• YAILE-VMIWIEiaSinnr- • miBiK^israr • 1911 ***¦¦ <^»*j^il DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. TORONTO DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE AND ITS REFLECTION IN RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AN ESSAY BY J. R. ILLINGWORTH, M.A., D.D. (¦art t( 5 otf Kivovfievov Kivei, atdtov Kal ouaia ko.1 ive'pyeia otiffa . . . dpeydfieda de 5i6tl So/cel /j,8X\ov ?) doKei ditm dpeydfieda. Aristotle, Meta. MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON i 9 1 1 PREFACE It is now more than twelve years since I published an essay on divine immanence, con sidered as one aspect of a dual truth which was stated in the following words : — " Christianity, with its correlative doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, laid equal stress both on the transcendence and the immanence of God, or in less technical terms upon His supremacy, and His omnipresence."1 But in the interval the latter phrase has been frequently employed as though it were an exclusive alternative to the former ; with the result that such has come to be its natural meaning and implication for many minds. In other words, it has been diverted from a Christian to a pantheistic use. I have en deavoured, therefore, in the ensuing pages to recall attention to the complementary conception 1 Divine Immanence. V vi DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE of divine transcendence ; as being, from the Christian point of view, presupposed, and not precluded by that of immanence ; and further to point out its intimate connection with the note of spiritual, and, in that sense, supernatural authority, which distinguishes the organization, faith, and worship of the Church, and leads to a correlative element of obedience in the character of its members. CONTENTS CHAPTER I EFFECT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS PAGE /There is no single and uniform tendency in " modern thought," but various diverse tendencies . . .1-3 One of our most modem sciences, if yet entitled to the name, is psychology .... 3 Which describes the processes but not the object or the end of thought ... . . . . 4 This has a tendency illegitimately to take the place of philosophy . 5 And causes undue emphasis of the subjective element in religion . 6 As against its objective and authoritative element, which is none the less real for the difficulty of its definition . .7-8 For Christ claimed authority . ... 8 And transmitted it to the Church, which has since exercised it . 9-10 While from the nature of the case there must always be an authorita tive element in the teaching of religion . . .11 /Which in the last analysis is a reflection of the divine transcendence 12 For God is the absolute and transcendent ground of relative and finite existence .... .13 The term ' ' absolute " being here used to signify independence of all necessary or compulsory relations to anything outside Him self . 14-15 The divine transcendence is constantly recognized in the Psalms . 16 And is the necessary correlative of the divine immanence, which would otherwise degenerate into pantheism . 17-18 This transcendence is symbolized and reflected by the authority of the Christian religion . . .... 19 vii viii DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE But the older forms of that authority, e.g. in reason, the Bible, the Church, may appear to have been shaken by modern criticism, under the influence of the above-mentioned psychological bias Hence there is need for the reassertion of their essential importance and reality CHAPTER II RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE BEING Plato calls the absolute Being "the good" or "the idea of good " . . .22 Which is the transcendent cause of all existence and knowledge, otherwise called " God " 23 Who can only be known by an effort of our whole being, when morally and spiritually purified . . 24-27 The existence of this absolute Being is presupposed, as the standard by which we judge relative things ... 27 And our object should be to live in communion with it, and so become " the friend of God " . ... 28 Aristotle is in substantial agreement with Plato . 29 He maintains that there must be a transcendent Being, on whom all else depends, and this he continually speaks of as God, whose highest life is self-contemplation ... .30 And who moves the world — (1) as the object of universal desire; (2) as a general organizes an army . .31 Hence all nature aspires Godward ; and the aspiration culminates in man. Dante and Milton express this . . . 31-32 Plato and Aristotle agree, according to Augustine, in ' ' one method of most true philosophy,'' and its most influential interpretation has been the Christian . . . . . 33 They both agree on the need of moral purification for the know ledge of God . . 34-35 Also that the existence of absolute Being is presupposed in all our knowledge of relative things 36-37 An argument repeated by Augustine .... 37 That is, we have not merely a conception, but what may practically be called a perception of God . ... 38 CONTENTS ix PAGE Science justifiably assumes the rationality of the world ; which implies mind ; which implies personality .... 38-39 This is a judgment of our whole being ; and is repeated by Descartes . . . . . . 40-41 And this judgment culminates in the experience of the saint, e.g. Augustine . . 42-44 CHAPTER III THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS Personality is not necessarily finite because it involves distinction of the self from the not-self . . ... 45 For analogy suggests that a. perfect person would be one for whom there was no essential not-self ; though this would not preclude such distinctions as the doctrine of the Trinity involves . 46-47 Nor can an absolute Being be gradually realized by an evolutionary process . . 48-49 This is, in fact, substantially the same notion against which Plato and Aristotle contended, in their argument for absolute Being ; and their doctrine has been reaffirmed by all subsequent « idealists ...... . . 5° While it is confirmed, if indeed it was not originally suggested by our religious experience . . . 5I_52 As well expressed in the Psalms 53 Such experience, being that of our whole personality, is more real and concrete than any merely intellectual judgment . . 54 But it may be confirmed by intellectual arguments . . -55 Which, confessedly however, have more value as corroborations than as demonstrations of Theism .... .56 E.g. we can argue from the action of human will to a first cause . . ¦ 57-5^ And from human reason to a final cause 59 Which predisposes us to recognize design in nature, despite of the modern attempts to invalidate its evidence ... 60 Such design is further confirmed by our sense of divine guidance in our personal life 62 Which, in turn, throws further light upon the traces of God's provi dence in history . . ¦ • -63 DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE PAGE And also upon the moral arguments for Theism . . . 64 But behind all these intellectual arguments there is the instinctive verdict of our whole personality . . . 65 CHAPTER IV TRANSCENDENCE AND AUTHORITY It is sometimes said that the conception of immanence should super sede that of transcendence . 66 But this is unphilosophical . 66-67 And unchristian . . 68 For it lands us in pantheism, with all its speculative and moral difficulties . . .69 Eastern philosophers endeavour to escape these difficulties by teaching the unreality of matter . . .70 But this is obviously unscientific and also unphilosophical, since matter is intimately linked with spirit, and partakes of its reality . . . . ... 71 Thus transcendence and immanence are not alternative but correlative conceptions in Christian theology . 72 Both of which are involved in the Incarnation . . . 73-74 And this divine transcendence is reflected in the authoritative tone of Christianity ....... .74 For all authority, to the Theist, is of divine origin . . 75 Being the claim of the whole, to which by our social constitution we belong, over its parts . . 76-77 And appealing in the last resort to conscience for the recognition of its claim .... . . 78-79 While the absoluteness with which conscience speaks is a reflection of the absolute sovereignty of God . . 80-8 1 Whose authority is based, in the last analysis, upon the fact that He is the supreme good of man . . 82-83 And acts on him primarily by attraction, and only when rejected by coercion ... . . 84-85 Secular authority, as such, is delegated from the divine, as SS. Paul and Peter teach . .... 85-86 Hence religious authority is more fundamental than secular 87 And culminates in that of the Christian religion . 88 CONTENTS xi CHAPTER V THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH PAGE 'The first note in the teaching of Christ which impressed His hearers was its authoritativeness . . . 89 This He vindicated by appeal to His works, teaching, character, and claim of mission from the Father . 90-91 'Behind all which was the influence of His personality . . 92 , And so He founded His Church to act by personal influence upon the world < . . 93 1 And the Church claims to exercise an authority delegated from Him 94 But the sinfulness of fallible human beings has destroyed the visible unity of the Church . . ¦ • 95 And raised controversies, therefore, as to where the true Church is to be found . 96 " We appeal to antiquity .... 97 And there find the episcopate considered essential 98 As is stated, among others, by Clement of Rome, Irenaeus, and Ignatius of Antioch . 99 It is maintained in some quarters that the episcopate was not of apostolic origin .... . . .100 But this objection underestimates the gravity of the Church's tradition . .... 101 ' Only episcopally-governed Churches, therefore, are, in point of or ganization, identical with the primitive Church, and, in that sense, legitimate branches of the Catholic Church . . 102 Thus, in the institutional region, the episcopate is the symbol and instrument of Christ's authoritative hold upon the world . . 103 This position, can be maintained against adverse criticism . . 104 Which cannot shake the broad historic fact of the episcopate's con tinuous existence and claim . . . 105 But the study of comparative religion suggests that the Christian is only one of many priesthoods, due to the operation of a natural human instinct . • ¦ 106 This is true in a sense ; but the Christian is the explanation of all the rest, and illustrates them by suggesting that the human instinct was from the first divinely impressed . . . 107- no Thus, for those who accept it, there still exists a living authority, claiming to perpetuate that of Christ . in And its existence is a fact of great evidential value . 112 xii DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE CHAPTER VI THE AUTHORITY OF THE CREED PAGE The authority of the Church's teaching necessitates its dogmatic form, to which exception is often taken . . . 1 13 True, the Church consists of living men, whose object is to per petuate a life . . . . • rI4 ' But this life consists in union with Christ, and therefore involves the knowledge of who and what Christ is . . . IT5 This involves teaching the facts of His earthly life, together with the Church's traditional interpretation of them contained in the three creeds . . . . . n6 This interpretation was due partly to Christ's teaching, and partly to the subsequent illumination of the Holy Spirit . . 117 The creeds state ( I ) the historic facts . . . . 118- 119 (2) The interpretation of them, involving the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation . . . . . .120 The object of the creeds was simply to guard the apostolic tradition 121 And they must be read in the light of the New Testament . 122 To alter them would further endanger the unity of the Church 123 While their fixity reminds us that a certain element in our Christian thought is fixed, because revealed 124 They are essentially historical . 125 For the theological element which they contain is, in intention, no more than a statement and restatement of the particular interpretation historically put upon the facts 126-128 They are therefore inevitably dogmatic 129 But regulative rather than speculative . . . 130 While it is precisely their dogmatic definition which enables a definite life to be founded upon them ... 131 And therefore gives them especial value in a critical age . 132-133 CHAPTER VII THE AUTHORITY OF SACRAMENTS I, The Church confronts the world with authoritative sacraments . 134 The student of comparative religion suggests that these are only sublimated survivals of savage custom . . 135 CONTENTS xiii r PAGE •'But this does not prevent their having been invested with new authority by Christ . . . . . 136-137 In virtue of which they have the same element of fixity and permanence as the ministry and the creed ... 138 And are corrective of undue subjectivity in religion 139 By their objective character, as being gifts from God . 140-142 For there is a tendency, nowadays, to emphasize the human side of religion more than the divine . ..... 143 And this is accentuated by the comparative study of the ethnic religions of the world 144 But there is a divine initiative in all religion, which may be traced in the appeal of nature to man . . 145 In the inspiration of all great religious leaders . . 146 (Which is apt to be forgotten by the merely archaeological student of the past) ... . . 147 And again in the creation of the religious instinct itself . . . 148 Hence in all religions the primary fact is God's operation upon man 149 And the sacramental system brings this fact both symbolically and actually home to us ... 