THE PROSPECT FOR AUSTRALIA IN THE EVENT OF A
WAR WITH FRANCE :

A LECTURE
DELIVERED IN SYDNEY IN THE EVENING 0*
MONDAY, AUGUST 23rd, 1858,
. BY
THE REV. JOHN DUNMORE LANG, D-D.,
Senior Minister of the Scolt Church. Sydney.
WITH AN APPENDIX,
CONTAINING OOSKESPONDENGE ON THE SUBJECT.

"What was the use— what the practical advantage of continuing our connection with the
Colonies ? The connection might be of some small use in time 'of peace, but, on the other hand,
consider the danger arising from it in matters relating to war. * » * Under these circum
stances, it was a matter of serious consideration whether wo should not endeavour, in the most
friondly manner, to divest ourselves of a connection which must prove equally onerous to both
parties. Nor, in case of war, could we hope to defend the colonies sttocesafully."— Loud Ellbn-
borougu. See page 16.

/YALl

V^j,

SYDNEY: • n
PUBLISHED BY JOHN L. SHERRIFF, BOOKSELLER & STATIONER,
256, GEORGE STREET.
P. MASON AND CO., PEINTEKS, 105, YOKK STEEBT.

1 S58.

ADVEETISEMENT.

The following Lecture was advertised to be delivered in the Lecture Room
Jamison-street, Sydney ; but as that room, which holds only about 250, was
found much too small for the audience, the meeting was transferred to the
Soots Church. Dr. Lang requested that, in consideration of the place in which
they were assembled, there should be no audible expression of feeling on
the occasion, and commenced with the Lord's Prayer, in which the audience
all devoutly joined. The Lecture was originally published in the Empire
of the 25th of August. It is now republished separately, with corrections
and additions.

LECTURE.

Fellow Colonists and Friends —
I happened to be in England during the memorable year 1848, when the
Third French Revolution took the whole European world by surprise, and
the effete Government of King Louis Philippe was superseded by the
French Republic and the National Assembly. Louis Napoleon, the nephew
of the great Napoleon Buonaparte, was elected one of the members of that
Assembly ; and some time thereafter, when a Constitution was established
by the National Assembly, he was chosen President of the Republic. The
English Press and the people of England generally were very much dissat
isfied with this choice of the people of France, and every vituperative
epithet was liberally applied on the occasion both to the French people
and to the man of their choice. I happened to take a different view of the
case at the time ; and in a letter which I published on the subject in an
influential paper in London, and in which I admitted that, if I had been a
Frenchman myself, I should have voted for General Cavaignac, the unsuc
cessful competitor of Louis Napoleon, I shewed that it exhibited at all
events a generous impulse on the part of the French people (which entitled
them at least to the cordial sympathies of ail candid Englishmen), that they
had elected as their President, the nephew of a man who had done so much
for the honour and glory of their nation, notwithstanding all the suffering
and sorrow he had brought upon it through his unbridled ambition, and
who had experienced eventually not a little injustice at our own hands. I
mention this circumstance to shew that my best wishes, at the period in
question, were with Louis Napoleon, in the high office to which he had been
called by his country, and that my cordial sympathies were entirely with
the people of France.
You are all aware how Louis Napoleon worked the vessel of the State, at
the helm of which he had thus been placed by his too confiding country.
Every engine of power, every means of corruption, seems to have been
employed by that artful and unprincipled schemer to destroy the constitu
tion to which he had sworn allegiance, and to subvert the very Government
which he had taken the most solemn oaths to maintain and perpetuate. At
length the coup d etat of the second of December, 1851, concluded the first
scene of this " strange eventful history ;" the Republic and the Nationa
Assembly receiving their death- blow at the hands of their own President'

and the Empire being again inaugurated, through the notorious farce of the
ballot-box, under Louis Napoleon. I need scarcely add that the means em
ployed to effect this mighty, this retrograde revolution, were, as is well
known throughout the whole civilised world, high treason, on the part of
the chief actor, perjury and murder ! But " the end sanctifies the means"
is apparently the grand maxim of modern politics, and not in France only,
as we shall see presently ; and success, like charity, is supposed to cover a
multitude of sins !
One of the last injunctions which that great man, George Washington,
addressed to his country, on retiring from the office of President of the
United States of America, was to stand clear of all " entangling European
alliances." And there can be no doubt that the wonderful success that has
hitherto attended that country, in its past political career, is attributable in
no small degree to the strict adherence of its rulers to this safe and salutary
rule. It would have been well for England, had she followed, as I conceive
she might have done with perfect facility during the past ten years, this
pre-eminently wise course. She had only to exhibit to the Government of
the French Republic in the first instance, and to that of Louis Napoleon
thereafter, that courtesy and kindliness which our common Christianity
enjoins, but to stand clear of all entangling alliances with both, whether
for offensive or for defensive warfare.* Great Britain was in no way
accountable for the high treason, perjury and murder, with which the French
Emperor had axed his way to the throne. To use the language of one of
her own poets, " Her bulwarks" were " on the brine," a3 they had always
been, and she had nothing to fear from any aggressor ; but she had a high
character to maintain in the world as the first of the Christian nations — she
had to prove to all mankind that she was true in her allegiance to the moral
law of the ten commandments. And was this character, I ask, maintained
when she formed an offensive and defensive alliance with the Emperor of
the French ? — when Royal and Imperial visits were interchanged so lovingly
and so affectionately between Osborne House and the Tuilleries ? I think
not. On the contrary ; we thereby gave the national sanction of our ap
proval to all Louis Napoleon's crimes. And when her Majesty, Queen Vic
toria, condescended (doubtless at the instance of her responsible Ministry)
to buckle on the insignia of the order of the Garter on the leg of a man
whom all Europe recognised as a traitor, a perjured man, and a murderer, I
have no hesitation in saying that the deepest dishonour and disgrace was
entailed upon the whole British nation. (Sensation.) I felt assured, from
the first, that the God of Heaven would frown displeasure and condemnation
upon this French alliance — that in all likelihood it would be shortlived in
its duration, and would issue eventually in disappointment and dishonour,
if not even in disaster. And I am still confident, that sooner or later the

* Would to God that we had from the beginning kept aloof from these Congresses, in which
we have made shipwreck of our ancient honour.— Speech of Sir James Mackintosh in the House
of Commons, 15th June, 1824.

full vials of the wrath of the Almighty will be poured out upon Great
Britain for her conduct — her gross dereliction of duty and the national guilt
which Bhe incurred — in this matter of the French alliance.
It was in virtue of that alliance that we proclaimed war against Russia
in the year 1854. — I am happy to think, that I publicly denounced and pro
tested against that war as an unjust and unnecessary war, both at a great
public meeting held on the subject in this city in the month of May, 1854,
and afterwards on the floor of the late Legislative Council, of which I was
then » member. We have heard enough, and I think much more than
enough, of the honour and glory of that war ; although I should be sorry
to be supposed to depreciate in the slightest degree the services of those
whe won their well-merited laurels on its bloody fields. I feel confident,
however, that postority will pass a very different award upon both the
object and result of the great struggle of the Crimea from that to which we
have been accustomed to listen for years past in our own self-confident
boasting. For is it not the fact that the Russians, those northern barbarians
whom we were all wont to despise, were enabled for a long period, month
after month in succession, to withstand successfully the whole chivalry of
France and England combined ? Is it not the fact that, after all their enor
mous expenditure of blood and treasure, the whole force of these combined
nations only succeeded in taking a single Russian town not half the size of
Sydney ? The political results of that famous war, as well as of the French
alliance, under which it was conducted, and of which we were all so proud
for the time, are already universally recognised to have been absolutely
valueless.* But there is a moral result of that war still to be developed, as
I am confident it will be, and at no distant period, in the dark and myste
rious future. For as we have burned in the word " Waterloo" upon the
heart of France, to be remembered against us in some coming day of
national vengeance, so have we burned in the word " Sebastopol," for a
similar emergency, upon the heart of Russia.
At all events there is now virtually an end of the French alliance, and of
all the bright and brilliant hopes that were hung around it ; for if we can

* In a letter addressed to The Times, by a Presbyterian Missionary (the Rev. J. L. Porter),
from the North of Ireland, of date " Damascus, 1st March, 1858," after detailing the particulars
of one among many instances of recent Turkish persecutions of Christianity in Syria, notwith
standing the famous Hatti Humayoom, or Turkish Edict for the liberty of Christians, is the
following indignant comment on the results of our late war with Russia : —
" Thus, in the Turkish Empire, is Christianity treated as a crime, and the remonstrances of
English officials are either received with contemptuous silence, or met by false promises. Was it
for this our countrymen endured all the horrors of the Russian campaign ? Was it to support a
Government that insults our holy religion, and outrages civil liberty, that 20,000 of England's
bravest sons shed their blood in the Crimea ? Shall we permit the Turks to laugh at us, while we
fight their battles and support their constitution ? In all truth it is full time to put au end to
such an anomaly. The honour of our country is at stake. If Turkey will play the tyrant and the
persecutor, let us not virtually aid her in the work by defending her against rebel subject* and
foreign foes. Let ui leave her alone to tumble to pieces, a* she deserves."

