbury is admitted to have dis
charged with singular judgment and success. And the first
occasion on which he was called upon thus to exert him
self was one of especial difficulty and delicacy, since he had
to combine a decided objection to an appointment with a
sincere feeling of respect for, and, on many subjects, of
agreement with him on whom the appointment had been
conferred. The present was manifestly a Coalition Ministry :
one division of it being made up of those who had served
with Pitt, and had therefore some inclinations towards
Toryism ; another of those who had throughout been in
opposition to him, and were therefore to be classed as pure
Whigs : this latter section doubling the former in number ;
while in the original list of Cabinet Ministers Lord Sid
mouth was entirely unsupported.' From a natural unwill
ingness to be so completely isolated he first pressed the
claim of Lord Buckinghamshire (who shared the office of
Postmaster-General with Lord Carysfort) to a Cabinet
office. And, when that could not be conceded, he insisted
on, and at last carried, the admission to the Cabinet of
the Chief Justice, Lord EUenborough. There was a prece
dent for such an appointment in the case of Lord Mans
field ; but it was soon found to be so inconvenient that,
when that great judge had once quitted the Cabinet, on a
change of Ministry, he could never be prevailed on to
resume his place in it ; and the repetition of such a step,
after it had been thus practically discredited, excited such
great and general disapprobation that it was made the
1 Mr. Abbott arranges the Cabinet thus (ii. 37) : Lord Grenville, Lord
Spencer, Mr. Windham; Lord Sidmouth; Mr. Fox, Mr. Grey, Lord
FitzwiUiam, Lord H. Petty, Lord Moira, Lord Erskine, C.
P 2

212 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1806
subject of a distinct motion in each House of Parliament :
in both the attack coming not from members avowedly in
Opposition, but from the independent party ; Lord Bristol,
who mooted the question in the House of Peers, being even
a personal friend of Lord Sidmouth himself It is probable
that Lord Hawkesbury, in his position as a former Cabinet
Minister, would not have thought fit to originate the objec
tion ; but when, at the beginning of March, Lord Bristol
moved a resolution on the general principle, affirming the
impropriety of "summoning any of the judges of the
courts of common law " to councils of State, he could not
hesitate to support it, affirming that " the question was one
which vitally touched the very essence of the constitution.
He had no personal objection to Lord EUenborough him
self ; on many great points he knew that their opinions
concurred : but he disapproved of the conversion of the
Chief Justice into a political minister, not only on the prin
ciples of the British constitution, but on general principles
of liberty, He would cite Baron Montesquieu's opinion on
the division of political power in a State ; and that great
writer had laid it down as an axiom, that it was more
adviseable that the judicial power should be separated from
the executive than that the legislative power should be
kept distinct from the executive. Blackstone had said the
same. For himself he was not such an extravagant theorist
as to wish to push principles beyond practical utility ; but
the course which a wise legislator would adopt would be
to make the exceptions to his general principles not as
numerous, but as few as possible. In his conception there
could be no union more dangerous than that of a judge
and a minister of State ; and such, to all intents and pur
poses, the Chief Justice was now made. He was thus of
necessity identified with those who constituted what was
called the Government, in danger of becoming a party to
all their passions and prejudices ; and giving him, as he
himself did, full credit for the utmost purity, it was im
possible that, in questions which might arise between the

i8o6] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 213
Government and individuals, he should generally be regarded
as an unbiassed judge. Suppose, for instance, a man were
indicted for a libel on the Administration : the Chief Justice
might be called upon to sit in judgment on an offence
committed against himself Cases of riot again might arise
which the Government would find it necessary to repress
by the vigorous exercise of its executive authority. Could
it be adviseable that afterwards a member of the Cabinet
should be found presiding at the trial of those accused of
such disturbances .' Lord Bristol had stated truly that,
since the Revolution, there was but one instance of a
common law judge acting as a Cabinet Minister. Why did
he begin his researches at the Revolution, but for this
reason, that it was only from that period that the inde
pendence of the judges commenced .' The case of the Lord
Chancellor having a seat in the Cabinet bore no analogy
whatever to that of a Chief Justice, because his jurisdiction
had no connexion with criminal law. The Chancellor was
removable at pleasure, because he was a Cabinet Minister ;
neither the judges nor the Master of the Rolls were, because
it was not intended that they should ever become responsible
advisers of the Crown. It had been asserted, in the course
of the debate, that the appointment could not be stated
with truth to be either illegal or unconstitutional ; yet the
very speaker who made this admission [Lord Eldon] had
argued that, though it might be neither, yet nevertheless it
was in the highest degree inexpedient and unadvisable.
On the question of the legality of the appointment the
authority of his noble friend was indisputable ; and he him
self was well aware how difficult it was, when once a step
was admitted not to be illegal, to prove it to be unconsti
tutional. But he had no hesitation in affirming that the
present appointment of a common law judge to a seat in
the Cabinet was not congenial with the pure principles and
practice of the constitution. He should regret to see that
respect which was due to the sacred character of a judge
diminished by his becoming mixed up, as a party to them.

214 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1806
with the struggles of politics ; and, whatever might be the
decision of the House, he affirmed it to be beyond all
question that such was the general feeling of the country."
Lord Bristol, meaning his motion rather as a protest
against the appointment than as an attack to embarrass the
Government, forbore to press it to a division. But it was
generally felt that Lord Hawkesbury's speech was unan
swerable ; and the reason which makes it desirable to quote
portions of it is, that it is a speech eminently character
istic of his union of extensive constitutional knowledge
with moderation in its application. It shows his acquaint
ance with and appreciation of general principles and the
theory of government, combined with an indisposition to
push them too far; and founds his objections not on any
visionary subtleties, but on cases of probable, ordinary,
and even recent occurrence. There had been a vehement
outcry against the late Prime Minister for his prosecution
of Hardy and his fellow-prisoners ; but that outcry would
have been increased tenfold, would have been irresistible, if
a member of the same Cabinet which instituted the prose
cutions had also sat to try those who were accused. At a
later day Lord EUenborough himself admitted the justice
of the arguments that had been brought forward against
his appointment,' and greatly regretted that he had been
induced to lend himself to such a measure.
The new Ministry was not very popular from the com
mencement. The English people as a rule dislike coali
tions, and the union of Lord Grenville with Fox, to whom
till recently he had been always most vehemently opposed,
and of both with Lord Sidmouth, whom while in office
Lord Grenville from the first, and latterly Fox also, had
attacked with unceasing bitterness, seemed little less
unnatural than that which above twenty years before had
incurably damaged Fox's reputation. Lord Sidmouth
was more excusable than either, because he, like Lord
North before, might fairly consider these solicitations now
' Lord Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices, iii. 188.

i8o6] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 215
for his co-Operation a practical recantation of the reproaches
and contempt they had formerly heaped upon him. And
Fox more pardonable than Lord Grenville, because, as
more than half the Cabinet was composed of his own
adherents, the others were in fact surrendering their judg
ment to his in every matter on which he might think
fit to insist. Still the Coalition was unpopular as being
a coalition ; and there was no quality in its composition
which could tend to reconcile men to what from principle
and habit they disapproved. Some of the underlings of
the Government, knowing the value of a plausible name,
in allusion to the statement that had been advanced and
admitted a couple of years before, that it was a time that
required all the abilities of the kingdom to be united in its
service, boasted that what had been wanted was now
accomplished, and christened the new Administration " All
the Talents." But, in fact, in practical administrative
ability it was not only inferior to the last Ministry while
Pitt lived ; but, with the single exception of Fox, it was
generally inferior to it even after its great chief was taken
away. If we look at the principal offices, no prejudice
could compare Lord Spencer, the new Home Secretary, to
Lord Hawkesbury, any more than Lord Erskine as Chan
cellor could be placed on a level with Lord Eldon. Mr.
Grey was no doubt superior to Lord Barham as a speaker,
and, being a younger man, had a higher reputation for
general ability and vigour ; but of the particular depart
ment in which he was now placed he had no knowledge
whatever ; while Lord Barham, old as he was, had shown
an energy which even his younger successor could not
surpass, combined with a judgment founded on profes
sional experience to which, of course, he could make no
pretension. Again, though as a speaker Mr. Windham
had a higher reputation than Lord Castlereagh, he was
unquestionably inferior to him as a man of business,' One
' " July 1 5//2.— Rode two hours with Lord Grenville. A dissolution of
Parliament is not in contemplation. . . . Our other subjects of conver-

21 6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1806
member of each Government, though not in the Cabinet, was
too brilliant to be passed over without mention. Sheridan
succeeded Canning as Treasurer of the Navy. Here,
perhaps, there was but little inequality of oratory; even
if it be said that Canning never made the impression which
is attributed to more than one of Sheridan's early speeches,
it still cannot be denied that the latter was no longer what
he had been, and his setting rays at the time of which we
are speaking could not outshine the meridian brilliancy of
the rising ornament of the Tories ; while in every other
point, in official ability, in large and provident states
manship, and above all in character, Sheridan unhappily
could not be for a moment put in competition with his
rival. What character, therefore, the Administration enjoyed
for pre-eminent ability rested solely on the deservedly high
reputation of Fox. But it was soon seen that it had little
of him but his name. He was ten years older than Pitt,
and his constitution was even more completely broken up.
Before he had been two months in office it became occa
sionally necessary to postpone portions of the ministerial
business because of his inability to take a part in it ; and
for the last five weeks of the session he was forced to
discontinue his attendance altogether. Early in September
he died ; but before that time he had become so conscious
that his political life was over, that he expressed a desire
to resign his office : and Lord Grenville showed such a
consciousness that " all the talents " of the kingdom were
not yet combined in its service, that he invited Canning
to succeed him almost on his own terms. Canning was
ambitious and desirous of office, as every man confident of
his power to fill it with advantage to his country and to his
reputation must be ; but he had not that " inconsiderate
precipitancy of ambition"' which could lead him for the
sation were Mr. Fox's state of health, Windham's utter unacquaintance
with militia, and county affairs." — Lord Colchester's Diary, ii. 77.
' His own words. See his letter to Lord Barrington, " Life and

i8o6] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 217
sake of office to coalesce with a party v/ith which he had
hardly an opinion in common, or of which he doubted the
stability. And he had sound reason for his doubts. The
King, indeed, reluctant as he had been to entrust the
Government to the present ministers, acted with the most
scrupulous fairness to them, abstaining from touching in
the least degree on politics in his occasional conversations
with members of the Opposition.' But the Duke of York,
who was supposed to be no stranger to the King's secret
feelings, was earnest in encouraging the Tory Opposition
to an united plan of action. He would gladly have seen
an attempt made to dispossess the Ministry before the
prorogation ; but Lord Hawkesbury and the other leaders
of the party thought such a step would be premature.
Lord Hawkesbury had already given a cordial and
generous support to the Government in the measures
which it had adopted towards Prussia on its seizure of
Hanover. He was prepared to give an equally impartial
sanction to the breaking off, as he foresaw must happen, of
the negotiations into which they had entered with France.
He reciprocated too the feeling which during the last
weeks of Pitt's life had led Fox to withdraw or postpone
the objections which he had been prepared to make to
some recent measures, " Mentem mortalia tangunt;"^ and,
knowing Fox's condition to be almost equally hopeless,
he would not harass the last weeks of his life by any
needless show of opposition.
But Fox had hardly been laid in the grave when he
learnt that the tactics of the Ministry were altered ; and
he consequently saw the expediency of changing his own.
Times of G. Canning," p. 97. It is remarkable that in " The Court
and Cabinets of George III.," by the Duke of Buckingham, this
overture to Canning is passed over in silence.
' See a mention of a visit of George III. to Bulstrode (Malmes
bury, iv. 3S).
2 Fox's quotation when, just before the meeting of Parliament in
January, he announced Pitt's state to his adherents as a reason for
moderation. ^

2i8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1806
Fox's death had led to a slight change in the relative pro
portions of the Ministry. Of course his own loss had
weakened his party in it beyond retrieval, though the office
which he had filled was given to the ablest of his personal
followers. Mr. Grey's father had been made an earl in the
spring, so that he, his eldest son, was now known as Lord
Howick. He became Foreign Secretary, with the lead in
the House of Commons ; and his place at the Admiralty
was bestowed on Lord Grenville's brother, Mr. Thomas
Grenville. Judging by what occurred immediately after
wards, there can be little doubt that Lord Grenville now
resolved to re-open the Catholic question, which Fox, while
he lived, would not permit to be agitated. And, as the
existing Parliament was known to be unfavorable to any
change in the national policy on that question, he deter
mined on a dissolution of Parliament. The intention was
viewed with great displeasure by the Opposition, and Lord
Hawkesbury seems to have gone beyond his party in con
sidering it not only objectionable, but so indefensible that
it might be possible to induce the King to refuse his con
sent to it. Accordingly he addressed the following letter
to his Majesty :
Sire,
The confidence with which your Majesty has been so graciously
pleased to honour me makes rae feel it an indispensable duty to
obtrude on your Majesty's time for a very few moments for the
purpose of bringing under your Majesty's consideration several
circumstances which may eventually become of great public
importance, and with which I am confident your Majesty would
desire to be acquainted.
Since the change which took place in your Majesty's councils in
the beginning of February last, an alteration has been produced
in the relative state of parties much more rapid and extensive
than could have been expected in so short a space of time.
Your Majesty's present ministers have disappointed the expec
tations of many persons who were, in the first instance, dis
posed to place confidence in them : their strength in Parliament
has evidently dirainished; has proved rauch less than could have

i8o6] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, ii^i
been imagined ; and they have been progressively losing ground
in the opinion of the country. On the other hand, the party
which constituted your Majesty's last Administration have be
come more united amongst themselves, and have confessedly
acquired a great increase of strength and influence in Parliament
and in the country, and more particularly in the House of
Commons, where they were supposed, both by themselves and
by their opponents, to be most weak some months ago. The
result appears to be, upon the most accurate investigation, that
independent of that strength which belongs to Government as
such, and which may be considered as transferable from one
Administration to another, the number of persons attached to
your Majesty's present servants in the House of Commons very
little exceed the number of those who are attached to their
opponents. The state of the county representation in Great
Britain will furnish a reasonably fair test of the truth of this
observation. The number of county members of Great Britain
favorably disposed to the present Administration are forty-nine;
those favorably disposed to their opponents are forty-five;
there are eight undecided, but more inclined to the latter than
to the former ; and seventeen altogether doubtful.
Under these circumstances I cannot avoid most anxiously re
questing your Majesty's attention to the effect of a dissolution
of Parhament at the present time. Such a measure would have
the inevitable effect of throwing the whole influence of Govern
ment in the borough elections into the hands of the present
Administration. It would secure to them the strengffi they
would thereby acquire for the whole of a new Parliament. It
would determine in their favour the opinions of many persons
who are undecided at present, and, in the event of your
Majesty's feeHng it expedient to change your Administration,
it would deprive their successors of the advantage of that
measure which would be essential to the establishment of their
power.
This measure, if it should be proposed, cannot fairly be pressed
upon your Majesty on any public grounds. The present Parlia
ment was chosen in the month of June 1802. Three years of
its legal existence, then, are unexpired, and no pretence for a
dissolution can be advanced either on the ground of any

220 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1806
obstruction having been given in the House of Commons to
the necessary business of Government, or on account of any
material difference of opinion between the two Houses of
Parliament. I feel the less difficulty in submitting these obser
vations for your Majesty's consideration in consequence of
knowing that, whatever shades of difference of opinion may exist
on other points, there is an unusual agreement upon this sub
ject amongst all those who are not connected with the present
Administration whose opinion it has been judged practicable or
prudent to ascertain.
There are several points connected with the subject of this letter
which I could explain more fully to your Majesty in conversa
tion ; but, until I receive your Majesty's commands to attend
you, I feel the impropriety there would be in my obtruding
myself into your presence at this tirae.
I have the honour, &c. &c., Hawkesbury.
In thus urging the King to refuse his consent to measures
on which his ministers had resolved. Lord Hawkesbury was
but following the precedent afforded by Lord Temple and
Lord Thurlow in 1783.' But George III. did not repeat
the conduct by which he then had given occasion to un
favorable but hardly unjust animadversion. He probably
liked his present Ministry as little as he liked that of 1783.
He had contrasted the respectful demeanour of Fox with
the arrogance of another member of his Cabinet, whom he
did not name, but whom it was not difficult to identify, as
walking up to him " in the way he should have expected
from Buonaparte after the battle of Austerlitz." ^ And he
was even more offended at the sneers with which, as it was
well known. Lord Grenville at times permitted himself to
speak of Pitt, though he owed to him his introduction to
official life,^ first as Speaker and then as a Secretary of
' Stanhope's Life of Pitt, i. 147 — 149.
''¦ Twiss's Life of Eldon, i. 510.
^ " Lord GrenvUle, in a note which I saw to-day, said 'that he was
determined to make the Treasury as remarkable for its punctuality in

i8o6] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 221
State. But George III. knew also that he himself had
been thought to have acted in a way contrary to the spirit
of the constitution in encouraging any opposition to his
ministers' policy while they continued in his service. And
he judged, more correctly than Lord Hawkesbury, that he
could not now refuse his consent to the dissolution without,
at the same time, requiring their resignation ; and that the
proposal to dissolve a Parliament that had already sat for
four years, though it might be uncalled for, would not be
looked on by the kingdom as a sufficient reason for dis
missing them. The event proved that he decided wisely,
and his forbearance was rewarded by their giving him an
opportunity of treating with them, in which he had the
sympathy of the great majority of his people.
When the new Parliament met. Lord Hawkesbury re
stated his objections to the late dissolution, now bringing
them forward as a formal accusation of the Ministry, for
having advised an unusual exertion of the royal prero
gative " with levity and without due necessity." He
admitted, indeed, what could not be denied, that to dis
solve the Parliament at his pleasure "was a prerogative
which was inherent in the King in its strongest sense. If it
were possible that Parliament could acquire legal perma
nence, for ever so short a time, independent of the Crown,
there would be no security for the monarchy." But no
prerogative could be exercised in an unusual manner with
out "the ministers who advised such an act incurring the
weightiest responsibility.'' And that this was the character
of the late dissolution he considered that he proved by the
fact that, "since the passing of the Septennial Act, there
had been but one example, that of 1784, of a Parliament
being dissolved under six sessions. The dissolution in
1784 had been unavoidable, because at that time a mis
understanding existed between the Crown and the House
of Commons with respect to the Government. But no
business as it had been heretofore for the contrary' (a sneer as
unfounded as ungrateful)."— Lord Colchester's Diary, ii. 63.

222 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1806
circumstance had occurred, no plea had been assigned by
the ministers for the late dissolution." This statement of
the length of Parliaments during the preceding century will
seem strange to a generation accustomed to the proceedings
of recent Administrations, which have been in the habit of
using dissolution as one of their most ordinary weapons.
It may perhaps be doubted whether they have done wisely,
or whether they have not rather laid themselves open to
the charge of " making the medicine of the constitution its
daily bread." And Lord Hawkesbury's argument, founded,
as it was, on almost invariable practice, was well calculated
to make an impression on those to whom it was addressed.
But it was so impossible seriously to question the right of
dissolution that he did not venture to found any motion on
his objections : if he had, beyond all question the House
would have felt that, however ill-judged or causeless the
late dissolution might have been, the power of the King to
dissolve at discretion was one of such vital necessity to the
safety of the constitution, that it was better to let an
occasional misuse of it pass unchallenged than to commit
itself to any step which might have the least tendency
to fetter or embarrass the free exercise of the royal pre
rogative. And, as matters turned out, before many months
had passed Lord Hawkesbury himself had reason to rejoice
that he had not elicited such a vote from any considerable
number of his brother peers.
Lord Hawkesbury had not in his letter endeavoured to
alarm the King on the subject of any concessions to the
Catholics. Indeed the intentions of the ministers on that
subject were probably hardly suspected when he wrote.
But very soon after the meeting of the new Parliament,
which took place in the middle of December, a report
gained ground that they were preparing a bill intended, if
not as an actual removal of all the restrictions affecting
Roman Catholics, at least as such a relaxation of some
of them as must prove an inevitable stepping-stone to the
abolition of the rest. And though Lord Sidmouth had in

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 223
no degree withdrawn his objections to such a step, yet he
had greatly contributed to encourage his colleagues in a
belief of its practicability by a statement that the King
was so absorbed in meditation on the increase of his blind
ness and other infirmities, as to have become indifferent to
political questions. Under this impression the leaders in the
Ministry thought that they might safely afford a modified
indulgence to the Roman Catholics. They were certainly
influenced solely by the sincerity of their conviction of the
justice of the claims preferred by that body to a perfect
equality of civil rights with their Protestant fellow-subjects,
and not by any mere personal motive. On the contrary,
they thought the conduct of the Irish Roman Catholics at
the time, and especially of their leaders, not only factious
and intemperate, but most embarrassing to the Adminis
tration ; ' but they would neither allow this feeling of
personal annoyance to weigh with them, nor those more
important considerations which had njade such men as Pitt
and Fox, though equally impressed with the wisdom of the
concession, renounce all further agitation of the question.
And they prepared a bill which, though not going all the
lengths which Pitt had originally proposed, should yet grant
an effective raeasure of indulgence which would be parti
cularly acceptable to the higher classes among the Roman
Catholics, and would supply hereafter an argument for
granting more. A bill passed in 1793 had enabled Roman
Catholics in Ireland to hold any commissions in the army,
short of the very highest ; but, by a singular oversight, it
made no mention of their serving in England or Scot
land, though the regiments to which they belonged were, of
course, as liable to be quartered in either of those countries
as in Ireland. The first proposal of the Ministry went solely
' See " Life and Opinions of Earl Grey," p. 143, where the writer
(the present Earl) quotes a letter from Lord Grenville to his father,
characterising a speech made by Mr. Keogh at a meeting of the Irish
Roman Catholics, as one which "for its intemperance and inflam
matory tendency had hardly ever been equalled."

224 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
to the rectification of this omission by the addition of one
¦or two clauses to the Mutiny Bill. But having procured
the King's consent, though far from cheerfully or willingly
given, to those clauses, they were, by that success, en
couraged to attempt more ; they withdrew those clauses,
and substituted for them a separate bill, giving to Roman
Catholics, in every part of the King's dominions, a right to
liold any rank in either army or navy.
Such a concession was certainly a different thing from a
grant of civil privileges, or rather from a removal of civil
restrictions. But it was obvious that it must immediately
lead to it ; since it would have been an intolerable incon
sistency to refuse an equality of rights to those whom the
State invited to an equality of dangers. It is singular that
the ministers should have expected to obtain the King's
sanction to it, because, even when assenting to the previous
measure, he had expressly declared that " he would not go
one step further."' But so strangely were they led away
by their wishes, that they not only expected to obtain
it, but believed that they had obtained it, and in that
belief they introduced the bill. Its introduction led to a
warm dispute in the Cabinet. Lord Sidmouth, the Lord
President, who was averse to any relaxation of the existing
restrictions, and who declared not only that he could be no
party to such a measure, but that he had not been aware
that any such had been contemplated by his colleagues,
' Lord Sidmouth, a few weeks later, stated the written consent which
the King had given to the additional clauses in the Mutiny Bill to
have been concluded in these words : that " however painful his
Majesty had found it to reconcile to his feelings the removal of objec
tions which may have the most distant reference to a question which
has already been the subject of such frequent and distressing reflection,
be would not, under the circumstances in which it was so earnestly
pressed, and adverting particularly to what took place in 1793, pre
vent his ministers from submitting, for the considerations of his Par
liament, the propriety of inserting the proposed clauses in the Mutiny
Bill. Whilst, however, the King so far reluctantly conceded, he thought
it necessary to declare that he could not go one step further." (Cobbett's
Parliamentary Debates, vol. ix. p. 393.)

i807] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 225
at the same time asserted his conviction that his royal
master was equally ignorant. Lord Grenville and Lord
Howick affirmed that the object of their bill had been
fully explained to the King by the latter nobleman, that
he had deliberately assented to its introduction, and, more
over, that it had been most distinctly expressed in a
despatch which had been written to the Lord Lieutenant
of Ireland, and which, before being sent, had been sub
mitted to his Majesty, and had been returned by him
without comment or the slightest intimation of disapproval.
But Lord Sidmouth proved to be right. When the real
scope of the bill was explained to the King, he was thunder
struck and indignant. He affirmed that he had not only
not assented to any such measure, but that his ministers
knew that he never would. The King and Lord Howick
were thus at direct issue on a matter of fact. And, as
Lord Howick's scrupulous veracity and honour are above
suspicion, the fairest way of solving the contradiction would
appear to be to suppose that, in his conference with his
minister, the King had abstained from repeating his dis
approval, as thinking it sufficiently indicated by the
terms in which he had given his sanction to the clauses
in the Mutiny Act, and that the unfortunate state of his
eyesight had caused him to overlook or mistake the sen
tences relating to the bill in the Irish despatch. However
this may be, it is certain that, from the moment that he
knew the real character of the bill now before ParHament,
he announced in the most positive manner his determina
tion never to sanction it. And, though what had thus
taken place between him and his ministers could not yet
have been known to any but the members of the Cabinet,
it happened, by a singular coincidence, that the next day'
the Duke of Portland wrote to his Majesty, expressing his
belief that his Majesty's wishes and intentions on the
1 According to Lord Sidmouth's speech, already alluded to, this hap
pened March 11. The Duke of Portland's letter is dated March 12th,
and is given at length in Lord Malmesbury's Diary (iv. 360).
VOL. L Q

226 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
subject were misunderstood, his conviction on this point
being so strong that he ventured to add that, even if
" any peculiarity of circumstances should have induced his
Majesty to acquiesce in that bill, he himself should think
that, by following the dictates of his own conscience, and
voting against it, he should not offend." He had no doubt
that the bill might be, and would be, defeated in the House
of Lords ; and if the King should in consequence " be
driven to take the conduct of his affairs out of the hands
of those who were now administering them, he placed
his own zealous and faithful services at his Majesty's
command." The consequence of such a step as that taken by the
Duke, who had for many years enjoyed a very special
degree of private intimacy with the King, could hardly
have been a matter of doubt for a moment. George III.
again announced to his ministers, in the most unmistake
able terms, his repugnance to their policy on the subject
in question ; and he sent a similar communication to the
Duke. He went further ; he resolved to protect himself
from a renewal of such agitating vexation. And when the
ministers, in consequence of his declaration, withdrew the
bill, he required of them a promise that they would never
again, under any circumstances, re-open the question. To
give such a pledge they thought incompatible with their
duty, whether as privy councillors of the Crown or as
ordinary members of Parliament ; and such a refusal was
practically equivalent to a resignation of their offices.

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

CHAPTER VII.
The King sends for Lord Hawkesbury— The Duke of Portland becomes
Prime Minister — Lord Hawkesbury the most prominent member of
the new Administration — Debate on the change — Lord Hawkesbury's
speech — Maiden speech of Lord Aberdeen — Dissolution of Parlia
ment — Treaty of Tilsit — The expedition to Denmark — The Orders in
Council, and dissatisfaction of the United States — Quarrels between
the Prince and Princess of Wales — Arrival of Louis XVIII. as Comte
de L'Isle in England — His letters to the King and Lord Hawkesbury
— Plans of the Portuguese royal family — Debate and speech of Lord
Hawkesbury on the Danish expedition — Seditious conspiracies in
Ireland — Lord Hawkesbury's policy in Ireland — Proposal for a com
mutation of tithes in Ireland — Lord Grenville moves for a Committee
on the Catholic question — Arrangements in Scotland, and Lord
Hawkesbury's rules for the distribution of his patronage.
The first step the King took towards the formation of
a new Administration was to seek the advice of Lord
Hawkesbury and Lord Eldon. They found him, as is
mentioned in a letter from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord
Liverpool, " never better in health or more composed in
manner. He communicated to them all that had passed
between himself and his Government on the Catholic
bill. The important facts of the transaction were for
tunately in writing, and formed a complete justification
of the King's conduct. He had resolved," Lord Hawkes
bury added, "on changing his Government," and Lord
Hawkesbury anticipated "that the new arrangements
would be made without any considerable difficulty."
During the next few days, with the exception of those
Q 2

228 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
persons who were not yet formally divested of their minis
terial character, George III. saw no one but Lord Hawkes
bury. And it was through him that all the arrangements for
the new Administration were completed. The King had
intended to place him at the head of the Treasury, but
the whole party had already come to an understanding
to recommend that the nominal lead in the new Admi
nistration should be conferred on the Duke of Portland.
When, twenty years before, he had been placed in the
same situation as the chief of the Coalition Ministry, the
Duke had displayed no kind of abihty ; and his natural
mediocrity of intellect was now enfeebled by an agonizing
disease, which would prevent his taking an active part
in Parliament. But he had great borough influence and
a most extensive political connexion ; both of which
would be of service in the outset. For it required no
shrewdness of foresight to predict that the new Ministry
would be exposed to " a most formidable attack" from
their predecessors, though Lord Hawkesbury, when he
prophesied this, did not doubt that "if they had good
nerves they should get through it.'' He himself was, as
before, to lead the House of Lords, an arrangement that
hardly required specifying, for the Duke himself, during
the two years and a half that he remained at the Treasury,
never addressed a single speech to his brother peers, if
indeed he ever appeared among them at all.
Lord Hawkesbury returned to the Home Office, the
other Secretaries of State being Canning at the Foreign
Office, and Lord Castlereagh in the Colonial and War
Department; Mr. Perceval, who had previously held no
appointments but those connected with his profession of
the law, became Chancellor ofthe Exchequer, with the lead
in the House of Commons ; Lord Eldon resumed the seals ;
the Admiralty was entrusted to Lord Mulgrave. The other
places, inferior in importance, though higher in dignity,
the Presidency of the Council and the custody of the Privy
Seal, were conferred on Lord Camden and Lord West-

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 229
moreland. Lord Chatham became Master-General of the
Ordnance ; Mr. Huskisson resumed his old post as one of
the Secretaries of the Treasury. And, among those not in
the Cabinet, two subsequently rose to an eminence which
forbids the passing over their names in silence : Sir Arthur
Wellesley was appointed Secretary for Ireland, and Lord
Palmerston became one of the Lords of the Admiralty.
And thus was inaugurated the great Tory Ministry, which,
with scarcely any changes but those occasioned by death
or the growing infirmities of one or two members,
governed England for above twenty years with unbroken
success and unequalled glory. From the very first it
bore in a high degree the stamp of Lord Hawkesbury's
own character ; reflecting it, of course, to a greater extent
when, at the end of five years, he became its acknow
ledged chief
His task of upholding the new Ministry in his character
of leader of the House of Lords began before his other
and more official duties as Secretary of State had made
any great call on his time or abilities. He had not deceived
himself when he foretold that they should have a formi
dable attack to encounter. For, the very day that he
received the seals. Lord Grenville gave notice of his
intention to explain on the morrow the circumstances
which had led to his finding himself in his present situa
tion ; and shortly afterwards one of his chief partisans,
the Marquis of Stafford, gave notice of a resolution which,
though couched in a single paragraph, was, in fact, rather
two resolutions than one, since there was no necessary
connexion between its different clauses. The first was
particular ; it lamented the recent change in his Majesty's
councils : the second was general ; it asserted it to be
"contrary to the first duties of the responsible ministers
of the King to restrain themselves by any pledge, ex
pressed or implied, from submitting to his Majesty faith
fully and truly any advice which in their judgment the
course of circumstances may render necessary for the

23° LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
honour of his Majesty's crown, and the welfare of his
dominions." For the purpose of this narrative it will be more con
venient to look on the two debates as one general dis
cussion of the recent transactions, and to combine the two
speeches made by Lord Grenville and the two replies
which they received from Lord Hawkesbury. The speech
in which Lord Grenville professed to explain the circum
stances which had caused the faU of the late Ministry
was rather an attempt to lead the House away from the
real question, than a judicious or even skilful exposition of
the merits of the case. He gave an elaborate exposition
of the arguments in favour of the removal of the restric
tions which pressed on the Roman Catholics, and affirmed
with great emphasis, what every one knew, that both Pitt
and Fox had adopted them as irresistible. In touching
on the merits of the bill which had been prepared, he,
as was not unusual with him, injured his cause by over
stating it, representing the refusal to remove the existing
restrictions " as a renewal of persecution for the sake of dif
ferences in religion,'' and asked, with a vehemence which
many of even his own supporters felt to be misplaced,
" If persecutions for the sake of differences in religious
opinions were again to be revived in Ireland, could there be
any question that it would produce the most dreadful dis
sensions.''" But he slurred over the equally well-known fact
that both the great statesmen whom he mentioned had in
the last two years of their lives deliberately resolved not to
bring the question forward, because, however maintainable
it might be in principle, circumstances were such that to
press it while those circumstances existed must be useless,
and might be in the highest degree mischievous. And he
gave no adequate explanation whatever of the reasons
which had induced himself and his colleagues to disregard
their example, and to press the consideration of proposals
to which, as they well knew, the mind of their royal master
was unalterably averse. He .said indeed that Lord Howick

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 231
had been under the impression that he had obtained the
sanction of the King to the introduction of the bill ; but
he took no notice of the great improbability that, on a
matter on which his Majesty had hitherto felt so strongly,
he should suddenly have entirely changed his mind, with
out a single argument having been employed to lead to
that revolution in his opinions : an improbability so
strong that, the moment the full force of the intended
measure was seen, both the Duke of Portland, who was
out of the Ministry, and Lord Sidmouth, who was a mem
ber of the Cabinet, came to the same conclusion, that his
Majesty must have given his consent to the measure under
a total misconception. He was more successful when he
proceeded to justify his refusal to pledge himself never
to re-open the question, on the ground that, even if he
had in his own mind resolved to abandon it till he saw a
prospect of carrying it, it was clearly quite a different
thing to debar himself from doing so, under any pressure
of political necessity, by a formal renunciation. And
he argued with considerable force that such a pledge was
absolutely inconsistent with the duties of ministers. It
was, as he truly said, " their duty to advise the King, and to
give, without favour or affection, that counsel which they
thought best for the country." And he asked, "What
would be the situation of any set of men who should bind
themselves by oath to discharge this important office, and
at the same time bind themselves by a written promise not
to discharge it 1 Could the British constitution exist if
ministers should give pledges of such a character.'" He
argued fairly and convincingly that such a pledge once
given would have a tendency to become a precedent. And
he endeavoured ftom that argument to throw a heavy
responsibility on the new Administration, contending that,
"as such a pledge was required of the ministers who
retired, upon every fair construction it must have been
given by those who had succeeded them. And if this
doctrine and practice were to prevail, the corner-stone of

232 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
our constitution, namely, the maxim that the King can do
no wrong, and that his ministers are completely responsible,
is gone. We should return to those principles which must
sap the foundation -of the monarchy; to those, he had
almost said, diabolical principles by which the King of this
country was once brought to answer to his Parliament,
and was made responsible for all the transactions of the
Government." Lord Hawkesbury, in reply, declined, on this occasion,
to enter at length into the merits of the Catholic question
itself, as one which had already received " the most ample
discussion in both Houses of Parliament, and had been
decided on by the largest majorities ever known two years
before ; " though he did not abstain from briefly reiterating
his own opinion, that the removal of the restrictions on the
Roman Catholics would be a change of " the fundamental
principle of the constitution, which had established a Pro
testant Government and Church Establishment ; he believed
that such a change would overthrow the constitution ; and,
though this doctrine might be termed bigotry, he preferred
to any new lights the bigotry of 1688, which had effected
the Revolution, and established the liberties of this country
on the most solid foundation. But he conceived that, even
if he had been favorable to a removal of all restrictions,
he might still, with perfect consistency, have objected to the
'measure brought in by the late Government as one which
would only have unsettled the question ; for was it possible
to think that this measure would have satisfied the Catho
lics, that it would not rather have stimulated their desire
for further concessions } This measure was to give them
the sword, but to refuse them everything beside; and yet
he had never conversed with any person on the subject who
would not rather grant to the Catholics what the late
ministers by this measure refused them, and refuse what by
this measure they had granted." He then entered into the,
for the moment, more important question of what the
original proposal of the ministers had been to which the

l8o7] 01 LORD LIVERPOOL. 233
King had assented, and of how far they were justified in
inferring his approval of the larger measure which they had
subsequently introduced. By a minute but, as no one
denied, a most accurate dissection of the papers which were
before the House, he completely established his assertion
that the original proposal laid before his Majesty "did not
go further than to make the provisions of the Irish Act,
the Act of 1793, general. His Majesty was assured that it
was only the same measure to which he had assented in
1793, and was only intended to carry into effect that Act
according to the principle upon which it had been enacted.
That principle had been to give to the Catholics the privi
lege of holding certain commissions in the army, reserving
others ; and the reservation of some formed as much a part
of the principle as the concession of others. When it was
subsequently found out that a clause in the Mutiny Act
would not have the power, which it had been intended to
give it, of making the Act of 1793 general, a separate bill
was introduced. That step was so far unobjectionable ; but
not so if the object aimed at in the new and separate bill
was different from that which was meant to be accom
plished by the addition of clauses to the Mutiny Act.
How any misapprehension as to the King's opinion sub
sequently arose it was not for him to decide ; but he had
authority to state that, on the 3d of March, a commu
nication was made to his Majesty on the subject, and on
the 4th Lord Howick had an audience of him, when his
Majesty stated his objections to the measure. Yet, in spite
of what had thus fallen from his Majesty, that same evening
Lord Howick gave notice of his intention to bring in the
bill, and the next evening he actually introduced it into the
House of Commons. He fully acquitted that noble lord
of intending to assume a permission which had not been
granted to him. He was ready to admit that that noble
lord had felt convinced in his own mind that nothing had
fallen from his sovereign during his audience that precluded
him from opening the measure as he had done in his place

234 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
in Pariiament. But it was admitted that the ministers
soon found that the King had not been made aware of the
intended effect of the new bill ; that, as soon as he became
acquainted with it, he declared his entire and absolute dis
approval of it ;_and that the ministers, finding that it could
not be modified so as to answer the purpose for which it
had been intended, withdrew it altogether."
He proceeded to defend and justify the pledge which
the King had required from his late ministers. " In with
drawing the bill it appeared that they had made two
reserves : first, that they should be at liberty to declare
their opinions on the general policy of the measure, as well
on the withdrawal of the bill as in the event of the Catholic
petition being presented ; secondly, that as a Government
they should be at liberty to bring the subject from time to
time under his Majesty's consideration, by recommending
such measures as they might think proper to be adopted.
When any individual," he proceeded to argue, " consents to
give up any measure, he has, no doubt, a right to propose
conditions : but in this case there were two parties ; and,
though the late ministers had a right to propose conditions,
the situation of his Majesty was not to be forgotten. He
asked their lordships to consider what would have been
the situation of the King if he had assented to that proposi
tion .' what would have been the effect of such an assent
but to divide the unity of the Executive } Would it not
be to destroy the constitution, one of the wise maxims of
which was that the King could do no wrong, thereby casting
a veil over his sacred character 1 Would it not have the
effect of casting the whole odium upon his Majesty of
resisting the measure, and of giving the whole popularity
to his ministers } Was his Majesty to be kept in a con
stant state of expectation, waiting till his ministers might
think they had a greater power of extorting his consent to
it .'' He was not aware of any other alternative his Majesty
had when they had refused to withhold the statemeilt of
their opinions, or -to make any promise respecting the future,

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 235
than that which he had adopted. He had authority to
state, on the part of his Majestj'-, that the measure which
had been brought forward was widely different from that
which had been first proposed to him and sanctioned by him.
For himself, he could aver that till he had been called upon,
in conjunction with Lord Eldon, by his Majesty, he was
wholly ignorant of the transaction. But, when he had been
so called on, it would have been a base shrinking from his
duty if he had not yielded obedience to his sovereign's
commands. And he shrank from no responsibility which
that obedience had imposed upon him. On the contrary,
he maintained that those who shrank from responsibility
were Lord Grenville and his late colleagues, who, in order
to cloak their own misconduct and absurdities, had so
strangely ventured to arraign the personal conduct of his
Majesty at their lordships' bar."
In these last-quoted sentences Lord Hawkesbury most
adroitly took up his strongest ground. If we look at the
whole transaction by the light of constitutional principle,
and, it might even be said, of common sense, it is difficult
to deny that for a privy councillor or minister to pledge
himself never under any circumstances to recommend a
particular class of measures or line of policy to his sove
reign would be plainly inconsistent with that earlier duty
to which, on becoming a privy councillor, he had most
solemnly bound himself: at all times to tender such advice
as he should think for the benefit of both king and
kingdom. But exactly in proportion to the strength of
this argument does blame attach to Lord Grenville and his
colleagues for voluntarily and gratuitously placing them
selves in a position in which such a pledge was likely to be
demanded of them. The King's demand could not have
taken Lord Grenville by surprise, for no one knew better
than he that six years before George III. had required a very
similar pledge of Pitt, and had parted with even him when
he declined to give it. It may be admitted that the King,
in doing so, had taken up a false position ; but it was sure

236 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
that, under similar circumstances, he would return to it ;
and the deeper Lord Grenville's feeling of the unconstitu
tional character of such a demand was, the plainer was his
duty to avoid provoking his royal master to make it. He
had certainly laid himself open to Lord Hawkesbury's
charge, that, in his defence of himself for declining to give
the promise asked of him, he was in fact arraigning his
king ; his conduct in so doing being aggravated by the
consideration that it was his own wanton wrongheaded-
ness thaf had brought the King and himself into such a
situation. The result of the debates showed the feeling of
both Houses of Parliament on the general features of the
transaction. In the Lords a majority of 81, in the Com
mons one of 46, rejected the motions of the Opposition,
showing by their votes a resolution to give the new Ministry
fair play; the majority being in each instance probably
augmented by a feeling of sympathy with the King, and
in some degree by a jealousy and distrust of the Roman
Catholics, of whom the late ministers and their adherents
were from this time forth looked on as the especial
champions. Two circumstances were remarkable in the debate and
division in the House of Lords ; the first appearance as a
speaker of a future Prime Minister, and the extreme fulness
of the House. Lord Hawkesbury's report to his father,
now sinking under extreme old age, alludes to both :
Nothing could go off better than our debate in the House of
Lords ; and the division exceeded ray expectations. The
House of Lords was never on any forraer occasion so full : the
largest number that ever divided before, including proxies, was
229, and the nuraber last night was 261 ; as I hear, within
15 of the whole nuraber that had taken their seats. The
debate was, in fact, very good. Lord Aberdeen spoke for the
first tirae, and did well. Lord Harrowby made the best speech
I ever heard from him. It produced a considerable effect on
the House, and evidently galled Lord Grenville particularly.
I never heard frora Fox, in the tiraes of his greatest-violence,

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 237
so factious and mischievous a speech as Grenville's. I do not,
however, dread any bad effects from it even in Ireland, as
I know, from experience, that sort of speech defeats its own
object. There will be another debate in the House of Commons
to-morrow, but after the great majority in our House, and the
decision of the City, it is not to be apprehended that the
minority will increase in numbers.
The opinion of the city of London had at that time
greater influence than it carries at the present day ; and
that body, looking on the struggle between the two parties
as turning solely on the concession or rejection of the claims
of the Roman Catholics, proclaimed its opinions by an
address to the King, thanking him for the support which he
had " recently given to the Protestant reformed religion."
The feeling was so general throughout the country that the
ministers were prompted to avail themselves of it to the
utmost ; and, forgetting how they had condemned the dis
solution of the previous year, resolved to repeat it, though
the existing Parliament had only sat for a single session.
As a matter of constitutional practice it cannot be thought
justifiable thus to have thrown the whole kingdom into the
turmoil of a general election, merely in order to increase
their majority by taking advantage of the excitement
existing on a particular subject " before the country had
time to cool." ' But as a measure of party tactics it suc
ceeded perfectly. The new Parliament met in June, and
in the debate on the address, though Lord Howick himself
moved an amendment, and supported it by one of his most
elaborate speeches, in which he travelled over the whole
ground of difference between the present and the late
Governments, his own conduct, the principles of religious
toleration, and the loyalty of the Roman Catholics, he
found his adherents fewer by fifty than they had been in
the last Parliament, and was defeated by a majority of
' Lord Hawkesbury's expression to his father on announcing to him
the intention to dissolve, in the same letter of which an abstract has
already been given.

238 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
nearly 200 votes. In another division, a few days later,
when Mr. Whitbread moved for a committee on the state of
the nation, the result was the same : and during the latter
part of the session, which did not last quite two months,
the Opposition in the House of Commons almost ceased
from dividing the House, and in the Upper House Lord
Grenville altogether gave up his attendance.
And it was well that the Ministry found itself strong.
For the address had scarcely been voted when intelligence
arrived from the Continent of events which had not only
for a time put an end to every prospect of resistance to
France by our allies in the east of Europe, but which also
threatened to augment our enemies to a very important
extent. In the middle of June Napoleon had defeated
the Russians in the great battle of Friedland. In itself
the victory was not one which ought to have decided a war,
for the Russian army engaged was less than 50,000 men ;
and had not yielded without inflicting prodigious loss upon
their enemies, who were infinitely superior in numbers ;
only four months before, when the forces were more nearly
equal,' they had fought a drawn battle with the French
emperor at Eylau, which, indeed, if their general had
not retired the next day, they might have claimed as a
victory ; and, if the whole camipaign were taken into con
sideration, the French had probably been the greater
sufferers. But Alexander, though possessed, as he after
wards showed, of both bravery and fortitude, was a vain,
impulsive man ; easily offended, easily flattered. He had
conceived a great admiration for Napoleon, which was
fostered by some of the French conqueror's adroit partisans
in the Imperial Court ; he had taken offence at England,
' Alison gives the numbers at Friedland, fought June 14, as on the
side of the French 70,000 infantry and ,10,000 cavalry, against 40,000
Russian infantry and 8,000 cavalry ; and at Eylau, fought February 8, as
85,000 (of which nearly 16,000 were cavalry) against 75,000. He does
not specify the number of the Russian horse, which, however, were
far fewer than the French. But the Russians at Eylau had 460 guns
to 350 French.

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

239

as if it undervalued his alliance because it hesitated to
furnish the enormous subsidies which he had not been
ashamed to solicit ; and, under the influence of these
combined feelings, he now opened a negotiation with Napo
leon. Ten days afterwards the two sovereigns had an
interview at Tilsit, when they personally arranged a treaty,
providing not only for the cessation of the war with one
another, but for the co-operation of Russia with France
against England ; while by secret articles it was also ar
ranged that they should compel Denmark, Sweden, and
Portugal to join their confederacy. Throughout the whole
war our Foreign Office was admirably served by its agents :
when Lord Hawkesbury filled that department the des
patches sent or received by the foreign ambassadors in
London were lying on his desk copied and deciphered on
the very same day that they quitted or arrived in London ;
and the duty of procuring the earliest intelligence was not
likely to be neglected by so provident and energetic a
secretary as Canning. The substance of the Tilsit treaty,
secret articles and all, was instantly transmitted to London ;
and the Ministry, thus warned in time, lost not a moment
in taking steps to protect the country from the new attack
which was aimed at it.
They were wanting neither in resolution, nor in prompti
tude, without which indeed resolution would have been use
less. The most important part ofthe secret articles was that
by which the new friends agreed to compel Denmark to join
them against us ; since Denmark had a powerful fleet which,
if added to the naval force of France and Russia, would
strengthen them in the arm in which they were weakest, and
might prove of no trifling service to the French Emperor
in the event of his resuming his project of obtaining the
mastery of the Channel with a view to the invasion of our
shores. We resolved to prevent that fleet from being so
tumed against us. To suppose that Denmark would be
able to resist the compulsion intended to be brought to
bear on her was impossible. The only safety for ourselves

240 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
lay, therefore, in anticipating it; and with this feeling
Canning, as Foreign Secretary, proposed to his colleagues
to demand of the Danes a temporary surrender of their
fleet, a deposit of it in our hands while the war should
last, and to support that demand by the despatch of such
a force to the Baltic as should both render it impossible for
the Danes to refuse it, and excuse them even to Napoleon
himself for a submission which would so cruelly derange
his plans. His advice was adopted, and carried out with a
celerity as admirable as the boldness of the advice. The
conference at Tilsit had taken place on the 25th of June ;
the treaty founded on it was not actually signed till the 7th
of July. On the 27th of the same month a combined force
of twenty-seven ships of the line and 20,000 men sailed for
the Sound, and in less than a week reached Copenhagen.
Unhappily the Danish rulers, though they at once perceived
the armament by which our demand was supported to
be overpowering, nevertheless thought their honour con
cerned in resisting it, and we were compelled to bombard
their capital Then when, to satisfy this false point of
honour, many houses and much property had been destroyed,
and many lives, more valuable than either, had been
sacrificed, the Crown Prince yielded. A few of his ships,
as not being seaworthy, were destroyed, and the rest,
amounting, including gunboats, to above sixty sail, were
brought to England.
This achievement could not be said to add to our
enemies ; in fact the chief reason why it exasperated those
who already were such was that it prevented the addition
on which they had calculated being made to their number
But on the opposite side of the world an occurrence took
place which seemed Hkely for a moment to involve us in war
with a nation that had only an indirect concern in the war
which was raging in Europe. The decrees which the French
Emperor had issued, and had compelled his allies to issue,
respecting commerce, and the Orders in Council with which
Lord Grenville's Government had retaliated, had proved

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 241
a great obstacle to the carrying trade of the United States.
If the question had been looked at fairly, it must have been
seen by the most prejudiced observer that France, not
England, was the original cause of the vexations which
the Americans experienced, since it was Napoleon who
had set the example of interference with such matters by
the establishment of regulations which there was no pre
cedent to justify. But it was England which was chiefly
regarded with ill will by the Americans, because, while
France was unable to enforce its orders, we both could and
did compel the observance of ours ; while another source
of disagreement between us was found in the number of
British seamen who were serving in ships belonging to the
United States, and whom our captains claimed a right
to search for and carry off. On one occasion in the early
part of this year the advance of this pretension had led to
a collision between men-of-war of the two nations, the
Leopard, a British 50-gun ship, having fired into the
American frigate Chesapeake ; on which the President of
the United States, Mr. Jefferson, who was generally under
stood to be unfriendly to this kingdom, issued a pro
clamation commanding all British ships at once to quit the
American harbours, and to abstain from entering them
in future. The feeling of our Government on first hearing
of this transaction cannot be better shown than in the
following extract of a letter from Lord Hawkesbury :
The American Government, in consequence of the action be
tween the Leopard and the Chesapeake, have issued a procla
mation prohibiting the armed vessels of this country from
entering their ports or harbours. We have as yet received no
official communication on the subject, except a note from Mr.
Munro, the American minister here, written, as he avows,
without any authority from his Government, but only in con
sequence of the notoriety of the transaction. The civilians
are of opinion that Admiral Berkeley was not justified in his
orders, which authorised the searching a man-of-war for
deserters; but that, on the other hand, if there really were
VOL. I. R

242 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
deserters from our ships in the American service, the Araerican
Government were bound, on representation, to discharge them.
We are not sufficiently acquainted with all the circumstances of
the case to be able to decide on the exact application of these
principles to the case itself: but it will be thought right to send
a respectable naval force to Araerica, with a minister authorised
to enter into explanations on the subject, provided the
American Government revoke their prohibitions ; but, in the
event of their refusal, with full power to commence hostilities.
There appears to exist no doubt that the exclusion of the
ships of war of one belligerent frora these ports whilst those
of the other are admitted is a violation of neutrality to which
the country cannot submit. How this business wiU end it is
irapossible to say. An American war, in addition to all our
other difficulties, would certainly be an evil at the present
moraent ; but experience has proved that we shall not avoid it
by unbecoming concessions, and the losses, if it shall occur, will
fall more heavily upon the Americans than upon the people of
this country.
We were certainly very near a war when the minister
whom we sent out to negotiate had authority, under cer
tain circumstances, to declare it. It was averted for a
moment, partly by the exertions of the diplomatists on
each side, and partly in consequence of the expiration
of Mr. Jefferson's term of office, and of his successor,
Mr. Madison, being a man of more pacific temper But
the cause of discontent remained. Since we refused to
withdraw our Orders in Council, Mr. Madison was com
pelled by the public feeling in the United States to
maintain the order of his predecessor, known on his
side of the Atlantic as the Non-Intercourse Act ; and,
as the consequence was the cessation of all traffic between
the countries, a mutual animosity was engendered and
kept up, till, when Lord Hawkesbury himself was the
British Prime Minister, it broke out, as will be mentioned
hereafter, in formal war.
Matters such as these were not in Lord Hawkesbury's

i807] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 243
department, and are mentioned here chiefly because, when
Parliament reassembled, it was on him that the task of
defending the measures of the entire Government devolved.
But the affairs which, during his first months of office,
principally caused him trouble and embarrassment, were
also such as a Home Secretary is not usually called on to
interfere with, and which, if they made no call on his states
manlike ability, eminently required those other qualities
with which he was endowed, firmness, temper, and courtesy,
to enable him to steer through them without discredit or
offence. In the preceding summer, under the last Admi
nistration, the quarrels between the Prince of Wales and
his Princess had acquired a more public notoriety than
before, from the Prince bringing against his wife a
formal charge of infidelity. In this instance no blame
attaches to him, because the reports of her misconduct,
and of her having even given the Princess Charlotte a
brother, were so rife that to examine into their truth had
become a constitutional necessity. The investigation had
been entrusted by Lord Grenville to a Commission of
four noblemen,' with which no fault could be found but
that they all belonged to one party, and that the one with
which the Prince himself was politically connected. Their
labours were not protracted ; at the end of a few weeks
they presented their report, which acquitted the Princess
of everything but extreme indiscretion. But when she
demanded that her formal acquittal should be ratified by
the King admitting her to his Court, from which, while
her conduct was the subject of enquiry, she had been
excluded, compliance with her demand was eluded under
a variety of pretences, which showed how little the Cabi
net, which furnished the whole body of Commissioners,
exercised the impartiality which it had been, at all events,
the first duty of that section of it to observe. It was not
till the Princess threatened to publish to the world her
' The Commissioners were Lord Erskine, Lord EUenborough, Lord
Grenville, and Lord Spencer, all members of the Whig Cabinet.
R 2

244 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
own version not only of the recent investigation, but of the
recriminatory charges which she conceived herself justified
in bringing, and able to establish, against her husband, that
Lord Grenville's Cabinet promised that the King should
receive her ; and, when they had made the promise, they
took care to hinder its fulfilment ; so that, on the accession
of the Tories to office, they found the whole affair in the
most unsatisfactory state possible.
The Princess having been pronounced innocent, but being
still treated as if she were guilty, they at once applied them
selves to do away with an inconsistency which seemed cal
culated to throw a doubt on the equity of the King himself
They reported to his Majesty, as their unanimous opinion,
that the Princess was, as a necessary result of the report of
the Commissioners, entitled to be " admitted, with as little
delay as possible into his Majesty's royal presence, and to
be received in a manner due to her rank and station in his
Majesty's Court." And it was on Lord Hawkesbury that
the task devolved of announcing, not only the opinion of
the Ministry to the King, but the decision to which the King
had in consequence come to both the Prince and Princess.
As the resolutions thus adopted were agreeable to no
one (not to the King, for the reception of the Princess,
under the circumstances, could hardly fail to embarrass
and agitate him ; nor to the Prince, who was compelled to
acquiesce in the establishment of his wife's innocence, and
in her consequent reception at Court ; nor to the Prin
cess herself, who must have felt herself, though formally
acquitted of criminality, but insufficiently cleared of sus
picion, and received at Court rather on sufferance than cor
dially or honorably), it was not a very pleasant nor easy task
to communicate them to the different parties. But Lord
Hawkesbury contrived to execute this difficult and delicate
task in such a manner as not to lose the esteem or good
will of either. It added to the difficulty of his task that
the Prince would not accept the acquittal of the Princess
with a good grace., nor abstain from insisting, to the fullest

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 245
extent, on his right as a father to regulate her intercourse
with their daughter ; and that the Princess, with inexpli
cable wrongheadedness, gave him some excuse for a part
of the restrictions which he placed upon that intercourse
by persisting in detaining about her person a boy whom
she had adopted, and whose establishment in her house
had probably been the origin of the chief accusation which
had been brought against her; and, what was almost
worse, considering the effect which any agitating circum
stances were likely to have on the King's health, both still
persisted in addressing themselves to him. The Prince
insisted that he, as the sovereign and head of the family,
should make himself the channel of communication to
announce to the Princess his resolution that she should not
visit their daughter at Warwick House, which had been
recently fitted up for her, because he looked on it as a
part of his own residence, Carlton House, with which,
indeed, it had a communication. While the Princess, who
had hitherto been living at Blackheath, wrote also to His
Majesty, requesting that apartments might be assigned her
at St. James's, in order that she might receive more frequent
visits from her child ; and the King, though deeply pained
and shocked by the whole affair, yet wishing, as a father,
to do his best to heal, or at least to veil, the scandal,
as far as the case admitted, and being now under the
guidance of advisers of real impartiality, complied, in a cer
tain degree, with both their requests. He took on himself
to write to the Princess to communicate to her the Prince's
prohibition of her visits to Warwick House, not conceal
ing from either that he " was not to be understood to give
his sanction to such a rule, or to admit the reasons which
appeared to have influenced the Prince in resolving to
establish it." Indeed the deep regret which his letter
also expressed, "that the result of the late enquiry had
not had the happy effect of restoring personal harmony
between the Prince and Princess," was manifestly a reproof
to him rather than to the lady. And though he was

246 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
unable to comply with her request for apartments at St.
James's Palace, which had no rooms suited for the purpose,
he promised " to take immediate steps for her accommoda
tion in one of the royal palaces," Kensington being in
dicated as the most suitable; adding that "a compliance
with this request on his part had become the more urgently
necessary from the determination taken by the Prince of
Wales." In this state the affair rested for some years. And if
the settlement thus made had been final, we would gladly
have passed over the whole affair in silence ; but at a
subsequent period the dispute between the royal pair
was revived with the addition of so many fresh circum
stances of pain and shame, and such universal notoriety,
that suppression is impossible. Even the reputation of
the Ministry became concerned in the truth being known ;
and nothing is left but to lament the melancholy series
of misconduct and perversity by which a family scandal
became inseparably connected with the national history.
As if no kind of extra official trouble was to be spared
Lord Hawkesbury, before the end of the year the French
prince, afterwards King Louis XVIII., unexpectedly ar
rived in England, travelling under the name of the Count
de L'Isle. The circumstances which led to his doing so
are best explained by the Count de L' Isle's letter to the
King, and by a more detailed statement which he inclosed
in a courteous note to Lord Hawkesbury :
Letter from Louis XVIII. to the King. , ^
A Yarmouth, ce 2 Novembre, 1867.
Monsieur mon Frere et Cousin,
Je ne puis laisser passer le premier moment oh je mets pied k
terre dans les Etats de Votre Majesty, sans la remercier de
I'accueil qu'y revolt le Comte de L'Isle. Je prononce exprfes
ce nom, parce que je n'en veux, ni n'en pretends un autre dans
ces circonstance.s, ainsi que Votre Majestd en a pu juger par
les ddraarches faites en ra8me tems que ma lettre du 16 Octobre

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 247
lui a €t€ remise. Un jour viendra, j'en ai le ferme espoir, ou,
avec I'appui de Votre Majesty et de sa gendreuse nation, je
pourrai prendre publiquement le titre qui m'appartient ; mais ce
jour n'est pas venu, et en I'attendant il m'est k la fois doux et
d'un bien favorable augure d'avoir un sentiment de reconnois
sance k exprimer k Votre Majesty.
Je prends la libertd de recommander k sa bontd le Comte
d'Avaray que je charge de cette lettre, mieux que personne il
peut dire k Votre Majestd combien je lui suis sincferement
attache.
Je prie Votre Majestd d'etre bien convaincue de tous les senti
mens avec lesquels je suis, Monsieur mon Frfere et Cousin,
&c. &c. Louis.
Statement enclosed in a Letter from Louis XVIII. to
Lord Hawkesbury. Gosfield, le 18 Novembre, 1807.
Je suis parti de Mittau pour rdpondre k une invitation du Roi de
Sufede antdrieure au sidge de Stralsund, mais que cette circon-
stance ne rendoit pour moi que plus pressante. Le vent
m'ayant empechd d'aborder k I'lsle de Riigen, et continuant k
me repousser, j'ai pris le parti d'aller relacher k Carlscrone, ou
le Roi, k la suite d'une maladie mortelle, m'avoit prdcddd.
Dans mes conferences avec ce Prince, il m'a fortement con-
seilld de passer en Angleterre.
1°. Pour travailler k dtablir, plus solidement que jamais, avec le
ministfere, un accord ferme et permanent, qui seul peut mettre
un terme aux malheurs de I'Europe.
2°. Pour andantir les calomnies si favorables k I'usurpation,
solddes par elle, et non moins injurieuses k moi-meme qu'k
mon fibre, que nous pouvons marcher par des routes
divergentes.
3°. Pour examiner par moi-meme les projets et les moyens des
chefs ou agents royalistes, et combiner leur travail avec celui
d'une classe qui ne mdrite pas moins de fixer I'attention et qui,
dans Paris m^me, m'offre ses services.
4°. Pour attacher le de'vouement et Taction de tous les bons
Frangois et la mienne propre aux efforts gdne'reux de
I'Angleterre.

248 f.IFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
S°. Pour jouir de la satisfaction, dtant rduni k mon frfere, a mes
neveux et k mes cousins, au milieu de mes serviteurs ras-
semblds en Angleterre, d'exprimer k George III et k sa nation
ma gratitude de leur noble hospitalitd envers les Frangois
fidMes.
A ces motifs s'en joignit un autre bien puissant, celui de con
fondre les malignes insinuations que je nourris des preven
tions contre le Gouvernement Britannique qui m'empechent de
m'entendre franchement avec lui.
Je ddfdrai done k Tavis de Gustave IV, si conforme k mes propres
sentimens.
Ce premier point arretd, nous pensames que si je demandois
Tagrdment de me rendre en Angleterre, j'occasionnerois plus
d'embarras au gouvernement que par une arrivde subite et
inattendue. Le Roi de Sufede rae conseilla done ce dernier
parti, et me fit conduire par une de ses frdgates, convaincu
qu'avec de pareils motifs Tdtroite union qui existe entre Sa
Majestd Britannique et lui sauveroit tout ce qu'U pouvoit
y avoir d'irrdgulier dans cette marche.
Les vents qui ra'avoient tant contrarid sur la Baltique rae retinrent
trois seraaines k Gottembourg. Ayant dans cet intervalle
acquis la certitude que ma prochaine arrivde dtait connue en
Angleterre, et que ddsormais le secret convenu entre Gustave IV
et moi dtoit vain, je crus devoir par ddlicatesse meme pour Sa
Majeste Britannique ne pas garder plus longtems le silence, et
en donnant avis de cette resolution au Roi de Sufede, je confiai
k un packet-boat que je supposois devoir arriver plus tot que
moi, la lettre du 16 Octobre que je m'etois proposd d'abord de
n'dcrire qu'en touchant les cotes de la Grande Bretagne.
Dans cette lettre j'ai exposd franchement au Roi les motifs de
mon voyage, en parlant k ce Prince le meme langage que j 'ai
tenu k tous les souverains et particuUferement k I'Empereur de
Russie.
Sans m'arreter k rdfuter ici les interpretations donndes dans cer
tains papiers k mes projets et k raa conduite, j'ajouterai que
j'ai trop de confiance dans Sa Majestd Britannique et dans ses
- ¦ Ministres pour ne pas etre certain qu'ils ne m'ont jamais
suppose I'intention de vouloir chercher k les entrainer au-delk
des mesures dictees par leur sagesse.