1 50 It does not materialize spirit, but spiritualizes matter 1 5 1 As against modern Manichaeanism . 152 For the Incarnation made a new epoch in our philosophy of matter 153 And gave a sacramental character to the whole of our earthly life . 1 54 CHAPTER VIII THE AUTHORITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT The authoritative value of the Old Testament has not been impaired by recent criticism ... .... 155 Which has indeed called closer attention to the human element in the Bible ... . ... 156 But cannot affect its self-evident spirituality . 157 The prophets speak with a uniform conviction of inspiration . 158 The quality of which is quite unique in the history of the world 159 And their consentient message, viewed in connection with their influence, creates a strong presumption that their conviction was true .... .... 160 That message taught (1) the unity, (2) the omnipotence of God 161 (3) His wisdom seen in the order of creation . . . 162 xiv DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE PAGE (4) His righteousness in the judgment of individuals and nations . . ... . . 163-164 (5) The harmony of His moral with His natural legislation . 164-165 And this teaching was unique in its contemporary world . . 166 Further, they interpret their nation's history and destiny . 167 As being a people peculiarly chosen to bear witness to God 168-169 Both for themselves and for all nations . . . 170-171 And this service is, at last, expected to find its highest expression in an individual Messiah ....... 172 The degree in which this prophetic expectation can be regarded as fulfilled depends upon our presuppositions ... 173 For the believer in the Incarnation it has been decisively fulfilled 174-175 And is thus seen to have been divinely inspired . . 175 As Pascal forcibly points out . 176 CHAPTER IX THE AUTHORITY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT ¦^The authority of the New Testament depends on that of the Church, in whose service it was written ..... 177 1 "Its meaning, therefore, is that which from the first it possessed for the Church . .... 178^ Whose object is to make mankind members of Christ . 179 Hence the New Testament possesses for the Church an essential unity .... 180 As dealing with one subject — the fact and consequences of the Incarnation ... . jgj And this unity includes the Old Testament also . . 182 As taken up and continued in the Law . . . 183-184 But would fall to pieces, without the belief in the Incarnation 185 Hence the authority of the New Testament, like that of the Old, depends upon our presuppositions . . . 186 For Christians it is the authorized record of the origin of a life 187 Which exists, as a fact of experience, in the world to-day . 188 And is essentially founded on belief in the Incarnation and Atonement . ... jo- Which belief, therefore, must have been held by the synoptists, when they wrote, though they describe a time prior to its realization 190-192 CONTENTS xv PAGE For their function is to establish the humanity, as the epistles and Johannine writings establish the divinity, of Christ . . 193-194 The former, therefore, describe Christ as partially understood before Pentecost, the latter as fully understood after Pentecost . 195-196 Hence, for those who are living the Christian life, in the strength of the Christian creed, the New Testament possesses all its old authority ... . . . 197-198 CHAPTER X CHRISTIAN LIFE UNDER AUTHORITY The authority of the Church over its sincere members is as real as ever in the present day . .199 And is a reflection of God's authority . ... Hence the emphasis upon sin in Christian ethics, as being dis obedience to God's authority . And consequent importance of the Atonement This leads to humility 203 Which is the condition of Christian strength . . 204 Further, the sense of living under divine authority renders life a vocation . 205-206 And our ethical standard absolute . . . 207 It also leads to obedient self-surrender . 208 Which is the counter-agent of the anarchic temper . 209-210 And the secret of true freedom 211 Again it differentiates the Christian from other kinds of courage 212 And this courage culminates in patient endurance . . . 213 Finally, the conviction that the divine authority is based on love induces thankfulness . . . . . . .214 For the beauty of the world, and the love in human hearts, as being divine gifts . . ... 215-216 But above all for the Incarnation . . . . .217 And in this sense of gratitude the Christian character cul minates . . . . 218-219 200 201202 CHAPTER XI Recapitulation . . . • 220-244 xvi DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES Note A. Absolute Being . . . . 245 Note B. Episcopacy . . . 249 Note C. The Synoptists . .... 252 Note D. Religious Authority ... . . 254 CHAPTER I EFFECT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS »" Modern thought " is a phrase with which we are nowadays very familiar, but it is a some what misleading phrase ; for it seems to give a kind of fictitious unity to a number of what are in fact heterogeneous opinions. It thus tends to stereotype a fallacy — the fallacy that there is any one type or tendency of thought which can be called distinctively and characteristically modern. Whereas a really complete survey of contemporary opinion would disclose in it variety rather than unity — a multitude of incoherent and often incompatible points of view, all of which may in a sense be called modern, though many have ancient analogues ; but none of which can claim to be typically representative of the age. While, further, such unity as there seems sometimes to be is often more apparent than real. 2 EFFECT OF ch. For many of the current expressions which we all use— -words, for example, like " evolution " or " experience " or " reality " — mean such different things to different minds that their common employment does but darken counsel by imply ing an amount of agreement which does not in fact exist. There were never so many writers, and therefore, presumably, thinkers of a kind, as in the present day, and quot hominum tot sententiae is a proverb that is never obsolete. In other words there is no one modern view of the world to be accepted or rejected in the block. But there are many views which approxi mate and interlace and then diverge — currents, and cross-currents, and rapids, and backwaters of thought — which must be discriminated and judged on their individual merits. Moreover, modern thought, being of this complex and many-sided character, is neither altogether so good nor so bad as it is sometimes represented to be. We can easily recognize the admixture of truth with error in bygone ages, and may reasonably, therefore, suspect a similar condition in our own. Some of our present opinions will doubtless persist and thereby prove their truth ; others will disappear and thereby i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 3 expose their falsehood. While even the best opinions may, like men, have " the defects of their qualities," elements of congenial error com mingled with their truth. For in a world that is tainted throughout by moral evil, the mere increase of knowledge does not necessarily insure its correct use. # Now one of the most essentially modern of our sciences is psychology ; if it is yet entitled to be called a science, which some of its students deny ; the science or, at least, the description of our various mental processes. This, like all other special sciences, is abstract in the sense that it makes abstraction of its particular subject- matter, and then studies it in artificial isolation from the context wherein alone it actually and always lives. Thus psychology deals with the growth and nature and faculties and methods of the mind in its widest sense — how we feel, and think, and will ; and can never legitimately treat the further question, as to what we think, and why we think — the ultimate nature of the objects of thought, and the final cause of our existence as thinking beings, at all. The nature of this distinction may be easily illustrated from the case of any other science. An oculist, for example, 4 EFFECT OF ch. will give us an elaborate and fascinating explana tion of the marvellous mechanism with which we see, and all the complex process of its operation. But he cannot, as such, as far, that is, as he is simply an oculist, tell us what the particular objects in a distant landscape are, or what the effects of a sunset or moonrise will be upon our inmost soul. Or an aurist again may teach us the delicate structure and intricate convolutions of the ear, and the method in which its function is performed. But he cannot, as such, tell us the meaning of a symphony of Beethoven, or how the hearing of it may influence our life. While the significance of such sayings as " Turn away mine eyes lest they behold vanity," or " Take heed what ye hear," will be still more remote from the scientific cognizance of either. So distant is the how from the what and why of our feeling and thought. Thus psychology can trace the process by which our knowledge is acquired, but not the value or meaning of that knowledge* which is a question for metaphysic or philosophy. But specialists generally tend to overestimate the relative importance of their own speciality; particularly at a time when they have achieved i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 5 rapid and striking results, as has been the case with the study in question, of recent years. Hence there has lately arisen a disposition, explicit and articulate in some cases, inarticulate and unconscious in many more, to substitute psychology for philosophy ; either by adopting a frankly agnostic attitude towards all metaphysic, as dealing with things beyond our ken, or by so shifting the emphasis and interests from the philosophic to the psychological aspect of know ledge as to leave the former out of account. This psychological tendency, then, so to call it, is in the air, widely diffused beyond the ranks of those who are fully conscious of its operation. And, however the metaphysicians may smile or sigh, it colours our modern treatment of many problems to an undue degree. And nowhere is this more marked than in its influence on man's attitude towards religion and theology. We are told, for instance, in certain quarters, that the older conception of God as transcendent — sitting above the water-floods and remaining a king for ever — is being superseded by the conception of His immanence or indwelling presence in nature and the human soul. 6 EFFECT OF ch. Akin to this there is a widespread disposition to base religion exclusively on inner experience or spiritual insight or feeling : I have no name to give it, Feeling is all in all. With this, again, agrees the increased interest taken in the mental process by which our religious ideas are acquired, and the influence upon them of the emotions and the will to believe ; leading to the common use of phrases like the " evolution of religion " or " evolution of the idea of God." The same thing reappears in much of our Biblical criticism. In the New Testament, for instance, attempts are made to trace the rise and growth of Our Lord's consciousness of His person and office. While stress is laid upon the psychology of the various writers — their personal idiosyncrasy as affecting their treatment of history and doctrine. And with all this there is an increase of religious individualism. Personal experience and private judgment are emphasized as against all that is external or institutional in the life, or traditional and dogmatic in the teaching of the I PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 7 Christian society. This, of course, in itself is no new thing ; but it has received a new impetus of recent years. Now all these views contain elements, and often important elements of truth ; but taken together they show a tendency, if not of the modern mind, as such, at least of many modern minds, to be one-sided in their appreciation of religion ; to exalt what in the common phrase is called its sub jective over its objective and authoritative element. It may be granted at once that we cannot now attempt either to locate or define authority as precisely as was done in bygone days. The authority of reason, the authority of conscience, the authority of the Bible, the authority of the Church are all phrases which at once raise complex difficulties of thought. They have lost something of the clear-cut character and definite outline which they once possessed. But this need not mean that they have lost their reality. On the contrary it is mainly due to the fact, or to our increased appreciation of the fact, that all such authority is a living thing. For we cannot classify or define living things as completely as abstract conceptions ; since living things, from the very fact of being alive, are always in a state g EFFECT OF ch. of change, and cannot be arrested in a static condition. While we are painting them, they imperceptibly assume a new expression, and we find that our picture must be begun over again. But this difficulty does not alter the fact that there is and ever must be an element of authority in all true religion, and in none more explicitly so than in Christianity. To begin with, the Incarnation is emphatically presented to us in the New Testament as an advent ; no mere event in the ordinary line of human evolution, but the coming of One from a transcendent sphere. " God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son." " I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world." " The Word was made flesh." " Who