give credit to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, Great Britain was
very recently within a few hours of a war with France ! And although
that particular cloud has passed away for the time, the political firmament
is still dark and lowering, and events of tremendous import, including in
all likelihood wars and revolutions of a fearful and sanguinary character,
are evidently impending over the European world. I cannot suppose,
indeed, that Louis Napoleon has personally any peculiar feelings of hosti
lity towards Great Britain. On the contrary, I rather think he wishes well
to us, as an old Refugee who has experienced our hospitality. But, in com
mon with myriads and myriads more of intelligent Frenchmen, the remem
brance of Waterloo seems to haunt him like a ghost ; and as the nephew o*
the first Napoleon, he is the representative (as he told the French House of
Peers under Louis Philippe, when on trial for his life,) of that great
national defeat and disgrace — a defeat to be avenged only on the field o1
battle, a disgrace to be wiped away in the humiliation of its authors.
Independently, however, of his own personal and private feelings on this
subject, Louis Napoleon is very much the child of circumstances. He has
bent the iron bow of despotism so powerfully that it threatens to snap
aBunder in his hands. He has risen to his present giddy elevation on the
shoulders of his army ; but, like the famous Praetorian guards of ancient
Rome, these armed manufacturers of modern Emperors have already
become too strong and too formidable for their master. The safety of the
latter may depend in future on his shewing them a field of strife that will
rouse within them all the demon of war — on his pointing out to them a foe
worthy of their sharpest steel, and unheard-of booty for the Gallic victors.
In short, an invasion of England, and a simultaneous attack upon her colo
nies, may be the last card in the hand of Louis Napoleon ; and the author
of the coup d'etat, of 1851, is not the man to refuse to play that card, in the
proper crisis of the game of Empire. This, at all events, is the impres
sion, both at home and in these colonies ; for one of our own celebrities,
the well-known author of the famous Electoral Act of 1851, is going to
ask the representative of the Government in our Upper House on Wed
nesday next whether it is all right with our national defences ! I confess I
have no wish to anticipate the Solicitor-General's answer to this important
question, I am not going to say a word this evening about our national
defences ; but I propose to point out to you what I conceive will prove, in
any conceivable emergency, the cheapest and the best defence of the Aus
tralian nation. (Subdued applause.)
What, then, I ask, is the prospect for Australia in the event of a war
with France ? There is much light thrown upon this subject in a Parlia
mentary Inquiry of the late French Government into the Condition and
Organisation of the French Navy, of which there is an able Exposition in the
Edinburgh Review of July, 1853. The following is the account which the
Reviewer gives of that very interesting document — exhibiting, as it
does, the whole policy of France in anticipation of a war with England : —

On the 31st of October, 1849, the Legislative Assembly of the French Republic passed a law
¦ordering that an investigation should he instituted into the whole state of the navy, by a Commis
sion of fifteen members of the Assembly itself, to bo elected by ballot from the whole number .
The Commission thus appointed comprised, amongst other eminent men, Admiral Hernoux, Vice
Admiral Laine, and Captain Charner, of the Marine service ; the Duke of Montebello, M. Daru,
and M. lacrosse, who had been, or were about to be, Ministers of Marine ; and M. Jules de
Lasteyrie, M. Lanjuinais, Baron Charles Dupin, and M. Dufaure, of parliamentary celebrity. M.
Dufaure was chosen president and reporter of the Commission, In the course of two years,—
from November 1849 to November 1851,— the Commission visited all the naval arsenals of France,
and held 203 sittings, sometimes at the ports themselves, sometimes in Paris ; it examined eighty-
nine witnesses, whose depositions were taken down in short-hand. The evidence was, in fact,
complete, and M. Dufaure had already made some progress in the preparation of his Report,
when the coup d'etat of the 2nd of December, 1851, took place. The Commission and its labours
were of course extinguished by the same blow which annihilated the Constitution, the Legislature,
and the liberties of the nation. The Minister of Marine, however, who took office under Louis
Napoleon, expressed a desire that these important and assiduous labours should not be altogether
wasted, and that the Minutes and Evidence collected by the Commission should at least be put
upon record. The greater part of this valuable matter was already in type, and more than dSlOOO
had been spent in printing it. Under these circumstances M. Collas, the secretary, was induced
to complete his task, upon condition that he was allowed to print the whole evidence and pro
ceedings precisely as the Commission had left it, without alteration or omission to suit the con
venience of the Admiralty. The Report, by M. Dufaure, was to have formed a third volume, but
wo understand that only about one-fourth part of this Report has been written, and if it were
complete it could no longer receive the assent of the whole Committee. The materials on which
this Report was to have been drawn up are, however, wholly before us, and this important evi
dence has already been more minutely examined, and may become better known in this country,
than in France ; for although the Government of Louis Napoleon allowed the investigation to be
completed and the evidence to be printed, very few copies of this work have been permitted to
leave the Imprimerie Nationale, and we rejoice that one of them has fallen into our hands.
The first object of the Commission was to institute a comparison between
the navies of France and of England, first, in regard to the materiel, or the
ships of war, and second, in regard to the personnel^ or the means and
facilities of manning the respective navies. The following is the conclu
sion to which the reviewer comes on the subject : —
To express in a single sentence the verdict we should be disposed to give on the evidence we are
about to lay before our readers, we entertain no doubt that the materiel of the British navy is
superior in the proportion of 2 or 3 to 1 to that of France ; but the resources of France in the
personnel of the navy are so much more available and complete than our own, by reason of the
absolute command which the State retains over the whole seafaring population, that this advan
tage in some degree counterbalances the other causes of inferiority in the maritime forces of
France. "France," observes Admiral La Snsse, "in case of maritime war, could dispose of 90,000
men, which is sufficient to man every vessel in the fleet."
This inquiry, the reviewer continues, demonstrates that our neighbours have fully considered ,
and deliberately adopted, all that would in case of war be most injurious to the commerce and
the territory of Gr^at Britain; that they contemplate a change in the principles of maritime war
fare, expressly directed against this country; and that they are not dismayed by the vast outlay
and prolonged exertions which can alone give effect to their plans.
The first point to which the attention of the Commission was directed was the actual strength
to be given to the navy. "We must first establish," said M. Collas, the secretary, "the number
of ships of the line that France can and ought to put to^ sea the day that war w declared. On
this head, we have a certain basis. Our adversary is known. It can only be England"
I shall not occupy your time with the details given by the reviewer as to
the numbers and the strength of the French navy. Suffice it to say, that

at the peried to which the Inquiry refers, the French navy, which has since
been greatly increased and strengthened under the Empire, consisted of
392 ships of war, including a steam fleet of 108 vessels of all sizes.
In tho sitting of the Committee of the 12th February, 1851, it was resolved, unanimously, that
20 frigates of the first class should be built for steam-power a grande Vitesse ; and that as many
other frigates as possible should be fitted with auxiliary screw-propellers *' to escort swift sailing
vessels which might convey troops for disembarkation."
Sailing vessels for the transport of troops are to be abolished, and 20 steam-propelled transport s
of large size, capable of oonveying 1000 men each, kept in readiness. Of these transports,
whieh are paddle-steamers originally built for another purpose, the "Descartes" is the best
specimen. She has carried 1200 men, with all their munitions and baggage, and makes her pas
sages between Toulon and Algiers in forty hours with that force on board at an expense not ex
ceeding 10,000 francs. The " Labrador," in the expedition to Rome, carried 110 horses, 700 men,
and several field guns at once. The " Montezuma" carried, on one occasion, 1800 men, 11
horses, and baggage.
It has been justly remarked by Sir Howard Douglass in his observations on this evidence, that
the French do not propose to raise their line-of-battle ships to the strength it possessed before the
Revolution. In 1788 France had 88 ships of the line ; and even Napoleon, after the battle of
Trafalgar, in 1809, had 32 ships of the line afloat and 21 building. But the nature of the prepa
rations for maritime warfare recommended by this Committee are of a different character. They
rely for the success of their flag in future hostilities, especially with this country, on the number
and velocity of their smaller vessels, and on the capacity and power of their steam transports.
For the objects propesed are to harass the enemy in his foreign trade and en his coasts, carefully
avoiding a general action. And for these purposes swiftness and facility of locomotion under all
circumstances are most essential conditions.
In support of this theory of rapid and desultory operations (I quote from
the reviewer), the following remarks, made to the Committee by M. Mais-
tiat, are of great iuterest, for they determine the nature of the 'vessels
available for these purposes, and especially adapted to harass this country : —
" A maximum of force is indispensable to engage with success an enemy's ship within broadside
range, though an enemy of a superior velocity has nothing to fear even from a stronger vessel
from which he can escape. A maximum of velocity, therefore, enables a weaker vessel to brave
*he superior force of the enemy. Force is of use only in presence of an enemy powerfully armed ;
velocity enables you to harass and escape his armaments. Veloeity is, therefore, the natural
weapon against an enemy better armed and more vulnerable on different points. It is the natural
and indispensable weapon of the party weakest in resources, least powerful at sea, and most
daring by national character (?) It is, therefore, the natural weapon of France. * * *
In another point of view our geographical position recommends the same selection of the means
of the maritime warfare. Let us suppose a war breaking out with England in the Mediterranean,
or elsewhere, for it would equally be fought out in the Mediterranean. Suppose a fleet at Toulon
which can put to sea,— a fleet specially composed of vessels of first-rate power, but with only so
much auxiliary steam-power as is necessary to manoeuvre in action, or to conquer the imperious
difficulties of navigation, England must keep her eyes on such a fleet, and must therefore main
tain a large share of her maritime resources in the Mediterranean, Her vessels would be far
from their stores of coal ; our vessels would be near our own. Hence the increased British con
voy of supply would be more tlian ever obliged to pass the Straits of Gibraltar, and to pass our
western coasts, and afterwards between the coasts of France and of Algiers. Suppose then a few
of our vessels of great velocity laying wait in our Atlantic or Algerine ports I England would be
obliged to convoy her supplies on the whole length of passage ; and to establish a complete system
of defence though not a French cruiser were in sight. If theBe convoys are in sailing vessels
(which they must be, as steamers only carry the coal they consume), thoy will be exposed to con
tinual i\irpiim», Tliey must, therefore, be defended by swift steamers ; and France will be

