I .Hi mill Hi lllill 11 II Si II 11 | 1 H 1-1111 J Ii iiiiij miiiii 111 i ft! i'j ?:-hM- ' Illi I 111 01 "l.gn Bonks for the foitnding ef a C I , "otony" >Y^LIE«¥MII¥EI&SHWo - The pro-Gethsemane : rapdo-a-a. The Agony, its elements and meaning. 'ASri/wviw ; \viriop.ai, iK0at±l3(!ofj.ai, irepLXvTos. The Dereliction. Cause of our Lord's Death. Fundamental religious emotions unmentioned. Few ordinary emotions mentioned : davp.dj;a>, £irt0vp.la, tiraurxti'op.at.. Conclusion: Fulness of our Lord's emotions. Reality of his humanity. His individuality. His chief characteristics? His comprehensive ness. Our model. Our Saviour. ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD It belongs to the truth of our Lord's humanity, that he was subject to all sinless human emotions.1 In the accounts which the Evangelists give us of the crowded activities which filled the few years of his ministry, the play of a great variety of emotions is depicted. It has nevertheless not proved easy to form a universally acceptable conception of our Lord's emo tional life. Not only has the mystery of the Incarnation en tered in as a disturbing factor, the effect of the divine nature on the movements of the human soul brought into personal union with it being variously estimated. Differences have arisen also as to how far there may be attributed to a perfect human nature movements known to us only as passions of sinful beings. Two opposite tendencies early showed themselves in the Church. One, derived ultimately from the ethical ideal of the Stoa, which conceived moral perfection under the form of airdOeia, naturally wished to attribute this ideal airdOeia to Jesus, as the perfect man. The other, under the influence of the conviction that, in order to deliver men from their weak- 1 "Certainly ", remarks Calvin (Commentarius in Harmoniam Evan- gelicarum, Mt. xxvi. 37), "those who imagine that the Son of God was exempt from human passions, do not truly and seriously acknowledge him to be a man." " But Christ having a human nature the same for substance that ours is, consisting both of soul and body," argues Thomas Goodwin (Works, Edinburgh ed., 1862, iv. p. 140), "therefore he must needs have affections, — even affections proper to man's nature and truly human. And these he should have had, although this human nature had, from the very first assumption of it, been as glorious as it now is> in heaven." " In what sense the soul is capable of suffering ", says John Pearson (An Exposition of the Creed, New York ed., 1843, p. 288), "in that he was subject to animal passion. Evil apprehended to come tor mented his soul with fear, which was as truly in him in respect of what he was to suffer, as hope in reference to the recompense of a reward to come after and from his sufferings. " 38 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD nesses, the Redeemer must assume and sanctify in his own person all human irdO-n, as naturally was eager to attribute to him in its fulness every human irdOos. Though in far less clearly defined forms, and with a complete shifting of their bases, both tendencies are still operative in men's thought of Jesus. There is a tendency in the interest of the dignity of his person to minimize, and there is a tendency in the interest of the completeness of his humanity to magnify, his affec- tional movements. The one tendency may run some risk of giving us a somewhat cold and remote Jesus, whom we can scarcely believe to be able to sympathize with us in all our infirmities. The other may possibly be in danger of offering us a Jesus so crassly human as scarcely to command our high est reverence. Between the two, the figure of Jesus is liable to take on a certain vagueness of outline, and come to lack definiteness in our thought. It may not be without its uses, therefore, to seek a starting point for our conception of his emotional life in the comparatively few2 affectional movements which are directly assigned to him in the Gospel narratives. Proceeding outward from these, we may be able to form a more distinctly conceived and firmly grounded idea of his emotional life in general. It cannot be assumed beforehand, indeed, that all the emo tions attributed to Jesus in the Evangelical narratives are in tended to be ascribed distinctively to his human soul.3 Such is 3 There is some exaggeration in the remark : " The notices in the Gospels of the impressions made on his feelings by different situations in which he was placed, are extraordinarily numerous " (James Stalker, Imago Christi, 1890, p. 302). The Gospel narratives are very objective, and it is only occasionally (most frequently in Mark) that they expressly notify the subjective movements of the actors in the drama which they unfold. 3 Direct mention of our Lord's human 'soul', under that term (vxt) is not frequent in the Gospels : cf. Swete on Mk. xiv. 34, " Though the Gospels yield abundant evidence of the presence of human emotions in our Lord, (e. g. iii. 5, vi. 6, x. 14, Jno. vi. 33), this direct mention of his " soul ' has no parallel in them if we except Jno. vii. 27 ; for in such pas sages as x. 45, Jno. x. 11 ^1} is the individual life (see Cremer s. v.) rather than the seat of the emotions." J. A. Alexander on Mk. xiv. 34 remarks that " my soul " there " is not a mere periphrasis for the pronoun, ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 39 no doubt the common view. And it is not an unnatural view to take as we currently read narratives, which, whatever else they contain, certainly present some dramatization of the human experiences of our Lord.4 No doubt the naturalness of this view is its sufficient general justification. Only, it will be well to bear in mind that Jesus was definitely conceived by the Evan gelists as a two-natured person, and that they made no difficul ties with his duplex consciousness. In almost the same breath they represent him as declaring that he knows the Father through and through and, of course, also all that is in man, and the world which is the theatre of his activities, and that he is ignorant of the time of the occurrence of a simple earthly event which concerns his own work very closely; that he is meek and lowly in heart and yet at the same time the Lord of men by their relations to whom their destinies are determined, — " no man cometh unto the Father but by me." In the case of a Being whose subjective life is depicted as focusing in two centers of consciousness, we may properly maintain some re serve in ascribing distinctively to one or the other of them mental activities which, so far as their nature is concerned, (/), but refers his strange sensations more directly to the inward seat of feeling and emotion." Cf., however, the Greek text of Ps. xiii. 6, 12, xiv. S ; but also Winer, Grammar, etc., Thayer's tr., 1872, p. 156. The term irveOfia occurs rather more frequently than fvxti, to designate the seat of our Lord's emotions : Mk. viii. 12 ; Jno. xi. 33, xiii. 21 ; cf . Mk. ii. 8 ; Mt. xxvii. 50; Jno. xix. 30. 'Such an attempt as that made by W. B. Smith (Ecce Deus, 1911, p. 101), to explain away the implication of our Lord's humanity in the earliest Gospel transmission, is, of course, only a " curiosity of liter ature." " Mark ", says he, " nowhere uses of Jesus an expression which suggests an impressive or even amiable human personality; or, indeed, any kind of human personality whatever." What Mark says of Jesus, is what is commonly said of God — of Jehovah. The seeming exceptions are merely specious. He ascribes " compassion " to Jesus : it is the very core of the oriental conception of God that he is merciful. He speaks of Jesus "rebuking" ( trm/ido ) or "snorting at" ( iuppipdoijuu ) men : these are expressions suitable to God and employed in the Old Testament of Jehovah. He tells us that Jesus " loved " the rich young man — the only ascription of love to Jesus, by the way, in the Synoptics : but the rich young man is just a symbol, the symbol of Israel, whom Jehovah loves. And so on. 40 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD might properly belong to either. The embarrassment in study ing the emotional life of Jesus arising from this cause, how ever, is more theoretical than practical. Some of the emotions attributed to him in the Evangelical narrative are, in one way or another, expressly assigned to his human soul. Some of them by their very nature assign themselves to his human soul. With reference to the remainder, just because they might equally well be assigned to the one nature or the other, it may be taken for granted that they belong to the human soul, if not exclusively, yet along with the divine Spirit; and they may therefore very properly be used to fill out the picture. We may thus, without serious danger of confusion, go simply to the Evangelical narrative, and, passing in review the definite ascriptions of specific emotions to Jesus in its records, found on them a conception of his emotional life which may serve as a starting-point for a study of this aspect of our Lord's human manifestation. The establishment of this starting-point is the single task of this essay. No attempt will be made in it to round out our view of our Lord's emotional life. It will content itself with an attempt to ascertain the exact emotions which are expressly as signed to him in the Evangelical narrative, and will leave their mere collocation to convey its own lesson. We deceive ourselves, however, if their mere collocation does not suffice solidly to ground certain very clear convictions as to our Lord's humanity, and to determine the lines on which our conception of the quality of his human nature must be filled out. I. The emotion which we should naturally expect to find most frequently attributed to that Jesus whose Whole life was a mis sion of mercy, and whose ministry was so marked by deeds of beneficence that it was summed up in the memory of his fol lowers as a going through the land " doing good " (Acts xi. 38) , is no doubt "compassion". In point of fact, this is the emotion which is most frequently attributed to him.5 The term em- "Mt. xx. 34; Mk. i. 41; Lk. vii. 13; Mt. ix. 36, xiv. 14, xv. 32; Mk. vi. 34, viii. 2. Cf. Mk. ix. 22. Not at all in John. ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 41 ployed to express it6 was unknown to the Greek classics, and was perhaps a coinage of the Jewish dispersion.7 It first ap pears in common use in this sense, indeed, in the Synoptic Gos pels,8 where it takes the place of the most inward classical word of this connotation.9 The Divine mercy has been defined as that essential perfection in God " whereby he pities and re lieves the miseries of his creatures" : it includes, that is to say, the two parts of an internal movement of pity and an external act of beneficence. It is the internal movement of pity which is emphasized when our Lord is said to be "moved with com passion" as the term is sometimes excellently rendered in the English versions.10 In the appeals made to his mercy, a more external word11 is used ; but it is this more internal word that is employed to express our Lord's response to these ap peals : the petitioners besought him to take pity on them ; his heart responded with a profound feeling of pity for them. His 5 Z7rXa7x"'fo/MH : see Bleek, An Introduction to the New Testament, § 33, (vol. i, p. 75) ; J. A. Alexander on Mk. i. 41 ; Plummer on Mt. ix. 36. Buttig's monograph, De Emphasi airKayxvl^opai., we have not seen. ' So Lightfoot, on Phil. i. 8. 9 It is found in the LXX in this metaphorical sense apparently only at Prov. xvii. 5. Cf. Swete on Mk. i. 41. 0 OUrflpw, which does not occur in the Synoptic Gospels, and indeed only once (Rom. ix. 15) in the N. T. The adjective, oIktIpiwv occurs at Lk. ix. 36 (also Jas. v. 11 only in N. T.) ; the noun olKTipubs , occurs in Paul (Rom. xii. 1; 2 Cor. i, 3; Phil. ii. 1; Col. iii. 12; also Heb. x. 28 only). 