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 249
J'ai regu avec autant de sensibilite que de reconnoissance Toffre
que le Roi m'a faite du Palais d'Holyrood pour ma residence
et celle de ma farnille. Si j'dtois venu dans I'intention de
chercher un asile, je m'en serois ouvert au coeur genereux de
George III. Mais ayant laisse ma femme et la Duchesse
d' Angouleme en Courlande, des motifs de deiicatesse, et je puis
dire de politique generale, que Sa Majeste Britannique et son
cabinet peuvent apprecier, expliqueront en ce moment ma
conduite.
D'aprfes cet expose sincere, et bien convaincu que dans les pre
sentes circonstances une grande circonspection est requise,
j'attendrai en silence et dans une parfaite securite le moment
oh les Ministres croiront utile de se mettre en communication
directe avec moi. C'est dans cette resolution, et n'ayant jamais
compte resider k Londres, mais ne voulant pas cependant abuser
de Tobligeance du Marquis de Buckingham, que je compte
sous peu de jours quitter Gosfield et prendre une maison pour
Thiver, sans aucun edat, k portde de mes parens, de mes
serviteurs et de ceux enfin qu'il m'est important d'ecouter.
Je ne puis terminer cette not#sans detruire par des faits la sup
position accreditee, que j'avois pretendu redamer le titre et les
honneurs de la royaute. Mes instructions k mon frbre et au
Comte de la Chatre ; la lettre du Comte d'Avaray k M. d'Adler-
berg, en date du 16 Octobre; la mienne au Roi, en date de
Yarmouth, retardee par une circonstance particulibre k laquelle
je suis etranger, enfin mon refus du salut de la frdgate suedoise
en quittant son bord, prouvent suffisamment que, dans ma
volonte meme, c'est le Comte de L'Isle, et non le Roi Trfes-
Chretien qui est venu descendre en Angleterre. Louis.
As his arrival in this country implied an expectation
that we should support the expense of his establishment,
a duty of hospitality' from which, to the credit of all
' By an account found in Lord Hawkesbury's papers of the next
year, 1808, it appears that, from the year 1794 to that time, the sums
which had been voted by Parliament for the use of the French
emigrants araounted to above two millions and three-quarters of
'money.

250 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
be it said, neither party was inclined to shrink, our liber
ality gave the Government a right in some degree to
dictate the conditions under which it should be exercised ;
especially the locality where the Prince's residence should
be fixed. The inconveniences which might arise from
his taking up his residence in or near London were
obvious ; and George IIL himself suggested his with
drawal to Scotland, proposing to have Holyrood Palace
fitted up for his reception there. Lord Hawkesbury at
once made the offer in the king's name. But though,
at a later period, and after a second revolution, his younger
brother thankfully chose Holyrood for his abode, Louis
objected to it now. The Marquis of Buckingham placed
one of his country seats at his disposal ; and, after some
discussion, the resolution to which the Cabinet finally
came was that, though the King had no other palace to
offer, the prince might establish himself with his retinue,
which was very numerous, in any part of the kingdom,
provided it was not within fifty miles of the metropolis.
He acquiesced with apparent thankfulness and compla
cency, and took up his residence at Gosfield ; but after
a time some of his English visitors, apparently to annoy
the Ministry, began to represent to him that any re
striction on his place of abode or movements was an
insulting interference, and to encourage him to disregard
it ; and Lord Hawkesbury was compelled to announce
that his nearer approach to the capital must be followed
by a cessation of all communication between him and
the Government. He had other difficulties also. The
younger prince. Monsieur, afterwards Charles X. had
been for some time in England : and, as soon as Louis
arrived, the old jealousies between the two brothers, which
had shown themselves so discreditably at Coblentz fifteen
years before, were revived. A letter of Lord Liverpool's
to his father, written the very week after Louis had
landed at Yarmouth, shows how a community in mis
fortune had failed to reconcile the brothers ; while the

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 251
latter part of it throws some curious light oil the affairs
of Portugal, which in the ensuing year began to exercise
a powerful influence on the affairs of all Europe :
We shall still have, I fear, a great deal of trouble with the French
king and his attendants. They are at present at Gosfield.
The Comte d'Avaray, who is the reputed minister, applied
yesterday to be allowed to come to town ; but leave was refused
to him. I conclude Monsieur will return in a few days, and
we shall then know with more certainty on what we have to
rely. I have no doubt of his anxiety to get his brother out ot
the country, as far as he can manifest it without indecency.
The brothers have always had two distinct parties ; besides,
Monsieur would not like to be eclipsed by the presence of his
elder brother.
The fate of Portugal appears to be still uncertain. The Prince
Regent professed his determination, by our last accounts, at all
events to send his eldest son to the Brazils. You will be sur
prised, perhaps, to hear that the Pope's nuncio at Lisbon has
done everything in his power to persuade the Prince Regent
himself and the whole royal family to go to the Brazils. He
has represented to them in very strong terms the great advan
tages that would arise to the Catholic religion from the estab
lishment of a powerful Catholic empire in that quarter of the
world. The information we have received respecting his advice
is undoubted ; but it should be kept secret, for fear of com
promising the Pope and his nuncio with Buonaparte.
But with his firm refusal to sanction any departure
from the conditions laid down by the Cabinet for the
French prince's residence among us. Lord Hawkesbury
combined such evident sympathy with his position, and
such an unmistakeable desire to consult his wishes in every
way that did not threaten to open political discussions,
which at that time could be neither useful nor seasonable,
that Louis gradually learnt to acquiesce with entire cheer
fulness in the path marked out for him. The condition
as to the distance of his abode from London was slightly
relaxed ; and at last he settled quietly at Hartwell, a seat

=52 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
belonging to the Marquis of Buckingham, near Ayles
bury, and reniained there till the train of events, of which
the commencement is alluded to in the extract just given
from Lord Hawkesbury's letter, replaced him on the throne
of his ancestors.
Lord Hawkesbury's anticipations that the expedition
against Denmark would be made the subject of a formi
dable attack by the Opposition were realized as soon as
Parliament reassembled. Indeed, it may be said that the
Ministry, who were, as they were entitled to be, proud of
their conduct in every part of the transaction ; of their
vigilance and address in obtaining the earliest intelligence
of the Treaty of Tilsit, with the existence and purport of
the secret articles ; of the decision and energy which they
had displayed in counteracting the aims of their old and
new enemies; and of the complete success which had
crowned their efforts, challenged the criticism of their
opponents by putting a congratulatory and exulting men
tion of the enterprise in the very front of the King's speech,
and in the address which their adherents in both Houses
proposed as a reply to it. It was a bold challenge, because,
though they had in their possession a most convincing and
irresistible argument in the secret articles, it was one which
they were resolved that no consideration of self-justifica
tion should tempt them to use ; which indeed they could
not use without ensuring the ruin of the agent to whose
timely information they were indebted for their knowledge
of them ; and with his ruin the destruction to the country
of all means of acquiring similar information hereafter. If
they withheld that absolute proof of the propriety of their
conduct, they must rely for their justification on general
policy ; on the knowledge that all who were not wilfully
blind possessed of the strength of France, of the weakness
of Denmark, and of the way in which the ruler of France
was sure, sooner or later, to avail himself of the inability of
Denmark, and of all countries situated as Denmark was
situated, to resist his commands ; and, above all, on their

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 253
own characters not only as able statesmen, but as honest
men, who would neither assert their knowledge of what
they did not know, nor wantonly oppress a nation whose
prudence or whose weakness might suggest to it the
observance of an honest neutrality, much less one whom
there were many reasons to regard as a secret well-
wisher. Their conduct was discussed not fewer than three times.
First on the address ; again on a motion made by the
Duke of Norfolk for papers "to throw more light on the
motives which induced the ministers to propose and under
take the expedition ;" and lastly on a proposal of Lord
Darnley's to address the King with a formal condemnation
of the conduct of the Ministry, which was met by Lord
Eliot by a motion for an address signifying the highest
approval of their " prompt and vigorous measures." But,
as on a former occasion, it will be more convenient to look
on the different discussions as parts of one prolonged
debate. It was somewhat singular that the peer who, on
the first occasion, put himself forward as the leader of the
Opposition was Lord Sidmouth. But the chief argument
on which he rested his condemnation of the Ministry was,
in fact, the highest compliment that could be paid to them.
He reminded his brother peers of the date of the Treaty
of Tilsit, the 7th of July, of the date of the entrance of
our irresistible armament into the Baltic, the 3d of August,
and he contended that these dates were "alone sufficient
to prove that the ministers were not acting upon any in
formation which they had obtained of the secret engage
ments entered into between France and Russia ; and in
which they would have it understood that Denmark con
curred." The ministers had never alleged or supposed
that Denmark had concurred, or had been invited to concur,
in the secret articles ; they merely affirmed, what was patent
to the meanest comprehension, that Denmark was not
strong enough to refuse an invitation which was likely to
be pressed on her by neighbours of a strength so dispropor-

254 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATIOiV [1807
tioned to her own. But Lord Sidmouth's denial that their
act of the 3d of August, or rather of a week earlier (since,
as has been mentioned before, it was on the 27th of July
that our expedition sailed), could possibly have been the
consequence of their knowledge of a transaction which
was only completed at a great distance from our shores on
the 7th of the same month, did in fact only prove that.
Prime Minister though he had been, he was still utteriy
ignorant of the resources which, at such a crisis, energetic
rulers could put forth to obtain information ; and that he
was still more unable to appreciate or even believe in the
vigour and promptitude with which men desenring the
name of statesmen, deserving to have the destinies of a
nation committed to their care, can act on intelligence,
however unexpected. Lord Grenville in one respect even
went beyond Lord Sidmouth, for in the debate on the
address he ventured to allege that, when "the ministers
had asserted that there were secret articles in the Treaty
of Tilsit, affecting the interests of this country, and the
French had asserted that there were none, that denial of the
French Government was a challenge, and it was incum
bent upon ministers to prove their assertion; and that, as
they had not attempted to prove it, they had given it up."
It was easy to demolish an antagonist who could make it
a charge against the ministers that they had not chosen
to give formal satisfaction and proof to an enemy of the
truth of their assertions, when the very act of which he
was complaining was founded on the circumstance that he
required no proof from us, but had it in his own possession ;
when in fact the very ability to give the proof demanded
of itself made the proof unnecessary. And in the very
same breath Lord Grenville admitted that "it was laid
down by the most approved writers on the law of nations
that, where you had certain evidence of the intention of an
enemy to seize upon a neutral territory, neutral vessels, or
property (such neutral being incapable of resisting), and
thereby to place you in imminent danger, you have a right

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 255
to seize such neutral territory, vessels, or property, in order
to ensure your own safety." Lord Hutchinson, a general
officer who had been employed on a mission to the court
of the Czar at the time, joined in the attack on the Ministry,
though the chief reason he alleged for his opinion was a
singular one, being founded on the great indignation which
Alexander had expressed at our conduct. Lord Moira also
condemned it, arguing that Denmark would have persisted
in maintaining its neutrality, and that neither France nor
Russia could " have followed them to the island of Zea
land," to compel them to abandon it ; and Lord Grey, after
adopting this opinion from Lord Moira, followed Lord Gren
ville in another argument, and asserted that dates proved
"that it was morally and physically impossible that the
declaration put into the mouth of the King could be true,"
or that the order for the expedition against Denmark
could have been the consequence of the Treaty of Tilsit.
He, too, dwelt on the displeasure with which the Emperor
of Russia had viewed our conduct ; and pronounced that
the ministers only refused to give "precise information
because they felt that they had immolated the honour of
their country ; " and Lord Erskine, it may be almost said,
went further than he in the positiveness with which he took
on himself to deny that any information about the secret
articles had ever been received at all. One more speaker
on the same side deserves to be noticed, because he was
the nephew of Fox, and would have been his successor at
the Foreign Office if it had been thought judicious by his
party to be guided by the partiality of the dying statesman
in a matter of such importance. He not only endorsed all
the allegations of former speakers that " the ministers were
incapable of supporting the assertions which they had put
into the King's speech by the least shadow of evidence;"
but also ventured on the declaration that, even if France
had succeeded in overbearing Denmark's resolution to
preserve a neutrality, the acquisition of the Danish fleet
could have been of no service to her ; could neither have

256 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
materially injured this country, nor increased our danger
of invasion.
Against this combined attack of many parties the
ministers had the aid of the great statesman who, by
his own foresight and energy, had greatly extended and
strengthened our dominion in India ; and was therefore
pre-eminently qualified to appreciate such qualities in the
Home Government, the Marquis Wellesley. He reviewed
the whole scheme of Napoleon's policy, his hatred of Eng
land ; laying it down as an undeniable proposition that the
battle of Friedland, and its result, the alliance between
France and Russia, would, beyond " all question, lead to his
immediately turning his whole power against ourselves ;"
and contended that no proof could be wanted of " his in
tention to destroy and annihilate our independence, nay,
our very existence as a nation." But, besides that the
present narrative is concerned chiefly with the language of
Lord Hawkesbury, we may the more fitly confine ourselves
to his speech on this occasion, because it was the one
which entered most closely into what may be called the
personal defence of the ministers.
He disdained to notice with any particular refutation the
arguments by which his opponents had attempted to show
that the expedition to the Baltic had not been really
decided on in consequence of the transactions at Tilsit. He
took, as became the organ of the Government, the high
ground that "what his Majesty's speech stated as a fact
they were bound to believe. It was not unusual for Pariia
ment to act upon a fact distinctly stated to them by the
ministers of the Crown ; and they had a right to have their
statements as to a matter of fact accepted with confidence.
But in this instance the truth of those statements had been
corroborated by others than the ministers themselves. It
had been corroborated by the Portuguese Government,
which, before the result of the expedition to Copenhagen
was known, the allies of Tilsit had required to make
common cause with them against England, and to unite its

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 257
fleet to theirs, in order that the confederacy might thus
be enabled to make a general attack on these islands. It
was confirmed by the testimony of different persons in
Ireland, where, strange to say, all the designs and projects
of the enemy were most speedily known, and where it
was promised that the combined fleets of Spain, Portugal,
and Denmark would make a descent on both the British
islands." He skilfully availed himself of Lord Grenville's
admission that there might be circumstances in which our
own personal safety would justify a disregard of the strict
rights of a neutral nation which wanted the power requisite
to enable it to preserve its neutrality, and affirmed that
the whole case rested on the answers to be given to these
questions : " i. Whether the House believed that there
was a design on the part of the enemy to form a great
maritime confederacy against this country, and to seize the
fleet of Denmark to effect this purpose .' 2. Whether it
was practicable for him to carry this design into execution
either by absolute force or intimidation .' 3. Whether the
object was of sufficient magnitude and importance to justify
a deviation from the ordinary rules of proceeding .-' As to
the first question, even without the Treaty of Tilsit and its
secret articles, no one could possibly doubt the intention
of the present ruler of France. He never concealed it. It
was expressly stated in the official journals of that country.
As to the second, the present unexampled condition of the
Continent was an equally undeniable proof of his power
to form such a confederacy. The events of the last
two years, which had prostrated at his feet all Austria,
Russia, and Prussia, had left no power on the Continent to
which Denmark could look for the slightest support, and
had produced a state of affairs which no one, whether states
man or political writer, had ever witnessed or imagined
before. It was idle to speak of Denmark as able to resist
the compulsion which France might desire to put upon her,
because there might be difficulties in the way of pouring
a French army into Zealand from Holstein. The Crown
VOL. I. S

258 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
Prince himself had confessed that in 1801 Denmark had no
means of resisting the demands of Russia. How then
could it be seriously pretended that she could now resist
Russia and France united .? When both these questions
were thus answered, when it was admitted or proved that
France had the desire to form a confederacy against us,
and the power to compel Denmark to join it, the answer
to the third question, turning on the importance of the
object attained by our expedition, could be no matter of
doubt. The expedition had at once disabled an entire
fleet in so advanced a state of preparation that in six weeks
it was got ready for service. It was therefore necessary for
safety. It had been adopted and carried out with a celerity
the Opposition might not be able to appreciate ; but that
celerity was indispensable to its success. To have given an
hour Xo preliminary negotiation before despatching our
fleet would have shown the enemy that their intentions
were discovered, and would have thus enabled them at
least to increase our difficulties, if not altogether to baffle
out exertions. Lord Hutchinson had alleged that our pro
ceedings had excited a general feeling of disgust through
out Europe. Lord Hawkesbury denied it. Had it dis
gusted Sweden, where the King still preferred our alliance .'
or Portugal, whose Court still looked on us as its only pro
tectors .' He would even venture to ask. Had it even
offended the nation of Russia ? For there also, as he was
informed by credible witnesses, the mass of the people
considered our act as a necessary measure of self-defence.
No doubt those nations which were under the domina
tion of France were obliged to express whatever sentiments
the ruler of France thought fit to prescribe for them.
Finally, he affirmed that the safety not only of this nation,
but of the whole world, had required the measure which we
had adopted. Nothing prevented France from acquiring
universal dominion but the naval power of Great Britain.
That alone formed the security of the whole globe. It was
indeed no ordinary step that had been taken ; but was it

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 259
an ordinary situation of affairs when, except France, we
ourselves were the only independent nation in Europe 1
Two sources of the power of the enemy had been intended
to be the navy of Denmark and the navy of Portugal.
They were both happily removed out of his grasp. Those
who formed a correct estimate of the power of France, and
considered at the same time that personal preservation was
the first law of nature, must agree that the ministers had
averted a great danger from the country, and, in doing so,
had acted with all the mildness that the case permitted."
Apart from the cogency of the speaker's arguments, their
manly tone, and the distinctness with which he rested his
cause, in the first place, on the ministers' right to expect
complete reliance on their assurance that they had received
such and such information from a trustworthy source, was
well calculated to win the favour of his hearers. And to
such a degree did he carry the House with him that his
opponents could barely muster fifty votes to support them
in their attack upon the Ministry, which they now therefore
found they had strengthened rather than injured.
Among the statements which Lord Hawkesbury had
advanced in confirmation of the accuracy of their intel
ligence one was, that the junction of the Danish with the
French fleet for the invasion of this kingdom had been
expected in Ireland ; and a great portion of his attention
throughout the year was occupied by the condition of
that part of the kingdom, where the agitation which had
hitherto shown itself in occasional feverish outbreaks was
now acquiring a settled organization and a permanent
character, which even the concession of its original demand
for emancipation has not yet extinguished. Its first osten
sible object was one in which religion and politics were
mingled ; Catholic emancipation, to use the brief and
comprehensive term by which it was usually described.
But with this another soon became combined, and the
lower classes, who were nearly all Roman Catholics, had
learnt to be almost equally eager for the transfer of their
S 2

26o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
allegiance to France. As early as the middle of the pre
ceding summer some of the resident officers of the Govern
ment in Dublin had reported to Lord Hawkesbury that
" the whole middle and lower class in Ireland was de
cidedly hostile to the Government and to the English
connexion ; that the people, even the labouring poor,
talked and thought of nothing but Buonaparte's successes
on the Continent, and relied with certainty on his invading
their country and separating it from England ; the poor
saying that they could not lose, and that they believed
they should gain, by the change." And a fresh association
was formed to promote both objects, the attainment of
civil equality and the French invasion, by a system of
outrage and terror. The members took the name of " the
Liberty Rangers," announcing their resolution to be " to
effect all that the Croppies had failed to achieve in the
year 1798." The higher classes among the Roman Catho
lics were not, except perhaps in very rare instances, ac
quainted with the treasonable part of these designs, but they
were so intemperate in their prosecution of emancipation
that one gentleman, a Mr. Keogh of Mountjerome, openly
denounced the warmest and ablest of their advocates in
Parliament, Curran, the Irish Master of the Rolls, and
Grattan, whose name requires no further description, for
treachery to their cause, because they had expressed dis
approval of the violence of the language which they intro
duced into an intended petition. In such a posture of
affairs it was necessary to strengthen the hands of the
Executive in Ireland by measures of military precaution,
since any steps in the direction of indulgence or liberty
would be liable to be misinterpreted and ascribed to fear, if
the Government did not first show itself able to put down
disaffection with the strong hand.
It happened that the two colleagues whose departments
most closely connected them with the Home Secretary on
these subjects were both Irishmen ; Lord Castlereagh was
Secretary at War, Sir Arthur Wellesley was Secretary for

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 261
Ireland. The latter had also been a member of the Irish
House of Commons. And the intimate acquaintance which
both necessarily had with the country peculiarly qualified
them to judge of Lord Hawkesbury's plans. One part of
these was calculated at once to meet the danger of an out
break at home, and of invasion from abroad. He suggested
the propriety of fortifying some of the most important and
most assailable points, especially Cork and Dublin ; and
Cork he proposed to make a large military depot, a step
which, as he pointed out to Wellesley, the situation of the
town would hereafter make " very convenient for the des
patch of speedy and secret reinforcements to any armies
that might be employed anywhere to the westward or the
southward." It is a singular coincidence that Sir Arthur
himself subsequently proved to be the general whose army
derived the greatest advantage from this piece of foresight.
As a member of Addington's Adminstration Lord Hawkes
bury had devoted a great deal of attention to increasing
the efficiency of the London police. He had resumed the
task when he returned to office ; and he now wrote to
Wellesley to recommend him without delay to take measures
for assimilating the police in Dublin, and if possible in the
other great towns of Ireland, to that of Westminster,
entering into the minutest details with a precision which
no one was better able to appreciate than his correspondent,
and to which indeed he could find a close resemblance in
his own habits.
And besides, and as a sort of counterbalance to these
measures of repression. Lord Hawkesbury had in contem
plation others which could not fail to be regarded as favours
and indulgences by the Roman Catholics, if they would
compare what was offered, not with any imaginary con
cessions which might be required to place them on a footing
of equaHty with the Church of England, but with what
they had hitherto enjoyed, and with what was necessary for
the full efficiency of their Church in Ireland. He proposed
to augment the grant which had hitherto been calculated

262 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
to support 200 students at Maynooth, by a sum sufficient
to increase that number by a fourth ; while, at the same
time, since nothing was further from his intention than to
favour or promote the vigour of one Church at the expense
of the other, he desired Sir Arthur to procure him, re
specting the " existing establishment of Protestant charter
schools," which was said to be very defective, " such infor
mation as might enable the Government to take judicious
steps for improving their organization and extending their
usefulness ; steps which it was especially incumbent on
them to take at " a time when they were contemplating so
large an increase of an institution for the education of
Catholics." It was to a certain extent as a measure accep
table to the professors of both the Church of England and
the Roman Catholic forms that he finally desired Sir Arthur
to consult the Primate, the Lord Chancellor, and any other
persons of sufficient judgment and authority, on the possi
bility of devising some satisfactory measure for the com
mutation of tithes : always " bearing this in mind, that no
system of commutation ought for a moment to be enter
tained that did not give to the clergy the same security
which they enjoyed at the present moment ; that is, the
security of the land."
The measure last mentioned was unavoidably postponed
for many years ; but it is no slight proof of Lord Hawkes
bury's sagacity, that when tithes were at last commuted,
both in England and Ireland, the principle on which the
commutation was effected was that indicated in the letter
of instructions from which this extract has been quoted.
The majority of the other measures were at once carried
out ; but it cannot be said that they were followed by the
consequences which they deserved of allaying disaffection.
On the contrary, the willingness shown by the Ministry to
make some concessions rather encouraged the Roman
Catholic priesthood to insist on more. And in one instance,
that of allowing the King a veto on the appointment of
Roman Catholic bishops, which the chief authorities of

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 263
their Church had previously consented to sanction, they
played fast and loose with their own supporters, repudiating
conditions to which they had formally agreed, in a manner
which drew down a warm denunciation of their bad faith
from so steady a partisan of their cause, on the general
principles of toleration, as Lord Grey.
Yet, in spite of the notorious disloyalty of the bulk of
the Irish Roman Catholics at that time, of the equally
undeniable bad faith of their prelates and leaders, and in
spite too of his own knowledge of the unalterable resolution
of the King to consent to no relaxation of the existing
laws on the subject. Lord Grenville thought every conside
ration so secondary to that of embarrassing the Govern
ment that he again presented a petition from the Roman
Catholics, and moved for referring it to a committee ;
supporting his motion by the same arguments that he had
used before ; and unfortunately provoking Lord Hawkes
bury to rest his opposition to it still more positively and
emphatically than before on a principle from which he could
hardly depart or swerve. He now affirmed his " conviction
that a Protestant Government alone was consistent with
the laws and constitution of the British empire," and
maintained that the oath which barred the Houses of Par
liament and the great offices of State against the Roman
Catholics was "a test with which, consistently with the
security of the Protestant Government and Protestant
Establishment, it was impossible to dispense."
In one important particular, that of union, the Roman
Catholics were stronger than they had been before, as
those in England, who had hitherto held aloof from their
Irish brethren, had now come to the resolution of combining
with them, and despatched an agent to Ireland to arrange
a system of co-operation.' But it did not assist them in
' Sir A. Wellesley, who communicated this fact to Lord Hawkesbury,
makes a curious comment on it : " The Irish appear to hope to derive
some advantage from this union of interests, of which it can only be
said that, if it should be made, it will inoculate them with more

264 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
the Parliamentary divisions. Lord Grenville was defeated
by eighty-seven ; and in the House of Commons, where a
motion similar to his was brought forward by Grattan, and
enforced in one of his finest speeches, even Canning, who
was as favorable to the principle of emancipation as Pitt
had been, spoke and voted against it, though his reasons
were founded solely on the unreasonableness of pressing a
request, however reasonable, at a time when those who
urged it knew a compliance with it to be impracticable.
If, as with the history of the next twenty years before us
it seems impossible to doubt, the long postponement of the
settlement of so agitating a question was a great misfortune,
those who opposed it, like Lord Hawkesbury, are scarcely
more responsible or blameable for the protraction of the
agitation than those professed champions of the Roman
Catholics who, by their untimely and factious advocacy,
drove their opponents to rest their opposition to their claims
on grounds from which it was hardly possible for them to
recede with plausibility, or even decency.
Scotland had long ceased to cause anxiety to its
governors from the same causes as Ireland ; but, perhaps
from the necessity under which the Government had at
one time found itself of lavishing the public money among
the chieftains of the clans, there was no quarter of the
King's dominions in which jobbery was more rife. And an
attempt to induce Lord Hawkesbury to countenance what
was delicately called an arrangement, though unimportant
in itself after the transaction was over, seems worth pre
serving from the broad principles which it led him to
announce as his rule in the dispensation of patronage, in
which, as will be seen hereafter, when he became the head
of the Government, few ministers have ever been equally
scrupulous. Some changes in the organization of the
chief courts of judicature were contemplated, and in con-
religion, and may have the effect of moderating their party violence ;
at all events it will give us an additional channel for knowing their
secrets."

i8o7] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 265
nexion with them one of the chief judges wished to retire,
endeavouring to make a stipulation not only that he should
receive a pension, to which from his length of service he
was amply entitled, but that the vacancy on the judicial
bench should be filled by his own son ; and great interest,
of the kind which is apt to be most influential with
ministers, was exerted to induce their compliance with this
condition. In reply to this proposal Lord Hawkesbury
writes : " There will be every disposition to consider the
claims of Mr.  at a proper opportunity, but we are
convinced that it is of the utmost importance, with a view
to the new system of judicature which is about to be intro
duced in Scotland, that any arrangement which grows out
of it should be free from even the appearance of any
personal object, and should rest exclusively on public
grounds. I have no difficulty, therefore, in saying that if
Mr.  's claims to the bench were equal, in all respects,
to those of any other person at the bar in Scotland, it would
be more advisable, even in that case, that his pretensions
should be postponed till another vacancy. I am confident
that, if the bench of judges in England enjoys a degree
of respect and confidence which it possesses in no other
country, it owes it in a great measure to the scrupulous
delicacy which prevails in all the arrangements respecting
it ; and I can say from my own knowledge that ever since
the union with Ireland the same principles have been
adopted with respect to the courts of justice in that
country as have been found by experience so beneficial in
England." A few months later he had to withstand some
peculiarly pressing solicitations of the same kind in England
from a supporter whom it was especially difficult to refuse,
and his language was that, in all cases of a vacancy on
the judicial bench, " the person best qualified, whoever he
might be, would be appointed, without any regard to favour
or political arrangement." And in a similar spirit, when
two prelates of noble birth and great family influence were
entreating their translation to more lucrative sees, he wrote

266 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1807
to the Lord Lieutenant to disregard both their claims.
" He was only anxious," he said, ^' for the most proper
person, and the most creditable appointment." He sug
gested the name of another bishop, wholly unknown to
himself, solely on the ground of his reputation " as a hard
working prelate and a considerable scholar," adding what,
if it had been known, might have led to gome diminution
of the solicitations on these subjects, that " the fact of his
not having applied for promotion, if it were right to call it
such, was, in his judgment, no objection whatever ; on the
contrary, if he was the proper person, rather a recom
mendation,"

i8o8] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 267

CHAPTER VIII.
Napoleon's invasion of the Peninsula— Sir A. Wellesley is sent to
Portugal — Commencement of the Peninsular War — Lord Grenville's
attack on our policy in engaging in that war — Death of the first Lord
Liverpool— Lord Liverpool's defence of the Ministry — Conduct of
the French princes — Lord LiverpooTs memorandum on the Wal
cheren expedition — Quarrel between Lord Castlereagh and Canning
— Resignation of the Duke of Portland — Letter from Mr. Perceval
— He becomes Prime Minister — Lord Liverpool becomes Secretary
of State for War and the Colonies — He recommends the evacuation
of Walcheren — Contest for the Chancellorship of Oxford — Lord
Liverpool's views as to the maintenance of the Peninsular War, and
his letter to Lord Wellington.
The autumn of 1808 had seen the commencement of a
new stage of the war. After the battle of Friedland all
Europe to the east of the Rhine was prostrate at the feet
of Napoleon, and he was thus left at leisure to direct his
attention to the countries on the other side of France,
beyond the Pyrenees. Neither of the Peninsular kingdoms
was in a condition to make a long resistance to his first
attack. The royal family of Portugal fled frora Lisbon to
take refuge in their Araerican dominions, and even before
the close of 1807 the French marshal Junot led an army
across the frontier, and, meeting with no resistance, in a few
days made himself master of the whole country. At the
beginning of 1808 a second French army invaded Spain ;
Charles IV. abdicated the throne in favour of his son, who
was first proclaimed King as Ferdinand VII. ; was next
persuaded by Murat, Napoleon's brother-in-law, to enter

268 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1808
France for the purpose of a conference with the French
Emperor ; and was then seized, and compelled to resign all
pretensions to the throne ; while the crown, which he could
scarcely be said to have worn, was transferred to Napoleon's
brother Joseph. That prince had not long before been
invested with the kingdom of Naples by the same autho
rity; and, in order that Murat too might wear a diadem,
was now transferred, not altogether with his own consent,
to Madrid.
But the Spaniards did not acquiesce in the new dynasty
as easily as the Neapolitans. Fallen as they were from
their ancient heroism and renown, they had yet honour
enough left to resent the shameless trickery of which their
sovereigns, however unworthy they had shown themselves,
had been the victims, and courage sufficient to rouse them
to defy the invader of their own rights, the usurper of
their king's prerogatives. Their first steps in the way of
resistance were singularly successful. It was hardly a
month after Joseph had been recognised by the Notables
as their king, when, on the 21st July, a French army was
surrounded at Baylen, and compelled to an inglorious
capitulation ; while in Portugal events were equally un
favourable to the common enemy. The overthrow of the
two Peninsular kingdoms without a shadow of pretext
for hostilities had kindled a flame of universal indignation
throughout Britain. The very pusillanimity and imbecility
of the sovereigns had augmented our sympathy for the
people. The moment that intelligence reached our shores
of the rising of the Spaniards against their new rulers, we
determined on aiding them, and a small force was placed
under the command of Sir A. Wellesley, who, by his
skilful management of the attack on Copenhagen, had
shown that his military genius was not confined to the
requirements of Indian warfare. A fortnight after Dupont
had surrendered at Baylen, Wellesley landed in Mondego
Bay, between Oporto and Lisbon. Before the end of
August he had defeated Junot . in one skirmish and one

i8o8] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 269
pitched battle, and had the means at his command for
driving him in ignominious retreat out of Portugal, when
fresh commanders arrived from England, to prevent his
reaping the full harvest of fame which he had deserved.
They preferred negotiations to the vigorous pursuit which
he recommended : but even their diplomacy, feeble as it
was, compelled the French to evacuate Portugal, and to
leave the Russian fleet, which had sailed to the Tagus to
co-operate with them, to become our prize. The generals
were all recalled, and the army was placed under the com
mand of Sir John Moore, who in the course of the auturan
received reinforcements which emboldened him to under
take measures of active offence. Leaving one division for
the protection of Portugal, he advanced into Spain with
the reraainder, in the hope of being able to aid the citizens
of Madrid, who were making enthusiastic preparations for
the defence of their capital. But the check which his
arms had received was sufficient to bring Napoleon him
self across the Pyrenees ; and the forces which he as
sembled were so overpowering in number that he had no
difficulty in compelling the British general to retreat. Nor
was it without sorae difficulty and hardship that, with
sadly diminished numbers, Moore reached the harbour of
Corunna. There he turned to bay, repulsed Soult, to
whom Napoleon had entrusted the last stages of the pur
suit, in a hard-fought battle, in which he purchased the
victory at the cost of his own life, while the discomfiture of
the enemy enabled the array to re-embark in safety.
It returned to England ; but the success of Wellesley
in the autumn, and even the importance which Napoleon
had been seen to attach to Moore's operations, premature
as they were, plainly showed to the rainisters that they
had at length found a field on which the British arraies
could act with advantage to the comraon cause. And they
resolved to send Wellesley back to Portugal, which he
himself pronounced to be the fittest country for the base
of his operations. He reached the Tagus at the latter end

270 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
of April, 1 809, and from that time the history of the war,
as far as England was concerned, is identified with his
career of steady progress and unbroken triumph. But if
Lord Grenville had been listened to, those campaigns, the
most glorious in the records of the British army, would
never have been commenced. The instant that Parliament
met, he took the opportunity of denouncing the conduct
of the Ministry, both in its past acts and its present pro
jects. In the autumn Napoleon and Alexander had trans
mitted to this country a joint proposal for the restoration
of peace, in language which showed the resolution of the
French ruler to retain his hold upon Spain, and of the
Russian Emperor to assist him to the utmost in so doing ;
the Spaniards, who were in arms for the rights of their
native sovereign, being characterised as insurgents. We
refused to enter into a negotiation which should involve
the abandonment of their cause ; and though Lord Gren
ville admitted the insincerity of Napoleon's proposals, he
nevertheless pronounced our implied demand, that he
should withdraw his brother from the Spanish throne, as
" unreasonable." The further maintenance of a British
force in the Peninsula he pronounced to be a " committal
of the country to a hopeless contest, in which success could
not be the reward of valour." Nor were the consequences
to be limited to the disasters of our army. " He had no
hesitation in declaring that, if the system hitherto acted
on were to be further pursued, the destruction of this
monarchy was inevitable, and that we should soon be
reduced to the same condition with Prussia and the con
quered states of the Continent."
The history of Parliamentary faction has preserved but
few instances of any one who made any pretence to states
manship committing himself to a prophecy which the
event so signally falsified ; and the Secretary of State, who
by the recent death of his father had now become Earl
of Liverpool, had no difficulty in convincing the House
that his own view of the state of affairs was the more

1 809J OF L ORD LI VERPO OL. 271
sound when he affirmed, in express contradiction of the
preceding speaker's opinion, that "it was difficult to con
ceive any situation which would better warrant hopes of
ultimate success than that of Spain at the present day.
The people were unanimous in their resistance to the invader,
and it was the only instance since the first outbreak of the
French Revolution in which a whole people had taken up
arms in their own defence, while the Country itself pos
sessed many local advantages in favour of the natives and
their allies against any invader." He was at least equally
supported by the general feeling both of his brother peers
and of the nation at large, when he contended that the
ground on which we had rested our recent rejection of the
French and Russian proposals, namely, a refusal to admit
that the Spaniards, who were in arms for their hereditary
sovereigns, were insurgents, and that Joseph Buonaparte
was thfe legitimate King of the country, was the only ground
consistent with the honour and reputation of the country.
In fact, on neither of the occasions when Lord Grenville
pronounced his condemnation of the conduct of the Govern
ment did he venture to invite the judgment of the House
by a division. And the ftext attack on the policy of the
Government came from Lord Grey.
He was hardly as comprehensive in his condemnation of
it as his colleague, who had "declared sincerely that not
one measure had been adopted by the ministers which,
had he been in thdr situation, he would have thought it
right to resort to." But he was bolder even than he ; for
he ventured to deliver his opinion on matters of military
science and on the generalship of Wellesley, condemning
him even for the victory of Vimiero, on the ground that to
fight a battle at all was " to incur a hazard which he ought
not to have done." And he summed up his view of all
the transactions in the Peninsula in an address, in which
he proposed to represent to the King that " disgrace had
been brought on his Majesty's councils, and injury sustained
by the British fempire : that nO just view had been taken

272 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
of the political situation of either Spain or Portugal : . . . .
nor had any due attention been paid to the supply of
those means which alone could have enabled the British
armies to act with a reasonable hope of success."
Lord Liverpool, as he had ventured to do even when
Pitt was the assailant, met the attack on the Government
boldly, in the directest manner, admitting their entire
responsibility ; and invited the judgment of the House
and of the country on every part of their conduct. Lord
Grey " had declared it to be his opinion that ministers
ought to have waited to ascertain the probability of the
success of the cause of patriotism in Spain, before they
offered the Spaniards assistance. What .' when the feeling
of resistance was so strong and so general in Spain, would
it have been honorable to the British character to say
to the gallant Spaniards : ' We will not give you aid while
you are in want of it, while your efforts at emancipation are
in infancy. We will defer our assistance till you are in full
strength, and have no need of it Y Had such been the
language of the ministers, they would indeed have deserved
the reprobation of every man in the country. It was
remarkable that each individual who censured their con
duct had a plan of his own ; but none of these plans
had a single principle of agreement with each other, a
fact which showed the greatness of the difficulties under
which the ministers themselves must have laboured in
forming their own plans. But, with respect to the plan
which they had adopted, he undertook to establish two
points : firstly, that it was the most wise and expedient
that could have been adopted in the view in which cir
cumstances at first presented themselves ; and also that
it had been pursued with the utmost steadiness and firm
ness, and with eminent success : and, secondly that,
even after fuller information was obtained of the state
of the Peninsula, no other place could have been sub
stituted which promised greater advantages." He entered
into a detailed explanation of the object for which Sir

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 273
A. Wellesley had been sent to Portugal ; and showed
that the very circumstance of their so employing him
before they had received the minute details of the posture
of affairs in that country, for which Lord Grey would
have had them wait, of itself justified their conduct in
the other point of which he had complained of it, namely,
in leaving large discretionary powers to the general.
Indeed any general entrusted with the safety of an army
in a distant country was entitled to have confidence re
posed in him, and a large discretion left to him. And
he reminded the House that the Gallician Junta had
declared that the general's first object, even in the interest
of Spain, should be the expulsion of the French from
Portugal Lord Grey had taken on himself to condemn
Wellesley for fighting and defeating the French at Vimiero.
" He could say with truth of that gallant officer, that
he had been influenced by his public duty alone. And
it would be superfluous now to repeat any eulogy on
his campaign, which in thirteen days had compelled
the enemy to evacuate Portugal. Lord Grey had also
denounced the Ministry for having provided their general
with an insufficient force of cavalry. He forgot not only
the difficulty of procuring at a moment's notice any great
quantity of transports for the conveyance of horses ; but,
what was still more material, he forgot also the nature
of the country in which the army was to serve. In the
centre of Spain cavalry could act, but not in the maritime
provinces of either country. And so rauch was this the
case that, when Sir John Moore was retreating, he was
forced to separate the cavalry from the infantry because
the best route for the infantry was one by which supplies
for the cavalry could not be conveyed ; and the march
of the infantry was delayed owing to the necessity of
bringing forward the cavalry in small detachments. Un
doubtedly the Spaniards had met with reverses and mis
fortunes. Ministers had not been so weak, so destitute
of foresight, as to expect that their first efforts would be
VOL. L T

274 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
crowned with unqualified success. That would have
been to calculate on impossibilities. But these reverses
had not been owing to their indifference to the cause,
or to their want of courage. They were rather to be
imputed to their want of discipline and military experi
ence, and to an ill-judged contempt of the enemy." He
was equally decided in his defence of Sir John Moore's
operations ; venturing even on the assertion that that
officer's advance, " regarded as a diversion, had completely
succeeded ; and that he in his conscience beHeved that
forward movement had saved Spain.'' He was probably
alone in this opinion at the time, but, since he spoke, it
has been corroborated by the soundest military critics, who
have looked on the march into Castile as a proof of great
strategical ability. Finally the speaker challenged the
verdict of Parliament on the past campaign as a whole.
"By it we had gained possession of the Russian fleet,
while our own had been relieved from the tediousness
and difficulties of a blockade. We had materially assisted
the cause which we undertook to support. And, though
Buonaparte had 200,000 men in that country ; though his
troops were of the bravest, his generals among the most
skilful in the world, he had not yet succeeded in subduing
Spain. It had been said a year before that Buonaparte
was so placed that partial success would be almost as
prejudicial to him as failure. But partial success was all
that he had met with ; for he had not yet got possession
of more than half of Spain, and in the other districts
the hostility of the people was as fierce as ever. Upon
the whole, I have the satisfaction,'' concluded the speaker,
" in common with my colleagues, to reflect that, whatever
may be the results of the struggle we are embarked in,
we have not lost the confidence of the Spanish people.
We know that every Spanish heart beats high for their
country ; we know that, whatever shall happen, they will
not accuse us. Submission may be the lot they are fated
to endure in the end ; but they do not impute to us the

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 275
cause of their misfortunes. They are sensible that neither
the thirst after commerce, nor territory, nor security, has
been the motive of the assistance we have offered them
on this important occasion. Whatever may be the results,
we have done our duty. We have not despaired ; we
have persevered, and will do so to the last, while there
is anything left to contend for with the slightest prospect
of eventual success."
It was an argumentative and manly defence, and it had
its deserved recognition in a decisive majority. Lord Grey
was aided by Lord Grenville, by Lord Sidmouth, and his
steady adherent Lord Buckinghamshire, by all, in fact, who
hoped to rise to office if the proposed address should be
carried ; but in an unusually full House he was beaten by
above fifty votes, and the ministers were thus left at liberty
to follow out their own designs for the deliverance of the
Peninsula from the eneray's grasp. In April, as has been
already stated, Wellesley sailed once more for that country,
which he only quitted to cross the Pyrenees as the invader
of France, after Victor, Massena, Ney, Marmont, Jourdain,
and Soult had all proved alike unable to check his career
of victory ; and so corapletely had Lord Liverpool estab
lished his raastery over his Opponents that when, later in
the session, he brought down a message from the King to
Parliament, desiring the Houses to enable hira to furnish a
loan to the Prince Regent of Portugal, the Whigs would not
venture to do more than put up the Duke of Norfolk and
Lord Buckinghamshire to utter a feeble murmur of discon
tent, and the raoney was granted with apparent unanirait)^.
A Cabinet has seldom had its firraness rewarded with
such speedy and decisive success as attended the resolution
of the present Ministry to prosecute its own plans of war
without being turned aside by the clamours of faction.
Even now a generation accustomed to look on the pre
eminence of WeUington as an indisputable fact can hardly
avoid marvelling at the rapidity and completeness of his
first triumphs. It was the 22d of April when, after a
T 2

276 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
stormy and dangerous voyage, he cast anchor in the Tagus.
On the 1st of May he moved towards the northern pro
vinces, on his way defeating one or two French generals
in trifling actions. On the 13th he surprised Soult in
Oporto, and drove him and his army from the city in
ignominious retreat, which was also so sudden and unex
pected that he himself ate the dinner which had been pre
pared for the French marshal. By the iSth he had chased
him out of Portugal as he would gladly have chased Junot
the year before ; then, without a moment's delay returning
to the south, he pushed on up the Tagus into Spain, with
the view of relieving the northern provinces by alarming
Soult for the safety of Madrid ; and before July had closed
gained a decisive victory over King Joseph himself at
Talavera. With the conduct or progress of the war Lord Liverpool,
however, had not yet any official connexion. It was for
tunate for him that during the early part of the year he
was still Home Secretary, as thus he escaped being mixed
up in ever so trifling a degree with the annoyances which
the charges brought against the Duke of York as Com
mander-in-Chief must have caused the Secretary at War.
And his chief troubles during that period arose from the
conduct of the French princes and' their retinues. The
latter were continually quarrelling with one another, and
sought to make him the umpire between them ; an office
which he declined, not without administering a dignified
rebuke to those who made so bad an use of the hospitality
afforded them by this country, pursuing a line of conduct
which was in the highest degree discreditable to the prince
himself whom they acknowledged as their king ; while
Louis himself was even more difficult to manage, since,
discrowned as he was, he nevertheless looked on himself as
King of all his fellow-emigrants in England, and put forth
pretensions to exert an authority over them which was
wholly incompatible with our laws and the rights of our
own monarch.

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 277
As those who quarrelled took no care to conceal their
differences, but rather seemed proud of publishing them to
the world,' Lord Liverpool was compelled to expostulate
with the princes themselves ; and the following letter to
the Comte d'Artois at last had the effect, if not of putting
an end to the conduct of which he complained, of at least
deterring the inferior parties from making their quarrels a
public scandal, and of repressing the pretensions put forth
by their head, which were inconsistent not only with our
laws, but with the title of Count, which, as we have seen,
was all that he clairaed in this country.
Private and most confidential. Charles Street, March 2, 1809.
Sir,
Since I had the honour of seeing your Royal Highness the day
before yesterday, I am sorry to be under the necessity of
stating that some circumstances have come to my knowledge
respecting the intentions ofthe Comte de L'Isle, and of those who
advise him, which have given me the most serious concern.
Your Royal Highness is fully acquainted with my sentiments
vrith regard to the unjustifiable publications of Monsieur de
Puisaye, and how sincerely I lamented the steps taken by the
' The following is a copy of a handbill which the Comte de Puisaye,
not undistinguished in the wars of La Vendde, thought it decent to
print and circulate about the noblemen at that time most in Louis's
confidence : " Londres, Janvier 26, 1809. Mon respect pour le Roi de
France, et pour les princes de son sang, ne me permettant pas de
rdpliquer publiquement au libelle recemment rdpandu par M. Beyrade
d'Avaray, avant d'avoir soumis k Sa Majeste Trfes-Chretienne les
preuves qui constatent les mefaits et Tignominie de I'homme qui a si
longtems et si indignement abuse de sa confiance, j'espfere que les
honnetes gens qui d^plorent autant la forme audacieuse de ce libelle,
qu'ils sont indignes de son contenu, me sauront gre d'un deiai qu'ils
jugeront sans doute etre suffisamment justifie par son motif. Le
Comte Joseph de Puisaye, Lieutenant- General." And the same
Comte de Puisaye did more than this. For in some " Memoires "
which he published about this time he printed secret correspondence
of some of our ministers, without any permission from our Govern
ment, and even, as Canning wrote to Lord Liverpool that he believed,
" in defiance of Lord Castlereagh's prohibition." Our Government
was forced at last to threaten to stop his pension.

278 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
Comte de L'Isle, and the Comte d'Avaray in consequence
of them, not only as they were calculated to increase the very
evils which they were intended to prevent, and to produce
effects most prejudicial under the present circumstances to the
cause of royalty itself, but as they had the appearance of an
assertion, on the part of the Comte de L'Isle, of a species of
jurisdiction over the French resident^ within his Majesty's
dominions, which is wholly inconsistent with the laws, and
constitution of this country.
I will not conceal from your Royal Highness that the conduct of
the Comte d'Avaray has appeared to his Majesty's Government
to have been on several occasions so very objectionable, and
his views with respect to this country so discordant from
those which ought to be entertained by any person standing
in the relation which he does to the Comte de L'Isle, that it
has been a subject of deliberation how far it might not be
proper to direct that he should leave this countiy. Painful
and distressing as such a proceeding would be to his Majesty
and his Government, the interests of the Comte de L'Isle
himself might render it necessary to resort to it, unless the
Comte d'Avaray can be induced to appreciate more correctly
his real situation in this country.
I beg your Royal Highness will consider this letter as con
fidential ; at the same time I am sure I may rely on your
prudence and good sense to prevent an explosion which, from
your knowledge of this country, you must be sensible would
be at any time most inconvenient, and at the present moment
dangerous to the interests of those who occasioned it.
I have the honour, &c.,
Liverpool.
The prodigious exertions which Napoleon was now making
in Spain and Austria were in one point of view a relief to
Lord Liverpool's department, since they prevented the pos
sibility of any enterprise being undertaken by France
against Ireland. And consequently, as he wrote to the
Lord Lieutenant, the Duke of Richmond, at the beginning
of the summer, he was now able to consent to a portion
of the force which had previously been required in that

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 279
country being transferred to Wellesley's command in
Portugal. " He knew, however, that a considerable force
raust be wanted to secure internal tranquillity," and there
fore Governraent " would never reduce the British infantry
in Ireland below 120,000 men." He naturally attached
great iraportance to the victory gained over Napoleon at
Essling in May, hoping " for the raost iraportant conse
quences from it, if the Austrians could but follow up their
successes, before he received reinforcements." But no
British statesman could anticipate the miserable vacilla
tions and jealousies which, combined with his own slowness
of moveraents, hindered the Austrian prince's victory from
being of any permanent advantage to his country. And
scarcely the. most experienced soldier could have calcu
lated on the tenacity of purpose, the fertility of resource,
the accuracy of corabination, and energetic rapidity of
execution by which, in the short space of six weeks. Napo
leon was able to fight another battle on a still larger scale,
and to terrify Austria into an ignorainious peace which
proved Wagrara^ to have been a decisive victory.
Our exertions, as it is hardly necessary to remind the
reader, were not this year ¦confined to the south of Europe.
A still larger force than that entrusted to Wellesley was
sent against Antwerp. It raiscarried to a great extent,
' In spite of the pompous bulletin of Napoleon, no testimony can
be plainer than that of Savary, who was in the battle, that Wagram
was not a victory till the Archduke Charles made it one by his unac
countable retreat. He says, " L'armee autrichienne nous tint tete pres-
que partout." And, after pointing out one or two errors in the Arch
duke's conduct, he adds, " l'armee autrichienne n'avait aucune raison
pour se retirer, elle etait plus forte que nous;'' and concludes, "Les
grands evfenemens de guerre sont toujours suivis d'un etat moral qui
forme I'opinion pour ou contre un des deux partis. La bataille d'Ess-
ling nous avait rendu I'opinion ddfavorable. Celle de Wagram
detruisit ce que la premiere avait produit de facheux, et nous rendit un
peu de notre premiere popularitd. Ce qui acheva de nous ramener
I'opinion, qui s'entetait k douter de notre succfes, c'est que nous suivimes
l'armee autrichienne dans sa retraite. (Mem. du Due de Rovigo,
iv. 13.)

28o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
chiefly through an undue deference to the judgment of
George III. himself, who probably, from an attachment to
Pitt's memory, pressed the appointment of that statesman's
brother. Lord Chatham, to the command of the army
employed. Yet the enterprise was not ill-judged, nor did
it wholly fail, since the destruction of Flushing, which was
fully accomplished, was an achievement of great import
ance in the eyes of our ablest soldiers, and of Napoleon
also, whose works at Antwerp were deprived of their chief
value by the demolition of the docks and arsenal at the
mouth of the Scheldt. We need not enter into the details
of the expedition ; but, as the consideration which led to its
being generally regarded as neither fortunate nor creditable
to the country proceeded mainly from the pestilence which
the unwholesome air of the Walcheren marshes engendered
among our troops, a very conclusive defence of the endea
vour to retain possession of that island, which was sub
mitted to his colleagues by Lord Liverpool who, before
we had evacuated it, had become Secretary of the War
Department, will be read with interest, and can hardly
be denied to have been well founded.
In the following observations I confine myself to that part of
the question respecting the expedition to the Scheldt which
relates to the retention of the island of Walcheren, after the
object of Antwerp had been entirely abandoned, and the army
withdrawn from South Reveland.
The possession of the island of Walcheren, and the town and
port of Flushing, have been at all times favourite objects of
policy with the Government of this country. The latter,
together with Ramrilikens and the Bril, have been actually in
our possession, and been garrisoned by British troops from the
year 1585 to the year 1616, and the restoration of these places
to the States of Holland was one of the most unpopular acts
of King James I.
The conquest of Walcheren has been a subject repeatedly under
the consideration of different Administrations during the last
war and the present. It was a subject of consideration in

iSog] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 281
Lord Sidmouth's Administration. It was an object about which
Mr. Pitt was particularly anxious in the year 1805. It is likewise
reported to have been an object of the last Administration in
the year 1806-7, a^s the best diversion that could then be made
in favour of Russia. On these several occasions, I speak con
fidently of the two first, the object was abandoned, not from
undervaluing its importance, nor from the supposed unhealthi
ness of the climate, but because the military means at the time
were thought inadequate to the attainment of it.
I can appeal likewise to Lord St. Vincent, to Commander Owen,
and to every naval officer who has seriously reflected on the
subject of invasion, whether the Scheldt is not the only quarter
from whence an invasion of England can be seriously appre
hended, as long as we maintain our superiority at sea ; and
whether the possession of the island of Walcheren would not
render any such project impracticable, by making it impossible
for any fleet or flotilla of the enemy to move out of the Scheldt
without the certainty of our being able to bring them to action.
These particulars having been premised, it is further to be
observed that one of the objects of the expedition to the
Scheldt was a diversion in favour of Austria. It is not denied
that Austria would have preferred a more early diversion to the
north of Germany, but, after the expedition to the Scheldt had
been undertaken, the Austrian Government were so persuaded
of the importance of it as a diversion in their favour that they
were particularly solicitous that the operation should be con
tinued in that quarter, and should not then be diverted else
where. During a considerable part of the month of August,
during the whole of the month of September, and until the
middle of the month of October, there was every reason to
believe that hostilities were to be renewed. As late as the
I oth of October a letter was received from Mr. Bathurst, dated
the 2 ist of September, informing the Government that the
armistice was to be renounced the next day. The accounts of
the state of the Austrian army were most favorable, and the
change which had taken place in the command was represented
as likely to lead to more vigorous operations. It was not till
about the middle of October that reports were first brought to
this country which proved afterwards to be unfounded, Articles

-S3 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
of Peace having been actually signed between Austria and
.France.' It was not till the 30th of October that the fact of
peace having been signed was known with certainty in this
country, and measures had been taken to prevent any delay
which might occur in the evacuation of Walcheren on the
24th and 27 th of that month.
The expedition to the Scheldt had produced the effect of divert
ing troops from the interior of Germany, and which were on
their march towards the Danube to Antwerp and Holland.
The occupation of Walcheren by British troops, and the spirit
of discontent which had manifested itself in sorae parts of
Holland and the Low Countries, and was likely to be kept
alive by the retention of the island by the British Government,
rendered it impossible for Buonaparte, in such a state of things,
not to keep a considerable force in those countries. Eut
whether that force was more or less, the question is whether
the Government of this country would ever have been pardoned
if, upon the renewal of hostilities, any proportion of French
force could have been directed towards the Danube, which
must have otherwise been employed in keeping in check the
British force, and those who might be supposed likely to
support them, and thereby decide the fate of the campaign,
which, from the experience of what had occurred previous to
the armistice and the unsubdued spirit of the Austrian armies,
might not otherwise unreasonably be considered as doubtful.
But, even if hostilities did not recommence, was not the posses
sion of so favourite an object as Walcheren and Flushing by
the British force likely to have an effect favorable to Austria in
the negotiation for peace ? It was certainly believed in Paris
that the conquest and retention of the island by the British
forces had materially influenced the negotiation. Upon this
view of the question alone, there would be little difficulty in
contending that, even if the expedition should not be judged
by some the most expedient direction of the British force, yet
having been undertaken, and the island of Walcheren being in
our possession at a tirae when it was uncertain whether hosti-
^ The battle of Wagram was fought July 6th, 1809. On the 18th
Austria signed an armistice, and the Peace of Vienna was formally
signed October 14th.

i8o9] 01 LORD LIVERPOOL. 283
lities would or would not be renewed between Austria and
France, it could not be judged politic to abandon it till the
issue of those negotiations was known, particularly as the winter
season was approaching, and the inconvenience of retaining
Walcheren was likely to diminish every day.
It must be observed, in the next place, that, independent of the
general value attached to Walcheren as a naval station. Sir
Richard Strachan wrote to Lord Mulgrave on the 13th of
September, to request that the island might not be given up till
he had had an opportunity of seeing Lord Mulgrave upon the
subject, and until Government had heard all the opinions for
and against it. He states his own opinion to be strongly,
under the then existing circumstances, for retaining the island.
Sir Richard Strachan did not arrive in the Downs until the 3d
of October.
In all the communications which his Majesty's ministers had at
the time with the different officers who came from Walcheren,
or who had had an opportunity of forming an opinion upon the
practicability of retaining it, the distinction which was taken
was whether the state of the Continent admitted of the French
Government directing a considerable portion of their force
against that island. They were all of opinion that, if the war
between Austria and France should recommence, there could
be no doubt but that it was possible to retain it with a com
paratively small force, both naval and military ; but that if
peace should be re-established between Austria and France,
and a large proportion of the disposable force of France could
be brought into Flanders and Holland, the defence of Walcheren
would evidently be attended with very great difficulty, and at
all events could only be accomplished by a very large force,
both naval and military, and at a very considerable expense.
Under such circumstances the policy of retaining it must have
depended in a considerable degree on the question of peace or
war between Austria and France.
But even if it had been determined to evacuate the island as early
as the 9th or loth of September, the evacuation could not have
been accomplished, together with the destruction of the basin,
in less than six weeks, or I might even say two months.
For the sick must all have been embarked before the effective

284 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
part of the garrison could be removed, and before it would
have been safe to have given the alarm in the island, which
the commencement of the operations for destroying the basins
would necessarily create. The nuraber of sick were nearly
8,000 on the 13th of September, and above 9,000 (the largest
nuraber at any period) on the 23d of September. The evacua
tion could not therefore, in this view, have been effected before
the end of the month of October, the period at which the
healthy season is represented as usually beginning. It must
likewise be observed that the effect of destroying the basin,
and the practicability of stopping up the navigation ofthe river,
could only be ascertained by local observations on the spot,
after we had obtained possession of the island, and, until the
sentiments of the naval officers and engineers were ascertained
upon these points, it would not have been adviseable to have
determined on the evacuation. It was found impracticable to
stop up the navigation, but the destruction of the basin for a
time was effectually accoraplished ; and it appears by the last
accounts that the French Government are not determined even
to attempt to restore it : until they can restore it, or establish
some port equally convenient in the same quarter, they lose
the advantage of being able to keep twenty sail of the line in
a state ready equipped for sea at the mouth of the Scheldt.
The autumn of the year 1809 once more brought the
office of Prime Minister within Lord LiverpooTs reach, if
the gratification of personal ambition had ever been a prime
object of his policy. The circumstances that led to the
change which took place, though from their coincidence in
point of time with the expedition to Flanders they were
often identified in the view of the public with that enter
prise, were in point of fact wholly independent of it. They
must be attributed, in the first instance, to that restlessness
of disposition which has already been remarked as the
chief fault of Canning's character, leading him to be always
dissatisfied with the way in which every department but
his own was managed. A natural consciousness,of splendid
ability had also engendered in him something of a dicta-

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 285
torial temper, which had been greatly fostered by occur
rences in his personal history since Pitt's death, which
showed hira the high value which all persons attached to
his co-operation. Even while Fox still held the seals Lord
Grenville had made a second attempt to gain him to his
Administration almost on his own terras. He was nearly
connected by marriage with the Duke of Portland ; ' and,
on the formation of the present Cabinet, he had had
influence sufficient to close it against Lord Sidmouth ; and
this circumstance probably contributed to create a belief
in his mind that his dictation on other points would not be
resisted. Under the influence of this unfortunate dispo
sition, in the course of the spring he began to suggest
alterations in the composition of the Cabinet to the Prime
Minister There had been differences of opinion between
Canning and Lord Castlereagh in the preceding winter,
principally on the obligation of the Government to carry
out the terms agreed to by the generals concerned in the
Convention of Cintra ; and in the discussion of the point
raised by Canning, who insisted that they had exceeded
their powers, the Cabinet in general had coincided with
Lord Castlereagh. Canning had subsequently expressed
great discontent at the comparative failure of Sir John
Moore's expedition, and began to feel still more annoyance
than, as the arrangement was inevitable, he could well
express, at a clashing of the War Department, over which
Lord Castlereagh presided, with his own Foreign Office in
portions of their political correspondence.^ A coolness had
in consequence grown up between the two rainisters ; and
Canning, availing himself of his connexion with the
Prime Minister, at the beginning of April urged the re
moval of Lord Castlereagh, and his replacement by Lord
Wellesley, with whom, ever since that nobleman's return
from India, he had closely connected hiraself. The Duke
' The Duke of Portland and Canning had marrried two sisters.
5 See " George Canning and his Times " (by G. A. Stapleton, Mr.
Canning's private Secretary), p. 174.