enabled to keep up this incessant system of alarm by having recourse only to these iuexpen&ire
principles in the structure of her vessels."
Supposing, however (the reviewer continues), the number of frigates In the French fleet to be
fixed at forty-five or fifty, all being eventually provided with steam power, the attention of the
Commission was next directed to the mode in which such a force could be most effectually dis
tributed. On this subject all the members of the Commission seem to have concurred in the
opinion that it was desirable to have at all times a large number cf frigates bo dispersed over the
globe, that on the first arrival of news of a declaration of war, they could instantly pounce
with the greatest effect on the trading vessels of England. Admiral Hernous said that ' the only
use of frigates henceforth was to harass the commerce of the enemy, especially in the Indian
seas.' M. Collas, the Secretary of the Commission, proposed a scheme expressly adapted in time
of peace, • to prepare for the moment when all the possessions of England might be attacked at
once, and especially her trade at the outset of the war. To Btrike the trade of England is to
compel her to make peace. England possesses at this moment the maritime commerce of the
world witb Europe ; to ruin this commerce everywhere at once, and so to oblige England to main
tain peace from the dread of immense disasters, is the object of my plan/
"Admiral Laiue added that, 'although the frigates sent for this purpose to India might be in
jeopardy, yet that was no reason to forego barrassing the commerce of the enemy, especially as
they might give support to the native population whenever it was disposed to revolt against Eng.
land.' Another member suggested that a blow might be struck with great effect at Aden. The
same weapons might be employed, it was argued, with equal effect on our trade up channel, aud
to keep our coasts in constant alarm."
One of the most competent witnesses examined by the Oommittee was M. Norm and, a private
shipbuilder at Havre, who said :—
" If I may express an opinion on the maritime warfare to be waged by France, I should say
that she can only carry on a guerre de course in the Channel and in distant seas. For tho Chan
nel we want swift vessels, with screw-propellers aBd a light draught of water, capable of running
into our ports on every part of the coast. They should be real birds of prey, able to fall upon
the enemy's vessels where they choose to attack them, and to escape with certainty when they
are comp elled to retire."
In regard to the accommodation afforded for naval purposes by the
French harbours, in the prospect of a war with England, and of the invasion
of that country, the reviewer quotes the following from a confidential paper
submitted to the British Admiralty by Sir Byam Martin, Admiral of the
Fleet :—
(U This officer stated that the three harbours, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, had been so
enlarged and deepened as to be capable of receiving more than 100 large war steamers."
" By means of these improved harbours the French will be able to assemble so great a number
of steamers, as mav almost fill up the space between Calais and Dover, and always ready to move
when the suitable time arrives for Bending forth their invading legions,"
" With what view so enormous an expense has been incurred — who can doubt ?"
The reviewer then proceeds as follows : — In spite of the natural disadvantages we haye
pointed ont, the resources and prospects of the French navy are spoken of with the utmost confi
dence by those who are best acquainted with its real strength ; and in this respect the evidence of
Admiral de la Susse is especially valuable and interesting, because that officer has had frequent
opportunities of comparing his squadron with our own forces in the Mediterranean, and he was,
nearly up to this time, in command of the French fleet in the Levant.
" * I am intimately convinced,' said he,' * that France has nothing to dread in a contest with
England : and when I compare my recollections of what our vessels were under the Empire (that
is the first Empire) with what they are now, I am persuaded that, if it were well managed,
England would suffer more than France in such a struggle. But we must be prepared before
hand : for nothing cau be done off-hand in maritime affairs ; and it is only after having been a
y»ar in commission that a ship acquires a maximum power. From these considerations I infoc

10
that France ought always to maintain, iu time of peace, a squadron of eight ships of the line
ready for sea."
" ' War being declared, we must, at the same time, carry it on at a distance, and concentrate
a powerful force in the Ocean and the Mediterranean. But the duty of these two forces is alto
gether different; for the one is destinod to the desultory warfare of cruisers, the other the slow
warfare of observation. The cruisers are to attack, pursue, and destroy commerce on all seas ;
and that should be the object of our frigates on the ocean. Other vessels of greater power, but
all swift and well armed, should assist in this work of destruction."
To return to the reviewer : — The majority of the witnesses examined, and of the members of
the Committee, confine themselves mainly to the contingency of war with England, with a view
first to the defence of the French coasts,— secondly, to the destruction of British commerce, — and
lastly, to the possibility of invasion.
The language of M. Daru is perfectly explicit on the»e points, and he presented his plan for tbr
defence of the French coast, and the attack on England, in the following terms : —
" A former Commission has recommended that, after fortifying our arsenals, trading ports, and
stores, so as to protect them from a coup de main, the first instrument of defence is the Bteamer,
which must be employed for the double purpose of observation and of action. These swift vessels
would keep up a communication between the ports of Dunkirk, Havre, Cherbourg, St. Malo,
Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire, each of which should contain a small fleet in reserve. The effi
ciency of this force should depend on its connexion with a force prepared for aggression, which,
by constantly menacing the enemy, would keep many a ship in the Thames and the Irish Channel ;
a whole fleet would thus be paralysed and unable to stir. The number of these light vessels must,
of course, remain undetermined. But as for the flotilla in reserve, of sufficient force to make a
sudden descent on England, we have a fact which may throw some light on this part of the ques
tion. When the expedition to Rome was decided on, ten days after the order was given by
telegraph to embark the troops stationed at Toulon, two brigades of infantry, reckoning 7561 men,
with 434 horses and two field batteries, with a complete battery of siege, ammunition, materiel,
&c, and provisions for twenty days, were landed at Civita Vecchia, 100 leagues from Toulon, and
took the field. Hence it may be reckoned that a corps of 10,000 men, with 1200 horses, might
cross the Channel in a few hours, in a squadron consisting of 8 steam frigates ; 1 corvette of 320
horse power ; 1 aviso, of 190 , and 8 transports — each frigate towing one. And a squadron of
three times this force might convey 30,000 men and 3600 horses to Ireland or any other part of
the United Kingdom. The principal part of this force would be collected on strategical princi-
ciples at Dunkirk, if the Eastern coast of England were to be menaced ; at Cherbourg or at BreBt
if it were the Southern coast, or Ireland. Cherbourg especially, which faces Great Britain and
is nearest to it, is, by, its position, the inevitable rendezvous — the head-quartets of steamers in
tended to operate on the other side the Channel. Nature has given this place strategical qualities
whose value will be acknowledged when the case occurs, and is already known to our enemies :
for Admiral Napier Baid, in a recent speech, in the words of the Emperor, "Cherbourg is an eye
to see across the straits, and an arm to strike them."
This allusion to Cherbourg (adds the reviewer), induces us to extract the very important obser
vations made to tho Commission on that subject by the Secretary, M, Collas, in a special Report.
The distance from Cherbourg to the Needles is 63 miles, and has recently been crossed by one of
our swift steamers, the '' Valetta," in i hours and 15 minutes.
" We have yet to speak of the labours of the naval department at Cherbourg. The breakwater
(digue) may be said to be finished. This enterprise, which is, without exception, the boldest and
the finest executed by the hand of man, is accomplished.
" The port of Cherbourg, in tho event of war with England, will be the most Important. It is
necessary, therefore, with a view to this occurrence, that Cherbourg, as well as Toulon, should
have at its disposal the means of repairing, and consequently of constructing, the machinery of
the fleet. To complete these means of defence and aggression, which will shortly place France m
advantageous circumstances for a struggle, it is indispensable that the port of Dunkirk should be
adapted to receivo a steam flotilla. Our interest compels us to put this port in a condition to
render the services which maybe expected from its excellent situation; and on this point it i*
proper to challenge the attention of the Government."

11
M. Benoist D'Azy, one of the witnesses examined by the Commission, and one of the Vice
Presidents at the time of the National Assembly, speaks as follows : —
t( It should never be forgotten that whatever efforts and sacrifices France may make for her
navy, will always be exceeded by England, for whom it is a question ' To be, or not to be,' and who
would give, in such a case, her last man, whilst she was spending her last shilling. We must
resort, therefore, to the question of alliances which are positive and certain. No great hope of
assistance, indeed, can be founded on the United States, which are tending to isolate themselves
more and more from Europe ; but in Russia France may hope to find a 'point d'appui ' for the
day of war with England,"
France (adds the reviewer, in quoting this passage), under what was in 1851 her Republican
Government, reserves to herself the chance of purchasing the alliance of Russia !
Alluding to the twofold operations contemplated by the French in case of war with this
country (England), the reviewer proceeds as follows : — They would collect a sufficient force of
transports, frigates, and corvettes, in the ports of Brest, Cherbourg and Dunkirk, to keep us con
stantly on the alert : for even though no movement at all were attempted, the presence of such an
enemy within reach of our coasts, would retain a very large British force upon guard in the
Channel. But they would also keep afloat a sufficient number of cruisers (in the wordB of M.
Collas), " To display the French flag at all times in all the seas of the globe, to drill their crews In the
manceuvres and exercises of the ship, to protect our commerce everywhere, and, on a declaration
of war with England, to strike her possessions everywhere at once as soon as the declaration of
hostilities was made known."
M. Collas remarked (adds the reviewer), that the force of these vessels (paddle-wheel war
steamers) on foreign stations, which are now 46 in number, is too small to attempt active opera
tions with success; and after a suggestion of his own, adds, "If war broke out, these ships per
fectly armed and equipped, would be apprised of it by the steam communication through Suez
and Panama ; and before France and England could send a fleet to sea, they would commence
the destruction of the oommerce of the enemy all over the globe."
It is evident from all these passages that the idea of a war with England
has been a very favourite one in France, especially among naval and mili
tary men of the highest standing, for a series of years past. The very
same idea, which has recently been so strongly and so offensively developed
under the Empire, was cherished and dwelt upon with evident satisfaction
under the Republic. It is equally evident that while France trusts princi
pally, in the event of a war with England, to the number and the swiftness
of her vessels of war, she contemplates pouncing at once upon all the
foreign possessions of England, as soon as the declaration of war is made.
And are we, the golden lands and colonies of Australia, likely to be forgot
ten among the foreign possessions of England, which are thus to be attacked
immediately and simultaneously on the declaration of war ? On the con
trary, the fame of our gold-fields will make both these colonies and their
trade of every kind the special object of attack ; and the war, we may rest
assured, will be transferred, in great measure, from Europe to Australia.
There has never been such a prize held forth to French cupidity as the
plunder of these colonies, and the prospective destruction of 'their trade,
will present. Our communications with the old world will immediately be
cut off, our trade will be crippled and ruined, our coasts will be subject to
the descent of armed bodies of plunderers, and our towns be subjected, if
not to destruction, at least to forced contributions of enormous amount.
Only think too how remarkably convenient for such purposes it will he