10 A. V. Mk. i. 41, vi. 34; Mit. ix. 36, xiv. 14; R. V. Mk. i. 41; Mt. ix, 36, xx. 34. a'E\e4), Mt. ix. 27, xv. 22, xvii. IS, xx. 30-31; Mk. x. 47-48; Lk. xvii. 13, xviii. 38-39; cf. Mk. v. 19; Mt. xviii. 33. This word also is not found in John. In Mk. ix. 22 only is s pDn, ]ri) is the inclination to succor the miserable, oiKTippAs the feeling of pain arising from the miseries of others . . . olKTip/iis is the feeling of sympathy dwelling in the heart; eXros is sympathy expressing itself in act." SirXo^x"'?"/"" is a term of feeling, taking the place of olKrelpu. 42 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD compassion fulfilled itself in the outward act;12 but what is emphasized by the term employed to express our Lord's re sponse is, in accordance with its very derivation, the pro found internal movement of his emotional nature. This emotional movement was aroused in our Lord as well by the sight of individual distress (Mk. i. 41; Mt. xx. 34; Lk. vii. 13) as by the spectacle of man's universal misery (Mk. vi. 34, viii. 2; Mt. ix. 36, xiv. 14, xv. 32). The appeal of two blind men that their eyes might be opened (Mt. xx. 34), the appeal of a leper for cleansing (Mk. i. 41), — though there may have been circumstances in his case which called out Jesus' reprobation (verse 43), — set our Lord's heart throb bing with pity, as did also the mere sight of a bereaved widow, wailing by the bier of her only son as they bore him forth to burial,13 though no appeal was made for relief (Lk. vii. 13). The ready spontaneity of Jesus' pity is even more plainly shown when he intervenes by a great miracle to relieve temporary pangs of hunger : " I have compassion on " — or better, "I feel pity for" — " the multitude, because they continue with me now three days, and have nothing to eat: and if I u W. Lutgert, Die Liebe im Neuen Testament, 1905, thinks it impor tant to lay stress on this side of our Lord's love. " In the Synoptic portrait of Christ the trait which stands out most clearly is the love of Jesus. He not only commanded love, but first himself practiced it. It is not merely his thought but his will, and not merely his will but above all his deed. He therefore not only required it but aroused it. It expresses itself accordingly not merely in his word, but in the first instance in his act. Jesus' significance to the Synoptists does not consist in his having discovered the command of love, but in his having fulfilled it. For them Jesus is not a ' sage ' who teaches old truths or new, but a doer, who brings the truth true, that is, acts it out" (p. 53). " His love never remains a powerless wish, that is, an unsuccessful willing, but it always succeeds. The working of Jesus is described in the Gospels as almighty love" (p. 54). "Since his acts are really love, they have primarily no other purpose but to help. Their motive is nothing but the compassion of Jesus" (p. 56). Accordingly, Lutgert insists, no cry to Jesus for help was ever made in vain: "Jesus acts precisely according to his own command, Give to him that asketh thee " (p. 55). 13 Render, not " he had ", but " he felt compassion ", to bring out the emphasis on the " feeling ". ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 43 send them away fasting to their home, they will faint in the way; and some of them are come from far" (Mk. viii. 2; Mt. xv. 32 ) , — the only occasion on which Jesus is recorded as testifying to his own feeling of pity. It was not merely the physical ills of life, however, — want and disease and death, — which called out our Lord's compassion. These ills were rather looked upon by him as themselves rooted in spiritual destitution. And it was this spiritual destitution which most deeply moved his pity. The cause and the effects are indeed very closely linked together in the narrative, and it is not always easy to separate them. Thus we read in Mark vi. 34 : "And he came forth and saw a great multitude, and he had com passion on them " — better, " he felt pity for them ", — " because they were as sheep not having a shepherd, and he taught them many things." But in the parallel passage in Mt. xiv. 14, we read : " And he came forth and saw a great multitude, and he had compassion on" ("felt pity for") "them, and he healed their sick." We must put the two passages together to get a complete account: their fatal ignorance of spiritual things, their evil case under the dominion of Satan in all the effects of his terrible tyranny, are alike the object of our Lord's compassion.14 In another passage (Mt. ix. 36) the emphasis is thrown very distinctly on the spiritual destitution of the people as the cause of his compassionate regard : " But when he saw the multitude, he was moved with compassion for them, because they were distressed and scattered, as sheep not having a shepherd." This description of the spiritual destitution of the people is cast in very strong language. They are compared to sheep which have been worn out and torn by running hither and thither through the thorns with none to direct them, and have now fallen helpless and hopeless to the "J. A. Alexander's note (on Mk. vi. 34, repeated verbally at Mt. ix. 36 and xiv. 14) is therefore too exolusive : " What excited his divine and human sympathy was not, of course, their numbers or their physical condition, but their spiritual destitution.'- It was both. Cf. Lutgert, as above, p. 68 : " It is a characteristic trait of Jesus that he feels pity not merely for the religious, but also for the external, need of the people and that he acts out of this pity. The perfection of his love stands precisely in this— that it is independent of gratitude. He helps to help." 44 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD ground.15 The sight of their desperate plight awakens our Lord's pity and moves him to provide the remedy. No other term is employed by the New Testament writers directly to express our Lord's compassion.16 But we read elsewhere of its manifestation in tears and sighs.17 The tears which wet his cheeks18 when, looking upon the uncontrolled grief of Mary and her companions, he advanced, with heart swelling with indignation at the outrage of death, to the con quest of the destroyer (Jno. xi. 35), were distinctly tears of sympathy. Even more clearly, his own unrestrained wailing over Jerusalem and its stubborn unbelief was the expression of the most poignant pity : " O that thou hadst known in this day, even thou, the things which belong unto peace " (Lk. xix. 41 ) !19 The sight of suffering drew tears from his eyes; obstinate unbelief convulsed him with uncontrollable grief. Similarly when a man afflicted with dumbness and deaf ness was brought to him for healing we are only told that he " sighed " 20 (Mk. vii. 34) ; but when the malignant unbelief of 15 Cf. Plummer in loc: "A strong word (i : xi. 3, 36, xx. 2. 50 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD that the phrase must not be taken in too exclusive a sense.32 Both terms, the more elevated and the more intimate, are employed to express Jesus' love for him.33 The love of Jesus for the household at Bethany and especially for Lazarus, is also expressly intimated to us, and it also by both terms, — though the more intimate one is tactfully confined to his affec tion for Lazarus himself. The message which the sisters sent Jesus is couched in the language of the warmest personal attachment : " Behold, he whom thou lovest is sick " ; and the sight of Jesus' tears calls from the witnessing Jews an ex clamation which recognizes in him the tenderest personal feel ing : " Behold, how he loved him ! " But when the Evangelist widens Jesus' affection to embrace the sisters also, he instinc tively lifts the term employed to the more deferential expres sion of friendship : " Now Jesus loved Martha, and her sister, and Lazarus." Jesus' affection for Mary and Martha, while deep and close, had nothing in it of an amatory nature, and the change in the term avoids all possibility of such a miscon ception.34 Meanwhile, we perceive our Lord the subject of those natural movements of affection which bind the members of society together in bonds of close fellowship. He was as far as possible from insensibility to the pleasures of social inter course (cf. Mt. xi. 19) and the charms of personal attractive ness. He had his mission to perform, and he chose his ser vants with a view to the performance of his mission. The rela tions of the flesh gave way in his heart to the relations of the spirit : " whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, he is my brother, and sister, and mother" (Mt. xii. 82 Jno. xx. 2, not " the disciple whom Jesus loved ", but " the other disciple whom Jesus loved." Jesus loved both Peter and John. Cf. Westcott in loc Hence Westcott says (on xiii. 23) that the phrase "the disciple whom Jesus loved", "marks an acknowledgment of love and not an exclusive enjoyment of love." 83 'Ayairdu: xiii. 23, xix. 26, xxi. 7, 20; ePptp.G>vro) against her". The inward emotion is expressed by ayavaKriia, its manifestation in audible form by ifj.Ppifj.dofj.aL. 03 See above, note 19; and cf. Gumlich, TSK, 1862, p. 258. '"*' Ayavanrtoj : see above, notes 41 and 52. 60 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD the grave of Lazarus, in a state, not of uncontrollable grief, but of irrepressible anger. He did respond to the spectacle of human sorrow abandoning itself to its unrestrained expres sion, with quiet, sympathetic tears: "Jesus wept" (verse 36 ).55 But the emotion which tore his breast and clamored for utterance was just rage. The expression even of this rage, however, was strongly curbed. The term which John employs to describe it is, as we have seen, a definitely external term.56 " He raged." But John modifies its external sense by an nexed qualifications : " He raged in spirit," " raging in him self." He thus interiorizes the term and gives us to under stand that the ebullition of Jesus' anger expended itself within him. Not that there was no manifestation of it : it must have been observable to be observed and recorded;57 it formed a marked feature of the occurrence as seen and heard.58 But John gives us to understand that the external expression of our Lord's fury was markedly restrained : its manifestation fell far short of its real intensity. He even traces for us the move ments of his inward struggle: "Jesus, therefore, when he saw her wailing, and the Jews that had come with her wail ing, was enraged in spirit and troubled himself " 59 . . . and wept. His inwardly restrained fury produced a profound agi tation of his whole being, one of the manifestations of which was tears. Why did the sight of the wailing of Mary and her com panions enrage Jesus? Certainly not because of the extreme violence of its expression ; and even more certainly not because it argued unbelief — unwillingness to submit to God's providen- M Aanpioj (not K\atio as in verse 33) : see above, note 18. "' See above : note 43. S7 So Hengstenberg, in particular, and many after him. 58 John Hutchison, The Monthly Interpreter, 1885, II. p. 286: "A storm of wrath was seen to sweep over him." 69 Kai irdpa&v iavrbv . Many commentators insist on the voluntari ness of Jesus' emotion, expressed by this phrase. Thus John Hutchison, as above, p. 288 : " It was an act of his own free will, not a passion hurrying him on, but a voluntarily assumed state of feeling which remained under his direction and control. . . In a word there was no draila in it." For the necessary limitations of this view see Calvin on this passage. Cf. Lutgert as cited, p. 145. ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 6l fial ordering or distrust of Jesus' power to save. He himself wept, if with less violence yet in true sympathy with the grief of which he was witness. The intensity of his exasperation, moreover, would be disproportionate to such a cause ; and the importance attached to it in the account bids us seek its ground in something less incidental to the main drift of the narrative. It is mentioned twice, and is obviously emphasized as an indis pensable element in the development of the story, on which, in its due place and degree, the lesson of the incident hangs. The spectacle of the distress of Mary and her companions enraged Jesus because it brought poignantly home to his consciousness the evil of death, its unnaturalness, its " violent tyranny " as Calvin (on verse 38) phrases it. In Mary's grief, he " contem plates " — still to adopt Calvin's words (on verse 33), — "the general misery of the whole human race " and burns with rage against the oppressor of men. Inextinguishable fury seizes upon him; his whole being is discomposed and per turbed ; and his heart, if not his lips, cries out, — " For the innumerable dead Is my soul disquieted." 60 It is death that is the object of his wrath, and behind death him who has the power of death, and whom he has come into the world to destroy. Tears of sympathy may fill his eyes, but this is incidental. His soul is held by rage: and he ad vances to the tomb, in Calvin's words again, " as a champion who prepares for conflict." The raising of Lazarus thus be comes, not an isolated marvel, but — as indeed it is presented throughout the whole narrative (compare especially, verses 24-26) — a decisive instance and open symbol of Jesus' con quest of death and hell. What John does for us in this par ticular statement is to uncover to us the heart of Jesus, as he wins for us our salvation. Not in cold unconcern, but in flam- 80 Cf. John Hutchison, as above, p. 375 : " He was gazing into ' the skeleton face of the world ', and tracing everywhere the reign of death. The whole earth to him was but ' the valley of the shadow of death ', and in these tears which were shed in his presence, he saw that ' Ocean of Time, whose waters of deep woe, Are brackish with the salt of human tears '." 62 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD ing wrath against the foe, Jesus smites in our behalf. He has not only saved us from the evils which oppress us; he has felt for and with us in our oppression, and under the impulse of these feelings has wrought out our redemption.61 There is another term which the Synoptic Gospels employ to describe our Lord's dealing with those he healed (Mt. xii. 16), which is sometimes rendered by our English versions — as the term we have just been considering is rendered in similar connections (Mk. i. 43; Mt. ix. 30) — by "charged" (Mt. xii. 16, xvi. 20; Mk. iii. 12, viii. 30, ix. 21) ; but more frequently with more regard to its connotation of censure, implying dis pleasure, " by rebuked " (Mt. xvii. 18; Mk. ix. 21 ; Lk. iv. 35- 41, xix. 42; Mk. viii. 30; Lk. ix. 55; Mt. viii. 20; Mk. iv. 39; Lk. iv. 39, viii. 24). 62 This term, the fundamental meaning of which is " to mete out due measure ", with that melancholy necessity which carries all terms which express doing justice to sinful men downwards in their connotation, is used in the New Testament only in malam partem, and we may be quite sure is never employed without its implication of censure.63 What is implied by its employment is that our Lord in work- 01 The classical exposition of the whole passage is F. Gumlich's, Die Rdthsel der Erweckung Lazari, in the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1862, pp. 65-110, and 248-336. See also John Hutchison, in The Monthly Interpreter, 1885, II. pp. 281-296 and 374-386. 62 "ETiTifidu: See Schmidt, Synonymik etc. I. 1876, § 4, 11, p. 147: "iTnipav is properly to impute something to one (as a fault) . . . And indeed it denotes harsh and in general vehement reproaches with reference to unworthy deeds or customs, construed ordinarily with the dative of the person : to condemn with harsh words, to heap reproaches on." Cf. also Trench, § 4 (p. 12). 83 Swete, on Mk. i. 25: "iTuripav, Vg. comminari, Wycliffe and Rheims ' threaten ', other English Versions, ' rebuke ' : the strict meaning of the word is ' to mete-out due measure ', but in the N. T. it is used only of censure ". Plummer on Lk. iv. 35 : " In N. T. iirni.pA.oj has no other meaning than 'rebuke'; but in classical Greek it means — 1. 'lay a value on, rate'; 2. 'lay a penalty on, sentence'; 3. 'chide, rate, rebuke'." " The verb is often used of rebuking violence (verse 41, viii. 24, ix. 42 ; Mt. viii. 26, xviii. 18; Mk. iv. 39; Jud. ix) ; yet must not on that account be rendered 'restrain' (Fritzsche on Mt. viii. 26, p. 325)." Morrison accordingly thinks that " rated " might give the essential meaning of the word. Lagrange (on Mk. i. 28) unduly weakens the term. ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 63 ing certain cures, and, indeed, in performing others of his miracles — as well as in laying charges on his followers — spoke, not merely " strongly and peremptorily ",64 but chid- ingly, that is to say, with expressed displeasure.65 There is in these instances perhaps not so strong but just as clear an as cription of the emotion of anger to our Lord as in those we have already noted, and this suggests that not merely in the case of the raising of Lazarus but in many other instances in which he put forth his almighty power to rescue men from the evils which burdened them, our Lord was moved by an ebullition of indignant anger at the destructive powers ex hibited in disease or even in the convulsions of nature.66 In instances like Mt. xii. 16; Mk. iii. 12; Mt. xvi. 20; Mk. viii. 30; Lk. ix. 21, the censure inherent in the term' may almost seem to become something akin to menace or threat : " he chided them to the end that they should not make him known;" he made a show of anger or displeasure directed to this end. In the cases where, however, Jesus chided the un clean spirits which he cast out it seems to lie in the nature of things that it was the tyrannous evil which they were working upon their victims that was the occasion of his displeasure.67 When he is said to have " rebuked " a fever which was tor menting a human being (Lk. iv. 39) or the natural elements' — the wind and sea — menacing human lives (Mt. viii. 26; Mk. iv. 39; Lk. viii. 24), there is no reason to suppose that he looked upon these natural powers as themselves personal, and as little that the personification is only figurative ; we may not 54 Morrison on Mk. iii. 12. raHahn on Lk. iv. 35: ''i-jriTlp/rjo-ev atrip, that is, he vehemently com manded him, charged him with strong, chiding words (cf. verses 39, 41, viii. 24, ix. 21, 42, 55), an expression by which Luke would say that Jesus spoke the following words in a tone of highest displeasure :" cf. on verse 39. 06 Cf. Gumlich, TSK, 1862 p. 287 : " Similar movements of anger, iiriTipuiv instead of ip.ppip.ao-8ai directly before or after a miracle, we find also elsewhere in him: threats (Bedrohen) to the wind and the sea (Mt. viii. 26), most frequently in the case of healings of possessed people of a difficult kind (Mt. viii. 26, vii. 18; Mk. ix. 21, i. 25, iii. 12; Lk. iv. 41)." 67 In Mk. viii. 33 ; Lk. ix. 55 the objects of his displeasure were his fol lowers. 64 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD improperly suppose that the displeasure he exhibited in his up braiding them was directed against the power behind these manifestations of a nature out of joint, the same malignant in fluence which he advanced to the conquest of when he drew near to the tomb of Lazarus.68 In any event the series of pas sages in which this term is employed to ascribe to Jesus acts inferring displeasure, greatly enlarges the view we have of the play of Jesus' emotions of anger. We see him chiding his disciples, the demons that were tormenting men, and the natural powers which were menacing their lives or safety, and speak ing in tones of rebuke to the multitudes who were the recipients of his healing grace (Mt. xii. 16). And 'that we are not to suppose that this chiding was always mild we are advised by 88 Cf. Zahn, Das Evangelium des Johannes, 1908, p. 480, note 82 : " Since Jesus, without prejudice to his faith in the all-embracing providence and universal government of God, looked upon all disease, and not merely possession, as the work of Satan (Lk. xiii. 16, x. 19, cf. Acts xvi. 38; 2 Cor. xii. 7), and held him to be the author not only of isolated miseries, but of the death of man in general (Jno. viii. 44) ; Heb. ii. 14 does not go beyond Jesus' circle of ideas." — Also Henry Norris Bernard, The Mental Characteristics of the Lord Jesus Christ. 1888, pp. 90-91 : " The miracles of Christ formed part of that warfare which was ever waging between the Son of God and the power of evil which he was manifested to destroy. The rage of the elements, the roaring wind, and the surging waves ever seeking to engulf the fishers' boat; the fell sickness racking with pain man's body ; the paralysis of the mental powers destroying man's intellect, and leaving him a prey to unreasoning violence, or to unclean desires; the death which shrouded him in the unknown darkness of the tomb — these things were to the Saviour's vision but objective forms of the curse of sin which it was his mission to remove. The Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Satan were brought together in opposition. The battle between the Lord's Christ and the great adversary was ever going on. Man's infirmities and his sicknesses, in the eyes of Christ, were the outward symbols of the sin which was their cause. So the inspired writer, in the healing of the sick, and in the casting out of devils, sees direct blows given, which, in the end, shall cause Satan's empire to totter to its fall. Every leper cleansed, every blind man restored to sight, every helpless paralytic made to walk, every distracted man brought back to the sweetness of life and light of reason, above all the dead recalled to life — each, in the salvation accorded them, furnished a proof that a greater than Satan was here, and that the Kingdom of God was being manifested upon earth." ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 65 the express declaration that it was in one instance at least, "vehement" (Mk. iii. 12). 69 Perhaps in no incidents recorded in the Gospels is the action of our Lord's indignation more vividly displayed than in the ac counts of the cleansings of the Temple. In closing the ac count which he gives of the earlier of these, John tells us that " his disciples remembered that it was written, The zeal of thine house shall eat me up" (Jno. ii. 17). The word here employed — " zeal " — may mean nothing more than " ardor " ; but this ardor may burn with hot indignation, — we read of a "zeal of fire which shall devour the adversaries" (Heb. x. 27). And it seems to be this hot indignation at the pollution of the house of God — this " burning jealousy for the holiness of the house of God " 70' — which it connotes in our present passage. In this act, Jesus in effect gave vent " to a righteous anger ",71 and perceiving his wrathful zeal72 his followers recognized in it the Messianic fulfilment of the words in which the Psalmist represents himself as filled with a zeal for the house of Jehovah, and the honor of him who sits in it, that " consumes him like a fire burning in his bones, which in cessantly breaks through and rages all through him." 73 The form in which it here breaks forth is that of indignant anger towards those who defile God's house with traficking, and it thus presents us with one of the most striking manifestations of the anger of Jesus in act. It is far, however, from being the only instance in which the action of Jesus' anger is recorded for us. And the severity of his language equals the decisiveness of his action. He does 89 Cf. Swete in loc; also Lagrange : "iroXXd, taken adverbially, does not mean in Mk. ' often ', nor even ' in a prolonged fashion ', but ' earn estly', 'strongly', 'greatly' (except perhaps in i. 45) ; cf. v. 10, 23, 43, vi. 20, ix. 26; the Vulgate has, therefore, well rendered it vehementer (here and xvi. 43)." 