286 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
received and acted on the demand thus made upon him
with an imbecile unfairness which nothing but his bodily
sufferings can excuse : he apparently did not at all coincide
in the sufficiency of Canning's reasons for removing a col
league with whom he generally agreed ; but he saw still less
how to dispense with Canning's assistance, if he should per
sist in offering his own resignation as the only alternative ;
and he therefore agreed to require Lord Castlereagh's
retirement in favour of Lord Wellesley after a time, though
in the meanwhile he kept the contemplated arrangement
a profound secret from all but one or two of his colleagues,
one of whom. Lord Camden, the President of the Council
was looked upon as the especial friend of Lord Castlereagh.
The general outline of the events which ensued cannot be
better explained than in a letter from Lord Liverpool to
Mr. Wallace, written while the new arrangements were in
progress which they had necessitated :
Private and confidential. Coombe Wood, September 23, I0C9.
My dear Wallace,
As you must be desirous of knowing generally the circumstances
which have led to the present extraordinary state of the King's
Government, I have thought the following account of them
would not be unacceptable to you. The particulars must be
deferred till you come to town.
The story respecting Lord Castiereagh is too long to render it
possible for me to trouble you with it at length at the present
moment His removal from the situation of the Secretary of
State had been determined some time before either Perceval,
myself, or the majority of the King's servants knew of the
occurrences which had led to it. The expedition to the Scheldt
had been decided before we even heard of it ; and the question
at that time was, whether the communication should be made
to Lord Castlereagh immediately after the sailing of the
expedition, or whether it should be deferred till its conclusion,
and till the result of it was known in this country. A variety
of considerations induced us to think (perhaps erroneously)
that this was the most improper time for making any new

1809] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 287
an-angements of the departments of Government ; and we were
led to hope that some events might occur in the course of the
expedition which might obviate, in some degree, the difficulties
which at that time presented themselves to our minds.
In this state matters remained till Sunday, the loth inst, when
the expedition being considered by Canning to be at an end,
he called upon the Duke of Portland for the fulfilment of the
promise which the duke had' most unfairly extracted from the
King (without the knowledge of the greater part of his colleagues,
and particularly of those whom he was most bound to consult), at
the time Lord Granville Leveson was admitted into the cabinet.
The promise was, however, absolute, and, having been made ia
the King's name, must necessarily be fulfilled.
The state of the Duke of Portland's health had become more
critical every day ; and it occurred to me that the best means
of obviating the various difficulties with which we were sur
rounded, was by persuading the Duke of Portland to retire,
and by making, in consequence, an entire new arrangement of
the Administration.
It was obvious that no satisfactory arrangement could be made of
the Government in the House of Commons if Perceval and
Canning did not both form a part of it. Though there might
be advantages in the first minister being in the House of
Commons, Perceval was fully aware that Canning might make
difficulties in acting under him in that capacity, and in a com
munication which passed between them he proposed that they
should both keep their relative situations, and that some peer,
whom the King would approve, should be agreed upon as
First Lord of the Treasury. This communication led to an
explanation from Canning that, in his opinion, the first minister
must be in the House of Commons ; that the choice in that
House rested between Perceval and himself ; that he could not
expect that Perceval would agree to his holding the situation,
and that he, on the other hand, could not agree to act under
Perceval as first minister. To this Perceval replied that their
situations were very different. That since the commencement
of the present Government he had been entrusted witii the
general direction of business in the House of Commons ; that
he could not consent to Canning being minister without giving

288 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
up both the situation and office which he had hitherto held in
the House of Commons ; that in the other alternative Canning
would remain in the same office, and that though his (PercevaTs)
power and authority in the House would be somewhat increased.
Canning's would not, therefore, be diminished ; that he was
aware, however, of the difficulties which might be considered
as fairly standing in the way of such an arrangement, and
that it was his wish, therefore, that they should endeavour to
agree upon a third person to whom these objections did not
apply. This proposal was, however, rejected. Canning de
clared that, if the Duke of Portland resigned, he should resign
likewise ; that he was ready to undertake to be minister himself,
but that he could not agree to any arrangements of the nature
suggested.
Such is the state of this most extraordinary transaction.
I have stated little more than facts, and leave them to your own
judgment. I should only add that the remaining members of
the Cabinet, with the exception of Lord Granville Leveson, are
determined to stand together, and by the King. Huskisson and
Sturges Bourne follow Canning ; Rose, Long, Wellesley Pole,
and I believe I may say all the other members of the Govern
ment, appear disposed to take their part with the majority of
the Cabinet. It would be vain, however, to think of forming
a Government on our own exclusive strength without sorae
attempt at union with the most respectable of those who have
hitherto been opposed to us. In consequence of this opinion
Perceval and myself received the King's commands, on Saturday,
to communicate with Lord Grey and Lord Grenville for the
purpose of forming an extended and corabined Administration.
Messengers have been sent with this communication, and I
conclude Lord Grey and Lord Grenville will be in town by the
end of the week. What will be the result of the negotiation
it is impossible to say ; but under all the present circumstances
it is certainly deserving of a fair trial.
I shall be obliged to you if you will consider this letter as con
fidential. You shall hear from me again as soon as the result
is known. Believe me to be.
Most sincerely yours, Liverpool.

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 289
In the course of the suraraer, as is mentioned in this
letter. Canning had been strengthened in the Cabinet
by the introduction of his friend Lord Granville Leve
son, who in June succeeded Sir Jaraes Pulteney as Secre
tary at War, an office which did not usually confer a seat
in that body ; but this did not render him less anxious
for the other alteration. And, as soon as the failure of the
Walcheren expedition was known, though this was in no
degree attributable to Lord Castlereagh, whose measures of
provision for its success had been complete and admirable,
he demanded the instant fulfilment of the arrangement
which had been promised to him. His renewal of his appli
cation had two consequences which he did not anticipate.
The duke, terrified at the degree of trouble and arrogance
which he foresaw, instantly resigned ; and Lord Castlereagh
then for the first time becoming aware of what had been
going on behind his back so long, naturally conceived that
he had been treated with the most extreme unfairness. He
certainly had ; but the persons to blame were the duke him
self and Lord Camden, not Canning, who had not been
aware of the secrecy which had been practised, and who, as
soon as he became acquainted with it, foresaw that the
blame of it would fall on himself, and remonstrated warmly
against it' Lord Castlereagh took the view which Canning
' I subjoin an extract from a letter from Canning to the Duke, a
copy of which is in the Liverpool Papers. The date is July 18. " But
in justice to myself I cannot forbear to request of your Grace that it
may be remembered, whenever hereafter this concealment shall be
alleged (as I doubt not it will) against me, as an act of injustice towards
Lord Castlereagh, that it did not originate in my suggestion ; that, so
far from desiring it, I conceived, however erroneously. Lord Camden
to be the sure channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh ; and
that, to a very late period, I beheved such communication to have been
actually made." And the Duke replied : " As to the reserve which you
observe has been practised, and is to be continued, towards Lord
Castlereagh, I have not the least hesitation in assuring you that I shall
always be ready to avow its having originated with me ; and, whatever
blame may have been or to be incurred, to take the whole of it, and to
acknowledge the remonstrances you have repeatedly made against it.
VOL. L U [Sut

290 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
foresaw that he would take, and claimed satisfaction in
the way in which in those days it was ordinarily given.
The two ministers fought a duel and, almost as a matter of
course, subsequently resigned their offices.
The first steps in the reconstruction of the Ministry have
been indicated in the letter to Mr. Wallace. It was not
without the greatest unwillingness that the King was induced
to consent that Lord Grenville and Lord Grey should be
consulted ; and his surrender of his own inclinations and
judgment met but a sorry reward.' Lord Grey refused to
go to London to discuss any future arrangements, and
Lord Grenville went to town with a fixed resolution to
reject whatever proposal might be made to him ; conse
quently the Ministry went on as before, with a slight re
arrangement of offices, and undoubtedly with some diminu
tion of strength : not indeed in the House of Lords, where
they gained weight by the acquisition of Lord Wellesley
as a colleague, but in the Commons, where the loss of
both Canning and Lord Castlereagh was of incalculable
importance; certainly not to be counterbalanced by the
acquisition of Mr. Ryder, who became a Secretary of State.
Before his duel Canning had avowedly been a candidate
for the Treasury, saying openly that it was desirable, as
But I must own to you that I neither knew, nor did I imagine, that
till a late period, or, indeed, at any time since the measure of Lord
C  's removal has been in agitation, you have believed that the
communication of it had been actually made to him."
' I subjoin a curious and interesting letter from Mr. Perceval to Lord
Liverpool, giving an account of his conversation with the King on this
subject:
" My pear Lord,
"As you desired me to give you a line upon my return from
Windsor, I sit down for that purpose. But, in the first place, I must
state that I did not arrive here till past four o'clock, and found the
summons to the Cabinet at half-past three, which, as I could not
possibly attend till past five, I am obliged to neglect. As the King
kept me for a full hour and a. half, and as his conversation was very
precise, abstruse, and continued, it is impossible to attempt giving you
any full idea of it. Many points, indeed, I shall hardly notice. What
he said of Lord Chatham, who he says is hurt, and adds, ' With reason'

1 809] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 291
indeed it has often been felt and acknowledged to be since,
that the Prime Minister should be a member of the Lower

and what I observed upon that, will keep : but he began with it.
Upon quitting that subject he said, ' But now to our business.' And
then he told me he must give me an account of Canning's conversation,
which he called the most extraordinary he ever heard. He went through
it with wonderful accuracy. I will endeavour, at another time, to give
you the particulars ; all that is now important is that, in the King's
opinion, and in mine also from his relation of it, it was very little dif
ferent from his letter, except that it was more explicit and more strong,
and except that he distinctly stated to the King, as his opinion, that
the D  of P  's health was such that it was not possible he should
retain his situation. The points in which he was more precise were,
that the minister who must in these times be necessarily in the House
of Commons must also necessarily have complete authority over all
other departments. That at the present time he and I were the only
persons that could be this minister, not only in the present Adminis
tration, but in any part ofthe House. That he should not be surprised
or displeased in the least if the King preferred me ; that it would be the
most natural thing of the two, it would hardly require a new patent, only
the insertion of a new name in the old one. But that if his Majesty
honoured him with his commands, he would readily undertake it. ' Not,'
said the King, 'that he would consider of it, that he would advise with
others, as you or any other person would have said, but he was fully pre
pared to undertake it. Now,' continued his Majesty, ' I do not believe, if
he was to be the minister, that there is any one of you who would con
tinue with him ; and he does not seem at all to think of that.' I told
him I had no authority to say, or means of knowing, that none of his
present servants would continue : I thought some certainly would not,
but I could not pretend to speak for any one but myself I told him
that when I had penned the passage in the minute, in which it was
said that his Majesty might collect from Mr. C  's letter that he
would undertake it, I had been almost afraid I might have drawn an
inference beyond what might have been intended. ' Oh, no,' he said,
' he stated it to me most distinctly, and said that the ministers who
retired when Mr. Pitt died had done in his opinion very unwisely ; that
he was not then in the Cabinet, but that he should have advised other
wise.' I said I had never heard before that he had thought so, but I
could not pretend to say what his opinion was at that time ; but if he
had not said that he would have advised their continuance, I should
rather have suspected the contrary to be his opinion. These are, I
think, the most material points, in the King's narrative of Canning's
conversation, the comment and observations upon vvhich I have no
time for now, nor for many other particulars which I could state but
U 2 [for

292 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
House ; and avowing also that, though he could not expect
Perceval to serve under him, he on his part would not serve
Jfor want of time. The account of this narrative and the observations
upon it being over, he then proceeded to the subject of the minute of
the Cabinet. He said he would consider of it very maturely, could
not deliver an opinion then. I assured him I had not expected one ; I
only thought he might wish to see me, and converse upon various
points of it. He was very glad I had come, he said, and glad to talk
to me about it ; that he should talk to the Lord Chancellor and Lord
Liverpool and others to-morrow. He knew, indeed, that they could
not represent it in any other view than had been done in the paper ;
but it was a decision for life, everything was at stake, and he must not
come to that decision without the maturest consideration, that he did
not know how to make up his mind to it. He seemed disappointed at
the opinion leading to a communication both with Lord Grey and
Lord Grenville; the latter evidently formed, as we anticipated, the
great objection. He could do nothing towards it, he said, till he was
satisfied upon the point (the Catholic question). When he was advised
last to send for Mr. Pitt by the Lord Chancellor, he had required to
know expressly from Mr. Pitt that he would not bring forward that
question ; that he had the most direct assurance from Mr. Pitt in
writing ; he knew he had his letter, he had been looking for it (he
then digressed into an account of his papers ; that he was arranging them
all regularly ; that up to 1800 they were quite perfect; and from the
commencement of the late Administration up to August last ; and that
for that period he could turn to any paper in a minute) ; but he said
he should find Mr. Pitt's paper ; it was an express assurance. And
further, he said, when he saw Mr. Pitt, he not only confirmed the assur
ance, but added, that he would not only not bring it forward, but that
for private views of his own he would oppose it whoever brought it
forward. This, he said, he voluntarily said to him : it was more than
he expected ; it surprised him ; it appeared like an expression of his
own opinion ; that he might have paid him (the King) the compliment
of supposing that the determination was taken out of compliment to
him ; but he stated it to be for private reasons of his own. He must,
he said, have a similar assurance now ; that this was a point he could
not give up in honour : no more, he said, could I ; that I as well as he
had both given our opinions upon that point solemnly to the country ;
that we could not give them up.
" I agreed that we could not give them up ; that his servants were
unanimous in their opinion that he must be protected against that
question ; that it was with that view, and upon that principle, that
they had humbly given his Majesty the opinion which that paper con
tained ; that they thought under the circumstances of the times that it

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 293
under Perceval. It was an avowal which could not be
justified, so manifestly did it involve an arrogant boast of
was the most effectual, if not the only effectual, means of so protect
ing him. That if Lord Grey and Lord Grenville consented to form a
Government with us, who were known to have such decided opinions
upon that subject, they must come into that Government with a perfect
knowledge that that measure could never be a measure of that Govern
ment ; that this would necessarily be implied from the very formation
of the Government. ' It must be expressed,' he said, 'or he could not
be satisfied.' I stated that it did not appear to me probable to expect
that Lords Grey and Grenville could as men of honour consent, after
all that had been said upon this subject, to have even the question put
to them, to require an express declaration upon this. ' Then,' said he,
' I am driven to the wall, and would be deserted.' I assured his
Majesty again that the object of his present servants was to protect
him ; they would not desert him ; that the opinion we had furnished
to his Majesty was, as we thought, the best mode of protecting him ;
that if we madean ineffectual attempt to form an Administration alone,
we should be overpowered, and would not be able to stand between
him and the wall.
" ' Then,' said he, rather hastily, but very collectedly and firmly,
' they should take the Government to themselves ; he would have
nothing to do with it ; they should not have his name.' ' Oh, sir,'
said I, • what an extremity your Majesty is contemplating ! What
would become of your Majesty's country }' ' No country had a right
to expect a man should give up his own honour. His honour was in
his own keeping. If the country deserted him, he could not help it.'
I again assured his Majesty that deserting him was the last thing we
thought of But we conceived that the combined Government which
we had an idea of forming was to be formed by his Majesty's present
servants, and with such a proportiofcof them that, having a full share
in the different offices, we should, by refusing at any time (as we should
refuse) to concur in any measure of that description, be enabled to put
a stop to it by bringing the Government to an end ; that they would
feel this, and they therefore would naturally not think of attempting it.
He then asked what reason we had for thinking they would form such
a Government. I said that we could not, without almost making an
overture to them, have found their real sentiments ; but that we had
reason, from various conversations of their friends, to think it probable
they would not generally object, though undoubtedly we could not tell
in what manner they would expect it to be made. He asked .what
these conversations were. I told him Lord Henry Petty's to Lord
Euston, Lord Grey's to Colonel Gordon, Lord G. Cavendish's to Lord
W. Bentinck. ' But then,' he said, ' what is to be done if they refuse ?' I
r-=aid

294 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
a superiority of talent. For Perceval was the older man
and the older minister; he had filled the office which
said we had not omitted to think of that ; but that the manner of
their refusing, and the grounds on which they refused, might be so
various, and it would depend so much upon them, that there was no
possibility beforehand of distinctly saying what would in that event be
best to be done till the event occurred. Then he asked how it was to
be done. I suggested the letter to both at once, stating his Majesty's
commands that they should communicate with us, and that we should
consider on the formation of a Government, and that we had his com
mands also to acquaint them that if they wished to see his Majesty
first that his Majesty would see them. That would be very hard
upon him, he said ; he had no means of letting the world know what
might pass : they might each tell their own story. The last time he
had the good fortune to have it in writing. That would not do ; he
could not see them ; but he knew from us what they were prepared to
do. That he was the worst person in the whole world to settle any
point with them ; he was sure he should quarrel with them at the first
setting out. I said that certainly would not answer any purpose ; that
it was certainly an important consideration that his Majesty might
think of, but that we had considered that it would be better to offer
them the alternative. Then he asked whether I thought I alone should
communicate with them, or I and any one else. I said that as there
were to be two of them, I thought it preferable that there should be
some one joined with me. He agreed in this, and suggested the
Chancellor as the person. I explained the Chancellor's objection,
from the various instances of personal conflict in which he had been
engaged with them. ' What,' says he, impatiently, ' do you think I
could be advised to form a Government without the Chancellor ?' 'By
no means,' I said ; I thought that the present ChanceUor might be
one of the Government ; but that your Lordship must be another :
that I considered this as indispensable. He then seemed to be
satisfied as to the reason for not joining the Chancellor with me, and
canvassed the question whether it should be you, or Lord Bathurst, or
who else ; and this, as well as other questions, were left open for con
sideration. Much more passed, which I may possibly in part recollect,
though I am not certain that I shall ; but I think I have given you
enough to show the temper of mind in which I found him, and that at
last his mind was led to consider the proposition with more reference
to the detail of it than he would have done if he had insurmountable
objections to the whole. He concluded however with saying he could
not yet form any opinion ; that he must take time to think of it
He thanked me for coining down to him, and for giving him, as he
expressed it, that opportunity of thinking aloud upon it. [" Upon

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL 295
latterly the Prime Minister when a commoner had usually
united with the Treasury, and he had been the leader of the
Ministry in the House of Commons. And it is a striking
proof of the extent to which the ascendancy of Canning's
genius was acknowledged, that his thus claiming promotion
over Perceval's head, as a condition of his continuing to
serve his Majesty as a member of the Government, does
not appear to have struck those who were aware of such a
pretension as unreasonable.
The duel, however, as he felt himself, put an end for the
time to such a possibility. The King himself was justly
offended with both the combatants. In acknowledging the
letter in which Lord Liverpool conveyed to him the intelli
gence of what had taken place, he declared it "had occa
sioned hira not more serious concern than surprise, that two
persons holding the situations of Secretaries of State, and
still in possession of the seals of office, should have been
guilty of so total a dereliction of duty as to violate the laws
which they were bound to maintain by the authority vested
in them." If, therefore, the Prime Minister was to be a com
moner, Perceval had now no competitor. Lord Liverpool
coincided in the opinion that that arrangement was the
most desirable. The King willingly adopted this view, and
once more united the Treasury and the Exchequer.
But the events which were taking place at the same time
in Germany were again leaving us to maintain the whole
burden of the war against France. On the 14th of October
" Upon the whole I never knew him in any conversation which I have
had the honourof having- with him so coherent, so distinct, or anything
like so methodical in the view which he took of the different points of
the subjects on which he conversed. I much doubt whether you wiU
think my account gives you a fair representation of it in these particu
lars ; but I have been writing as fast as my pen could run, and I fear
you wiU have some trouble in deciphering it. You may read it to any
of your colleagues you please, and I wiU thank you to send it to the
Chancellor for his information before he sees the King to-morrow.
" Yours very truly,
" Sp. Perceval."

296 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
Austria signed a final treaty of peace at Vienna, so that we
had no longer a single ally but Portugal, whose exertions
could be of no service unless they were both supported by
English liberality and directed by English skill. In such a
posture of affairs the department which was charged with
the conduct of hostilities became, next to the Exchequer,
the most important office in the State ; and therefore
Perceval's first step in the organization of the Cabinet was
to propose to Lord Liverpool to quit the Home Office and
become Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.
Though he had originally been unwilling to take the
Home Office in exchange for that of Foreign Affairs, Lord
Liverpool had now become so familiar with its duties that
he would have preferred continuing where he was ; but he
saw, as he explained in a letter to the King on the subject,
that his agreeing to the arrangement proposed "would
afford greater facilities than any other plan for completing
the Government in a way which Would be acceptable to his
Majesty ; and he never allowed his personal inclinations or
convenience to interfere with the requirements of the public
service. His general feeling on the duty of all the ministers
to sacrifice every other consideration to that of serving the
King with a due consideration for his feeHngs and unalter
able opinions, is shown in the following extract of a letter
from him to Lord Wellington on his first acceptance of his
new office : —
I know you have heard from Pole,' and probably from others, all
the distressing circurastances which have led to Castlereagh's
and Canning's resignation, and to the present state of the
Administration. It is painful to reflect that a Government,
which had nothing serious to apprehend from its enemies,
should be brought to the point of dissolution by the divisions
of its friends. Whatever may be the state of personal feelings
on some parts of these transactions, or the public difficulties in
which they may have involved us, the line of duty I consider
' The Hon. W. Wellesley Pole, Lord Wellington's brother, afterwards
Lord Maryborough.

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 297
as plain. We accepted the Government two years ago to
protect the King against an unwarranted attempt to surprise
his conscience on a subject on which he was known to have
the strongest scruples. Having done so, I feel that we are
bound not to desert him. We may be defeated in the struggle
when Parliament meets ; but, even in that event, we shaU at
least have the satisfaction of keeping a respectable party
together, which may be able to afford some protection to the
King, and, I trust, some security to the country.
One raore change also requires notice. As on Canning's
resignation his friend Lord Granville Leveson had also
retired. Lord Palmerston was now transferred to the post
of Secretary at War, which he held frora that tirae without
interruption for nearly twenty years, still discharging its
duties when, on Lord Liverpool's illness in 1827, Canning,
then . becoraing Prime Minister, rewarded his long service
by attaching to it a seat in the Cabinet.
Though, as we have seen. Lord Liverpool had a strong
impression of the value of the island of Walcheren, if it
were possible to retain it, the practicability of doing so
appeared both to him and his colleagues so greatly affected
by the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna, which raust
enable Napoleon to bring down an overpowering force on
the Scheldt, that he now recoraraended the withdrawal of our
troops, founding this advice, in a minute which he subraitted
on the subject to the King, entirely on the withdrawal of
Austria frora the war, and in no respect on any change of his
own opinion as to the iraportance of the island. The King
approved of the intention, adding an expression of great
anxiety for the destruction of all the naval works along the
banks of the Scheldt, which had formed a part of Lord
Liverpool's proposal. Accordingly orders were at once sent
out ; the whole of the fortifications, the docks and arsenal, all
which had recently been greatly enlarged and strengthened,
were demolished, and before Christmas the last regiment
had returned home ; many of the men unhappily bringing
back with thera the seeds of disease, which the pestilential

298 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
vapours of the Walcheren marshes seemed to have im
planted permanently in their constitutions.
At the same time Lord Liverpool was taking a deep
personal interest in another matter which was of a mixed
character, private as well as in some degree political. The
arrangements for the reconstruction of the Ministry had not
been fully completed when the Duke of Portland died.
He had been Chancellor of the University of Oxford, and,
even before his death. Lord Grenville had been diligently
canvassing the members of the University in the hope of
succeeding him. He had so decidedly deserted the Tories
for the Whigs that it was not to be expected that he would
be allowed to obtain his object without opposition ; but
the Tories were long irresolute whom to select as their
candidate. Those most solicitous for the honour of the
University naturally desired to put forth some one whose
general reputation for ability and statesmanship should
be at least as high as that of Lord Grenville, even
with the additional weight that his name derived from
the fact of his having been Prime Minister. And with
this feeling some of the heads of colleges applied to
Lord Liverpool to allow himself to be put in nomina
tion. It was known, however, that the Duke of Beaufort,
who had extensive connexions with the University, was
anxious for the honour, and, as Lord Liverpool's friends
admitted their belief that he also would certainly become
a candidate. Lord Liverpool declined the proposal, feeling
a great solicitude that Lord Grenville should be defeated,
and being equally convinced that a division of the Tory
interest must render his success probable. The Tories
then turned their eyes to the Lord Chancellor; and, as
by that time a report had got abroad that the Duke of
Beaufort had abandoned all idea of offering himself Lord
Eldon consented to stand in the breach. He had hardly
committed himself to the competition when it became
known that the duke would certainly be nominated also.
And thus the evil which Lord Liverpool had sacrificed his

iSogJ OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 299
own pretensions to avert was incurred. He laboured,
however, as strenuously in the interest of his colleague as
he could have done in his own cause ; canvassing all whom
he could have any hope of influencing for his brother
minister ; and putting Lord Eldon's claims still more on
the ground of his opposition to the emancipation of the
Roman Catholics than on the pre-eminent reputation
which he was rapidly creating as a judge. But his
efforts were in vain. The division of the Tory interest
was fatal to both candidates. The Duke of Beaufort had
no chance himself, but he drew frora the Chancellor votes
enough to turn the scale against him, and at the close of
the poll, though the two Tories had between them above
700 votes. Lord Grenville defeated Lord Eldon by 13,
having 406 in his favour against 393.
As may be supposed, the moment that the question of
Walcheren was disposed of the attention of the new
War Secretary was engrossed by the war in the Penin
sula. Wellesley, for his capture of Oporto and victory at
Talavera, had been raised to the peerage as Viscount
Wellington, and Lord Liverpool now bent the whole of
his energies to furnishing him with means to win still
higher honours. It . was probably a consideration of the
advantages which might be expected to arise frora having
in the Government a brother of the general employed in
the Peninsula, that had led him and his colleagues so
willingly to accede to Canning's proposal to substitute
Lord Wellesley for Lord Castlereagh. And now, the
moment that he himself had changed his office, he wrote
to the marquis, who was at this time at Lisbon as our
ambassador, to " convey to him in the strongest terms his
personal anxiety that he should accept the offer which
would be made him," of returning home to take the
Foreign Office, "and joining the greater part of his old
friends in supporting the King's authority against the
endeavours which would infallibly be made to reduce him
to a state of unconditional submission." For it was less

300 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
a secret than ever that the Opposition, headed by Lord
Grenville, designed to make a vigorous effort at the meet
ing of Parliament to force themselves into office ; mis
calculating so greatly the disinterestedness and high-
mindedness of Canning , as to believe that they might
gain him as a coadjutor. Lord Liverpool himself did not
think it absolutely impossible that he might be won over
by a repetition of the offers which Lord Grenville had
formerly made to him ; but, though he knew how intimately
Lord Wellesley had connected himself with him, he had
no scruple in expressing his confidence that, even if Can
ning, from a feeling of disappointment at recent events,
should so commit himself Lord Wellesley would not
suffer his friend "to involve him also in that connexion.
He was," he concluded, " most solicitous to add that, if a
consideration of all the circumstances of the case should
induce Lord Wellesley to accept the offer, he would find
in himself a colleague who would be desirous most cor
dially to co-operate with him in every branch of business,
whether in office or in Parliament. It was a satisfaction
to reflect that, amidst all the difficulties of the Ministry,
they were at this time an united party, and that they had
a cause to support which the country had not hitherto,
when a fair appeal had been made to it, shown any dis
position to abandon."
On the question thus alluded to, the removal of the
restrictions on the Roman Catholics, Lord Wellesley did
not wholly agree with his correspondent. He was not,
indeed, inclined to press for emancipation in the teeth
of insurmountable obstacles ; but he judged, with states
manlike foresight, that it must eventually be conceded,
and that therefore it was only a question of time. But,
though thus differing from Mr Perceval and Lord Liver
pool on the cardinal point of their domestic policy, he had
no hesitation in joining them as a colleague, because at
the time the foreign policy of the country was the more
important, or at least the more immediately pressing

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 301
consideration. That, in his eyes, was identified with the
support to be given to his brother in his campaign ; and he
had no doubt that he could aid WeUington more efficiently
by consultations with the Government at horae than with
the Portuguese rainisters. He therefore returned to Eng
land to becorae Secretary of State, when he found Lord
Liverpool had lost no time in taking the best raeans of
acting up to his and Wellington's wishes, by obtaining in
forraation of the opinions and expectations of the general
himself Lord Liverpool had scarcely been sworn in to
the perforraance of his new duties, when he addressed
to Wellington a series of questions, with the view of
laying the answers before his colleagues, and taking thera
as a guide for their future arrangements. He indicated to
him his own view, which on subsequent occasions he ex
pressed even more strongly, as being the only conduct com
patible with honour, that " it must be our policy to reraain
in Portugal as long as we could remain there without
risking his army." But at the same time he pointed out
to him that "as there was every reason to believe that
peace had been concluded between France and Austria "
(he was writing before any certain intelligence of the
treaty had, or could have, arrived in England), it "was
probable that the whole railitary efforts of France would,
in a short time, be directed against Spain." And therefore
he asked Wellington's opinion of the chance of these
efforts " for the complete subjugation of that country "
proving successful. And what, with reference to present
operations, was raore iramediately important, whether "they
would be likely to make a serious attack upon Portugal
before they had acquired a tolerably quiet possession of
every part of Spain north of the Sierra Morena : whether
they were likely to be able to spare an army sufficient for
this purpose before the north and centre of Spain were
subdued .' If they did make such an attack, what was
the prospect of a successful resistance .' " And finally, what,
to one responsible for not unduly risking a British array in

302 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
a hopeless contest, was the most important question of ah,
" If resistance were not likely to prove ultimately success
ful, how far the British army would be endangered, and its
embarkation be likely to be prevented, by delaying to
withdraw it till the French had penetrated in force into
Portugal ? "
They were sagacious questions, indicating the possession
of that happy talent which fixes its attention on points of
far more importance, to the disregard of others of inferior
though perhaps of more obvious moment. Yet, while the
novelty of his appointment necessarily made him feel the
want of precise information which had dictated them, he
did not conceal his expectation of receiving such an answer
as would justify a vigorous prosecution of the contest ; but,
in putting his enquiries, reminded Wellington that, " not
withstanding all the efforts which the French had already
made, they had never at any one period since the rising
of the people been in military possession of more than
one half of the country." And, while asking his opinion
about the probability of their invading Portugal, he ex
pressed a strong doubt whether they could have any
prospect of success without employing an army which
should at least double the amount of our own, and whether,
while Spain was unsubdued, they could possibly spare so
great a force for that purpose. And he added an emphatic
opinion as an individual that, " though we should not be
justified, from want of timely precaution, in sacrificing
that army, which formed the greater part of our disposable
force, yet it would neither be just nor politic to abandon
Portugal before such a measure was absolutely necessary."
Wellington, who probably as yet stood alone among
military men in his confidence of the eventual result of
the war, had no hesitation in giving expression to that
confidence in his answer. He believed that, "if the
Spaniards were commonly prudent," it would require "a very
large reinforcement indeed to give the enemy military pos
session of the country ; a much larger to effect its complete

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 303
subjugation." But he likewise thought, in a railitary point
of view, that, even before they had made theraselves
raasters of Spain they ought to renew their invasion of
Portugal ; indeed, " that they ought to make the possession
of Portugal their first object. But they would not succeed
with an army of even 70,000 or 80,000 men unless they
made their attack at once, which he had reason to suppose
impossible." As to Central Spain, or Old Castile, that
province, he pointed out, " was already subdued ; and
indeed had in all wars been in the possession of the army
that was strongest, especially in cavalry." That if, con
trary to his expectation, the French should attack Portugal
at once, " they would be successfully resisted " he had
little doubt, and no doubt at all that, under any circura
stances, even " after defeat," he could re-erabark his array.
It is reraarkable how closely the opinions here expressed
coincided with the views of Napoleon himself, as we learn
from his correspondence. They are the more striking now
that we can reflect on thera by the light of their complete
fulfilment. But Lord Liverpool's appetite for information
was not yet completely satisfied ; and before he had
received Wellington's answers to his first questions, he
addressed him a second letter of enquiry, which shows not
only a remarkable acquaintance with the character of the
different provinces of Spain, and of the nature of each, but
proves, too, how fully the writer was prepared to agree in
Wellington's anticipations of the ultimate result of the
struggle. For he points out, from the past history of the
country, how great will be the difficulties experienced by
the enemy before he can subdue those districts which,
as being nearer France and further from us, superficial
observers raight have fancied the most completely at the
mercy of an army crossing the Pyrenees, or a fleet, sailing:
from Toulon. The whole letter is well worth preserving,
as a proof how felicitous was the choice which, Perceval
had made when he persuaded the writer to undertake the
War Department.

304 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
Private. Downing Street, 21st November, 1809.
Dear Lord Wellington,
I think it may be very material that we should endeavour to
procure, if possible, some accurate information respecting the
present state of the provinces of Catalonia, Aragon, and
Valencia.
I have always thought it an unfortunate circumstance unavoidably
attendant on the Spanish contest, that the provinces best cal
culated, from the character and disposition of their inhabitants,
to make a formidable resistance to the French, should be the
most remote from all intercourse with the British Government.
The Aragonese are, as we are informed, universally admitted
to be the most warlike people in Spain, and the Catalonians
and Valencians the most industrious and active.
The resistance which these provinces have made (though we are
imperfectly informed of the particulars) appears to have been
raore spirited, determined, and systematic than that of any
other part of Spain. And though their neighbourhood to the
frontiers of France must have given their enemy great advan
tages over them, yet it does not appear that they ever have
been completely subdued ; and, as long as the spirit of resist
ance continues there, it will be very difficult for Buonaparte to
make an adequate effort for the purpose of reducing under his
authority the more southern provinces.
It must be obvious that you have it not in your power, even if it
were otherwise desirable, to afford any direct military assistance
to this part of Spain by means of the array under your command ;
and I ara not prepared to say that, even under the circum
stances of such a change in the Spanish Governraent as raight
" afford the prospect of a more favourable issue to the contest,
it would be advisable to employ a limited moveable corps on
the coasts of Catalonia and Valencia.
But I think it raay be useful to have at least the means of con
sidering this question fairly and fully, and that at all events this
advantage would arise from opening an intercourse with that
part of Spain, that we should know how far we might really
depend upon them, what they wanted, and whether we had

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 305
the means of affording them any assistance which could be
considered as important.
If you agree with me in this opinion, I think it may be very
advisable that you should send some steady officer on whose
judgment you can rely, to provide you with information respect
ing this part of Spain, and it may be more convenient, on many
accounts, that this officer should go from the British army, and
communicate with you as commander of his Majesty's forces
in the Peninsula, than that he should be sent direct from this
country.
The names of two officers have been suggested to me as properly
quahfied for such service. Colonel Rourke and Major Sturgeon
of the Staff Corps. I know nothing of them personally. You
are the best judge how far they are competent to the service,
and, if so, whether they can be properly spared at this time
from the army.
Having opened my mind to you upon this subject, I leave it to
you to take such measures upon it as you may judge most
advisable. I am confident that you will see the importance,
in the event of the war continuing in the Peninsula, of giving
your most serious attention to the state of these provinces.
I ought to add, that any steps which you may think it expedient
to adopt for this purpose should be communicated to Lord
Wellesley, or whoever may be his Majesty's minister in Spain ;
and he should be informed that the object of sending an officer
to those provinces is to obtain military information, and not to
interfere in any concerns whatever of a political nature.
I am, &c. &c.
Liverpool.
The answer therefore to his first questions which, shortly
after the despatch of this second letter. Lord Liverpool
received, coincided closely with his own hopes and judg
ment. He laid it before his colleagues, accorapanied as it
had been with an explanation of the need that the array
had of reinforceraents to supply the vacancies which the
last campaign had caused in its ranks, and before the end
of the year he was enabled to promise Wellington the re
inforcements which he required, and which as yet were not
VOL. I. X

3o6 UFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
more than would suffice to keep his army at the strength
of 30,000 effective men. And he added a request to know
privately the names of the general officers whom Wellington
would wish to have under him, that he might send those,
and no others. In fact, as he wrote to him in the course of
the following summer, " when he accepted the seals of the
War Department, he laid it down as a principle that, if the
war was to be continued, we ought not to suffer any part of
our efforts to be directed to other objects."
With the promise of the troops came also the assurance
that "his Majesty felt the strongest inducement, from at
tachment to his ancient ally, and from every motive of
sound policy, to persevere in the contest in the Peninsula
as long as it could be maintained with a reasonable ex
pectation of success." He assured the general that " the
King fully coincided with the ministers in leaving him a
large discretion for his operations ;" only bidding him re
member " how essential the return of his army must be to
the security of his own dominions in the event of Spain
and Portugal falling entirely under the dominion of
France." And, while thus leaving him to the almost unfettered
exercise of his discretion with respect to his own operations.
Lord Liverpool likewise showed the confidence which he
himself placed in that discretion in other matters (for the
measures to be taken for the maintenance of war were
adopted principally in deference to Wellington's judgment,
and on his responsibility). And he announced to him also
that the King had consented to give the Portuguese the
pecuniary aid which he had recommended to enable them
to keep on foot such an army as their population could
supply, and to officer it with British officers. The adoption
of these measures is manifestly owing in no trifling degree
to the confidence which Lord Liverpool himself felt in the
eventual issue of the contest. And when it is considered
how few people in England, whether soldiers or civilians,
shared it at this time, that confidence is by itself a proof of

i8o9] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 307
a very statesmanlike and comprehensive judgment. At
the same time it in no wise led him to overlook the possi
bility of failure ; but the conclusion of the same despatch
enters as carefully into the possibility of a hurried evacua
tion of the country becoming necessary, and into the
measures which, in such an event, would be requisite, as
if the army had already met with some disaster, or, like
that of Moore, were only seeking to escape one by a rapid
retreat to the coast. And Wellington himself must have
derived additional assurance and encouragement from
knowing that, besides his own brother, he had a friend in
the Cabinet who, while he thus displayed entire reliance on
his skill and prudence, and a sanguine conviction of his
eventual triumph, yet took into consideration the possibiHty
of disappointment, and raight therefore be depended on
to stand by him as firmly in moments of disaster as of
victory. So consistent was Lord Liverpool in his resolution to
concentrate, so long as he should be in office, the whole
exertions of the country on the Peninsula, that when Sir
John Stuart inforraed hira that, in compliance with Lord
Collingwood's suggestions, he had detached a force to expel
the French frora the Ionian Islands, he instantly warned
hira that although, " if the occupation by us of those islands
would tend raaterially to the security of Sicily without the
. necessity of increasing our railitary force at that tirae in
the Mediterranean, it raight on that ground, be deemed
expedient," it would not be so if it required the slightest
addition to the number of the troops under Sir John's com
mand, which indeed it would probably " be necessary to
reduce rather than to augment, to provide for the exi
gencies of the service in other quarters." He concluded by
repeating a hint which the general had already received
from Lord Castlereagh, that he might be required to detach
any troops which he could spare to the eastern coast of
Spain, where a diversion raight facilitate Wellington's
operations by compelling the French to divide their forces.
X 2

3o8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
And he was the more anxious to employ the needlessly
large force at present in Sicily for that object, because, as
he more than once expressed to Wellington, he felt it a
great inconvenience that "the provinces best calculated,
from the character and disposition of their inhabitants, to
make a formidable resistance to the French, should be the
most remote from " our own shores.

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

309

CHAPTER IX.
Lord Liverpool's labours as Secretary for the Colonies — State of
Canada — Lord Liverpool's estimate of the difficulties of the Ministry,
and of Lord Wellington in Spain — Lord Grenville's censure of the
conduct of the war — Lord Liverpool's defence — His panegyric on
the spirit of the Portuguese and Spaniards — Lord Grey's motion on
Parliamentary Reform — Lord Liverpool's speech — The recent Re
form Bill — Opinion of Castanos on the war — Difficulties of providing
specie — The loss of Ciudad Rodrigo — Irritability of Wellington —
Letter of Lord Liverpool to Wellington.
Lord Liverpool filled the office of Secretary of State
for War and the Colonies for about two years and a half,
and during that period the attention of the whole Govern
ment as well as his own was principally fixed on our
Peninsular army. As the iraportance of its operations and
the grandeur of its commander's genius gradually developed,
the anxiety of the whole nation became concentrated on it.
But as yet he himself, and the energetic statesman whom
he had replaced, were, with Wellington's own relations,
whose views were naturally coloured by their confidence
and pride in him, almost the only men in England who
estimated at its true value the field opened to our glory by
the French invasion of the Peninsular kingdoms, and by the
spirit of unanimous resistance which that most unprovoked
of all Napoleon's outrages had awakened in the people
of both nations. Yet the very minister- who felt most
deeply the necessity of devoting his whole attention to this
part of his work, was the very one who by his office was the
most called upon to devote no trifling portion of his labours

3IO LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
to Other subjects ; for, by an absurdity that was never re
medied till its practical inconveniences were brought out
StiU more fully by the difficulties of a subsequent war, the
care of the colonies, with all their varied interests, was
committed to the same department as the war. And the
minister whose whole energies, however untiring they might
have been, would have been strained to the very uttermost
by the task of giving judicious and timely counsel and in
struction to the general of an army, and of providing him
with means of all kinds for carrying out those instructions,
often had his time occupied and his mind distracted by the
affairs of the extreme east or west, by clerical establish
ments in one settlement, and by proposals for establishing
new forms of government in another.
In deaHng with all these various and dissimilar subjects
Lord Liverpool displayed the same extensive and accurate
information, and, where the occasion admitted it, at least
an equally shrewd and penetrating foresight, as has been
already remarked on topics with which he had had more
opportunity of making himself previously acquainted.
While explaining to one of the chief dignitaries of the
Church at home his extreme anxiety to be able to procure
the acceptance of chaplaincies in Ceylon by clergymen " of
talents and character  likely as such to be respected by
the inhabitants of the colony ; " and having with this view
asked him to recommend him persons properly qualified
(for on no subject was Lord Liverpool more scrupulous
throughout his long official career than in his distribution
of ecclesiastical patronage, never making it a means of pro
viding for his own relations or dependants), he took occa
sion to explain to him all the different circumstances which
rendered the appointments which he had to offer both
eligible and important. Eligible, because the island was
particularly healthy ; important, because " Christianity has
less difficulties to encounter in its progress in Ceylon than
in any other part of the East. The distinction of castes
must, while it continues, form a considerable impediment

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL

3"

to its progress in India. But this distinction does not exist
amongst the Ceylonese, who are Buddhists ;' and it has been
consequently found that great facilities have existed in per
suading large numbers of the natives to be baptized, though
it has been difficult to eradicate afterwards the reraains of
their superstition."
In Canada his attention was at the same time deraanded
by a question of greater political iraportance ; one which
has on more than one occasion within our tirae caused our
statesmen the greatest anxiety, and which has only within
a very short time been settled on what may be hoped to
' On this passage I have been favoured with the following comment
by my kind friend the late Bishop of Ceylon :— " The extract you sub
mit for my opinion from Lord Liverpool's papers is in the main correct,
though not quite so. The distinction of castes does exist among the
Ceylonese Buddhists ; but it partakes more of a social than of a reli
gious character, and is therefore neither so bigoted nor so obtrusive as
in India ; but in the north and on the north-east coast of the island,
occupied by the Tanish race from India, to the entire exclusion ofthe
Singhalese, both Brahminism and caste are in full force. Education
and missionary work has made some impression on them ; and is pro
gressing favorably but slowly. In the south and centre the Singha
lese race and language and religion (that of Buddhism) prevail and
to this portion of the island Lord Liverpool's remark is more appli
cable, great numbers under the Dutch rule (which preceded our own)
having been induced rather than persuaded to be baptized in the hope
of Government employment. Their system of parochial subdivisions
and registration was very complete, and none were admitted on their
lists (called thombos) without compulsory baptism. These registers I
found to be still cherished by thousands of hollow professors of Chris
tianity, who could see no inconsistency in calling themselves ' Budd
hist Christians.' This is a real hindrance to missionary progress, but
Christian education in the last fifteen or twenty years has done its
work more thoroughly, and we may well be hopeful of better fruit."
When it is recollected that Ceylon was among our very latest acqui
sitions, the accuracy of Lord Liverpool's information concerning its
people, in which one who has had such pre-eminent opportunities of
becoming acquainted with the island as Bishop Chapman finds so
little to correct, is a remarkable evidence of the honest and judi
cious diligence with which he applied himself to every part of his
duties ; and may well incline us to rely on his statements respecting
other raatters on which a knowledge of the precise truth was more
easily attainable.

312 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
prove both a permanent and a safe footing. The bill of
1 79 1, by which the province had been parted into two divi
sions, had not been found to answer the main object which
had been hoped from it, that of quenching the animosities
which existed between the old French inhabitants and the
more modern settlers of English blood. And the present
commander-in-chief in the colony. Sir James Craig, wrote
to Lord Liverpool in the summer of 18 10, to suggest some
modifications of the Act which he had reason to think
would be acceptable to the French party, who, as was not
unnatural, were the aggressors in the disputes which had
arisen, and were now looking with eagerness which was not
dissembled, and with wishes which could hardly be mis
taken, on our contest with France. He looked at the
question solely with regard to his position of responsibility
for the tranquillity of the province. Lord Liverpool was
compelled to take a wider view, which he explained in the
following letter :
Dear Sir,
I do not know whether my public despatches by this mail will
prove satisfactory to you.
I can assure you that the subject of your very able letter has been
most anxiously considered, not only by those who are imme
diately the King's confidential servants, but by the Attorney-
General and by the Master of the Rolls, who has much local
knowledge of Canada from having passed the early part of
his life in that country. It would be wasting your time to
repeat to you in a private letter those considerations which
you will find fully brought before you in my public despatch.
But there is one circumstance to which I would wish particu
larly to draw your attention, a circumstance to which I have
obliquely alluded in my public letter, but which for reasons
sufficiently obvious it was impossible for me to explain in such
a letter so explicitly as I can in a private communication.
You may rely upon it, that if the subject of the constitution of
Canada was brought under the discussion of the British Par
liament, the cause of the Canadians would be warmly supported
by all the democrats and friends of reform in this country. It

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 313
would most probably receive the support likewise, under pre
sent circumstances, of Lord Grenville, the original framer of the
Act of 1 7 91, and of his friends. The support of so powerful
a combination, even if it was for the moment successfully
resisted, could not fail to have the effect of encouraging the
factious and disaffected in Canada. They would look to the
chance of their friends coming into Government for a revision
and alteration of the system which might at this time be
adopted. In short, we should have the game of the American
war played over again.
The object of Opposition would be, in the first instance, to
embarrass fhe Government, but by the measures they would
adopt for that purpose they might separate the North American
colonies fi-om the mother country. Another consideration
impresses itself very strongly on our minds, that every en
deavour would be made in Parliament to connect the questions
of Government in Canada with the Catholic question in Ire
land. It may be admitted that some connexion might not
unfairly be considered as existing between them. The intro
duction, however, of such a topic might be productive of the
most unfortunate results, both in Ireland and Canada, especially
at the present time.
We are therefore clearly of opinion that the great object ought to
be to keep the subject of Canada out of Parliament as long as
possible, unless a connexion could be proved between the
popular party in Canada and the Government of France.
In that case I am convinced there would be no difficulty in carry
ing the most effectual measures, even the abolition of the
Constitution of 1791. But, in any other alternative except this,
I dread no proceeding so strongly as an appeal to Parliament.
In communicating to you these sentiments, I can assure you that
we are all fully convinced of the evils which have arisen from
the Act of 1791, and of the absurdity of attempting to give
what is falsely called the British constitution to a people whose
education, habits, and prejudices render them incapable of
receiving it. But the evil is done ; our steps cannot be easily
retraced. We must endeavour, in the first instance, to make
the best use we can of the instrument which has been put into
our hands, but above all we must avoid tampering with it. If
Parliament is to be called upon for its interposition, it must be

314 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
by the most decisive and effectual measures, such as will pre
vent altogether the recurrence of the evils again ; and it appears
to us that it would be in vain to expect the adoption of such
measures frorn Parliament without a case far stronger, and
very different in its nature, than that which we could bring at
present under their consideration.
With respect to any military attempt of Buonaparte upon Canada,
I can assure you that at present his hands are too full for any
such operation. It is evident that he has not the military
means of raaking as large an effort in Spain and Portugal as
his interest and reputation require. As long as the contest
can be maintained in that quarter upon its present scale we
need be under little apprehension for more distant objects.
I ara happy in being able to acquaint you with what I have no
doubt you will have heard frora many other quarters, and .
particularly from some of j our professional friends, that the
events of this campaign hive exceeded our most sanguine
expectations, and certainly af.brd no very unreasonable ex
pectation that the contest in the Peninsula may finally prove
successful
At all events, if the Fr ench are not expelled from the country,
many years must elapse before they can obtain sufficiently quiet
possession of it to enable them to avail themselves of its
resources, and to direct them against the King's dominions.
I am, &c. Liverpool.
The mention of the contest in the Peninsula, contained
in the above letter, shows how real was the confidence
which he felt in its ultimate result. And he acted with as
much resolution as he wrote, losing no time in sending out
reinforcements sufficient to keep up Wellington's force
always " at the amount which he considered as necessary,
30,000 men fit for duty," and with them every kind of supply
which the general thought requisite, and which the resources
of the kingdom could furnish. But he had in his way as
great difficulties to contend with as Wellington himself
Some of them are explained in his private letters to Wel
lington, from which it is but fair to his memory here to give
copious quotations, because, without a candid examination
of them, it would be impossible to form an adequate idea

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 315
of his merit in surmounting them. It was a great thing
during these eventful years that the minister on whose
department the efficiency of the army depended, even raore
than on the general himself, should encourage the general
by candid support, by the most implicit and judicious
confidence, and, above all, by the fellow-feeling as to the
eventual issue of the struggle, and as to the duty iraposed
on us, by our national honour, to persevere in it to the last.
In sorae instances the letters also show a great capacity for
organization, corabined with a great insight into character,
and even into the professional ability of different officers.
It is the more necessary to point this out, because it is well
known that the Opposition in Parhament made complaints
which frora time to time escaped Wellington, on occasional
deficiencies ofdifferent kinds which impeded his movements,
the text for furious denunciations ofthe Ministry at the time ;
and that since that day writers have sought to enhance
his glory by dwelling on these deficiencies, and inveighing
against the Government for suffering them to exist; keeping
out of sight the fact that he himself, when not under the
influence of moraentary irritation, admitted that the minis
ters had done all that raen in their position possibly could
do, and that the real cause of the disappointments which
he at tiraes experienced was to be found partly in their own
political difficulties, and partly in the state of Europe, which,
as in the case of his frequent want of raoney, rendered it
actually difficult to procure the precious raetals in sufficient
quantities, and had reduced us, for our own internal trade,
to resort to a paper currency.
This latter difficulty is certainly not exaggerated in the
following extract frora a private letter from Lord Liver
pool to Lord Wellington, written in December of this same
year, 1 809, the first year of the war as far as his array was
concerned :
The expenditure of this country has become enormous ; and, if
the war continues, we must lopk to economy. I do not believe
so great a continued effort has ever been made by this country.

3i6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1809
combining the military and pecuniary aid together, as his
Majesty is making for Portugal and Spain. The respective
Governments of these countries should be made sensible of
the truth of this position, and should feel the necessity of
making extraordinary exertions for their own support
I think it material to draw your attention to the mode of defraying
the expense which it has been agreed to incur for the Portu
guese army. We are naturally anxious to know, with some
certainty, that we have our money's worth for our money. It is
very desirable, therefore, that the sums advanced by Great
Britain for the Portuguese force should be applied directly to
defraying the expenses of that force, and should not pass
circuitously through the hands of the Portuguese Governraent;
in which case we might not be certain that it was not diverted
to other purposes.
It was not easy to guard against such a misappropria
tion of our treasures in Portugal, and still harder in Spain,
where the corruption of all classes, even of the highest,
was as general as their presumption and obstinacy. An
extract from another letter, written on the same day,
while it makes light of some circumstances which looked
formidable on paper, alludes, though without dwelling
too much on them, to the difficulties which beset the
Ministry itself As to the campaign, it informs Wel
lington that :
It is understood here from a messenger of Stahremberg's, who
has passed through France, that 80,000 raen have been ordered
to raarch to Bayonne. If Buonaparte cannot send a larger
force, I should not feel rauch alarraed at the prospect. I think
we may, however, rely that he will make every possible exertion
to subdue Spain, and that his first great efforts will be directed
against the British army. All our measures should be calcu
lated on this view of the subject. It is a great satisfaction to
us to find that you entertain a just notion of the eventual
difficulties to which you may be exposed, and that you have
not undervalued them on the one hand, or exaggerated them
on the other.
Lord Wellesley is installed, and we are going on very smoothly.

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

317

It is impossible to form any calculation yet of our strength in
Parliament. We have some awkward questions to manage at
the outset (particularly that of Walcheren), which must put us
under considerable difficulties. I trust, however, that by pru
dence and temper we shall get through them.
He was estimating the difficulties of himself and his col
leagues in the very same frame of mind which he praised
in the general, neither undervaluing nor exaggerating
them ; and, as to the progress of the campaign, showing
a keen and correct appreciation of the course likely to be
taken by Napoleon, and of the force which he would find
necessary for the attainment of his object. But probably,
with all his experience of Lord Grenville's inability,
through sheer ill-temper, to see two sides of a question,
he was hardly prepared for the degree to which party
rancour blinded him and the rest of the Opposition, when
Parliament re-asserabled. In the debate on the address
Lord Grenville denounced with almost equal vehemence
the general and the ministers. " His heart was full, and
he must give vent to his feelings." And his feelings led
him to pour forth such a torrent of unreasoning invective as
has rarely been heard. He attacked every one concerned
in the expedition to the Scheldt. And this part of his
harangue was in truth plausible, for it could not be denied
that in some quarter or other there had been great mis
management. But he marred the effect of it by being
equally if not more vehement on the subject of the cam
paign on the Tagus, for which, in a subsequent speech, a
few days later, he even urged the House to refuse its thanks
to Lord Wellington : declaring that it was impossible to
justify him for fighting a battle at Talavera, and denying
that the result of that battle had been a victory to our
arms. Lord Grey, a constant critic of all military opera
tions, even went beyond his friend in his condemnation
of both ministers and general, declaring himself unable
to give utterance to the indignation with which he had
heard of honours having been conferred on Wellington
resembling those which had formerly been bestowed upon

3i8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
Marlborough, and forgetting all the ordinary restraints
of Parliamentary courtesy in his description of the imbe
cility and misconduct of the ministers, and of the miseries
which they had inflicted on their country. It must be
stated, to Lord Grey's honour, that he subsequently
recanted his denunciations of the conduct of the war ;
which Lord Grenville never did. But at the opening of
this session he fully rivalled his coadjutor in vehemence;
and the two made motion after motion designed in the
first place to eject the Ministry, but all having the una
voidable effect, whether they succeeded or failed, of
embarrassing the defenders of the nation, and with it of
the common cause of freedom in Europe.
On another occasion Lord Grenville ventured on the most
dangerous of all acts of temerity, prophecy. He asked,
" Was there any man who heard him, who in his con
science believed that even the sacrifice of the whole of the
brave British army would secure the kingdom of Portugal .¦'
And if he received from any person an answer in affirmation
of that opinion, he should be able to judge, by that answer,
of the capacity of such a person for the government of
this country, or even for the transaction of public busi
ness in a deliberative assembly. He had always thought
the enterprise impossible, but now it was known to all
the people of the country that it had become certainly
impossible." He denounced the ministers for persisting
in such an enterprise. He denounced the general as an
officer possessed of no military quality but courage. He
denounced our envoy in Portugal for erroneous views of
the capabilities of the country, and for an unwise method
of carrying out even his own ill-conceived plans, and
he insisted on the instant withdrawal of the British army
from Portugal. " The campaigns in Spain and Portugal
had already cost this nation the lives of 12,000 of its
brave soldiers. It was now to be considered whether
any further sacrifice was to be incurred in this hopeless
contest. He would conjure their Lordships not to go on
in the fruitless profusion of life and treasure ; but, while

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 319
there was yet time, arrest the fatal progress of national
calamity and disgrace. Portugal, so far from the most
defensible, was the least defensible country in Europe."
The relation of these efforts of disappointed ambition
and impotent malice is not a purposeless waste of tirae.
They are recapitulated here for the lesson they afford of
the degree to which the spirit of faction can drive men of
even high ability, and for the sake of the at least equally
instructive warning that in political debate every speech
and argument should be judged of by its own validity, and
not by the presumed purity of intention or intellectual
capacity of the speaker. Lord Liverpool, as was his
wont, met these different motions with a straightforward
opposition, which began by brushing away all the flirasy
subterfuges and artful screens with which a show of an
attempt had been made to disguise the real object of his
assailants. In whatever forra, whether of substantive
motion or specious araendraent, they brought the question
forward, he treated their different steps as " virtual raotions
for the reraoval of the Ministry, and for the abandonment
of our allies beyond the Pyrenees." His defence of the
Governraent was complete on every point but one, where
it must be admitted to have been partially defective. He
affirmed truly that the enterprise undertaken against the
fortresses on the Scheldt was " the greatest expedition ever
sent from this country upon any occasion," and that " the
object, the destruction of the enemy's naval preparations at
Antwerp, was one for which it was worth while to encounter
a considerable risk." But when he added, " That it failed
in its ulterior object was not to be attributed to any fault
or failure in the plan, or in the execution of it ; to any
neglect of the Executive Government, or to any miscon
duct of the army or navy ; but to circumstances which
it was impossible to control, to the elements, and to the
unusual state of the weather at that season," he advanced
an excuse which his hearers can hardly have accepted as
well founded, and which posterity has not endorsed. For
it was notorious that the want of success was solely owing

320 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
to the dilatory incapacity of Lord Chatham;' and it was
almost equally well known that he had owed his appoint
ment to the pertinacious partiality of the King himself, and
not to the judgment of his colleagues in the Cabinet.
Probably this latter fact contributed to make all parties
desire to avoid that part of the question. And on no
other topic had Lord Liverpool any difficulty in carrying
conviction to the minds of his hearers. He had unques
tionably reason on his side when he reproached Lord Gren
ville and the other assailants of the Government for "the
dangerous and impolitic appeal which they had made to
the passions of the people, by displaying to them in aggra
vated colours the losses of the army and the pecuniary
burdens they were called on to support." And, in reply
to their description of the country which was the scene of
war as one destitute of points of defence, he was not
content with merely disproving the accuracy of that
description on the testimony of militaty officers better
acquainted with the country than those who thus con
demned it, but he reminded the House of a fact which,
except by Wellington and himself, had not hitherto been
much attended to, that we had on our side what was of
greater consequence in such a contest than any advantages
to be derived frora the character of the country, the cha
racter of the people. In the kingdoms beyond the Rhine
" the moment their armies were defeated the countries
' Alison, in a note on chap. Ix. § 1 3 of his history, has accumulated a
number of authorities beyond all suspicion on this point, testifying
that the plan of the Government was well conceived, and could hardly
have failed to succeed in other hands. Pelet, the author or authors of
the " Victoires et Conquetes," Jomini, and, above aU, Napoleon him
self, according to both O'Meara and Montholon, agree that, when the
expedition first reached the Scheldt, Antwerp was so scantily gar
risoned as to be wholly at our mercy. The loss of a few days sufficed
to put that important town out of danger. But even after Antwerp
was safe, the naval officers (as the present writer has shown in his
" History of the British Navy," xxxiii.) strongly pressed the adoption of
other operations of which they could have ensured the success, and
which would have been of great importance ; but Lord Chatham would
not listen to them-

i8lo] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 321
were conquered. The people were everywhere neutral, and
uniforraly remained tame spectators of the contest which
was to decide their fate. But in Spain our armies had the
support of the whole armed population, which throughout
two campaigns had fought under every circurastance of
adversity and disadvantage, and were still as resolute not
to yield to the foreign invader as at the beginning of the
struggle. Undoubtedly the Spanish armies when by them
selves had suffered some severe defeats. But the noble
baron had spoken as if war had not its chances and
reverses, as if the risks in railitary operations were not
always proportioned to the raagnitude of the contest, and
had triuraphantly asked. What had we gained in the Penin
sula .'' What had we gained .'' We had gained the hearts
of the whole population of Spain and Portugal We had
gained that of which no triuraphs, no successes of the
eneray could deprive us. In Portugal such was the affec
tion of the inhabitants that there was not a want of the
British soldier that was not instantly and cheerfully sup
plied. In Spain the universal feeling, even in that awful
moraent of national convulsion and existing revolution,
was that of the most complete deference to the British
envoy and Government ; and so perfect was their confi
dence in both that they placed their fleet under the orders
of the British admiral Whatever might be the issue of
the contest, to this country would always remain the proud
satisfaction of having done its duty. He trusted we should
never abandon Spain so long as any hope remained of the
possibility of ultimate success. Their lordships were bound
by every sentiment of honour and good faith to support a
people who had themselves given proofs of honour, good
faith, and bravery that had not been exceeded by any
nation that ever existed." The day was not far distant,
it came even before he quitted the office which he was then
holding, when the murmurs of even his most rancorous
opponents were silenced by the glorious and undeniable
success which attended the perseverance of the Govern
ment in the course which he had thus laid down for it.
VOL. I. Y

322 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
But when even those who did not, like Lord Grenville
and Lord Grey, proclaim the incompetence of the British
general, and deny that Talavera had been a victory,
might yet reasonably doubt whether the complete rout of
the principal Spanish army at Ogana' did not more than
counterbalance it with regard to the probability of Spain
making a permanently successful resistance to the invader,
at such a time to speak nothing but words of hope and
encouragement required not only a clear foresight, a
capacity for taking a comprehensive view of the whole
question in all its chances of fortune whether for good or
evil but the equally statesmanlike attribute of resolute
courage, of firmness to withstand not only the assaults of
his antagonists, but the doubts of his friends, the commend
able anxieties and uneasiness of the whole people.
One of the motions by which the Government was assailed
in this session was brought forward by Lord Grey, and referred
to the general state of the nation ; and one topic on which
he dilated has not yet lost its interest. Undeterred by the
convulsions into which the atrocities of the French Revo
lutionists were throwing the whole world, he had in 1792
allowed himself to be made the organ of the revolutionary-
societies which had established themselves on their model
in England, and in that character had then brought forward
a motion on the subject of Parliamentary Reform, which
Pitt, though in less dangerous times he' had shown himself
a friend of the principle, with a wiser patriotism now refused
to countenance it on the express ground of the " anarchy and
confusion" which at such a moment such a measure must
produce. It could hardly be said that the present time,
while we were engaged in a most arduous war, was more
favorable for its consideration ; but Lord Grey now brought
' At Ogana, on the 3d of November, the Spanish General Areizaga,
with 50,000 men, was utterly defeated by Soult with 30,000. He lost
20,000 prisoners and nearly all his artillery and ammunition. And his
overthrow led to a smaller army, under the Duke del Parque, receiving
an almost equally decisive defeat frora Kellerraann before the end of
the same month.