12
for Louis Napoleon to have such an excellent naval and military station, as
New Caledonia, within three days' sail of our coast— an island containing a
whole series of the finest harbours in the Pacific, some of which are now
strongly fortified, together with the finest timber for naval purposes. It
was a master stroke of policy on the part of Louis Napoleon to seize upon
that island, in view of the possible contingency of a war with England.
And can any person suppose that the large naval armament, and the nume
rous military force, now concentrating in that island, are there, for the pur
poses of colonization ? The idea is utterly absurd. There is as much need
for a second moon in the firmament as there is for the large naval and mili
tary force now in New Caledonia, for any such purpose ; and that force, we
may rest assured, is there only to bide its time, to wait till the great clock
of the world again strikes the hour of war with England, and then, to
pounce upon us, the defenceless colonists of Australia, as tho tiger upon his
prey. There are two modes of dealing with such an emergency. The first i6
to strengthen our defences ; to embody a national militia ; to raise and
equip whole corps of volunteers. This will evidently, however, be a very
expensive process, to say the very least of it, while it will withdraw from
their ordinary pursuits a large number of our fellow-colonists. But will it
serve our purpose and be successful in accomplishing its proper object — for
that is the question ? For my own part, I very much doubt it. For if the
enemy should even be kept out of our towns and harbours — which is very
problematical — he will be able to cripple and destroy our trade, to pick up
our coasting steamers in all directions, and to carry off not a few of our
colonial worthies to durance vile, perhaps for years together, in New Cale
donia. (Strong sensation.) Now be assured such a state of things will not be
tolerated long in these colonies, especially in the neigbouring colony of Vic
toria, where there is much more combustible matter in the body politic, and
where things would be sure to come to a crisis much sooner than here. The
wiseacres there are, at present, holding a Commission of Inquiry upon their
national defences, forsooth ; but what will all this avail them, if their ships
are picked up, one by one, as they will be sure to be by the French armed
cruisers, and carried off with all their passengers and cargo, including tens
of thousands of ounces of gold, to New Caledonia ? In such circumstances,
as sure as the sun will rise to-morrow, a party of colonists will very soon
start up, and increase and multiply daily, determined to put an end to this
harassing state of war by declaring their entire freedom and independence
— from no dislike, you will observe, from no cooling of their affections to
Great Britain, but simply from the urgent necessity of their circumstances.
Great Britain may doubtless be willing enough to protect us in such cir
cumstances, as I am quite sure she would, to the utmost of her power. But,
considering that there are not fewer than about fifty British colonies in all,
with India besides, and her own extensive coasts and commerce at home, I

13
deny that it is possible for Great Britain to protect us a',1 in such an
emergency.* Now, my plan is simply to anticipate, or rather to obviate, all the possi
bilities and contingencies of war, from any quarter whatsoever, on these
Australian coasts, hy petitioning the mother-country at once to concede to
us, with all necessary guarantees and stipulations, our entire freedom and
national independence, and to recognise these Australian colonies from
thenceforth as Sovereign and Independent States. (Sensation.) Such a
consummation, now that we have got Responsible Government and entire
freedom of trade, would scarcely affect our relations with Great Britain in
any perceptible, in any appreciable, degree. We should still retain our
British habits and associations, our British feelings and predilections, as
strongly as ever ; but we should simply be our own masters, receiving the
law from Downing-street no longer, and living in peace and harmony with
all mankind ; cherishing towards our British brother for all time coming a
strong fraternal affection, but holding out, at the same time, the right hand
of friendship and fellowship to Frenchman, American, and Buss alike,
whatever wars might rage in Europe. In short, were that consummation
which I have suggested realised, whatever wars might he waged in the old
world, that vast ocean that lines our coast would, as far as these noble
colonies are concerned, be a Pacific Ocean in reality for all mankind.
I have drawn up the draft of a Petition on this subject, which I shall now
read, either to Her Majesty the Queen, or to the Imperial Parliament, to be
signed as extensively as possible, provided it should be approved of before
hand, not only in this colony, but in Victoria, South Australia, and Van
Dieman's Land.
Draft op a Petition to Her Majesty, The Queen, ok to the Imperial Parliament.
The Petition of the undersigned Colonists of New South Wales, &e,
Humbly Showeth —
1. That the population of the fonr Australian Colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, South
Australia, and Tasmania, amounts already to a million of souls, and is rapidly increasing.
2, That from the great variety and peculiar importance of the natural resources and produc
tions of these colonies, and especially from the discovery of numerous gold-fields in their
extensive territories, this population has created an amount of wealth, and given rise to an extent
of valuable commerce unparalleled in the history of mankind.
3. That it is indispensably necessary for the progressive and rapid settlement of these colonies,
for the development of their various and vast resources, and for the maintenance and augmenta
tion of that fabric of wealth and commerce which has thus been created through their instrumen
tality, that tiieir inhabitants should enjoy uninterrupted peace with all mankind.
4. Thst situated, moreover, as these colonics are, at a vast distance from all other parts of the
civilized world, and entirely isolated as they are both from Europe and America, there can be no
reasonable ground of apprehension of their ever coming into hostile collision, as self-governed
political communities, with any other portion of the human race.
5. That your petitioners have nevertheless heard, with serious apprehension, if not with great
alarm, that, in the ever-changing complications of European politics, there is at present a strong
probability of war arising between Great Britain and France.
* The French, having no colonies of their own to protect, at least none to speak of, would be
so much more at liberty to attack ours.

14
'6. That, in such an event, your petitioners, as British colonists, without having been in any
way concerned either as to the cause or the object of the national quarrel, would necessarily be
involved, In an eminent degree, in all the calamities of war ; as the reputed wealth and valuable
commerce of Australia would render her, if not the first, yet *» special object of attack, to any
maritime enemy of Britain.
7. That the apprehensions of your petitioners have been not a little increased and strengthened
by the fact, which has come to their knowledge, that a comparatively powerful naval and military
force is at present concentrating in the French island of New Caledonia, in the Western Pacific
Ocean, within three days' sail of this coast ; for there are* no legitimate purposes of colonization
for which such a force can ever be required in that island.
8. That, in the event of a war with France, the cost to Great Britain of defending the coastB
and commerce of Australia, by a powerful naval armament, if not also by a military force, would
be enormous : while she would be utterly precluded, by an Act of her own Imperial Parliament,
from eyer deriving any direct revenue from Australia to assist in defraying that cost.
9. Thut, in such an emergency, the Australian Colonies would also be subjected to a serious
expenditure for national defences ; while a large body of their inhabitants would be permanently
withdrawn from the useful and profitable occupations of colonization, to be engaged in the profit
less and demoralizing operations of war.
10. That, in such circumstances, yoar petitioners are strongly of opinion that, iu order to save
herself much unnecessary expenditure in all time coming, as well as to preserve theBe flourishing
communities, in any conceivable conjuncture of European politics, from the calamities of war, it
ia alike the interest and the duty of Great Britain to concede to the Australian Colonies, under
such guarantees and stipulations as might be mutually desirable, their entire freedom and inde
pendence, and to recognize them thenceforth as Sovereign and Independent States.
11. That your petitioners regard with utter scorn the false and unfounded allegation of certain
interested paTties, that, in submitting such a proposal for the serious consideration of the Impe
rial authorities, they are animated in any degree with unfriendly or hostile feelings either towards
her Majesty the Queen and the Imperial Government, or towards the British people ; for they
simply regard it as a law of nature and an ordinance of God, while they view it also as a matter
«f urgent political necessity under existing circumstances, that a series of self-governing commu
nities at the ends of the earth should also be sovereign and independent.
12. That derived, as a very large majority of the inhabitants of these colonies are, from the
British Isles, and earnestly desirous as they are tbat their vast territories should be occupied as
speedily and as extensively as possible by a thoroughly British population, and cherishing as they
do, almost universally, British feelings and* predilections, British habits and associations, your
petitioners humbly submit that such an event as the entire freedom and independence of Aus
tralia would neither affect the present course of trade in any perceptible degree, nor divert the
affections of the Australian people, in any degree whatever, from their beloved father-land ; for
while they would still unfeignedly rejoice with their mother-country in all her prosperity, and
sympathise with her in all her calamities, they would merely be enabled, in such altered circum
stances, to realize their present and ardent desire to live in peace and harmony with all mankind.
13. That, as Great Britain has established entire freedom of trade with all her colonies, and
conceded Responsible Government to her colonies in Australia, the change, from their present
condition of colonial dependence to one of acknowledged sovereignty and national independence,
would be rather nominal than real, as far as the mother-country is concerned, while it would at
once ensure to all these colonies the blessings of peace with all mankind, whatever wars might
prevail in Europe.
14. That, as Great Britain has, within the last few years, recognized the entire freedom and
independence af the Transvaal Republic, and the Free State or Orange sovereignty in Southern
Africa — two sovereign States whose united population does not equal that of the smallest of the
Australian Colonies — there can be no possible ground of objection to the course recommended for
these colonies, on account of their present amount of population.
15. That in the event of the continuance of the present political relations of these colo
nies with the mother country, during a war between Great Britain and France, or any other
maritime power, the certain result of the first serious losses which the colonies would sustain through

15
the war, would be the formation of a strong party determined to declare their freedom and
independence at once, as a measure of self-preservation, and without asking either the permis
sion or the concurrence of the mother country-a proceeding which would, in all likelihood, be
disastrous to both countries, and might possibly involve tho colonies in the still greater calamities
of civil war.
In regard to the reception which such a petition as I have just read
would he likely to meet with from the Imperial Parliament, at least from
some of the most distinguished memhers of both Houses, we are not left to
mere uncertainty and conjecture. On the 15th of June, 1854, the Duke of
Newcastle, who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies, moved in the
House of Lords the second reading of the Legislative Council of Canada
Bill, and the Earl of Ellenhorough, one of the ablest and most eminent
members of the British Peerage, spoke as follows on the subject, the report
of his speech being contained in the Times of the 16th of June, of that
year :— -
We made such progress last year in the work of concession to Canada, that the question now
was, not whether we should stop in our career, still less whether we should attempt to go back, but
whether we should not, in the most friendly spirit towards Canada aud the other North American
Colonies, consult with their Legislatures on the expediency of taking measures for the complete
release of those colonies from all dependence on the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain .
He recollected having a conversation with Mr. Huskisson in 1828, during the time that statesman
held the seals of the Colonial Office, in which he intimated most distinctly that the time had
already arrived for the separation of Canada from this country; and Mr. Huskisson had evon
bo maturely considered the matter that he mentioned the form of Government which he thought
it would be for our interest to have established in Canada, when our connection with the colony
should cease. What was the use— what the practical advantage of continuing our connection
with the colonies ? The connection might be of some small use in time of peaoe ; but
on the other hand, consider the danger arising from it in matters relating to war. It was certain
that in the event of war occurring between this country and the United States, on grounds totally
unconnected with the colonies, they must, from, their connection with us, be drawn into the war
and their whole frontier would be exposed to the greatest calamities. Under these circumstances,
it was a matter of serious consideration whether we should not endeavour, in the most friendly
manner, to divest ourselves of a connection which must prove equally onerous to both parties.
Not, in case of war, could we hope to defend the colonies successfully. * * * Considering
the increased strength and appliances at the command of the United States, it would hardly be
possible to defend Cauada with any hope of suceess. * * * Under these circumstances, he
hoped that an early period, the Government would communicate with the leading persons in the
Legislative Assemblies of the North American Colonies, with the view of ascertaining their
opinion on the subject of separation. We should consult with them in the most friendly spirit'
as if they were members of one and the same family, in which we felt a deep concern.
The Duke of Newcastle, being a much younger man than Lord Ellen-
borough, and naturally hot and hasty, seems to have been unprepared for
such sentiments, and administered a. sharp rebuke to his lordship on the
occasion. But the matter was not permitted to end here. It is added,
" Lord Brougham wished to say one word, after the severe rebuke which
had been given by the noble duke. He had the misfortune of coming
within the description of persons against whom the noble duke had so
powerfully and indignantly declaimed — namely, those who, while desiring
a separation of Canada, as a colony, from the mother-country, did not wish.