70 Westcott in loc. 71 Zahn in loc : p. 168. 72 Meyer in loc : " In this wrathful zeal which they saw had taken hold of Jesus, they thought they saw the Messianic fulfilment of that word of the psalm. ..." 73 Delitzsch in loc. 66 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD not scruple to assault his opponents with the most vigorous denunciation. Herod he calls " that fox " (Lk. xiii. 32) ; the unreceptive, he designates briefly " swine " (Mt. vii. 6) ; those that tempt him he visits with the extreme term of ignominy — Satan (Mk. viii. 33). The opprobrious epithet of "hypo crites " is repeatedly on his lips (Mt. xv. 7, xxiii. passim; Lk. xiii. '1 5), and he added force to this reprobation by clothing it in violent figures, — they were " blind guides ", " whited sepul chres ", and, less tropically, " a faithless and perverse genera tion ", a " wicked and adulterous generation ". He does not shrink even from vituperatively designating them ravening wolves (Mt. vii. 15), serpents, brood of vipers (Mt. xii. 34), even children of the evil one : " Ye are ", he declares plainly, " of your father, the Devil " (Jno. viii. 44). The long arraign ment of the Pharisees in the twenty-third chapter of Matthew with its iterant, " Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypo crites ! " and its uncompromising denunciation, fairly throbs with indignation, and brings Jesus before us in his sternest mood, the mood of the nobleman in the parable (Lk. xix. 27), whom he represents as commanding: "And as for these my enemies, bring them hither and slay them before me." 74 The holy resentment of Jesus has been made the subject of a famous chapter in Ecco Homo.75 The contention of this chap ter is that he who loves men must needs hate with a burning hatred all that does wrong to human beings, and that, in point of fact, Jesus never wavered in his consistent resentment of the special wrong-doing which he was called upon to witness. The chapter announces as its thesis, indeed, the paradox that true mercy is no less the product of anger than of pity: that what differentiates the divine virtue of mercy from " the vice 74 Cf. James Denney, article " Anger ", and E. Daplyn, article " Fierce ness ", in Hastings' DCG. Also Lutgert, as cited, p. 97 where instances of our Lord's expressions of anger, " which occupy a large place in the Synoptics " are gathered together, and p. 99 where it is pointed out that " Jesus grounds his declarations of woe, not on what his opponents had done to him, but purely on their sins against the law and the prophets . . . Jesus' anger remains therefore pure because it burns against what is done against God, and not against what has happened to himself". 75 Chapter xxi. " The Law of Resentment." ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 67 of insensibility " which is called " tolerance ", is just the under lying presence of indignation. Thus. — so the reasoning runs, — " the man who cannot be angry cannot be merciful," and it was therefore precisely the anger of Christ which proved that the unbounded compassion he manifested to sinners " was really mercy and not mere tolerance." The analysis is doubt less incomplete ; but the suggestion, so far as it goes, is fruit ful. Jesus' anger is not merely the seamy side of his pity ; it is the righteous reaction of his moral sense in the presence of evil. But Jesus burned with anger against the wrongs he met with in his journey through human life as truly as he melted with pity at the sight of the world's misery : and it was out of these two emotions that his actual mercy proceeded. III. We call our Lord " the Man of Sorrows ", and the designa tion is obviously appropriate for one who came into the world to bear the sins of men and to give his life a ransom for many. It is, however, not a designation which is applied to Christ in the New Testament, and even in the Prophet (Is. liii. 3) it may very well refer rather to the objective afflictions of the righteous servant than to his subjective distresses.76 In any event we must bear in mind that our Lord did not come into the world to be broken by the power of sin and death, but to break it. He came as a conqueror with the gladness of the imminent victory in his heart; for the joy set before him he was able to endure the cross, despising shame (Heb. xii. 2). And as he did not prosecute his work in doubt of the issue, neither did he prosecute it hesitantly as to its methods. He rather (so we are told, Lk. x. 21) " exulted in the Holy Spirit " as he contemplated the ways of God in bringing many sons to glory. The word is a strong one and conveys the idea of exu berant gladness, a gladness which fills the heart ; 77 and it is 76 So e. g. Cheyne, G. A. Smith, Skinner, Workman. 77 'AyaWidopai : see G. Heine, Synonymik des N.T. -lichen Griechisch 1898, p. l47:"xofpw in general, gaudeo, laetor (xapd, XVOW ), dyaWidw, -omoi ( S'J ) exsulto, vehementer gaudeo, Mt. v. 12; Lk. x. 21 ( dyaWlains) Lk i. 14, 44, summum gaudium (frequently in LXX; not classical)". 68 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD intimated that, on this occasion at least, this exultation was a product in Christ — and therefore in his human nature — of the operations of the Holy Spirit,78 whom we must suppose to have been always working in the human soul of Christ, sustaining and strengthening it. It cannot be supposed that, this particu lar occasion alone being excepted, Jesus prosecuted his work on earth in a state of mental depression. His advent into the world was announced as "good tidings of great joy" (Lk. ii. 10), and the tidings which he himself proclaimed were "the good tidings " by way of eminence. Is it conceivable that he went about proclaiming them with a " sad countenance " (Mt. vi. 16) ? It is misleading then to say merely, with Jeremy Taylor, " We never read that Jesus laughed and but once that he rejoiced in spirit."79 We do read that, in con- There is a good brief account of the word given by C. F. Gelpe, in the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1849, pp. 645-646: "the pro- foundest and highest transport ". Cf. Godet in loc " 'Aya\\iao-6ai., to exult, denotes an inner transport, which takes place in the same deep regions of the soul of Jesus as the opposite emotion expressed by the ip.ppifj,ao-6ai , to groan (Jno. xi. 33). This powerful influence of external events on the inner being of Jesus proves how thoroughly in earnest the Gospels take his humanity." 78 Plummer in loc: "This joy is a divine inspiration. The fact is analogous to his being 'led by the Spirit in the wilderness', (iv. 1)." 79 The Whole Works of Jeremy Taylor. Ed. Heber, London 1828. II. p. lxvii. Jeremy Taylor's object is to show that Christ is not imitable by us in everything ; hence he proceeds at once : " But the declensions of our natures cannot bear the weight of a perpetual grave deportment, without the intervals of refreshment and free alacrity." This whole view of our Lord's deportment lacks justification: but it has been widely held from the earliest times. Basil the Great, for instance, in condemning immoder ate mirth, appeals to our Lord's example, — although he accounts for his de portment on a theory which bears traces of the " apathetic " ideal of virtue so wide-spread in his day. " And the Lord appears to have sus tained" says he (Regulae fusius Trdctatae. 17: Migne, PG. xxxi. p. 961), " the passions which are necessary to the flesh and whatever of them bear testimony to virtue, such as weariness, and pity to the afflicted : but never to have used laughter, so far as may be learned from the narrative of the Evangelists, but to have pronounced a woe upon those who are held by it (Lk. vi. 25)." Chrysostom (Horn, vi in Matth.: Migne, PG. lvii, p. 69) in commending a grave life by the example of Christ, exaggerates the matter: "If thou also weep thus, thou hast become an imitator of thy Lord. For he also himself wept, both over Lazarus ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 69 trast with John the Baptist, he came " eating and drinking ", and accordingly was malignantly called " a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners" (Mt. xi. 19; Lk. vii. 34) ; and this certainly does not encourage us to think of his demeanor at least as habitually sorrowful. It is pure perversion, to be sure, when Renan, after the de basing fashion of his sentimentalizing frivolity, transmutes Jesus' joy in his redemptive work (Jno. xv. 11, xvii. 13) into mere pagan lightness of heart and delight in living, as if his fundamental disposition were a kind of " sweet gaiety " which " was incessantly expressing itself in lively reflections, and kindly pleasantries." He assures us that Jesus travelled about Palestine almost as if he was some lord of revelry, bringing a festival wherever he came, and greeted at every doorstep " as a joy and a benediction " :¦ " the women and children adored him." The infancy of the world had come back with him " with its divine spontaneity and its naive dizzinesses of joy." At his touch the hard conditions of life vanished from sight, and there took possession of men, the dream of an imminent paradise, of " a delightful garden in which should continue forever the charming life they now were living." " How long ", asks Renan, " did this intoxication last? ", and answers : " We do not know. During the continuance of this magical apparition, time was not measured. Duration was suspended ; a week was a century. But whether it filled years or months, the dream was so beautiful that humanity has lived on it ever since, and our consolation still is to catch its fading fragrance. Never did so much joy stir the heart of man. For a moment in this most vigorous attempt it has ever made to lift itself above its planet, humanity forgot the leaden weight which holds it to the earth and the sorrows of the life here below. Happy he who could see with his own eyes this divine effloresence and share, if even for a day, this unparalleled illusion!" 80 The perversion is equally great, however, when there is and over the city; and touching Judas he was greatly troubled. And this, indeed, he is often to be seen doing, but never laughing (-yeXfiiTa), and not even smiling even a little; at least no one of the Evangelists has mentioned it." 8" Vie de Jesus, ch. xi. ad fin.; ed. 2. 1863, pp. 188-194. 7o ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD attributed to our Lord, as it is now very much the fashion to do, " before the black shadow of the cross fell athwart his pathway," the exuberant joy of a great hope never to be ful filled : the hope of winning his people to his side and of inau gurating the Kingdom of God upon this sinful earth by the mere force of its proclamation.81 Jesus was never the victim of any such illusion : he came into the world on a mission of ministering mercy to the lost, giving his life as a ransom for many (Lk. xix. 10; Mk. x. 4; Mt. xx. 28) ; and from the beginning he set his feet steadfastly in the path of suffering (Mt. iv. 3 f. ; Lk. iv. 3 f.) which he knew led straight onward to death (Jno. ii. 19, iii. 14; Mt. xii. 40; Lk. xii. 49-50; Mt. ix. 15; Mk. ii. 1-9; Lk. v. 34, etc.). Joy he had: but it was not the shallow joy of mere pagan delight in living, nor the de lusive joy of a hope destined to failure ; but the deep exultation of a conqueror setting captives free. This joy underlay all his sufferings and shed its light along the whole thorn-beset path which was trodden by his torn feet. We hear but little of it, however, as we hear but little of his sorrows : the nar ratives are not given to descriptions of the mental states of the great actor whose work they illustrate. We hear just enough of it to assure us of its presence underlying and giving its color to all his life (Lk. iv. 21 ;82 Jno. v. 11, xvii. 1383). If our Lord was " the Man of Sorrows ", he was more profoundly still " the Man of Joy ".84 8X Cf. the article " Foresight " in Hastings' DCG. See for example, A. Jiilicher, Die Gleichnisreden Jesu. I. p. 144; Paul Wernle, Die Anf tinge unserer Religion, p. 65 : " There was a time in Jesus' life, when a wholly extraordinary hope filled his soul. . . Then, Jesus knew himself to be in harmony with all the good forces of his people . . . that was the happiest time of his life. . . . We only need to ask whether Jesus retained this enthusiastic faith to the end. To that period of joyful hope there succeeded a deep depression." 