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 323
it forward as a subject the neglect of which was a grave
fault in the Cabinet. He admitted, indeed, that there was
" some difference between his present sentiments and his
former impressions " on the question. And he showed how
great that difference was by a denunciation of " those vague
and general speculations in which some men would wish to
engage ;" and by a declaration that he should wish to take
for his guide and rule in the framing of any raeasure of
reform "the fixed principles ofthe constitution ;" and that
"the remedy which he sought was one which should be
liraited by the existing defects, should be raarked out by
the constitution itself and should not launch out into any
extravagance of theory." But, though Lord Grey had been
thus guarded in the enunciation of his present sentiraents.
Lord Liverpool wisely thought it was a matter on which in
so critical a season no doubt should be allowed to exist as
to the feelings of the Governraent. And in his reply he
delivered his opinion, in which all his colleagues coincided,
that while "they had no objection to an economical re
form," they would never countenance any measure which
went beyond " a practical remedy for practical grievances."
Among these he did not class the inequalities in the Parlia
mentary representation of the people on which Lord Grey
had dwelt, but which he affirmed to be only apparent, and
to have no reality. On the contrary, "he would say that he
believed there never was a period in our history when the
representation of the people in Parliament was less unequal.
That it was unequal in theory he would admit, but that
theoretic inequality he regarded as one of the greatest
advantages of our constitution. This was the opinion of
that enlightened statesman Mr. Burke, who said that it was
this peculiarity in its constitution which made it, instead of
an assembly of deputies, an entire and perfect deliberative
meeting. For hiraself, he had carefully examined all the
plans of reform that had been subraitted to ParHaraent at
various tiraes, and he would fairly state that there was not
one of thera to which he did not see insuperable objections.
One of these plans, brought forward by the noble mover,
Y 2

324 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [i8ia
certainly not the most objectionable, aimed at making
population and not property the basis of representation.
Such a change he thought could not but be exceedingly
injurious in its effects.''
These few sentences, weighty in themselves, derive a
particular importance from the office to which the speaker
soon rose, and which, as he never changed his opinion on
the subject, marked out the line to which the King's
Government, as long as it was taken from the Tory party,
steadily adhered ; those who were looked on as its most
liberal section, such as Canning and his school, being to the
full as much opposed to any tampering with the existing
composition of Parliament as the most tenacious adherents
of old customs, and adopting the very arguments on which
Lord Liverpool now relied. It was not till he had passed
away that the champion of Reform, to whom he now
opposed himself, carried a measure on the subject which
popular clamour induced him to make far more sweeping
than he seems at this time to have contemplated ; though
after its enactment it was acquiesced in with cheerfulness,
even by those who had most strenuously resisted it, and, in
the perilous excitement of the third French Revolution, even
with satisfaction, as being supposed to have taken away
from all but the most profligate demagogues all pretence
for exciting the people to discontent, and to have contri
buted greatly to the feeling which made the lower classes
rally round their sovereign at a moment when scarcely
another throne in Europe could be looked on as secure.
But that Reform Bill of 1832 is now in its turn superseded
and swept away. The craving for change, not in order to
remove acknowledged grievances, but merely for the sake
of change, and to gratify those vague theories of equality
which Lord Liverpool now denounced, and even Lord Grey
repudiated, has been stimulated till it threatens to become
insatiable ; and, if the assertion of the advocates of the bill
of 1867 be correct, that it is but the necessary consequence
and complement of the previous measure, it may well be
doubted whether Lord Liverpool and his Tory colleagues

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 325
were not counselling the nation more for its permanent
advantage when they resisted the first approaches to
reform, than those more popular statesmen who excited
the populace to demand and then granted a measure which
is thus proved to have been merely an incitement to re
quire more, and an instrument to compel the concession of
one which must prove at no distant day absolutely incom
patible with the preservation of a single fragment of the
ancient constitution.
On every division in these debates the Government was
supported by decisive majorities in both Houses ; and this
naturally gave them confidence to proceed more firmly in
prosecuting their own views as to the war. Lord Liverpool
was a little embarrassed and perplexed by the Spanish
General Castanos. At the beginning of 18 10 that officer
was appointed to the comraand of the chief Spanish array ;
an occurrence at which in one point of view Lord Liver
pool was greatly pleased, because " he knew frora expe
rience that he was the raost right-rainded Spaniard who
had appeared since the Revolution ; and he believed hira
to be sincerely and zealously attached to the British con
nexion. He had also been so principally concerned in all
those events which had led to the present state of things
in Spain that it was scarcely possible for him under any
circurastances to look forward to any prospect of terras
with the eneray." But though his steady fidelity to the
cause in which he was embarked could thus be depended
on, " it appeared by his letters that he thought unfavor
ably of the issue of the contest in Spain upon the prin
ciples on which it was then conducted," even while he
believed that " it would not be possible for the French to
subdue the country" completely. And the knowledge
that such was his language caused Lord Liverpool deep
anxiety, since he naturally attributed great weight to the
sentiments of one who had such means of forraing a cor
rect judgraent, and such strong reasons to desire to corae to
the opposite opinion ; and he consequently began to " fear
from his account that the enemy might prove successful in

325 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
passing the Sierra Morena, and in getting possession of
Seville. In that case," he supposed, " the Spanish armies
must retreat to the island of Leon, and every effort must
be made for the defence and safety of Cadiz." In such an
event he anticipated that the Spaniards might solicit
Wellington himself to furnish troops from his army to re
inforce the garrison, and he proceeded therefore to consult
the general whether, if such a request were made, he would
be able to comply with it " consistently with the security of
Portugal ; and, if it should become necessary to make an
option between the two objects, which ought to be pre
ferred ;" adhering to his usual practice of setting the case
to be decided on in every point of view before Wellington,
supplying him with all the information in his power, and
then leaving him to regulate his conduct by his own judg
ment. Nothing can show more plainly the resolution of
some of the Opposition at the time, and of some of the
critics of the Ministry since that day, to find fault, right or
wrong, with all that they did and all that they did not do,
than the circumstance that Lord Liverpool's conduct in
thus leaving Wellington unfettered to use his own discretion
has been attacked as if it were a mean evasion of the re
sponsibility which belonged to himself and his coHeagues
as ministers. He expressed his reasons for so doing to the
general in a letter written towards the end of this year :
" We wish you to be governed on this point " [that of
bringing the French to action] " entirely by your own dis
cretion ; and that you should neither abstain from attack
nor engage in it in consequence of any opinion which may
be supposed to be entertained in this country. If it were
even possible (which it is not) to form a just opinion here
¦on such a subject, the change of circumstances and succes
sion of events would be very likely to render that opinion,
which might have been good when it was formed, bad when
it came to be acted upon. In short you know our objects
to be the defence of Portugal and the support of the cause
of the Peninsula, as long as they are practicable ; and I
trust you feel that you possess the entire confidence of the

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 327
Governraent with respect to the measures which it raay be
desirable to adopt for these purposes, whether they may be
of a cautious or of a raore enterprising character."
Candid judges, with rainds unpervert.ed by the tera
porary struggles of party, will be of opinion that this is the
only spirit in which instructions ought to be fraraed by a
Cabinet coraposed of civilians for a railitary commander ;
that, if he deserves to be trusted with the safety of an army
at all, he certainly deserves to be trusted to know how to
direct its operations better than they. And they will be
supported in so deciding by no less an authority than that
of Nelson, who stated his own rule of conduct to be to con
sider that it was impossible for the ministers " to tell exactly
at a distance " what ought to be done, but to reraeraber
their general object, the destruction of the French, and to
carry out that object in the most effective way, whether that
way were in accordance with, or even in open contradiction
to, the letter of their instructions. At the same time it is ira
possible to avoid reraarking that, if ever a Ministry could
with wisdom fetter the discretion of a distant general, the
comprehensive views of the whole question, and the capacity
for judging, not merely of the general features of the
operations on both sides, but even of professional details,
during these years displayed by Lord Liverpool, would
have justified the existing Cabinet in being more precise
and minute in their instructions.
To aid Wellington's judgment on the question now sub
mitted to him. Lord Liverpool added that "there could be
no doubt but that in this country a higher value was set
upon Cadiz (connected with the Spanish fleet, arsenal, &c.),
than upon Lisbon ; but," he proceeded, " even if the value
of the two objects were equal, is it not true that Cadiz and
some part of the south of Spain raight be defended, if
Portugal were, for the tirae, lost ; but that Portugal could
not long be defended if Andalusia were in possession of the
French .? It is material Hkewise to consider how far under
such circumstances the Portuguese army could be induced
to retreat to the southern provinces of Portugal, and to

32S LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
keep up thereby a line of communication with the British
and Spanish armies."
So sound did Wellington himself think the views ex
pressed in this letter of the mutual importance of Cadiz
and Portugal to one another, that, while it was on its way
to him, he sent a division under General Graham to rein
force the garrison, and in a short time that all-important
city was placed out of danger. So far Lord Liverpool's
mind was at ease ; but on other points he was full of
anxiety and perplexity. The history of that period of the
war has been often, it might perhaps be said generally, re
presented as if the general alone had felt assured of ulti
mate success, and as if one of the hardest of his tasks had
been to inspire with a portion of his own confidence and
courage a weak and desponding Ministry. Lord Liverpool's
letters, as we have seen, disprove this notion to a very great
extent. He himself and certainly most if not all of his
colleagues, apart from their reliance on Wellington's abilities,
which they fully appreciated even before his return to Por
tugal in the preceding spring, felt a strong conviction that
they had found a field where they could successfully stem
the further advance of Napoleon's ambition. And in the
reasons which had dictated this opinion it would be more
correct to say that they coincided with Wellington than
that they borrowed them from him. The despondency
existed, not in the Ministry, but in the nation at large.
The factious cavils of the Opposition concurred with what
seems the natural propensity of every people to blame those
who for the time are their rulers. The refutation of these
cavils by the ministers was refused the weight which pro
perly belonged to it, because it seemed like an eulogy of
their own prudence, a pleading of their own cause ; and thus
the murmurs of those who lamented the death of Moore,
who sneered at Wellington's imprudence and wanton rash
ness in fighting unnecessary battles, and even denied that a
victory had been won at Talavera, gained more credit with
the unreflecting and impatient many than those who pointed
out that he had already twice expelled the French from

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 329
Portugal ; that on every occasion on which the EngHsh and
French soldiers had raet in conflict the French had been
worsted in spite of a considerable superiority in nurabers ;
and that it was plain that throughout Wellington was
able to regulate his operations by his own preconceived
ideas, and that the enemy were unable to compel him
to take a single step unsanctioned by his own deliberate
judgraent. From believing the description given by Lord Grenville,
Lord Grey, and their followers and copyists in the House
of Commons, of the character of the last campaign, the
people in general, and even military men who ought to
have known better, were easily led to augur still worse of
that which was to corae. In March 18 10, Lord Liverpool,
while expressing to Wellington the unabated sanguineness
of the Ministry itself, is forced to add, " I should apprise
you, however, that a very considerable degree of alarm
exists in this country respecting the safety of the British
array in Portugal The chances of successful defence are
considered here by all persons, military as well as civil, so
improbable," that there would be but little sympathy for
the general, and no approval, if, in consequence of his
persevering in what those critics would call "a desperate
resistance," the array were to raeet with any disaster, how
ever trivial. Lord Liverpool evidently foresaw that, in the
event of any such mishap befalling it, the popular clamour
would becorae so ardent as to render it irapossible for the
Governraent to persist in keeping an array in the field,
though even in that case he was resolved not to withdraw
frora the struggle, but to throw the bulk of our force into
Cadiz: arguing that "15,000 or 20,000 British troops
might make it secure for the reraainder of the war ; and
such a garrison would either oblige the French to evacuate
the south of Spain, or would corapel them to keep in that
part of the country an array of at least three tiraes the
amount of the British force."
Therefore, even if defeated both by the enemy in the
field and by his antagonists in ParHament, he would not

330 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
abandon hope while one foot of ground remained on
which a British regiment could make a stand. But the
disparagement of our own chances of success, and the
panegyrics of our enemy's genius and power, both equally
ceaseless, inevitably embarrassed and hindered the Ministry
in their attempts to supply the general with all the
resources which he required, and which they were eager
to furnish. And, even if this had not been the case, such a
scarcity of specie at this time prevailed throughout Europe
that there was a great difficulty in providing money. It
cannot be better shown than in the following extracts from
a letter of Lord Liverpool to Wellington, written at the
end of June in this year, the last portion of which ex
hibits also the earnestness with which the whole Cabinet,
and especially the writer, encountered, and from the first
had resolved to withstand and to overcome, all difficulties.
Thus he writes :
I can assure you that we are making every effort to supply you
with specie. The Bank has had, from the beginning, the
most positive directions to purchase all that can be procured
in the markets ; but, notwithstanding the prosperous state of
the trade of the country, they are in such distress with respect
to specie, that they were positively in want, about a fortnight
ago, of a hundred thousand dollars for the purpose of internal
circulation. I should think that there must be large quantities
of specie in Portugal ; for the balance of trade between Por
tugal and Great Britain is at all times in favour of the former,
and I ara not aware of any circurastance which can lead to an
export of specie from Portugal to other countries, except for
the purpose of purchasing corn. It would be a great relief
if the Portuguese Government would take a considerable part
of the subsidy in kind. The Americans, who will bring flour
both to Lisbon and Cadiz, would be too glad to receive bills
upon England for it. . . . We should feel mortified to the
greatest degree if the contest in the Peninsula should fail for
want of pecuniary means. No Government could attach more
importance to the continuance of it than the present, or be
more disposed to direct the whole disposable efforts of the
country to this one object. When I accepted the seals of the

iSio] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 331
War Department, I laid it down as a principle that, if the war
was to be continued in Portugal and Spain, we ought not to
suffer any part of our efforts to be directed to other objects.
Upon this principle we have acted, and are still acting. Every
regiment which is serviceable, and every general officer of
reputation and experience whose station in the army admitted
of his being employed in Portugal and Spain, has been selected
for this service. ... If any means can be found for providing
for our wants in the one matter of specie, we shall, I trust,
get through the campaign creditably, and perhaps brilliantly;
and I cannot avoid entertaining hopes of ultimate success.
In one way even the general excellence of our credit
added to our difficulties ; as in a letter written a week or
two afterwards Lord Liverpool (though far from wishing
the case different) writes :
I hope we shall not be disappointed in our expectation of supplies
from Vera Cruz ; and, if they should arrive in the course of the
next six weeks, we shall do tolerably well We cannot expect
to carry on war on a large scale without some difficulties :
those of a pecuniary nature are perhaps more trying than any
others, but they are, at the same time, most common. We
are in general such good paymasters when compared to our
enemies, that it is very difficult for us to resort to those shifts
and expedients to which they are in the constant habit of re
curring whenever a pressure of difficulties comes upon them,
or the circumstances of the service require them.
His letters to General Graham in Cadiz are in the
same strain. And it may be that he had in his raind the
jealousies which had already begun to divide the French
marshals when he forwarded to Grahara copies of the des
patches which he had written to Wellington, and " recom
mended Graham to have the raost unreserved comrau
nications with hira;" not only because "the whole army
in the Peninsula was under Wellington's general comraand,
but because it was also of the utmost importance that
the arrangements which were raade with respect to any
part of it should be made, as far as possible, on one
system, and that the military operations having in view

333 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
the security of Lisbon and Cadiz should be connected on
the same principle.''
Many of the injunctions and counsels contained in
these letters may appear to refer either to petty details,
unworthy the notice of history, or to matters of course.
But it is on apparently trivial points that the success or
failure of great operations often turns, nor are any things
more apt to be overlooked than those which seem matters
of course. It is the peculiar characteristic of men fit for
posts of the highest trust not to think such beneath their
attention. And the interest which Lord Liverpool's
correspondence shows him to have taken in such matters
of minute detail is also a proof how especially well-
suited he was for the post which at this crisis was the
most arduous and important in the whole Government.
The summer of 18 10 did not pass without one great mis
fortune, not indeed to our own armies, but to our allies, in
the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, which, greatly to his personal
chagrin, Wellington was forced to leave to its fate. Pro
bably no single incident in the whole war shows in a
stronger light how singularly fit he was for such a com
mand as was entrusted to him at such a time. For it was
by no means certain that he was not strong enough at
least to deliver the garrison. The Portuguese were almost
as eager as the Spaniards that he should make an attempt
to save the place ; because, while it remained untaken, the
French could hardly renew their invasion of Portugal. The
gallantry of the garrison itself and of its veteran com
mander, Andreas Herrastl was a powerful incentive to try
to succour them ; and if Wellington had looked not only
to the chances of success in the enterprise, but even to the
credit of the whole campaign, instead of to the general
issue of the entire war, he would certainly have attempted
to save them. But he felt bound to take, as he warned
Herrasti himself " a larger view of the interests of the
allies," as concerned the whole war ; and, in comparison
with them, to disregard the preservation of any "single
town, however important ; " and feeling that the " irrevo-

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 333
cable loss of the whole cause would be the consequence of
any failure in the atterapt to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo," he
decided that frora such an atterapt it was his duty to
refrain. Still it could not be denied that its surrender to
the French bore the appearance of discorafiture and disaster.
And it is therefore creditable to Lord Liverpool also that
he was in no degree discouraged by it ; on the contrary, he
wrote to Wellington in terras of decided commendation for
forbearing to risk a battle for its defence, reminding him
that " the attitude which he had been able to assume on
the frontier had certainly had the effect of protracting the
siege, and obliging the enemy to collect together the great
means which they had been compelled to eraploy."
Allusion has been raade to the mistaken view which
some writers have taken of the confidence entertained
by the rainisters in the result of the war. And it cannot
be denied that they find grounds for their theory in certain
isolated portions of Wellington's despatches. But the truth
is that this greatest of generals, though patient beyond all
men in action, was rarely, at any time of his life, patient
or measured in his language. He was at this tirae not
only engaged in one of the raost arduous labours that ever
rested on one raan's shoulders, but he was erabarrassed in
the perforraance of it by all kinds of irritating difficulties ;
not only by the obstinacy of the Spaniards and the disin
clination of the Portuguese for military service,^ but by the
misconduct of his own troops. Long before the war was
over he had brought thera to a perfection of discipline and
consideration for the people araong whora they were serving
of which no other array in the world has shown an equal
example. But, in his earlier campaigns, the raoraent that

I It was often necessai-y to send the Portuguese recruits in chains to
head-quarters to prevent them deserting before they joined their regi
ments. And in 1809, when he had just expelled the French from
Oporto, the municipal authorities of that very city made grievous
complaints of his pressing them to lend him 10,000/. for the use of
the army, though they were assured that it should be repaid almost
instantly.

334 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
the excitement of actual warfare ceased, they broke through
all rules, and committed gross outrages on the natives,
which created a great bitterness of feeling on their part,
and provoked the general into declaring that "he had
long been of opinion that a British army could bear
neither success nor failure, and that their present conduct
proved the truth of this judgment." The officers, too, were
becoming weary of the war, and were disgusting him with
constant requests for leave. And when, in addition to
these and other numberless annoyances, any momentary
want of supplies of any kind pressed on him, he was apt
to give vent to his mortification in terms which he himself
in his cooler moments admitted to be unfounded.
One of his letters, in which he addressed his complaints
to Lord Liverpool, produced an answer which is worth
preserving, not only for the excellent temper with which it
soothes the general's vexation while refuting his complaints,
but also for the picture it affords of the difficulties with which
the Cabinet had to contend at home, and of the vigorous
and resolute efforts which they were nevertheless making
to place the means of success within his reach ; efforts so
great that, with all their anxiety to maintain the contest
to the very last, indeed partly because of that very anxiety,
they felt it doubtful whether the country would or could
long bear so violent a strain :
Private. London, September 10th, 1810.
My .dear Lord Wellington,
I have received your letter, marked "private," of the 19th ult. I
am at a loss to conceive upon what grounds you can have
supposed that the King's ministers had no confidence in the
measures adopted for the defence of Portugal. I should have
thought that their language in Parliaraent must have had the
effect of satisfying the world as to their pubHc sentiments upon
this subject. It certainly exposed them not only to the censure
of Opposirion, but even to the animadversion of some of their
friends, for what was represented to be their extreme sanguine
ness in the cause of the Peninsula. With respect to their

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 335
private sentiments, I never knew a question on which there was
less difference of opinion in Cabinet than upon the subject of
Portugal ; either as to the expediency of persevering in the
defence of it, as long as could be consistent with the safety of the
British army, or as to the belief that there existed a fair chance
of success, provided the attack was deferred till after the British
army was reinforced, and had recovered the effects of the sick
ness of the last campaign, and that time could be gained for
the equipment and discipline of the Portuguese force.
It is certainly true that, in the House of Commons, the Portuguese
subsidy was carried by a small and unwilling majority ; and I
believe that, if the House had been left to act upon their own
feelings, they would in the month of February, when the subsidy
was voted, have decided upon withdrawing the army from
Portugal ; but this is principally to be ascribed to the circum
stance that all the officers in the army who were in England,
whether they had served in Portugal or not, entertained and
avowed the most desponding views as to the result of the war
in that country. Not one officer, as far as I recollect, ex
pressed, on the occasion, any confidence as to probable success ;
and not a mail arrived from Lisbon which did not bring letters
at the time from officers of rank and situation in the army
(many of which were communicated to me) avowing their
opinions as to the probability, and even necessity, of a speedy
evacuation of the country. It is true that some of the officers
to whom I allude have since entirely changed their opinions,
as I know from letters which I have recently received from
them ; and they may now, therefore, be very ready to shift
their former opinions upon the members of the Government ;
but the truth is, the contest never could have been maintained
in Portugal through the winter and spring, if it had not been
for the determination of Government to persevere in it, at all
risks to themselves, against not only the declared opinions of
their opponents, but the public remonstrances of many of their
friends.
Upon another part of your letter I am anxious to make an obser
vation. I can assure you that you are very much mistaken if
you suppose that the defensive system of warfare, which you
have felt it necessary and expedient to adopt during the

336 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
present campaign, has lowered your reputation in this country.
Upon this subject I can safely refer you to any friends or
correspondents you may have in England, in whatever situation
of life they may be, and I am sure you will find thera all
concur in stating that your military reputation never stood so
high as it does at the present moment, and that even those
whom you might suppose were least favorably inclined towards
you are disposed now to do you the fullest justice.
You will find in the enclosed paper the answers to all your pro
positions in the order in which you brought them forward ; I
trust that most of them will prove satisfactory to you.
When the reinforcements now destined for you shall have reached
you, and the four regiments shall have arrived from Sicily, the
British army in Portugal will have received an augmentation of
nearly 14,000 rank and file; and, allowing for a waste during
the campaign of 4,000 men, the augmentation at the end of it
would still amount to 10,000 men beyond the force originally
destined for the defence of Portugal.
I should deceive you if I held out to you the expectation that
either the military or financial resources of this country would
enable the Governraent to keep up' an army to this amount in
Portugal for any considerable length of time, in addition to all
the other necessary drains upon the service.
The recruiting does not, at this moment, cover in proportion the
ordinary waste of an array at home, and, unless we receive
larger supplies of money from South Araerica than we have any
reason to expect, Mr. Perceval is at a loss to know how we
shall be able to find specie to meet such a great increase of
expenditure.
The augmentation, therefore, of your force must be considered as
raade with reference to the present exigency ; and if the contest
is to be raaintained in Portugal and in the Peninsula upon the
principle originally adopted, of its being a long contest, the
British army must be reduced as soon as the present exigericy
will admit of it.
We are very anxious, therefore, not with a view of abandoning,
but for the purpose of maintaining the contest in the Peninsula
for an indefinite time, that, as soon as the present crisis shall
appear to be over, you would send home the excess of your

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

337

force, after keeping 30,000 effective rank and file in Portugal
and a sufficient garrison at Cadiz ; selecting, of course,
these regiments to be returned home which are the least
efficient, and consequently the least fitted for active service.
The question, in short, must c(jme to this. We must make an
option between a steady and continued exertion upon a mode
rate scale, and a great and extraordinary effort for a Hmited
time, which neither our means, military or financial, will enable
us to maintain permanently.
If it could be hoped that the latter would bring the contest to a
speedy and successful conclusion, it would certainly be the
wisest course ; but, unfortunately, the experience of the last
fifteen years is not encouraging in this respect.
Ever most sincerely yours,
(Signed) Liverpool.
To such an extent, indeed, did Lord Liverpool carry his
resolution to place every conceivable resource at Wel
lington's disposal that in October he even wrote him word
that he had procured the sanction of the Admiralty to his
borrowing " the lower-deck guns of the men-of-war in the
Tagus, and availing himself of the assistance of a propor
tion of the seamen and marines of the fleet for the purpose
of manning thera," if he should think such a step desirable
for the purpose of strengthening his lines of defence at
Torres Vedras, of the construction and object of which the
Governraent had been inforraed, though Massena, whose
projects and boasts they were intended to confound, had as
yet no suspicion of their existence.

VOL. I.

338 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810

CHAPTER X.
Illness of the King — Violence of the Opposition — Discussions on the
Regency — Characteristics of Lord Liverpool's eloquence — Lord
Holland's opposition — The Prince of Wales becomes Regent.
The next letter which the general received from the
minister is not without a melancholy interest. It was
written to congratulate him on the result of the battle of
Busaco, in which he had given Massena an unmistakeable
lesson that his retreat before the French legions was not
forced upon him by the superior strategy of the marshal,
renowned, intrepid, and skilful though he was, but was a
part of his own long-premeditated plan of the campaign.
For the victory of the British army was decisive ; and the
triple line of fortification which subsequently received our
troops had occupied the whole summer in its construction.
Richly merited, therefore, was the panegyric which Lord
Liverpool was, as it were, the mouthpiece of the whole
nation in pronouncing on the commander-in-chief And,
as the Portuguese divisions had highly distinguished them
selves in the battle, he added that the King proposed to
confer the Order of the Bath on General Beresford, the
officer who had been entrusted with the duty of bringing
them under the restraints and giving them the strength of
discipline, and who had performed his task with the most
conspicuous zeal and ability. Lord Liverpool added, "I
can assure you that I never saw the King more entirely
satisfied than he has been with the late operations of the
army."

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 339
It was the last letter in which such language could ever
be applied to George III. His favorite daughter. Prin
cess Amelia, was lying on her deathbed, and he had more
than once expressed his apprehension that his mind would
not be equal to the shock that her death, which he knew
to be inevitable, must cause hira. When it took place he
was hardly conscious of it. The date of the letter of which
the sentence quoted above is an extract is the 17th of
October. That day week the first signs of a relapse into
his old disorder were perceptible. He grew rapidly worse ;
every hour confirmed the worst apprehensions that had
been entertained ; and before the 2d of November, the
day on which his daughter breathed her last, he had
sunk into a state of derangement which eventually proved
permanent and incurable. It was not at first supposed
to be of such a character. The completeness of his
recovery frora forraer attacks of the sarae kind naturally
engendered a hope that this seizure would prove equally
teraporary. And the language which Lord Liverpool held
to Wellington on the subject was, that "the reports of all
the physicians who attend hira are so far favorable, that
they agree in giving the most confident expectations of his
recovery. I trust this event will happen speedily, and
before it can be necessary to take any steps for filling up
the defect in the royal authority, for I am thoroughly
convinced that, if a regency is once established, the King
never will recover."
For his alienation of mind as yet was only partial, and
not without intervals of consciousness. A Regency could
not have been appointed without his being aware of it,
and the feeling which he had displayed on that subject in
1788 could not fail to be present to the recollection of his
ministers. He had then looked on all who had been
desirous to hasten the appointment of a Regency almost in
the light of his personal eneraies, and had declared that if
the bill had once passed, whatever raight have been the
state of his health afterwards, he would never have resumed
z 2

340 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
his authority. It was therefore a clear and positive duty
of the ministers to postpone till the last moment a step
which might have so prejudicial an effect. And at the
beginning of December they still saw reason to hope that
it might be unnecessary to have recourse to it, so decided,
as Lord Liverpool wrote on the 4th, were " the reports of
the physicians that the King had been getting gradually
better for the last five days."
But the Opposition refused to take the chances of his
recovery into their calculation. A subsequent paragraph
of the same letter proceeds thus : " We had a most dis
agreeable scene in the two Houses of Parliament on Thurs
day last [November 29]. The feeHng and temper of the
country are, however, as good as possible, and our majori
ties were respectable. But the conduct of Lord Grenville
on this occasion was beyond anything we could have
conceived." While of the leaders of parties and sections
of parties he says : " Canning was not in the House, and
his friends did not vote ; Lord Sidmouth and his friends
zealous with us. Castlereagh likewise with us."
On the 1st of November the existing prorogation of
Parliament h*ad expired. As a matter of course it had
been intended that it should be renewed ; but since, from
the King's illness, that had become impossible, the ministers,
on its meeting, had instead moved an adjournment of both
Houses ; and on the 29th, feeling the importance of allow
ing no step to be precipitated which might damp the
prospect of the King's restoration to health. Lord Liverpool
proposed to repeat the adjournment for a fortnight longer.
So harmless and ordinary a motion might have been
expected to pass without comment. But the Opposition
entertained no doubt that the appointment of 'a regent,
who could be no one but the Prince of Wales, would be
followed by their instant installation in office, and were not
inclined to wait for so desired a consummation a single
day. Lord Spencer was put forward with an amendment,
which proposed "to examine his Majesty's physicians, and

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 341
to report the examination to the House without delay,"
and Lord Grenville supported hira in an harangue of which
scarcely any exercise of charity can account for its
veheraenee and exasperation. He exhausted the whole
vocabulary of Parliaraentary reproach in his denunciations
of the idea of waiting a fortnight to see what turn his
Majesty's disorder raight take. If their Lordships should
agree to such a raotion, "they would be turning their
backs upon the constitution and upon the country." It
was "a proposition most derogatory to the dignity of
ParHament, most hostile to the best interests of the
monarchy, and most repugnant to every principle of the
constitution." If, when the ministers proposed the pre
vious adjournment, they had intended thus to repeat it,
he would say that " they had not alone been guilty of
disingenuousness, but had been iraplicated in a very criminal
and treacherous proceeding." If he himself were to con
sent to the adjournment, it " would be a base and criminal
dereliction of his duty." Lord Liverpool had founded his
motion on a report raade by the King's physicians to the
Privy Council at an examination of those gentleraen.
That this body should have been convened for the purpose of
instituting an exaraination, " without the consent, the know
ledge, and the sumraons of the King," was now denounced
as an act " most hostile to the principles upon which the
monarchy stands, and one which, though not republican,
would lead to the establishment of the raost odious and
detestable forra of aristocracy." Lord Liverpool had said
" that there existed two grave reasons for the House con
curring in his proposition : first, that there had taken place,
since the comraenceraent of the King's illness, a material
araendraent in his disorder ; and secondly, that it had not
been of long duration, as it had been when the Estates of
the realm before proceeded to supply the deficiency of the
kingly functions. Of these two facts, so confidently de
pended upon, he (Lord Grenville) denied that the House
possessed any legal or constitutional knowledge."

342 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
It is evident that this argument rested on a strange
misconception of the case, and of the ministers' proposal.
If the Cabinet had been bringing in a bill proposing to
enact a law, it would have been indispensable that every
form should be strictly observed, and that ParHament itself
should have examined the witnesses on whose evidence it
was about to found its exercise of legislative power.
But, as matters stood, where it was manifestly most desir
able to postpone action which might prove to be pre
mature ; and, till the permanent nature of the King's
malady should be clearly established, to avoid giving the
case a publicity which might tend to increase the chance
of its becoming permanent. Parliament might well be
content to acquire its information, so long as it was
certain, in an informal manner. That, as yet, the King's
disease had not been of long duration was a matter of
universal notoriety. It was not above five weeks since
he had been mixing with his Court in perfect health. That
it was now abating, if alleged by the physicians to the
Privy Council, would certainly not be denied by them
before the Parliamentary Committee. The factiousness
and unreasonableness of the attack on the conduct of the
ministers was accordingly condemned by a large majority
of the House : the most remarkable circumstance in the
division being that the princes of the royal family no
longer acted as an united party ; but, while the Dukes of
York and Cambridge (the first-mentioned of whom was,
of all the brothers, the most attached to the Prince of
Wales) voted with the ministers, the Dukes of Clarence
and Sussex joined the Whigs, with whom they now
began to identify themselves.
The hopes, however, which the physicians had expressed
of the King's speedy restoration to health grew fainter
as December advanced. When, at the expiration of the
fortnight. Parliament reassembled. Lord Liverpool him
self moved the appointment of a Committee of the House
to examine the physicians in attendance on his Majesty ;

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 343
and the Prime Minister made a similar motion in the
House of Coraraons. The raotions were agreed to as a
matter of course ; and on the report of the Comraittees
it appeared that the physicians, five in nuraber. Dr. Rey
nolds, Dr. Heberden, Dr. Baillie, Sir H. Halford, and
Dr. Robert Willis, were unanimous in giving it as their
opinion that, though a speedy recovery was less probable
than it had seemed a few weeks before, the chances of
the King's ultimate restoration to coraplete health were
in no degree diminished. When pressed on the subject
of his time of life, they were equally agreed that years
had made an unusually slight impression on his constitu
tion ; that he was, as one expressed hiraself, younger
and stronger at seventy-two, than raany persons at sixty-
two, and therefore that his age was not likely to present
any great impediment to his cure. When similarly ques
tioned as to his blindness, there was a similar harraony
in their opinion that in the first stages of the coraplaint
that deprivation was even an advantage, as reraoving the
patient out of the reach of raany circurastances which
might cause agitation ; though, as he progressed towards
recovery it might be in some degree injurious, as rendering
it raore difficult to amuse his mind. Dr. Willis explained
to the Committee that the malady was rather derange
ment (a term which of itself seems to indicate a temporary
attack) than insanity ; and Sir H. Halford stated as one
reason why he relied on the disease being eventually
removed, "that his Majesty's faculties did not seera in
any respect impaired by the continuance of his disease :
so far from it, that his perception was clear and keen ;
his raeraory, which is the first faculty usually observed
to be influenced and injured by this disease, and which
is the first to feel the effects of age, was sound and strong.
It was his judgraent that was eclipsed."
Still as, though thus unanimous in believing in the
-probability of the King's ultimate recovery, the physicians
equally agreed in apprehending that it could not be speedy,

344 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
the ministers decided that it was necessary to appoint a
regency ; and in doing so they wisely and naturally took for
the guide as to their own conduct the precedent afforded
by the transactions of 1788. In some respects they were
more fortunate than Pitt and his colleagues, in that the
ground was partly cleared for them by the discussions
which had taken place on that occasion. But the old
question whether they should proceed by a legislative
bill to confer the kingly authority on the Prince of Wales,
or by an address to his Royal Highness, entreating him
to take that authority upon himself, was as fiercely
debated as ever. The objection which was urged with
the greatest plausibility against proceeding by bill was
the same which had been proposed by Fox before, that
the royal assent, which by the constitution was indis
pensable to make any bill the law of the land, could
not be given ; and that to affix the Great Seal to any
such document without the express order of the sovereign
was an act of treason. There was also the same personal
motive existing now which had operated on the former
occasion, and which, it is impossible to avoid suspecting,
coloured to a certain extent the arguments and con
duct of both parties ; that both took it for granted that
the first act of the Prince of Wales as regent would
be to change the Administration. Those, therefore, who
expected that the first consequence of the establishment of
the Regency would be an invitation to them to become the
advisers of the Regent, were solicitous to ingratiate them
selves with him by conferring the power on him in a
manner which he was known to prefer. Those who
considered him as incurably alienated from them, and
who, from past experience, had reasonable doubts of both
the political prudence and the filial duty which he was
likely to exhibit, were desirous to fetter, for a time at
least, his exercise of authority by some not very rigorous
restrictions. And this motive had an inevitable weight
in making the one party prefer the address, and the

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 345
other the bill. For if the Prince were of right and by
his own act to assume the sovereign authority, he must
of course assume it as free and unfettered as it had been
exercised by his father. But, if his exercise of it de
pended on an enactment of Parliament, it was plain that
they who conferred it must have a right to affix condi
tions and limitations to their gift. The truth was that
neither method of procedure was free from objections,
or reconcileable to the strict theory of the constitution.
A regulation was certainly incomplete which was enacted
by only two Estates of the realm, instead of three. To
declare a measure so passed as valid a law as if the three
had consented to it ; to suppose the consent of the third
when it was notorious that it neither had been nor could
be given, was an ignoring of that third, or an usurping
of its power, which was in direct antagonism to the most
fundamental principles of the constitution. On the other
hand, for the two Houses of Parliament to address the
Prince of Wales to take on himself the supreme authority
by his own act was not only a similar ignoring or usurp
ing of the power of the third Estate, the sovereign, but
it was also an invitation to an usurpation, which was a
still greater violation of constitutional law : an invitation
to the Prince to seat himself on the throne which his
father had not yet vacated.
With such alternatives alone before thera, the ministers
were clearly justified in choosing that which had the
greater argument in its favour to counterbalance the
objections which they theraselves could not deny. And
therefore Lord Liverpool, in bringing forward the pro
posals on which the Government had decided, applied
hiraself mainly to prove that, though the precedents on the
subject were neither numerous nor very explicit, they all
went to establish the right and power of Parliament to
raeet the difficulty by its own enactment, and certainly
gave no countenance whatever to the suggestion that any
one, even the acknowledged heir to the throne, had any

346 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
right to seize upon it till Parliament should have placed him
there. On the 27th of December he brought forward three
resolutions. Firstly, that, by the King's indisposition, the personal
exercise of the royal authority was suspended.
Secondly, that it was the right and duty of the Lords
and Commons to provide the means of supplying this defect.
Thirdly, that for that purpose it was necessary that Lords
and Commons should also determine on the means whereby
the royal assent might be given in Parliament to such bill
as might be passed by the two Houses of Parliament.
The first it was impossible that faction itself could deny.
To establish the two last he apphed all his fertility of
argument, whether derived from facts or analogy ; all his
knowledge of constitutional law, and of historical prece
dent. " Till he heard that it was intended to object to the
resolutions which he had laid upon the table, he had
thought that all would be agreed on the propriety of
looking back to the precedent of 1788 as that which might
be denominated a rule of conduct in respect of the form of
their proceedings. The principle of that great and salu
tary precedent he considered analogous to, and clearly
founded on, the genuine principles of the constitution. It
was that the throne must be considered as always fuH, and
that the political capacity of the sovereign is always in
existence, whatever may be the immediate temporary inca
pacity or personal situation of the monarch. This was a
practical distinction, of a nature not only expedient, but
necessary to ensure the governed the continued existence
of all the advantages to be derived from the principle and
operations of an hereditary monarchy. The second prin
ciple, on which the proceedings of 1788 were founded, and
which rendered them a proper precedent on the present
occasion, was that the law knows no such office as that of
regent. It is an office created under special circumstances,
to meet a special exigency, which must always be grounded
upon the necessity of the case itself and ought not to be

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 347
extended beyond what the existing exigency may require.
If this had not been the feeling of our ancestors, they
would have made some general provision on the subject
of regency ; and had such an office as that of regent
been recognised by laws we should have found something
respecting it in the statute-book, and should long since
have had it defined by the law of the land. But our
ancestors evidently held that it was dangerous to meddle
or interfere with so important a question by prospective
provisions ; and, whatever inconvenience might arise frora
any interval occurring in the personal exercise of the royal
functions, they chose to rest upon the broad basis of the
presumed general capacity of the king. In such a defi
ciency as the present they trusted entirely to the Parlia
ment of the day to provide for the emergency, not by the
adoption of any general measure, but by particular regula
tions founded on the special circurastances of the case ;
which raight thereby furnish the strongest barrier when
opposed to individuals aspiring to that office, and the
strongest security to the Crown itself He knew that some
entertained an opinion that it might be wise to extend the
principles and rules of the succession to the throne to the
order and right of succession to the regency; that, how
ever, had not been the principle of our ancestors, nor had it
been an acknowledged principle in raonarchical govern
raents in other countries to which regulations sirailar to
those of our own raight have been applied. There was,
indeed, hardly any country where that point had been so
settled ; nay, so far frora it, the heir apparent or heir pre
sumptive in raost other countries is positively considered as
the last person that should be appointed regent : as we
knew that in countries where even the Salique law pre
vailed, the next successor to the throne had not been
generally considered as entitled of right to take and exer
cise the powers of the regency. The third principle, on
which the proceedings of 1788 were forraed, and which
forraed the basis of the third resolution, was that it be-

348 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
longed to Parliament alone to appoint the regency. There
had been no instance whatever in our history in which to
make the appointment had not been recognised as the
right and duty of the Parliament. And the very nature of
the case limited the use of the term Parliament here to the
Lords and Commons. Claims of right undoubtedly in
some instances had been made by individuals aspiring to'
the office of regent, but those claims on full consideration
had been uniformly rejected. In the reign of Henry VI,
the monarch being a minor, a claim was made by the next
of kin to exercise the royal authority during the minority :
the claim was considered by Parliament, that is, by the
Lords and Commons of Parliament, precedents were
searched for, the authority of all the greatest men of
the time was taken upon the subject, and the answer to
that claim was that the Duke of Gloucester, the person
asserting it, could have no such claim either by will or
by kindred, but that the power of appointing a regent
for the kingdom belonged solely to the estates of the
realm. In short, he would venture to assert, without
fear of contradiction, that no example whatever was to
be found of any other mode of appointing a regent,
except by the Estates of the realm in Parliament
assembled. At the same time he might remind their
Lordships that, on the present occasion, while claiming
for the Estates of the realm the sole exclusive right to
appoint the regent, he did not in any way mean to
contend that the Prince of Wales ought not to be the
person appointed. He had only said thus much on the
question of the right of Parliament, because the claim
of right on the part of the Prince had been explicitly
preferred in 1788, though it had been subsequently
abandoned. "There was a fourth great constitutional principle on
which the great precedent of 1788 was founded, worthy of
particular attention : that, on a review of our whole his
tory, there did not appear to be a single instance, with

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 349
the exception of the cases of the Duke of Gloucester, after
wards Richard IIL, and of the Duke of Soraerset in the
reign of Edward VI. , in which the authority of the regent,
even though appointed by Parliament, had not been in
some way or other also Hmited or restrained by Parlia
raent. He was aware that it raight be said that the
examples referred to were mostly drawn frora tiraes of
turbulence and violence. That could not be denied ; but he
must at the same time reraind the House that to these
times we are to look back for the establishment of the
great and fundamental principles of the constitution ; for
the assertion of the rights and liberties of the people ; for
the foundation of those salutary laws which provide for
the security of the lives and properties of the subject ;
and that we were consequently bound to regulate our
conduct even by the precedents and authority of these
reraote tiraes, if no later or better authority could be
procured. The period between the establishraent of the
Great Charter and the accession of Henry VII. was that at
which we were to look for the great foundation of our con
stitution. And there were many instances in the history
of the Stuarts, who derived their right to the crown from
the Tudors, where the greatest lawyers deduced those
principles of Hberty, on which the Revolution was after
wards founded, from the precedents established during
that period. The great principles then laid down by
Lord Coke, Selden, and other most eminent constitu
tional lawyers, rested practically on the precedents of
that epoch ; which, although a period of violence and civil
commotions, was yet one to which Englishmen raust look
for the principles of their civil and political liberty.
" Moreover, these precedents had been confirmed in later
times. In the twenty-fifth year of the last reign provision
was made for a regency in the event of a prince who was a
minor succeeding to the throne. At that time, in default
of the issue of Frederick, the late Prince of Wales, the
Duke of Cumberland was presumptive heir to the throne.

35° LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
a person at that time extremely popular in the country,
and a favourite son of the reigning monarch ; yet under
all those circumstances Parliament gave the regency not to
him, but to the Princess Dowager of Wales, subject to such
limitations and restrictions as they in their wisdom thought
proper to impose. It was clear therefore that those pre
cedents, taken altogether, fully established the principle
that the whole arrangement was, and had at all times been
considered to be, wholly within the province of Parliament.
The question now to be considered was in what way
Parliament should proceed. The ministers recommended
a bill, which, by virtue of the authority of the two Houses
of Parliament, should receive the sanction royal by com
mission under the Great Seal, and thereby become an act
of the whole Legislature. Others, it was equally well
known, intended to propose proceeding by an address to
the Prince of Wales, requesting him to take upon himself
the government of the country, still under such restric
tions and Hmitations as should seem meet to the Houses.
I wish therefore," continued Lord Liverpool, "to call
your Lordships' attention to the difference between the
two modes of proceeding. It has been asserted that the
two Houses cannot by any act of theirs appoint a regent,
because they are incompetent, by themselves, to pass any
law. But if this be so, if the two Houses cannot by any
act of theirs legally appoint a regent, how can they
appoint him by address any more than by bill .' And
again, whether they appoint him by address or by bill,
will he not be equally appointed by Parliament ; which, so
long as it consists only of the two Houses of Lords and
Commons, those who resist the mode of proceeding by
bill deny to have any legal right to appoint him .' The
only difference would be that he would not be so formally
appointed in one case as in the other. For my own part
I have no hesitation in saying that I consider the mode
of proceeding by bill not only the better mode, but the
only mode that, upon any sound view of the principles of

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 351
the constitution, can be adopted. I conceive likewise
that the mode of proceeding by address would not estab
lish the authority of the Regent so firmly as that the
courts of law would be controlled by it, because, if there
were any flaw in its legislative sanction, they might think
themselves not bound to take cognizance of his autho
rity. An address, I admit, may call into activity legal
powers already in existence, but cannot therefore be con
sidered efficient to call forth or enact any powers not
already existing ; so that our proceedings in Parliament,
if we should adopt the raode of proceeding by address,
might be followed by a refusal on the part of the courts
of law to act upon thera. This, therefore, is a capital
objection to the raode of proceeding by address ; but it
does not hold good with respect to the raode of proceed
ing by a bill to which the Great Seal shall have been
affixed, for any bill to which the Great Seal has been
once affixed has all the authority and power of law so
long as it reraains unrepealed. And this is equally the
case if it has been affixed illegally ; for that is a question
into which the courts of law cannot inquire, but which
can only be investigated by the Parliament."
Lord Stanhope interrupted the speaker to declare that
this was a false view of the law ; but he only led Lord
Liverpool to prove his position on the spot, by a citation
of the language held by Lord Camden in 1788, who then
affirmed with respect to the Great Seal, that " Such was its
efficacy and unquestionable authority that, even if the Lord
Chancellor should put the Great Seal by caprice to any
comraission, it could not be afterwards questioned, not even
by the judges themselves. If an Act of Parliament passed
by authority of a commission issued under the Great Seal,
and was endorsed with the words ' Le Roi leveut', it raust be
received as a part of the statute law of the land, and could
not be disputed." And he further established his assertion
by a reference to indisputable precedents drawn from the
annals of Henry VI. and Edward VI., when unqualified

352 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
obedience had been rendered to different enactments after
the royal assent had been formally signified to them, even
though it was far from certain that that assent had been
duly and legitimately obtained.
Lord Liverpool therefore concluded that, in case of the
" personal incapacity of the King to signify his assent, there
remained no other mode to provide for the deficiency but
that of legislation. It lay only in the two remaining
branches of Parliament to provide for the deficiency. For
this there were numerous precedents. The principle of the
present proceeding went throughout on the consideration
that the throne was full; that the courts of justice were
open ; that the State was alive in all its parts. In 1688,
much vaunted as a precedent for proceeding by address,
the case was wholly different. The throne was vacant ; the
courts of justice were shut ; the Great Seal was destroyed.
Under these circumstances there was no alternative. Parlia
ment then could have no authority to legislate, and of
necessity adopted that mode under the circumstances which
appeared to them most beneficial to the State. They
adopted it because of the exigency of the case. He was
ready to admit that, if the King were capable, the two
Houses had no power to legislate without his authority;
but, if he were incapable, they had no other means of legis
lating but by putting the Great Seal into activity. The
common rule and constitutional principle was not to
legislate partially if we could legislate generally. If there
was a natural defect in one branch of the Legislature, then
recourse must be had to that which is nearest the power of
the whole in order to complete an act of authority by that
which remains. We must either pursue that mode of legis
lating or do nothing at all. We must exert our legislative
authority by the best means and forms which we have, and
we shall then have the satisfaction of knowing that our act
of authority cannot be disputed except by Parliament itself
on reasonable grounds.''
He concluded : " I wish that the question respecting these

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 353
resolutions now before you should rest on its own merits.
They involve one of the greatest and most important
questions ever discussed in Parliaraent ; they involve the
most essential rights of the Legislature ; they involve the
most essential interests of the throne : and in these considera
tions they involve everything raost dear to the liberties of
the subject, raost iraportant to the preservation of the con
stitution. Their adoption will afford the best security for
the welfare and prosperity of the country, and hold out the
most effectual protection for the rights and interests of all
classes of the coraraunity. For it cannot but be incon
sistent with the genuine principles of the constitution and
monarchy of the country, that any individual, however
exalted in rank or station, should be invested with the
powers of sovereignty without the constitutional sanction
and control of Parliament."
Unusually copious extracts have been given from Lord
Liverpool's speech on this occasion, partly on account of
the great constitutional iraportance of the subject, and
because the mode of procedure then adopted will probably
be taken at any future time as affording an irresistible pre
cedent ; partly, perhaps still raore, because they afford as
good a speciraen as can be desired of Lord Liverpool's
style of oratory. It may not soar to the highest flights of
eloquence; it does not seek to illustrate the topics with
which it deals by any rich or varied imagery (they hardly
admitted of impassioned appeals to the feelings) ; and from
sarcasm he at all times carefully abstained. But never
theless the speech, in its unabridged completeness, is not
without high merit. It exhausts the question ; it displays
a thorough and minute knowledge of the whole history
of the subject, an entire mastery of the fundamental , prin
ciples and of the practical working of the constitution.
It marshals facts and precedents with admirable clearness
both of arrangement and explanation. It shirks no point
which could be raised by the opposite party ; it avoids the
fatal but comraon error of weakening a single argument or
VOL. L A A

354 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
statement by exaggeration. Such a style of oratory, if, as
has been admitted, not of the highest possible class, is
nevertheless well suited to the character of the speaker as a
minister entrusted with the conduct of weighty and delicate
State affairs, well adapted to its object of convincing the
reason of Parliament, and of justifying the proceedings of
the Government to the nation at large.
The speech was completely successful. Lord Grenville,
who had held an inferior office in Pitt's Ministry in 1788,
felt himself precluded by his position then from now
opposing a measure which marched exactly in the steps
of that proposed by his chief on that occasion, though he
indemnified himself for the forbearance of his vote by a
virulence of invective (if indeed his language deserves so
respectable a name) against the ministers personally sur
passing all former explosions of his ill-temper. The sole
cause of his indignation, as he himself avowed, was that
they had allowed two months to elapse before they had
taken any steps to fill up the void left in the Government
by the King's illness. He declared that their conduct in so
doing " was putting to hazard the best interests of the coun
try, and might entail calamity, not alone upon this nation,
but upon the whole human race. Supporting, as he meant to
do, their proposition, he must still reprobate and condemn
the accumulated criminality of ministers : he must exclaim
with all his might against the usurpation of those arrogant
raen, who first, since the days of Cromwell, had the au
dacity to assume and to exercise the functions of the regal
authority. Their conduct could only be considered as an
outrageous insult upon the nation, and a barefaced usur
pation of the sovereign's power, by forging his royal
mandate and issuing orders in the King's name, when it was
admitted that his Majesty's pleasure could not possibly
have been taken upon any public measure."
Such frantic vehemence defeated itself Considering that
twice within the recollection of most of his hearers the King
had been attacked by a malady of the same kind, and had

i8io] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 355
corapletely recovered, it was not likely that they could be
induced to think eight weeks too long a period to wait in
the hope of indications of a sirailar recovery ; while it was
obvious that, unless the whole Governraent were brought
to a standstill during the incapacity of the King, the
rainisters must take upon themselves to carry it on as if
they were able to consult him.
The task of formally opposing the resolutions therefore
was left to Lord Holland. He could not deny the sound
ness of Lord Liverpool's principal positions, acknowledging
even what in 1788 his uncle had so strenuously denied, that
Parliament had the undoubted right, in appointing a re
gency, of " passing by even the heir apparent or presumptive
of the throne." But he denied that " any agreeraent of the
two Houses could make an Act of Parliaraent," and charac
terised any atterapt to impose teraporary limitations on the
prerogative proposed to be entrusted to the Regent as "a
direct and studied insult to hira." He went further, and
formally denied the power of the two Houses so to limit
the royal authority even when vested in the hands of a
deputy, on the ground that "as it had been conferred on
the King for the security of the people, as, unless it were
necessary to their interests and conducive to their safety, it
ought not to exist at all, no power but that of a_/z<// Parlia
ment was competent to wrest it from them." He contended
that the Long Parliaraent itself, an assembly certainly not
inclined to put the authority of the King too high, had
asserted in the plainest raanner that " there was no instance
of Parliaraent sitting without its full powers, and that every
Act was incoraplete without the concurrence of the three
branches of the Legislature. Even in that raoraent of
popular agitation, the great raen who were the leaders of
the Parliament at that tirae, and who were sorae of the
first lawyers and patriots in our history, were so careful not
to exceed the bounds of their Parliamentary duties that
it was not until the Parliament had agreed to the abolition
of monarchy itself that they proceeded to acts of legisla-
A A 2

356 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1810
tion." If, in his statement that to impose temporary
restrictions on the full exercise of the royal authority was
a direct and studied insult to the prince who was to be
appointed regent, he fell in a minor degree into the same
fault of exaggeration that marked Lord Grenville's harangue,
in this latter argument he was presuming largely on the
probability of the party feelings of a portion of his audience
leading them to overlook both logic and fact, since nothing
could be plainer or more notorious than that, if the concur
rence of the three Estates was necessary to constitute an
Act of Parliament, the Long Parliament had not abolished
monarchy, since undoubtedly Charles had assented to no
such abolition.
Finally, Lord Holland was compelled to admit that " the
nature of the emergency was such that no course of pro
ceeding, neither that by bill nor that by address, was
entirely unobjectionable," and to rest his preference for the
address as more respectful and more agreeable to the
inclinations of the prince who was to become regent.
Two of the royal princes declared their adherence to the
amendment which Lord Holland concluded by moving:
the Duke of Sussex following Lord Grenville in his
vehement denunciations of the whole Cabinet for having
"assumed for the immense period of eight weeks the
functions of royalty," and showing his animosity to them
personally still more by the care with which he repeat
edly styled them "the late ministers of his Majesty;"
while the Duke of York, though he approved of their
having waited till the present time, and declared that
he would willingly have voted for even a further adjourn
ment, equally objected to the raethod of proceeding by
bill, and to the imposition of any limitations on the Re
gent's power. There could be no doubt that he was speak
ing the sentiments of the Prince of Wales himself ; and, if
they had considered their own prospect of retaining office,
it would have been the interest of the ministers to have
yielded at least the last point, which was probably the one

i8n] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 357
to which their future master attached the greater iraport
ance. But, considering nothing but the principles of the
constitution, as they interpreted it, and the interests of
the country, as they regarded thera, they were firra in
their adherence to their original view : and their uncom
promising steadiness had a reward which they had never
anticipated, and which came upon their opponents like a
thunder-clap. On a division the resolutions of the Government were
carried in the House of Lords by a majority of 26, in the
House of Coraraons by more than 100. A deputation of
both Houses was appointed to wait upon the Prince of
Wales, and to express their hope that, " from his regard
for the interests of his Majesty and the nation, he would
be ready to undertake the weighty and iraportant trust
proposed to be invested in hira." And he returned a short
and dignified reply, intimating, indeed, some annoyance
at the limitations iraposed on the Regent's authority by
the assurance that his own feelings would have prompted
him "to show his father and sovereign all the reverential
delicacy inculcated in the resolutions," but consenting to
undertake the regency, "relying with confidence on the
constitutional advice of an enlightened Parliament, and
the zealous support qf a generous and loyal people. He
would use all the raeans left to hira to merit both."
The bill necessary to give the resolutions formal legis
lative validity was passed through both Houses with all
practicable rapidity. The charge and care of the King's
person, and the control of the royal household, were vested
in the Queen; and the Opposition, flattering theraselves
that the distribution of all other appointments would
belong to them, caused a little delay by their efforts to
remove one or two offices which had hitherto always been
ranked as belonging to the household, such as those of the
Lord Steward and the Master of the Hounds, from that
classification. On this topic it was remarkable that they
were joined by Canning, as they had been on the question

358 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1811
of imposing limitations on the Regent's power ; but, though
in one or two divisions the majority obtained by the
ministers was very narrow, the bill was ultimately passed
by both Houses as they framed it, with a provision that
the limitations on the Regent's authority should cease at
the end of twelve months, since, if the King had not
recovered his health by that time, but little hope could be
entertained of his ever becoming able to resume his position
as the active ruler of the kingdom. It is remarkable that
so great were the fluctuations of the disease in its earlier
stages, that as late as the 28th of January the Lord Chan
cellor stated to the Lords that there was " a most material
amendment in his Majesty." But the hopes engendered
by this statement, and by the opinions of the physicians
on which it was formed, proved delusive. The two Houses
further agreed to a resolution authorising the issue of a
Commission to give it the sanction of the royal assent in
the King's name, " forasmuch as " (in the words of the
Letters Patent) " for divers causes and reasons we cannot
conveniently at this time be present in our royal person
in the higher House of Parliament." The assent was thus
given on the Sth of February ; on the 6th the necessary
oaths were administered to the Prince at the Privy Council,
and the Regency was formally established.

i8ii] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 359

CHAPTER XI.
Mr. Perceval continues minister — Increased strength of the Ministry
— Expectations of the Spaniards — New measures respecting the
militia — A Committee of the House of Commons recommends a
return to cash payments — Lord Liverpool predicts a war between
Russia and France — Birth of the King of Rome — Operations in
Sicily and in India — Debate on the Catholic question — Resignation
of Lord Wellesley — Expiration of restrictions on the Regency — Lord
Castlereagh becomes Foreign Secretary — The Regent's cordiality
towards the ministers — He makes overtures to Lord Grenville and
Lord Grey to join the Cabinet — The Catholic question — Lord Liver
pool's predictions of some of the results of emancipation verified
in 1868 — Murder of Mr. Perceval— Negotiations for fresh ministe
rial arrangements — Mr. Stuart Wortley's address to the Regent for
a strong Ministry — Discussions in Parliament on the negotiations
— Lord Wellesley's proposals to Lord Grenville — Negotiations with
Lord Moira — The old Administration is replaced under Lord
Liverpool.
The leaders of the Opposition, who in some of their recent
votes had been avowedly guided by the inclinations of the
Regent himself, had never doubted that his first act would
be to deprive the existing ministers of their offices and to
entrust the government to them. They found theraselves
signally deceived. The day before the bill passed the
Prince had written to Mr. Perceval^ to coraraunicate his
intention to keep him and his colleagues in his service.
The chief reason alleged for this decision was his Royal
Highness's desire to do nothing which "raight in the
^ The letter is given at full length, with Mr. Perceval's reply, in Lord
Colchester's Diary, ii. 316, 317. The date of the letter is February 4th,
' that of the minister's reply February 5th, the day on which the bill
passed.

36o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [i8ii
smallest degree have the effect of interfering with the
progress of his sovereign's recovery." But another reason,
which probably was not without its weight, might perhaps
have been found in the dictatorial manner which the two
lords, as they were often called, Grenville and Grey, had
already adopted towards him. They had evidently con
sidered him bound implicitly to adopt their counsels. He,
on the other hand, had shown at least an equal inclination
to consult Lord Moira, and in passages of difficulty a still
greater disposition to be guided by the judgment of
Sheridan, by far the ablest man of the Whig party since
the death of Fox, and also the most intimate of his
personal friends. It must be added that he had a fair
reason for not consideririg hirnself bound, on the score of
consistency, to discard his father's Tory councillors for his
own former friends of the opposite party, since, on the
death of Fox, he had made known to the surviving leaders
of the Whigs his intention of withdrawing from all personal
interference in politics, and had expressed himself desirous
of being no longer considered as '' a party man."^
Sheridan's advice, if, as is most probable, it contributed
to decide the Prince to retain the services of Perceval
and his colleagues, was certainly mqst disinterested, since
it deprived him of an appointment which it was of
great consequence to him to obtain. If a Whig Cabinet
had been formed, he was to have been Chief Secretary for
Ireland, and to counsel a step so destructive of his per
sonal prospects was a rare act of political good faith. But
he seems fully entitled to the praise. It is certain that
the letter which announced that decision to the Prime
Minister was of his framing, and that the Prince himself
saw gradually more and more reason to be satisfied with
the decision to which he had come. In truth, the reason
put forward, that any change of the Administration at
that moment might have a prejudicial effect on the King's
health by retarding his recovery, expressed his genuine
' Moore's Life of Sheridan, ii. 384.

i8ii] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 361
feelings : for just at this moment the bulletins of the
King's health were growing more and more favorable ; and
on the very day that the Regency Bill passed George III.
spoke of it to Lord Eldon ^ with a calmness and good
judgment well calculated to encourage sanguine hopes
that his recovery could not be far distant.
The ministers themselves felt their position greatly
strengthened by the circurastances under which they were
thus continued in office. Even while the Regency Bill was
in preparation, and when they fully expected to be dis
missed in a few weeks. Lord Liverpool could write to one
of his correspondents that, though the Opposition were
" more bitter than ever, they were certainly very much
divided amongst themselves ; and he was confident that
the Government had a considerable majority of the well-
disposed and respectable part of the community on their
side." And if this calculation was correct when, according
to the general belief, the Opposition leaders were enjoying
the full confidence of the Prince of Wales, it was evident
that the entire change of circurastances, which had rendered
the Prince with his increased authority the open patron of
the Ministry, had placed thera wholly above danger. And
during the year 181 1 they were consequently able to follow
out their own policy without hindrance or obstacle, sorae
of the Opposition theraselves being even gradually won
over to a change of their opinions on points connected
with the Peninsular war, by the proofs which our great
general was daily giving of his raanifest superiority to all
his antagonists. Even before the end of February the
accession of strength which the ministers derived frora these
occurrences began to be felt, and Lord Liverpool could
^ He said, " I don't think it a very pleasant thing to be put out of
office any more than apy of you may do. But my ministers tell me
that my physicians think it best that the weight of business should be
taken off my hands ; and my physicians tell me that my ministers
think so ; and as I have a perfect confidence in you all, that you will
do what is best for me, I shall very readily acquiesce." (Diary of Lord
Colchester, ii. 319.)