16
to throw the colonists over or to abandon them. And why should the noble
duke denounce so vehemently this opinion ? It was by no means novel.
It had been entertained and expressed by mauy eminent men. It was an
opinion shared in by Lord Ashburton and by Lord St. Vincent ; and those
who held the doctrine of separation did so, not because they were disposed
to undervalue the importance of Canada, but rather because they highly
estimated the importance of that country. They believed that after a cer
tain period of time — after what was called ' passing the youth of nations,'
a colonial life — the best thing that could happen to a country in colonial
connection with an old State was, that without any quarrel, without any
coldness or alienation of any sort, but with perfect amity and good-will,
and on purely voluntary grounds, there should succeed to that colonial con
nection a connection between two Free Independent States."
So much then for the House of Lords. As to the House of Commons,
listen to the sentiments of one of the ablest and most distinguished mem
bers of that honourable House — I mean Mr. Roebuck, one of the members
of Parliament for Sheffield.
" The colonies which we are founding in America, Australasia, and Africa,
will, probably, at some future day, be powerful nations, who will also be
unwilling to remain in subjection to any rule but their own. But this
withdrawal from our metropolitan rule ought not to offend or wound us as
a nation ; we should feel in this case as a parent feels when a child has
reached unto manhood — becomes his own master, forms his own separate
household, and becomes, in his turn, the master of a family. The ties of
affection remain — the separation is not the cause or the effect of hostility. -
Thus should it be with a mother-country and her colonies. Having founded
them, and brought them to a sturdy maturity, she should be proud to see
them honestly glorying in their strength and wishing for independence.
Having looked forward to this time as sure to come, she should prepare
for it. She should make such arrangements in her system as to put things
in order for this coming change in the colony's condition, so that indepen
dence may he acquired and friendship retained. The colony would, in such
u case, continue to feel towards the mother-country with kindness and
respect ; a close union would exist between them, and all their mutual rela
tions would be so ordered as to conduce to the welfare ef both." — The Colo
nies of England, by John Arthur Roebtjck, Esq., M.P., p. 170.
" If a dominant country," observes another eminent member of the
House of Commons, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, late Chancellor of the
Exchequer under the Palmerston Ministry, — " if a dominant country under
stood the true nature and advantages arising from the relation of supremacy
and dependence to the related communities, it would voluntarily recognise
the legal independence of such of its own dependencies as were fit for
independence ; it would, by its political arrangements, study to prepare for
independence those which were still unable to stand alone; and it would
seek to promote colonization for the purpose of extending its trade rather

17
than its empire, and without attempting to maintain the dependence of its
colonies beyond the time when they need its protection."— Essay in the Go
vernment of Dependencies. By the Bt. Hon. Sir G. C. Lewis, M.P., &c, p. 334.
To these expressions of opinion by eminent members of both Houses of
Parliament at home, I shall only add the following expression of opinion
on the same important subject by an honourable member of the Parliament
of Victoria, It is contained in a letter which I had the honour of receiving
from that gentleman by the very last steamer from Melbourne.
" European politics is a wide field of speculation for such as myself to
enter upon, Nevertheless, I hope you will not think me presumptuous in
offering an opinion on the subject. I have long held and never scrupled to
express the conviction that the only safety these colonies have in case of
war with France or America is in declaring their independence."
As Solomon says, " there is no new thing under the sun," it is worthy of
remark, that the very same recommendation as I have now given in refer-
ance to these Australian Colonies, was given — by a minister of religion,
too, a minister of the Church of England, and a dignitary of that Church —
in reference to the American Colonies, nearly ninety years ago.
" Only one Englishman at this crisis" — that is during the troubles that
preceded the first American war — " had the sagacity to perceive that the
views and pretensions of Britain and America were quite incompatible, and
that, in the warmth of the controversy, these conflicting views had been so
far disclosed and matured, that a cordial reconciliation was no longer pos
sible. This was Dr. Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester, one of the most
learned and ingenious writers on commerce and political economy that
England has ever produced. With a boldness equal to the comprehension
of his views, he openly recommended, in several tracts which he published
about this time, an entire separation of the two countries and a formal
recognition of the independence of the American States. The doctrine
which he inculcated was, that " when colonies have reached such a degree
of wealth and population as to be able to support themselves, the authority
of the parent State, whence they emanated, must necessarily be trivial and
precarious ; and that, consequently, in all cases of this kind, it is the dic
tate of prudence and sound policy that the parties, instead of waiting to be
separated by emergent quarrel and strife, should dissolve their connection
by mutual consent." Such, he contended, was now the situation of the
British Colonies in America ; and in urging upon Britain the consequent
policy of releasing them from further control, he maintained with much
force and good sense that this measure would be attended with a great
alleviation of the national expense, without ,any real diminution of the
national gain. For this unpalatable counsel the doctor was regarded as a
wild visionary, both by those of his countrymeu who supported, and by
those who opposed the measures of their government. But time illustrated
his views and honoured his wisdom." — Hist, of the U. S. of America. By
Jambs Gbahame, Esq., IV. 307.
B

18
Dr. Tucker's good advice, therefore, wss not taken ; and what was the
result ? Why, Great Britain went to war with America ; but after expend
ing upwards of 150 millions sterling, and spilling the blood of myriads of
her sons, she had to retire from the contest with defeat and disaster ; leav
ing a legacy of alienation and hostility towards herself on the part of her
own American children, of which the manifestations are visible and fre
quent even to the present day. The historian, whom I have just quoted,
adds in a note to the passage I have just read — " Watkins, in his Life of the
Duke of York, relates, that after the independence of America had been
irrevocably conceded by the Treaty of Paris, George the Third, meeting
Tucker at Gloucester, observed to him, ' Mr. Dean, you were in the right,
and we were all in the wrong.' "
It may be thought, indeed, that the subject I have thus been dis
cussing is not properly within the sphere of a minister of the Gospel. I
am not of this opinion, however, As a minister of the Gospel of peace, I
conceive I am by no means out of the proper course of my duty in doing
all in my power to promote peace on earth and goodwill towards men ; and
I, therefore, make no apology for discussing such a subject in this place,
although you are aware, it was intended that we should have met else
where. I have lately been reading the life of a very eminent man, the late
Sir Thomas Powell Buxton (so illustrious for his successful efforts in the
cause of negro emancipation), in whose house I have had the honour of
being received as a visitor, and at whose table I have sat as a not unwel
come guest. One of the numerous correspondents of that eminent man
was the late Dr. Daniel Wilson, Bishop of Calcutta, who, in a letter
addressed to Sir Thomas, in the year 1844, had alluded in terms of gratifi
cation to the then recent successes of the British arms in Central India,
and especially to the taking of Gwalior, one of the centres of the present
insurrection. The following is an extract from Sir Thomas Buxton's
reply :—
I am far more of a Quaker than you are as to these Indian wars. I know every one of them
may be called defensive, but the principles and root of all are aggression and conquest. I cannot
conceive how our missions are ever to prevail against the arguments of our cannon. Six thousand
heathens slain at Gwalior are a terrible set off against our converts. Yet we are not to be dis
couraged. I long for the whole Christian world to combine its forces against war. Peace seems
to me an object not nearly enough striven for, as lying at the root of all other good. Sir T. F.
Boston, 'to the Bishop of Calcutta, May 1, 1854.— Memoir of Sir T. F. Buxton, page 592.
In these sentiments I entirely concur, and I impute it, in no small degree,
not only to the culpable neglect of the clergy of all denominations, in not
discharging their proper duty as the ministers of peace, but to the positive
evil influence they have too often exerted in this important matter, that the
war-spirit has hitherto been so greatly encouraged and promoted and
strengthened in our land. It is clearly one of the first duties of a minister
of the Gospel to endeavour, if possible, to exorcise this evil spirit from the
community, And now that the talk in these Australian colonies is all about
wars and rumours of war, national defences, the embodiment of militia

19
and corps of volunteers, it is the bounden duty of every minister of the
Gospel to do all he can to shew to all within the sphere of his influence " a
more excellent way," that there may be peace in our time, and that God,
even our own God, may bless us.
The lecture, which occupied two full hours in delivery, was listened to
throughout with profound attention, and evidently with the deepest interest;
the occasional murmurs of applause being immediately repressed. It was
concluded with the doxology, in which all cordially joined, and the apos
tolic benediction. The late William Cobbett used to say that the meetings
of the Religious and Philanthropic Societies of his time were got up chiefly
to let second-rate men pass fulsome votes of thanks to one another.
There is too much truth in the observation, By special desire, however,
there was nothing of the kind in the present case.