8,P Aya\\idop.ai ; see note yy above. 83 Xapd : consult also the use in parables of both x^pd, Mt. xxv. 21, 23 ; Lk. xv. 10, and xalP'a, Mt. xviii. 13 ; Lk. xv. 5, 32. 84 A. B. Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ," 1881, p. 334: "Hence, though a man of sorrow, he was even on earth anointed with the oil of gladness above his fellows. . . . Shall we wonder that there was divine gladness in the heart of him who came into the world, not by constraint, but willingly; not with a burning sense of wrong, but with a ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 71 Of the lighter pleasurable emotions that flit across the mind in response to appropriate incitements arising occasionally in the course of social intercourse, we also hear little in the case of Jesus. It is not once recorded that he laughed ; we do not ever hear even that he smiled ; only once are we told that he was glad, and then it is rather sober gratification than exuberant delight which is spoken of in connection with him (Jno. xi. 15). But, then, we hear little also of his passing sorrows. The sight of Mary and her companions wailing at the tomb of Lazarus, agitated his soul and caused him tears (Jno. xi. 35) ; the stubborn unbelief of Jerusalem drew from him loud. wailing (Lk. xix. 41). He sighed at the sight of human suf fering (Mk. vii. 34) and " sighed deeply " overmen's hardened unbelief (viii. 12) : man's inhumanity to man smote his heart with pain (iii. 5). But it is only with reference to his supreme sacrifice that his mental sufferings are emphasized. This supreme sacrifice cast, it is true, its shadows before it. It was in the height of his ministry that our Lord exclaimed, " I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished" (Lk. xii. 50). 85 Floods lie before him grateful sense of high privilege ; and that he had a blessed consciousness of fellowship with his Father who sent him, during the whole of his pilgrimage through this vale of tears ? " A. E. Garvie, Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus, 1907, p. 318 : " Although in his emotions, varying notes of joy or grief were struck by the changeful experiences of his life among men, yet the undertone was the sense of a great good to be gained by the endurance of a great sorrow." G. Matheson, Studies in the Portrait of Christ™ 1909, I. pp. 274 sq. : " We speak of the ' Man of Sorrows ', yet I think the deepest note in the soul of Jesus was not sorrow but joy." C. W. Emmet, DCG. ii. p. 607 b : Christ " is the Man of Sorrows, yet we cannot think of him for a moment as an unhappy man. He rather gives us the picture of serene and unclouded happiness. Beneath not merely the outward suffering, but the profound sorrow of heart, there is deeper still a continual joy, derived from the realized presence of his Father and the consciousness that he is doing his work. Unless this is remembered, the idea of the Man of Sorrows is sentiment alized and exaggerated." F. W. Farrar, The Life of Christ, 1874, i- P- 318; ii. p. 103. ^Hahn in loc: "We see from this verse that Jesus had a distinct foreknowledge of his passion, as indeed he bears witness already in ix. 22, 44. There meets us here, however, the first intimation that he 72 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD under which he is to be submerged,86 and the thought of pas sing beneath their waters " straitens " his soul. The term rendered " straitened " 87 imports oppression and affliction, and bears witness to the burden of anticipated anguish which our Lord bore throughout life. The prospect of his sufferings, it has been justly said, was a perpetual88 Gethsemane; and how complete this foretaste was we may learn from the incident recorded in Jno. xii. 27,89 although this antedated Gethsemane, by only a few days. " Now is my soul90 troubled," he cries and adds a remarkable confession of shrinking at the prospect of death, with, however, an immediate revulsion to his habit ual attitude of submission to, or rather of hearty embracing of, his Father's will. — "And what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour ! 91 But for this cause, came I to this hour ! looked forward to it with inner dread (Angst), though there are re peated testimonies to this later (Cf. xxii. 42; Jno. xii. 2; Mt. xxvi. 37)." Cf. Mt. xx. 22 : " Are you able to drink the cup that I am about to drink?"; Mk. x. 38: "Are you able to drink the cup that I drink? or to be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with ? " 88 Cf. Meyer on Mk. x. 38: "The cup and baptism of Jesus represent martyrdom. In the case of the figure of baptism . . . the point of the similitude lies in the being submerged . . Cf. the classical use of KdraSieiv and Pairrlfeiv , to plunge (immerge) into sufferings, sorrows, and the like." 87 'Zwixoj : see G. Heine, Synonymik etc., 1898. p. 149: "o-xjvex.op.ai, affligor, laboro". Cf. Plummer in loc: "How am I oppressed, afflicted, until it be accomplished! Comp. viii. 3y; Jno. v. 24. The prospect of his sufferings was a perpetual Gethsemane : cf. Jno. xii. 27." Weiss in loc: "And how I am afflicted (bedrdngt) until it be accomplished! Expression of human anxiety in prospect of the sufferings which were to come, as in Gethsemane and Jno. xii. 27." 88 The fws Stov emphasizes the whole intervening time : "I am strait ened through all the time up to its accomplishment." 88 Zahn in loc, (p. 509) : " The essential content of this incident, nar rated by John alone, is the same that the Synoptics record in the prayer- conflict in Gethsemane, which John passes over in silence when his nar rative brings him to Gethsemane (xviii. 1-11)". 80 See note 3. 91 This prayer is frequently taken as a continuation of the question. So, e. g. Zahn. (p. 507) : " To the question tI ettroj , the words which follow : irdrep, ouxrbv pje in ttjs upas Ta&rijs cannot bring the response; for the prayer is at once corrected and withdrawn ( dXXd ktX ) , and replaced by an absolutely different one (verse 28). The first prayer shares ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 73 Father, glorify Thy name !" He had come into the world to die ; but as he vividly realizes what the death is which he is to die, there rises in his soul a yearning for deliverance, only however, to be at once repressed.92 The state of mind in which this sharp conflict went on is described by a term the fundamen tal implication of which is agitation, disquietude, perplex ity.93 This perturbation of soul is three times attributed by John to Jesus (xi. 33, xii. 27, xiii. 21), and always as express ing the emotions which conflict with death stirred in him. The anger roused in him by the sight of the distress into which death had plunged Mary and her companions (xi. 33) ; the an ticipation of his own betrayal to death (xiii. 21) ; the clearly realized approach of his death (xii. 27) ; threw him inwardly into profound agitation. It was not always the prospect of his own death (xii. 2J, xiii. 21), but equally the poignant real ization of what death meant for others (xi. 33) which had the power thus to disquiet him. His deep agitation was clearly, therefore, not due to mere recoil from the physical experience of death,94 though even such a recoil might be the expression therefore in the interrogatory inflection of rl etiria and is to be filled out by an apa (or ?j) etirio derived thence, with the new question, 'Am I to say, perhaps: Father save me from this hour? ' " Against this, however, Wes- cott forcibly urges " that it does not fall in with the parallel clause, which follows: 'Father glorify Thy Name'; nor with the intensity of the passage, nor yet with the kindred passages in the Synoptics (Mt. xxvi. 39 and parallels)." 02 Zahn (p. 509) : " Into the world of Jesus' conceptions the possibility of going another way than that indicated by God could intrude; that was his temptation; but his will repelled it." 93 Tapdo-o-oj : see Schmidt, Synonymik etc., iii. 1879. § 739. 6. p. 516: Heine, Synonymik etc., 1898. p. 149. 84 Cf. Calvin Com. in Harm. Evang., on Mt. xxvi. 37 : " And whence came to him both sorrow and anxiety and fear, except because he felt in death something sadder and more horrible than the separation of the soul and body? And certainly he underwent death, not merely that he might move from earth to heaven, but rather that he might take on himself the curse to which we were liable, and deliver us from it. His horror was not, then, at death simpliciter, as a passage out of the world, but because he had before his eyes the dreadful tribunal of God, and the Judge Himself armed with inconceivable vengeance; it was our sins, the burden of which he had assumed, that pressed him down with 74 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD not so much of a terror of dying as of a repugnance to the idea of death.95 Behind death, he saw him who has the power of death, and that sin which constitutes the sting of death. His whole being revolted from that final and deepest humiliation, in which the powers of evil were to inflict upon him the precise penalty of human sin. To bow his head beneath this stroke was the last indignity, the hardest act of that obedience which it was his to render in his servant-form, and which we are told with significant emphasis, extended " up to death " (Phil. ii. 8). So profound a repugnance to death and all that death meant, manifesting itself during his life, could not fail to seize upon him with peculiar intensity at the end. If the distant prospect of his sufferings was a perpetual Gethsemane to him, the im mediate imminence of them in the actual Gethsemane could not fail to bring with it that " awful and dreadful torture " which Calvin does not scruple to call the " exordium " of the pains of hell themselves.96 Matthew and Mark almost exhaust the resources of language to convey to us some conception of their enormous mass. It is, then, not at all strange if the dreadful abyss of destruction tormented him grievously with fear and anguish." 95 Thus Mrs. Humphrey Ward reports a conversation with Mir. Glad stone (" Notes of Conversation with Mr. Gladstone," appended to the second volume of Robert Elsmere, Westmoreland ed. 1911) : "He said that though he had seen many deaths, he had never seen any really peaceful. In all there had been much struggle. So much so that ' I my self have conceived what I will not call a terror of death, but a re pugnance from the idea of death. It is the rending asunder of body and soul, the tearing apart of the two elements of our nature, — for I hold the body to be an essential element as well as the soul, not a mere sheath or envelope.' " "Institutes. II. xvi. 12: "If anyone now ask, whether Christ was al ready descending into hell when he prayed to be delivered from death, I reply that this was the exordium, and we may learn from it what diros et horribiles cruciatus he sustained when he was conscious of standing at the tribunal of God, arraigned on our account." " It is our wisdom," Calvin remarks in the context, " to have a fit sense of how much our salvation cost the Son of God." Cf. the discussion in the same spirit of Thomas Goodwin, Works, v. pp. 278-288 : " For it is God's wrath that is hell, as it is his favor that is heaven" (p. 281). ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 75 our Lord's " agony " 97 as an early interpolator of Luke (Lk. xxii. 44) calls it, in this dreadful experience.98 The anguish of reluctance which constituted this " agony " is in part de scribed by them both — they alone of the Evangelists enter into our Lord's feelings here — by a term the primary idea of which is loathing, aversion, perhaps not unmixed with despondency.99 This term is adjoined in Matthew's account to the common word for sorrow, in which, however, here the fundamental element of pain, distress, is prominent,100 so that we may per haps render Matthew's account : " He began to be distressed and despondent" (Mt. xxvi. 37). Instead of this wide word for distress of mind, Mark employs a term which more narrow ly defines the distress as consternation, — if not exactly dread, yet alarmed dismay :101 " He began to be appalled and despond- m ' Ayiovla : see G. Heine, Synonymik etc., 1898, p. 189: "Contest, quaking, agitation (and anxiety of the issue?) Lk. xxii. 44; Luther, 'he grappled with death ', Weizsacker, ' he struggled ', Bengel ; ' supreme grief and anguish. It properly denotes the anguish and passion of the mind, when it enters upon a conflict and arduous labor, even when there is no doubt of a good issue'." Plummer in loc: "Field contends that fear is the radical notion of the word. The passages in which it occurs in LXX confirm this view. . . . It is therefore an agony of fear that is apparently to be understood." It would be better to say consternation, appalled reluctance. 98 The discussion of the language employed, by John Pearson, An Expo sition of the Creed, (New York, 1843), p. 288, note t, is very penetrating. m' ASTipjwioj : see Heine, Synonymik etc., 1898, p. 148: " pavesco, angor." Cf. Lightf oot, on Phil. ii. 26 : " The primary idea of the word will be loathing and discontent." " It describes the confused, restless, half- distracted state, which is produced by physical discouragement, or by mental distress, or grief, shame, disappointment, etc." Lagrange on Mk. xviii. 33: "seized with despondency". Thomas Goodwin (Works. v. 276) : " so that we see Christ's soul was sick and fainted," " his heart failed him." Il" AvTiopuc. see note 38. 101 'EtcBap-piopat : see Hastings' DCG. i. p. 48, article "Amazement"; G. Heine, Synonymik etc., p. 149 : It " is used of those whose minds are horror-struck by the sight or thought of something great or atrocious, not merely because it injects fear, but because the mind scarcely takes in its magnitude." Weiss in loc: " inBappeTo-Bai cannot designate the dread (Angst) but only the horror (Erschrecken) which attacks Jesus at the thought of the sufferings which stand before him." Thomas Good win (Works, v. p. 275) : " It signifies 'to be in horror'." 76 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD ent" (Mk. xiv. 33). Both accounts add our Lord's own pathetic declaration : " My soul102 is exceeding sorrowful even unto death ", the central term103 in which expresses a sorrow, or perhaps we would better say, a mental pain, a distress, which hems in on every side, from which there is therefore no es cape; or rather (for the qualification imports that this hem- ming-in distress is mortally acute, is an anguish of a sort that no issue but death can be thought of104) which presses in and besets from every side and therefore leaves no place for de fence. The extremity of this agony may have been revealed, as the interpolator of Luke tells us, by sweat dropping like clots of blood on the ground, as our Lord ever more impor tunately urged that wonderful prayer, in which as Bengel strikingly says,105 the horror of death and the ardor of obed ience met (Lk. xxii. 44). This interpolator tells us (Lk. xxii. 43 ) also that he was strengthened for the conflict by an angelic visitor, and we may well suppose that had it not been for some supernatural strengthening mercifully vouchsafed (cf. Jno. xii. 27L ), the end would then have come.106 But the cup must needs be drained to its dregs, and the final drop was not drunk until that cry of desertion and desolation was uttered, " My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" (Mt. xxvii. 102 See note 3. 103 IlepCKv-n-os. J. A. Alexander : " Grieved all round, encompassed, shut in by distress on every side." Morrison : " The idea is, My soul is sorrowful all round and round." 104 Swete's " a sorrow which well-nigh kills " is too weak : the meaning is, it is a sorrow that kills. Thomas Goodwin (Works, v. p. 272) dis tinguishes thus : " A heaviness unto death, not extensive, so as to die, but intensive, that if he had died, he could not have suffered more." 105 On Jno. xii. 27. The evidence derived from the conflict of wills in this prayer that these emotions had their seat in our Lord's human nature is often adverted to, — e. g. by J. R. Willis, Hasting's DCG. i. p. 17a: — " The thrice-repeated prayer of Jesus in which he speaks of his own will as distinct from but distinctly subordinate to his Father's adds to the im pression already gained, of the purely human feelings exhibited by him in this struggle." 108 Cf. the description of this " agony " in Heb. v. 7 : " Who, in the days of his flesh, having offered up, with strong crying and tears, prayers and supplications unto him that was able to save him from death ''. ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD yy 46; Mk. xv. 34). 107 This culminating sorrow was actually unto death. In these supreme moments our Lord sounded the ultimate depths of human anguish, and vindicated on the score of the intensity of his mental sufferings the right to the title of Man of Sorrows. The scope of these sufferings was also very broad, embracing that whole series of painful emotions which runs from a consternation that is appalled dismay, through a despondency which is almost despair, to a sense of well-nigh complete desolation. In the presence of this mental anguish the physical tortures of the crucifixion retire into the back ground, and we may well believe that our Lord, though he died on the cross, yet died not of the cross, but, as we common ly say, of a broken heart, that is to say, of the strain of his 187 Calvin, Commentarius in Harmoniam Evangelicarum, on Mt. xxvii. 46: " And certainly this was his chief conflict, and harder than all his other torments, because he was so far from being supported in his straits by his Father's help or favor, that he felt himself in some measure estranged. For he did not offer his body only in payment for our reconciliation with God, but in his soul also he bore the punishments due to us ; and thus became in very fact the man of sorrows, as Isaiah says (liii. 3). . . For that Christ should make satisfaction for us, it was necessary that he be sisted as guilty before the tribunal of God. But nothing is more horrible than to incur the judgment of God, whose wrath is worse than all deaths. When, then, there was presented to Christ a kind of tempta tion as if he were already devoted to destruction, God being his enemy, he was seized with a horror in which a hundred times all the mortals in existence would have been overwhelmed; but he came out of it victor, by the amazing power of the Spirit ". . . Also Institutes II. xvi. 11 : " And certainly it is not possible to imagine a more terrible abyss than to feel yourself forsaken and abandoned (derelictum et alienatum) by God, and, when you call upon him, not to be heard as though he had conspired for your destruction. Christ we see to have been so dejected (defectum) as to be constrained in the urgency of his distress (urgente angusta) to cry out, ' My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me ?' " Calvin adds with clear insight that though it is evident that this cry was ex intimi animi angore deductam, yet this does not carry with it the admission that " God was ever either hostile or angry with him." " For how could he be angry with his beloved son, in whom his soul delighted, or how could Christ appear in his intercession for others before a Father who was incensed with him ? " All that is affirmed is that " he sustained the weight of the Divine severity; since, smitten and afflicted by the hand of God, he experienced all the signs of an angry and punishing God." 78 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD mental suffering.108 The sensitiveness of his soul to affec- tional' movements, and the depths of the currents of feeling which flowed through his being, are thus thrown up into a very clear light. And yet it is noticeable that while they tore his heart and perhaps, in the end, broke the bonds which bound his fluttering spirit to its tenement of clay, they never took the helm of life or overthrew either the judgment of his calm understanding or the completeness of his perfect trust in his Father. If he cried out in his agony for deliverance, it was always the cry of a child to a Father whom he trusts with all and always, and with the explicit condition, Howbeit, not what I will but what Thou wilt. If the sense of desolation invades his soul, he yet confidingly commends his departing spirit into his Father's hands (Lk. xxiii. 46 ).109 And through all 188 That his death was due to psychical rather than physical causes may be the reason why it took place so soon. Jacobus Baumann in a most dis tressing book (Die Gemiitsart Jesu, 1908, p. 10) appeals to the rapidity with which Jesus succumbed to death as evidence of a certain general lack of healthful vigor which he finds in Jesus : " With this liability to easy exhaustion, his quick death on the cross agrees — a thing which was unusual." 109 Calvin, Institutes ii. xv. 12 does not fail to remind us that even in our Lord's cry of desolation, he still addresses God as " My God " : " although he suffered agony beyond measure, yet he does not cease to call God his God, even when he cries out that he is forsaken by him." Then at large in the Comm. in Harm. Evang., on Mt. xxvii. 46 : " We have already pointed out the difference between natural feeling and the knowl edge of faith. There was nothing to prevent Christ from mentally con ceiving that God had deserted him, according to the dictation of his natural feeling, and at the same time retaining his faith that God was well-disposed to him. And this appears with sufficient clearness from the two clauses of the complaint. For before he gives expression to his trial, he begins by saying that he flees to God as his God and so he bravely repels by this shield of faith that appearance of dereliction which presented itself in opposition. In short, in this dire anguish his faith was unimpaired, so that in act of deploring that he was forsaken, he still trusted in the present help of God." Similarly Thomas Goodwin (Works, v. p. 283) : "And both these differing apprehensions of his did Christ accordingly express in that one sentence, ' My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me ? ' He speaks it as apprehending himself a son still united to God and beloved by him, and yet forsaken by him as a surety accursed." ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 79 his agony his demeanor to his disciples, his enemies,, his judges, his executioners is instinct with calm self-mastery. The cup which was put to his lips was bitter : none of its bit terness was lost to him as he drank it : but he drank it ; and he drank it as his own cup which it was his own will (because it was his Father's will) to drink. " The cup which the Father hath given me, shall I not drink it? " (Jno. xviii. 