being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied him self, taking the form of a servant." And with this accords the contrast between the teaching of Christ and other men. " He spake as one having authority and not as the scribes." " Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time . . . but I say." " A new commandment I give unto you." " Come unto me." " Take my yoke upon you and learn of i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 9 me." " For my yoke is easy and my burden is light." " Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do." " Him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out." The language is human, but the implied attitude is that of One who confronts mankind with an authority which is other than that of men, and which He wills to be accepted as such. Moreover, what He once did, Christ has continued and still continues to do, according to the Christian belief, through His Church. " Go ye and teach all nations " are the words of its commission, and again, "He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth Him that sent me." And so the Church, as an institution, has stood and stands in a sense over against the world, confronting it with an authority that is difficult to define, but easy to recognize, as transcendent, coming from above, before it can grow immanent, realized within. The Church meets each fresh individual with a message, a ministry, a literature, and sacraments. And this is as true of the baptized child as of the unconverted heathen. He may early have been taken into Christian arms and received into the Christian society. But as he grows up he finds 10 EFFECT OF ch. that society, in a very real sense, outside him, and around him ; teaching, insisting, appealing to him through a number of external agencies, to enter upon his inheritance, and make the Christian life his own. And if he listens to this appeal and gives his mind to the subject he will naturally ask questions that need to be answered. Whereupon he is again confronted by a number of evidences from without ; such as the practical universality of religion in the race, the various arguments in its favour, the strangely prophetic history of the Jewish people, culminating in the appearance ¦ and character of Jesus Christ, the foundation and history of the Christian Church, the New Testament, the sacraments, the lives of the saints. These various facts, with their Christian interpre tation, are presented to him, by the society, which claims an authoritative mission so to present them. Concomitantly with this process, his own inner and personal religious experience may be growing. But it will, usually, grow out of and be conditioned by all this suggestion from without. And, how ever independent of external influence, or critical of its details he may become in the end, he could never have attained that end without its operation. i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS n Moreover, we must remember that from the very nature of the case, this process must of necessity, if the Christian life is to continue, be repeated in every successive generation ; since we all enter the world as children, asking questions, and dependent upon others for their answer. While, further, the majority of mankind have neither the time, the capacity, nor the opportunity, to study religious questions at first hand for themselves, and must therefore remain as dependent upon authority as the child. This -need not prevent them from gaining real religious experience ; but it will supervene, as with the child, upon suggestion from without. Of course no personal religion that is real will long continue to rest solely on external authority. An element of experience will soon begin to blend with the acceptance of authority, and that element will gradually increase. While the attainment of a maximum of inner personal experience is the natural goal of all religious endeavour,— such experience as will enable us to say " I know whom I have believed, " — the experience which true mysticism seeks. But it would probably be fair to say that the majority of those who, in any generation, might be called sincerely religious 12 EFFECT OF ch. people, fall far short of this possible maximum, and live largely in reliance on authority. And we have seen that from the nature of human life it must be so. The element of authority in religion must always be strong. But there is a great deal more to be said upon the question than this. ' For authority is not merely a compendious means for conveying knowledge to those who have no time or power to gain it in other ways. It stands for a substantive fact ; it symbolizes a great reality ; it is the witness to an important truth ; — the truth of what in technical language we call the divine transcendence. » There is a natural objection in many minds to the employment of abstract, metaphysical expres sions when speaking about religion. But their use enables us to isolate particular points for consideration, and so to clear our thoughts, which the infinite complexity of real existence would otherwise but hopelessly confuse. Even the physical sciences which deal with the most concrete forms of experience would be powerless without the use of abstraction, and the consequent generalizations which abstraction enables us to make. i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 13 When, then, we contrast the transcendence, or surpassing nature, with the immanence or in dwelling presence of God we are only describing, in our very inadequate human language, two aspects of one and the self-same Being. But they are very different aspects, and it is of the utmost importance that in our thoughts about religion both should be kept in view. Metaphysically speaking, then, God is the absolute, transcendent Being, who makes finite and relative existence possible ; and all those mental categories, or forms of thought, like "cause" and "substance" by which we give comparative stability to what would otherwise be merely the fleeting phenomena of sense, do but symbolize the fact that all the chance and change of things which is for ever going on around us, has its root in a permanent Being, or as the Germans would say world - ground, that abides and is the source of all reality. We do not postulate this idea because our feelings need it. On the contrary its necessity is involved, as all idealists from the days of Plato and Aristotle have constantly maintained, in all our thoughts. We shall return to enlarge upon this point in a subsequent chapter ; but to prevent confusion 14 EFFECT OF ch. it may be well here to state in what sense we use the phrase "Absolute Being," particularly as some of our modern pragmatists scoff at its use altogether, while other thinkers criticize adversely this particular use. " Absolute " means unrelated to anything out side itself. It may include internal relations, but precludes all external ones. Some thinkers construe this to mean, independent of all relations of any kind whatsoever, to anything outside itself. Therefore, say they, the Absolute is a term that can only be applied to the totality of all existence, that is to the world - ground together with the world, or in theological language God together with creation. But if the Absolute is to be understood in this sense, it becomes a practi cally meaningless thing. For we can attach no common predicate, beyond that of bare existence, to such an absolute. We can make no profitable statement about God and the universe viewed together as one whole. And accordingly this conception of the Absolute has led men into extraordinary intellectual difficulties. But the term " Absolute " may also be used, and is used by Christian theologians, to imply " independent of all necessary or compulsory re- i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 15 lations," " independent," that is, of all compulsion or determination by another, or in other words completely self-dependent and self-determined. It is in this sense that we apply the word to God. And His absoluteness, so conceived, is not affected by His relation to creation since that is not a necessary relation, but one con tingent on His own self-determination — His own will to create. A free man may voluntarily limit his practical freedom, by adopting a pro fession or a rule of life, but such voluntary self- restraint does not diminish, but rather emphasizes his essential freedom. And so we conceive God's absoluteness to be perfectly compatible with His relation to His creatures, precisely because they are His creatures, or in other words* the result of His own free will. In fact our chief need of the term "Absolute" is to protect the doctrine of the divine freedom. " Of His own will begat He us." It is in this sense then that we speak of God as the absolute Being. Now the theological bearing of this absolute ness is that God is the perfect Being, the Almighty, the Omniscient, the Good, who sustains all finite beings in existence, or in other words imparts to them all the reality that 16 EFFECT OF ch. they possess, while transcending them as im measurably as the Creator ever must transcend the creature. He is our infinite and absolute Other. He is all that we are not. And for this very reason He is the Object of all our hope and desire. " All men yearn for the gods, as young birds open their mouths for food," says the Greek poet. " My soul is athirst for God," says the Hebrew Psalmist. " We are restless, O God, till we rest in Thee," adds the Roman philosopher. The Psalter is a prayer book that has not yet grown obsolete ; and the psalter is full of this thought, of the dependence of the creature on his Creator. " Thy hands have made me and fashioned me ; . . . O give me understanding that I may live." " Be thou my stronghold, whereunto I may alway resort ... for thou art my house of defence, and my castle." " The Lord is my shepherd, therefore can I lack nothing." " The Lord is my light, and my salvation." "The Lord is the strength of my life." " Whoso dwelleth under the defence of the most High, shall abide under the shadow of the Almighty." Such language may not express the whole of religion, as a Christian conceives it ; but it does i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 17 express its essentially fundamental and permanent basis ; except upon which no further super structure could be raised. It does not express an earlier conception of God, to be superseded in time by a later ; but the very first and fore most feature of what we mean by God at all. For when we pass on, as Christians, to the further thought of God's indwelling presence or immanence within us, and of Christ's being formed within us, and of our bodies becoming temples of the Holy Ghost, the whole signifi cance of this depends upon the fact that God is our eternal Other, and not our self. " It is one thing to be God," says St. Augustine, " and another to be partaker of God," and the essential character of this antithesis cannot be better or more emphatically expressed than in the well- known words of St. Thomas — " We come as sick to the physician of Life, unclean to the fountain of mercy, blind to the light of eternal brightness, poor and needy to the Lord of all things . . . that we may receive the bread of angels, the King of Kings, the Lord of Lords, with a humble, lowly, and contrite heart." In other words, the Christian conception of the divine immanence in man is the extreme c 18 EFFECT OF ch. opposite of the Vedantic identification of the inmost self with God. Man at the centre of his being is not God, but is capable of receiving God (capax deitatis), while, as the result of that reception, his own individuality, his own "peculiar difference " is not pantheistically obliterated, but divinely intensified. Thus the divine immanence in man, as conceived by Christians, depends, for its very character and value, upon the divine transcendence ; upon the thought that the same God who "hath respect unto the lowly," is still " the High and Holy One that inhabiteth eternity; whose name is Holy." This, then, is the great truth which lies behind the authoritative element in the Christian religion. That authority is a permanent reminder of the absolute sovereignty of God, in its twofold aspect, as involving the unqualified right to com mand us, and the unlimited power to protect us. " Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God ? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, Why didst Thou make me thus?" and again, "neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities, nor things present nor things to come, nor powers, nor height nor depth nor any other creature, shall be able to i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 19 separate us from the love of God." And this twofold thought is at once the source of our religious awe and our religious peace. Our Creator and Ruler and Judge is God Almighty ; but our Father, Saviour, Sanctifier, is the same Almighty God. The truth, then, that authority symbolizes being of this permanently important character, its symbol must needs be important too. And here arises our modern difficulty. For all the old forms of authority seem at least to have been shaken by criticism ; because in all we have come to recognize, with increasing clearness, the element of human fallibility and consequent error. And we have to sift this criticism, with a view to discover the extent to which our old forms of thought are inadequate ; and, in that case, how their inner reality may best be preserved. For example, the demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God was convincing enough to men who were perfectly satisfied with syllogistic deduction from self-evident premises. But both the self-evidence of these premises, and the sufficiency of the syllogism have ceased to be obvious to us ; and the authority of reason in religion has, in consequence, lost its old simplicity 20 EFFECT OF ch. of application. Again a Church whose general councils were held to be infallible, and whose dogmas were viewed as adequate expressions of divinely revealed truth, represented authority in a definite and tangible shape. But our modern recognition of the necessarily human and limited characters of the men, who sat in councils, as well as of the language that they used, has rendered our appreciation of their authority more critical and complex than of old. While once again an infallible Bible, verbally inspired, was a positive source of authority to those who so received it. But with our fuller realization of the human element in the Bible, the precise form of its authority has changed ; we can no longer settle our difficulties by the mere quotation of a text. Other instances might be cited with the same effect, but these will be sufficient to illustrate our point. Now in all these cases the authority symbolized a reality. It represented God's sovereignty over man. But the form of its expression was tem porary, and in some cases, as we now think, mistaken. Yet the reality remains, as great for us as for the men of old. God has the samej sovereign relation to us as to them. And i PSYCHOLOGICAL BIAS 21 reason, and the Bible, and the Church still witness to the fact. Only the precise mode of their witness has for us somewhat changed its character ; and in so doing become harder to define. But we cannot, because this is the case, accept the suggestion which is now often made, that we should fall back upon mere feeling or personal inner experience as the sole basis for our religion. Reason and the Bible and the Church are as important to us as ever, as authoritative as ever ; and are not essentially affected by the fact that the precise nature and conditions of their authority present to us more complex problems than they did to a previous generation. CHAPTER II RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE BEING We have spoken of the conception of absolute Being as dating in Western philosophy from Plato. For though he had his predecessors they are only known to us in fragments, and chiefly through theirjnfluence upon himself. It may be well, therefore, to refer briefly to what Plato taught. For to us he is practically the father of philosophy, the great idealist of all time ; whose thoughts, however variously interpreted along the ages, have never lost their magic charm, and are still a power in the world to-day. Plato then speaks of the absolute Being as " the good " or " the idea of good " ; ideas in his language meaning not intellectual abstractions, but transcendent realities which are the heavenly "patterns" of all earthly things. And the neuter form of his expression must not be taken to imply impersonality, any more than when we ch. n ABSOLUTE BEING 23 say " the deity." For he elsewhere speaks of " God " and of " the very and eternal mind." " As the sun," he says, " is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of genera tion and nourishment and growth ... in like manner the Good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge in all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the Good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power." And again, " That which imparts truth to the object and knowledge to the subject is what I would have you term the Idea of good, and that you will regard as the cause of science, and of truth as known by us ; beautiful, too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in regarding this other nature as more beautiful than either." 1 " Can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with absolute being? Can we imagine being to be devoid of life and mind, and to remain in awful unmeaningness, an everlasting fixture? That would be a terrible admission."2 And again, " The creator of the world was good . . . and being free from jealousy he desired that all things 1 Repub. 508, 509. 2 Sophist, 249.. 24 RELATIVE AND ch. should be as like himself as possible . . . God desired that all things should be good, and nothing bad as far as this could be accomplished. . . . Such was the scheme of the eternal God." 1 But the knowledge of the good is not easy of acquisition. "My opinion is that in the world of knowledge, the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort ; and when seen is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful, and right, parent of light and the Lord of light in this world, and the source of truth and reason in the other . . . the first great cause which he who would act rationally must behold."2 Our capacity for this knowledge arises from our own kinship with the divine, and its condition is moral purification. Thus : " Concerning the highest part of the human soul, we should consider that God gave this as a spirit (Sal/iova) which was to dwell at the summit of the body, and to raise us as plants not of an earthly but a heavenly growth, from earth to our kindred which is in heaven. And this is most true ; for the divine power suspended the head 1 Timaeus, 30, 34. 2 Rep. 517. ii ABSOLUTE BEING 25 and root of us from that place where the generation of the soul first began. . . . He therefore who is always occupied with the cravings of desire and ambition . . . must have all his opinions mortal, and as far as man can he must be all of him mortal ; — But he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and true wisdom . . . must of necessity, as far as human nature is capable of attaining immor tality, be all immortal, as he is ever serving the divine power. . . . And the notions which are akin to the divine principle within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. These every man should follow . . . and by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the whole, should assimilate the perceiver to the thing perceived, according to his original nature, and by thus assimilating them, attain that final perfection of life, which the gods set before mankind as best, both for the present and the future." 2 And again, " The most divine part of the soul is that which deals with knowledge and wisdom. . . . This then resembles the divine principle. And the man who contemplates this and so learns 1 Timaeus, 90. 26 RELATIVE AND ch. to know the whole divine principle, would thus also come best to know himself."1 " By acting justly and temperately you will act as is pleasing to God . . . and you will so act by contemplating the divine light." 2 " We ought to fly heaven ward, and to fly thither is to become like God as far as possible ; holy and just and wise." For "In God is no unrighteousness at all — he is altogether righteous ; and there is nothing more like him than he of us who is the most righteous." 3 But this involves a process of entire con version from all ignoble aims and interests. " As the eye cannot turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too when the eye of the soul is turned round, the whole soul must be turned from the world of generation to that of being, and become able to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being — that is to say, of the good. . . . And this is conversion . . . not implanting eyes for they exist already, but giving them a right direction, which they have not." 4 It is thus not merely with our intellect, but 1 Alcibiades, i. 133. 2 lb. 134. 3 Theaetetus, 176.: 4 Repub. 518. n ABSOLUTE BEING 27 with our whole being, when spiritually purified, that we may recognize the good or God. And of the process by which we do so he says : " When I, or any one, look at an object and perceive that the object aims at being another thing, but falls short of it and cannot attain to it — he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which, as he says, the other though similar, was inferior."1 " Therefore before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a know ledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that the equals which are derived from the senses — for to that they all aspire and of that they fall short." . . . And so with " all other ideas ; for we are not speaking only of equality absolute — but of beauty, good, justice, holiness, and all which we stamp with the name of absolute being." 2 Thus we imply our consciousness of perfect Being, in our judgment that earthly things fall short of it. And our soul must rise from the one to the other by using the objects of sense and the hypotheses of science as " steps and points of departure into a region which is far 1 Phaedo, 74. 2 /*¦ 75, 28 RELATIVE AND ch. above hypothesis, in order that she may soar beyond them into the first principle of the whole."1 Thus the true way of love "is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which one mounts upwards, for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions, he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of true beauty is." 2 " This is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute ... in that communion only ... he will be enabled ... to become the friend of God, and be immortal if mortal man may." 3 It is, of course, impossible to do justice to an artist like Plato by any bare quotation of extracts ; but these passages may suffice to show his general view of the question before us : — First : that God is the absolute Being on whom all else depends. Secondly : that we know Him through an element within us that is akin to Himself. Thirdly : that this element of our soul needs 1 Repub. 511. 2 Sympos. 211. 3 lb. 212. ii ABSOLUTE BEING 29 moral purification ; since only the godly can know God. Fourthly : that we thus find the perfect implied in the knowledge of the imperfect. This he sometimes calls " reminiscence " such as Wordsworth has described : The soul that riseth with us, our life's star, Hath had elsewhere its setting, And cometh from afar ; Not in entire forgetfulness, And not in utter nakedness, But trailing clouds of glory do we come From God, who is our home. But it is doubtful how much Plato intended, or how far he retained this particular view. Fifthly : that the objects of sense and science have a real value " as stepping-stones and points of departure," from which we may ascend to the truth and beauty and goodness which they imperfectly manifest. Before going further it may be well to com pare the teaching of Aristotle with this. Aristotle criticizes Plato, but in fundamental questions is substantially at one with him ; and often only translates his master's poetic eloquence into dry and highly technical prose. " The highest philosophy or theology," he 30 RELATIVE AND ch. says, " deals with the being that is eternal, immutable, transcendent."1 For "it is plain that there must be some one and eternal being which is the originator of all movement."2 " Something which while itself changeless is the source of all change, an eternal and essential energy." " On such a first principle heaven and all nature depend." " Therefore we describe God as an eternal, perfect, living being ; so that continuous and eternal life pertains to him, or rather he is that life."3 " The energy of God is immortality, and this is eternal life."4 "And since God contains all good, and is independent he will be occupied in contemplation ; for this is the highest mode of life ; and since there can be nothing better than himself he will contemplate himself." 5 Thus " He thinks himself (as his own object) and his thought is thought of thought."6 "So that the energy of God, while excelling in blessedness will be contemplative." 7 On the relation of God, thus conceived, to the world, he gives two somewhat different, but not necessarily irreconcilable views. The first principle " moves all things by its 1 Met. v. i. 2 Rhys. viii. 6. 3 Met. xii. 7. * De Caelo, ii. 3. 6 Mag. Mor. ii. 15. 6 Met. xii. 9. ~ Nic. Eth. x. 8. n ABSOLUTE BEING 31 attraction . . . like the objects of desire or thought, which are ultimately the same, namely the real good ; that which does not merely seem good because we desire it, but is desired because seen to be good." 1 But again, " If we ask how does the nature of the universe contain the good, whether as some thing existing independently apart, or as its own orderly arrangement, we answer in both ways ; like an army whose excellence consists both in its organization and in its general, but more especially in the latter ; for the general does not result from the organization, but the organization from the general."2 From this conception of God follows the rationality of the world. " God and nature do nothing aimlessly."3 "Nature always does the best thing that is practically possible." 4 Andnature rises through successive stages towards God — a thought which both Dante and Milton have em bodied in passages that are purely Aristotelian : All things, whate'er they be, Have order among themselves, and this is form, That makes the universe resemble God, 1 Met. xii. 7. 2 lb. lo. 3 De Caelo, i. 4. i lb. ii. 5. 