APPENDIX,

The following very able letter has been received by the Rev. Dr. Lang,
from an unknown correspondent, on the subject of the preceding Lecture.
It expresses the sentiments of thousands throughout this territory. There
is no likelihood, however, of a mere letter to the Times being of any service
in the matter. The Imperial Government will never be induced to move in
the case, except on the petition of the colonists, either directly or through
their Legislatures ; and as the latter are not likely to move in it, for many
and obvious reasons, the people must do so themselves. The Home Govern
ment could scarcely be expected to originate such a movement under any
circumstances ; as it would be tantamount to a confession of weakness on
the part of the mother-country on the one hand, and would lay her open to
the charge of an unnatural abandonment of her dependencies on the other.
But if the proposal were coming from the colonists themselves, in the spirit
of friendship and affection which the proposed Petition implies, she would
certainly hail it in the same spirit, and would instantly feel relieved from a
great source of embarrassment in the event of a war. The political con
nection between us and Great Britain might cease and determine to-morrow ;
but would that in the least affect the ties of friendship and affection that
now bind us to our mother-country ? Certainly not. Every colonist of
British descent would still say of her, as the Jewish captive did of Jerusa
lem, — " Lf I forget thee, let my right hand forget her cunning, and my
tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth :" —
Sydney, Monday night, 23rd August, 1858.
Rev. Sir — I have listened with the most profound interest to your lecture of this evening, and
fully endorse all your views on the important subject you treated on.
No doubt your arguments will be objected to by your political opponents ; but I believe they
are incontrovertible ; and I fear that some of your auditors may have a restless night from the
graphic picture you drew of the fearful consequences to us of a war with France, and the utter
impotence of any attempts on the part of the Australian colonies at a military defence.
Considering the general apathy of colonists here on all public matters — no doubt greatly attri
butable to the oonviot influences of our descent — I put no faith in a volunteer force even if it
could be raised.
What has there been in eur antecedents to arouse and develope patriotism and love of country
in the present generation of Australians ?
But give us a nationality, aud we may then hope that under the fostering cares of appropriate
wtitutions, a " love of country" may grow up with the rising generation, which may fit them to

21
contend with future emergencies, even to the doing battle on their native soil, for their homes and
hearths, if needs be.
Should your proposed petition to the Queen and Parliament come before this community in a
more prominent way I shall, as an " Old Colonist " (which I adopt as my signature to this com
munication), give it my support and influence.
Meanwhile, considering the length of time which must elapse before the question can be
discussed and agitated in all the Australian colonies, and before united action can be brought
jnto operation, to achieve the object you propose, I very respectfully submit, for your better
judgment and consideration, the great advantage of your addressing a letter on the subject to the
Times, the leading journal of the world, by the very next overland mail. Who knows that the
Imperial Government, seeing in the awful struggle with Prance, which we anticipate, that her
colonies will be amongst her great sources of weakness, that she may not spontaneously proffer
that which we seek to obtain by petition, and without any loss of time? Apologising for the ob-
trading on your notice what you may consider very worthless and puerile,
I remain, Rev. Sir,
Yours very respectfully,
AN OLD COLONIST.
To the Rev. Dr. Lang.
The following letter was addressed to the Empire, in consequence of an
anonymous critique on the Lecture, which had appeared in that paper : —
WAR WITH FRANCE.
TO THE EDITOR OP THE EMPIRE.
Sir — I am not sorry to observe that my lecture on Monday evening has
excited some little attention among parties who dislike the principles it
advocates and the course it recommends. It is very evident, at all events,
that there is a war party in this colony, and that, in all matters relating to
war or peace, that party pretends to a monopoly not only of patriotism but
of intelligence.
For example, one of my anonymous critics in this morning's Empire
alleges that, even in the event of these colonies becoming free and inde
pendent, we should be as much exposed as ever to attack and spoliation on
the part of Louis Napoleon and the French. Now, sir, this not only exhibits
the grossest ignorance on the part of your correspondent, but is an impudent
and unfounded calumny upon the whole French nation. The French are
a civilized people ; they are not pirates and robbers. When they go to war
with any other people or nation, they set forth the cause or grounds of the
war in a manifesto or declaration, on which they appeal to the whole
civilised world, as they did very recently in the case of their war with
Russia ; and they uniformly conduct their warfare also agreeably to the code
of modern civilization. If they went to war with England (whether there
were satisfactory grounds for that war or not) we, as English, and peculi
arly valuable English, possessions, should unquestionably be one of their
first objects of attack and spoliation ; and this would be in perfect accord
ance with the laws of modern and civilized warfare. But if we were only
free and independent or Sovereign States, the French would have no quarrel
with us, and would enter our harbours, when it suited them, as our best
friends. Nay, I feel perfectly confident that, as the French have manifestly
no genius for colonization, and that as the expensive toy of New Caledonia

22
has evidently been taken up by Louis Napoleon, in anticipation of the
foreseen contingency of a war with England, and for no other purpose what
soever, he would not only be inclined to maintain perfect peace with us, if
we were Free and Sovereign States, but would be glad to make over to us,
as one of the States of the future Australian Empire, the whole island or
colony for what it has cost him. Of what use, I ask, are the French colonies
in the Pacific, or rather what use do they make of them ? New Caledonia,
Tahiti, and the Marquesas are simply expensive toys to France^ and of no
possible use to the State, except as naval and military stations, in the pros
pect of war with England. If our Australian ports were only as free and
open, at all times, to the French as to the British, as ihey would unques
tionably be in the event of our being a Sovereign people, the French would
very soon discover that they could get all their shipping concerns in the
Pacific managed at a much cheaper rate in our Australian ports than in
colonies of their own.
Your correspondent next indulges in the following rhapsody : —
Perish the thought, that in the hour of England's peril, it may be of disaster, we should
choose this opportunity to cast off our allegiance, and, like rats, who are said always to leave a
sinking vessel, desert our father-land, when the vessel of the Stete may soon be in the strong
waters of a conflict to the death for her very existence as a nation.
If we a/re defenceless let us enrol volunteers for a naval brigade, for a corps of riflemen, and a
troop of light cavalry. We have plenty of men, men of the right stamp too, who only want to
have arms put in their hands by the Governmeut, and to be trained to use them to strike in
defence of our liberties and wealth, our hearths and homes ; and, if we fight, let us fight under
the flag that braved a thousand years the bKttle and the breeze.
Now, I should like to know, what possible concern we, t he people of
Australia, can have in any quarrel between England and France ? Lord
Ellenborough lays it down as a maxim, in the speech from which I quoted
in my lecture, that in such circumstances the colonies should not be involved
in the calamities of a war between these nations. Then, as to our deserting
England, in the hour of her peril, the idea is simply ridiculous. So long as
we are colonies of Britain, so far from assisting her in her wars, we shall
only be a serious and perhaps intolerable drag upon her. It will cost her
millions per annum to keep up such a naval armament here as we shall
require for our defence ; and what will she get for that expenditure more
than if we were a Sovereign people ? Literally nothing. She cannot tax us
to keep up her navy, and we should be great fools to tax ourselves for any
such purpose, if it can be shewn, as it certainly can, to be totally unne
cessary. But of all the species of cant I know of, there is none so thoroughly im
pudent as the cant of patriotism ; of which these war-people, forsooth
pretend to have a perfect monopoly. Why, for more than a year past Eng
land has been engaged, in her possessions in India, in one of the most
terrific wars that has ever been heard of in the course of her history. And
yet, so far as I have either seen or heard, not one of these Captain Bobadils

23
of our war party has stirred a foot to help her ! They are all here, the
canting hypocrites that they are (for I like to give them their own shot back
again, as they have the best right to it), skulking all the while behind the
hedge of anonymous correspondence !
I can have no possible objection to these fire-eaters forming volunteer
corps, either of cavalry or of infantry, and placing guns if they please on
every rock in our harbour ; but I do object to their volunteering (for that is
their real object after all) to put their hands into our pockets to make us
pay for it all. Let them play at soldiers as long as they please ; but let
them do it at their own expense. For my own part, I, for one, will not
stand (if I can help it) to see a standing army billetted upon our Colonial
Treasury, at the bidding of certain would-be captains, majors, and colonels,
not to mention a whole corps of other speculators upon the gullibility of
the public, behind the scenes. The Peace party have now a regular battle
to fight for their principles in these colonies, and I for one will not object
to " shoulder arms" in the cause.
In regard to your correspondent's allusion to the reference I made in my
lecture to the advice given to Great Britain, by the Rev. Dr. Josiah Tucker,
Dean of Gloucester, about the , year 1770, " to emancipate her American
colonies, and declare them Sovereign and Independent States," that advice
had no reference whatever to the particular cause of quarrel at the time
between England and America. It simply embodied a general principle
equally true at present, as it was then, viz., — that it was much better for
both parties that the colonies should be their own masters and govern
themselves. George the Third acknowledged, when too late, that it was a
right principle after all, when he thus accosted Dr. Tucker, after the peace,
" Mr. Dean, you were in the right, and we were all in the wrong."
I am, Sir, yours, &c,
JOHN DTJNMORE LANG.
Sydney, 25th August, 1858.

On Wednesday, tho 24th August, the Honourable E. D. Thomson, Esq.,
put a question to the Solicitor-General, as the Representative of the Govern
ment in the Legislative Council, as to the state of our defences ; which
elicited the information referred to in the following letter. That letter was
forwarded for publication in the Empire on Saturday, the 28th ; but the pub
lication of that paper having (most unfortunately for the liberal interest in
this colony, as well as for the worthy proprietor) been discontinued from
that date, the manuscript was returned to the writer, and the letter is now
published as follows : — WAR WITH FRANCE.
TO THE EDITOR OP THE "EMPIRE."
Sir,— From the Solicitor-General's reply to the question of the Honoura
ble E. Deas Thomson, Esq., in the Legislative Council, on Wednesday last,