362 LIFE AND ADMINISTRA TION [i 8 1 1
write to Lord Wellington that " everything was going on
more smoothly than could have been expected, and hitherto
as well as could even have been desired. The King," he
added, "was certainly recovering."
Lord Liverpool's own resolution to consider everything,
and even the civil rights of the soldiers themselves, secon
dary to the great object of strengthening Wellington's
hands, was remarkably shown in one piece of advice which
he gave him about the same time. The general com
plained, not without reason, that the enemy whom he was
combating was greatly assisted by our own newspapers,
which continually published accurate and minute details of
the amount and distribution of his forces, and in some in
stances even of the designs which he had, or was supposed
to have, in contemplation. A careful inquiry satisfied Lord
Liverpool that this information was procured from no
subordinate official of the Government, but from officers
themselves, or from their friends at home, who communi
cated to the papers the letters which they had received.
" Indeed a mail never arrived without his seeing in the
next newspapers copies of such letters, which bore internal
marks of their authenticity." And he therefore recom
mended Wellington to try the effect of a general order
pointing out the difficulties to himself and the dangers to
the country which such communications caused, and re
quiring the officers to take care that their letters were not
thus divulged in future. And he recommended him, if this
warning should be disregarded, or should prove ineffectual
to stop the post altogether. He mentioned, what Wel
lington apparently was not aware of, that Sir John Moore
had taken this step during his campaign, and urged him in
the strongest manner to follow that officer's example if the
evil were not stopped. He " knew very well that such a
measure could not be continued for any length of time ;
but even a short experience of its inconvenience would, he
had no doubt, make the officers with the army and their
friends at home cautious for the future.

i8ii] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 363
Wellington would have even wished to have the details
of his own formal despatches kept out of the Gazette. But
that, as Lord Liverpool explained to him, was a matter of
greater difficulty. "He had," he said, "used every caution
in his power on this subject, and had alraost invariably con
fined the publication of the despatches to statements of
facts, without observation or prediction as to the future. But
Wellington himself raust be aware of the very difficult
situation in which ministers were placed frora the nature
of our government. The public expected inforraation
from them, and a raost unfavorable impression was some
times produced by their reraaining wholly silent." He
therefore asked Wellington, if possible, to write two des
patches, one of which should be " confined to what he
might think could safely be published, while the other
might convey that information and those observations
which ought to be brought under the view of his Majesty
and his Government, but ought at the same tirae to be
confined to them exclusively. Or, if he should be unable
to spare time for this work, if he would mark in his des
patches what he might be willing to have published, he
hiraself would take care that the publication should be
limited to those passages." But, he added, it would be
necessary for the general to take the sarae precaution with
respect to the Portuguese Governraent, since " he had
found passages published in the Portuguese gazettes from
Wellington's despatches to the authorities at Lisbon in
every respect similar to those which he had himself received
frora hira, but which he had thought it prudent to omit.
And this had given the appearance of a desire on the part
of the rainisters to conceal what there was no objection to
publish in Portugal, and had produced an unfavorable
irapression." It required all the care and energy of both
minister and general to abate the evil of which both were
conscious, and which the impossibility of fettering our press
prevented from being entirely removed.
Nor indeed, in spite of their increased strength both in

364 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [i8ii
Parliament and with the nation at large, were the ministers
yet free from the difficulties which had hitherto embar
rassed them in their efforts to provide the supplies and
reinforcements necessary to maintain the army in a state
of complete efficiency. Money was still scarce to a degree
which at the present day we find difficult to comprehend ;
and our population, far smaller then than that which we
see around us now, seemed scarcely equal to the drain
made upon it by the demands of the two services in so
protracted a war. The extent of the difficulty caused by
these deficiencies is shown by the following letter from
Lord Liverpool to Lord Wellington on the subject of
the project which it was understood that the Spanish
Government entertained, of offering the British leader the
eommand of their army as well as of our own :
Private. Downing Street, 20th February, 181 1.
My dear Lord,
I have received the favour of your Lordship's letter relative to the
proposal which is likely to be made to you by the Spanish
Government, to confer on you the command of the Spanish
arraies.
Before I retum an answer to your letter in this respect, I think it
may be material to take this opportunity of communicating to
you the sentiments of Government with regard to our situation
in the Peninsula.
You will recollect that, at the commenceraent of the last campaign,
we calculated the expense of the exertion to be made in
Portugal as not exceeding in the whole three millions for that
year ; and we were of opinion that, if the expense could be
confined within this lirait, the exertion might be raaintained,
perhaps, for an indefinite period.
The events of the carapaign have led to a gradual augmentation
of our army, and to an increase of expenditure in all the
different branches of the service. These efforts have been
certainly made in the hope that it would not be necessary to
continue our exertions upon the present scale for any con
siderable length of time.

i8ii] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 365
I may refer you on this point to my private letter of the loth of
September, in which I inform you that the augmentation which
it was then agreed should be made to your force would be
made only with reference to a temporary exigency. I add,
"We must make an option between a steady and continued
exertion upon a moderate scale and a great and extraordinary
effort for a limited time, which neither our means military nor
financial will enable us to maintain permanently."
Upon comparing the expenditure of the last year with our original
intention, and with the expenditure of former years, the result
is as follows : —
The campaign of 1808 may be considered as having cost
2,778,796/. ; the campaign of 1809, 2,639,764/. ; the campaign
of 1810, 6,061,235/. This expense is exclusive of ordnance
stores, supplies of every sort which have been sent in kind, and
of transports, making in the whole not less than 2,000,000/.
more. It is further to be observed, that this amount furnishes
no ground for calculating our probable expenditure, according
to our present effort, for the year 181 1 ; as the first considerable
augmentation of our army in Portugal only took place in the
month of September, and as a reinforcement of 5,000 men has
been recently sent from this country. We have therefore to
calculate for the current year, not only upon whatever increase
may be necessary for the Portuguese subsidy, but likewise upon
the expense of an army of 50,000 British from the beginning of
the year,
I am fully convinced that every effort has been made to carry on
the service with as much economy as possible ; but I am under
the necessity of stating it to be the unanimous opinion of every
member of the Government, and of every person acquainted
with the finances and resources of the country, that it is abso
lutely impossible to continue our exertions upon the present
scale in the Peninsula for any considerable length of time.
If the present amount and condition of our army is likely to
enable us to bring the contest in Portugal to a short and
successful issue, we must meet the difficulties, whatever they
may be ; but we must otherwise look, at no very distant period,
either , to a reduction of the scale of our exertions, or to the
necessity of withdrawing our army altogether.

366 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1811
The honour of this country, as well as its safety, is however so
deeply committed in the contest, and the obligations we have
contracted with the Portuguese army and nation are of such a
nature, that we are fully sensible that every effort is to be raade
by us to preserve our station in Portugal as long as possible.
But these considerations furnish an additional inducement why
we should not involve ourselves, under circumstances such as
those which I have been obliged to describe, in any further
engagements which we may be wholly unable to fulfil, or which
can only be fulfilled by diminishing our exertions in the quarter
to which they are now directed.
It is impossible for us therefore to hold out any prospect to the
Spanish Governraent of our being able to assist them materially,
under the present circumstances, with the means of supplying
and equipping their armies. If the case was a new one, we
might give the nations of the Peninsula the option between
considerable railitary aid or a subsidy to a large amount ; or a
middle course might be adopted, and the military aid and
subsidy both be afforded to a limited extent. But the resources
of this country do not enable us to afford, at the same time (in
addition to all the other great and unavoidable demands of the
war), such a military effort as we are at present making in
Portugal and at Cadiz and large pecuniary supplies to the
Spaniards. We are at this time maintaining a British and
Portuguese force in the Peninsula of not much less than 90,000
men ; we are keeping in check the most efficient and raost
numerous arraies of France in that quarter; we are affording
thereby to the cause of Spain, as well as Portugal, the most
effectual assistance possible : and if the Spaniards cannot avail
themselves of such a diversion, it is difficult to say what effort
of their allies is likely to accomplish their deliverance.
After having brought these considerations under your view, it
appears scarcely necessary to add that, under the present cir
curastances, we see no adequate advantage that would result
frora the command of the Spanish armies being conferred upon
you. At the same time, if any arrangement could be made
which, without involving the country in further expense, or
engaging the British army in operations in the interior of Spain,
would place at your disposal the Spanish armies which may be

i8ii] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 367
in the provinces immediately contiguous to Portugal, and would
enable you to combine their operations with those of the army
under your command, considerable advantage might certainly
arise from such an arrangement ; and you will exercise therefore
your discretion with regard to any such qualified proposal, if it
should be made to you on the part of the Spanish Government.
I have the honour to be.
My dear Lord,
Very faithfully yours, Liverpool.
Lord Liverpool clearly thought that one great induce
ment to the Spaniards to entertain a design so inconsistent
with the usual arrogance of their nation was the idea that
it would induce us to be still more lavish than heretofore
of our resources in their behalf And this was actually
beyond our power. In fact, the very depth and firraness
of our resolution to raaintain the contest to the last did
of itself imperatively warn us to husband our means, which
this year were also in sorae degree crippled by an unusually
bad harvest, a calamity that extended over all the coun
tries of Northern Europe. The exertions which the letter
just quoted recapitulates were far beyond any estiraate that
could previously have been forraed of our power ; and
though, as the struggle continued, habit enabled us to
support still heavier burdens, it was no wonder that as
yet what was already being done appeared even to the
raost earnest the utmost that by any possibility could
be contrived.
To meet one of the difficulties Lord Liverpool proposed
to his colleagues a raeasure for recruiting the regular army
by a systeraatic draught from the militia ; and a further pro
posal for the interchange of the British and Irish militia, by
which the transfer of the regiments of one island to service
in the other should be legalized. Both measures received
the sanction of Parliament ; and it is deserving of remark
that, in recommending the second bill to his brother peers.
Lord Liverpool took the opportunity of bearing a warm

368 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [iSii
testimony to the general good conduct of the Irish Roman
Catholics : saying that " he believed them to be as respect
able and loyal as any other description of his Majesty's
subjects, and that the regiments raised in counties chiefly
Catholic would be among the first to volunteer to serve
in England." Such language showed a complete freedom
from the bigotry which influenced many of those who fol
lowed him in his resistance to Catholic emancipation ; but
at the same time it gave up the ground on which the Roman
Catholics had originally been debarred the full exercise of
their civil fights, and which had been their loyalty to the
exiled dynasty instead of to the reigning sovereign, and
the incompatibility of their avowed allegiance to the Pope
with their fidelity to a Protestant, or indeed to any tem
poral prince. The bills thus passed outran even the hopes
of those who framed them in the success which resulted
from them ; and, during the remainder of the war, the
militia proved » very effective and abundant nursery for
the army employed abroad. ^ But the want of specie was a
difficulty not so easily overcome. At the time of which we
are speaking it influenced all our transactions at home,
however petty or important. Lord Folkestone affirmed to
the House of Commons that a farmer going to a fair,
though there was a bank in the town where it was held,
found himself utterly unable to procure silver for a single
pound note. Those who had come to sell were unable to
find purchasers, from the absolute dearth of small change,
except in cases where four or five persons clubbed together
to make purchases which, taken together, should amount to
a pound. The Bank itself passed a resolution declaring
that a crown-piece was worth five-and-sixpence ; while
men were prosecuted for selling guineas for a sum beyond
'^ Before the summer was over. Lord Liverpool wrote to Wellington :
" I am happy in being able to add that our measure for recruiting by
volunteers from the militia has been in this country more successful
than we had any reason to expect. And we gain this peculiar advan
tage from it, that every man who is approved is a formed soldier, and
not a raw recruit."

i8ii] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 369
their norainal value ; an inconsistent piece of severity and
injustice, when the coraraittee appointed by the House of
Coraraons reported that gold had risen raore than fifteen
per cent, above its usual price. Various remedies were pro
posed, one of which, though urged by a coraraittee of the
House of Coraraons, was, in the opinion of the Government,
calculated rather to aggravate than to diminish the evil.
It recommended a repeal of the law which suspended cash
payments at a fixed period, whether the war should have
been previously terrainated or not. And it is probable that
this recoraraendation, which it was manifest might involve,
and, as the event proved, would inevitably have involved, a
paralysing of our railitary operations at a raost critical
period, disposed Mr. Vansittart and Lord Liverpool, who
at all tiraes enjoyed, both araong his brother rainisters
and brother peers, a high reputation for his acquaintance
with financial affairs, to resist the adoption of the corarait-
tee's report. Under their advice the Governraent carae to
the aid of the coraraercial classes by a great advance of ex
chequer bills, and thus enabled thera to save their credit as a
body, and preserved nurabers of thera frora ruin, and the
country in general frora a monetary panic which might have
been raost raischievous to all It was a wise and salutary
raeasure, and was soon acknowledged to be so. Nor per
haps was it an inferior proof of statesraanlike wisdom to
acknowledge the impotence of legislation in other cases,
and to adrait that no legislative raeasure could supply the
deficiency of the precious raetals.- None was attempted, and
the evil, left to itself, gradually, to some extent, cured itself
Under the judicious care of the Governraent, equally saga
cious in its partial action and its partial inaction, British
trade recovered its balance, and coin began to flow raore
freely into the Exchequer to be transraitted to our troops
and allies in the Peninsula.
The campaign of 1811 was, however, distinguished by
no great exploits ; though marked by the steady progress
of the British arras, and by conflicts which placed in a
VOL. L B B

370 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1811
stronger light than ever the superiority of the British
troops to their enemies. But neither Barrosa nor Al-
buera were productive of any more positive consequences ;
and the operations of the whole year must be looked
on rather as a preparation for and augury of the brilliant
and decisive achievements of the two ensuing campaigns,
than as deserving of any detailed mention from their
own importance. An omen of the future, indeed, even
before Barrosa and Albuera, was drawn from the occu
pation and maintenance of the lines of Torres Vedras by
no inconsiderable part of the Opposition itself And it
was on the occasion of Lord Liverpool inviting the House
to thank Wellington for his successful defence of Portugal
by those operations, that Lord Grey, (as has been pre
viously mentioned,) did himself honour by frankly ad
mitting the injustice which he had previously done the
general and the ministers. Lord Liverpool in a speech
of very elaborate details, after giving a minute descrip
tion of the greatness of the preparations which Napoleon
had made to ensure the success of his armies, and of
the means and acts by which Wellington had baffled the
utmost endeavours of the French marshals, claimed for him
the praise of having shown himself superior in every quality
of a commander to Junot, Soult, Victor, Jourdan, Massena,
"generals whose career of success had made their names
proverbial." And Lord Grey, who the year before had
inveighed so bitterly against the Government, the general,
and every one connected with the war, now put himself
forward to second the motion, and, with a candour which
is the more honorable from its rarity, acknowledged how
completely his former anticipations had been falsified ;
and, while " he trusted their Lordships would do him the
justice to believe that the opinions which he had formerly
delivered, though now happily contradicted by the event,
were at least the sincere and honest dictates of his mind,
taken up from no illiberal or invidious feelings," avowed that
" he had now no hesitation to qualify and retract them."

i8ii] OF LORD LIVERPOOL

371

For the object of the present work it is not out of place
to add that in sorae previous sentences he had also ex
pressed his adrairation of Lord Liverpool's speech, "to
which he had listened with the sincerest pleasure ; and
his thanks were particularly due to hira for the candour
which he had displayed on this, as on every sirailar occa
sion, in avoiding the introduction of any invidious topics,
and oraitting all allusion to any of those forraer differ
ences of opinion which might have tended to interrupt
the unanimity which ought to prevail on such an occasion."
For one of the most uniforra characteristics of Lord
Liverpool's oratory was its extreme forbearance and fair
ness towards his adversaries ; and the moderation of temper
which this habit indicated, combined as it was with an
unshrinking assertion of and adherence to his own con
victions, eminently qualified him for the higher post to
which he was soon to be called, and even in times of
the greatest party violence, frora which his Adrainistration
was not free, allayed the irritation and tempered the
opposition of all but the most rancorous and the most
unscrupulous.^ The qualities of the existing Prime Minister closely
resembled his own, and on his own scene of action were
I Alison (c. Ixv. §116) quotes from Berthier's letters to Massena, dated
March 1811, the following astonishing statement : "L'empereur lit les
journaux de Londres, et chaque jour un grand nombre de lettres de
rOpposition, dont quelques-unes accusent Lord Wellington, et parient
en ddtail de vos operations ; I'Angleterre tremble pour son arm^e
d'Espagne." But it seems due to the character of our Parliament, little
trammelled as some members had shown themselves by the ordinary
rules of candour or patriotism, to avow a total disbelief that any of
them had been guilty of the treasonable wickedness of furnishing
information to the enemy. If Napoleon did really receive letters from
England (a fact which may be doubted, so little is the credence due
to the assertion of any Frenchman of that day, and especially to his
own), they probably came from some of the members of the different
revolutionary societies which were still in existence ; from men trying
to represent themselves as persons of importance, rather than from
any who actually were such. B B 2

372 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [i8n
equally effective. In the same month which had witnessed
Lord Grey's retractation Lord Liverpool writes to Wel
lington : " We are proceeding with our business in Par
liament very prosperously. The good news you have
sent us has greatly assisted us. Perceval's character is
completely established in the House of Commons ; he
has acquired an authority there beyond any minister
within my recollection except Mr. Pitt. Our weak side,"
he is forced to add, " is Ireland : and so it will remain
for many years." This prediction, which his own unfor
tunate stedfastness on the question of Catholic emanci
pation contributed to verify, was not the only one in
this letter. With a sagacity which no one else seems as
yet to have shared, he announced to Wellington that he
certainly saw " appearances of a renewed conflict in the
north of Europe ; and it v/ould be a great question to
determine what advantage could be taken of it, if it should
occur" It denoted a singularly keen foresight thus to anti
cipate the renewal of resistance by the Powers of the
north of Europe to the will of the French emperor.
It is true that Russia had recently relaxed some of her
commercial decrees in a manner with which he was dis
satisfied ; but she appeared to be so fully occupied with
her war against Turkey, that it was hardly to be expected
that, while that continued, she would bring on herself a
fresh antagonist, and that one so formidable as she had
already found the conqueror of Friedland : while, of the
other great kingdoms, Prussia had concluded a fresh
treaty with Napoleon in January, and his alliance with
Austria seemed more firmly cemented than ever by the
birth of a son, which Maria Louisa had borne him only
three weeks before this letter was written. But a true
statesman can often pierce through the outer screen of
present acts and occurrences ; carefully scrutinizing the
real interests and genuine though perhaps, secret feelings
of other nations and other statesmen, he learns to dis-

i8ii] OF LORD LIVERPOOL 373
tinguish transitory entanglements frora perraanent con
nexions, and thus is able at tiraes to foresee the degree
in which, in spite of existing circurastances, or even, it
raay be, in consequence of those very circurastances, the
raore enduring interests and feelings raay eventually work
a change in the policy of present allies or present eneraies.
And thus it happened in this instance. Fourteen raonths
afterwards the prediction which Lord Liverpool thus an
nounced was fulfilled ; and the total failure of Napoleon's
plans, and the ruin of his army in Russia, was owing
in no slight measure to the firraness with which he, who
had then becorae Prirae Minister, adhered to the resolu
tion which the sarae letter also repeated, that, whatever
raight happen elsewhere, " the Government was determined
not to be diverted from the Peninsula to other objects :
if we could strike a blow, it was there that we would
strike it." And the influence which this deterraination
had on the carapaign at the raost distant extreraity of
Europe was demonstrated by the singular coincidence
that, on the very morning that the French and Russian
hosts were arming for the deadly struggle at Borodino,
the one was cheered and the other disraayed by the news
of the great victory which Wellington had achieved at
Salaraanca. With all his conviction that the Peninsula was the field
of action to which, so far we were concerned, every other
was subordinate. Lord Liverpool was not allowed to fix his
undivided attention on it. He was forced also to take
raeasures to secure the safety of Sicily, which it was under
stood that Murat was preparing to attack, and to enter
into a' correspondence with the Governor-General of India,
Lord Minto, with respect to attacks which he had planned
and the navy had executed against the iraportant islands
of Bourbon and the Mauritius, and the still raore valuable
Dutch settleraent of Java. They were all, as the reader
need hardly be rerainded, entirely successful ; and Lord
Liverpool, generously giving the whole credit of the con-

374 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1811
quests thus achieved to Lord Minto, announced to him that,
as soon as the restrictions on the Regent's authority should
have expired, the Prince intended to promote him in the
peerage. Though it was with great unwillingness that
his Royal Highness had consented to any limitations being
placed on his authority, yet, after they were so imposed, he
acquiesced in them with the most entire cheerfulness and
good faith ; abstaining even from conferring honours which
were confessedly within his authority to grant,^ lest his be
stowing them might seem a proof of his discontent with
those who had forbidden him to grant more, and of whom
his acquaintance with them as ministers had led him to
form a very different opinion from that which he had
formerly entertained.^
The first year of the regency had thus passed by with a
great increase of credit and authority to the Ministry, which
was of the greater importance because the hopes of the
King's recovery, which up to midsummer had been enter
tained with sanguine confidence by all his physicians, during
the autumn and winter had gradually faded away, and at
the beginning of 1812 few persons, if any, ventured to
whisper a belief in the possibility of his restoration to
health. In February, if he were still in the same state, all
restrictions on the full exercise of his authority by the
Regent were to cease ; and the leaders of the Opposition
1 After General Hill's splendid surprise of Gerard at Arroyo de
Molinos, Lord Liverpool wrote to Wellington that Hill was to have
the red riband of the Bath "as soon as the restrictions on the
regency had expired ;" adding, "You are of course aware that there is
no restriction upon the regent's right of granting this species of
honor. But his Royal Highness has thought proper to restrain him
self as to the grant of every description of honour until the period when
Parliament shall have declared, from the little probability of the Kingis
recovery, that the Executive Government should be administered by
the regent as fully and unrestrainedly as by the King himself."
2 In a letter quoted by Mr. Twiss ( Life of Lord Eldon, ii. 196),
the chancellor tells one of his intimate friends that " Before the close
of it [the year of restricted regency] the prince had totally altered his
opinion of the men whom he had hated."

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 375
still cherished a hope that, when that moment should arrive,
the Prince would think that the reasons which he had
avowed for the retention of the existing rainisters were also
terrainated, and would at last call theraselves to his councils.
Without being aware of it, from the moraent that Parlia
ment reassembled, which it did in the first week of the new
year,, they took and adhered to a line of conduct which
materially lessened any inclination that, from early pre
possessions he may have felt, to entrust them with the chief
direction of affairs. For he had gradually come to embrace
the opinions of his father and the existing ministers on the
subject of the Catholic clairas ; but in the debate on the
address Lord Grenville closed a raost veheraent attack on
the Administration by a pointed reference to these claims,
as a right the settlement of which would no longer adrait
" of procrastination, of irre.solution, or of further considera
tion." And before the end of the raonth both he and Lord
Grey exerted most elaborate efforts in support of a motion
made by Lord Fitzwilliam, "to take the present state of
Ireland into consideration," which avowedly had for its
principal object the instant reraoval of all restrictions on
the Roraan Catholics. As such it was opposed not only by
Lord Liverpool who reminded the House that Mr. Pitt,
whose opinions in favour of emancipation had been re
peatedly referred to by the speakers on the opposite side,
" with all his anxiety for the measure (and anxious for it he
admitted him to have been), had yet declared that he would
never propose it without at the same tirae proposing
securities for the Church of England and the constitution
in general ;" but it was also resisted by Lord Wellesley,
who, though a firm supporter of the principle of religious
equality, objected strongly to the tirae at which, and the
manner in which, the question was now brought forward.
A similar motion was proposed in the House of Commons
by Lord Morpeth : but both he and Lord Fitzwilliam were
defeated by majorities of nearly a'^ hundred. As no one
expected a different result, the policy of such an invitation

376 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
of defeat may well be questioned : it certainly for a moment
injured the very clients of whom the two lords constituted
themselves the champions, by inducing one so generally
inclined to support them as Lord Wellesley to administer
to the Roman Catholic leaders and their advocates a dig
nified and severe rebuke of the tone which they had adopted.
" Their demand," as he said, " had been put forth in the
array of war, and no alternative was offered but submission
or battle ;" while the feeling which this language expressed
was shared by others, and to all appearance by none more
keenly than the prince regent.
It is remarkable that this was the last act of Lord
Wellesley as one of his ministers. His colleagues might
well have thought his speech partly dictated by a desire
to display a complete agreement with them. It was rather
the forerunner of a rupture with them ; unaccountable in
itself and rendered more strange by other circumstances
which occurred almost at the same moment, and which
might have been expected to bind him closer than ever to
those who had been the instruments of a measure which
could not fail to have given him high gratification. Early
in February the restrictions which had prevented the
regent from exercising the full authority of the sovereign
terminated ; and the King's physicians, who had been
closely examined on the subject at the first meeting of
Parliament, gave scarcely any hope that he would ever
revive. Till July they had been sanguine about his ulti
mate restoration to health of both body and mind ; but
during the latter part of the summer and throughout the
autumn and winter he had grown manifestly worse ; and it
was apparently only a professional unwillingness to admit
any case to be hopeless that prevented them from pro
nouncing his Majesty's present condition irremediable. A
few days before the expiration of those restrictions intel
ligence was received of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo;
and the very first use the regent made of his unfettered
authority was to reward the conqueror for his inost brilliant

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 377
exploit. He created him Earl of Wellington, and sent down
a raessage to Parliaraent requesting the Houses to enable
him to settle an annuity of 2,000/. a year on him in addition
to the grant which had already been bestowed for his pre
vious exploits. The capture of that great fortress was,
however, manifestly only a forerunner of other similar
enterprises : its chief importance indeed lay in the degree
in which its possession would facilitate thera ; and Lord
Wellesley's original reason for exchanging his erabassy in
the Peninsula for the seals of a Secretary of State had
been avowed to be the belief that as a raeraber of the
Cabinet he should be able to render his brother raore
efficient support than in any other position. Yet, just at
the raoment when, if his presence in the councils of the
sovereign had ever been useful to the general, it was
likely to be more iraportant than ever, he suddenly re
signed his office, on grounds which can hardly be said to
have been ever very satisfactorily explained. Lord Liver
pool, who of all the Cabinet had probably been originally
the raost anxious to secure his co-operation, was greatly
vexed, as will be seen frora the following letter, in which
he comraunicated the news to Wellington :
-_ , February, 1812.
My dear Lord, "
I am very much obliged to you for your two letters on the subject
of your intended operations ; they afford me all the information
I could expect or even desire. I am fully aware that any plan
of campaign formed at this period of the year must be subject
to those contingencies to which all important and extended
operations are liable from the events of war : you may rely
therefore on my discretion in communicating your present
intentions to as few persons as possible.
I am sorry to be under the necessity of informing you that Lord
Wellesley has intimated to the Prince Regent his intention of
resigning his situation in the Government. I am not aware of
the existence of any distinct difference of opinion on any
political question of importance which has led to this determi
nation. He says generally that he has not the weight in the

378 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION \ [1812
Government which he expected when he accepted office. I
have never seen any want of attention to his opinion, nor do
I recollect a single question (except one of comparatively little
moment lately, respecting the King's and Regent's establishment)
to which he entered a dissent. The Government through a
Cabinet is necessarily a Government inter pares, in which every
man must expect to have his opinion and his despatches can
vassed ; and this pre-vious friendly canvass of opinion and
measures appears to be absolutely necessary under a constitu
tion where the public acts of Government will be ultimately
hostilely debated in Parliaraent. I have always regretted that
Lord Wellesley's habits of late have prevented his seeing as
much of his colleagues and mixing as much in general business as
is usual with persons in public office. I do not believe he has
attended more than half the Cabinet meetings which have taken
place since he has been in Government ; and this circumstance,
corabined with others, unavoidably prevented him from having
the same comraon feelings with his colleagues as exist amongst
those who not only act but live together. Lord Wellesley
declares it is not his intention to go into Opposition, and he
does not even wish his son to resign his seat at the Treasury.
The event is as yet a secret, but it must be known in a few days.
If you wish to know my opinion as to the effect of it, I am
persuaded it will not, under present circumstances, materially
prejudice the Government. The Prince takes it very quietly,
and appears now determined to support the present Govern
ment with all his influence. Indeed, he says he has no alterna
tive : this may appear to you to be strange after all that has
passed : but so it is. It is Perceval's intention immediately to
sound Castlereagh about his retum to office.
I ara yours, Src.
Liverpool.
Wellington himself was greatly annoyed at his brother's
conduct, which, with his complaints of his colleagues, he
pronounced to be wholly unreasonable. In Parliament the
marquis, who' had been naturally expected to explain the
reasons of his resignation, was wholly and strangely silent
on the subject : and at a subsequent period some of his

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 379
friends, evidently authorised by himself, put forward an
explanation of it which did not render it more intelligible.
The truth would seem to be that Lord Wellesley, conscious
of great abilities and a deservedly high reputation, had
contracted a certain impatient arrogance frora his long
habit of uncontrolled authority in the East ; and that,
under the influence of this feeling, he had expected greater
deference to be paid to the slightest intiraation of his
opinions than could be conceded.^ Great, however, as his
talents unquestionably were, it can hardly be said that
either the Administration or the country suffered from his
retirement ; for he was replaced by Lord Castlereagh : and
that statesman, during the most eventful and critical period
of the next two years, discharged the duties of his office
both at horae and abroad with a sagacity, decision, and
resolution that no one could have exceeded, and perhaps
hardly any one could have equalled.
The general expectation, as we have seen, was that the
changes in the Adrainistration would not have been thus
liraited. The Prince hiraself was desirous to raake thera
more extensive, though the plan which he proposed to him
self was very different from that which the leaders of the
Opposition had reckoned on his forming. They had felt
confident that, the moment the restrictions on his authority
should have expired, and the whole power of the State
should have corae to be vested in hira as rauch as if he
were actually sovereign, he would uncereraoniously disraiss
the advisers of his father, and place the governraent in their
hands. If, since the fall of the Grenville Cabinet in 1807,
he had ever entertained such an idea, the events of the past
year had done rauch to change his purpose. Not only had
a more intiraate acquaintance with the rainisters led hira to
conceive a greater regard for them as men, and a far higher
estimate of their capacity for office than he had previously
entertained (and few princes have ever been more
^ It had been said of him, on his return, that he was a grand speci
men of a sultanized Englishman.

38o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
capable than he, when unswayed by his passions, of ap
preciating great abilities and great qualities), but he knew
that a change of the Ministry was always held to indicate
a change of system ; and to make the slightest change in
the poHcy which was being pursued, or even to do any act
which might induce any party, either at home or abroad, to
imagine the likelihood of such a change, he looked on as
not only unwise but dangerous. To use his own words,'
" He could not but reflect with satisfaction on the events
which had distinguished the short period of his restricted
regency. Instead of suffering the loss of any of her
possessions by the gigantic force which had been employed
against her. Great Britain had added most important
acquisitions to her empire. The national faith had been
preserved inviolate towards our allies : and, if character is
strength as applied to a nation, the increased and increasing
reputation of his Majesty's arms showed to the nations of
the Continent how. much they might achieve when animated
by a glorious spirit of resistance to a foreign yoke. In the
critical situation of the war in the Peninsula he should be
most anxious to avoid any measure which could lead his
allies to suppose that he meant to depart from the present
system. Perseverance alone could achieve the great object
in question ; and he could not withhold his approbation
from those who had honorably distinguished themselves
in support of it."
The reasons which he thus gave for feeling abundant
satisfaction with his existing ministers were solid and
statesmanlike. They were amply sufficient to make him
discard the idea of any sweeping change, if he had ever
entertained it. But he still retained so much of his
former predilections for the Whigs, for Fox's friends
and Fox's kindred, as to wish to find room for a sec
tion of them in the Administration ; and, as there were
^ .See his letter to the Duke of York, written in order to be commu
nicated to Lord Grey and Lord Grenville, and of which a copy -was
sent by himself to Mr. Perceval.

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 381
araong thera raen of deservedly high reputation in the
country for uprightness and ability, he conceived that
the union of such with his present advisers would add
strength to his governraent. He was aware too that
Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool were desirous of such
an alliance, if it could be purchased without the sacrifice
of principle. And, therefore, in the conclusion of his
letter he coraraissioned his brother to coraraunicate his
wish to Lord Grey and Lord Grenville, with the addition
that he had himself sent a copy of his letter to the
Prirae Minister. The details of the interview between
the duke and the two peers which was the result of this
coraraunication have been so fully and repeatedly nar
rated that it is unnecessary to recapitulate thera here.
It is sufficient to raention that both lords agreed in
declining any attempt to negotiate with the existing
ministers, alleging that they differed frora them "on
almost every political subject." But it is worthy of
remark that the duke avowed to them the prince's ob
jection to the question of Catholic emancipation being
brought forward, and that not as a new opinion but as
one which they were aware that he had entertained for
raany years. Frora it he never afterwards swerved : and
his sentiments on the question raay have been a prin
cipal reason for the stedfastness with which Lord Liver
pool hiraself continued to resist concession; for the
question was again brought forward in the House of Lords
a few weeks later : and, though he opposed the motion to
go at once into committee on the subject, he now rested
his opposition more on existing circumstances than on
principle ; and in the explanation of his general views of
policy which, in the negotiations which ensued on the
death of Mr. Perceval, he gave to Lord Wellesley and
Mr. Canning, he "protested against its being inferred
from any declaration of his that it was or ever had been
his opinion that under no circurastances it would' be
possible to raake any alteration in the laws respecting

382 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
the Roman Catholics," adding that "On the last occa
sion on which the subject- was discussed in Parliament,
he had expressly stated that circumstances might arise
in which, in his judgment, some alteration in those laws
might be desirable."
He had even gone further than he then stated, in in
timating a possibility that he might, in some more favorable
contingency, be willing to make concessions ; for he had
declared, to quote his own words, that "he did subscribe
to the principle which the noble lord [Lord Donough-
more, who had brought the question forward] had laid
down as the foundation of his reasoning on the subject,
that every restraint, civil, political, or religious, was to be
considered as an evil in itself, and to be justified only by
necessity.'' Nor was another observation which he made
at the same time, that " it was material, with a view of
unravelling the argument, that it should be understood that
it was not upon any principle of direct exclusion that the
Catholics were excluded, but by the indirect operation of
tests," without a very important bearing both upon the
question itself and his own view of it. All imputations on
the good faith and general. loyalty of the Roman Catholics
he most pointedly disclaimed. " He did not believe they
held the doctrine of not keeping faith with heretics ; and
he verily believed that, as far as any moral principle went,
not connected with the Established Church, their institu
tions were as pure as our own."
At the same time he could not admit that the authority
which the Romish Church claimed was purely and solely
spiritual ; and he quoted a pamphlet published within the
last two years by one of the most learned men of the
Roman Catholic body, which expressly stated that " the
bishops claimed the power of imprisoning in episcopal
matters, of whipping, and inflicting other tortures ; and
also of settling the fees and incomes of the inferior clergy ;
and could any man," he asked, " say that these were not
powers of a temporal nature V Of one prediction on which

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 383
he ventured, alraost as his closing arguraent, we raay be
said to be witnessing the fulfilraent at the present day.
" His sincere opinion was that the imraediate effect of the
measure proposed would be raerely to benefit a small pro
portion of our Roraan Catholic fellow-subjects directly
and immediately; but at last it would begin to be con
sidered by them with respect to their Church Establish
ment, whether they should pay for the maintenance of two
Churches or one, whether they should pay their own clergy
instead of the Protestant clergy. He was sure that their
Lordships would not lose sight of the interests of those
whose very circumstances, from the nature of their situa
tions, would, above all others, be raost affected by the
measure, the great body of the clergy of Ireland. But,
though Lord Donoughmore had said that he was a friend
to the Protestant Establishraent in Ireland, (in fact the
whole of his argument went to this : that there would be no
safety for that Establishment until the Roman Catholic
clergy were established in Ireland), he himself raaintained
that the very inference of all the arguments and views that
had been urged on the other side of the House went to
this : that Ireland should be made a Roman Catholic
country, and that the Establishment of Ireland should be
Roman Catholic. He should not even be surprised to
hear that the Irish Protestant bishops theraselves, having
first generously raade over a portion of their endowraents
for the peace and raaintenance of their Catholic brethren,
were ready to make a further proposition to subject all his
Majesty's dominions, by law, to a division of the produce
of ecclesiastical dues between the two Churches. That this
was one of the consequences which would follow the con
cession of the Catholic clairas he raost sincerely believed."
The ministers, while thus as it were taking up new
ground, resting their opposition raore on the circumstances
of the raoraent than on principle (indeed to the principle
of concession it was notorious that one raost important
member of the Cabinet, Lord Castlereagh, was favorable).

384 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
were as successful as ever. Lord Donoughmore's motion
was rejected by a majority of more than seventy Peers; in
the House of Commons they prevailed by a still greater
number. And as each successive victory not only increased
their strength in Parliament and in the country, but also
gratified the Regent by the sanction which both Houses
thus appeared to give to his decision to maintain them,
there seemed every likelihood that the end of the session
might see them a strong Government, enabled fearlessly to
carry out their own policy in every particular, from a con
sciousness of the security of their position, when they, and
the whole kingdom with them, were suddenly thrown into
confusion by one of those strange crimes which, committed
without provocation and without inducement, almost seem
as if they were permitted for the purpose of showing how
vain is all the foresight of the wisest, how unsubstantial the
hopes of the most prudent, since all can be baffled and
disconcerted by the act of a single person, destitute of
wealth, or ability, or character, or any quality whatever
calculated to give him importance, save his power of
mischief On the I Ith of May, as Mr Perceval was passing through
one of the passages of the House of Commons, he was
assassinated by a man named Bellingham, a merchant of
some respectability, whose brain had been in some degree
turned by losses in his trade, which he attributed to the
refusal of the Ministry to grant him the relief which he had
claimed for them. The murder struck the whole kingdom
with horror and real sorrow, for the minister thus suddenly
taken away was a man in whom the difficulties of a most
arduous office, and the sense of responsibility for the most
momentous concerns and interests, had awakened or de
veloped talents which he had not previously been supposed
to possess. We have seen the description that Lord Liver
pool gave of the ascendency which he had already acquired
over the House of Commons ; and even those who most
differed from his policy felt the influence of his private

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL 385
virtues, and gave cordial praise to his high-minded and
unassuming integrity; his sincere patriotism; and, in the
greatest eagerness and heat of debate, his unvarying can
dour and moderation and fairness to his adversaries; and
neither they nor his followers could be insensible to the
gravity of the political consequences which might be ex
pected to result from his sudden removal. Even amid the
first poignancy of their sorrow for their friend, the ministers
were forced to consult how his place was to be filled, for
the wish at once expressed by the Regent was to make no
change in the Adrainistration beyond such addition as was
necessitated by the vacancies created at the Treasury and
Exchequer ; and the first and most important question,
therefore, for the reraaining rainisters to resolve, was whether
they could so fill up those vacancies as to procure an
accession of strength in Parliaraent. Of the statesraen
not in office the raost iraportant were Lord Wellesley, Lord
Grey, and Lord Grenville, among the peers, and Canning
in the House of Commons ; and a meeting of the Cabinet
decided that, unless at least a willingness to conciliate
were shown, by inviting the co-operation of one section of
them, their own ability to carry on the Government suc
cessfully and permanently must be very questionable. Of
the four. Lord Grenville and Lord Grey were out of the
question, from their positive refusal to join the Ministry
three raonths before, and the grounds on which they had
justified it. But there was no such difference of opinion
on the general policy of the country, with the exception
of the single question of Catholic eraancipation, between
the existing Cabinet and Lord Wellesley and Canning.
To them, therefore, it was decided that a proposal should
be raade to re-enter the Administration ; and as, besides
consenting to this measure, the Regent also cordially co
incided in the unaniraous opinion of his existing ministers
that the intended negotiation and the subsequent govern
ment of the country could be carried on by no one with so
much probability of success as by Lord Liverpool, it was
VOL. L C C

386 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
settled, as a preliminary step, that in inviting the accession
of those whose co-operation it was desired to gain, he
should announce himself as the Prime Minister.
Even those who most felt the value of the assistance
which these most able men could afford were not sanguine
of their consent. Since Lord Donoughmore's motion,
another debate on the Catholic question had taken place,
in which they both declared strongly against any further
delay being interposed to its settlement ; and it was also
apprehended that personal motives would intervene. The
causes alleged by Lord Wellesley for his resignation three
months before were beyond a doubt almost entirely of a
personal character ; for he had resisted all attempt at
reconciliation by a final declaration that he would not
serve under Mr. Perceval'^ And, now that that minister
was removed, it was even more probable that he would
refuse to act under any other head, but that it would be found
that his real aim was to become Prime Minister himself
A somewhat kindred motive, it was feared, might in
fluence Canning, since it was also fixed that Lord Castle
reagh was to be the leader in the House of Commons,
Canning was forward in declaring that " no objection of a
personal sort should prevent him from uniting with the
existing Administration in the public service, if he could
do so with honour." But subsequent events showed that
this proviso was of a very elastic nature ; and he, as well
as Lord Wellesley, absolutely refused the offers made to
them : Canning alleging differences with the Ministry on the
Catholic question alone. Lord Wellesley resting his decision
partly on this ground, and still more on " the imperfect
scale on which the efforts in the Peninsula were conducted,"
a point on which his own brother, the general in command,
had already pronounced his complaints unreasonable.
The negotiation with these statesmen having thus failed,
the Prince, who appears hardly to have coincided with the
ministers in their opinion of its importance, desired that they
' Pearce's Life of Lord Wellesley, iii. 209.

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 387
should consider in what other way they could fill up the
vacancies caused by Perceval's death and Lord Liverpool's
removal to the Treasury. Mr. Vansittart was at once
appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, and all that was
necessary seemed to be to find a statesman fit for the
Secretaryship of State ; but a feeling was rising that the
Ministry, as it was about to be reconstructed, would be
inadequate to the conduct of affairs at so critical a period,
and, on the day after Mr. Vansittart's writ had been moved
for, one of the raerabers for Yorkshire, Mr. Stuart Wortley,
invited the forraal expression of this feeling by raoving an
address to the Regent, " praying him, under the present
circumstances of the country, to forra a strong and efficient
Adrainistration." On many accounts it was singular that
such a motion should have come from such a quarter ; for
the mover had hitherto been a supporter of the Ministry, and
especially agreed with them in their views of the Catholic
question : and the reasons he gave for his motion did not
lessen the strangeness of his bringing it forward at all. He
declared that, " after the late discussion and division on
the question of the CathoHc claims, he thought all further
opposition to them vain ; " and therefore he must for the
future distrust a Ministry which still resisted thera. Yet,
as we have seen, in each House the advocates of concession
had been defeated by raost decisive majorities. Another
of his arguments was, that "in 1803 the present Govern
ment had been tried and found wanting." It was true that
most of the existing Cabinet had also been ministers in that
year ; but the circumstances and the distribution of offices
were wholly different. That Ministry had fallen chiefly on
account of Mr. Addington's inferiority to Pitt as a financier :
there was no similar weakness in that branch of the Govern
ment to complain of, alleged or anticipated, now ; still less
was there any member of the Opposition with any pre
eminent reputation in that line ; and the cause which had
chiefly prompted Mr. Wortley to take such a step seemed
to be his affection for the memory of Mr. Perceval, whom
c c 2

388 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
he described as " the chief, if he might not say the only,
support of the Administration while he lived," and to whom
he appeared to think it due to pronounce none of his
colleagues competent to supply his place.
Lord Milton, who seconded him, was equally unreason
able and more illogical, the argument on which he chiefly
rested being, that the fact of the ministers having invited
Lord Wellesley and Canning to join them was of itself a
confession that without their aid they could not carry on
the Government. He forgot that, as two offices were vacant,
it was absolutely necessary to introduce some new members
to the Cabinet to fill them, and that, though the invitation
to those whom he mentioned might be allowed to prove
their belief that, under all circumstances, they were the men
calculated to afford the most useful aid, it certainly did not
follow that they were the only persons so qualified. Other
supporters of the motion dwelt with pertinacious exaggera
tion on " the dangers and difficulties of the country," which
they affirmed to be unexampled ; though, as far as the war
was concerned, the dangers were already passing away, and
the captures of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, which had
already made the campaign of 18 12 illustrious, supplied
abundant proof that Wellington's genius had now brought
our affairs in the Peninsula into such a state that the
enemy had more to fear from him than he from them.
Canning, -with somewhat more doubtful taste than he
usually displayed, spoke and voted for the motion. Mr
Ryder the Home Secretary, and Lord Castlereagh, argued
against it; the former pointing out with not unmerited
satisfaction the success with which, since the retirement of
the Duke of Portland, the present ministers had carried
on the war and the general affairs of the country, and
pointedly and especially appealing to the great capacity
shown by the new " head of the administration, the Earl of
Liverpool, the same person who had been so long success
fully conducting that part of the affairs of the country
which, on so many occasions, had experienced the appro-

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 389
bation of the House and of the nation. If the Cabinet,
which was not yet completely filled up, was the old
Ministry, what had happened to justify their condemnation
by the House, which had so often approved their con
duct } If it was a new Ministry, where was the fairness
of condemning it without a trial t " Lord Castlereagh
who always adopted the boldest line in debate, manfully
justified the Ministry for not abandoning their offices
either on the lamentable loss of their former chief, or on
the refusal of two former colleagues, however splendid might
be their individual abihty, to join them. He affirmed, with
notorious truth, that the obstacles to the desired union had
not come from the Ministry, and plausibly argued that the
motion was to some extent one of reproach to the Regent,
as if he had not done his utmost to forra an Administration
entitled to the public confidence, and able efficiently to
serve the country. His arguments were the raore weighty
because it was well known that he had at all tiraes been
favorable to Catholic emancipation ; and he averred himself
to be still desirous to see that measure carried, though " he
would not suffer it to be raade a stalking-horse for the raere
purpose of erabarrassing a Government at a period when
objects of so much greater raagnitude occupied the attention
of the country." What was, perhaps, as remarkable as any
other circumstance in the debate was, that so important a
question had not attracted a very full House; not 350
members were present at the division, which was unfavor
able to the Governraent by a slender raajority of four votes.
The majority, such as it was, was an accidental one,
since the division was taken while four or six steady sup
porters of the ministers were raoraentarily absent in other
parts of the House, and were thus locked out while fully
intending to support them ; but in so close a division a vote
or two was of no practical consequence, and neither they
nor the Regent could refuse to accept the decision of the
House as an avowal of want of confidence in the Govern
ment. Accordingly they tendered their resignations, and

390 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
the Prince at once took steps to form another Adminis
tration, and entrusted the task to Lord Wellesley. Lord
Wellesley consulted Canning ; and the course which they
adopted was one that had at least the merit of singularity.
It was no secret that Lord Grey and Lord Grenville had
lately unhesitatingly refused the invitation of the Prince to
join Lord Liverpool and his colleagues on the ground of
differences of opinion on almost every subject. Yet the
first step now taken by Lord Wellesley and Canning was
to invite both these parties, whose disagreement had been
thus publicly proclaimed, to unite with themselves, who,
on one important point or another, disagreed with each.
Of the leading principles of the intended Administration,
which were stated to be the early settlement of the Catholic
question and the prosecution of the war in the Peninsula
with all the means of the country, the last was indeed in
harmony with the views and all the past conduct of Lord
Liverpool and the first, if unpalatable to Lord Liverpool
himself, was not so to all his party. But within the last day
or two an event had taken place which had given them all
the deepest personal offence. Lord Wellesley had scarcely
rejected Lord Liverpool's offer, and Mr. Wortley's motion
was still pending, when a document appeared in the public
newspapers purporting to be the authorised statement of
the grounds of Lord Wellesley's resignation in the pre
ceding February, and bearing also the appearance of a
public attack on Mr. Perceval's memory, while the sorrow
of his friends for his loss was still fresh and unallayed.
Friends of Lord Wellesley afterwards took the blame on
themselves of having communicated the document to the
papers without his privity or permission, and added that
he had felt the greatest distress at its publication ; ' but it
1 See a statement by Colonel Meyrick Shawe on the subject of Lord
Wellesley's resignation, published in the Supplementary Despatches of
the Duke of Wellington, vii. 257 — 288. It must be remarked, how
ever, that Colonel Shawe omits to explain how the paper had been
communicated to the Morning Chronicle, in which it had already
appeared before it was sent to the Times.

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 391
was not strange that Lord Liverpool and those who acted
with him should have failed to conceive the possibility of
any third person venturing to publish such a paper without
the authority of the person principally concerned ; or that,
looking on its publication as the act of Lord Wellesley
himself, they should have deeply resented it as a treacherous
and unpardonable display of ill-feeling towards the dead.
And under this impression Lord Liverpool, in his reply,
abstained from entering into any discussion of the intended
policy of the new Cabinet, because he and his colleagues
" all felt themselves bound, particularly after what had
recently passed, to decline the proposal of becoming
raerabers of an Administration to be formed by Lord
Wellesley." The attempt to form a junction with the Whig party
proved equally unsuccessful, apparently because the leaders
declined to pledge theraselves to an increased exertion of
our railitary power in the Peninsula, of which they doubted
the compatibility with the financial resources of the country ;
and Canning made a renewed effort to obtain a raore con
ciliatory reply from Lord Liverpool, remonstrating in a
friendly manner against the wisdom of resting his refusal
to discuss Lord Wellesley's proposals on what bore the
appearance of personal hostility. He failed, as will be
shown by the following reply which he received :
Fife House, May 24th, 1812.
My dear Canning,
I have this moment received your answer to my letter of last
night.
As that letter was not written without due consideration, I do not
feel that it can be necessary for me to call my colleagues again
together upon the subject of it.
I can answer however for myself (and I am confident equally for
them), that I am not actuated in declining the proposal made
to us by any objection of a nature purely personal ; but when
I advert to the opinions and statements recently sent forth to
the world respecting pubHc men with whom I have been con-

392 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
nected, and public measures in which. I have been engaged,
I do not feel that I should have acted consistently with my own
honour and character, or with the respect which I must ever,
and shall ever, feel to ray departed friend, if, under such circum
stances, I could have consented to have entertained the pro
posal which you were authorised to submit to me.
As these considerations afforded an insuperable obstacle to my
becoming a party to the proposed arrangements, I thought it
wholly unnecessary to enter into any explanation on the two
principles on which the Administration is stated as being
intended to be forraed, or on other points of the greatest pubUc
iraportance ; and I must protest against any inference whatever
being drawn frora my silence in this respect.
I can assure you that I am most vrilling to render you every
degree of justice for the motives which have dictated (your)
answer td^;^etter, and I remain. Yours, &c. ^
Liverpool.
For the moment Lord Wellesley abandoned his attempt to
form an Administration. And the Prince was greatly per
plexed. He thought that he had now no alternative but
to retain his existing advisers. They took a different view
of the situation ; and while by a Cabinet minute they
expressed to his Royal Highness " their decided conviction
that no public benefit was likely to arise from any further
attempt being made to bring about an union between them
and Marquis Wellesley and Mr. Canning," by another they
pressed upon him their advice that " he would be graciously
pleased to take such immediate measures as might appear
most advisable to himself for filling up the principal offices
of the Government." He summoned them to a personal
conference, ostensibly because "he was desirous to learn
from each of them the grounds of the opinions which they
had thus communicated to him," but probably with a
secret belief that, in a personal conversation with them, his
own address and influence might induce them to modify
their resolution. However, before the appointed hour
arrived he changed his summons for a demand that each

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 393
should separately explain to him the reasons which had
influenced him ; and Lord Liverpool's motives were laid
before him in the following letter :
Fife House, May 28th, 1812.
Lord Liverpool has the honour to inform your Royal Highness,
in obedience to your Royal Highness's commands, that he
concurred in the opinion contained in the paper which was
transmitted to your Royal Highness by your confidential
servants yesterday, respecting an union between your present
servants and Lord Wellesley and Mr. Canning, for the following
reasons :
First, because he is most fully satisfied, from all that has recently
passed, that the difference of opinion which exists between
Lord Wellesley and Mr. Canning on the one hand, and himself
on the other, on the subject of the Roman Catholic claims, is
so essential, not only as regards the points of the question
itself, but as to the conduct which it is the duty of Government
to pursue respecting it, that there is no probability that, under
present circumstances, they could co-operate with advantage, as
ministers of the Crown, in the public service.
Secondly, because Lord Liverpool is convinced that, however
desirable it must have been to procure an accession of strength,
in order to enable your Royal Highness's present servants to
carry on the administration of government successfully, the
advantage of the assistance of Lord Wellesley and Mr. Canning
could only at this time have been obtained by the loss of
strength in other quarters not less important. The proposed
arrangement could not therefore have been made with a better
prospect of ultimate success, and it would have been purchased
by sacrifices which would have been inconsistent with the
honour and character of the persons who were parties to it.
The soundness of these arguments could not be denied ;
and at all events the letter was so conclusive as to the
resolution of the ministers that the Regent renewed Lord
Wellesley's commission ; and the Marquis reopened a
communication with the Whig nobles. His statement
as to his own complete authority was fuller than that
which he had announced before, and on that very account

394 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
it was less successful. He stated that the Prince had
decided on appoindng him Prime Minister; while their
share in the Administration was to extend to a third of
the Cabinet offices ; and he again implied a hope that he
might enlist in the Prince's service some of the existing
ministers. They objected to the stipulation as to the
number of their own adherents who were thus to be
appointed to office, as introducing " a principle of dis
union and jealousy," and " establishing within the Cabinet
itself a system of combination inconsistent with the pro
secution of any uniform and beneficial course of policy,"
and f)eremptorily " declined all participation in a Govern
ment constituted on such principles."
Once more Lord Wellesley relinquished his undertaking.
Lord Moira, a noble of high personal character, but of no
political experience, failed to prevail on the Whig leaders
even to discuss the subject of Lord Wellesley's proposals
and views further ; and the next step taken by the Regent
was to entrust the arrangement of an Administration to
Lord Moira himself With him in this new position neither
Lord Grey nor Lord Grenville could refuse to negotiate,
though in reality they were resolved to consent to no
arrangement which should not place the entire power in
their own hands.^ They were fortunate, however, in the
discussions taking a turn which justified their final dis
agreement with Lord Moira, and showed them in the light
I This is clearly shown by the following passage in Lord Grey's
letter to Lord Moira (" Life and Opinions of Lord Grey," by Lieutenant-
General C. Grey, p. 291) : " It is my deliberate conviction that till the
Prince shall see that, to render our services useful to himself, it is
necessary that he should give us full powers in making the arrange
ments in every part of the Government, in the same manner as he
professed to do in the spring of 181 1" [this is clearly a mistake, for
in 1811 the Prince had declared his resolution to retain Perceval in
office], and as he promised to do whenever the restrictions on his
authority should cease ; in short, till he is prepared to give us his full
confidence both as to men and measures ; it certainly is not desirable
for us, and perhaps not for him, that we should be called to his
councils."

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 395
of champions of a constitutional principle. They required
that the changes to be made in the ministerial departments
should be accompanied by a corresponding rearrangement
in the great offices of the household, and Lord Moira looked
upon this condition as derogatory to the Prince's dignity ;
though the Prince himself entertained no such feeling, and
though those who filled the offices in question had already
formed the resolution of resigning them. On this petty
difference this negotiation too was broken off, though the
soundness of the principle for which the Whig leaders con
tended was undeniable, and the only instance in which since
that time it has been called in question was by those who
after Lord Grey becarae the leaders of his party, and who,
though for a raoment they succeeded in breaking down
the rule, brought an obloquy on themselves by their very
success which raore than counterbalanced the advantage of
the short prolongation of power which it secured to thera.
Inadequate as was the cause which thus put an end to
the last attempt that was or could be made to effect a
change in the Government, the result was most fortunate
for the country. Nothing remained but that the old
Administration should continue ; accordingly on the 8th of
June Lord Liverpool announced to the peers that he had
been appointed Prime Minister : and it was obvious that
his chance of carrying on the affairs of the country with
credit and success was greatly strengthened by what had
taken place. He and his colleagues owed their present
position to no anxiety which they had shown to retain
office, but solely to the inability of any other person or
party to form an Administration. And so entirely was this
the feeHng of the House of Commons which had recently
voted to displace them, that when, in the debate which
ensued on their resumption of office, a motion similar in
purport to Mr. Wortley's, but rather milder in form, was
brought forward, it was rejected by a majority of 125, and
the ministers were thus in effect assured of the confidence
of the House of Coraraons, which but three weeks before
had been denied to thera.

396 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812

CHAPTER XII.
Peculiar qualifications of Lord Liverpool for the lead in the Govern
ment — The Catholic question is made an open question — The policy
or impolicy of such an arrangement — Debate on it — Negotiations
with Canning — The lead of the House of Commons — Lord Chatham
in 1766 — Labours which fell to Lord Castlereagh's share, and his per
formance of them — Mr. Peel is made Secretary for Ireland — Original
difficulties and eventual triumphs of the Liverpool Administration.
Lord Liverpool was thus, on his forty-second birthday,
placed in the highest position which a British subject can
attain, the chief direction of the affairs of his native land.
And, in addition to his natural qualifications for so arduous
a post, he was more than usually fitted for it by the train
ing of the last eleven years. Of the preceding Prime
Ministers since the beginning of the reign some had had
no previous official experience whatever when they were
suddenly placed in the highest office of all ; others had
held a single office for a period too brief to have given
them any great practical insight into the working of even
one department •} but Lord Liverpool, besides his period of
probation in subordinate posts, had filled successively every
Secretaryship of State, holding each for some considerable
time ; and had thus acquired a thorough personal acquaint
ance with all their duties and details. At the Foreign Office
1 Lord Rockingham in 1765, the Duke of Grafton, the Duke of
Portland in 1782, and Mr. Addington, had held no office when they
were first made Prime Ministers ; Lord Bute and Mr. Pitt had each
held but a single Cabinet office for a few months, and no office out
of the Cabinet.