11), — it was in this spirit, not of unwilling subjection to unavoidable evil, but of voluntary endurance of unutterable anguish for adequate ends, that he passed into and through all his sufferings. His very passion was his own action. He had power to lay down his life ; and it was by his own power that he laid down his life, and by his own power that he trod the whole pathway of suffering which led up to the formal act of his laying down his life. Nowhere is he the victim of circumstances or the helpless sufferer. Everywhere and always, it is he who pos sesses the mastery both of circumstances and of himself.110 The completeness of Jesus' trust in God which is manifested in the unconditional, " Nevertheless, not as I will but as Thou wilt " of the " agony ", and is echoed in the " Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit " of the cross, finds endless illustration in the narratives of the Evangelists. Trust is never, however, explicitly attributed to him in so many words.111 Ex cept in the scoffing language with which he was assailed as he hung on the cross : " He trusteth in God ; let him deliver him now if he desireth him" (Mt. xxvii. 43), the term "trust" is never so much as mentioned in connection with his relations u0 Cf. the remarks of H. N. Bernard, The Mental Characteristics of our Lord Jesus Christ, 1888, pp. 2S7sq. m Cf. Heb. ii. 13. In Jno. ii. 24 we are told that Jesus " did not trust himself ( Mo-revo-ev )" to those in Jerusalem who believed on him when they saw the signs which he did. Cf. Lutgert, as cited, p. 63 : " From this the relation of Jesus to God receives a two-fold form : on the one side it is absolute trust, a certainty of receiving everything, a wish and prayer directed to God, which leads to a complete exaltation above nature; but this side of his faith Jesus makes use of only for men. By virtue of this his confidence he fulfils the wish of all who ask him. In this use of his faith he expresses his love for men. The faith of Jesus has however also another side; it is bowing, renunciation and subordination to God. This side of his faith Jesus employs only for himself. The story of the tempta- 80 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD with God. Nor is the term " faith ".112 Nor indeed are many of what we may call the fundamental religious affections directly attributed to him, although he is depicted as literally living, moving and having his being in God. His profound feeling of dependence on God, for example, is illustrated in every conceivable way, not least strikingly in the constant habit of prayer which the Evangelists ascribe to him.113 But we are never directly told that he felt this dependence on God or "feared God" or felt the emotions of reverence and awe in the divine presence.114 We are repeatedly told that he re- tion shows that Jesus uses this renunciation in order to glorify God." (Further, p. 89). 112 Cf. A. Schlatter, Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 1909, p. 317: " Perfect love involves perfect trust, and is not thinkable without it. Yet though the disciples have declared that Jesus empowered them for faith and demanded faith of them, they have said nothing of Jesus' own faith. Even John has said nothing of it although he has rich formulas for the piety of Jesus and speaks of faith as the act by which Jesus unites his disciples with himself. The notion of faith is introduced by him only with respect to Jesus' relations to men, ' He trusted himself not to them ' ; while, of Jesus' relation to God, he says ' He heard him, loved him, knew him, saw him,' but not, ' He believed on him ' (Jno. ii. 24, viii. 26, 40, xi. 10, xiv. 31, x. 15, xvii. 25, iii. 11, vi. 46, viii. 35). As a rule for the conduct of the disciples toward Jesus is expressly drawn from Jesus' conduct towards the Father, the formula ' Believe in me as I believe in the Father ' might have been expected. But it does not occur." U8Mk. i. 35, vi. 46, xiv. 32, 35; Mt. xiv. 23, xix. 13, xxvi. 36-39, 42-44; Lk. iii. 21, v. 16, vi. 12, ix. 18-28, xi. 1, xxii. 41, 44. Cf. Lutgert, as cited, p. 90: "Also in the expression of his love to God, Jesus fulfilled, accord ing to the Evangelists, his own commandment, not to exhibit his piety openly, but to practice it in secret. The Evangelists therefore designedly lay stress on Jesus' seeking solitude for prayer. The communion of Jesus with God, the ' inner life ' of Jesus, falls accordingly outside their nar rative. The relation of Jesus with God is not discussed, his com munion with God remains a secret." This is spoken of the Synoptics who alone tells us of Jesus' habit of prayer (¦n-poo-tixop:ai, wpoirevxti do not occur in John). 114 Cf. Heb. v. 7: "having been heard for his godly fear (erJXd/Jeia)", i. e. for his reverent and submissive awe, "that religious fear of God and anxiety not to offend him which manifests itself in voluntary and humble submission to his will" (Delitzsch in loc). Davidson in loc: "The clause throws emphasis on the Son's reverent submission." Humanitarian writers debate whether " fear " of God is to be attributed to Jesus. Well- ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 8l turned thanks to God,115 but we are never told in so many words that he experienced the emotion of gratitude. The nar rative brings Jesus before us as acting under the impulse of all the religious emotions ; but it does not stop to comment upon the emotions themselves. The same is true of the more common emotions of human hausen (Israel, und jiid. Geschichte', p. 383, expanded in Skiszen und Vorarbeiten, i. 1884, p. 98) represents him as passing his life in fear of the judge of all : " He feels the reality of God dominating life, he breathes in the fear of the Judge who demands account of every idle word and has power to destroy body and soul in hell." Similarly Bousset (Jesus, 1904, pp. 54, 99, E. T. pp. 112, 203) speaks of him as learning by his own experience " that God is terrible (furchibar) and that an awful darkness and dread encircles him even for those who stand nearest to him," and as " sharing to the bottom of his soul " " the fear of that al mighty God who has power to damn body and soul together," which he " has stamped upon the hearts of his disciples with such marvellous energy." Karl Thieme, however, from the same humanitarian standpoint (Die christliche Demut, i. 1906, pp. 109 sq.) repels such representations as without historical ground: we may historically ascribe reverential awe (Ehrfurcht) to Jesus but not fear (Furcht). "Of course he compre hended God in the whole overtowering majesty of his being, and adored his immeasurable exaltation in the deepest reverence (Ehrfurcht)." But " we may maintain in Jesus' case an altogether fearless (furchtlos) assurance of God and self." " We cannot speak of a ' fear of the Judge ' in Jesus' case, because it does not well harmonize with his faith in his own judgeship of the world. But we can no doubt call the intensity of his obedience, the living sense of responsibility in which he made it his end, his whole life through, to walk, in all his motions, with the utmost exactness according to the will of God as the almighty majestic Lord, his fear of God." Lutgert (Die Liebe im Neuen Testament, 1895, pp. 88, 89) points to Jesus' turning to the Father in Gethsemane and on the cross, not as something terrible (furchtbar) but with loving confidence, as decisive in the case. On the place of ' the fear of God ' in Christian piety,' see Liitgert's article Die Furcht Gottes, published in the Theo- logische Studien, presented to Martin Kahler on 6 January 1905 (Leipzig, 1905, PP. 163 sq.). ^'EvxapuTTioj , Jno. xi. 41; Mt. xv. 36; Mk. viii. 6; Jno. vi. 11, 23; xxvi. 27 ; Mk. xiv. 23 ; Lk. xxii. 17, 19 ; 1 Cor. xi. 24. On the word, see Lobeck, Phrynicus, p. 18 ; Rutherford, The New Phrynicus, p. 69. 'Eijojuo \oyiopat, Mt. xi. 25 ; Lk. x. 21 ; R. V. mg. ' praise ' : so Meyer, Hahn, Zahn, also Kennedy, Sources of N. T. Greek, p. 118. Fritzsche: " Gra- tias tibi ago, quod ". Better, Plummer : "acknowledge openly to thine honour, give thee praise." Similarly J. A. Alexander. 82 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD life. The narrative is objective throughout in its method. On two occasions we are told that Jesus felt that occurrences which he witnessed were extraordinary and experienced the appropriate emotion of "wonder" regarding them (Mt. viii. 10; Lk. vii 9; Mk. vi. 6).116 Once " desire " is attributed to him (Lk. xxii. 15), — he had " set his heart ", as we should say, upon eating the final passover with his disciples — the term used emphasizing the affectional movement.117 And once our Lord speaks of himself as being conceivably the subject of " shame ", the reference being, however, rather to a mode of action consonant with the emotion, than to the feeling itself (Mk. viii. 38; Lk. iv. 26). 118 Besides these few chance sugges tions, there are none of the numerous emotions that rise and fall in the human soul, which happen to be explicitly attributed to our Lord.119 The reader sees them all in play in his vividly narrated life-experiences, but he is not told of them. We have now passed in review the whole series of explicit attributions to our Lord in the Gospels of specific emotional movements. It belongs to the occasional manner in which these emotional movements find record in the narrative, that it is only our Lord's most noticeable displays of emotion which are noted. One of the effects of this is to give to his emotions 118 Qavpd^io: see Schmidt, Synonymik etc., iv. § 165, pp. i84sq. : " it is perfectly generally ' to wonder ' or 'to admire ', and is distinguished from Bappe'iv precisely as the German sich wundern, or bewundern is from staunen: that is, what has seized on us in the case of Bavpd^iv is the extraordinary nature of the thing while in the case of 0ap.peiv it is the un expectedness and suddenness of the occurrence." Cf. Art. "Amazement" in Hasting's DCG. I, pp. 47, 48. 117 '~Eiri0vp.La: see Schmidt, Synonymik, III, § 145, 3, 5; 146, 8; and cf. J. C. Lambert, art. "Desire" in Hastings' DCG, I, 453. m"E.Ttaurxtvopai : see Schmidt, Synonymik, III, § 140; Trench Synonyms, § § 19, 20. On Shame in our Lord's life cf. James Stalker, Imago Christi, p. 190, and Thieme, as above, p. in. U9When Wellhausen (Geschichte Israels? p. 346) says, "There broke out with him from time to time manifestations of enthusiasm, but to these elevations of mood there corresponded also depressions," — he is going beyond the warrant of the narrative, which pictures Jesus rather as sin gularly equable in his demeanor. Cf. Lutgert, as cited, p. 103. ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 83 as noted the appearance of peculiar strength, vividness and completeness. This serves to refute the notion which has been sometimes advanced under the influence of the " apathetic " conception of virtue, that emotional movements never ran their full course in him as we experience them, but stopped short at some point in their action deemed the point of dignity.120 In doing so, it serves equally, however, to carry home to us a very vivid impression of the truth and reality of our Lord's human nature. What we are given is, no doubt, only the high lights. But it is easy to fill in the picture mentally with the multitude of emotional movements which have not found record just because they were in no way exceptional. Here obviously is a being who reacts as we react to the incitements which arise in daily intercourse with men, and whose reactions bear all the characteristics of the corresponding emotions we are familiar with in our experience. Perhaps it may be well explicitly to note that our Lord's emotions fulfilled themselves, as ours do, in physical reactions. He who hungered (Mt. iv. 2), thirsted (Jno. xix. 20), was weary (Jno. iv. 6), who knew both physical pain and pleasure, expressed also in bodily affections the emotions that stirred his soul. That he did so is sufficiently evinced by the simple cir cumstance that these emotions were observed and recorded. But the bodily expression of the emotions is also frequently expressly attested. Not only do we read that he wept (Jno. xi- 35) and wailed (Lk. xix. 41), sighed (Mk. vii. 34) and groaned (Mk. viii. 12) ; but we read also of his angry glare (Mk. iii. 5), his annoyed speech (Mk. x. 14), his chiding Words (e. g. Mk. iii. 12), the outbreaking ebullition of his rage (e. g. Jno. xi. 33, 38) ; of the agitation of his bearing when under strong feeling (Jno. xi. 35), the open exultation 120 Origen, for example, in his comment on Mt. xxvi. 37 lays great weight on the words : " He began to be ", in the sense that the implica tion is that he never completed the act. Jesus only entered upon these emotions, but did not suffer them in their fulness. He was subject to irpoTrdBeia but not to the irdBi\ themselves. Similarly Cornelius a Lapide wishes us to believe that Christ instead of " passions " had only " pro- passiones libere assumptae". For a modern writer approaching this posi tion, see John Hutchison, The Monthly Interpreter, 1885, II, p. 288. 