32 RELATIVE AND ch. In the order that I speak of are' inclined All natures by their destiny diverse More or less near unto their origin.1 And again Milton : One Almighty is, from whom All things proceed, and up to Him return, Endued with various form, various degrees Of substance, and in things that live, of life ; But more refined, more spirituous, and pure, As nearer to him placed, or nearer tending, Each in their several active spheres assigned, Till body up to spirit work, in bounds Proportioned to each kind. So from the root Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves More airy, last the bright consummate flower Spirits odorous breathes ; flowers and their fruits, Man's nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed, To vital spirits aspire, to animal, To intellectual ; give both life and sense Fancy and understanding ; whence the soul Reason receives, and reason is her being.2 At the crown of this ascent stands man. " Man is the only animal that stands upright . . . because his nature and essence is divine ; and the function of what is divine is wisdom and un derstanding."3 He has a passive mind, which receives the impressions of sense, but also an active reason which is "separable"4 and 1 Dante, Par. i. 102 el seq. 2 Par. Lost, v. 469. 3 Part. Animal, iv. 10. 4 De An. Hi. 5. n ABSOLUTE BEING 33 comes into him from without and is alone divine.1 And the highest life for man is " not to confine himself to mortal things, but as far as possible to immortalize himself," by imitating the divine life of contemplation, " in virtue of that divine element that is within him." 2 Aristotle, it will be noticed, is more coldly intellectual than Plato ; but they are funda mentally at one. And Augustine, in speaking of them, says: "The ablest critics teach us that, despite of the differences which strike careless readers, Aristotle and Plato agree in their reasoning ; so that as the result of much time and discussion, one method of most true philosophy has, in my judgment, been evolved."3 Like alii great philosophers they have been variously inter- I preted or developed, the Neoplatonic mysticism \ and the Arabic pantheism, for instance, being ! among their historical results. But the form in ' which they have, as a fact, been most widely ' influential has been the Christian development which they received from the Fathers and School men. Plato weighed most with the Fathers, and especially Augustine, during the period when 1 Gen. An. ii. 3. 2 Eth. x. 7. 3 Contr. Acad. iii. u. 19, 42. D 34 RELATIVE AND ch. Christian theology was being formed ; and Aris totle with the Schoolmen when it was being systematized and arranged. , To return then to Plato: we find him teaching that God or the absolute Good is not to be apprehended by the mere intellect, but by the: whole man, the converted soul that has been brought out of the dark cave into the true light. Nor is it possible to convey by a single quotation the emphasis with which he insists upon this point.j For it is the burden of long dialogue after dialogue. It is the reason of the importance that he attaches to education and to law ; they are to purify and train the soul. For the philosopher is a lover ; philosophy is the practice of dying, or the preparation for death (fiekeri) davdrov). The senses are to be suspected, not so much for their intellectual inadequacy as for their moral seductiveness ; because they drag down the soul. While the chief value of science is declared to be not intellectual satisfaction but advancement towards the knowledge of God. Now when religious teachers maintain, as all religious teachers consistently do, that knowledge of God, as distinct from speculation about Him, can only be reached through the gateway of n ABSOLUTE BEING 35 moral purification, they are apt to be charged with obscurantism. It is noteworthy, therefore, that Plato, a Greek of the Greeks, a philosopher, freely critical of his country's religion, and biased by no trammels of priestly tradition, makes, with all possible emphasis, the same assertion. And though Aristotle is less explicit upon the point — Aristotle, who, as Shakespeare reminds us, thought young men, on account of their "hot passion of distemper'd blood," Unfit to hear moral philosophy — 1 yet the whole drift of his ethical teaching is to the like effect. Here, then, we have the verdict of what is wont to be called the natural or unassisted human reason, if indeed that phrase has any meaning — the verdict of Augustine's "one method of most true philosophy " ; and it fully supports the Christian belief that he and he only that " willeth to do shall know of the doctrine." Before enlarging upon this point it may be well to revert to Plato's view of the way in which we obtain our first conception of absolute Being ; which is preliminary to that further knowledge of which we have been speaking. We find the con- 1 Troilus and Cressida, Act ii. Scene 2. 36 RELATIVE AND ch. ception involved, he says, as we saw above, in our judgment of relative and finite things as such. In judging things to be relative and finite, we are judging them by tacit reference to an absolute standard ; in calling them imperfectly beautiful, or good, we presuppose that there is a perfect beauty and goodness, which they only partially reveal. And Aristotle argues in colder language to the same effect ; that a world of rationally ordered change, or as we should say development, implies as its condition an absolute reason which itsel:" transcends and is beyond all change. A universe! ]< he saw, could not develop itself in the air, a:; some modern writers appear to think. It must be sustained in the process by a Being who is, in his language, "wholly actual"; that is, above anc beyond all development — Himself " unmoved, al motion's source." Augustine, a thorough Platonist, reproduces Plato's form of the argument : " Examining whence it was that I admired the beauty of bodies celestial or terrestrial ; and what aided me in judging- soundly on things mutable, and pronouncing 'This ought to be thus, this not ' ; examining I say whence it was that I so judged, seeing I did so judge, I had found the n ABSOLUTE BEING 37 unchangeable and true eternity of truth above my changeable mind. . . . My reason . . . without any doubting proclaimed ' that the unchangeable was to be preferred to the changeable ' ; whence also it knew that unchangeable, which unless it had in some way known, it had no sure ground to prefer it to the changeable. And thus with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at That which Is."1 And at a later date, Aquinas revived the Aristotelian reasoning. Now the first point of this argument is that we do not derive our notion of absolute or infinite Being, as a mere conception, from the indefinite amplification of what is relative and finite, and then attempt to prove that a reality corresponding to this conception exists. This is the usual empirical account of the matter, and it is against this view only that Kant's pleasantry holds good, that the thought of a hundred dollars does not prove their existence in our pocket. On the contrary our argument maintains that in thinking of relative and final things we presuppose, not merely the conception but the actual existence of an absolute and infinite Being, as necessary to 1 Aug. Conf. vii. 23. 38 RELATIVE AND ch. account for, and therefore partially revealed in, all lesser existence. In other words we do not start with a mere conception of God, but with what may practically be called a perception of Him ; as being involved in all our experience, and in the very possibility of that experience. Take ordinary scientific experience, for in stance. It has a metaphysical implication, of which its students are, for the most part, unaware, for the simple reason that it is no concern of theirs to be metaphysical any more than it is to be musical ; they must specialize themselves for scientific success. But science, incidentally, proves the truth and validity of reason ; for it learns to understand the world, and proves the correctness of its understanding by making pre dictions that are subsequently verified and in ventions that actually work. And this further proves that the world is intelligible and so capable of being understood ; that it is orderly and not chaotic ; a house and not a heap of bricks, a book and not a pile of letters. The scientific man does not pause to assert this. He assumes it, takes it for granted, at his every step ; and the assumption is invariably justified. But the same n ABSOLUTE BEING 39 reason which leads us so far leads us inevitably further, to the conclusion that an intelligible or rationally ordered universe must be the work of mind ; and that in the process of understanding it we come in contact with this mind ; as we do with that of an artist in studying his picture or an author in reading his book. There is then77 as a fact of our experience, mind or reason in '" the world-ground. But this conviction necessitates a further step. For mind or reason in the only form in which we know it is an attribute of persons, self-conscious beings who can also love and will. To speak ot impersonal reason, or unconscious purpose like Hartmann, or unconscious will like Schopenhauer, is to use sonorous language that means literally nothing. For such terms are merely abstractions from personality with its most essential elements omitted. We must therefore either decline to discuss the subject, or follow the only analogy that we possess, and conclude that the mind or reason in question is personal. He must, of course, infinitely transcend personality as we know it, but He must include it in His greater being ; analogously, perhaps, to the way in which animal life transcends yet includes chemical activity ; while 40 RELATIVE AND ch. human personality again transcends and includes animal life. And though it may be said that this divine personality, however probable, is only an inference, we must remember that it is an in- Terence from a fact of actual experience, namely the presence of reason in the world. This would be a modern way of stating the case ; but it is in the last analysis identical with the argument of Plato and Aristotle, and of all the great idealists from them to the present day. Various proofs, as they have often been miscalled — for they are not proofs in the sense of demon strations — various proofs of Theism have been classified and catalogued and named ; but they all have their root in this fundamental position that a world of relative and finite things exists as a fact, and yet, being relative and finite, cannot account for or explain itself; and therefore implies by its very existence the further existence of a Being that is neither relative nor finite ; an I absolute and infinite Being. Moreover, though I thus capable of intellectual expression, this argu ment is not merely a judgment of our intellect but of our whole personality — reason, feeling, conscience, will; and therein lies its strength. As persons we can recognize other persons ; and n ABSOLUTE BEING 41 we recognize, beyond the relative, an absolute Person. Descartes, who handed the argument on, with intense conviction of its validity, from mediaeval to modern philosophy, expressed its purely intel lectual aspect in a way that is open to criticism — leading to the gibe of Kant that we have quoted above. But it should be remembered that he also puts this more concrete and personal aspect of the case with force, as follows : " From the very fact that God created me, it is highly likely that I am in some way created in His image and likeness ; and that that likeness, wherein the idea of God is contained, is perceived by me, through the same faculty, wherewith I perceive myself. That is to say, when I turn my mind's eye upon myself, I not only know that I am an incomplete, dependent being, which aspires unceasingly towards something greater or better than itself; but I know also at the same time, that the being whereon I depend possesses in itself all the perfections to which I aspire, and that not indefinitely only or poten tially, but actually and infinitely ; and therefore that this being is God." 1 1 Midit. i. 42 RELATIVE AND ch. But this personal consciousness of God only reaches its highest degree of certitude in the experience of the saint. For the saint alone has undergone in its completeness that conversion of which Plato speaks. He alone, therefore, is qualified to enter into that personal communion with God, before which all other ways, and degrees and kinds of knowledge pale. The saints, then, are our strongest evidence that the verdict of reason has pointed true. And the saints, it should be remembered, far outnumber the philosophers. Known and unknown through the ages, they have been, without hyperbole, " a great multitude whom no man can number " ; godly people of whom alone the proverb is in its highest degree true, that their consentient voice — and on the point before us they all speak with one accord — their consentient voice is the voice of God — vox populi vox Dei. Let us hear in conclusion one of these, as great a philosopher as saint, who had been led, as he tells us, by the teaching of Plato to the teaching of St. Paul, and whose whole language remains instinct with transfigured Platonism. "I entered," says Augustine, "even into my inmost self. ... I entered and beheld with the ii ABSOLUTE BEING 43 eye of my soul . . . above that eye of my soul, and above my mind, the Light unchangeable . . . not the common light, which all may look upon, nor any greater of the like kind . . . not such, but other, far other than this. Nor was It above my soul, as oil floats above water, or sky over-arches earth : but above my soul because It made me ; and I beneath It, because I was made by It. He that knows the Truth, knows what that Light is ; and he that knows It knows eternity. Love knoweth It. O Truth who art eternity ! and Love who art Truth ! and eternity who art Love ! Thou art my God, to Thee do I sigh night and day. . . . And Thou criedst to me from afar ' Yea verily I am that I am.' And I heard as the heart heareth, and could sooner doubt my own existence than that Truth ' which is clearly seen being understood by those things which are made.' "1 But this assurance only came after that long agony of conversion which the Confessions of Augustine describe — conversion whose result was to purify the heart, and by doing so to clarify the mind. For : " Reason is the sight of the soul . . . and 1 Aug. Conf. vii. x. 16. 