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 397
he had become known to the leading diplomatists of other
countries, and had learnt to appreciate their characters and
abilities. As Home Secretary he had becorae conversant
with the varied interests and objects of the different classes
of his own countrymen, and especially he had been led to
study the condition of Ireland, which he recognised as
being then, as subsequent statesraen have since been forced
to confess it to be, his chief difficulty. As Secretary for
War and the Colonies every kind of subject had engaged
his consideration : in respect of the war, not raerely the
military operations, but also, and still more, the means of
supplying our arraies with reinforcements, with provisions,
and, above all, with money ; in respect of our foreign
settlements, their resources for defence, and in sorae in
stances for attack, their internal character, their produc
tions, their trade, the disposition and genius of the natives,
in all the infinite varieties to be found in an empire stretch
ing unto every quarter of the globe. So that it is not
too much to say that, when he first took the reins of the
Government, there was no one branch of it with which he
was not thoroughly farailiar.
Undoubtedly he had anxieties, and even difficulties, to
contend with ; and the greatness of them on the principal
question of doraestic policy, the clairas of the Roman
Catholics, was shown by the adoption of a line of conduct
for which there was no precedent at the time, though since
that day the weakness of more than one Adrainistration
has induced its chief to follow the example then set. The
concession or rejection of those clairas was left an open
question, or, to borrow the language in which Lord Castle
reagh explained to the House of Coraraons the course
resolved on by the Cabinet, " In subraission to the growing
change of public opinion in favour of those clairas, and the
real sentiments of certain raerabers of the Governraent, it
had been resolved upon as a principle that the discussion of
this question should be left free from all interference on the
part of the Government, and that every member of that

398 LIFE AND ADMINISTRA TION [1812
Government should on it be left to the free and unbiassed
suggestions of his own conscientious discretion."
It cannot be denied that the necessity for an Adminis
tration to act with entire unanimity upon any question of
policy is increased, not diminished, by the importance of
the question ; and that on a grave and momentous subject
to leave each member free to pronounce a separate judg
ment, so that one may resist what another advocates, is on
that subject to abdicate the functions of government
altogether. If, as Lord Castlereagh implied (and a very few days
supplied evidence of his accuracy), public opinion was
setting so strongly in favour of concession that it was now
impossible to form a Cabinet on the principle of main
taining the restrictions, that fact rather supplied an addi
tional and cogent argument in favour of an immediate
settlement of the question than a justification of the course
adopted. It was hardly so unstatesmanlike to entertain a
wrong opinion as to have no opinion at all. And we fear
that in thus acquiescing in the disagreement of his colleagues
on a subject of such magnitude Lord Liverpool cannot be
altogether acquitted of having established a pernicious
example for future ministers, of which, as they have been
but too glad to follow it, the country is to this day con
stantly feeling the evil effects.
For the present moment, however, the resolution thus
declared undoubtedly answered a part of its end by
smoothing the path of the Cabinet, and weakening the
Opposition. As we have already mentioned, the motion,
which again proposed an address to the Regent to beg him
to form a strong and efficient Administration, and which,
therefore, would have been tantamount to a declaration of
want of confidence in that which was now established,
was defeated by a large majority ; and, even before it
was brought forward. Lord Liverpool felt confident of de
feating it, as will be seen by the following letter to Lord
Wellington :

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 399
June loth, 1812.
My dear Lord,
You will not be surprised that, in the confusion and uncertainty
which has prevailed for the last three weeks, I should have
refrained from troubling you with any private letters. Indeed,
the untoward turn which events have taken with respect to
some of those with whom you are most nearly connected must
have made it painful for me to write, or for you to receive a
letter upon some part of the transactions in which we have been
here engaged, and I felt that I should best meet your feelings
by abstaining, at least under present circumstances, from expla
nations which at another time I should be happy to give you.
The result of all the negotiations which have been passing is
that the Government has devolved again upon the remains of
Mr. Perceval's party, and, in consequence of the unaccountable
conduct of the Opposition, has devolved upon them with a
reasonable chance of their being at least able to get through
tKe~pfe'sent session. You may rely upon it that the country is
decidedly with us, as against the Opposition, and that no
Administration could have been formed of which the substan
tive strength did not consist either of our party or of that of
the Opposition.
With respect to myself, I feel placed in a most arduous and
difficult situation, from which I should have been most happy,
on raany accounts, to have been relieved ; but I could not,
under the circumstances, have shrunk from it with honour; and
I owe it now to the Prince to use my best endeavours for
carrying on his government.
I thought perhaps it might have been acceptable to you to have
had Pole for my successor in the War Department ; but I am
not surprised, under the present circumstances, that he should
have declined it. It is intended, therefore, that Lord Bathurst
should succeed me.
I beUeve you are sufficiently acquainted with him to know that
there are few men so assiduous at business, and that you could
not have a more agreeable correspondent. You may rely with
the utmost confidence on a continuance of every possible degree
of support from the Government. They feel the importance of
a successful issue to the contest in the Peninsula, and they are

400 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
determined to make every effort in that quarter compatible with
our resources, and which is consistent with the security of the
British empire. — I ara, &c. &c. Liverpool.
This letter crossed on its way one from the general, in
reply to an earlier one in which Lord Liverpool had in
formed him of Perceval's death, and of his own acceptance
of the Treasury, a few days before Mr. Wortley's first
motion. Wellington's reply was characteristic.
,, T Fuente Guinaldo, lune gth, 1812.
My dear Lord, '¦" ^ '
I received your letter of the i6th, and I have felt, in common,
I believe, with the whole civilized world, for the loss of Mr.
Perceval. The event is one of the most extraordinary and
most unfortunate that ever occurred, as it affects the public
interests and his family and friends.
All parties in Parliaraent appear to have behaved well upon this
raelancholy occasion.
You have undertaken a most gigantic task, and I don't know how
you will get through it. When I was in office raatters were not
very successfully carried on in the House of Commons when
Mr. Canning, Lord Castlereagh, and Perceval were on the
Treasury Bench, and, to all appearance at least, acted well
together. I should think that you would have the assistance
of both the survivors of poor Perceval, and you will scarcely be
able to get on in the House of Commons wiffi only one of
them.
However, there is nothing hke trying ; and I can only assure your
Lordship that I shall be happy if I can be of any use to you in
any way. Ever, my dear Lord,
Yours most sincerely, Wellington.
The spirit breathed in the last paragraph was akin to
Lord Liverpool's own. In the original discussion on the
probability of the Ministry being able to maintain itself
after Perceval's death, he had been one of those least in
clined to despond ; and the duty of " trying " was far more
unquestionable now when every attempt to form any other

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

401

combination had failed, and his Adrainistration seeraed the
only refuge frora confusion and anarchy.
The Cabinet, as it was now forraed, presented as little
variation as possible from its former arrangeraent. Mr.
Vansittart, as has been already raentioned, filled Mr.
Perceval's place at the Exchequer, and the seals which
Lord Liverpool had resigned were given to Lord Bathurst.
Lord Sidmouth exchanged the Presidency of the Council
to become Home Secretary, and was succeeded in the
post which he vacated by Lord Harrowby. Lord Melville
removed to the Adrairalty from the Board of Control,
and the affairs of India were entrusted to the care of
Lord Buckinghamshire. It proved to be an arrangeraent
which lasted with scarcely any alteration ' for several
years ; but it was not at first intended to be permanent, as
Lord Liverpool was most anxious to prevail on Canning to
join him : his colleagues generally showed the same feeling,
and he had no reason to expect any unwillingness on the
part of Canning himself, now that the treatment of the
Catholic question by the Cabinet left hira free to follow the
dictates of his own judgment on that subject. On this
question Canning himself took a line evidently designed to
be conciliatory to the Government. Before Perceval's death
he had given notice of his intention to move some resolu
tions calculated, if carried, to compel an early settlement
of it. His motion had been inevitably postponed, and
when, after the completion of the ministerial arrangements,
he was about to bring it forward on the 22d of June, he
submitted the resolutions -Virhich he had fraraed to Lord
Liverpool, and at his suggestion modified them to an extent
which was calculated to render thera palatable to some of
his colleagues in the Lower House, though not more accept
able to the Prime Minister himself His language in finally
proposing them, while in no respect shrinking frora putting
the case which he was advocating in the very strongest
light, breathed the sarae spirit as his conduct ; it was con
ciliatory and even corapliraentary towards those whora he
VOL. I. D D

402 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
expected to oppose them, giving them every credit for the
purest motives. And his prudence and moderation were
rewarded by a large majority of 129 ; his supporters, among
whom were found both Mr. Vansittart and Lord Castle
reagh, more than doubling in number those who resisted
his motion. And when, a few days later. Lord Wellesley
brought forward a similar motion in the House of Lords,
and Lord Liverpool rested his opposition chiefly on the
vague character of the resolutions proposed, which did not
.specify the measures of relief designed for the Roman
Catholics, and still less the securities to be substituted for
the existing laws, the Peers also looked on the claims advo
cated by the Marquis with greater favour than on any
previous occasion. Lord Eldon himself only encountered
the resolution with a motion for the previous question,
avowedly because " he did not wish at once and for ever to
shut the door of conciliation against the Catholics ;" and
even that modified opposition only succeeded by a single
vote, the numbers being 126 to 125. The question seemed
on the point of being carried : but the claims of the" Roman
Catholics were apparently regarded with less favour out of
doors. The next year a new Parliament sanctioned the
first steps towards concession by a far smaller majority, and
eventually rejected a bill brought in by Grattan for their
relief The anti-Catholic feeling grew stronger and stronger,
and after one or two more discussions the success of the
advocates of emancipation seemed so hopeless that in some
years they abstained from raising the question at all, pro
bably thinking it wiser and kinder to the Roman Catholics
themselves not to exasperate their opponents into stubborn
ness by repeated importunity ; and Lord Liverpool's and
two more Administrations were destined to pass away
before the question was finally settled under circumstances
far less favorable to a prudent arrangement and to the
exaction of the securities which the anti-Catholics looked
on as necessary.
In suggesting to Canning such an alteration in his reso-

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 403
lutions as would enable many of his colleagues to support
them. Lord Liverpool was acting even a more conciliatory
part than Canning pursued in adopting his suggestions.
But it was from no fear for the stability of his power that he
had done so. On the contrary, the failure of Mr. Wortley's
renewed motion,^ which has been already raentioned, had
caused hira to feel perfectly secure on that point. And,
on the very same day on which he forwarded his advice to
Canning, he wrote to Lord Wellington that " the raajority
on Thursday in the House of Commons had had a very
great effect ; and though," he says, " our difficulties are not
over, I see no reason for thinking that we shall not get
through the session. The country is decidedly with us."
Still this feeling did not diminish his desire to enlist
in the Government the co-operation of Canning, who, in
addition to his more solid qualities of large-minded states
manship, decision, and energy, was without a rival as an
orator in either House of Parliament. It is greatly to the
honour of Lord Castlereagh that, forgetting their former
quarrel, he was equally anxious to secure him as a colleague,
and to further the Prime Minister's object at the cost of no
inconsiderable personal sacrifice. That the negotiation failed
was the fault of no one of the ministers. But few transac
tions have more remarkably shown the mischief done by
officious friends. Canning, if left to himself, would have
cordially closed with the offer raade to him. It went
beyond his most sanguine expectations.^ He admitted
himself to be highly flattered by it, and it was a flattery to
' At the end of the last chapter it has been called " a motion similai
to Mr. Wortley's," and both expressions are correct. On the nth ot
June Mr. Wortley brought forward a motion almost identical with that
which he had carried three weeks before ; but the division was taken
on an amendment moved by Lord Milton, which differed from the
original motion only in form, and was equally a motion of want of
confidence in the existing Administration.
^ " Mr. Canning more than once described this offer to me as per -
haps the handsomest that ever was made to an \nA\y\&\x2X."— George
Canning and his Times, p. 298,
D D 2

404 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
which he or any other statesman might well be pardoned
for being susceptible. The first proposal was that Lord
Bathurst should give up to him the seals of the War Office,
which he had so lately received, and which the Prime
Minister himself had lately held. When he declined this,
from " obvious motives of delicacy,'' to quote his own words"
from a letter which he wrote to Lord Liverpool, Lord
Castlereagh even offered to place the office which he him
self held at his disposal, and to undertake the Chancellor
ship of the Exchequer. It might have been supposed that
motives of delicacy would have operated still more to pre
vent the acceptance of this office ; but the Foreign Office
was so decidedly the object of Canning's ambition and his
preference, that to obtain it he overruled any scruples which
he might have felt at taking advantage of his former anta
gonist's liberality ; and the matter would probably have at
Dnce been settled to his great advantage, had not some ad
herents, who called themselves his friends, suggested that he
Dught also to demand the lead in the House of Commons.
When, on Perceval's death. Lord Liverpool first invited
Canning and Lord Wellesley to join him, it was mentioned
as one of the few points which were already settled that
Lord Castlereagh was to have the lead, the management,
that is to say, of the Government business, in the House
of Commons ; and, when Canning then declared that no
objection of a personal character prevented his uniting with
the Ministry, it must have been understood that he was
principally referring to this arrangement. If he was willing
to acquiesce in the lead being allotted to Lord Castlereagh
then, when it was completely vacant, since it had hitherto
of course been exercised by the Prime Minister, it was
evidently much more reasonable to agree to such an
arrangement now, when Lord Castlereagh was actually in
possession of it, and could hardly be dispossessed of it
without a serious imputation of his fitness for office. And
Canning probably felt this, for he was not inclined to make
any difficulty on the point himself tiU he allowed himself

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 405
to be over-persuaded. Against his better judgraent he
demanded the lead as well as the seals ; having been
induced to make the deraand, he naturally exerted all his
ingenuity to justify it ; and in the difficulty thus unluckily
created the whole scheme was finally shipwrecked.^ Not
that the negotiation was at once broken off, or that many
expedients were not suggested for the accommodation of
the difficulty thus unfortunately and unreasonably created.
But, while Lord Castlereagh was conciliatory and ingenious
in conciliation. Canning was impracticable ; the more so
probably since he was (as he afterwards confessed) acting
against his own conviction. The only concession which he
could be brought to make was to express a willingness to
take the seals of the Home Office ; but to leave the lead to
Lord Castlereagh he absolutely refused. Even while as
serting this determination he could hardly conceal his own
judgment of it. His words to Lord Liverpool were, "With
respect to what is called the lead of the House of Coraraons
I heartily wish that it had never been raentioned at all : it
is no fault of mine that it has been brought forward." Such
a statement was beneath his good sense, since it was pal
pable that by no one but hiraself could the subject have
' Mr. Stapleton, who at a subsequent period was Canning's private
secretary, and is, therefore, naturally an admiring partisan of his old
master, does not conceal his opinion that Canning's original demand
and persistency in it were unreasonable. His words are : " Some of Mr.
Canning's friends suggested that if he had not the lead, the offer ought
not to be accepted. He was not himself of that opinion. . . . There is,
however, a letter frora Mr. Canning, written about this time to Mr.
Wilberforce, and published in his Life (iv. 37), which at first sight
seems hardly consistent with this version of the transaction, inasrauch
as it decidedly defends the course which was adopted. It is evidently,
however, not a balancing of arguments on both sides to determine
which would preponderate, but a reply to a remonstrance from Mr.
Wilberforce against the decision, in order to show that there were
abundant reasons to justify it. It having been irrevocably taken, no
doubt Mr. Canning at the time pressed into the service everything
that could be urged in its favour in order to reconcile it to himseff.
This seems to be the true solution of the apparent discrepancy."—
George Canning and his Times, p. 208.

4o6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
been brought forward, and that, as Lord Castlereagh was
actually the leader of the House when the first overtures
were made to him, no one but himself could ever have ¦
raised the question of displacing him. The letter continues :
" But, it having been so brought forward, while I beg, on
the one hand, that I may be considered as not claiming it
for myself^ I cannot, on the other hand, submit to the claim
of it for Lord Castlereagh. You know that I say this
without the slightest feeling of unkindness towards him.
I am ready to act cordially with him on a footing of perfect-
equality in the House of Commons ; but it is the feeling,
not only of my friends, but of every man whom I have
consulted, that neither my public character and reputation
(the only means through which a man can be useful in high
office), nor the interests of the Prince Regent's service well
understood, will allow of my consenting to enter the Govern
ment on the condition of acting under Lord Castlereagh in
the House of Commons." It almost amounted to a misre
presentation to speak of "the claim of the lead for Lord
Castlereagh," when he had already been for several weeks iri
possession of it. And if this letter showed a lingering per
sonal jealousy of Lord Castlereagh, a second letter, written
on the very same day, betrays that feeling still more un-
raistakeably ; for it offered to consent to a plan which he
understood Lord Liverpool to have hinted, of " leaving the
lead in abeyance as between Lord Castlereagh and himself;
in the hands of neither; but in those of Vansittart as
Chancellor of the Exchequer ; " adding, that he " sug
gested this not as a perfect arrangement, or as one that he
desired, but merely as a facility on his part towards the solu
tion of a difficulty which he believed Lord Liverpool to be
^ It is remarkable that Stapleton, speaking afterwards from Canning's
own information, says that he did claim the lead for himself. His
words are : " Some of Mr. Canning's friends suggested that, if he had
not the lead, the ofifer ought not to be accepted. . . . They decided that
he ought to insist upon the lead." But this letter seems to show that
Stapleton must have been mistaken.

i8i2]- OF LORD LIVERPOOL 407
anxious to solve." It seems strange that a man who was
so resolute in refusing to act under Lord Castlereagh,
should have been willing to act under Mr. Vansittart. But
he was so eager to assert his equality with Lord Castlereagh
that he overlooked the humiliating position in which Lord
Castlereagh would be placed if the lead were taken from
him to be given to a rainister whose adraission to Cabinet
office was so rauch raore recent than his own.
Lord Liverpool perceived that sorae of Canning's per
tinacity arose frora his adoption of the idea that possession
of the lead by one minister implied a subordination in
the rest ; and he tried to remove that impression by the
following letter, which, besides its value as a raost perspi
cuous definition of the duties and positions of the different
ministers in their respective Houses of Parliament, affords
also an admirable example of the patient temper and cour
teous consideration for others which were such distinguished
attributes of his character : Fife House, July 22d, 1812.
My dear^ Canning,
As I must on every account be desirous not to be misunderstood
with respect to the substance of the communications which
have lately passed between us, I am anxious once more to call
your attention to those communications, and to bring before
you the proposition which I made to you, and the grounds on
which I conceived it to rest.
In proposing the arrangement that Lord Castlereagh should take
the office of Chancehor of the Exchequer, with the manage
ment of the general business of the House of Commons, and
that you should take the office of Foreign Secretary of State,
which he was wilUng to relinquish in your favour, I considered
myself as proposing the arrangement which was likely to be
most advantageous to the Prince's Government and to the
public service ; most honorable to the parties ; and most likely,
from being definite, to provide against any unpleasant collisions
in future.
I considered it most advantageous to the public service, because
in any case two-thirds, at least, of the business of the House

4o8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
of Commons must be conducted by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, from the nature of his office.
This is the office, therefore, to which the management of the
general business most properly belongs.
The office of Foreign Secretary of State will always give to the
person who holds it a degree of consequence in Parliament
and the country which perhaps belongs to no other depart
ment ; and so far are the duties of it from being connected
with the management of the general business of the House of
Commons, that, considering the great detail of that business,
and the tirae which it occupies, the separation of it from the
duties of the Foreign Office is in all respects a raore convenient
arrangeraent.
I considered it as raost honorable to the parties concerned,
because Lord Castlereagh was willing, on a principle of accom
modation, to resign the office of higher rank, of larger emolu
ments, and more particularly the office which was considered
hy others, as well as by himself, as the most agreeable in the
Government, from the description of business which belonged
to it, in exchange for a situation in all respects very different.
If you admitted what is called the lead in the House of
Commons in him, you adraitted it not on any principle of
superiority, but because you might naturally be of opinion that
it was most conveniently connected with the department which
he would then hold. You obtained in retum every advantage
in point of office, and you obtained particularly the office
which was most congenial to your habits, to your feelings, and
to your talents.
I considered it, lastly, as most likely to provide against any
unpleasant collisions in future, not from any apprehension that
such collision would be likely to exist in your case rather than
in any other, but from a general feeling that, in the relation in
which you were to be placed in the House of Commons, it
must be an advantage that your respective duties should be
marked out, as far as it is practicable.
If you were both Secretaries of State, with any third person
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the debates are to depend
principally upon the Secretaries of State, it is scarcely possible
that there should not be continual difficulties as to the person

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 409
to whom any particular business should belong ; and the public
service would suffer in consequence. But in the supposed case,
the office and situation would sufficiently distinguish the duties,
though each must, of course, look for support from the other in
the business which properly belonged to him.
In the former part of this letter, as well as in one which I wrote
to you from Coombe, I have made use of the term " manage
ment of the business of the House of Commons " rather than
the term "lead," and I have purposely avoided the words
" acting under."
I am satisfied that the term made use of by me is a more correct
description of the idea, and that the latter terms have created a
very unfair prejudice in the minds of some persons. In my
view of this subject I am very anxious that there should be no
misunderstanding on this head.
I mean by management of the general business of a House of
Parliament the same management which Mr. Perceval had in
the House of Commons during the Duke of Portland's Adminis
tration, the same which I myself had in the House of Lords
during Mr. Pitt's, the Duke of Portland's, and Perceval's
Administration. I never considered it as giving me any
authority over my colleagues, though I certainly considered
myself entitled to their cordial support in all the business
which devolved upon me in consequence of that situation.
They took the lead of me (if the term is to be used) in the
business of their respective departments, and I felt myself
always bound to give them the same support in the business of
their department as I expected from them on other occasions.
There never has existed a single difficulty between myself and
any of my colleagues, as to our respective Parliamentary duties,
in the course of the eight years during which I have been in
this situation; and I do not believe that any difficulty ever
occurred between Perceval and his colleagues in this respect,
whatever might have arisen out of other circumstances.
I have maturely considered every other suggestion for the exten
sion of the Government, and I am satisfied that the one which
I have proposed is the only one which is at this time practi
cable, or would furnish the chance of an united Administration.
If upon consideration, you should be disposed to agree to this

4IO LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
as a basis, I have only to repeat what I have already stated
to you in conversation, that the offices of Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland, Secretary to Ireland, Chancellor of the Exchequer of
Ireland, and the office of Treasurer of the Navy, besides
another office, which I avoid mentioning at present, will be
disposable for the purpose of raaking other arrangements ; and
I should hope, therefore, that there would be the means of
providing for your friends in a raanner which would be perfectly
satisfactory to you and to them, as well as to all those with
whora I ara acting at present. — I am faithfully yours, Liverpool.
A subsequent letter placed the matter in a point of
view still more favorable to Canning's pretensions, since
it showed that, so far from his being required to act
under Lord Castlereagh, he would be placed in a posi
tion of complete independence as to the business of his
own department, if it may not even be said that on
that Lord Castlereagh would be bound to defer to his
judgment. Private. Fife House, July 23d, 181 2.
My dear Canning,
It raay be material that you should be informed, that though
I wrote the letter which you received from me yesterday -without
any previous communication with Lord Castlereagh, I have
since shown it to him, and he entirely concurs in my view of
the relation in which you would stand to each other under the
proposed arrangement, viz. : in consequence of his undertaking
the management of the general business of Government in the
House of Coraraons, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, you
would stand, in regard to him, in the same relation in which
you stood with respect to Perceval in the Duke of Portland's
Adrainistration, and in which Lord Wellesley stood to me in
the last Administration.
The management of the business of the Foreign Department
which might come before the House of Commons would, of
course, rest with yourself; and Lord Castlereagh - would be
bound to act with respect to you on the business of that depart-

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 411
ment, as you would have to act with respect to him on the
business which his situation devolved upon him.
Lord Castlereagh is not disposed to advance any claim whatever
of supremacy. He only wished to be placed in the situation
in which other Chancellors of the Exchequer have been placed
in 'those instances in which the management of the general
business of the House of Commons has been entrusted to them,
and when the First Lord of the Treasury has been in the
House of Lords.
I have only to add that if, upon consideration, your answer
should be a rejection, I can only regret it. If you think proper
to seek by letter any further explanation, which I trust will not
be necessary, I wish, in that case, that you would not commit
yourself to any particular expressions on the subject without
previous communication with me.
Ever, my dear Canning,
Very sincerely yours, Liverpool.
It might have been thought that enough had now been
offered to appease the most punctilious asserter of his own
dignity. Canning, however, was still unsatisfied. He per
sisted in claiming such an equality with -Lord Castlereagh
as in his judgment every one raust discern to be a com
plete equality, though in the eyes of every one else it
would have araounted to a stronger assertion of Lord
Castlereagh's inferiority than even the placing of the cora
plete lead in Canning's hands ; for, under the guise of a
submission to the original theory of the Secretaryship of
State, so obsolete that few people were aware of it, it went
to curtail the lead of raore than half its authority ; and the
cases on which he rested as precedents to show that the
Secretary of State had had the raanageraent of the busi
ness of the House of Coramons oftener than the Chancellor
of the Exchequer had but little bearing on the case, since
they were cases where the Chancellor of the Exchequer
was wholly inexperienced in the usages of Parliament at
all, as were Mr. Pitt in 1782, and Lord H. Petty in \i

412 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
or wholly incompetent, as was Lord J. Cavendish ; besides
that in 1806 Fox was in reality the chief minister as much
as the elder Pitt had been in 1757. In all such cases the
precedent which is really of authority must be the latest ;
and the latest Canning admitted to be against him ; and
that with his own submission to it. Long as the letter is, it
is fair to him to give it at full length, and equally fair to add
Lord Castlereagh's explanation of his own views and feelings
on the subject, with Lord Liverpool's reply to Canning,
not written -wdthout unusual deliberation.
Private, Gloucester Lodge, July 2Sth, 1812.
My dear Liverpool,
I have fully considered your letter of the 22d, and the two sup
plementary letters which I have since received from you.
I proceed to state to you, as clearly as I can, my final view of
the proposition which you have made to me.
I begin by repeating what I have already expressed to you, both
verbally and in writing, my readiness to act cordially with
Lord Castiereagh on a footing of equahty in the House of
Commons.
I understand, from your letters, that no superiority is claimed fo»-
Lord Castlereagh.
I understand frora you that what is ordinarily called the " lead,"
what you (more correctly perhaps) terra the management of the
general business of the House of Commons, is proposed to be
separated from the office of Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and annexed to that of Chancellor of the Exchequer, as
an arrangement more convenient for the public service ; and
that it is thought to be more convenient, both because by far
the greatest portion of that business must, at all events, under
any arrangeraent, fall into the hands of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, and because the Foreign Secretary of State will be
the better able to discharge the duties of his own department in
office by being relieved from details in the House of Commons
with which his office has no necessary or natural connexion.
Now there has been no instance, as I believe, except that of
Perceval in the Duke of Portland's time, in which the manage
ment of the general business of the House of Commons has

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 413
been given to a Chancellor of the Exchequer not First Lord
of the Treasury. The general rule has been to give it to a
Secretary of State. However just, therefore, the reasoning may
be by which the proposed arrangement may be recommended,
it is not to be disguised that a certain priority is allotted by
it to that one of two persons of equal pretensions in whose
favour the innovation is established.
On the other hand, I must in fairness admit that Lord Castle
reagh has, as you say, relinquished in my favour an office of
higher official rank, and one of which the business is peculiarly
agreeable to me.
Thus far we are probably quite agreed.
I am sure, however, that you will feel with me that any arrange
ment which shall have the effect of disparaging me in public
estimation, by exhibiting me as subordinate to Lord Castlereagh
in the House of Commons, would be, through that disparage
ment (so far as I am capable of rendering any service at all),
prejudicial to the Prince Regent's service ; and I am still more
sure that you feel (for you have stated that feeling repeatedly in
your first letter) that an arrangement which, " by being definite,
should be most likely to provide against future collision," and
" which should mark out our respective duties in the House of
Commons as nearly as is practicable,'' would be highly desirable
and advantageous.
Upon these principles it is impossible for me to agree to the
proposal in your last letter for leaving everything relating to
division of business in the House of Commons to be settled
hereafter by reference to the head of the Government, as each
particular case may arise. This would be not to define, but to
avoid definition ; it would not be to prevent collision, but to
invite, and almost to ensure it. The suggestion of following
" what has been usual in similar cases " does not help us at all.
In all former instances (within our memory) : in that of Mr. Fox
and Lord John Cavendish ; of Mr. Pitt (when Chancellor of
the Exchequer under Lord Shelburne) and Lord Sydney, then
Mr. Townshend ; of Mr. Fox and Lord Henry Petty and Lord
Howick : the management has been with the Secretary of State.
Such is the general rule. I have admitted Lord Castlereagh's
voluntary relinquishment of the Secretaryship of State to entide

414 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
him to a departure from the general rule in the present instance.
I do not, however, think that it justifies the complete inversion
of the rule.
In Mr. Pitt's second and third Administrations he was not
Chancellor of the Exchequer only, but Prime Minister. No
inference whatever can be drawn, therefore, from his relative
situation with Lord Grenville (when Secretary of State in the
House of Commons) or with Mr. Dundas and Mr. Windham.
In the Duke of Portland's last Administration the distribution
was between three persons of equal pretensions, two of them
being Secretaries of State and agreeing to allow the precedency
to the third as Chancellor of the Exchequer : originally, perhaps,
for the very purpose of preventing competition between them
selves. There is, therefore, no case exactly " similar," much less
any series of cases frora which usage could be collected.
To say that I should stand towards Lord Castlereagh as I did
towards Perceval in the Duke of Portland's time is incorrect
in a double view : first, as Perceval's precedency was to a
certain degree the result of a compromise between Castlereagh
and me ; secondly, as by proposing to confine my management
to my own department alone, and assigning to Lord Castlereagh
the management of all the remainder, you place me, not as I
stood towards Perceval but as towards Perceval and Lord
Castlereagh in one.
1 have been, as you know, perfectly ready now to stand again
with Lord Castlereagh in the same situation in which he and"
I stood towards Perceval towards any third person, if such
person could now be found. This arrangement you tell me is
impracticable. One of your main objections to it is that, if
Lord Castlereag'n and I were both Secretaries of StatCi it
would be scarcely possible that continual difficulties should
not arise as to the division of business between us. Is it not
obvious that, if this be so, precisely the same difficulties must
arise when Lord Castlereagh, though Chancellor of the Ex
chequer, assumes the management of all the business of the
other two Secretaries of State ?
Out of this consideration a very simple arrangement suggests
itself which I really think would place us on a footing of fair
and liberal equality. The office of Secretary of State is, in

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

415

constitution, one office, though divided, for public convenience
usually into two, or, as now, into three departments. Of the
heads of these departments each can do, and does, the business
of the other, upon occasion, as matter of course, without any
new or special appointment : so much so that it might happen,
according to your projected division of duties in the House of
Commons, that I might sign despatches at the Home or War
Department (upon occasion of a vacancy, or an absence, or an
indisposition), for which despatches I should be personally
responsible, but which Lord Castlereagh, as Chancellor of the
Exchequer, would have to explain and justify to the House of
Commons.
The arrangement which I would propose, therefore, is conform
able, if not to usage (which is -not applicable to the case), but to
analogy. It is that, as things now stand, and so long as I am
sole Secretary of State in the House of Commons, I should act
there, not as Secretary of State for the Foreign Department
only, but that I should be understood to have the management
of all business proceeding out of either department of the Secre
tary of State's office ; and Lord Castlereagh of everything else.
This would be clear, " definite," and simple. It would carry the
established distinction of office fairly into Parliament, and
would mark the boundaries of duty there with a plainness not
to be mistaken.
Leaving the Chancellor of the Exchequer the. management of the
business of every other department, in addition to his natural
province of Finance and Revenue ; leaving him the business of
Navy, Ordnance, Army (over, or together with, the Secretary at
War), of Judicature, of Trade, Commerce, and Manufactures,.
of India, with its charter (one great business, if not the busi
ness, of the ensuing session), of the new Civil List establish
ment (probably not very distant, and sure to be of itself the
most important transaction of the time in which it is brought
on), and generally of all that mass of undefinable business
which grows up in the House of Commons, it can hardly be
thought that the magnitude and varieties of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer's occupations will be unreasonably, or even
perceptibly, impaired by this arrangement.
The principle once acknowledged, I should not, as you may

4i6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812.
readily believe, be very jealous of its application in cases where,
from the intermixture of the business of the Home or Colonial
Department (as may sometimes happen) with that or some
other department under the cognisance of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, the whole conduct of it might be more conve
niently in his hands, or in those of sorae person acting in aid of
him. And upon the whole of what I had to do myself I should
desire the most constant and unreserved communication with
hira.
It is the acknowledgment of the principle that I desire, as one of
fair and stateable equality ; and I desire it not as matter of
punctilio, but for the very reasons which you give for the
desirableness of definite arrangement, because I think this
principle not only likely to meet ^11 ordinary cases, but almost
certain to serve as a rule even for any extraordinary or anoma
lous case that raay arise, and so prevent all doubts, disunions,
and appeals.
If this principle be distinctly acknowledged, I will no longer with
hold my consent to your proposition, so far as I am myself
concerned in it ; supposing always that the arrangements in
which others are coraprehended shall be settled to mutual
satisfaction. ^ , ^ ¦
I ara, dear Liverpool,
Very sincerely yours,
George Canning.
P.S. Upon looking over your letters again, I think it right to add
that, desirous as I shall be to co-operate cordially with Lord
Castlereagh, I must take for granted that, when you speak of
the support which we are to look for from each other, you do
not mean to look for a constant daily and nightly attendance
from me on every stage of every measure which he raay have
to bring forward ; or that my occasional absence from those
detailed and protracted discussions- which must interfere with
my official occupations would ever be considered as indicating
any want of cordiality towards hira. Perceval and I understood
each other perfectly on this point ; and the principle upon
which you place the separation of the lead, or management,
from the Foreign Office, is itself so clear a recognition of it,
that I need not, perhaps, have said anything upon it, if I had

i8i2j OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 417
not thought it better to leave nothing unexplained that could
be in any way liable to misunderstanding hereafter.
St. James's Square, 26th July, 1812.
My dear Liverpool,
Having reflected upon Mr. Canning's letter, and the conversation
which passed between us upon it, I deem it material, in order
to guard against future misconception, to trouble you with my
sentiraents upon it.
The distribution of business therein proposed appears to me
formed upon an assumption that no general management of
the business, or lead, as it has usually been called, is to exist
as heretofore in the House of Commons, (I use not the word
lead in the invidious sense of superiority, which I am perfectly
ready to disclaim, but in the practical and parliamentary sense
of that expression), but that such an arrangement of business
should be made as may be consistent with the equality therein
contended for. In this principle I cannot possibly acquiesce,
being satisfied that some one person must be charged with the
general management of the business of the House of Com
mons, who is understood, in that situation, to possess the con
fidence ofthe minister, and on whom shall devolve, as a matter of
course, subject to arrangements of special convenience or accom
modation, the conduct of all business which does not belong to
departments the chiefs of which are in the House of Commons.
When the alternative was proposed to me, as the means of pro
curing Mr. Canning's accession to the Government, of either
preservin.g, as it is called, " the lead" in the House of Commons,
with the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, or, if I pre
ferred it, the Foreign Department without the lead, I considered
that arrangement as one perfectly intelligible, and to be under
stood in its ordinary and accustomed sense. When I met
Mr Canning at your house, I expressly stated to him that I
could not recede from my situation in the House of Commons,
but that I was ready, as I had expressed myself to you some
time before, to open the Foreign Office for him, if he preferred
it to the Secretaryship of State for the War Department, which
I understood, with Lord Bathurst's sanction, you had proposed
to him.
To this arrangement I adhere, because I consider it as an
VOL. I. E E

4i8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
accommodation to Mr. Canning not involving any breach of the
accustomed principles of Parliamentary business. I declined
to acquiesce in what was called " the lead being in abeyance,''
because it appeared to rae an entirely new and impracticable
principle, calculated to destroy all unity of action in the
Government, and to throw the House of Commons into dis
order. I cannot now agree to a distribution of business which
appears to me calculated to effect the same purpose under a
different name. I must adhere to the proposition you brought
under my consideration, interpreted and limited in its fair
Parliamentary sense, and must decline being a party to any
stipulation which is to alter the character of the situation in
which it was proposed to rae to stand, and for the execution of
whose duties I cannot consent to make myself responsible, if
I am not understood to be charged not only with the functions,
but supported with the authority and influence essential to
^ their effectual execution.
In the conduct of public business my feelings would always lead
me to accommodate to the fair wishes of a colleague ; and if
Mr. Canning should be desirous of bringing forward the
business of Lord Bathurst's office, so far as it connects itself
with foreign affairs, such an arrangement, as far as I am per
sonally concerned, would be cheerfully acquiesced in by me ;
but I cannot agree to it as a matter of previous stipulation,
much less as a principle which is to alter the general relations
of office, or to give to any change of office a character incon
sistent with the avowed grounds, on which it was originally
proposed and acquiesced in by me.
With respect to Mr. Canning's attendance in the House of
Commons, I should hope it would be regulated upon those
principles which have always influenced the conduct of
members of a Governraent acting cordially together.
I ara, dear Liverpool,
Ever faithfully yours,
Castlereagh.
Fife House, July 27th, 1812.
My dear Canning,
I have very attentively considered your answer to my letter. As
the opinions contained in my former letters have not undergone

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 419
any change, I think it would be unnecessary to enter into
further particulars respecting them.
I cannot depart from the principle laid down in those letters, that
the management of the general business of the House of
Commons should rest with Lord Castlereagh, as it was under
stood to exist in the hands of Mr. Perceval during the Duke
of Portland's Administration.
It is perfectly true that the business which will devolve upon
Lord Castlereagh in consequence of there being only one
Secretary of State in the House of Commons will be far more
extensive than that which devolved on Mr. Perceval; and,
though no previous stipulation can be made which would have
the appearance of altering the character of Lord Castlereagh's
situation, yet if you are desirous of bringing forward in the
House of Commons that part of the business in the War
Department which is connected with the Foreign Office, I am
confident that there will be no difficulty in accommodating you
in this respect.
With respect to the postscript of your letter, I will say no more
upon it than that I trust your attendance in the House of
Commons will always be regulated by those principles which
have influenced the conduct of the members of a Government
acting cordially together. Believe me, &c. Liverpool.
Lord Castlereagh's letter was read by Lord Liverpool
to Canning, and afterwards lent to him for further con
sideration, with the announcement of an additional offer on
Castlereagh's part, which will be best understood by the
following letter : July 27th, 1812.
My dear Canning,
I have communicated to Castlereagh what passed between us
to-day on the subject of what may be the pretensions of the
Secretary of State when there was only one in the House of
Commons, and when the management of the general business
of Governnient in that House was considered to be in the
Chancehor of the Exchequer. He wifl not object to whatever
has been usual in this respect in similar cases ; and if the
practice has been various, or is on other accounts doubtful, he
E E 2

420 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
will be satisfied to abide by whatever may be the opinion of the
person who may at the time be at the head of the Government,
after such friendly coraraunication as may be had upon the
subject between the parties interested in the business.
Yours, &c. Liverpool.
It might have been thought almost impossible to refuse
the offer thus made : but as if the very moderation of Lord
Castlereagh had been irritating, it made or left Canning
more pertinacious than ever. Conciliatory and even yielding
as Lord Castlereagh's letter had been, he found offence in
the very terms in which Lord Castlereagh had expressed
his anxiety to comply substantially with his wishes. The
following note shows the degree in which, during the course
of the discussion, his natural eagerness of temper had been
goaded into cavilling captiousness by the advisers to whom
he was unfortunately listening :
Private. Gloucester Lodge, July 27th, 1812.
My dear Liverpool,
I retum Lord Castlereagh's letter. I had not imagined it, upon
your reading it over to me this morning, to be half so strong
and so precise as upon reading it and considering it myself
I find it to be. Nor would my apprehensions, perhaps, have
been awakened about it at all (conceiving your subsequent
agreement to supersede whatever might previously have passed
between Lord Castlereagh and you in any previous discussion),
had I not heard of the existence of this letter, after I left you,
in a way which leaves me little doubt that I may hear of it
often again.
With this letter in existence, and uncontradicted, I cannot con
sider any such agreement as was made with you at all satis
factory. Lord Castlereagh would always be at liberty to sayi
that he had positively refused to acquiesce in a " principle of,
equality " between us, upon which alone I can consent to act,
and which I thought might be attained as well by mutual]
coraproraise as by precise parity of situation. He will always]
be at liberty to say that he positively refused to consent to that]
arrangement as a "previous stipulation,'' which, if it be not

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 421
matter of stipulation on my part (as alone I would take it),
must be matter of grace and favour on his.
The result is, I am afraid, that nothing can be made of our
attempts,' sincere on my part, I assure you, and I firmly believe
on yours, to reconcile my claim of equality with his of pre-
I eminence ; and I have therefore only to repeat that, after
considering this letter, I feel more strongly than ever that
I will not go into the House of Commons under Lord
Castiereagh. Ever, my dear Liverpool, Very sincerely yours,
George Canning.
P.S. I will write to Wellesley to desire to see him before he obeys
Lord Sidmouth's summons.
The discussion was thus finally closed. The only sub
sequent letter from Canning on the subject which appears
among Lord Liverpool's papers is written in a friendly
tone, expressing his " great unwillingness that any personal
point of honour of his own, however insuperable, should
stand in the way of the public service," and assuring him
therefore that " if there were any among those persons who
would have come into office with himself whose assistance
Lord Liverpool was still desirous Of obtaining, he would
labour to induce them to accept any proposals, not dis
honorable to themselves, which Lord Liverpool might
think proper to make to thera, as sincerely as if he were
himself able to raake a part of the Government."
St. Jaraes's Square, 29th July, 1812.
My dear Liverpool,
Considering the negotiation with Mr. Canning is now closed,
I should not trouble you with any remarks upon his last letter
if it had not referred (in my conception unjustly) to the tone of
mine, which I am wholly unconscious to have been such as
unnecessarily to aggravate the evident difficulties of the subject
to which it related ; much less was it intended to affect, in the
slightest degree, Mr. Canning's feelings ; and, as I understood,
its primary impression was not of that nature.
That letter was written to obviate further misconception, in con-

422 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
sequence of my ha-ving seen two letters from Mr. Canning, which
required, as the condition of his coming into the Government,
that 1 should in substance relinquish my present situation in
the House of Commons, for the purpose of placing the conduct
of business in that House upon a principle which never has
been at any former period, and, in my deliberate judgment,
never ought to be acted upon, either with a view to the credit
of the individual members of the Administration, or to the
interests of the public service.
I felt rayself called upon to decline any such arrangement, as
soon as it was proposed, first on public grounds, as necessarily
leading to weakness and disunion ; and, secondly, from a sense
of character, being satisfied that Mr. Canning, under similar
circumstances, would not, and, I must add, ought not, to have
acceded to such an arrangement, if proposed by me. With
these impressions, I was anxious that Mr. Canning and myself
should not be exposed to act together under different concep
tions of our respective duties.
I wish not to be understood as offering the slightest allusion
against the propriety of Mr. Canning's conduct ; he has no doubt
been guided by feelings to which I ara ready to do the utmost
justice. If upon reflection I entertain any doubt vrith respect
to the course I have myself pursued, it is rather that I have
gone too far, than not far enough, in the spirit of accommoda
tion, frora a desire to raeet the wishes of my colleagues, to
strengthen the Prince Regent's Governraent, and from a sense
of dutiful deference to what appear to be the personal senti
ments of his Royal Highness.
Whatever the obstacles may be which prevent Mr. Canning and
myself frora being brought to act together in the Administra
tion, under an; arrangeraent satisfactory to our rautual feelings,
there is no reason why they should be a subject of complaint or
irritation on either side. From the outset my disposition was
to interpose no obstacle which a sense of character did not
dictate to your endeavours to effect an arrangement which
might be advantageous- to the public service. I have endea
voured faithfully to execute this purpose : I lament that any
impediraent should exist, at a period of acknowledged pubUc
difficulty, in strengthening the Adrainistration ; more especially

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 423
that this impediment should in any degree arise from considera
tions personal to myself I should deem it, however, a source
of weakness, and not of strength, to the Prince Regent's
Government, were I to make a part of an arrangement, which
was novel upon the face of it, founded in appearance, if not in
fact, on feelings of jealousy and personal competition, and to
which, for the reasons assigned, I could not accede without a
violation of public principle and a sacrifice of my own feelings
and character. i am, dear Liverpool,
Ever faithfully yours, Castlereagh.
This final letter of Lord Castlereagh has been given to
show the generosity with which he was eager to raake
every allowance for Canning's personal feelings ; though
he was aware that they originated rather in the suggestions
of others than the dictates of his own judgment. And it is
due to Canning also to add that, after the negotiation was
thus terminated, he did not allow the soreness which he
can hardly have helped feeling at its failure to influence
his conduct towards the Administration, but afforded_jt_a
frank and heartysupport. But he had made a great mis
take. When, half a century before, the great statesman of
that day was prevailed on, in a somewhat sirailar raanner,
to refuse office which his conscience admonished him that
he was bound to accept, he could not forbear reproach
ing his adviser in the raild forra of a classical quotation, ¦¦-
that he had irreparably daraaged the reputation and
interest of both, and had at the sarae tirae inflicted no
trifling injury on their coraraon country. Canning might
certainly have lamented his own submission to the fatal
influence of his counsellors with as rauch justice as Lord
Chatham; they kept him frora power at a tirae when a
crisis was rapidly approaching which placed within the
' He apostrophised Lord Temple in the words of Anna to the dying
Dido: " Exstinxti me teque, soror, populumque, patresque
Sidonios, urbemque tuam," — ^n. iv. 682.

424 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
reach of those who were in authority such glory as has
fallen to the lot of few Administrations. And it was only
through an accident which no one could foresee, and which
he himself lamented as deeply as any one, that after many
years the opportunity which he now so weakly and cap
tiously threw away was re-opened to him. But the end
of Lord Chatham's quotation is not applicable to his case.
His refusal, which left to Lord Castlereagh the conduct of
our foreign affairs, cannot be said to have been unfortunate
for the country. The three years which ensued were per
haps the most important as far as our foreign policy was
concerned that are recorded in our history. Our Secretary
of State was required not merely to negotiate with the
diplomatists of other lands, but to guide, to stimulate, to
restrain their sovereigns. On his voice depended the
settlement of more than one question affecting the peace
of the whole world. Lord Castlereagh rose with the
demand made upon his abilities. During that most event
ful period he displayed alternately every quality which is
most required in those invested with great influence. In
moments' of danger, prompt and fearless decision ; in hours
of deliberation, shrewd judgment and keen foresight ; when
others were fretful or exacting, or selfish, he calmed and
shamed them by his unfailing equanimity, his unruffled
courtesy, his perfect disinterestedness. Nor with the
worshippers of heraldic punctilio, among whom the nego
tiations at Vienna were carried on, were his social advan
tages, his high rank in the most real nobility of Europe,
without their weight. The consideration which these
external circumstances gave him with Metternich and
Hardenberg was more than once sufficiently apparent.
And it may well be doubted whether Alexander, who
chafed sufficiently under his frank expostulations and
fearless reproofs, would have tolerated such language at
all had it proceeded from one on whom the advantages
of birth and hereditary importance had been less freely
showered. Canning's partisans may believe that he whom

,8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 425
they admired might have equalled him in ability : taking
all the circumstances together, flattery itself could not
venture to expect that he could have surpassed him.
The whole transaction had been full of great vexation
and disappointment to Lord Liverpool, though it is
probable that he did not greatly regret the release frora
the obligation to give places to Canning's adherents ; and
in one instance he was able to fill up an office which had
been offered to one of thera rauch raore to his satisfaction :
the post of Secretary for Ireland. It had been occupied
by Lord Wellesley's brother, Mr. Wellesley Pole, in later
days known as Lord Maryborough, who had already
signified his wish to resign, and was only retaining his
office till the negotiation with Canning should be concluded.
The Prime Minister now made his retirement the oppor
tunity of introducing into public life a young man who
had but recently entered Parliament, but who, during the
short time that he had enjoyed a seat in the House of
Commons, had done rauch to realize the expectations that
he had already created by a distinguished University career.
And he announced his intention to the Lord Lieutenant,
the Duke of Richraond, in the following letter, which does
great credit to his own power of discrimination and insight
into character :
Private. Fife House, August 1st, 1812.
My dear Duke,
I desired Lord Bathurst a few days ago to inform you that, if
certain negotiations, which were then depending, and of which
you were informed, should prove unsuccessful it was my inten
tion to propose the situation of Secretary to Ireland to Mr. Peel
I have now to acquaint you that I have proposed it to him by
the authority of the Prince Regent, and that he has accepted it.
I can speak with more confidence of Mr Peel than I could of
most persons to whom such an office might be offered. He
has been under me in the Secretary of State's office for two
years, and has acquired all the necessary habits of official
business. He has a particularly good temper, and great frank-

426 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
ness and openness of manners, which I know are particularly
desirable on your side of the water. He acquired great repu
tation, as you raust have heard, as a scholar at Oxford, and
he has distinguished hiraseff in the House of Commons on
every occasion on which he has had an opportunity of speaking.
I have the greatest hopes, therefore, that this appointment
will prove acceptable to you and advantageous to ffie Go
vernment
With respect to the office of Chancellor of ffie Exchequer, I am
inclined to ffiink that Mr. Leslie Foster will be the best
selection ; but I defer any final determination upon this for a
few days. j ^jjj^ -mtla. sincere regards,
Yours, &c.
To the Duke of Richmond. Liverpool.
From the language of another letter it might be fancied
that he already foresaw the future eminence of the new
Secretary. While lamenting the failure of his efforts "to
bring Castlereagh and Canning together as members of the
present Government," and expressing that he consequently
"had had no resource but to bring forward the most
promising of the young men, on whose exertions the fate
of the Government in the House of Commons another
session would very much depend," he adds, " I should be
most happy to see another Pitt amongst them. I would
most willingly resign the government into his hands, for
I am fully aware of the importance of the minister being,
if possible, in the House of Commons ;'' and proceeds to
describe his own feelings and desires in words which strik
ingly show his own unselfish patriotism : " I can assure you
I never sought the situation in which I find myself placed ;
but, having accepted it from a sense of public duty, I am
determined to do my utmost for the service of the Prince
Regent as long as I have reason to believe I possess his
confidence ; and at all events I will endeavour to keep
that party together which affords the only security either
to the Crown or to the people against the complete and
uncontrolled dominion of the Opposition."

,8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 427
The appointment, however, of INIr. Peel was perhaps
the only one which was entirely to Lord Li\-erpoors raind.
And it was thus, amid difficulties of no ordinary character,
that he entered on his Administration. At his ver}^ first
acceptance of office it had been condemned by the House
of Commons as unequal to the greatness of the occasion ;
and the general opinion of Parliament, of the country,
and of many even of his own colleagues, certainlj- was
that it wanted strength. It had unquestionably sustained
a diminution of strength from the notoriety of the failure
of the negotiations with Canning, and probably during its
first years no one augured for it a long existence. Yet
from this unpromising beginning it became a powerful,
successful Ministry, and permanent, with but t\vo excep-
tions,! beyond all former example. It terminated ^\"ith un
precedented success and glory the greatest war in wffiich
the country had ever been engaged. With equally signal
success, it grappled with and crushed its unexpected re
vival. The return of peace and the inevitable reaction
brought with it domestic dangers alraost as violent, almost
as enduring, as the war itself These also it surmounted,
and, amid circumstances of great and uni\'ersal financial
distress, laid the foundation of that wonderful coraraercial
prosperity which for the last forty years has been the
most distinguishing feature of our national history. Such
achievements and results supersede the necessity of pane
gyric. And, as they could have been accomplished by
none but men of great practical ability, so also is it clear
that they could not have been accomplished even by them
if their chief had not been a statesman whom all respected
for his capacity, and to whom all were attached by his
uniform consideration for all.
' Sir Robert Walpole's and Mr. Pitt's.

423 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812

CHAPTER XIII.
The United States declare war — The Orders in Council— The right of
search — Conciliatory conduct of Mr. Perceval on this Subject — Mr.
Brougham's motion on the subject — Toleration Bill — Lord Liver
pool's feelings towards Dissenters — Riots of the Luddites — Fresh
proposals of Napoleon for negotiation — Lord Liverpool's language
on Napoleon's title — The battle of Salamanca — The battle of Boro
dino — Lord Liverpool's comments on the state of affairs — Slight
influence of the Government on elections — The new House of
Commons favorable to the Ministers — Mr. Peel's view of the state
of Ireland.
The arrangements for the new Ministry were hardly coni-
pleted, when their attention was called to a matter of
paramount importance, on which it was believed that the
question of peace and war with the United States depended.
It afterwards appeared that nothing that could have been
done since Lord Liverpool became Prime Minister could
have affected the result ; since, while Lord Wellesley's
negotiations were going on, the American House of Re
presentatives came to a vote in favour of war, and actually
declared it on the very day on which the subject was first
mentioned in the House of Lords.
The pretext by which the Americans justified their
recourse to hostilities was the Order or Orders in Council
issued by the Duke of Portland's Administration, which
were in fact only a formal assertion of the principle
adopted by Mr. Fox in 1806, when he and his colleagues
established the coasting blockade. As has been already
mentioned,^ they had been drawn up and established to
'See ante, p. 240. Mr. Brougham, in the debate of June 16, 1812,
expressly admits that this species of blockade, first devised in May
1806, was " the first step to the famous Orders in Council."

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 429
retaliate on the French for the arrogance of Napoleon's
Berlin decrees ; but they were in reality felt less by that
nation than by the neutral Powers, or rather by that one
neutral Power, the United States of America, which, pre
viously to their enactment, had nearly engrossed the carry
ing trade, but which now found that source of profit almost
wholly cut off. It is quite clear that these Orders were
indefensible on any acknowledged principle of national law,
since they professed to establish a blockade of ports of
which not a single ship was stationed to guard the entrance.
But our navy was powerful enough to override all con
siderations of that kind, and captured ship after ship of
the Americans freighted with cargoes destined for French
consumption. The Americans expostulated,; but, when
their remonstrances failed to procure thera relief, they
began to consider whether they could not, in their turn,
retaliate on us as we had retaliated on the French, and
passed a law known as the Non-Intercourse Act, by which
they prohibited all coraraerce between their raerchants and
either of the belligerent Powers. France was norainally
included, because it was impossible for thera to deny that
that country had been the aggressor by her Berlin decrees ;
but France suffered no practical damage, since we had
destroyed all her trade long before. The Act was only
effective as regarded us, and against us it was a weapon of
great power, since our trade with America had latterly be
come of great magnitude and value. For many of our
manufactures she was, even in time of peace, almost our
best customer ; and, since France had armed the Continent
against us, there was no such market for most of our
produce as was furnished by the growing population of
the United States.
It was, of course, an act of great self-denial on the part
of the Americans thus to break off a coraraerce which was
as profitable to them as to ourselves, and to resolve to
dispense with luxuries and comforts which had become
ahnost necessities. But they had not yet entirely forgotten

430 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
the animosities kindled by the war of 1775. The feehng
had been revived in all its first intensity by the loss of
their trade ; and, though they had wrought themselves up
to think any inconvenience or distress to themselves repaid
by the probability of inflicting still greater injury upon us,
they did not the less writhe under the diminution of their
public and private wealth. Another source of mutual irrita
tion had arisen from a claim which we asserted to search
American ships for deserters from our navy, of whom it
was no secret that numbers were serving in them ; while the
Americans denied the right, and resented the exercise of it
(on which our captains were instructed to insist) so warmly
that in more than one instance their officers had. endeavoured
to provoke ours into acts of warlike hostility. On both
these subjects negotiations had been for some time going on
between the two countries, which our ministers long hoped
to bring to a satisfactory conclusion. But a few days after
the death of Mr. Perceval intelligence arrived of a law
having been adopted by the American House of Repre
sentatives that breathed a spirit of such frantic and un
reasoning animosity against Great Britain as was calculated
to extinguish all hope of the preservation of peace in all
but the most sanguine bosoms.^ That our statesmen were
bent on peace, if it could be maintained without loss of
the national honour, abundant proof was supplied by the
circumstance that on the 23d of April almost the same
day on which this famous bill was introduced into the
"¦ Towards the end of April a bill was introduced, and rapidly
carried, " for the protection, recovery, and identification of American
seamen ;" the first clause of which declared that " Every person who,
under pretence of a commission from any foreign Power, should
impress upon the high seas any native seaman of the United States,
should be adjudged a pirate and a felon, and upon conviction should
suffer death." While another clause gave to every such seaman im
pressed under the British flag the right of attaching in the hands of
any British subject, or of any debtor of any British, subject, a sum
equal to thirty dollars per month during the time of his detention.
("Annual Register," 1812, p. 195.)

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 431
American Congress, the Prince Regent had issued a de
claration revoking the Order in Council as far as con
cerned American vessels and cargoes. It is true that the
revocation was in a certain degree conditional. It was to
take effect from the ist of August ; and was stated in the
preamble to have been caused in part by a decree issued
during the past year by the French Governraent revoking
the Berlin decrees in respect of shipping belonging to the
United States ; which it was understood was likely to lead
to a repeal on the part of the United States of the Non-
Intercourse Act as far as France was concerned ; and it
was at the same tirae expressed in the Regent's declaration
that, unless the Araerican Government should revoke also
their exclusion of British vessels, whether merchantmen or
men-of-war, frora their harbours, so as to place thera on
the same footing with the ships of France, the revocation
should be annulled, and the Orders in Council should
resume their operation.
Conditional in forra as such a declaration was, it could
not be denied that in practical effect it amounted to all
that the Americans clairaed on the subject, since it rested
with themselves alone to render it permanent. Yet the
intelligence of its promulgation was utterly disregarded in
the United States, and both the Government and Repre
sentatives proceeded from one violent resolution and mea
sure to another, till on the i8th of June the President
issued a formal declaration of war against Great Britain.
Such a step, however, on his part was far frora being
anticipated here, when on the i6th of June Mr. Brougham
brought forward a motion to address the Prince for an
immediate, general, and unconditional suspension or revo
cation of the Orders. He enforced it by a description of
the distress which pervaded our coraraercial classes of all
ranks ; while at the sarae tirae he contended that the
Orders had almost -wholly failed to produce the annoyance
or injury to France which had been expected from thera.
Lord Castlereagh, while he affirmed, and indeed proved.

432 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
that Mr. Brougham's statements of the sufferings of our
manufacturers were exaggerated, and that, even if they had
not been, the stagnation of trade which he described was
attributable to other causes beside the Orders in Council
declared at the same time that, so desirous was the Govern
ment to remove every cause of complaint on which the
Americans insisted, that the suspension of the Orders
should not be delayed, as had been formerly proposed, till
August, but should take place at once, in order that our
envoy at Washington might be able to enforce his demand
for the repeal of the Non-Intercourse Act by the intelli
gence that we had already abrogated the decree to which
that Act was intended as a reply. Even after he had thus
renounced them. Canning, who indeed had been their author,
defended the policy of their original issue as a "justifiable
measure of retaliation on France.'' But in the House of
Lords Lord Liverpool adopted and justified the policy
which Lord Castlereagh had announced, while he steadily
rejected the advice of Lord Grey and his party to revoke
the Orders unconditionally ; a measure which, in his view,
could not be reconciled either to our dignity or to our
interests. As we have seen, the decision came too late, or
rather the eagerness of the Americans for war frustrated
any attempt of ours to preserve peace. But the combina
tion of conciHation and firmness which the conduct of the
Government exhibited afforded a good omen of its future
policy. Another indication of the general principles by which
the administration of our domestic affairs was to be re
gulated was furnished by a Toleration Bill, which relieved
the Dissenters of all sects from the annoying and vexatious
provisions of the Five Mile Act and the Conventicle Act,
both of which were now repealed, and which placed them
in all respects on a footing which they themselves admitted
to be satisfactory. Their spokesman in the House of
Commons, Mr. W. Smith, truly characterised it as "the
most complete Act of Toleration which had been passed in

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL 433
this country." And, as an evidence of the general feeling
of the new Government on the subject of religious liberty,
the bill itself, liberal as it was, was hardly more iraportant
than the language in which the Prime Minister introduced
it to his brother peers, recommending it to them not solely
on the ground of the justice of the claims of the Dissenters,
but also because "an enlarged and liberal toleration was
the best security to the Established Church." The consent
of the Archbishop and most of his brethren in the House
he had already secured by private discussion. The Arch
bishop at first had desired to make one or two clauses more
stringent ; but Lord Liverpool in reply pointed out to him
that, as the Government had drawn it, it was exactly " the
same in substance as that which regulated the Roraan
Catholics," and that to grant less " would be inconsistent
with his object of carrying through a bill which would be
satisfactory to the greater part of the Nonconformists."
One of his remarks will probably surprise many of those
who look on all Nonconformists as at all tiraes equally
hostile to the English Church. The Archbishop had wished
to specify " Dissenters " by name, as those to whom the
bill applied. On this point. Lord Liverpool writes, " With
regard to the insertion of the word ' Dissenters ' at the
beginning of the clause, it may perhaps have escaped you
that the effect of it would be to take the great body of the
Methodists entirely out of the operation of the law ; and,
as the Conventicle Act would be repealed, to relieve them
from the necessity of registering their meetings, though the
registry in their case is as iraportant as in any other. I
should observe that a large proportion of this particular
body of men profess to be members of the Church of
England. They attend divine service in the church, and take
the Communion in the church ; but they claim the privilege
of meeting and associating for religious purposes in other
places and at other times. I ara perfectly aware that they re
quire particular attention from all the heads and orthodox
members of the Establishment, even from the very circum-
VOL L F F

434 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
stance of their approximating to the Church itself; but I
doubt very much the policy of any measure which, at any
time, and more particularly under the present circumstances,
would drive them to become professed Dissenters from the
Church of England. I trust, with all their errors, their
occasional conformity and their professed assent to the
Articles and doctrine of the Church is more advantageous
than injurious to the Church itself" And his arguments
were so well received, his desire to protect and strengthen
the Church itself so universally recognised, and his judg
ment so generally deferred to, that a few days afterwards
he was enabled to announce to Mr. Smith that the bishops
would not resist any part of the bill in its existing shape ;
though he declined to add to it, as a party among the Non
conformists desired, a clause repealing the Test and Cor
poration Act, with which the Unitarians seem to have been
the body that was most dissatisfied.
One bill which the Government was forced to introduce
before the adjournment of Parliament was of a less satis
factory character. Throughout the spring the manufac
turing districts had been disturbed by some of the most
formidable riots of which there was any record for at least
three centuries. Bands of men traversed Nottinghamshire,
Cheshire, and the southern districts of Lancashire and
Yorkshire, breaking open houses, carrying off arms, de
stroying machinery of all kinds, and in some instances
proceeding to most ferocious acts of murder. They gave
themselves the name of Luddites, from a poor idiot named
Lud, who, in a fit of frenzy, while seeking to wreak his
vengeance on some boys who had teased him, had broken
some stocking-frames. But there were no symptoms of
defective intellect in the operations of his imitators. On
the contrary, secret committees, which were appointed by
both Houses to investigate the riots and their causes, agreed
in reporting them to be the result of a systematic organi
zation, carried on by societies, the members of which were
bound by secret oaths ; and, though it was probable that in

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 435
some degree they had been caused by the distress arising
from want of employment, they affirmed that they owed
their origin still raore to political motives, and that the
rioters were to a great extent tools in the hands of those
whose turbulence and disloyalty derived no provocation
from poverty. The ordinary powers of the law proved
wholly inadequate to deal with an evil which was spreading
terror through an extensive district, paralysing trade, and,
as far as distress had anything to do with it, aggravating it
tenfold. And therefore, two days after the Committee of
the Commons presented its report. Lord Castlereagh intro
duced a bill to invest the Governraent with authority
sufficient to restore tranquillity, which hitherto it did not
possess. Formidable as was the mischief with which the
bill grappled, the powers for which the Government asked
were so moderate as to show, more indisputably than the
most elaborate stateraent, their conviction of their own
strength : for not only were the chief enactraents of the bill
limited to increasing the authority of the raagistrates to
search for arms, which, if secreted, should be presumed
to be intended for unlawful use ; to conferring on them
a greater power of dispersing tumultuous assemblages, at
whatever hour they might be collected ; and to enabling
magistrates of other counties to act in those in which
riots might be taking place ; but even this law, pre
ventive and not vindictive as it manifestly was, and raild
and full of mercy in its most vigorous operation, was only
to extend over a small district, that most infected with and
disturbed by this lawless spirit, and was only to last for a
very limited time, its expiration being fixed for Lady-day of
the next year. And Lord Liverpool, in bringing it forward in
the House of Lords, after it had been passed by the Cora
mons, took occasion frora this extrerae raoderation -of the
proposed enactraent to claim general praise for the Adminis
tration, and (as Lord Darnley, who opposed the bill, had
attacked the Ministry as . one which in May had been con
demned by the House of Commons) to remind the Peers
F F 2

436 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
that that adverse vote had been practically rescinded by a
decisive majority in their favour in a much fuller House.
The bill was passed, and proved entirely successful
The Ministry was also" strengthened rather than weakened
by a discussion, which was brought on a few days before
the prorogation, on an occurrence which had taken place
before the recent changes, and during the lifetime of Mr.
Perceval In April Napoleon had made a new proposal
to negotiate with a view to the re-establishment of peace,
offering on some points terms which bore the appearance
of considerable advantage to England, but speaking also
" of the actual dynasty of Spain " as one which both Powers
were to declare " independent." Lord Castlereagh, who
at that time had just become the Foreign Secretary, had
replied by a request to know the meaning of the term
"actual dynasty." If it meant "that the royal authority
of Spain and its Government should be recognised as
residing in the brother of the ruler of France, and a
Cortes formed under his authority, and not as residing
in the legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand VII  the
obligations of good faith precluded his Royal Highness
from entertaining a proposition founded on such a basis."
If on the contrary, the independence to be acknowledged
were that of Ferdinand, the Prince Regent would be pre
pared to treat. No answer was ever sent to this letter,
and in the last week of the session questions in both
Houses were put to the Government on the subject. In
the House of Commons the ministers had the powerful
aid of Sheridan, who, in affairs affecting the national
honour, had constantly shown a disposition to prefer
patriotism to party, and who now did not hesitate to
denounce the French proposal as tricky and perfidious,
never intended to lead to peace with us, but only to terrify
Russia into submission, lest she should be left single-
handed to encounter the storm which was menacing her,
and which had since broken upon her. Canning, too (the
debate took place while the negotiation for his return

,8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 437
to office was still proceeding), raade one of his raost
brilliant speeches in defence not raerely of Lord Castle
reagh's answer, but of the whole policy of the Government
in originally going to the aid of Spain, though till " Buona
parte committed his aggression on that country we were
at open war with her." And in the House of Lords no
one raised a voice against Lord Liverpool's arguraent that
the honour of the nation absolutely prohibited any nego
tiation being entered into of which the recognition of
Joseph Buonaparte as King of Spain was to forra a pre
liminary. It deserves reraark that, in the sarae speech, he
advanced no immoveable objection to the recognition of
Napoleon as Emperor of France, which Lord Holland
had just advocated. On that subject he contented himself
with the assertion that " the Government had acted upon
the principle of all former Governments, and even of that
of which the noble lord had forraed a part, which was
that such acknowledgraents should not be raade gratui
tously, but ought to be the objects of a stipulation for a
consideration and an equivalent." It was thus publicly
avowed by the Prime Minister that there was no objection
on point of principle to prevent our acknowledging the
sovereignty of Napoleon (in fact there could be no question
that he had been formally chosen by the French nation
for their sovereign). And this avowal was acted upon
during the early part of 18 14, when we displayed a perfect
willingness to make peace with him ; for a treaty with hira
must inevitably have recognised his imperial authority ;
and the conclusion of such a treaty was prevented by no
cause but his own indomitable obstinacy.
At the end of July the Parliament was prorogued, and
it had hardly separated when intelligence arrived which
rendered the maintenance of Joseph Buonaparte on the
throne of Spain hopeless even to the French marshals.
The day after the debate in the House of Commons
Wellington had won at Salamanca a victory which had
been equalled by no British array since the days of

438 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
Marlborough, and had opened himself the way to Madrid,
from which the usurping foreigner was forced to make a
hasty retreat. Nearly a year, indeed, still elapsed, be
fore a still more crushing defeat compelled him to flee
altogether from the country; but the day on which he
was first expelled from his capital by the irresistible
conqueror of Salamanca virtually put an end to his
hopes of permanently retaining the kingdom to which,
against his own will, he had been transferred.
Nor was Spain the only quarter in which Napoleon's
military schemes were disappointed. We need not dwell
on the incidents of his Russian campaign, but it is in no
respect foreign to our subject to mention how rapidly, as
the intelligence of different events in that quarter of the
world reached England, Lord Liverpool formed a shrewd
and correct judgment of their probable effect on the affairs
of Europe.
It was on him that Lord Wellington chiefly depended
for intelligence of what was passing in the North, and
Lord Liverpool was writing to him on the very day on
which the news of the battle of Borodino arrived in
Downing Street. The object of his letter had been to
express his opinion that Wellington's capture of Madrid
and Seville would open to him fresh sources of supply,
which would relieve him from the difficulties under which
he had hitherto laboured for want of specie. But he
lengthened it to give the general his own views of the
character which the French invasion of Russia was
assuming. On this subject he says:
I send you enclosed the substance of the information which
has this day been received from Lord Cathcart respecting the
battle between the Russians and the French on the 7th of Sep
tember. By comparing this account wifh the French bulletins
you will be enabled to form some judgraent ofthe result of this
sanguinary action, which has certainly been creditable to the
Russian arms. But, what is still more important, it does not
appear that either the spirit of the Russian Government or of the

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 439
Russian nation has been at all subdued by the late events. On
the contrary, they appear determined to persevere. And, if that
perseverance should continue for six weeks or two months longer,
Buonaparte will be in a situation more critical than any in which
he has ever yet been engaged. He is now nearly 800 miles
from the Russian frontier, and besides the main army in his front,
which is receiving reinforcements daily, he has two formidable
corps on each of his flanks. What a moment for Austria to
strike a blow ! But this is more than we can expect.
It was more than could be expected at the moraent :
not that Lord Liverpool was raistaken in his idea of the
view which, in spite of her having given one of her prin
cesses to Napoleon for a bride, Austria was beginning to
take of her national interests, but she had learnt caution
from her many disasters ; and another year was to elapse,
and Wellington was to win another still more decisive
victory, before those who ruled the councils of Vienna
could feel that the hour had arrived when they could
safely assume a tone of independence, which in the eyes
of Napoleon was almost equivalent to a declaration of
war^ A letter dated three weeks later is still more worthy
of preservation as a proof how worthy of the first place
in the Government of England was he who, discarding all
passion and iUusion, could reason thus, as accurately as
confidently, on the future results of the drama, of which
each day's intelligence was presenting sorae new phase.
Not the least reraarkable passage in the letter is that in
which he already anticipates, and suggests to Wellington,
the invasion of the south of France, a year before it was
executed ; perhaps even before the idea of such an operation
had occurred to the general himself Lord Chatham has
been extoHed as one of the greatest of war rainisters, but
no event in his administration displays so signal a fore-
' Alison states that the news of the battle of Vittoria reached
Dresden on the morning of the 30th of June, and decided the line
taken by Austria in the negotiations which were just about to be
opened at Prague betM'een France and Austria (chap. Ixxix. § 17).