24
t appears that the Local Government have for some time past been corres
ponding with the Imperial authorities, about the organization of a regular
system of coast defences for this colony against foreign aggression, and that
they have also had under their consideration the formation of a colonial
military force for the same purpose. Now, I beg to enter my solemn pro
test, as an Australian colonist of thirty-five years standing, against every
thing of the kind ; first, as being altogether unnecessary ; and secondly, as
implying that, in the event of a rupture between England and France, we,
the colonists of Australia, are morally and politically bound to declare war
against France also, which I utterly deny that we are. In his famous
speech in the House of Lords, of the 15th Juue, 1854, Lord Ellenborough
lays it down as a maxim that a war might arise between Great Britain and
the United States, on grounds in which Canada, although bounded by the
United States along the whole line of its frontier, could have no concern.
And will any man pretend to say that we, — a million of people of British
origin inhabiting Australia — can have any possible concern with any quarrel
that may arise between England and France, situated as both of these
c ountries are at the other side of the globe ? Why. then, I ask, should we
be called, in such circumstances, to quarrel and fight with the people of
France, who have never done us, as a people, any injury, and with whom
we all doubtless wish to live on terms of good fellowship to the end of the
chapter, whatever just and necessary wars — for we must admit, for the sake
of argument, that they are all just and necessary — may prevail in Europe ?
That there is a possibility, nay a probability, and a strong probability
too, of war arising between England and France, is now universally ad
mitted. And it is evident, from the series of extracts contained in my recent
lecture from the evidence given before a French Parliamentary Com
mission, that, in the event of such a war arising, it is the avowed intention
of the French, under whatever form of government they may live, to make
an immediate and simultaneous attack upon all the foreign possessions of
England. For this purpose, as far as we Australians are concerned, the J'
have already secured, as a naval and military station of the first order, the
noble island of New Caledonia, the discovery of our own Captain Cook,
situated within three or four days' sail from our Moreton Bay coast. How
convenient that island will be, as a receptacle for the gold ships and other
Australian prizes, which the numerous fleet of war steamers and fast-sailing
privateers that will make it their head quarters, in the event of a war, will
ever and anon be bringing into its ports from all these colonies, it is
scarcely necessary to shew ; for the thing is self-evident and cannot be dis
puted. Surely, then, it becomes us, who are sure to he the very first object
of attack in such an emergency, to make immediate and effectual prepara
tion for the dark and mysterious future.
I conceive it utterly absurd to allege that Great Britain, in the event of
a war with France, could afford adequate protection, either to these colonies
or to their trade, from French aggression. Let it be remembered, that while

25
the navies of the two countries are pretty much upon a par (materiel and
personnel combined) France has no colonies worth mentioning to defend,
while Great Britain has actually about fifty altogether, besides the continent
of India. Let it be remembered also, that as the great object of apprehension
in such an emergency would be a descent upon some part, or rather, perhaps,
upon several parts simultaneously, of the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland,
a large proportion of the British fleet w ould necessarily he employed in guard
ing and protecting her own extensive coast line. In such circumstances, as
the antient Britons, when left to shift for themselves by the Roman Emperor
, (who, it seems, had his hands full enough at home), about 1450 years ago,
addressed his Imperial Majesty on the subject in a pitiful whining paper,
entitled " The Groans of Britain," I suspect we should very soon (Captain
Bobadil and his troop notwithstanding) have a second edition of that paper,
entitled " The Groans of Australia." And why should Australia give
utterance to a single groan in the case ? She has only to stand erect in the
majesty and the might of her own nationality — as I am quite sure her own
mother dear would not be sorry to see her doing — and all will be well.
I should be sorry, indeed, to offend Captain Bobadil and his troop unne
cessarily ; but the case is too serious to trifle with such braggarts and
bullies. It is the declared intention, as well as the obvious policy of the
French, in the event of a war with England, to make an immediate attack
upon all the foreign possessions of the enemy. The probability, therefore,
is, that one of the very first intimations we should have of the actual decla
ration of war, would be in the fearful tidings of the landing of perhaps
2000 French troops, from New Caledonia, within a few miles of Sydney, if
not actually within the Heads. Their war steamers could approach the
proper landing places to the southward in the night, and land the whole of
them at break of day : and in a few hours thereafter the city would be at
their mercy. How many millions — not of francs, but of pounds sterling —
they would take not to destroy the city, it would be hard to conjecture ; for
history informs us that they are rather exacting in their way on such occa
sions. But, that the thing is practicable, and that it is just the thing to be
attempted, at least, by a resolute and chivalrous enemy, fired with the pros
pect of an immense booty, no man in his senses can deny.
Such, then, will, in all likelihood, be the first chapter in the history .of a
future war with France ; for even taking it for granted that our noble har
bour is in a sufficient state of defence from maritime aggression, which I
deny that it is, we are utterly defenceless in the event of an attack by land.
God forbid, I would say with all my heart, that the matter should ever be
put to the test !
As to the harbour, have we forgotten already, that an American squadron
actually entered the Heads, sailed up the harbour, and anchored off the
very cove by night, and could even have taken the city, as their commander
has since facetiously boasted, before any body knew it ? No doubt such a,
thing is scarcely likely to occur a second time ; hut what is there, I ask, to

26
prevent one or two war steamers entering at the Heads, under similar cir
cumstances, and landing a large body of troops within the very harbour,
to attack our forts in the rear and to spike every gun in our batteries ? No
doubt Captain Bobadil and his troop will be very valiant on the occasion ;
and all our bank clerks and drapers' assistants will doubtless be extempo
rised into first-rate soldiers, to meet, perhaps, the very men who took the
Malakhoff, somewhere between this and the Heads. Of course we shall
leave them there, to fight it out ; unless the valiant bank clerks and drapers'
assistants should prefer taking the hint, which we give them, that the train
is just starting for Campbelltown. For he who fights and runs away,
May live to fight some other day ;
But he who is in battle slain
Shall never rise to fight again.
In these circumstances, strongly disapproving, as I do, in common, I
believe, with thousands of others, of any expenditure being incurred by
this colony, either for coast defences or for the raising of a colonial military
force of any kind ; and firmly believing, in accordance with the repeatedly
declared opinions of some of the ablest and most distinguished members of
both Houses of the Imperial Parliament, that the safest, the most patriotic,
and the best course for all these colonies, as well as for Great Britain her
self, in the present alarming crisis of European affairs, is to petition Her
Majesty and the Imperial Parliament to concede to us our entire freedom
and independence, and to recognise us thenceforth as Sovereign and Inde
pendent States, I would simply recommend that a Requisition to this effect
be presented to the Right Worshipful the Mayor of Sydney, requesting him
to call a public meeting of the inhabitants for these purposes on an early
day. It is peculiarly fitting for us, the Colonists of New South Wales, as
being the mother-colony of the Australian group, and the nearest the lion's
den in New Caledonia, to take the initiative in this matter. The requisite
further steps to be taken, in pursuance of that commencement, could be
indicated at the meeting, if a Petition were resolved on.
At all events, let it not be forgotten that, if this prudent and peaceful
course is not taken in time, the very same consummation as is thus indi
cated may be arrived at very speedily, and in a much more exceptionable
way. For in the event of a war taking place in our present circumstances,
the certain result of the first losses we should sustain — either in our towns
being attacked and plundered, or in our ships and passengers being cap
tured and carried off to New Caledonia — would be the formation of a strong
party to insist upon a declaration of independence at once, without asking
the consent of Great Britain, and thereby, perhaps, to involve the country
jn civil war. Is it not, therefore, the right course — the course indicated by
enlightened patriotism, as well as by humanity and Christianity — to act
forthwith upon the recommendation I have thus given ?
I am, sir, Tours, &c,
Sydney, 28th August, 1858. JOHN DUNMORE LANG.

27
The following letter is copied from the Melbourne Argus of September
10th :— WAR WITH FRANCE.
TO THE EDITOR OP THE ARGUS.
Sir, — Permit me to offer the few following observations on your leading
article of Monday last, commenting on a lecture of mine, recently delivered
in this city, on ' The Prospect for Australia, in the event of a War with
France.' In that lecture, after showing that a war with France is not only
possible, but, from all appearances, extremely probable, I recommended
that, in such circumstances, we, the Australian people, should petition Her
Majesty and the Imperial Parliament to concede to us, under such guaran
tees and stipulations as might be mutually desirable, our entire freedom
and independence, and to recognise us thenceforth as sovereign and inde
pendent States, that we, the British colonists of Australia, may not be
involved in the calamities of any future European war.
You are pleased to characterise this proposal as one " that savors equally
of folly and poltroonery,' and to express your regret that ' a man of ability,
like Dr. Lang, should stand up in a public assembly to proclaim cowardice
» duty and pusillanimity a virtue." But are you not aware that these sen
timents and proposals of mine are precisely those also of some of the most
eminent members of both Houses of the Imperial Parliament — of Lord
Ellenborough, for example, of Lord Brougham, of Lord Ashbraton, of Lord
St. Vincent, and of Lord Macaulay, in the House of Peers, and of such men
as the late Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir G. C. Lewis), Mr. Roebuck,
and many others in the House of Commons, not to mention the late Right
Hon. Mr. Huskisson, and the late Rt. Hon. Sir James Mackintosh ? Will you
venture to assert that you have anything in Victoria to be compared, either
in lofty intellect, or in warm and enlightened patriotism, with this splendid
constellation of British talent and worth ? And yet the whole of these
distinguished men either advocate or have advocated precisely the same
sentiments and opinions as those to which I have given expression in my
recent lecture, in regard to the relation between a mother country such as
Great Britain, and her full-grown colonies, such as those of Australia.
You profess to have a complete monopoly of patriotism in the case, as
far as I and my opinions are concerned. Patriotism, in my estimation, is
" to seek the good of the land" in which one dwells ; and if this, according
to the Prophet Jeremiah, himself a patriot of the first order, was the duty
even of the captive Jews in Babylon, surely it is much more that of the
British colonist in Australia, who is a dweller in this land from choice, and
not from necessity. But will any man tell me that it can ever be the duty
of an Australian patriot to seek to involve his adopted country, with its
million of inhabitants, in the calamities of war, whenever, in the compli
cated maze of European politics, Great Britain chooses to go to war with
France, or any other great Power, as we know she has done too often, and