44 RELATIVE BEING ch. ii right or perfect reason is of the nature of a virtue ; but even this will not enable us to see the light, unless three qualities are present within us — faith to believe that the Object of our look will when seen bring blessedness ; hope to assure us that if we look aright we shall see that Object ; love to desire both Its sight and Its enjoyment. Then follows that very vision of God which is the end and object of our look. . . . And this is the crown of virtue, the attainment of reason's goal ; whereon the life of blessedness ensues." 1 1 Aug. Soliloq. i. vi. 13. CHAPTER III THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS Before continuing our subject it may be con venient to notice one or two current objections to the conception of absolute personality. It is urged in some quarters that personality involves the distinction of a self from a not-self, or ego from non-ego, and is therefore essentially finite and relative — relative to the not-self, without which it could not exist ; and consequently that an absolute Person is an impossible conception. But this criticism has been answered again and again to the effect that self and not-self are in no sense correlative or co-ordinate terms. My consciousness of myself is a perfectly positive thing; whereas the not-self, considered simply as such, is a mere negation. I am conscious of myself as a self-conscious being, one, that is, who can reflect upon myself, and my own internal state, my thoughts, feelings, purposes, or, in 45 46 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. other words, as a subject who can make myself my own object. And the essence of my person ality consists, not in my distinction from the rest of the world, but in my self-consciousness and all that it involves. It is obvious that as a relative and finite being I am dependent upon other persons and things. But why and in what way dependent? Not simply because they are not myself — a mere negation — but because they are potential parts of myself; capable, that is, of being assimilated and incorporated in myself, like the food by which my body grows. And it is precisely in this process that the development of personality consists. A person learns languages, science, music ; wins the love of friends ; gains money, property, power, influence ; and in each case makes what was once an alien not-self into a part of himself, with the result that the whole content of his personality is enlarged. He has become a richer, greater, fuller, more complex person. And in proportion as this is the case he is less constantly dependent on the not-self, for he can be occupied with his own inner experience ; like Milton in his blindness composing Paradise Lost. Of course under human conditions we can in THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 47 only trace this process to a very limited extent. But it is sufficient to suggest, by analogy, that a complete and perfect Person would be one for whom there was no essential not-self, because all essential experience was His own ; an infinite fulness or Pleroma, in the language of St. Paul. This analogy obviously would not preclude such internal relationships within the Godhead as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity involves ; but rather points, indeed, when thought out, in their direction. Nor, again, would it be affected, as we have seen above, by the existence of finite creatures created by God's own freewill. It merely suggests that personality need not necessarily imply contrast with an alien not- self and therefore be to that extent always finite ; but that it may be, on the contrary, wholly self- contained and therefore absolute. In which case one might say in the words of Lotze that have of late years been so often quoted, " Perfect personality is in God only ; . . . the finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of . . . personality, but a limit and hindrance of its development." But another objection has been raised of late years against the doctrine of God's absolute- 48 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. ness, on the ground that He realizes His will, and therefore Himself, through an evolutionary process, and here on earth through the ministry of men, men who co-operate with Him to raise their fellows. Consequently, it is urged, He must be in process of realization, and as yet not fully realized ; partly still potential and not wholly actual. But, of course, this objection begs the question against God's free relation to the universe. It assumes that the universe is in some sense essential to His being. Whereas the familiar experience of our own free relation to our works may at least suggest another analogy. For a man remains, in all essentials, the same human being, whether he chooses to employ himself in external works or no. If he writes poems, paints pictures, invents machines, he will by so doing manifest, and in that sense realize, his innate capacities ; but he will not add a cubit to his stature, or otherwise alter his essential personality. If he had chosen to remain a " mute inglorious Milton " and do nothing, he would have been a less useful, and a less moral man, but still equally a man, with all the constituents of human personality. And so if m THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 49 God's relation to the universe is free, if He creates and sustains its development of His own freewill, He does, of course, in so doing manifest Himself, and realize Himself in a new region; but not in a way to affect His divine personality, or absolute Being, as such. In other words we might say that His purpose is increasingly realized, but not His person. This is only a human analogy, and cannot be pressed too far, but it is an analogy based on something that we know, whereas the pantheistic alternative, which it is designed to meet, has no such basis in known fact ; it is an imaginary hypothesis that cannot really be thought out. These objections, therefore, fail to maintain themselves when analysed. At the same time, as we said above, the conception of absolute person ality cannot be developed without leading in the direction of some such doctrine as that of the Christian Trinity in Unity. As we have frequently enlarged on this point elsewhere, we need not now do more than state the fact. Sociality is certainly of the very essence of personality as we know it, though limitation is not. Absolute personality would therefore involve absolute sociality ; which is precisely what 50 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. the doctrine of the Trinity implies. And it is because Christians hold this doctrine, as the result of human thought playing upon what they believe to be a basis of revelation, that they can the more securely think and speak of God as possessing absolute personality. To return : we saw in our last chapter how Plato and Aristotle taught that the reality of an absolute Being is involved in all our knowledge of relative and finite Being. And this doctrine has been maintained by all the great idealists, too numerous to name, that have handed on the torch of philosophy from Plato to the present day. It has been differently expressed in different ages, but these differences of expression, relative as they naturally were to the varying categories of their day, do not alter the fundamental identity of the thoughts that underlie them. And though the position is attacked in the present day from the agnostic or empirical point of view, there is no essential novelty in this attack, whatever new name it may assume. It is the same criticism which idealists in every age have had to meet, and in meeting which they have only intensified their central conviction.1 1 See Note A. in THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 51 Moreover, we saw that this doctrine runs up into and is confirmed by the highest religious experience. We might put this otherwise, and perhaps more accurately, by saying that it is an abstraction from, or an abstract portion of that religious experience. For religion is of course older, far older and more universal than philo sophy, and the religious conception of God is proportionately older and commoner than the philosophic. Indeed, it is interesting to note that many modern psychologists are disposed to trace the historic origin of our religious consciousness back into the region of instinctive feeling or emotion ; and this not with the effect of reducing it to a thing of merely subjective value, but rather as emphasizing its fundamental place in our original constitution and make. There are analogies for this. The mutual attraction of the sexes, and the maternal instinct, for example, are among the most elementary and funda mental attributes of our race. And they are both, in their obvious aspect, purely emotional — irrational instincts as they are sometimes called. Yet they work teleologically for the production and protection of offspring, and thus for the maintenance of mankind. In other words, they 52 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. accomplish the most far-reaching results of reason and compel us to believe that they were implanted for that end. And so, if we trace religion to an instinctive origin, we do not thereby diminish but increase its authority ; as springing from a region that lies deeper than ghostly fears, or mythic fancies, or selfish interests of priestcraft — the region of which we can only say, " It is He that hath made us and not we ourselves." "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and we are restless till we find rest in Thee." But, whatever the history of its development, religion once developed rests ultimately on the experience of really religious people. Others may accept it on their authority ; but its whole vitality and power in the world is due to those for whom it has become a matter of real experience. And what is this experience ? It is that of personal communion with a tran scendent Person, who appeals to our conscience, our affections, our intellect, our will — to all the faculties of our complex being. It is summed up for all time in the language of the Psalmist : O Lord, Thou hast searched me out, and known me : Thou knowest my down-sitting, and mine up-rising ; Thou understandest my thoughts long before. Thou art about my path, and about my bed : and spiest out all my ways. in THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 53 For lo, there is not a word in my tongue : but Thou, O Lord, knowest it altogether. Thou hast fashioned me behind and before : and laid Thine hand upon me. Such knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me : I can not attain unto it. Whither shall I go then from Thy Spirit : or whither shall I go then from Thy Presence ? If I climb up into heaven, Thou art there : if I go down to hell, Thou art there also. If I take the wings of the morning : and remain in the utter most parts of the sea ; Even there, also, shall Thy Hand lead me : and Thy Right Hand shall hold me. If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me : then shall my night be turned to day. Yea, the darkness is no darkness with Thee, but the light is as clear as the day : the darkness and light to Thee are both alike. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect : and in Thy book were all my members written ; Which day by day were fashioned : when as yet there was none of them. How dear are Thy counsels unto me, O God : O how great is the sum of them ! If I tell them, they are more in number than the sand : when I wake up I am present with Thee. The stages by which the possibility of this experience is reached, whether in the history of the individual or the race — Plato's steps and points of departure, — no longer concern us when their work is done. They are the ushers that 54 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. have introduced us to the presence-chamber ; and once there, the Presence speaks for itself. We are conscious of relation to a Person, in His unity and wholeness, on whom we depend, and towards whom we aspire ; and are aware, in the same indivisible act, of our finitude and His infinity, of our own relativity and His absolute transcendence. And it is upon this experience, attested by its countless experts through the ages, that our conviction of God's reality ultimately rests. And this personal experience of our whole being, it must be remembered, is more real and concrete than any merely intellectual judgment. We might compare it to existence in three dimensions, as contrasted with existence only in one ; a solid, that is, as contrasted with a line. For besides intellectual apprehension it involves love, of the kind which is no mere passive emotion, but the active love that issues in self-sacrifice and moral purification, with the intuitive insight that purity brings — the love that issues in the life of prayer. And further, it involves a corre spondence of the will with God's will, an active endeavour to carry out His will, rather than our own, in all practical relations with the world ; m THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 55 a life spent, that is, in the service of God. And it is in proportion as a person thus realizes or puts reality into all his relations with God, that he grows increasingly aware of the divine reality, which meets his love, answers his prayer, strengthens his will, and assures his intellect. But credo ut intelligam is the law of our intellect ; as thinking beings we must reflect upon the nature of our experience. And so, as we break up the white light with a prism into its component rays, we decompose our primary perception of God into various partial conceptions, to express, however inadequately, different attributes and aspects of His Being. And thus we reach the different abstractions with which philosophy deals, and out of which the various arguments in favour of Theism are constructed. Kant's criticism of these arguments is still often quoted against them. It should be remembered, therefore, that this criticism largely turns upon his own peculiar ' distinction between phenomena and noumena, or appear ances and things-in-themselves ; which distinction we now regard as utterly untenable. Still, it is urged, such abstract arguments do not prove the God of our religious consciousness ; and 56 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. this is perfectly true, for the simple reason that they are abstract ; they deal only with isolated aspects of a complex living Being. Moreover, they have a different value for the convinced Theist — the man of such experience as we have above described — and for the man who has no such personal conviction. For the former sees in them the partial analyses of a creed which he already holds in its synthetic unity and completeness ; and which he knows to be incapable, under our present limitations, of adequate intellectual expression. He can use them, therefore, without offence at their logical incompleteness, to illuminate and corroborate his faith. Whereas the latter, the man without any Theistic conviction, taking the arguments in question at their bare logical value, and, as a rule, ignoring the cumulative effect of their convergence, is so preoccupied with their in adequacy as proofs, and with their distance, in any case, from the religious conception of God, that he usually underestimates the probability which they suggest. The Theistic arguments have thus two different aspects, which may recall Plato's description of the double procedure, by which we rise from iii THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 57 hypotheses or probabilities till we reach that first principle which is no longer hypothetical ; and when once secure in the possession of this, can deduce our old probabilities from it as new certainties. Thus the Theist is already in posses sion of the first principle which is no longer merely hypothetical. He has reached the divine person ality in its wholeness, with his own personality in its wholeness ; and can then analyse its aspects intellectually, in virtue of his own correspondence with it ; by picturing his own powers with all their limitations removed. This is the scholastic via eminentiae, or modern method of infinitation, and gives us not merely negative, but positive and definite conceptions of the Divine. Thus we possess in our own will a positive instance, and the only positive instance that we know, of causa tion, not in Hume's sense of a mere antecedent or secondary cause, but as a definite power that can originate. We are, in our measure, creators ; we can initiate action, form characters, frame policies, paint pictures, carve statues, write poems, invent machines. But we are limited in all this by our material, our capacity, our opportunity, and all the incidents of our finite nature. These, however, are only hindrances to the free opera- 58 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. tion of our will and have nothing to do with its essence. We can consequently think them away, and so reach a perfectly positive conception of an absolute will, which, as such, is the first cause. For the first cause is not, of course, as is some times absurdly supposed, the earliest of an infinite series of antecedents, like the tortoise whereon the world -bearing elephant rests, but a power which differs in kind from all its effects, and is not only, to speak in temporal language, the past creator, but also the present sustainer of that continuous process of events which constitutes the life of the world. And when, for intellectual convenience, we separate any antecedent and consequent parts of this process into causes and effects, we are only using the term " cause " in a secondary sense, which must not be confused with the fact of primary causation. The former only transmits, while the latter originates energy. Again, when we consider the human will as a cause, it is not a power that initiates blindly. It is rational and acts for a purpose or end, which is the final cause, the sufficient reason of its action. And the presence of a sufficient reason satisfies our intellect. It constitutes an adequate explanation behind which we have no further need to go. If iii THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 59 I wish to understand a man's character, no mere survey of his successive actions is sufficient ; I must discover the motives which actuated him, the purpose which he had in view. And so in reading history we are not content with the bare record of past events, but endeavour to discern the motives of its various agents. And where we cannot discover this ultimate purpose, or final cause, as in the case of natural phenomena, we recognize that our knowledge, however scientific, is incomplete. For the ultimate demand of reason remains unsatisfied ; the demand to know not only how, but why things happen as they do. The Absolute First Cause then, whom Theists apprehend as personal, is also the Absolute Final Cause, as Aristotle saw must be the case ; not only the cause but the reason of all things. This, again, is a perfectly positive conception, founded on what we know of ourselves ; though, of course, wholly beyond our limited knowledge to com prehend. But though the final cause of the universe lies beyond our comprehension, we can study the small fragment of it that lies within our ken. And a rational cause must be rational throughout. We should expect, therefore, to find traces of purpose in ourselves and the world 60 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. around us, as we can see purpose in the parts of a machine of whose total function we are ignorant. And this is precisely what the Theist finds both in himself, in history, and in the natural world. To consider first the natural world : there is no question that, on the surface, it suggests order, adaptation, purpose, design in a myriad forms, from the stars in their courses to the bee in its cell. And the positive weight of this suggestion is not logically affected by the fact that there are negative, or more strictly neutral, cases in which we, with our human standards of judgment, can see no purpose at all. The positive evidence of design in a seed, for instance, is not in any degree negatived by the fact that a thousand are what we should call wasted in nature, for every one that is matured. And this evidence of design in the world has, as we know, been amongst the most powerful of popular arguments for Theism in every age. But nowadays we are met by an alternative hypothesis which would explain away this superficial appearance of design ; as due to the survival of those things that were accidentally fitted to their environment, amid the destruction of the innumerable unfit. This hypothesis, when extended from organic to inorganic nature, as it iii THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 61 must be, if it is to prove its point, labours under very serious difficulties ; and may be fearlessly met, as it has been met again and again, on its intellectual merits. But we are not now con cerned with these ; for our present point is that the Theist, whose faith is founded on personal experience, finds amply sufficient evidence around him of that purpose in the world, which he already believes to exist. If there were no such evidence its absence would perplex him. But granting the evidence to be, as it confessedly is, on the obvious view abundant, the fact that it might possibly admit of another very hypothetical explanation is for him totally beside the mark. The facts are admitted and he holds their explanation. And this brings us to the purpose or providen tial guidance of man, and his history ; and first of the individual man. The religious man, who is not merely a speculative Theist, but in earnest with his religion, is conscious of two elements in his inner life ; his own will, and God's guidance. His own will, weakened and perverted by various causes and in various degrees, has led him to sin, and so to complicate the whole course of his life. He never is what he can see that ideally he might 62 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. have been, had there been no need of repentance, no past to undo, no energy impaired, no oppor tunity wasted, no frequent relapses, no failures of faith. And to this extent the divine guidance has been resisted and hindered and obscured. His life does not present to his inner conscious ness the picture of one that has been led steadily straightforward by God. Yet, like Augustine, he can trace God's presence in the very midst of his resistance, leading him slowly but still surely out of the devious paths of his own choosing, and despite of his reluctance to be led. And he learns, among other things, that prayer is heard and answered ; — answered not by any mere modifica tion of our own subjective condition ; but also and often by the control of events which actually happen to us from without. Few probably, if any, of those who have come to lean on prayer as their source of life have any doubt whatever of this fact. It is a certainty for them which gradually grows to be the centre of all their other certainty. And this certainty is not a thing of yesterday. It is as confident in the Hebrew Psalmist as in the Christian saint. " I called unto the Lord . . . and He heard me out of His holy hill." Thus the religious man has a conviction that his life is iii THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 63 divinely superintended, and, as he cannot suppose himself an exception, that this is universally the case. And in the light of our personal experience, we are more prepared to trace providence in history. Because, to begin with, that experience teaches us not to expect top much. The sin of the individual is multiplied and complicated in the race, hampering, hindering, counter-working, quenching the operation of the Divine Spirit ; and rendering His perpetual presence pro portionately difficult to trace. Our inability to distinguish what is primitive in human nature from what is due to degradation is an instance of this difficulty, from which much false generaliza tion has arisen in recent years. Or again, the impossibility of clearly sifting the elements in historical characters, like that of Mahomet, or Luther, or Cromwell, for example, or in crises like the Reformation or the Revolution, would be another instance in point. " The trail of the serpent is over it all." But one fact stands out above all these uncertainties ; that is the advent of Jesus Christ, with its long preparation in Jewish history and prophecy, its apposite occurrence " in the fulness of time " that has 64 THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS ch. so often been enlarged upon, and the subsequent work of the Christian Church in the world. Here we trace God in history, in a way that throws reflex light not only upon all the earlier religious aspirations of mankind, but also upon the evidence of design in the natural world. And in that light we can believe in a " divine event to which the whole creation moves." And what is true of the arguments from design is true of the moral arguments for Theism. They must be viewed from within to be read aright. If we confine our attention to the external aspect of things, the struggle for existence in nature, — "nature red in tooth and claw," and the moral disorder and physical and mental sufferings of humanity, they seem difficult to reconcile with the governance of an Almighty God of love. It is only when we are convinced by personal experience of our own relation to such a God, who speaks to us in the categorical imperative of conscience, and guides us by severity as well as by reward, that we feel sure there must be another interpretation of these superficial appearances than seems at first to meet the eye. This is a point which has often, of course, been discussed at length ; and we iii THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 65 only mention it here, as being in harmony with what we have been saying above. To resume then : we are nowadays prepared to admit that the authority of reasdn is more circumscribed than men have sometimes thought to be the case. We do not expect to force Theism by intellectual arguments into unwilling ears ; we cannot, by such means, do more than suggest its probability. But what we may seem to lose here, we more than gain elsewhere. For we have come to see that our Theism rests upon a wider basis ; upon an instinctive consciousness of our whole personality in which feeling, will, and action all play their part. This does not involve any contradiction of the verdict of our reason, that the universe must be ultimately rational, and goodness and beauty coincide with truth. It merely means that our present conviction is in advance of our complete understanding — that "we know in part and prophesy in part " ; looking to reason not to demonstrate, but progressively to illuminate the Object of our faith. CHAPTER IV TRANSCENDENCE AND AUTHORITY We have alluded above to the notion that the conception of God's immanence or indwelling presence in the universe represents a truer and more mature point of view ; before which that of His transcendence must ultimately give way, and become obsolete. But as this opinion, with all the confusion of thought that it involves, is somewhat prevalent in the present day, it may be well to pause upon it for a while in passing. In the first place, it should be obvious from what has been said before that the notion in question is unphilosophical ; since the meta physical contention of Plato and Aristotle has been approved by subsequent thinkers in every age — the contention that we cannot account for relative and finite existence at all, except as grounded in an absolute and infinite Being — in a Being, that is to say, which is transcendent. 