440 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
sight of what another campaign might render practicable.
The occupation of the southern provinces of France by
the British army was, as we shall see hereafter, the event
which more than any other single circumstance ensured
the final overthrow of Napoleon. And it is not derogating
from the skill or glory of the hero who accomplished it,
to point out that some portion of the credit due to so bold
a conception belongs to the minister who at so early a
period entertained and recommended it.
Private. Fife House, October 27th, 1812.
My dear Lord,
You will have seen by the public papers the particulars of the
military operations which have recently occurred in Russia.
Buonaparte might calculate, and indeed he did calculate, that
the Emperor of Russia would raake peace for the purpose of
saving Moscow ; but now that Moscow has been abandoned by
the Russians, after everything that was valuable in it which
could be removed had been taken away ; that the greater part
of the city has been destroyed ; that the spirit and enthusiasm
of the Russians increases under all the dangers and difficulties
with which they have been surrounded ; that the Government
has not been intimidated, but continues to manifest the most
deterrained perseverance : under all these circumstances the
situation of the French army must have become most critical.
The season of the year must operate likewise against them in a
degree incalculable. It is impossible that Buonaparte can have
found any considerable supply of provisions in Moscow, and, if
he cannot occupy a sufficient extent of country to be enabled
to lay in his supplies in the course of this month and the
beginning of November, his army must be starved. We have
accounts from Lord Cathcart as late as the 3d of this month,
and Paris papers as late as the 2 2d, which might contain
intelligence from Moscow as late as the 6th, and no events had
then happened to alter the relations of the armies. It is
material that you should be inforraed of a circumstance which
has not yet become public, but which furnishes the strongest
proof of the determination of the Emperor of Russia to _per-

i8l2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

441

severe in the contest, and of his confidence in the Brkish
Government. In order to guard against all contingencies, he
has announced to Lord Cathcart his determination to send his
fleets to the ports of this country ; and measures were taking,
when Lord Cathcart despatched his last messenger, to give
effect to these intentions.
Notwithstanding this favorable aspect of affairs in the North, I am
ready to admit tliat Buonaparte has escaped from so many
difficulties, and his resources are so extraordinary, that he may
be able to extricate himself from his present situation, perilous
as it is. He may be able to beat Kutuzow completely, for a
drawn battle or half success would not answer his purpose.
He may, by means of the reinforcements which he is ordering
in the direction of Russia from all quarters, establish his com
munications so entirely with the frontier of Poland as to com
mand the resources of that part of the country. These measures
would be difficult, but might not be impossible. One advantage,
however, must infallibly arise from the present state of things :
that all the resources of France, for many months to come,
must be turned io the direction of Russia ; that reinforcements
of any considerable extent cannot be sent to Spain; and that
you will therefore have to calculate only on the existing French
force in the Peninsula for the operations of the winter, of next
spring, and probably of next summer.
You have been so good upon former occasions as to inform rae,
before the meeting of Parliament, of what were your own
general views as to prospective operations. I have kept these
communications to myself, or have extended them at most to
two or three of my colleagues ; but I have felt considerable
advantage from having them in the course of the discussions
which have taken place, as it has enabled me to give a tone to
the debate which would have been otherwise impossible. The
pecuHar circumstances of the present moment would render
such a communication more than ever valuable.
General Nugent wiH, I believe, deliver to you this letter. You
will find bim a very intelligent man : he is certainly more
attached to the Italian operation than I am.
Lord Bathurst has, I know, desired your opinion fully upon this
subject. Though I have no settled or fixed opinion, I confess

442 LIFE' AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
the inchnation of my mind, in the event of the French being
driven out of the Peninsula, is strongly in favour of an operation
in the south of France in preference to any other. In addition
to the advantage which would arise frora your army being
readily equipped for this service, which it could not be for a
great length of tirae for any other, I conceive that you would
have no difficulty in carrying with you some of the Spanish
corps, which would have the effect of keeping up their military
ardour and natural antipathy to the French, instead of suffering
them, after the French had left the country, to relax under a
false sense of security.
Excuse rae, ray dear Lord, for having gone so much at length into
these subjects ; I have, in fact, been thinking aloud upon thera ;
and I thought there would be no harra in bringing under your
1 consideration those ideas which the extraordinary circumstances
of the present crisis have presented to my own raind.
I ara, my dear Lord, Yours, &c..
To the Marquis ' of Wellington. Liverpool.
Another letter of nearly the same date to Lord Cath
cart, who was with the Russian emperor during these
transactions, expresses still more fully his feelings with
respect to the prospect which the general results of the
campaign, as far as it had yet gone, were already opening
to Europe.
Private and confidential. Fife House, October 22d, 1812.
My dear Lord,
It would be difficult for me to express to you, in adequate terms,
the satisfaction which we have all felt at the receipt of your
despatches of the 30th of September and of the 3d instant
The intention of the Emperor of Russia to send his fleets to the
ports of this country is so decided a manifestation of his deter
raination to persevere in the contest in which he is engaged,
and at the sarae tirae so clear a proof of his confidence in the
British Governraent, that the most beneficial effects cannot fail
to result from it.
It will excite, I have no doubt, the enthusiasm of this country in

1 8 1 2] OF L ORD LI VERPO OL,

443

the cause of Russia in the same degree in which it has been
exerted in that of Spain ; and you must be aware, from your
own observation, of the advantages which have resulted to
our allies, as well as to ourselves, from the popularity of the
Spanish war.
The extraordinary fortune of Buonaparte in escaping from
difficulties in which he has' been involved has created in man
kind a natural indisposition to be sanguine about the result of
any operation which he has undertaken ; but upon any rational
principle of calculation I cannot see how it is practicable for
him to extricate himself from his present situation if the Russians
have but the steadiness to persevere in the system which they
have adopted.
It should be recollected that the Spanish war is the only national
war in which Buonaparte has been engaged before the present.
The Russians have therefore the example of Spain and the
success of Spain before their eyes ; they have many advantages
which the Spaniards have not, especially those which arise from
the distance of the Russian empire from France.
In the present situation of the French army nothing short of an
army can be sent to reinforce it; no detachments could be
expected to reach their head-quarters in safety ; and for every
supply of every description they must depend upon the country
in which they are acting, and in which every man they meet is
a foe.
I have been led further than I intended into this subject from an
anxious desire that you should be informed of the strong im
pression which exists in my mind of ultimate success to the
Russian arms in the event of perseverance. You will feel I
ara confident, all the importance of keeping alive the national
spirit which now exists in Russia by the strongest assurances of
the common interest which is felt in their cause, not only by
the British Government, but by the British people, and that it
is the universal opinion in this country that, if the Emperor
shall succeed in repehing the invaders, his dominions will be
more secure, his throne will be more firm, than at any former
period, and he wiU crown himself with everiasting glory.
I am most happy in having this opportunity of assuring you that
the whole of your proceedings from the commencement of your

444 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
mission have met with the entire approbation of the Prince
Regent and of his Governraent. I have the honour to be, &c.
To Lord Cathcart. Liverpool.
Parliament was dissolved in the autumn, and this combina
tion of propitious occurrences, Wellington's splendid achieve
ments in the South, and Buonaparte's disasters in the North,
had a marked effect on the new elections. But those who
have been accustomed to believe that in the old days of
unreformed Parliaments the Government of the day had the
means of influencing a sufficient number of seats to turn
the scale on the majority of important questions, will be
surprised to read Lord Liverpool's statement of the total
amount of his influence, in the following letter addressed
to the brother ofthe Lord Chancellor:
Private and confidential. Fife House, September 25th, 1812.
My dear Sir,
I have received the favour of your letter, and I can assure you I feel
all the iraportance of having the King's Advocate in Parliament.
I should hope that this may be accomplished if he can assist hira
self to a certain degree. You will, perhaps, be surprised when
I tell you that the Treasury have only one seat free of expense, for
which our friend Vansittart will be elected. I have two more
which personal friends have put at my disposal : and this is the
sum total of ray powers free of expense.
Mr. Curwen's bilP has put an end to all money transactions
between Government and the supposed proprietors of boroughs.
Our friends, therefore, who look for the assistance of Govern
ment must be ready to start for open boroughs, where the
general influence of Government, corabined with a reasonable
expense on their own part, may afford thera a fair chance of
success. I should hope the King's Advocate would have no
difficulty in agreeing to what has been proposed to him ; in
1 In 1809, Mr. Curwen, M.P. for Carlisle, carried a Bill to pre
vent the sale of Seats in Parliament. Lord Liverpool supported it
warmly in the House of Lords, though Perceval, at that time Chancellor
of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons, opposed it.

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL,

445

doing which he will ha,ve the same advantage as many of our
official supporters who have been in Parliament for years.
I am, &c. Liverpool.
To Sir W. Scott.
Small, however, as the direct influence of the Govern
ment was, the result of the elections gave the ministers a
good working majority.^ Not only because the utter
failure of the recent atterapts to form any other Cabinet
were to all reasonable people a sufficient cause for sup
porting them, but because facts, more unbending than the
best framed arguraents, showed that happier effects could
not be expected frora any Adrainistration whatever than
those which had flowed frora their raeasures. The Public
Peace Bill had been wholly successful in restoring tranquillity
to the raanufacturing districts. The glorious achievements of
our armies in Spain abundantly refuted those who imputed
to the ministers niggardliness or incapacity in supplying
the troops with raeans of success ; while, in spite of the
rupture with America, trade was reviving. Even Ireland
was tranquil and flourishing ; and the following letter
from the new secretary presents a picture of its state at
this time which its unfortunate rarity renders worth
preserving :
Private. Dublin Castle, September 14th, 1812.
My dear Lord Liverpool,
I assure you that we fully participate in your joy at all the good
news which you have sent us from the Peninsula, and I think
we may attribute to it in a great measure the extraordinary
tranquillity of this country in every part of it. Even this state
of quiet, however, does not satisfy the very loyal, and I am
told that some of them would prefer a little agitation to so
dead a calm.
I have written privately to Lord Sidmouth on the subject of
' Lord Colchester's Diary, November 22, 1812, says : "The calcula
tion of strength is computed at an increase of 60 on the side of the
Administration, putting Lord Wellesley's and Canning's friends on the
side of Opposition ; and an increase of 24 above the ministerial
side, as returned upon the Duke of Portland's Pariiament in 1807."

446 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
opening the distillation frora grain. It is suspended by law
until the 31st of December next, but the Lord Lieutenant has
the power of opening it by proclamation on any day after the
1st of October, giving one month's notice. From the information
which I have been able to collect the potato crop is more than
usually abundant ; and there is every probability that the com
harvest wiU produce more than an average supply, notwith
standing the present extraordinary price of corn in the markets.
We can little afford to lose the revenue which will be derived
frora distillation, and, as I have said to Lord Sidmouth, any
objection to the renewal of distillation at the earliest period
must arise from external causes, frora the necessity of replacing
a deficiency in the harvest of Great Britain, or of providing
those means of subsistence for our armies in Spain of which
the rupture with America may have in part deprived them.
I should be most anxious to have your opinion and advice before
anything is decided upon finally. The period is fast ap
proaching when the Lord Lieutenant may exercise his power.
In a conversation which I had with Mr. Marsden the other day,
he calculated the revenue from the duty on spirits at nearly a
million per annum.
The prospect of the Duke of Richmond's stay here gives me the
greatest possible satisfaction : indeed, if he left us, as Sir Charles
Stanton is about shortly to resign his situation, a new Lord
Lieutenant and Chief Under Secretary would find themselves, I
fear, much embarrassed should any difficulties arise.
I am very anxious to do something with the press in Ireland, and
I am not quite without hopes that we may put it on a better
footing.
Pray give my kindest regards to Lady Liverpool, and assure her
that I will keep my promise of writing to her.
I am, my dear Lord Liverpool,
Yours most affectionately, Robert Peel.
P.S. On looking over my letter I think I have much underrated
the probable productiveness of the corn harvest.
Before the year closed Lord Liverpool had the satisfac
tion of seeing his anticipations respecting Napoleon's
campaign in Russia more than fulfilled. The new Parlia-

i8l2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

447

ment was assembled for a short session before Christmas,
in order to furnish the Governraent with a necessary supply
of raoney; and on the iSth of Deceraber the ministers
invited the general participation of the raerabers in the
sentiments to which we have seen Lord Liverpool give utter
ance respecting the enthusiastic sympathy with which the
British people regarded the efforts and sacrifices which
the Russians had raade for their national independence.
They brought down to both Houses a raessage from the
Regent, recommending a grant of raoney to aid those who
had been stripped of everything by the French invasion ;
and, though one or two members of the Opposition ques
tioned the necessity or propriety of the grant, the general
feeHng was so strongly in favour of it that no one ventured
to divide against it ; and in the midst of our own difficulties,
and while the distress in sorae quarters of our own island,
if abated, was still unextinguished, we thus sent 200,000/.
to succour those who but a few months before had been our
unprovoked and bitter eneraies.
As it was afterwards learnt, on that same evening
Napoleon reached Paris, himself the bearer of the news that
in the few months that had elapsed since he last quitted it
he had lost above half a million of his best troops. He
strove to render the horrifying intelligence as endurable as
he might by false excuses, and boastings which he himself
could hardly believe, and which frora a large proportion of
his subjects, who were already beginning to repent their
submission to his rule, could not disguise the fact that, while
adding to the number of her eneraies, at the sarae time he
had stripped France of the power to withstand them.
The news of his i'eturn had not reached England when,
four days afterwards. Lord Liverpool addressed the fol
lowing letter to Wellington, who, in consequence of the
arrogant disobedience of Ballasteros, had been corapelled
to evacuate Madrid and to raise the siege of Burgos,
and was now in winter quarters on the Portuguese
frontier, resting his troops and meditating exploits which

448 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
should realize the anticipations of his friends in the
Cabinet, and make the next campaign even more glorious
than the last.
Private and confidential. Fife House, December 22d, 1812.
My dear Lord,
I received by the last mail the favour of your letter of the 23rd
ult., and I am very much obliged to you for the iraportant
information which it contains, as well with respect to your past
proceedings as to the best judgment you can form at present of
your future prospects.
I trust you will be satisfied with all that has passed in Parliament
on your account.
The disposition to abuse the Government for the retreat from
Burgos and Madrid might naturally have been expected in the
actual state of political parties.
It has, however, produced no effect of any consequence to the
prejudice of those in whose hands the administration of the
' Governraent has been placed. We have gone through our
) short session in the most satisfactory manner. Lord Castle
reagh has done admirably, and has raised himself very consider
ably in the eyes of the House of Commons. The two Houses
of Parliament adjourn to-day to the 2d and. 3d of February.
The intelligence of the operations in Russia will have reached you
through the gazettes and other public papers. There has been no
example within the last twenty years, araidst all the extraordinary
events of the French Revolution, of such a change of fortune as
Buonaparte has experienced within the last five months. If
there is any political speculation upon which reliance may
safely be placed, we may now say that Russia is for ages
alienated from France and united to this country. The most
formidable army ever collected by Buonaparte has been sub
stantially destroyed, and it remains only to be ascertained
whether he will be able to escape, and with what remnant of
that array with which he entered Russia in June last. By the
best accounts the Russians have not taken less than 100,000
prisoners.
The French cavalry is now never mentioned in any of the bul
letins, and must, in fact, have ceased to exist, except, perhaps,

i8i2] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 449
a small proportion of it immediately attached to the person of
Buonaparte. The greater part of his artillery we know has
either been taken or abandoned.
I am still however, of opinion that he will contrive to escape
with a part of his force ; but that part is so reduced in number,
and in such a condition, that it will be necessary for him to
take up a defensive position for the -winter; and I doubt
whether it will be possible for him to collect such a force as may
enable him to begin offensive operations in the next campaign.
Under these circumstances the question naturally occurs whether
he will leave the French army in Spain. We have a report that
he has ordered 40,000 men from that country to join him ; but I
give this to you only as a report. I am inclined, however, to
be of opinion that he will withdraw the greater part of his force
from Spain : even if he should not be in a situation to renew
offensive operations against Russia, his power and consequence
in Germany, after the 'shock which his reputation has received,
will depend upon his being able to assume a commanding atti
tude in that country.
The only efficient French army at the present moment in ex
istence is the one under Soult; and whatever it may cost
Buonaparte to abandon Spain, I think he will prefer that
alternative to the loss of his power, consequence, and influence
in Germany. I may be wrong in this speculation, but I have '
given you my reasons for it ; and I have been particularly :
desirous of calling your attention to this view of the subject, in
order that you may take the necessary means for obtaining
early information of the movement of any French divisions
towards the frontier, and that you may consider what measures
may be most proper to be adopted if my conjecture should be
realized.
I wish we could see any prospect of a wiser policy being adopted
by Austria and Prussia, and particularly by the former, for I
have no doiibt the latter would act if she could rely upon the
support of Austria. If these two Powers would really take
advantage of the Russian successes, we might have hopes of
effecting the deliverance of the Continent ; but nothing can be
more abject than the Council of Vienna at this time, and I fear
that neutrality is all that can be expected from them. We are
VOL. r. G G

450 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1812
doing our best, however, to rouse them, and the wise and mag
nanimous conduct which the Emperor of Russia has adopted
towards them ought not to be wholly without effect.
Believe me to be, with great truth,
Yours, &c. Liverpool.
To the Marquis of Wellington.
The writer, it need hardly be said, was mistaken in his
anticipation that the disasters in Russia would lead Napo
leon to withdraw the greater part of his force from Spain.
But from some secret feeling which it is difficult to fathom.
Napoleon clung to the maintenance of his influence in
that country with more than even his habitual tenacity. It
is possible that he was actuated by an unwillingness to
acknowledge failure where Louis XIV. had succeeded ; and
that, as that monarch, in spite of his defeats on the Danube
and in the Netherlands, had succeeded in preserving the
Spanish crown for his grandson, he conceived his own
honour staked on proving that his disasters beyond the.
Rhine could not wrest the same diadem from the head of
his brother ; and, in submission to this feeling, at a later
period, months after Joseph had been expelled from Spain,
he broke off one negotiation which promised him great
advantages rather than acknowledge the right of Ferdinand
to the crown of which his treachery had deprived him.
That the course which Lord Liverpool now expected him
to take would have been the wisest conduct which he could
have adopted no one can doubt It would indeed have set
Wellington's army free to act a year earlier in the south
of France, but it would have furnished Napoleon himself
with a valuable reinforcement, which might probably so
have changed the fortune of war on the east of the Rhine
as at least to have prevented Austria from deciding against
him, and, if he could have been contented to retain it in
peace, to have preserved him his crown.

'8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

451

CHAPTER XIV.
Tranquillity of the session of 1813 — Fresh disputes of the Prince and
Princess of Wales — Advice of the Council to the Prince — Some of
the Opposition take up the cause of the Princess — Discussions on
the American war — Renewal of the East India Company's charter
— Establishment of the bishopric of Calcutta — Appearance of
Warren Hastings in the House of Commons — Opinions delivered by
him and Sir John Malcolm on India — The charter is renewed with
slight modifications — The battle of Vittoria — Wellington's invasion
of France.
The expectations of a tranquil session of Parliament were
completely realized. During the year 18 13 the struggle
with France was visibly drawing towards its termination ;
his enemies were pressing Napoleon on every side, and,
as battle succeeded battle in Gerraany, and Wellington,
advancing steadily with that army which was never again
to retreat, was reaping victory after victory, the attention
of all England was so riveted on those mighty deeds of
war that every other contest was laid aside: party itself
was mute in the presence of the great events which were
taking place, and even the leaders of the Opposition for a
moment seemed to postpone every other feeling to those
of_a^ desire to support the Government in every effort
necessary to furnish our great general with abundant
means of action, and of admiration for the genius which
was employing thera so gloriously.
One affair alone of a troublesorae character caused sorae
anxiety and vexation to the ministers ; but it was not of
a political character, and the judgment with which Lord
Liverpool dealt with it checked even much of the scandal
G G 2

1

4^2 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
which one of the parties seemed desirous to cause. Since
the enquiry into the conduct of the Princess of Wales, some
years before, the prince had restricted the intercourse
between her and the Princess Charlotte to a weekly visit.
But in the summer of 18 12 he thought fit to limit it sdll
further, and the visits of the daughter to her mother were
reduced by one-half The alteration was apparently only
suggested by considerations of convenience, since the
youthful Princess was not at this time residing in London,
but was at Windsor, under the care of the Queen ; at all
events, no conduct of the Princess of Wales was alleged as
the cause of it. But she was furious at the change. She
went down to Windsor, and claimed an interview with her
daughter ; she wrote to the queen ; she wrote to the regent
under cover to Lord Liverpool, desiring him to present her
letter to her husband. The prince refused to receive it,
and sent it back, and found that even before he returned it
she had sent a copy of it to the newspapers. She obtained
an interview with Queen Charlotte, who pointed out to her
with great kindness that she herself had no power to inter
fere with the regent's authority over his own child, and
assured her that some points of his management of which
she complained had been arranged by the King himself
before his illness. For one of the subjects on which the
princess made the loudest complaints was that her daughter
had not yet been confirraed ; and her grandfather had some
years before expressed his opinion that, as her confirmation
must be in some degree a public ceremonial, it would be
quite time enough for her to be confirmed when she was
eighteen. The princess, however, persisted in her demand to have
her intercourse with her daughter put upon its former foot
ing ; and the prince, behaving with as much prudence and
dignity as was within his reach, considering how lament
ably and inexcusably wrong he had been in the cause and
|0rigin of the quarrel, referred thi' matter-to. his ministers,
ith the addition of the principal judicial and ecclesiastical

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL,

453

authorities, and demanded their decision on the propriety
of his maintaining the restrictions which he had imposed
on the intercourse between his wife and daughter. On
what was in reality the cardinal question of all, the guilt or
innocence of the Princess of Wales, the coraraittee which
was now constituted was not wholly agreed. It could not
be questioned that the coraraission which had investigated
her conduct had formally acquitted her of criminality ;
and the chancellor pronounced his opinion that their report
was conclusive as to the view which all ooncerned were
bound publicly to take of her conduct, and that that
question could not now be reopened ; while Lord Ellen-
borough, the Chief Justice, refused to take that report
for more than a verdict of acquittal because the charges
had failed of legal proof, affirming at the sarae tirae his
private belief of their truth. It was evidently a question
of great difficulty and delicacy, since the rank of the
parties concerned, and the condition of one of them as the
future king and actual ruler of the nation, opened con
siderations which seemed to forbid the case to be decided
on the rules of strict law. And in coming to their final
decision the majority of the committee were probably
guided very greatly by their conviction that their judg
ment would not be allowed to influence the regent's
conduct ; but that what he was seeking was not really
advice how he should act, but such a recoramendation as
should support and sanction the resolution which he had
unalterably formed. They therefore looked on theraselves
rather as statesmen forced to choose the least of evils,
than as judges on whom it was incurabent to listen to
no voice but that of justice ; and they were fortified in
their opinion by the indecency of the princess's own con
duct in publishing the letter which she had written to the
prince even before she had received it back from Lord
Liverpool. The committee, therefore, unaniraously reported their
advice to be that the intercourse between the princesses

454 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
" should continue to be subject to regulation and restraint,"
without taking any notice of the propriety of increasing
that restraint, which indeed was a matter that could not
but be left wholly at the regent's discretion ; but it could
not be expected that the princess would acquiesce in such
a termination of the dispute. She was not without able
advisers to help her to give a plausible colouring to her
case ; and it was easy to represent this appointment of a
new committee as a fresh impeachment of her honour, and
as the establishment of a tribunal to judge her behind her
back without her being supplied with any information as
to the charges made against her, the evidence on which
they rested, or even as to the precise character which the
members considered to have been imposed on themselves.
The difficulty in which she thus found herself placed " com
pelled her," as she expressed herself " to throw herself upon
the wisdom and justice of Parliament,'' and in a letter
which she addressed to the Speaker, who had been one of
the recent committee, and which she desired him to com
municate to the House of Commons, she denounced their
report as "containing fresh aspersions on her character,
though its vagueness rendered it impossible to be precisely
understood," and prevented her from "knowing exactly
with what she was charged." She claimed " either to be
treated as innocent or to be proved guilty;" "desired the
fullest investigation of her conduct during the time she
had resided in this country;" adding, "that she feared
no scrutiny provided she were tried by impartial judges."
^ Such a letter was, in fact, an appeal to Parliament.
The ministers, as must have been expected, took no notice
of it, feeling that the whole business was odious and
I discreditable, but at the same time one on which they
had no very strong belief that the lady had, latterly at
least, deserved much better treatment than she had
received ; while they were certainly assured that no
representations which they or Parliament could make
could alter the disposition and resolution of her husband.

i8l3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL,

45 S

But one or two members of the Opposition, having no
feeling of responsibility or public decency to check thera,
thought that they could annoy both the regent and
ministers by an attack on the committee's report. And
Mr. Cochrane Johnston, the member for Grampound,
brought the question formally before the House by a
string of resolutions, which represented that the case of
the princess was one which raight possibly lead at sorae
future tirae to "disputes touching the succession to the
throne;" that the charges brought against her had never
yet been subraitted to any tribunal having "any legal
power to pronounce a judgraent or decision on the case,"
and therefore, on these grounds, deraanded "an ample and
impartial investigation of all the allegations, facts, and
circumstances, while the witnesses on both sides were
still living, and while all the charges were capable of
being clearly established or clearly disproved."
Even after Mr. Johnston had fixed a day for the pro
posal of his resolutions, there seeraed some chance of
their never being brought forward. For another raeraber,
Mr. Lygon, of Worcestershire, irapressed with the scandal
of bringing the private quarrels of the heads of the royal
family before the nation as a court of appeal, enforced
the standing order for the exclusion of strangers from
the House, and announced his intention to do so when
ever the question should be discussed : and a third
member, Mr. Bennet, of Shrewsbury, eager above all
things for the publicity which most decent people de
sired to avoid, declared with equal positiveness that,
whenever Mr. Lygon should move to clear the House
he would follow that motion by another for its adjourn-
1 ment. However, he was induced to give way, and Mr.
Uohnston had the mortification of finding that his. pro-
jceeding was so adverse to the good taste of the House,
jthat he could not venture to divide upon it, but was
forced to submit to its being unanimously rejected. He
professed to find comfort in having, as he said, established

456 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
the innocence of the princess ; and it is certain that no
one expressed a contrary opinion, though one or two
speakers hardly went further than to declare themselves
unconvinced of her criminality. Lord Castlereagh was
the only spokesman of the Ministry, and he had an easy
task when he contended that, whatever might be the
truth, the House of Commons could not be the proper
tribunal to decide the question ; and one still easier, if
possible, when, having described the letter written by
the Princess of Wales to the regent as " an appeal to the
country against their prince, and to the child against
her parent," he denounced its publication by the writer
as in itself affording a justification of the restrictions
placed on her intercourse with her daughter, and even
of an increased rigour in those restrictions.
Yet the champions of the princess, if it may not rather
be said those who hated the regent, were not satisfied.
A few days afterwards Mr. Whitbread presented a peti
tion from Sir John and Lady Douglas, begging to be
prosecuted for perjury. On the former inquiry into the
princess's conduct it was from them that the testimony
came which, if believed, would have been fatal to the
princess's character ; but their evidence had been disproved
in every particular, though there were insurmountable
difficulties in the way of procuring their legal conviction
as wilfully perjured. Mr. Whitbread, however, made their
petition a pretext for uttering a most violent philippic
against the prince; doing him, however, rather service
than injury by his vehemence, and by the strange means
which he employed to sustain his argument; reading
to the House documents which in the very same breath
he admitted he could not prove to be authentic, and of
which his own friend. Sir Samuel Romilly, immediately
denied and disproved the authenticity. His motion,
which dwindled into one for the prosecution of the
printers of the different newspapers which had contained
documents relating to the original investigation, no one

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL,

457

would even second, so palpably was his object raerely
to insult and daraage the prince. He withdrew it for
the present, but in the course of the spring both he
and Mr. Johnston made more than one attempt to renew
the subject ; on one occasion taking a step which the
Speaker himself was forced to reprove as " novel and
unparliamentary,"^ in raoving without notice to exaraine
Lord Moira. Lord Castlereagh would not condescend
even to oppose the raotion in raore than the briefest
terms ; and the feeling of the House was so unmistake-
ably shown that such discussions must be useless, and
worse than useless, that even they at last allowed the
matter to drop.
The opinion which the House of Coraraons affirraed
it to be beyond its province to pronounce did not bear
the same appearance to the eyes of the leaders of the
Common Council of the City of London. They resolved
to present an address to the princess to congratulate
her on the result of the late discussions, which they did
not hesitate to describe as her escape from a conspiracy
aimed at her honour and her life. She gladly received
them with all possible cereraony at Kensington Palace ;
and a part of the procession chose to take the line
of Pall Mall for the purpose of hissing as they passed
by Carlton House. In the next year we shall find the
subject revived, under circumstances which made her
appear to greater advantage.
Far more satisfactory were the debates on the war with
America. It was of necessity one of the first subjects
brought before Parliaraent ; and the view taken by the
Opposition of the papers which the ministers presented to
Pariiament, in explanation of the policy which they had
pursued, was so nearly identical with tbe opinions which
had guided the Cabinet that Lord Liverpool had araple
grounds for the self-congratulation which he expressed at the
unaniraity of the House on the subject of the unprovoked
1 The Diary of Lord Colchester (at that time Speaker), ii. 434.

458 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
wantonness with which the Americans had forced on the
war; their precipitation in doing which he was probably
correct in tracing very mainly to the partiality with which
they had at all times regarded France.
Almost equally cordial and unanimous was the support
which both Houses gave to the decision formed by the
Government with respect to the East India Company. The
charter which had been granted to them was on the point
of expiring, and for some months Parliament had been
besieged with petitions on the subject : those whose pecu
niary interests were concerned, as proprietors of the Com
pany, soliciting the renewal of the charter without modifi
cation or abridgment as a raeasure in which not only their
own prosperity, but the welfare and security of India itself
depended ; while those raerchants who were unconnected
with it, and who had long borne it ill-will as the possessor
of a lucrative monopoly, were at least equally desirous to
induce Parliament to abolish that raonopoly, to throw open
the trade, and to abrogate all restrictions upon what they
represented as the indefeasible right of all the King's sub
jects, to establish their abode in, and commerce with, any
country whatsoever, and most of all with any which were
among the possessions of the British crown. After a long'
and patient consideration Lord Liverpool and his col
leagues had decided on a middle course. They could not
deny the general right of all British subjects to be such as
the petitioners against the renewal of the charter repre
sented it : but, at the same time, it appeared to them that
the case of India was altogether exceptional ; that many
reasons interfered with the application of this general prin
ciple to so peculiar a country: and therefore they deter
mined on a middle course, proposing to confirm to the
Company for twenty years more its political authority ; but
opening the Eastern trade, with the exception of that carried
on with China, to any who might choose to engage in it.
And, while thus preserving to the Company its power of
government, and compelling it to admit the general body

I8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 459
of our merchants to a participation ofthe Indian coraraerce,
they exhibited a laudable regard for the future welfare and
civilization of the natives by planting the Church araong
thera on the sarae footing on which it flourished among
ourselves. No previous Government had looked upon it as
a part of its duty to establish and encourage religious
observances in our colonies. But Lord Liverpool took this
opportunity of setting an example which has since been
followed in all our dependencies. And one series of clauses
provided for the appointment at Calcutta of a bishop and
archdeacons, with adequate salaries and retiring pensions.
Not only were our own fellow-Englishmen in India, who
now amounted to nearly 150,000, entitled to such an esta
blishment, but it could not fail, it was hoped, favorably to
impress the natives, who, scrupulously attentive to the
forms and ceremonies of their different religions, had seen
with amazement the indifference to worship of any kind
that had hitherto characterised their Christian masters,
except where sorae zealous raissionary had raade his way
into the country, with an independence of the authority of
the Governraent which, in the eyes of those who did not
understand our constitution, bore no little appearance of
a defiance or renunciation of it.
The most interesting occurrences during the debates
which necessarily took place on a subject of such import
ance, arose out of the assent which Lord Castlereagh very
prudently gave to a proposal that, before the House came
to a final vote, it should seek information from those who
had a more practical knowledge of the question in all its
bearings than could be possessed by at least the great ma
jority of its raembers. And it happened that, though now
in extreme old age, that illustrious Governor-General to
whom above all other men the prosperity of the Company,
and of the country itself apart frora the Corapany, was
owing, was still alive, and still enjoying the full possession
of all his faculties. Thirty years before, on his return frora
his governraent, malice, ignorance, and the misdirected

46o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
enthusiasm of philanthropy had combined to rob him of
the reward due to his unequalled genius for organization and
for government, to his dauntless and unwearied energy,
to his unswerving public spirit, to his incorruptible disin
terestedness. To the disgrace alike of the assailants who
prompted, of the House who sanctioned, and even of the age
which endured such a scene, he, the greatest man then
alive, had been brought day after day, and year after year,
as a criminal to the bar of that House which ought to have
greeted his return to his native land with gratitude and
acclamation. Now, when of his chief accusers all but one
had passed away, and when he,^ too, had ceased to sit
among the members, a new generation was to make a tardy
atonement, such as it was, for the ungrateful injustice of its
predecessor. When the old raan entered the House to
give his evidence and opinion, every member rose to receive
him, standing with respectful admiration till he took his
seat in the chair which had been provided for him. On a
later day another man of extended experience in India,
where he had already acquired an eminent reputation,
which he was destined to raise still higher. Sir John Mal
colm, was also examined ; and, though not very closely
.connected with the subject of this narrative, one or two of
the opinions delivered by each are so remarkable, particu
larly as throwing a light upon, and being illustrated by,
recent events, that they are worth disinterring from the
mass of Parliamentary reports under which they are buried.
Both Hastings and Malcolm were fully agreed on the
mischief which would be caused, not only to the interests
of the East India Company, but to the prosperity, safety,
and peace of India itself, if the country should so be thrown
open that Europeans in general (by which term, however,
they only meant Englishmen) should be permitted to fix
their abode in India without restraint. Hastings drew his ob
jections from the character both of the Englishman and of
1 At the election in the autumn Sheridan had lost his seat for
Stafford.

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, i^ei
the native ; premising, at the same time, that he spoke more
of the natives of Bengal and its dependencies, than of those
of the other provinces and more remote districts, sorae of
which indeed had only been brought under British authority
since his departure from the country. " Nothing," said he,
"can be more opposite than the characters of the English
and the natives of India. The native Indian is weak in
body and timid in spirit ; he is not unsusceptible of resent
ment, but without that feeHng of shame which, under the
appellation of honour, in the breast of an European makes
resentment a species of law, and which overrules the fear of
law, pain, danger, and death. This " (he however explained)
" is not the absolute character of the people taken in the
mass. The native Indian is individually such as I have
described hira ; but there are cases in which a provocation of
a general grievance would excite a whole people, and even a
detached number of them, to all the ferocities of insurrec
tion. The Englishman is quite a different character in
India. The name of an Englishman is both his protection
and a sanction for offences which he would not dare to
commit at home. There is, besides, the highest idea of a
common participation in the sovereignty of the Company,
which possesses, I believe, with very little difference, the
mind of every Englishman in it : this idea in the lower
orders of the people rises to despotism, and is liable to all
the excesses of despotism where the prerogative attached to
it can be asserted with impunity." An unrestrained liberty
to Englishmen to sojourn in India would lead generally, in
his belief, to acts of tyranny and oppression of the natives.
And his opinion on this matter was entitled to the greatest
weight, because, as he explained to the House, he had not
always held it ; he had thought that, under certain regu
lations and restrictions, " the admission of free traders into
the country would not only be innoxious but beneficial ;
but then only on the understanding that the authority of
the Company was to reraain unchanged, and that aU British
subjects in India, residing in their territories, were araenable

452 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
to it." Nor did he believe that the expansion of our eJcport
trade would be greatly furthered by opening the traffic
with India to all who might desire to embark in it. For
" the poor in India might be said to have no wants ; their
wants were confined to their dwellings, their food, and a
scanty portion of clothing, which they could have almost
without any cost." The only rich class still remaining he
considered to be " the zemindars, who were almost all, if
not aU, Hindoos ; and the Hindoo officers of the revenue
and their habits were such as required no aid from our
trade. Of the Mahometans, who once constituted the most
opulent part of the community, few now remained, as he
imagined, but the survivors of the pensioners whom we
found when we first became masters of the country. And
these, from their present impoverished state, would certainly
not be able to purchase any of the articles of luxury with
which our ships could furnish them."
Sir John Malcolm's residence in India had begun just at
the time when that of Hastings ended ; and, in a long
course of varied employments, he had had opportunities
of becoming acquainted with the natives of every part
of our own territories, and even with some of the
tribes which dwelt beyond our border. With this more
extensive knowledge he drew distinctions between the
character and disposition of the different Indian races,
which Hastings had not had the same opportunity of
observing. His answer to a question put to him as to
"the prevailing character of the Hindoos'' is worth giving
in his own words : " The character of the different classes
of Hindoos, which compose a great proportion of the popu
lation of the subjects of the British Government in India,
varies in different parts of the empire perhaps as much as,
if not more than, the natives of Europe do from each other.
Under the Bengal establishment there are two descriptions
of Hindoos of a very distinct race : below Patna the race
of Hindoos called Bengalese I consider to be weak in body
and timid in mind, and to be in general marked by the

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 463
accorapaniraents of tiraidity, which are fraud and servility.
I think, as far as ray observation went, this class appeared
to diminish both in their bodily strength and their raental
qualities as they approach the coast. And those below
Calcutta are, I think, in character and appearance araong
the lowest of all our Hindoo subjects. But frora the
moment that you enter the district of Bahar, or rather
the district of Benares, throughout all the territories in
that quarter subject to the Corapany and their dependent
ally the Nabob of Oude, and the Douab, the Hindoo in
habitants are a race of men generally speaking not raore
distinguished by their lofty stature, which rather exceeds
that of Europeans, and their robust frame of body, which
in almost all is inured to martial toil by exercises (I speak
more particularly of the Rajpoots, who form a consider
able portion of this population), than they are for some
of the finest qualities of the mind. They are brave,
generous, and humane, and their truth is as remarkable as
their courage. The great proportion of the army of the
Bengal establishment is composed of these raen ; and it is
remarkable that there are few corporal punishments in that
army, the slightest reproach being in fact felt as the
greatest punishraent is araong other nations. It is more
than half a century since the array of Bengal was first
formed, and I believe there is no instance of any officers
being more sincerely attached to their men than the
British officers have been during the whole of that period
to the Hindoo native soldiery of that part of India 
I have spoken more of the military class of Hindoos than
of the others, because I am raore acquainted with thera ;
but from all I ever heard of the character of those who
follow civil pursuits, it is rauch the same, allowing for
difference of the habits of life, as that of the Bengal
sepoys. On the coast of Cororaandel the Hindoo is a
weaker man than the Rajpoot ; but still there are many
classes among them which are highly respectable. On the
other side of India, under the presidency of Bombay, the

464 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
Hindoos, inhabitants of Guzerat and our lately acquired
provinces, are chiefly Mahrattas, and, from all I have
heard or seen of them, are much superior to the inhabi
tants that I have described along the coast of Bengal, and
even to those along the coast of the Carnatic."
As to their feelings towards the British authorities, he
beHeved "the Hindoo population to be contented with
the British sway ; but he thought it probable that a great
proportion of the Mahometan population might not be
so much contented, because they had a more recent recol
lection than the Hindoos of that power which they had
lost by the introduction of our Government." The two
classes " lived together in as social habits as their faith
would permit." And, in reply to a series of questions as
to the probable result of any insurrection which might be
attempted by either Hindoos or Mahometans, or both
united, to overthrow our power, the views which he ex
pressed have on some points been so remarkably corrobo
rated by subsequent events that they still deserve the
attentive consideration of our Indian statesmen. He " cer
tainly did not think it was a common desire with the
Mahometans in every part of India to subvert the British
power, however it might be indulged by some of the
turbulent members of that class, and particularly in the
higher ranks, who had recently lost their authority. Nor,
on the other hand, was he satisfied that all Hindoos were
contented. He was able to speak only of the apparent
general disposition of pur subjects. If any ground were
furnished to enable the Mahometans to induce the Hindoos
to make common cause with them, he did not believe that
our authority could last a single day." But when asked
whether, while the Hindoos were contented, any attempt
on the part of the Mahometans alone could seriously affect
our power, his answer was, " The British power in India
is spread over so vast a country, and the different provinces
of that empire have such a varied population, that it is a
difficult question : but there are, no doubt, provinces in our

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 465
empire, such as the Douab, of recent acquisition, where the
great raajority of the military part of the population are
Mahometans ; and any insurrection in that province, for
instance, could receive no check from any good disposition
of the Hindoo inhabitants. In many other provinces the
Hindoos form the great majority, and an insurrection of
the Mahoraetans would be of coraparatively less conse
quence : but I certainly conceive that the attachment of
the Hindoo population is the chief source of our security
in India. It is, however, to be remarked that in raany
parts of India the Hindoos and Mahometans have amal
gamated more than could have been supposed frora the
difference of their persuasion ; and the Mahometans of
India have not only become more lax in the performance
of their religious duties than the Mahometans of neigh
bouring countries, but they seem gradually to have adopted
some of the minor usages of the Hindoos. Nor is it un
usual for Hindoo princes, such as Scindia and Holkar, to
conciliate their Mahometan subjects by paying their devo
tions at the shrine of Mahom-ctan saints, and raixing in
their feasts." It is impossible to avoid remarking that
these opinions seem to have been verified in sorae of their
most important points by the great mutiny of 1857, which
was a Mahometan outbreak, and in which our Hindoo
subjects, as a rule, refused to participate.
The advantages to be derived by English raerchants
unconnected with the Corapany from any measure which
might open the Indian trade to thera he agreed with
Hastings in estimating as very inconsiderable ; and for
the same reasons which the great Governor-General had
aheged. "The general population of India," he said,
" were not likely to becorae customers for European articles,
because they did not possess the means to purchase them,"
and "from their present simple habits of life and attire
they did not require them." "In the principal settle
ments, and at sorae of the larger towns, he had known
VOL. I. H H

466 LIFE AND ADMINISTRA TION [1813
some who (to flatter their superiors) imitated European
manners, and adopted almost their dress ; but such
generally appeared to him to have lost in the estimation
of their own class by a departure from the usages of
their race. The rich settlement of Bombay was perhaps an
exception to this rule : the Parsees," (said he) "who are
extremely wealthy, and a perfectly distinct class, had
assimilated more with the European character than per
haps any other race in India ; and they spend a great
deal of money in furnishing houses and purchasing
carriages and other luxuries of a similar description :
many of them are in the habit, I believe, of ordering
very large supplies of articles from England, both for
their own use and for sale ; for they are nearly all mer
chants." He added, in answer to another question, that
" Indian artisans, as manufacturers of European commo
dities," and also European artisans, had established them
selves in the chief cities of these presidencies ; the
masters being generally Englishmen, and the workmen
native Indians.
Lord Teignmouth, who, as Sir John Shore, had also
been Governor-General gave evidence which generally
tallied with the opinions of Hastings and Malcolm, as
did others whom the Committee summoned before them.
And, fortified in their opinion of the propriety of main
taining the Company in the enjoyment of its sovereign
authority by the unaniraity of the men who both from
natural capacity and opportunity were better able than
any others to form a correct judgment of the effects of
the existing system, and of the results which might be
expected from its extinction or from any extensive mo
dification of it, the ministers pressed on the bill which
they had prepared with great energy and rapidity. It
raet with no formidable opposition in either House. A
few amendments were moved to particular clauses, of
which perhaps the most important was one which was
proposed by Canning, to enable Parliament at the end

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 467
of ten years to reconsider the monopoly of the China
trade, which by the bill was secured to' the Company for
twenty ; but the araendraent Was rejected by a large
majority. The raost veheraent resistance which any of the
clauses encountered was excited by those providing for
the establishraent of the Church in India. Sorae' of those
members of the House of Coramons who, as former ser
vants of the Company, could cite their own experience,
declared that no step of our Governraent would be viewed
with such repugnance and horror by both Hindoos and
Mahometans as any that gave the idea that we were de
sirous of forcing our religion on them: and one speaker.
Sir Henry Montgomery, vehemently attacked the raission
aries who were already labouring in India, their conduct
in the country, and the reports of their success and pro
gress which they sent home ; extolled the religion of
the Hindoos as "pure and unexceptionable;" pronounced
their "moral character a great deal better than the raoral
character of the people of this country in general;" and
declared that he would not risk the lives of his fellow-
Christians in India to save the souls of all the Hindoos
in the country.
The clause, however, like all the rest which were con
tested, was carried by a decisive majority. And in the
House of Lords the opposition was still more incon
siderable. Lord Grenville indeed declaimed against what
he termed the precipitation of the Ministry in not intro
ducing the bill till the latter part of the session, with
even more than his usual violence of language. For
the Peers to pass it without more consideration, he de
clared, "would fix an eternal stigma upon their character
in the eyes of all nations." He boasted of his own
familiarity with the subject, the fruit of a deep study
of it in all its bearings ; but in the middle of June " he
would not lend himself to a hypocritical and base pretence
of discussion." Such exaggerated violence, though not
unusual in the speaker, was calculated to defeat itself
H H 2

468 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
Lord Liverpool reminded both him and the House that,
though the bill for renewing the charter had been but re
cently brought before Parliament, the resolutions on which
it was founded had been under consideration for months,
and the investigation of each separate resolution, with
the examination of evidence to guide the deliberations
of Parliament on each, had been the chief work of the
session. All unnecessary delay, therefore, in coming to
a settlement of the question, he deprecated as an inflic
tion of wanton injury on every one connected with, or
who hoped to be connected with, India. Not that he
expected any instant results of importance from those
parts of the bill which were new. He and his colleagues
(as he explained their motives) had in every case been
guided by the experience of years. And, as years had
been required to justify the conclusions to which they
had come, so the general results of many future years
could alone decide whether those conclusions were sound
or unsound. " The ministers had continued the China
trade to the Company because experience had shown
it to be beneficial. They had thrown open the Indian
trade because it had been unproductive in their hands."
As far as his own expectations were concerned, "he
entertained no great hope of immediate advantage to
the merchant from the export trade, but he thought very
1 great advantage would accrue from opening the import
trade to this country from India." The House so fully
agreed with his views, the moderate expression of which
contrasted agreeably with Lord Grenville's angry denun
ciations, that in the sole division on which the Opposition
ventured they could only muster fourteen votes. And
the general wisdom of the Government measure was
shown by the fact, not only that under it India increased
in prosperity of every kind even more than before, but
that, as long as the Company was left in possession of
the sovereign authority, all subsequent legislation fol
lowed the course indicated by this bill.

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL 469
Meanwhile the news from the seat of war was daily
becoming more exciting ; and our part in it more glorious.
Before the opening of the carapaign in the Peninsula the
ministers gave a proof how highly they estimated the
probability that Wellington's genius, if worthily seconded,
would be able to achieve the deliverance of the Peninsula,
by proposing a grant of a larger amount than had yet
been asked for to enable his Majesty to raaintain in his
pay a body of Portuguese troops, and otherwise to aid the
Portuguese Governraent. And so fully did the whole
kingdom by this time participate in the expectations of
Lord Liverpool and the Cabinet that two millions were
voted without a dissentient voice. Hopes have seldom
been so rapidly realized. Midsummer had not yet arrived
when Wellington inflicted on the raost nuraerous^ army
that had yet fought in Spain the raost ignorainious defeat
that the French arras had sustained throughout the whole
revolutionary war, and followed up his victory by a suc
cession of blows, which speedily drove the whole of the
invading army with their usurping king frora the Spanish
soil. It was to no purpose that Napoleon replaced Jour
dain, who had been beaten at Vittoria, by Soult, who
had never found any superior in military skill but Wel
lington hiraself, when four years before he was forced to
retreat before hira at Oporto. That great soldier fared
no better than his predecessor. Wellington drove him
from post to post ; defeated him at Sauroren ; took St.
Sebastian and Parapeluna before his face in spite of his
utmost efforts to save those hitherto irapregnable fortresses,
^ Each army consisted of about- 70,000 men ; the French, however,
being very superior in both cavalry and artillery. At Salamanca the
numbers were about 45,000 on each side. Even at Waterloo the
numbers were inferior to those which fought at 'Vittoria. Wellington
had not quite 68,000 men ; and, though Napoleon's strength cannot
be exactly ascertained, it is probable that he had not the advantage of
his conqueror in that respect by more than 5,000 men. In cavalry
and artillery he had a very great superiority.

470 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
on the 7th of October crossed the Bidassoa ; and, after
once more defeating the enemy in a smart action, carried
out Lord Liverpool's suggestion of the preceding year,
and established the victorious British standards on the soil
of France. Lord Liverpool, who always kept his eyes
fixed on every part of the war, on the allies in Germany
almost as much as on our troops in Spain, and perhaps
even with greater anxiety, because with less confidence,
congratulated the conqueror almost as much on the politi
cal effects which he expected from his victories as on the
victories themselves. The very night that the despatch
announcing the triumph of Vittoria reached London he
sent off messengers with the Gazette to the allied armies
in Saxony, and to the diplomatists who were carrying on
a tardy and delusive negotiation at Prague. From the
beginning of May he had cherished a belief that but a
slight improvement in the prospects of the allies was
needed to decide Austria to join them. And, though he
would not yet venture to speak sanguinely, he evidently
hoped that so great a victory as that which had been
gained on the Ebro would have a powerful effect on her
councils. On Russia and Prussia he could now, he assured
Wellington, firmly rely : while the Swedes were so cordial
in the cause that their new prince, Bernadotte, was apply
ing himself to strengthen the resolution of those sove
reigns, the Czar and the King, to resist any temptations to
make peace that might be offered them. The number of
troops under arms was enormous. The Russians, Prus
sians, and Swedes alone, according to his calculation,
amounted to a quarter of a million of men. Of the
French force he was less accurately informed. As to his
own army, he assured Wellington of his resolution to
enable him to keep it in the fullest state of efficiency.
And three or four days later he wrote to him more at
length, explaining minutely the steps he had taken to
diffuse the news of his victory over the Continent, and
speculating with a degree of foresight rare in a civilian on

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 471
his subsequent operations; venturing, as before, on some
suggestions of reraarkable acuteness.
Private and confidential. Fife House, July 7th, 1813.
My dear Lord,
I tmst you will be satisfied with the impression which your great
and splendid victory has made upon the pubHc in this country.
I have no doubt it will produce a state of feeling not less gra
tifying upon the Continent, and I only hope it wiU arrive in
time to counteract the political machinations of the enemy.
We calculated that Buonaparte would receive the intelligence
at Dresden nearly about the time that we received it in London ;
and he will certainly have some days to avail himself of his own
knowledge of your success, and of the ignorance of the allies
and of Austria respecting it. Every precaution was, however,
taken to transmit the Gazette in French, Dutch, and German
to the different parts of the coast with as littie delay as possible,
besides a messenger being sent to Stralsund, and to the head
quarters of the Russian and Prussian armies. The event there
fore will, I hope, be known before any prolongation of the
armistice can have been settled.
We received yesterday the account of the treaties of alliance and
concert being signed between this country, Russia, and Prussia.
The intentions of Austria were still problematical She was
driving at peace, and the result of her endeavours will probably
depend upon the degree of sacrifice and concession which
Buonaparte will be induced to make under present circum
stances to obtain it.
Although the suggestions I am about to make have certainly
occurred to yourself, I think it right, however, at this particular
moment to mention them. We may now entertain a reasonable
hope that we shall succeed in driving the French out of Spain :
the next step will be to keep them out of that country.
A British army of so large an amount as that now under your
command cannot always remain there. It is material, there
fore, to consider what measures can be adopted for rendering
the Peninsula secure, without the necessary aid of a British
force, to a small and limited extent.
In the first place, would it be practicable to apply the principle

472 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
upon which the lines before Lisbon have been forraed to the
passes of the Pyrenees, and in what degree would such a
systera afford security to the country ?
Secondly, might not a perraanent force be raised in the five
northern provinces of Biscay, Navarre, Catalonia, Aragon, and
the Asturias (where, frora all accounts, the inhabitants are of a
rauch more warlike character than in any other part of Spain),
for the defence of the Pyrenees, to be equipped for this par
ticular purpose, and to act in concert with the regular army ;
and could such a force in any degree be officered by British
officers ?
Thirdly, would it be expedient and practicable to combine these
two objects with a British and Portuguese force, to a limited
extent, say 20,000, 25,000, or even 30,000 men? and would
these different raeasures, reduced into a systera, afford any rea
sonable security against the renewed invasion of the French,
regard being had to the nature and strength of the country in
which they must, in the first instance, be compelled to operate ?
I throw out these suggestions, not with a view to the present
raoraent, being fully persuaded that it cannot now be expedient
to reduce the allied armies in that quarter, or to divert them
from operations in the south of France, if the war on the Con
tinent should continue, and such operations should appear to
be practicable ; but, having always considered the independence
of Spain and Portugal as the first continental object to which
this country, under present circumstances, ought to look, it is
material to form some opinion upon the practicability of a
permanent system, the expense of which we may be able to
maintain, independent of the extraordinary exertion which
we have been recently making for ffie deliverance of those
countries from French dominion.
Lord Castlereagh has written to your brother. Sir Henry Welles
ley, to instruct hira strongly to urge the Spanish"' Government
to return to Madrid. Such a measure appears to be of the
utmost iraportance, not only with a view of delivering that
Government from the influence of the local prejudices of the
town of Cadiz, but likewise for the purpose of giving an impres
sion to the people of Spain at large, and to the other nations of
Europe, that the Government of Spain entertain a just con-

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 473
fidence in tiieir own strength ; an impression which may be
productive of the most important consequences, both to the
Peninsula and in Europe, at this time.
Believe me to be, my dear Lord,
Very sincerely yours.
To the Marquis of Wellington. Liverpool.
It must have been a great support to a general who, araid
all his triuraphs, was still not without his anxieties, to learn
how fully the Ministry at home entered into his difficulties,
as it was to the minister to find the general proceeding with
such unchecked success to realize his long cherished expec
tations. Considering the greatness of the obstacles pre
sented by the Pyrenees and the frontier fortresses, it is
probable that neither can have calculated beforehand on the
rapidity with which they were surmounted. As we have
already raentioned, in less than four raonths after the battle
of Vittoria, Lord Liverpool was able to congratulate Wel
lington, now a Field Marshal, on his entrance into France,
and to encourage him at the same tirae with intelligence of
the great events, both military and diplomatic, which were
taking place on the other side of Europe.
Private. London, October 20th, 1813.
My dear Lord,
I congratulate you most sincerely on your late successes : what
ever may be the result of these operations, the establishment
of the British army in France, after the expulsion of the
French armies from Spain, will be a proud event in our
military history, and forms a new epoch in the transactions of
this most extraordinary war.
We received last night letters from the head- quarters of the
allied armies of the 29th of September. They bring the ira
portant intelligence of an arrangement having been concluded
between the Austrians and Bavarians, by which the latter are
to take part in the war against France. If this arrangement
shall really be carried into effect (and there can be no doubt
of it, if some unforeseen misfortune does not happen to the

474

LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813

allied forces), it will corapletely secure the deliverance of
Gerraany, and probably of a large part of Italy. The
situation of Buonaparte at Dresden is most critical, and the
fate of his army raight be considered as certain if there was
one head that directed the operations of the allies, and that
a head in which all had confidence. In araount of force, in
quality of force, in zeal and spirit, military and national the
alUes are greatly superior. Buonaparte's advantage consists in
a simple command, opposed to a di-vided command. With this
advantage, however, on his side, I think we need not now be
apprehensi-ve of the result ; but the difference will, nevertheless,
be great between his retiring to the Rhine with his present
force nearly entire, or that force being completely defeated in
its present position. I reckon not a little on his obstinacy in
endeavouring to maintain that position longer than prudence
would warrant. By a return which I have seen, the French
armies have lost in the field and by sickness not less than
150,000 rnen since the re-commencement of hostilities. The
French force now in Germany may amount to about 200,000
raen.
Parhament meets on the 4th of Noveraber. We uitend to raise
i as rauch money as we can before Christmas, and like-wise to
I adopt the measures which may be judged, upon the whole,
most advisable for keeping up our army to its present amount.
Nothing is yet finally decided on this point. The subject is
under consideration. When these measures are passed, together
with the usual annual votes, we had some idea of adjourning
' till the month of March ; but of this intention we think it most
prudent to say nothing at present.
I was happy to hear from March so good an account of your
health. Believe rae to be, -with sincere regards,
Yours very faithfully, Liverpool.
His judgment respecting the operations in Germany was
proved by the event to be as correct as his calculations of
the course of the army with which he was better acquainted.
The multitude of counsellors, and raore especially the

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 475
degree in which one of them, on the strength of his imperial
rank, took upon himself to dictate to the generals of the
different allies in Germany, proved a serious impediraent to
their success ; while Napoleon's disasters and eventual ruin
were caused by that very quality of his disposition on which
Lord Liverpool here expressed his reliance, his exceeding
obstinacy, which led hira to disregard the warnings of
prudence and ordinary strategy. Nor (since some writers,
thinking to enhance the glory of Wellington, have repre
sented the Ministry as affording him scanty and grudging
supplies, and eager to pare down his force to the lowest
possible strength) is the resolution announced to maintain
his army in undiminished efficiency less deserving of re
membrance ; that justice may be done to all, and that,
without stripping a leaf from the chaplet of Wellington,
the ministers who so lavishly exerted themselves to provide
him the raeans of achieving his mighty deeds may not be
defrauded of the credit which is likewise due to thera.

476 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813

CHAPTER XV.
Necessity for new arrangements caused by the fall of Napoleon —
Unreasonableness of our allies — General confidence in the Govern
ment — The allies offer to treat — Stubbornness of Napoleon — The
Comte d'Artois crosses over to Holland — The Duke of Clarence
is present with the allies in the Netherlands — Opening of the
Congress at Chatillon — Character of Alexander — Ambitious views of
Bernadotte — Lord Liverpool's views on the end most desirable, and
on the line to be adopted by the negotiators — Differences among
the allies — Dissolution of the Congress — Wellington takes Bordeaux
— The citizens at Bordeaux acknowledge Louis XVIII. — Lord
Liverpool's letter to Wellington — The French Senate dethrone
Napoleon — Elba is assigned to him — Lord Liverpool's language
respecting the peace — Moderation of England — The Slave-trade —
Erection of the kingdom of the Netherlands.
The next year was one of universal interest, and, if of
unprecedented triumph in the absolute overthrow of him
who, while the common enemy of all Europe, had alv/ays
regarded England with a peculiar aniraosity and hatred,
the very completeness of that triumph brought with it
equally unprecedented anxiety to the Cabinet ; for Napo
leon, in the lawless pride of his power, had trampled on the
boundaries and rights of all other nations but our own ; and
when he was struck down, and it had become indispensable
to remedy the confusion which he had created, the existing
position of affairs did not permit recourse to be had to the
simple expedient of replacing things on their former footing,
but it was necessary to remodel, so to say, the whole of
Europe on the east of the Rhine, while every step of this
reconstitution of the different states imposed on those who

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 477
had the chief voice in it the further task of reconciling con
flicting interests ; of moderating unreasonable pretensions ;
of repressing vanity without offending it ; of silencing covet
ousness without yielding to it ; and called on thera for such
an union of extensive knowledge, keen foresight, and sound
judgraent, of firraness raingled with patient forbearance and
calmness of temper, as very few crises in the world's history
have afforded equal opportunities to display. That frora
such an ordeal England carae forth with even increased
glory was due in an eminent degree to the sagacious
statesman whose policy it is the aim of the present
work faithfully to narrate, and of his most distinguished
colleague, the Secretary of State, to whose great abilities
and great virtues his country is at last beginning to do
justice. On no occasion did the situation of England place her
on a higher vantage-ground, or enable her to carry out with
greater credit the policy so habitual to her that it might
almost be called national, of purchasing tranquillity for her
allies and the rest of Europe by the unselfish sacrifice of her
individual aggrandizement. She had nothing to recover ;
for, long and deadly as the strife had been, she had lost
nothing. No invading array had occupied her capital ;
not one foot of her sovereign's dorainions had gone to fur
nish an appanage for the kinsmen of her foe. On the
other hand, no nation which, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion, had been arrayed against her, had failed to reap
the fruits of its hostility in the loss of colonies and settle
ments. But nearly all her acquisitions, important as were
many of thera as outworks to her older possessions, valuable
as were others from their fertility or riches, she was willing
to cede for the great object for which she had been so long
in arms, at so vast an expenditure of treasure and of life,
the re-establishment of the peace of Europe on a safe and
durable footing. And her self-denying liberality shone
forth with the greater lustre from the contrast afforded to
it by the ambitious greediness of other nations, which, not

478 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
contented with being restored to the possession of what
they had been forced to surrender, sought to indemnify
themselves for past humiliation by gains which could only
be acquired through as unprovoked and flagrant violations
of right and justice as those by which they themselves had
formerly suffered.
The year, if as in a memoir of a minister seems reason
able, it be calculated by the meeting of Parliament rather
than by the almanac, comraenced sorae weeks before
Christmas ; and Lord Liverpool and his colleagues began
at once to reap the fruit of the energy and sagacity which
had hitherto distinguished their policy in the altered tone
of the Opposition. Not a year and a half had elapsed since,
on their resumption of office, they had been encountered
by sneers, disparagement, and open attack, as wholly unfit
for the offices which, through accident as it were, had fallen
to their share. Now many of those who had then been
bitterest in their invectives against them vied with each other
in expressions of approbation of their past conduct, and of
confidence in their future management. In the debate on
the Address the only whisper of objection came from Mr.
Whitbread, who, in spite of the manly way in which he
had recanted his former condemnation of Wellington, could
not yet forget his old animosity to Pitt, nor refrain from
asserting, what before his death Fox himself had ceased to
believe, that the war had originally been caused by Pitt's
policy, and might have been avoided if the advice of his
rival had been followed : yet even he terminated his speech
by declaring that he no longer wished to see one member
of the Cabinet displaced, so satisfied was he with the
situation into which they had now brought the affairs of
Europe, and with the statesmanlike moderation of their
present language and views. And in the House of Lords
the language of approval held by the Opposition was
unmodified ; Lord Grenville coming forward as the spokes
man of his party to approve of all that had been and was
being done by the Government, and selecting for parti-

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL 479
cular eulogy the royal speech itself, which was the special
composition of the Prime Minister.
Lord Liverpool had good reason to congratulate himself,
as he avowed that he did, on the change of feeling thus
displayed towards his Administration ; and, in expressing
his belief that a vigorous continuance of their efforts
" might lead to a successful termination of the war," he
took occasion to announce the principles which would
guide himself and his colleagues in the great task which
in that event would lie before them, the re-establishment
of the peace of the world on a durable foundation. They
were such as could only have been embraced by a Govern
ment and nation conscious of their own strength, and of
the universal recognition of it by other countries. It was
well known that we had no disasters to avenge, no losses
to repair, no disgraces to efface. The lust of conquest had
never influenced our councils; and, therefore, when the
Prime Minister declared that he should look upon it as a
national dishonour "to depart from political justice and
moderation ; from justice not only to our friends but also
to our eneraies," and expressed his conviction that in exact
proportion " as we were more vigorous, it became us to be
more moderate," he was giving utterance to a sentiment
which, while it was in the highest degree honorable to
himself and his colleagues, to whom it belonged to guide
the public feeling on this subject, was at the same tirae
received as worthy of themselves by the sympathy and
approval of the people in general. It was far, however,
from smoothing the labours of the Ministry during the next
two eventful years, since it was at direct variance with the
spirit which aniraated our allies, the raajority of whom,
exemplifying the exact converse of his proposition, now
showed a lack of moderation corresponding to their
former lack of vigour ; and, when their conqueror was at
their feet, sought to make diploraacy repair with interest
the losses which their military inferiority had brought
upon them.