28
without the slightest necessity, already ? If carrying out the theory of
those great men I have enumerated will save our country from so unheard-
of a calamity as a war would certainly be to us, it is clearly our duty to
adopt the means of doing so as speedily as possible.
But you ask, " Is Dr. Lang simple enough to believe that, supposing the
Imperial Parliament were to recal Sir William Denison and the other repre
sentatives of our Sovereign in these colonies, and to declare our indepen
dence of the British Crown, we should be suffered to remain at peace ?
Does he imagine that a territory equal in extent to the Continent of Europe,
with incalculable mineral wealth permeating its soil, would offer no temp
tations to the ambition and cupidity of France and Russia, or that our
" annexation" would not be discussed as something extremely desirable by
the Press and people of the United States?" Now, I confess I am simple
enough to believe all this, and I canuot but regard it as a very indifferent
proof of your acquaintance with the Law of Nations that you can be induced
to believe otherwise. I am quite confident, on the one hand, that if once
the sovereignty and independence of these Australian colonies were con
ceded by gieat Britain, it would be recognised and guaranteed, as far as the
comity of nations is concerned, within 48 hours thereafter, by whatever
Government, whether Imperial or Republican, might be subsisting in
France at tho time. And the course of post would bring us the same recog.
nition and guarantee from St. Petersburgh and Washington. M. Chose (as
the French say — I mean the French Consul at Melbourne) will surely make
you a very low bow for the very high compliment you pay his countrymen
in assuming that, in any such circumstances, they would ever be mere
pirates and robbers. And so, also, I have no doubt, would the Russian
Consul. As for the Americans, the idea of ' annexation' beyond seas, is
contrary to the fundamental principles of their policy, and is altogether
out of the question.
You seem to think that we should be of great service to Great Britain
in helping to fight her battles with the French here. On the contrary, we
should only be a serious drag upon her, and a great source of weakness
and of embarrassment. What would it cost the people of England to
keep up such a naval armament as would be necessary for the protection
of aU these colonies in the event of a war with France ? Why, something
enormous. And what would they get by this expenditure that they would
not get without it, if we were free and independent ? Why, nothing earthly
but the honor and glory of saying that we were part of their empire. Would
a single tie, either of blood or of friendship, be broken by the change that
should have passed over the spirit of our dream if we were a sovereign and
independent people ? Would a single relation or speculation of commerce
be affected by it ? Certainly not. All these things would continue pre
cisely the same as before, only we should thenceforth be two different
nations — they the British, and we the Australian nation; and it would

29
therefore follow as a matter of eourse, which all civilised nations would
recognise, that whatever wars Great Britain might be engaged in, we
should remain at peace with all the world. Of course, our sympathies
would still be with Great Britain as warmly as ever, but our political
dependence would have ceased and determined.
But the cant of patriotism is just as intolerable as any other form of
cantiug. Great Britain has for more than a year past been engeged, in her
possessions in India, in one of the most terrific wars she has ever been
engaged in in her whole history as a nation, and surely she needs the assis
tance of her colonial patriots in such circumstances. Seeing your paper,
as I do occasionally in our Subscription Library, I must do you the justice
to say that you have beat the drum for recruiis for that service well. But
with what success ? Where is there even a single specimen of the worthy
Captain Bobadil and his company of 19 Australian patriots to volunteer for
India — to kill these villainous sepoys right off, every man his ten a-day ? I
am sorry to say these patriots are all here yet ; showing how easily I could
retort the charge of 'cowardice and poltroonery,' if I thought it worth my
while, which I do not.
I do admit that, although a very considerable portion of our Indian
Empire has been acquired in quite as exceptionable a way as that in which
Russia acquired Poland, it would be a prodigious loss, not only to Britain,
but to India itself, and to humanity and Christianity, if we should lose that
empire ; but what loss of any kind, save the mere whistle of a name, either
Great Britain or we should sustain by the termination of our political
dependence on the mother-country, I cannot for my life discover. Our
value to the mother-country consists exclusively in our commerce, which I
have shown could not be affected by the change, not in her empire over us.
" In the event of a war with France, while we remain in our colonial
condition as mere dependencies of Britain— as the avowed policy of the
French is to attack all the English possessions immediately on the declara
tion of war, it is morally certain that these Australian colonies would be
one of the chief seats of that war. And for what other purpose can it be
than for such a contingency that Louis Napoleon has for some time past
been assembling a large naval and military force in his stronghold of New
Caledonia, within three days' sail of our coast ? Is that force there for the
purposes of colonisation— 30 colonists and 500 soldiers (as a Frenchman,
who had returned to Sydney from the island, gave me the proportions about
two years ago) ? Absurd. They are there simply, like the Bengal tiger in
his lair, till they are told to make the fatal spring. , When that time eomes,
our city will, in all likelihood, be the first to suffer, if not to fall : for it is
utterly absurd to suppose that we could either escape or^ defend ourselves.
With all the defences of our noble harbour, two French war steamers from
the island could enter at our Heads, and land perhaps 2000 men within our
very harbour, who would spike every gun in our batteries, and have the
city at their mercy in two hours. There never has been such a prize fc-H

30
forth to French cupidity as Sydney and Melbourne would certainly prove,
and Louis Napoleon would take special care to send some of his best troops
to seize it. No doubt you have plenty of Captain Bobadils and his men-^
I mean all those who didn't go to India — in your colony, as well as we have
in ours ; but I should be sorry to see either the one set or the other sent to
meet 2000 of the men who took the Malakhoff, between Sydney and our
Heads, or between Melbourne and yours. You tell us, indeed, that these
colonial patriots would be fighting pro aris et focis. I deny it. The arcc
and the foci are in no danger whatever, if we only do our duty to ourselves
and to our noble country. What, then, would they be fighting for, if they
fought at all ? Why, they would be fighting for the worthless theory of
the political dependence of a series of full-grown colonies on the mother
country at the ends of the earth— a theory which all the illustrious men I
have enumerated condemn, and which is alike contrary to the law of Nature
and the ordinance of God.
But supposing we should silently allow the War to go on, what then ? Why,
the certain result of the very first losses we should sustain, whether in our
towns plundered and burnt, or in our ships, with all their passengers and
crews carried off as prizes to New Caledonia, would be the immediate
formation of a party which would strengthen and increase every day, and
of which the watchword would be- — Freedom and Independence. And are
your fire-eaters, your " island mastiffs," as you call them, prepared to have
not only a French war, but a civil war to the bargain ? I go for neither ; and
I maintain, therefore, that my words are the words of truth and soberness.
I yield to no man in these colonies in my strong affection for all
that is good and great in our mother-country — in her Government,
in her free institutions, in her language and literature, in her past renown
as a nation, in her Protestant Christianity ; but I regard, as the grand event
of the future, as well as the consummation of urgent necessity for the
times, their speedy and peaceful elevation to the high and honorable con
dition of sovereign and independent States.
You state, on the authority of a hostile and anonymous writer, that the
announcement of my proposal elicited " scarcely a single cheer." The
fact was, that the lecture was announced to be delivered in the hall or
lecture-room of an Educational Institution which holds only about 250 per
sons ; but as a great many more than that number attended, the meeting
was transferred to the Scots Church, where, in consideration of the place,
and at my special request, all expressions of feeling on the occasion were
repressed. I question, however, whether any lecture has been delivered
in this city for a long time past that produced a stronger sensation, or was
listened to with more general acquiescence. We commenced with the
Lord's Prayer, and concluded with the Doxology and the Apostolic bene
diction, which I think you will admit was no bad omen for Australian
independence. I remain, sir, your obedient servant,
Sydney, Sept. 3, 1858. ' John Donmore Lang.

POSTCRIPT.

Extract of an Address delivered by His Excellency Sir R. Macdonnell,
Governor of South Australia, at the opening of the Parliament of that
colony, 27th August, 1858.
22. The unsettled conditions of the relations between the various European governments, to
which my attention has been called in a dispatch from Her Majesty's principal Secretary of
State for the Colonics, renders it prudent that the means'of defending the province against
external aggression should receive the early and serious attention of the Government and the
Legislature. With this object, I have obtained a report on the most suitable measures of defence
consistent with economy ; and have made a communication (in the subject to the Right Honour
able the Secretary of State in a dispatch, a copy of which I have directed to be laid before you.
I feel assured, that yon wyi cordially co-operate with the Government in .devising and giving
effect to such measures as may be adequate to the occasion.
The dispatch to which Sir R. Macdonnell alludes in his Address to the
South Australian Parliament is doubtless the same as that to which Mr.
Lutwyche alluded in our Upper House a few days ago. It seems to have
been a circular from Downing Street addressed to the Governor of all the
Australian Colonies. So we are to have all these four Australian Colonies
of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Van Dieman's Land,
expending millions sterling for years to come in the erection or construc
tion of trumpery ginger-bread fortifications, besides taking off thousands
of their inhabitants for weeks together at a time from their proper occupa
tions to play at soldiers ! And all this, too, is to be done under the noto
rious pretext of patriotism ! Patriotism— that ill-understood word, the -
index of a very rare quality — signifies simply "to seek the good of the
land " in which we dwell. This was the advice given by the prophet
Jeremiah, one of the most devoted patriots that ever lived, to the captive
Jews in Babylon. And surely if this was their duty, even in an enemy's
country, much more is it ours as British Colonists in Australia. And will
any man tell me that it is seeking the good of these Australian Colonies to
involve a million of people here at the ends of the earth in all the calamities
of war — of war, too, with a people and nation on the other side of the globe,
with whom, as Australian Colonists, we have never had any quarrel ? The
idea is as absurd as the pretence is impudent.
As to our so-called defences, the real truth is— and every body knows it
 we are utterly defenceless in the event of a war with France. And to

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erect batteries on Pinchgut and Mrs. Macquarie's Point, while the road to
Sydney is perfectly open for a land force, is pretty much like the conduct of
the ostrich, which thrusts its head into a bush and thinks itself safe, while
its whole body is exposed to its pursuers. The French know every foot,
both of land and water, all around Sydney and Melbourne as well as we do,
and they are not such fools as to attempt anything here by water till they
have made us all peaceable enough by land. This, as every man of intelli
gence knows, will be a matter of the greatest facility. How many millions
sterling the French Marshall in command will be disposed to take1 not to
destroy our city, when he marches in amongst us with two thousand men
along George-street, we cannot tell; but if that is the only lesson we choose
to take, we may have it some of these days to our heart's content. At all
events, we have now not merely the vague conjectures of the press, both
at home and here— we have not merely the idle dream of some hair-brained
alarmist— we have the formal declaration of one of Her Majesty's Ministers
of State that a great European war, in which we are sure to be one of the
first points of attack for the enemy, is exceedingly imminent.

N.B. Certain good people, both here and in Melbourne, are attempting,
for obvious purposes, to fix upon me the authorship of the slang phrase
" Cut the Painter," It is no phrase of mine : I never used it on any occa
sion whatever. It was used, however, by the Rev. Mr. Mc Ehcroe, in the
way of a menace to Great Britain, at a great Anti-Transportation meeting
in Sydney ten or twelve years ago ; and I merely related the circumstance
in one of my books.

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