66 ch. iv AUTHORITY 67 And this is not a mere postulate, or hypothesis, which we assume for our convenience ; but a positive affirmation of our reason. When, for instance, we contemplate the endless stream of secondary causation, we conclude that it must have a source which transcends, and is not itself a part of the stream. And it is the same with all other relative phenomena. By the very fact of being obviously relative and dependent, they point beyond themselves, to something which in the language of Aristotle must "not be immersed in them if it is to control them " (a/tty^? 'iva KpaTjj). But as most men prefer to have such thoughts as these expressed in less abstract and more concrete form ; we will put the point in its directly theological shape. " God dwells in the universe, we say, and sustains it by His indwelling presence. Deus est in toto mundo, says St. Thomas, ut anima in toto homine. " God is in the whole world, as a man's soul is in his whole body." And if we wish to describe this truth by a philosophical term we call it the divine immanence. But when Christians make this statement, as in one shape or another they have always done, they mean by God and the world two different things ; no less different 68 TRANSCENDENCE ch. than the Creator and the creature. And it is only as long as this distinction is preserved that the statement in question retains its meaning. God, whose very name implies that He is not the world, yet indwells and sustains the world by His indwelling. " Though the Lord be high, yet hath He respect unto the lowly" . . . "the Lord our God who dwelleth on high, who humbleth Himself to behold the things that are in heaven and in the earth." The paradox of it is its very point. And it may not uncharitably be doubted whether many of those who say that the conception of transcendence has been banished by that of immanence, do not vaguely and illegitimately retain an element of the former in mind ; which enables them to credit their statement with a more satisfactory meaning than it actually possesses. For as a mere question of the use of language, to speak of immanence or indwelling, inevitably implies some kind of dis tinction between the indweller and the indwelt. And the phrase can only retain its ordinary meaning so long as this distinction is present to the mind. But if the whole notion of transcend ence is rigorously excluded, we can no longer distinguish between God and the universe iv AND AUTHORITY 69 except as different aspects of one and the same thing. We can speak by abstraction of God as the soul of the universe, and conversely of the universe as the body or expression or manifesta tion of God. But we are not allowed by our hypothesis to regard the two as in any mode or degree separable ; since they are only different ways of describing the same reality, which may equally well be called nature or God. In a word we are landed in pantheism, and committed to the position that pantheism is superior to Theism. But this is old ground in the history of thought, and argues no new insight on the part of modern thinkers. Pantheism is full of speculative difficulties which have again and again been critically exposed. But we have agreed to confine the subject to its more concrete aspect ; and will therefore merely notice the bearing of pantheism upon morality. If God is regarded as simply and solely the sustaining principle of universal life, which includes, of course, the life of mart, He must be conceived to be as directly the source of evil as of good actions. In other words, the distinction between good and evil becomes meaningless ; since both alike are the results of the same divine or natural 70 TRANSCENDENCE ch. activity ; a sinister inference which in the popular practice of pantheistic races has only too fre quently been drawn, The Eastern philosopher endeavours to evade this difficulty by proclaiming the unreality of matter, and therefore of all material life. It is maya, he says, an illusion, which no more affects the divine Being, than do evil dreams an awakened man. Such a theory, which even if it seems to save their notion of God, obviously cannot protect their morals, needs no serious refutation for the Western mind ; though it has at times crept from the East into the borders of the West, and is not wholly unknown there in the present day. But of course it is both unscientific and unphilo sophical. That it is unscientific goes without saying ; for it reduces the whole realm of science to a dream. But it is equally repugnant to all sane philosophy. For " matter," as we call it, is indeed relative, unstable, impermanent ; changing its forms from day to day. " The mountain falling cometh to nought." And in this sense it might be called, in the abstract, unreal. But it does not exist in the abstract but in concrete union with spiritual life ; the life of God, who sustains iv AND AUTHORITY 71 it in Being as, in a measure, the manifestation of Himself; and the life of man, whose instrument of action it provides. Each moment of matter, therefore, as it passes, is the expression of a spiritual fact, and instinct with the reality of spirit. The heavens that declare the glory of God change their aspect, but renew their message, in fresh form, from day to day. The words and deeds of yesterday have fled away past all recall, but their consequences are perma nent, for evil or for good. " No power," says the Roman poet, "can ever make undone what the fleeting hour has once borne away." neque Diffinget infectumque reddet Quod fugiens semel hora vexit. So far, then, from any unreality of matter involv ing the indifference of moral conduct, the awful seriousness of moral obligation carries with it the reality of the material world, which is at once the instrument and stage of its realization. In a word, then, pantheism is incompatible with moral freedom and, therefore, with personality or character either in God or man ; and represents, accordingly, a far lower and less mature stage of theological thought than Theism. It is necessary, 72 TRANSCENDENCE ch. therefore, to emphasize the fact that directly we speak of divine immanence as if it were a superior alternative to divine transcendence, we are logically and inevitably committed to this irrational position. For to allow the faintest distinction in the divine attitude towards good and evil, is instantly to reintroduce the concep tion of transcendence. Since if God in the least degree prefers, or is even capable of preferring, good to evil, He is, ipso facto, morally tran scendent — " the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." Thus transcendence and immanence are not alternative but correlative conceptions in theo logy. The one guards us from the pantheistic confusion of God with the universe ; the other from the Neoplatonic separation of the two. Together they express what was first the Jewish and then the Christian belief; that God is at once eternally other than His creation, and yet intimately present in its every part. And the Incarnation has always been regarded by the Church as the fullest manifestation of this dual truth. Jesus Christ, as very man, "of a reason able soul and human flesh subsisting," tempted in the wilderness, weary at the well, praying in iv AND AUTHORITY 73 Gethsemane, dying on the cross, is the extreme exhibition of God's presence within the things of His creation. But it is not the exhibition of a God who is merely immanent ; for it is instinct throughout with reference to such a union with the Father as implies transcendence of created things; and in His miracles, His sinlessness, His awful authority of tone, flashes of this transcend ence appear. Of course in saying this we touch controversial ground, every inch of which has been critically contested ; and to say it, therefore, is to imply our conviction that all such criticism has been or can be reasonably met. But this is not our present point, which is simply to state what the Church has historically taught and still teaches about the Incarnation. It has not attempted to explain what, if true, must be to us inexplicable. It simply affirms that Jesus Christ is God as well as man, and as such essentially distinct from all mere men ; the Son in His own house, while they are sons by adoption. "I live," says St. Paul, "yet not I, Christ liveth in me." But it would be beyond expression inconceivable that he ever should have claimed the faintest personal equality with Christ. On the contrary, the very phrase implies 74 TRANSCENDENCE ch. the essentially qualitative distinction which ren dered such union possible. Thus the creed of the Church is utterly and wholly incompatible with any approach to the notion that Jesus Christ revealed the latent divinity of man ; in the sense that He exhibited in Himself what men potentially are, and may therefore in actuality become. On the contrary, the Incarnation revealed God's transcendence, as well as His immanence ; and enabled the unique atonement through which men might ultimately be upraised to a union with God, which they could never in their sinfulness have otherwise attained. The divine transcendence, then, is no mere matter of abstract speculation. It is the vital truth on which our whole Christian religion depends, and the justification of the tone of authority with which it confronts the world. It is probable that the word " authority" gains its first and most obvious meaning in the popular mind, from the secular authority of the state, with its universality of control, its positive laws, its physical power of coercion. When therefore we speak of religious authority, or the authority of religion, a thing whose sanctions are invisible, and whose sway is confined to those who willingly iv AND AUTHORITY 75 accept its voke, we almost seem to be using a metaphor ; or at least employing the term in a derivative and secondary sense. But such a supposition really inverts the facts. For all authority, in the eyes of a Theist, must in the last analysis be of divine origin, and can be adequately based upon no other ground. Take, for instance, what we call secular authority ; the power which enacts and administers the laws of a land. This may express itself, at different stages of national development, as the authority of the king, or of a ruling class, or of the people. And it may degenerate, in any of these hands, into mere tyranny, or brutal coercion. But wherever and whenever it is by common consent accepted, as a thing properly exercised, and therefore to be obeyed : what is its justification ? What does it represent ? It represents the claim of a whole over its parts ; of a nation or society over its individual members ; its right to control each for the good of all ; and that for no arbitrary reason, but because man is essentially a social being, who, as such, can only attain his true development, through the development of society at large ; the whole and its parts being mutually interdependent. Thus an individual man can only fulfil his destiny 76 TRANSCENDENCE ch. by recognizing that he is a part of a whole, and acting accordingly, both in what he does and in what he leaves undone. He must do his own work, perform his own function, make his own contribution to the welfare of the whole ; while he must not hinder or interfere with the correlative duty of all others to do the like. And, corre spondingly, it is the business of the whole, or of those who exercise authority over the whole society, or state, or nation, so to legislate, so to use their authority that all its individual members may be encouraged to perform their proper functions, and discouraged from interference with the corresponding functions of others. Such is the ideal of government, however imperfect its realization in a sinful world. But what is its justification ? Upon what is it ultimately based ? Why is the majority entitled to control the individual ? Hobbes, writing in an unhistorical age, pictured the natural state of man as one of unlimited self-assertion, resulting in a war of each against all (bellum omnium in omnes) ; whence government was a practical necessity, to make peace and progress possible. And Rousseau's theory of a social contract or agreement, to limit the individual by the general iv AND AUTHORITY 77 will, was founded on a somewhat similar view of human nature. But history, with its concrete teaching, has brought vividly home to our age the truth which Aristotle clearly stated in the abstract long ago ; that man is naturally a social being (d)v