48o LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
To pacify this combination of revenge and cupidity
was not the easiest portion of the work which awaited
our negotiators : more than once a resort to arms was
threatened, and it seemed far from impossible that in a
fresh war we might be driven by our sense of equity to
unite with our late enemy against our former alhes. That
such a catastrophe was prevented was owing chiefly to the
combined frankness and steadiness with which the different
envoys who on our part were concerned in the negotiations
from the first avowed and throughout adhered to the
principles thus laid down by the Prime Minister, and to
the knowledge which our debates in Parliament impressed
upon every foreign prince and council that the wisdom, and
vigour, and public virtue which the Ministry had displayed
(short, as yet, as had been their tenure of office), had con
verted their former opponents into supporters, and that
Lord Castlereagh, in the arguments which he advanced,
and in the conditions on which he insisted, was speaking
the language not of one party, but of an unanimous
nation. On the 5 th of November, the day after Parliament had
re-assembled, Wellington had resumed his operations against
Soult, which a long period of stormy weather had compelled
him to suspend ; and within a week had turned the French
marshal's position, and, driving him with heavy loss from
his lines on the Nivelle and Nive, had forced him back
upon Bayonne : and the same week the allied sovereigns of
Austria, Russia, and Prussia, whose armies had reached
Frankfort, and were preparing to cross the Rhine, despatched
a messenger to Napoleon with an offer to treat for peace,
on terms which would have left him not only secure pos
session of the throne, but master of a territory such as
had belonged to no French monarch since the time of
Charlemagne : all his conquests between the Alps, the
Pyrenees, and the Rhine he was at liberty to retain ; and
the messenger was even authorised to add that England
would make considerable sacrifices on points relating to

i8i3] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 481
commerce and navigation, to which it was known that he
attached especial importance. Never was the adage which
affirms that God deprives of their judgment those on whose
downfall He has resolved more con.spicuously verified than
in Napoleon's conduct on this occasion. He was not
required to give up a single foot of land which he still
possessed. He was to be left in possession of large pro
vinces to which France had no claim but that of recent
conquest, and of which the events of the last campaign
were sufficient to convince every one that a few more
months of warfare must inevitably deprive him. Nor was
it a secret that the French nation was as eager for peace as
those who thus proffered it. The greatest distress reigned
throughout every part of France : and while statesraen
and magistrates pressed upon Napoleon the necessity of
peace as affording the only prospect of relief to the people
from their misery, his officers urged on him similar advice
for military reasons ; pointing out how surely the sarae
preponderance of nurabers on the part of the allies, which
had brought on him the crushing defeats of the past year,
must prove equally irresistible in the year which was
approaching. Yet he obstinately set himself against pro
posals which all but himself saw to afford the only chance
of his preservation. Even he could not venture openly to
reject them ; but he evaded giving a reply to them as long
as he could, and interposed delay after delay in the way
of every raeasure calculated to give thera effect. The
alHes crossed the Rhine, and established theraselves on
French ground ; and the sarae day he, with the raost
violent expressions of indignation, dissolved the Legis •
lative Asserably for imploring him to restore peace to the
country. Nor, even after he had given an apparent assent to the
conditions which the allies had laid down as the indispen
sable and unalterable prehrainaries of the negotiation, and
when, after another month's delay, he had at last em
powered an envoy to meet the ministers of the allies, and
VOL. I. I I

482 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1813
to discuss with them the terms of the treaty, would he
furnish that envoy, though the most trusted and the most
trustworthy of all his advisers, with full powers. He
required the negotiators to await his own decision on every
detail : and the vacillation and caprice with which he alter
nately gave and withdrew his consent to different articles
showed, too plainly for his own most zealous friends to
doubt it, that he sought rather to amuse the aUies than
to agree with them; and that if while military opera
tions were still going on, a single chance of war should
turn in his favour, he would at once break off the dis
cussion, and once more trust all to the arbitrement of
the sword.
Our ministers, who estimated his character and designs
more truly than those who had had greater personal expe
rience of his pertinacity and his faithlessness, were more
disappointed than surprised at the reception with which
these overtures were met. Meanwhile the passage of the
Rhine by the Russian and German hosts, and the establish
ment of invading armies on both sides of France, began
to suggest to the exiled family of the Bourbons and their
partisans hopes which could only be realised if Napoleon
rejected every condition which might be offered him.
His establishment in the southern provinces had given
Wellington an opportunity of learning something of the
feelings of the French inhabitants of the district ; and he
soon formed an opinion which he expressed to the ministers
at home that it might prove a most successful stroke of
policy to put forward one of the Bourbon princes. 'With
this opinion he, towards the close of 18 13, on his own
responsibility, permitted the Comte de Grammont, an officer
who was serving in his army, to go to England as an
emissary from the Royalist party in France ; even before
that officer arrived in London, intelHgence which reached
the princes through other channels had determined them
to venture a blow for themselves, and the Comte d'Artois
sought an interview with Lord Liverpool on the sub-

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 483
ject, which was thus reported by the latter in a memo
randum which he drew up for the information of his
colleagues :
Memorandum by the Earl of Liverpool to be laid before the
Ministry.
Most secret. January 4th, 1814.
I have seen this morning his Royal Highness Monsieur, who
returned from Hartwell yesterday, after a communication with
his brother, Louis XVIII., and his two sons, the Due d'Angou-
leme and Due de Berri, on the subject of the memorandum
delivered by Lord Wellington to the Comte de Grammont, for
the purpose of being shown to Louis XVIII.
Before we entered upon the subject which had given rise to the
appointment, I stated to Monsieur that I was desirous of in-
' forming him that, by letters received from the head-quarters of
the allies at Freiburg, dated the 19th ult., it appeared that a
counter-revolution had taken place in the Canton of Berne ; that
the allies had, in consequence, been invited to pass the Rhine,
and to march into Switzerland ; that General de Watteville,
who commanded the Swiss troops, had consented to their
advance; and that Prince Schwartzenberg intended to begin
the passage ofthe Rhine on the 20th, with an army of 150,000
men, issuing at the same time a proclamation that the allies, in
passing into France through Switzerland, acknowledged the
independence of that country, and engaged not to lay down
their arras till its ancient independence and its ancient limits
were secured. I added that I was particularly anxious that this
important event should be known to him before we began our
conversation upon other matters, as it must tend, in a great
measure, to alter the opinion which I knew he had entertained,
that Austria was not really faithful to the aUiance, but was all
this time ready (provided she could obtain her own conditions)
to make a separate peace ; that I could assure him that this
operation was in a considerable degree to be ascribed to the
Austrian councils; and I would leave it to his judgment to
decide whether, if Austria had been pursuing her own personal
objects, she would not rather have looked to operations in
Italy on a more extensive scale, than to a distant operation in
I I 2

484 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814:
the interior of France. He admitted the truth of the obser
vation, and received the communication with strong marks of
satisfaction.
Monsieur then entered upon the subject on which we had met.
He said he had had a full conversation with his brother and
two sons in consequence of Lord Wellington's memorandum
and the Comte de Graramont's mission ; that all that had
passed, however, on this subject was confined to theraselves,
and had not been made kno-wn to any individual attached to
thera. He said that he considered Lord Wellington's memo
randum as furnishing additional proof from the highest authority
of that of which they had had indisputable evidence before,
that the dispositions of the people in France were in favour of
the re-establishment of the House of Bourbon, and that they
desired only the appearance of a prince of that House to
induce thera to declare in his favour ; that I was already
apprised of his sentiments as to what they considered as their
duty under present circumstances, previous to the arrival of the
Comte de Grammont ; and, that even if a doubt could have
existed of what they owed to their own honour and to France,
previous to this event, they could have now no hesitation in
declaring that it was their indispensable duty to comply with
the wishes which had been expressed from so many quarters,
and to embark with as little delay as possible for some part of
France. That the arrangements which had been approved by
Louis XVIII. were as follows : That the Due d' Angouleme
and the Due de Berri should embark on board a ship of war,
or, in case that could not be granted, on board the pacquet-
boat for Passages, and that, upon arri-ring there, they should
put themselves in comraunication with Lord Wellington. That
it was Monsieur's intention to embark on board a frigate, or, if
that could not be granted, a vessel which he had the means of
hiring, and to sail directly for the Garonne. That he knew
there was a party in Bordeaux ready to support him, and that
he had not the least doubt of being received and supported by
them as soon as he landed in the neighbourhood. That if our
engagements with our allies prevented our giving them that
active assistance in this business which they were so desirous
of obtaining, they limited their application to a demand for

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 485
passports for the Dukes of Angouleme and Berri, either under
their own names or under fictitious names, to embark on board
the pacquet-boat for Passages, and a licence for the ship in
which Monsieur intended to go to Bordeaux.
As soon as Monsieur had concluded, I began by reminding him
that when I last saw him, which was only two hours after the
copy of the memorandum from Lord Wellington to the Comte
de Grammont had been put into my hands, I had explicitly
stated to him my personal opinion that the British Government
could not, under present circumstances, further or assist the
proposition which I was aware would be grounded on that
memorandum. That we were so circumstanced with respect to
our alhes, that we should not be justified in taking such a step
without ffieh previous consent, or without such manifestation of
public opinion by an actual rising in France as might warrant
us, from what we previously knew of their sentiments and
opinions, in acting without the delay which would unavoidably
arise from a reference to them. That I could now state it as
the opinion of my colleagues (in which I included that of Lord
Castiereagh, for I had received his opinion in writing), that
neither our engagements nor our honour would permit our
adopting at this moment the proposal which he had made.
That the connexion which subsisted between us and our allies
necessarily required previous communication with them on a
measure of such importance, but that this communication was
rendered still more indispensable from the negotiations to
which we were jointly parties. That if he asked my opinion
as to the result of those negotiations, I did not believe they
would end in peace. That the allies would certainly not have
made peace at Frankfort upon the same terms as they would
have made it at Prague; nor would they, in my judgment, make
it at-"Besan§on or Dijon upon the same terms as they would
have concluded it at Frankfort ; but that, as they had admitted
the principle of treating with Buonaparte, it was in his power to
have peace by accepting their conditions, though, from what we
knew of his character, the acceptance of them was very impro
bable. That, whilst we could not agree to the measure he
proposed without previous communication with our aUies, we
were ready to communicate -without delay all that had passed

486 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
on this subject to them, for their consideration ; to desire their
favorable attention to it in the event of the negotiation being
either broken off, or any disposition appearing on the part of
Buonaparte to evade peace on the only admissible principles.
That we should be ready to concert with them upon the
measures which it might be proper to adopt with a view to the
interior of France ; and that Louis XVIII. and Monsieur should
be fully informed of the result of this communication. That
all therefore that we now suggested was a short delay till we
could receive an answer frora Lord Castlereagh. That this
delay appeared to me to be likely even to be advantageous to
him ; it would enable Lord Wellington to procure further infor
mation ; and they raust be aware that rauch might be done by
Lord Wellington in the present state of things, both towards
learning and trying the opinion of the country, which he ihight
be obliged to give up altogether, if a French prince should
once arrive against the declared opinion of the Government
That I conjured him not to put us under the painful necessity
of gi'ving an instmction to Lord Wellington to abstain from
any communication with them in the event of their arrival in
France ; an instmction which it would be most distressing to
us to be obliged to send, and which might in its results pro
duce the most unfavorable impression upon their own cause.
I added that, having forraed this opinion after mature delibera
tion, I was sure he would see how irapossible it was for us to
assist indirectly and covertly a project which we felt it our duty
to oppose till the sentiraents of our allies had been obtained,
and that we felt, therefore, the same painful necessity in re
jecting his second proposition as we had done in rejecting
the first.
Monsieur thanked me for the frankness with which I had explained
myself He said it was most painful for his brother and for
him to differ on such a subject with a Government to whom
they owed so many obligations, and to which they were bound
by so many ties. That we certainly were the best judges of
what our honour or our engagements to our allies required, but
that their honour was likewise concerned in this business, and
that they should not feel that they were justified either to them
selves or to their country if, after such an intiraation of the

i8l4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 487
wishes of the French people, they did not immediately repair to
the place where their duty obliged them to go. That all they
therefore asked was their passports and their licence, under real
or fictitious names ; that we might certainly give what instructions
we pleased to Lord WeUington, and if those instructions pro
hibited him from communicating with them they would certainly
abstain from such communication, and try their fortunes in other
ways ; but that, whatever were the consequences, they should in
that case feel that they had done their duty. He further added
that in going to France, however improbable might be the
chance of peace at this time, and he certainly thought so after
what I had said, they were fully sensible that circumstances
might arise in which it might be concluded with Buonaparte ;
and that they should think themselves most unjustifiable in
going to France for the purpose of exciting the people to rise
in their favour, unless they had entirely made up their minds,
even in the event of a peace, not to abandon them, but to share
the fortunes of those who declared in their favour, whatever they
might be.
I again urged the advantage of delay : that, though we differed
now, events might arise, and very shortly, which might lead us
entirely to agree; that even the public declaration of such a
town as Bordeaux in favour of the royal cause would in a
great degree alter the question ; and that, whatever might be the
policy of our Government in such an event, which must depend
upon circumstances, it might remove any objection to his going
in person, as in that case he would not appear to go by our
sanction to excite the p^eople to rise against the Government,
but he would go to those who had taken the measure upon
their own responsibility, and who were desirous of having him
amongst them.
To this he rephed that it was the universal opinion of aU those
with whom they had communicated, that there never would be
an , actual rising in France till a prince actually arrived, and
that it would take place as soon as he was known to be upon
French territory.
At the conclusion of our conversation he asked me whether they
should receive the passports and licence for which they applied.
I answered I did not think the Government, with the view

488 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
which they had taken on the subject, would be justified in
giving thera ; that they would certainly impose no personal
indignity upon them, but they would not be justified in giving
facihties until such time as the coraraunication with the allies
had taken place.
He then at first intimated, and afterwards plainly stated, that in
that case his sons would go to Falraouth to erabark on board
the pacquet for Passages. That they were aware they could not
embark without a passport, but, upon being refused permission
to embark, it would be necessary for the King and them to
publish to the whole world the actual state of the case, and
to make it known to France, and to Europe, that it was not
their fault that they were not actually in France, but that
they were prevented from going by the act of the British
Government.
Monsieur said this without anything like the appearance of
menace ; and indeed I must do him the justice to say that his
manner throughout, though earnest, and on some occasions very
affecting, was such as I have universally experienced from him,
and that he was as candid as I could have expected any
individual could be with the strong feelings which he possessed
on the subject of our conversation.
In a note which he addressed to the Count the next day
he reported to him as the joint decision of the whole
Cabinet the same opinion which he had himself expressed
on the spur of the moraent, that " they considered them
selves precluded in the present state of things from ac
ceding to his demands without previous communication
with the rest of the allies." And as it Was probable that
Alexander, and almost certain that the Emperor of
Austria, would countenance no step of which the avowed
object was to depose Napoleon, the Count abandoned the
idea of obtaining the sanction of any potentate, and,
taking a passage in an ordinary vessel crossed over to
Holland in the beginning of February.
Since the abdication by Louis Buonaparte of the kingly
authority which Napoleon had conferred on him, that

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 489
country and the Netherlands had been forraally incorpo
rated with the French erapire. But the last carapaign had
expelled Napoleon's troops from the eastern provinces ;
and, for some weeks before the Bourbon prince landed at
Rotterdam, a vigorous effort had been raaking by a
combined English and Prussian force, of which the EngHsh
division was under Sir Thomas Graham, to drive them
from the western fortresses ; the two principal of which,
Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoora, were- towns of extraordinary
strength. One or two of the inferior places were reduced
with comparative ease ; but an attack which Graham planned
and executed upon Bergen-op-Zoom failed in a raost extra
ordinary manner ; our troops first making themselves cora
pletely masters of the place, and then, through a series of
accidents and great mismanagement, allowing themselves
to be driven out again with very heavy loss : while against
Antwerp the aUies were wholly unsuccessful Carnot, who
had earned an unenviable notoriety in the worst days of
the Revolution, had adhered with such obstinacy to his re
pubHcan principles that he had refused all employraent frora
Napoleon, whether Consul or Emperor ; but now that foreign
enemies were invading France he, though by this time an
old man, came forward to offer his services to his country,
and Napoleon, recollecting his old skill as an engineer,
gladly accepted his assistance, and sent hira to Antwerp
as governor. He had lost but little of his former energy,
and none of his professional skill and fertility of resource.
He speedily not only rendered the city impregnable to any
force which was likely at present to be brought against
it, but, having recourse to raeans sirailar to the expe
dients with which Argon thirty years before had sought to
protect his batteries at Gibraltar, he enabled the ships also
which lay in the harbour to defy the bombardraent which
was aimed at them. The attack was witnessed by one
of our princes, the Duke of Clarence, who had recently
crossed to the seat of war, and who forwarded his opinions
to Lord Liverpool in the following letter, to which the

490 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
position subsequently attained by the writer lends addi
tional interest. British Head-Quarters, February 6th, 1814.
My dear Lord,
I was so suddenly called away by Sir Thomas Graham that it was
not in my power at the time to inform your Lordship. I must
ever regret the fleet was not burnt ; but at the same time the
ships, without the greatest repairs, will never be able to put to
sea. Two entire days and part of a third were dedicated to the
raost perfect and unraolested practice of our artillery against the
ships and buildings. We ought to have been crowned with
success, for every exertion was raade, and all ranks tried who
could most do their duty ; our loss, thank God, has been but
small ; and Sir Thomas Grahara did all in his power, and was
well seconded by those under hira. Being, therefore, perfectly
satisfied with the Commander-in-chief and his gallant officers
and raen, I remain with the British army on the march, and
shall continue with them at least four-and-twenty hours after
they are in their permanent quarters. Before- 1 retum to the
Hague I shall pay a visit to the Duke of Saxe Weimar, if he is
at Breda. I shall, however, write as circurastances arise, and, if
anything should prevent my returning to the Hague directly,
you shall hear from me ; but I am determined to proceed to
those places only where my reception is secure and proper.
Adieu, and ever beUeve me, my dear Lord,
Yours sincerely, WiLLLAM.
His Royal Highness, however, did not carry out the
plans which he thus announced. At the same time that
his letter reached England intelligence arrived that the
Prussian commander, Bulow, had received orders to quit
the Netherlands and join the main army, which required
every bayonet that could be mustered while forcing its
way into the heart of France. The duke had gone to
Holland without consulting any one, and the ministers
foresaw the possibility of such inconvenience if he should

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 491
follow Bulow to head-quarters, where there were far too
many princes already, that they represented to the Prince
Regent the advisability of suraraoning him back to Eng
land. Though Bulow's departure, of course, left Graham
too weak to undertake any operations of importance,
yet he still continued to blockade Antwerp : but it was
in France itself that the contest could alone be decided,
and matters were proceeding so rapidly across the
frontier that victory or defeat before a Flemish fortress
was disregarded, and absolutely lost sight of, in presence
of the great events which every despatch was announcing
as taking place almost daily between the frontier and
Paris. Unless Napoleon were prepared to declare to the French
nation, which was even more weary of the war, and far
more exhausted by it, than the rest of Europe, that he was
resolved to raaintain it, in spite of their avowed feelings,
for objects purely personal to himself, it was impossible for
him to refuse all discussion of the terms on which the allies
had offered to raake peace. He had probably fancied that,
by the lukewarraness which he had shown on the subject, he
should increase their eagerness to treat ; but in this he had
deceived himself. He had only impressed them more than
ever with the idea of the necessity of imposing on him
terms which he .should not find it easy to violate. The
disinclination to treat which he had evinced proved, in their
eyes, a love of war for its own sake, and imposed on them
the duty of preventing him frora renewing it hereafter with
such resources as he had forraerly enjoyed. And every
part of his conduct during the first three raonths of the
year confirraed them in this opinion of what the world had
a right to require of them. As, however, he could not with
decency reject the overtures that had been made to him, at
length, after nearly three months' delay, he authorised his
inost,irusted_minister, Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, to
meet the plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Russia,
and Prussia, in a congress which was opened at Chatillon

492 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
in the first week of February, though even then he withheld
from his envoy the full powers which the other sovereigns
had entrusted to their ministers, commanding him to refer
every proposal which he received to himself ; so that it was
plain that his principal objects were still delay and evasion.
After the negotiators met, his conduct, if such an expression
may be used of a man endowed with so many qualities of
greatness, was childish, if not worse, and showed more
plainly than even his former backwardness how tenaciously
he adhered to his preference for war. When all his prospects
of long making an effectual resistance to the superior
numbers of the hosts which were hemming him in seemed
annihilated by his defeats at La Rothi^re, he consented to
invest Caulaincourt with the character of a plenipotentiary.
In less than a fortnight, elated by the advantages which he
had gained in two or three smaller actions, which, indeed,
had proved once more, what no one doubted, the im
measurable superiority of his military genius to the hardy
unskUfulness of Blucher or the pedantic deliberation of
Schwartzenberg, but which were on too limited a scale to
have any real influence on the issue of the campaign, he
recalled those powers, and allowed himself to indulge in
language which he knew would be repeated, and probably
wished to come to the ears of the allies, indicating his belief
that they were still in greater danger from him than he
from them.
Such a disposition on his part prevented any one from
entertaining very sanguine hopes of peace while he should
continue on the French throne, though it was not doubted
that Caulaincourt himself was sincere in his eagerness to
conclude a treaty, and steadfast in his opinion that the
issue of this or that action could make no difference in the
character of the policy which was not only desirable for
his nation, but indispensable for the safety of his master.
In addition to the British plenipotentiaries,^ Lord Castle-
^ The plenipotentiaries of the foreign Powers were : for Austria,
Count Stadion ; for Russia, Count de Razamousky ; for Prussia,

i8i4]~ OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 493
reagh hiraself was present at all the earlier conferences,
indeed as long as there seemed any prospect of bringing
them to a satisfactory conclusion. For, unusual as it was
for a Secretary of State to leave the kingdom, the crisis
was so pecuHar, and the questions which raight arise be
tween the negotiators were so raanifold and various, while
at the sarae time they often required so instant a decision,
that it was thought desirable that there should be a
member of the Cabinet on the spot who should possess the
confidence of his colleagues sufficiently to be empowered
to decide everything conclusively that raight seem to call
for so rapid a judgment. Lord Castlereagh had taken
Basle on his way in order to have a preliminary conference
with the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns and ministers
and the Emperor Alexander. But he was probably not
sorry that the potentate last naraed had quitted the town
before his arrival. For the activity of Alexander's mind
was very far beyond its capacity, and his idea of his
importance as the sovereign of the country whose defeated
invasion was the most visible cause of Napoleon's diffi
culties was so exaggerated, that he seemed to claira acqui
escence in the wildest scheraes merely because they were
suggested by himself, and expected deference to his wishes
to override established usage and manifest propriety.
Lord Castlereagh had a sufficient specimen of his arro
gant temper while on his journey. As he wrote to Lord
Liverpool, "He received a confidential coraraunication
before he reached Basle that the Emperor of Russia
desired to see him iraraediately on his arrival, before he
had any coraraunication with any other Court or any of
his own rainisters, being desirous of personally opening
to Lord Castlereagh his sentiments on the present state of
Baron Humboldt. Great Britain had three ; Lord Aberdeen, Lord
Cathcart, and Lord Castlereagh's brother, Sir C. Stewart ; but, in the
presence of the Foreign Secretary himself, they, of course, possessed
no actual authority, in spite of their formal appointments as plenipo
tentiaries.

494 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION £1814
affairs." He was compelled to reply " that his duty would
be on his arrival to notify himself officially to the ministers
of the three Powers," and though he could not well refuse
to wait upon the Emperor after he had done so, he had
certainly reason, when he learnt the views which Alex
ander had apparently desired to urge upon him separately
and privately, to be glad that he was forewarned of them.
To his astonishment he learnt that Alexander was desirous
not only to dethrone Napoleon, but to establish another
mere soldier in his place, of incomparably inferior repu
tation, Bernadotte, whom a strange freak of fortune had
already raised to the rank of Crown Prince of Sweden ;i
and to whom that very elevation had suggested still more
ambitious hopes. In the unrestrained conversations which
the Emperor's departure enabled him to have with the
prime minister of Austria, Prince Metternich, he learnt,
what indeed he would have divined without such express
information, that to insist on such an idea would be not
unlikely to make Austria abandon the alliance, though in
his views of general policy the Emperor Francis was more
moderate and less disposed to allow personal feelings to
guide him than Lord Castlereagh had probably expected.
In spite of his having given his daughter to Napoleon, Lord
Castlereagh reported to Lord Liverpool that he did not
intend to raise "any objection, should the French nation
think fit to restore the ancient dynasty," while Metternich's
language as to his own personal feelings and judgment was
that " if a wish could decide between the alternatives [of
either forcing the best possible peace on Napoleon, and
1 In May 1810, Prince Augustenberg, who, by the treaty made
between Russia and Sweden in 1809, had been declared heir to the
Swedish throne, died of apoplexy; and as the reigning sovereign,
Charles XIIL, was the last of his family, it became necessary for the
States of Sweden to appoint him another successor, who should found
a new dynasty. Bernadotte, who was at that time commanding a
French army on the shores of the Baltic, was popular in Sweden, and
in September 1810 he was elected Crown Prince, and formally adopted
by the old King as his son.

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

495

preserving it by a defensive union when raade, or of
letting the government of France devolve to its ancient
and legitiraate sovereigns, unconnected equally with any of
the allies, and likely to be too weak for years to molest
any of thera], he could not hesitate to prefer the Bour
bons." With this view Castlereagh entirely coincided ; as
did Lord Liverpool hiraself, whose views on the whole
question of peace were expressed, a day or two after the
formal opening of the conferences at Chatillon, to Wel
lington in the following letter : Fife House, February 9th, 1814.
My dear Lord,
I enclose for your information a copy of a private letter from
Lord Castlereagh, written after his first communications at Basle
¦with the Austrian and Prussian Governments.
The Emperor of Russia and his minister were in advance at
Vesoul, and he had not therefore an opportunity of personally
kno-wing their sentiments upon the points to which this letter
refers.
As far as we have been able to judge of the disposition of the
people of France, in the eastern provinces of that country,
which are now occupied by the allies, and which include
Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comt^, Burgundy, part of the
Lyonnois, and part of Champagne, there appears to be a
general abhorrence of the tyranny of Buonaparte, but there has
not yet been manifested any sentiment whatever towards the
Bourbons. The only part of France in which we have heard of
any disposition of this nature (except in the districts occupied
by the army under your command) is in the lower part of
Brittany, and in that district which was formerly denominated
La Vendde ; and even here the sentiment is by no means so
prevalent as might have been expected, considering the tre
mendous conflict which subsisted for so considerable a length
of time in that country.
At the same time I should not be surprised, if the aUies were so
fortunate as to obtain another battle of Leipsic at Chilons,
that the French nation would feel the advantage of returning to
an order of things which would be more satisfactory to the

496 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
aUied Powers than any other which could be adopted, and
would certainly give to the French nation, and to Europe, the
best chance of what they all want, a lasting peace.
The extreme impmdence of the French princes renders any secret
communication with them very hazardous. Could you have
believed it possible that, when the Prince Regent visited the
Comte d'Artois, a few days before his departure for Switzerland,
in consequence of his being confined by the gout, and chose to
say civil things to him about his present prospects and the re-
establishment of his brother on the throne of France, that the
whole of what was said by the Prince upon that occasion was pub
lished verbatira in one of the morning papers a few days after ?
I can understand their wishing to commit us to their cause if
i possible, but they must have known that words of that sort
mean nothing, and that the publication of them could have no
other effect than to mark their own impmdence.
I think that many weeks, and perhaps even days, cannot elapse
before we hear of a great battle having taken place between the
allied armies and the French in the neighbourhood of Chalons.
The reports from our officers at head-quarters are very encou
raging. I confess I wish, however, that the line of operations
ofthe allies was not so extended.
If the allies should gain a great battle in their present situation,
either Buonaparte's power will be overturned, or he will be
obliged to accept the terms of peace which they may think
proper to dictate.
The belief at Paris I know to be that he will not return alive
unless as conqueror.
If, on the other hand, the aUies should receive a check, the ad
vantages which they possess in numbers, in the discipline of
their troops, in their artillery, and particularly in their cavalry,
will probably enable them to make a retreat which the enemy
would find great difficulty in raaterially impeding ; and in the
situation in which Buonaparte now is, with the conscription
resisted throughout a great part of the country, without any
national enthusiasm in his favour, an.d with all payments to the
civil and ecclesiastical servants of Governraent suspended, he
will probably be too glad to avail himself of such an opportunity
to agree to peace.

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

497

I do not see, therefore, at present any probability of the con
tinuance of the war, unless some dissension should arise
amongst the allies; and though there are certainly seeds of
disunion in this as well as in aU other great aUiances, I am not
apprehensive that they would break out under such circum
stances so as to prevent the conclusion of peace, though I
think they might in some degree affect the terms of it.
I have thus fully explained to you my views of our present
prospects. We are thoroughly satisfied that the weather and
state of the roads have been impediments to your advancing.
If the money which has now been sent shall enable you to equip
¦ the Spaniards, and you can safely take a much more forward
position in the country, great advantages might arise from it,
even in the event of peace. The period between a preliminary
and a definitive treaty is always critical, and the French would
either have to negotiate with great disadvantage, the aUied
armies being in possession of a considerable part of their
territory, or they must purchase the evacuation of it by some
such sacrifice as Buonaparte exacted at Marengo ; that, is by a
preliminary surrender of some strong places.
Believe me to be, my dear Lord,
Yours very faithfully, Liverpool.
To the Marquis of Wellington.
The policy of our Government, as we see from this
letter, was clear and decided : peace with France under
any government which she herself might choose, pro
vided it was one which the allies could trust for faithfully
observing the conditions. Nor were the secret wishes in
favour of the legitimate dynasty entertained by Lord
Liverpool and Metternich, nor their belief that better faith
might be expected from the Bourbons than from Napo
leon, suffered to weaken their recognition of the fact that
Napoleon, as the ruler chosen by the French people, had a
right to expect them to treat with him in that capacity, nor
to interfere with the perfect frankness and fairness of their
dealing with his envoy. And again in the sarae letter we
VOL. L K K

498 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
see the same power, very rare among civUians, of accurately
calcularing the chances and effects of military operadons
even on the most extended scale : for the anticipations
expressed of the different consequences of any check
received by either side were very remarkably and precisely
verified in the different actions which took place during
the next month, and in which the very circumstances that
Lord Liverpool here enumerates prevented Napoleon from
gaining any permanent advantage from the brilliant suc
cesses which his superiority of skill enabled him to achieve,
while the first great disaster which he himself sustained
overturned his power.
Parliament, which had adjourned before Christmas till
the 1st of March, again postponed its meeting till the end
of the month at the express command of the Prince
Regent, for the reason which, though not expressed, was
universally understood and admitted, namely, the incon
venience which might arise from unseasonable questions
being put to the Ministry while so important a negotiation
as that at Chatillon was going forward. To approve of
so protracted an adjournment was of course to express full
confidence in the sound judgment and good management
of the Cabinet ; and even those who thought the pre
caution of adjourning on such grounds superfluoiis agreed
in energetically proclaiming the trust which they reposed
in the ministers' conduct of the negotiation. The con
ferences, as is well known, proved fruitless ; but even their
imsatisfactory termination served to show how desirable it
had been that no interference of any extraneous body to
complicate matters by unseasonable comments should be
possible. They broke off because Napoleon finally refused
to cede his conquests, though every one of the territories for
which he held out, except Antwerp, had been already
wrested from him, and was occupied by the armies of his
enemies ; and Antwerp was so isolated that it and its garri
son were practically as much lost to him as Spain. But,
long before Caulaincourt gave in his last demand, in which.

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 499
besides insisting on the retention of Antwerp, Flanders,
and the frontier of the Rhine, he also demanded Italy and
the Ionian Islands for Eugene Beauharnais, principalities for
his sisters, and the restoration of the conquered colonies of
France by England, the allies had nearly quarrelled among
themselves ; and nothing but the prudence and force of
character of Lord Castlereagh had prevented the silly
schemes and pretensions of the Emperor Alexander from
dissolving the alliance.^
It is not worth while to follow in detail the steps of an
abortive negotiation. After a sitting of six weeks the
Congress was finally dissolved on the 21st of March;
and it is the raore strange that even Napoleon with all his
obstinacy should have allowed matters to come to such a
point, because, though he was hiraself by the superiority of
his genius keeping the events of the carapaign on a footing
of tolerable equality in the north, in the south Wellington's
superiority to Soult was as marked and undeniable as his
own advantage over Blucher, and was productive of far
more decisive results. The French marshal was driven
from one strong position to another ; river after river was
crossed in spite of all his efforts ; he received one signal
and decisive defeat in a pitched battle at Orthez ; a week
before the plenipotentiaries separated the great city of
Bordeaux was occupied by a British division ; and, a still
more ominous sign of the future, the citizens and muni
cipal authorities publicly discarded the embleras of the
RepubHc, replaced the tricolor by the white ensign of the
Bourbons, and received the Due d'Angoulerae with eager
ness as governor of the city in the name of Louis XVIII.
Another letter from Lord Liverpool to the warrior whose
' February i6th Lord Bathurst writes, " Lord Castiereagh's arrival at
head-quarters was of great use. He has at least prevented a quarrel
between the two Emperors. That of Russia disliked both Napoleon
and the old family. He has just suspended the negotiations. Lord
Castiereagh has left Chatillon for Troyes, where the two Emperors,
and 1 believe the King of Prussia, are."
K K 2

500 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
exploits had led to this strange revolution expresses his
feelings on the subject : Fife House, 24th March, 1814.
My dear Lord,
I ara much obliged to you for your letter, which I received a few
days ago by Major Freemantle. We have since received your
letters ofthe 14th, with the important intelligence of the occu
pation of Bordeaux by a di-vision of your army under Marshal
Beresford, and of the declaration of the civil authorities and
people of that city in favour of the House of Bourbon.
I shall direct a copy of the instructions which have been sent in
consequence to Lord Castlereagh to be forwarded to you.
The case which has arisen has been foreseen from the beginning
as possible ; and, as far as was practicable, pro-vision has been
made for it.
At a raeeting of the ministers of the allied sovereigns at Langres,
on the 29th of January, when they settled the principles on
which they were ready to negotiate with Buonaparte, Lord
Castlereagh declared, that though he was ready to negotiate
and conclude peace with Buonaparte on the part of his Govem-
ment as the sovereign de facto of France, yet, if anything
should occur in the course of the negotiations to call his power
in question, he reserved to himseff the right of suspending the
negotiations, or of adopting such course as, according to
circumstances, raight then be expedient.
That the declaration of the second or third city in France, as
Bordeaux may be said to be, in favour of the Bourbons, com
bined with the account you have given us of a similar senti
ment pervading the adjoining country, does in a degree call
Buonaparte's power in question, cannot be denied. The
question altogether is one of degree. Every effort of this nature
must have a beginning ; a more promising one could not have
been expected, and it remains to be seen to what extent it
spreads.
Whilst we are determined, however, under present circurastances,
to keep off the conclusion of any treaty of peace with Buona
parte, we must endeavour to manage our allies. Our decision
may at first alarm them. I entertain confident expectations

iSi4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 501
that they wiU be reconciled to it, if the preHminaries shall not
actually have been signed before they receive the communi
cations of yesterday. If the preliminaries shall have been
signed upon our own terms, the business will be more difficult ;
and their decision -will very probably then depend upon the
degree in which the spirit which has manifested itself at Bor
deaux extends itself At all events much will be done by
gaining time ; and I am sure you will see the importance of
furnishing us with the most early information on the following
points : First, on the progress of the Royalist spirit throughout
the south and other parts of France within your observation or
cognisance. Secondly, the resources which the country can
afford for the support and furtherance of that cause. Thirdly,
what would be the prospect of ultimate success if the other
aUied Powers were to withdraw from the contest, either by
making a separate peace, or by retiring with their armies to the
frontier, and Great Britain should be left to carry it on, unsup
ported by any Power except the nations of the Peninsula
and the Royalists themselves. The last alternative is one which
raust be most seriously considered.
If the Austrians were determined either on withdrawing from the
interior of France, or on making their separate peace, the
Russians and Prussians would never attempt to preserve their
present station ; and we should then have to decide whether we
would make peace jointly with the allies, or continue the war in
France, under such circumstances, in support of the Royalist
cause.
I have not the least apprehension of the Emperor of Austria being
actuated by any tenderness towards Buonaparte on account
of the connexion with his daughter. I can even say that, in
my judgment, he has been disposed to act more fairly about
the Bourbons than either of the other great military Powers.
But the Austrians of aU descriptions, mihtary and political
dread the power of France, and with resources far more con
siderable, and a better organized mUitary system, than either
Russia or Prussia, they want the spirit of enterprise and self-
confidence which belongs in a very considerable degree to
both the other Powers.
We shall wait with the most anxious solicitude for the next intel-

S02 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
ligence frora you ; and we must only now hope (as so con
siderable a portion of territory and population has already
coraraitted itself against Buonaparte) that the flarae will extend
itself so widely, as to leave no doubt of the insufficiency of
Buonaparte to answer for the French nation.
I have thus communicated to you freely my sentiments on the
,\ present raost singular and iraportant crisis. I have no appre-
1 hension of any difficulties in Parliaraent at present, whatever
may exist hereafter, if the line of policy adopted by the
Government should prove unsuccessful.
Believe rae to be, with great truth, my dear Lord,
Very sincerely yours,
Liverpool, i
To the Marquis of Wellington.
On such a matter the opinion of the Prime Minister was
of course the opinion of the Cabinet, as the declaration
to which he alludes as having been made by Lord Castle
reagh two months before had also been. But even yet he
did not feel justified in resolving that under no circum
stances would he consent to a treaty which should leave
Napoleon on the throne. His reasons were of a twofold
character : in spite of the confidence which he deservedly
placed in the Emperor of Austria's fidelity to his engage
ments, he knew that those in his employ were holding
language which implied a belief on their part that he
would be forced to change his policy •} and again, as long
as the position of affairs in the North depended on the
daily chances of the campaign, it was impossible to feel
assured that Napoleon might not find some occasion of
'- "The language of the Austrian minister. Count Meervelt, now here,
is strong in expressing the reluctance of the Emperor of Austria to
join in every hostile step which has been taken since the entrance of
the allied armies into Yx^.Tice." — Diary of Lord Colchester, ii. 477,
March 24. The stronger Lord Liverpool's belief was that these were
not the Emperor's real sentiments, the more did it, perhaps, seem that
an envoy who thus misrepresented him felt assured that he would be
compelled by circumstances to act according to the judgment or wishes
of others rather than according to his own.

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

503

dealing a deadly blow on sorae one of the generals opposed
to him which might paralyse or dissolve the whole alliance.
At the moraent that Lord Liverpool was writing. Napoleon
was retreating towards the Rhine, in the hope of find
ing such an opportunity whUe the aUies were pursuing
him, as he never doubted that they would do, and as, if
Alexander's counsels had been followed, they would have
done. For that prince, though he had no railitary experi
ence or skill, had an insatiable appetite for dictating plans
and operations to professional soldiers. And if a decisive
victory should again place Napoleon on a footing with
respect to his Gerraaa eneraies which raight give hira ever so
slight an appearance of equality with them, it was raorally
certain that the terror of hira, which even their hatred had
not been able to eradicate, would prompt them either to
make separate treaties with him, or to put an almost
irresistible pressure on Britain to join in concluding one
which would leave him on the throne. Fortunately some
of the Russian generals were better strategists than their
sovereign, and were able to put their recommendations to
march at once on Paris into a form sufficiently gratify
ing to his vanity. And thus, while Wellington was press
ing upwards, and driving Soult from one position to
another upon Toulouse, the grand army was beating back
Marmont and Mortier before it, not indeed by the superior
skill of its commanders, but by the equally resistless weight
of overwhelming nurabers.
It is alraost idle to call the operations which ensued
battles. Each day inflicted on the French losses which
were irremediable, at an expense of life in the allied
armies which in such hosts was never felt. Before
Napoleon learnt that his scheme of tempting thera to
pursue him towards the Rhine had failed, its faUure had
rendered the preservation of the capital hopeless ; and he
soon found that the loss of his capital entailed the loss of
his throne. In vain he tried every expedient of iraperial
assumption and diplomatic ingenuity. He was willing to

504 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
negotiate : his victorious enemies refused to treat with him,
inferring, from the temper with which he had rejected every
offer only a fortnight before, how little chance there was
of his remaining faithful to any terms to which he might
now agree a day longer than he felt the pressure of instant
danger and necessity. He was willing to abdicate in favour
of his son : they would not hear of his son, and had now
a simpler way of effecting a vacancy of the throne than
that of hampering themselves with a conditional abdication.
The French Senate itself passed a formal vote of dethrone
ment against him ; and, after that, the only question for
the allies to consider was what should be his future destiny.
Unhappily Lord Castlereagh was not with the victorious
armies. He had been for some weeks at Dijon, where the
Emperor Francis, with Metternich and other foreign states
men, was awaiting the course of events ; and his presence
there had on more than one occasion been found very
serviceable in its influence on the counsels of Austria.
There was, therefore, no one of sufficient weight at Paris
to counterbalance the influence of the Czar, or of sufficient
authority to check his ill-considered schemes. Relieved
from the restraint of the British minister's superior ability
and force of character, Alexander, weak, vain, and pompous,
assumed the chief credit of the present state of affairs, as if
he himself had conquered Napoleon, and was ambitious of
adding to it the further glory of a forgiving generosity.
He had not the sagacity to see that there are situations in
which to cast aside distrust is mere imbecility, or that
wonder is not always admiration. Dazzled by the .pros
pect which he thus presented to himself of to use his own
words, "giving an illustrious example to the universe of
liberality to a prostrate enemy," he first invited Napoleon
to accept an asylum in Russia, where he promised him
" a magnificent and, what is more, a cordial hospitality."
And when Caulaincourt's silence showed how little such
an offer was likely to be accepted, he offered him the
sovereignty of the island of Elba, which was not his to

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 505
give, but which belonged to France, having been indeed
one of the earliest acquisitions made by Napoleon hiraself
The moraent that the offer became known every one dis
cerned the preposterous folly of such a measure, but no
one saw how to prevent its adoption. After the Congress
at Chatillon had broken up, the British plenipotentiaries
had accompanied the allied armies in their march upon
Paris; but they were no longer invested with authority
even to remonstrate, though from the first they perceived
the mischief that must inevitably arise frora placing
Napoleon close to Italy, where Murat was still king.
Talleyrand, under whom a Provisional Government had
been established at Paris, was equally clear-sighted as to
the consequences, his perceptions being perhaps sharpened
by the conviction that not only was the territory thus
to be provided for Napoleon to be wrested from France,
but that France would also be called on to provide
the revenue for the new sovereign. Still, after the offer
had been made, no one, even of those who most strongly
condemned it, saw how to recall it without still greater
mischief The Czar looked on his honour as pledged to
securing its acceptance by the allies; and the Provisional
Government in general hardly shared Talleyrand's appre
hensions, or, in some instances perhaps, had secretly no
great objection to their being realized. Accordingly that
part of the arrangement was settled in a few hours by a
treaty concluded between the sovereigns of Austria, Russia,
Prussia, and Napoleon ; and when Lord Castlereagh arrived
in Paris he could only express the disapproval of hiraself
and his colleagues by warning them emphatically of the
danger thus needlessly run, and, according to instructions
which he received from the Cabinet, placing his and their
objections, as it were, on record by coupling his accession
to the treaty with a clause modifying the degree in which
it was to be understood to bind his own royal master.^
1 Fouchd, so long the head of Napoleon's police, felt, or professed to
feel, the objections to his being placed at Elba as strongly as any one.
[The

So6 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
So manifest indeed was it that neither he nor any other
English statesman had contributed to this great political
The alternative which he proposed was a strange one : nor was it less
singular that it was to Napoleon himself that he addressed his objec
tions ; while, as his chief object at this time was to ingratiate himself
with the Bourbons, he forwarded a transcript of the letter in which he
urged them to the Comte d'Artois. He subsequently sent copies of
it, and of his note to his Royal Highness, to Lord Liverpool hoping
that his Lordship, " apr&s les avoir lues, serait convaincu que j'ai fait
tout ce qui dtait au pouvoir d'un bon citoyen, k qui il ne restait que
I'autoritd des conseils pour prdvenir les malheurs de la patrie," and the
letters are so curious that I subjoin them :
Copie d'une lettre ecrite par le Due d'Otrante a S.A.R. Monsieur, le
23 Avril, 1 8 14.
" Monseigneur, "J'ai voulu rendre un dernier service k I'Empereur Napoleon,
dont j'ai ix€ dix ans le ministre. Je crois devoir communiquer k
V.A.R. la lettre que je viens de lui ^crire, ses int&Sts ne peuvent etre
pour moi une chose indiff&ente, puisqu'ils ont excitd la pitid gdndreuse
des puissances qui I'ont vaincu. Mais le plus grand de tous les int^rfits
pour la France et pour I'Europe, celui auquel on doit tout sacrifier,
c'est le repos des peuples et des puissances aprfes tant d'agitations et
de malheurs ; et le repos meme, alors qu'il serait dtabli sur de solides
bases, ne seroit jamais suffisamment assur^, tant que I'Empereur
Napoleon seroit dans File d'Elbe. Napoldon sur ce rocher serait pour
I'ltalie, pour la France, pour toute I'Europe, ce que le 'Vdsuve est k cot^
de Naples. Je ne vols que le Nouveau Monde et les Etats-Unis aux-
quels il ne pourra pas donner de secousses," &c.
Copie de la lettre ecrite par le Due d'Otrante a I'Empereur Napoleon,
le 23 Avril, 1814, incluse dans la prkedente.
" Sire, " Lorsque la France etune partie de I'Europe ^tait k vos pieds,
j'ai osd vous faire entendre constamment la vdritd ; aujourd'hui que vous
etes dans le malheur, je crains bien davantage de vous blesser en vous
parlant un langage sincere, mais je vous le dois puisqu'il vous est utile
et meme ndcessaire.
" Vous avez accept^ pour retraite I'lle d'Elbe et sa souverainet^. Je
prete une oreille trfes-attentive k tout ce qu'on dit de cette souverainetd
et de cette ile. Je crois devoir vous assurer que la situation de cette
ile dans I'Europe ne convient pas k la v6tre, et que le titre de souve
rain de quelques arpens de terre convient moins encore k celui qui a
poss^dd un immense empire.
" Je vous prie de peser ces deux considerations, et vous sentirez
combien I'une et I'autre sont fondles. [L'lle

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 507
blunder, that in the brief discussion which in the summer
took place in both Houses on the general subject of the
peace not one speaker on the Opposition side made the
least mention of the treaty with Napoleon as an act for
which Lord Castlereagh or the Cabinet was responsible ;
though the next year, when the mischiefs which had been
foreseen had broken out, and the flames of general war
" L'lle d'Elbe est assez voisine de I'Afrique, de laGrfece, de I'Espagne ;
elle touche presque aux c6tes de I'ltalie et de la France ; de cette ile
la mer, les vents et une felouque peuvent transporter rapidement dans
tous les pays les plus exposes k des mouvemens, k des ^vfenemens, et a
des revolutions. Aujourd'hui il n'y a encore nulle part de stability.
Dans cette mobility actuelle des populations, un g^nie tel que le votre
donnera toujours des inquietudes et des soupgons aux puissances.
¦Vous serez accusd sans ^tre coupable, mais sans ^tre coupable vous
ferez du mal ear des alarmes sont un grand mal pour les gouvernements
et pour les peuples.
" Le Roi qui va r^gner sur la France ne voudra rdgner que par la
justice, mais vous savez combien de passions environnent un trone, et
combien les haines sont habiles k donner k une calomnie les couleurs
d'une vdrite.
" Les titres que vous conservez, en rappellant k chaque instant ce
que vous avez perdu, ne peuvent servir qu'k rendre vos regrets plus
amers. lis ne paroitront pas un reste, mais une representation bien
vaine d'un etat de grandeur evanoui ; je dis plus, sans avoir honneur
ils vous exposeront d'avantage. On dira que vous ne gardez ces titres
que parce que vous gardez toutes vos pretentions ; on dira que le
rocher d'Elbe est le point d'appui sur lequel vous placerez les leviers
avec lesquels vous chercherez encore k soulever le monde.
" Permettez-moi de vous dire ma pensee toute entifere ; elle est le
resultat de mures reflexions. II serait plus glorieux et plus consolant
pour vous de vivre en simple citoyen ; et aujourd'hui 1' asile le plus sftr,
et le plus convenable pour un homme tel que vous, ce sont les Etats-
Unis d'Amerique.
" Lk vous recomraencerez votre existence au milieu de ces peuples
assez neufs encore ; ils sauront admirer votre genie sans le craindre.
¦Vous y serez sous la protection de ces lois egales et inviolables pour
tout ce qui respire dans la patrie de Franklin, de Washington, et de
Jefferson. Vous prouverez k ces peuples que si vous aviez regu la
naissance au milieu d'eux, vous auriez senti, pense, et vote comme
eux ; que vous auriez prefere leurs vertus et leurs hbertes, k toutes les
dominations de la terre. " J'ai I'honneur, &c.
(Signe) " Le Due d'Otrante."

5o8 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
were again kindled by Napoleon's invasion of France,
attempts were made to throw the whole blame on our
minister's acquiescence in the arrangement which Alexander
had thus concluded ; but, as will be seen hereafter, a plain
statement of the fact by Lord Liverpool easily and con
vincingly disposed of the accusation. It is somewhat
remarkable, however, that, even after Napoleon had taken
possession of his new kingdom. Lord Castlereagh was led
to beHeve that he might not be disinclined to renounce
it, and, what is more strange, did not appear to see any
insurmountable objection to his being received in England.
As late as the Sth of May he wrote from Paris to ask
Lord Liverpool's instructions on that question, saying,
" General Shuwellof, the Russian commissary, assures me
Buonaparte shows no fortitude in his difficulties. If his
taste for an asylum in England should continue, would
you allow him to reside in some distant province .¦¦ It
would obviate much alarm on the Continent. Joseph, now
in Switzerland, has expressly solicited a passport. What
am I to say .'" Joseph was too insignificant to make it of
any importance where he fixed his abode ; but that Lord
Castlereagh should have thought it possible for the Govern
ment to allow Napoleon himself to reside in an English
county as a private individual, in which condition no treaty
could be made with him, nor could any supervision over his
movements be exercised, is a singular instance of the de
gree in which association with weakness and insincerity can
at times undermine the firmness of the most resolute, and
bewilder the judgment of the most clear-sighted. There
can be no question that Napoleon acquiesced in his removal
to Elba on account of his perception from the very first of
the facilities which his position there, with the still recog
nised rank of a sovereign prince, would give him for
recovering his power in France at the first favorable oppor
tunity; while any hints which in moments of apparent
despondency he may have dropped of his inchnation to
solicit a refuge in this island proceeded from his theatrical

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 509
hypocrisy, which at all times was a strong feature in his
character, but which he never atterapted to carry into action
till every other hope and expedient had failed.
In every other respect but the destination of Napoleon
the conclusion of the peace and the manner of it were
circumstances of which England and the ministers who
governed her destinies might well be proud. In the debate
to which allusion has been already made Lord Liverpool
had a right to speak of hiraself, that is to say, of his
Administration and his policy, as he did speak, when he
said, " In becoming the negotiator of a peace he always
wished to consider himself as the arbiter of the different
interests at stake, and as forming his decision on a fair and
comprehensive view of the circumstances and claims of all
the parties." And certainly, at the close of a war of so
unprecedented a raagnitude, thus to be the arbiter of the
conditions on which it was to be terminated, was a glorious
position for England to assurae. It was not only because,
while all the other countries of Europe had been repeatedly
stricken down, she alone had neither defeat to avenge nor
loss to retrieve ; nor because her superior wealth and
hberahty had made her the paymaster of the alhance:
but rather because it was not more incontestable that her
triumphs had been won by her warriors than that they had
been foreseen by her statesmen ; that they had flowed
directly from a policy well conceived and steadily adhered
to ; and, above all things, because the language now held by
the Prime Minister, magnanimous and disinterested as it
was, was well known to express the real feelings with
which England had from the first approached and carried
out the great work of pacification. So far was she from
regarding with rancour the foe with whora she had been so
long contending, that she not only restored to France
almost all the colonies that she had wrested from her
during the war, but even interfered with effect with the
allies to procure for her, in this her hour of weakness and
lowest humiliation, some additions to her territory which

5IO LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
would not have been unimportant had they been trophies
and prizes of successful warfare, but which were now freely
given to her, not as consolations for her defeat, but as a just
recognition of claims which it was felt that she had a right
to advance, and to which, therefore, it was justice, and
therefore it was wisdom, to listen. And in other matters
also, being partly influenced by a desire to smooth the
difficulties of the restored dynasty, Britain forbore to press
claims of her own which invariable precedent would have
authorised her to enforce, as may be seen in the following
letter from Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh ; for, though
that minister had authority to settle at his own discretion
questions that required instant decision, on all others he
consulted and received his directions from~ the Prime
Minister : " ' Fife House, May 19th, 1814.
My dear Castlereagh,
In a letter which I -wrote to you some time ago I directed your
; attention to the large sura of money due from the French
i Government to the British for the maintenance of prisoners
of war.
You are of course aware that an article to liquidate these debts
has usually been inserted in all treaties of peace. I do not
believe that in the present case such an article would be likely
to give us the money, and certainly could not give it without
material pressure and inconvenience to the French Government.
It occurred to me, therefore, ffiat there might be some grace in
abandoning it, and that the honour of the French Government
might, perhaps, be saved on sorae other points, by a formal
relinquishment of this claim in an article of the treaty.
I can assure you that I feel sincerely desirous to see the credit of
the P'rench Government upheld, as far as we can contribute to
it, without the sacrifice of our public principles or of our
essential interests.
You wih see that we have lost no time in returning an answer to
your despatch by Robinson.
I trust the extravagant pretensions they have brought forward on
the subject of the fisheries can raise no serious difficulty. We are

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 511
ready to place them in this respect where they were in 1792, and
that is aU they can expect from us. In short, we demand
nothing which is of any value to them except the Mauritius ; for
there is not a Frenchman in the island of Tobago, and the only
value of Ste. Lucie is its port, which they do not want, having a
much better in Martinique. Our moderation, indeed, is great
corapared with that of any of our aUies. This consideration can
not too often be brought under the view of the French Govern
ment I am anxious on this account, I must confess, for the
signature of the peace, as I am confident that both Great
Britain and France will be able to speak with much more
authority on many points when all our respective difficulties are
adjusted. Yours, &c. Liverpool.
It was no unimportant sura that we thus forbore to exact,
for the French prisoners in England fell but little short of
70,000 men, while those whom Napoleon had taken from
us, and whose expenses therefore the French Governraent
was entitled to set against their maintenance, were but
insignificant in number ; so that the lowest calculation would
have entitled the Ministry to demand some millions of
money,^ which could certainly not have been provided with
out causing the greatest embarrassment to Louis XVIII.,
for whom every necessity to impose a fresh tax on his people
was in fact a compulsion to court an unpopularity which at
such a moment he could not afford to encounter. At the
same time, on questions of greater importance than money,
such as the Slave-trade, Lord Liverpool did not abstain
from enforcing his own views on the new French Ministry ;
and his conduct on this subject does him the greatest
honour, because, as will be remembered, he had not originally
been convinced of the duty of abolishing it even in our own
colonies :
1 The exact number of French prisoners is stated by Alison at
67,360 in England, besides a few hundreds abroad ; and the expense
of maintaining them was estimated at 100,000/. a month.

512 LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
Fife House, May 19th, 1814.
My dear Castlereagh,
I foresee that we shall have most serious difficulties on the subject
of the article relative to the Slave-trade in this country ; and I
am sincerely of opinion that the French Government have taken
a mistaken view of their own interest in this question.
If they were prepared to say that they had no intention of
agreeing to the abolition of the Slave-trade, considering the
continuance of that traffic as indispensable to their colonies,
their policy would be intelligible ; but if they are prepared, as
appears by your communication, to condemn the principle of
the trade, and to stipulate for its eventual abolition, I am con
vinced they would have less erabarrassraent in abolishing it
iraraediately than at the end of three or five years.
I wish you to consider that the Slave-trade has now been
abolished, with regard to their colonies, for the last six or
seven years, as well as with respect to our own. That the
imraediate abolition would be only a continuance, therefore, of
a system which now exists, and to which, for a considerable
space of time, they have been accustomed. But if they were to
suffer the Slave-trade to revive as to their own colonies, if they
are to permit the inhabitants of those colonies again to taste
of the advantages of that trade, the Government will, at the end
of the period, have to raeet it as a new question ; speculations
will have been formed which will be disappointed ; new capital
will be embarked in consequence, which cannot be withdrawn
without great loss and inconvenience ; and they will have all the
clamours to meet, not only of the West India colonists, but of
the merchants and inhabitants of the sea-port towns who may
embark their capital in the trade to Africa. In short, it appears
to me to be much more easy and prudent to continue the
abolition than to revive the trade, and abolish it a few years
hence.
I wish you would bring these considerations seriously under the
view of the Government. If they are weighed dispassionately,
I am satisfied they will be found to be just.
I cannot but hope that the prejudice which exists upon this
subject has been hastily imbibed, and that if the French
Government would avow the principle upon which they are

i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 5,3.
disposed to act, and state it to be a policy which they had
adopted in conjunction with Great Britain, Holland, Denmark,
and Sweden, the difficulties which they suppose" they would
have to encounter would in a great measure vanish.
Might not their feelings in some degree be reconciled to the
question if it was made a part of the stipulation in the treaty,
that we should restore the colonies to Holland upon the
condition that the Slave-trade should be abolished by the
Prince of Orange in the same manner as by the British and
French Government ? Yours, &c. Liverpool.
Lord Liverpool had indeed now become so zealous an
abolitionist, that, when he found the French Government
hung back, he expressed himself willing to purchase their
assent even by the sacrifice of a West Indian island, if
necessary. But the general feeling of France set so
strongly the other way that Louis and his ministers
feared to oppose themselves to it. And, with reference
to their position. Lord Liverpool thought it impolitic to
insist too positively on the point ; on which, indeed, no
one nation had either power, or right to compel the agree
ment of another. The question, however, was discussed
more at length in the winter at Vienna; when the per
severance of our ministers was rewarded by a success
which was almost complete. On raost other subjects
Lord Liverpool's views were at once adopted. And,
though portions of his correspondence of this date have
unfortunately been lost, enough reraains to show how
careful was the supervision which he exercised oyer
every point of the diplomatic arrangements which ensued
on the reduction of France to her former limits, and
how shrewd and correct was the judgment which he
formed on them. Among the articles of the definitive
treaty, one of necessity had reference to Holland, which
some years before Napoleon had erected into a kingdom
for his brother Louis : and, when by his tyrannical inter-
VOL. T. L L

SH LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION [1814
ference he had driven him to the abdication of the crown
which he had bestowed on him, had finally annexed to
his own empire. It was now settled that it was to be
restored to the dignity of a separate monarchy, enriched
by the addition of the greater part of the Flemish pro
vinces, which had formerly belonged to Austria, and
placed under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange.
But, though he consented to the arrangement. Lord Liver
pool from the first saw the objections to which it was
liable ; arising partly from the difference of religion, which
must almost inevitably embarrass an union between Pro
testant and Roman Catholic provinces, and partly from
the partiality, having its source iri religious sympathy,
of the Belgian provinces for a connexion with France.
And in a letter to Lord Clancarty, our ambassador at
the Hague, he foreshadowed some of the dangers which
at no remote period led to the dissolution of the new
kingdom :
Private. Fife House, May 30th, 1814.
My dear Lord,
.... I hope you are going on well vrith your business at Paris.
I -will ovsTi to you that I ara under serious apprehensions on
account of the views of some of the Prince of Orange's coun
cillors upon the policy to be adopted upon the union of the
Austrian Netherlands to Holland. Depend upon it, it -will
require the utmost raanageraent and indulgence to reconcile
the people of Brabant to this connection. A new connection
cannot be governed with as tight a rein as an old one.
Recollect how Ireland is governed now, and what lost Araerica
to the crown of Great Britain. The danger with respect to the
Low Countries must be viewed as particularly formidable when
their proximity to France is considered. A considerable party
in France will for sorae time cast a longing look upon that
country. The habits and prejudices of the Brabantes, though
not friendly to the French, approach nevertheless nearer to
them than they do to those of the Dutch ; and I am satisfied
that the only chance the Prince of Orange will have of con^

;i8i4] OF LORD LIVERPOOL, 515
solidating the connection between his new subjects and his old
ones will arise from his making it quite clear to the former
that it is their interest to be under the dominion of the Prince
of Orange rather than under that of the King of France. The
Dutch must be taught that Brabant is a most important out
work for the security of Holland, and that, if they do not
choose to bring the danger to their own doors, they must pay
something for keeping it at a distance. Believe me, &c.
Liverpool.
To the Earl of Clancarty.
The proximity to France, which he thus regarded as
a temptation to one considerable party in the Nether
lands, was, in fact, the moving cause of the revolution
which sixteen years afterwards severed the nations then
united. And if, as seems to be the case, no one but
Lord Liverpool foresaw this now, the accuracy of his
judgment is the more remarkable and creditable.

END OF 'VOL. L

LONDON :
K. CLAY, SON, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS,
BREAD STREET HILL.

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