84 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD of his joy (Lk. x. 21), the unrest of his movements in the face of anticipated evils (Mt. xxvii. 2>7)> the loud cry which was wrung from him in his moment of desolation (Mt. xxvii. 46). Nothing is lacking to make the impression strong that we have before us in Jesus a human being like ourselves. It is part of the content of this impression, that Jesus ap pears before us in the light of the play of his emotions as a distinct human being, with his own individuality and — shall we not say it? — even temperament. It is, indeed, sometimes suggested that the Son of God assumed at the incarnation not a human nature but human nature, that is to say, not human nature as manifesting itself in an individual, but human nature in general, " generic " or " universal " human nature. The idea which it is meant to express, is not a very clear one,121 and is apparently only a relic of the discountenanced fiction of the " real " existence of universals. In any case the idea receives m It is not clear, for example, precisely what is meant by A. J. Mason (The Conditions of our Lord's Life on Earth, 1896, p. 46), when he says : " When Christ is called ' a Man ' it sounds as if he were consid ered only an incidental specimen of the race, like one of ourselves, and not, as he is in fact, the universal Man, in whom the whole of human nature is gathered up, — the representative and head of the entire species." What is a " universal man " ? And how could " the whole of human nature " be " gathered up " in Jesus, except representatively, — which is not what is meant — unless universal human nature is an entity with "real exist ence "? And if even Mason is unintelligible, what shall we say of a writer like J. P. Lange (Christliche Dogmatik; Zweiter Theil; Positive Dog- matik, 1881, pp. 770-771) : "The man in the God-man is not an individ ual man of itself, but the man which takes mankind up into itself, as mankind has taken nature up into itself. And so it coalesces with the divine self-limitation, as the Son of God unites with the human limitation. The man in the God-man embraces the eternal Becoming of the whole world as it goes forth from God according to the energy of his nature So it is also radically the real passage of the Becoming through the per fected Becoming into the absolute Being, and therefore the proper organ of the Son of God according to his ideal entrance into the absolute Be coming. It is the limited unlimitation which coalesces with the unlimited limitation of the divine man, who takes up into itself the human God." It is only fair to bear in mind, however, that this statement is partly relieved of its unintelligibility when it is read in connection with Lange's expo sition of the ideas of man and the God-man in his Philosophical Dog matics, which, in his system, precedes his Positive Dogmatics. ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 85 no support from a survey of the emotional life of our Lord as it is presented to us in the Evangelical narratives. The im pression of a distinct individuality acting in accordance with its specific character as such, which is left on the mind by these narratives is very strong. Whether our Lord's human nature is " generic " or " individual ", it certainly. — the Evangelists being witness — functioned in the days of his flesh as if it were individual; and we have the same reason for pronouncing it an individual human-nature that we have for pronouncing such any human nature of whose functioning we have knowl edge.122 This general conclusion is quite independent of the precise determination of the peculiarity of the individuality which our Lord exhibits. He himself, on a great occasion, sums up his individual character (in express contrast with other individ uals) in the declaration, " I am meek and lowly of heart." And no impression was left by his life-manifestation more deeply imprinted upon the consciousness of his followers than that of the noble humility of his bearing. It was by the " meek ness and gentleness of Christ " that they encouraged one another to a life becoming a Christian man's profession (2 Cor. x. 1 ) ; for " the patience of Christ " that they prayed in behalf of one another as a blessing worthy to be set in their aspirations by the side of the " love of God " (2 Thess. iii. 5) ; to the imitation of Christ's meek acceptance of undeserved outrages that they exhorted one another in persecution — " be cause Christ also suffered for sin, leaving you an example, that ye should follow in his steps; who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth; who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, threatened not; but com mitted himself to him that judgeth righteously" (1 Pet. ii. 122 Cf. A. B. Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ? 1881, pp. 262, and pp. 427-428 : " I see in him traces of strongly marked, though not one-sided individuality . . . Generally speaking, the reality, not ideality, of the humanity is the thing that lies on the surface ; although the latter is not to be denied, nor the many-sidedness which is adduced in proof of it by Martensen and others." Cf. Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, ET, pp. 28osq. * 86 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 21-23). Nevertheless we cannot fix upon humility as in such a sense our Lord's " quality " as to obscure in him other qualities which might seem to stand in conflict with it; much less as carrying with it those " defects " which are apt to accompany it when it appears as the " quality " of others. Meekness in our Lord was not a weak bearing of evils, but a strong forbearance in the presence of evil. It was not so much a fundamental characteristic of a nature constitutionally averse to asserting itself, as a voluntary submission of a strong person bent on an end. It did not, therefore, so much give way before indignation when the tension became too great for it to bear up against it, as coexist with a burning indignation at all that was evil, in a perfect equipoise which knew no wavering to this side or that. It was, in a word, only the man ifestation in him of the mind which looks not on its own things but the things of others (Phil. ii. 5), and therefore spells " mission ", not " temperament ". We cannot in any case define his temperament, as we define other men's tem peraments, by pointing to his dominant characteristics or the prevailing direction of his emotional discharges.123 In this sense he had no particular temperament, and it might with truth be said that his human nature was generic, not individual. The mark of his individuality was harmonious completeness : of him alone of men, it may be truly said that nothing that is human was alien to him, and that all that is human manifested itself in him in perfect proportion and balance. 123 E. P. Boys-Smith, Hastings' DCG, II, p. 163a : " The fulness, balance, and unity of the Master's nature make it impracticable to use in his case what is the commonest and readiest way of portraying a person. This is to throw into the fore-ground of the picture those features in which the character is exceptionally strong, or those deficiencies which mark it off from others, and to leave as an unelaborated back-ground the common stuff of human nature. Thus, by sketching the idiosyncracies, and casting a few high lights, the man is set forth sufficiently. But what traits are there in the Lord Jesus which stand out because more highly developed than other features? Nothing truly human was wanting to him, nothing was exaggerated. The fact which distinguished him from all others was his completeness at all points. . ." ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 87 The series of emotions attributed to our Lord in the Evan gelical narrative, in their variety and their complex but har monious interaction, illustrate, though, of course, they cannot of themselves demonstrate, this balanced comprehensiveness of his individuality. Various as they are, they do n6"t inhibit one another; compassion and indignation rise together in his soul; joy and sorrow meet in his heart and kiss each other. Strong as they are — not mere joy but exultation, not mere irritated annoyance but raging indignation, not mere passing pity but the deepest movements of compassion and love, not mere surface distress but an exceeding sorrow even unto death, — they never overmaster him. He remains ever in control.124 Calvin is, therefore, not without justification, when, telling us125 that in taking human affections our Lord did not take inordinate affections, but kept himself even in his passions in subjection to the will of the Father, he adds : " In short, if you compare his passions with ours, they will differ not less than the clear and pure water, flowing in a gentle course, differs from dirty and muddy foam." 126 The figure which is here 124 T. B. Kilpatrick, Hastings' DCG, I. pp. 294b-295a: "Yet we are not to impute to him any unemotional callousness. He never lost his calmness ; but he was not always calm. He repelled temptation with deep indignation (Mk. viii. 33). Hypocrisy aroused him to a flame of judgment (Mk. iii 5, xi. 15-17; Mt. xxiii. 1-36). Treachery shook him to the center of his being (Jno. xiii. 21). The waves of human sorrow broke over him with a greater grief than wrung the bereaved sisters (Jno. xi. 33-35)- There were times when he bore an unknown agony . . . Yet whatever his soul's discipline might be, he never lost his self-control, was never dis tracted or afraid, but remained true to his mission and to his faith. He feels anger, or sorrow, or trouble, but these emotions are under the control of a will that is one with the divine will, and therefore are com prehended within the perfect peace of a mind stayed on God." There is a good deal of rhetorical exaggeration in the language in which the phe nomena are here described; but for the essence of the matter the repre sentation is sound : our Lord is always master of himself. 121 Com. on Jno. xi. 35. 126 Fr. Gumlich. TSK, 1862, p. 285 note b, calls on us to "guard our selves from " Calvin's statement that " his feelings differ from ours as a pure, untroubled, powerful but onflowing stream from restless, foaming, muddy waves." But do not his sinless emotions differ precisely so from our sinful passions? 88 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD employed may, no doubt, be unduly pressed :127 but Calvin has no intention of suggesting doubt of either the reality or the strength of our Lord's emotional reactions. He expressly turns away from the tendency from which even an Augustine is not free, to reduce the affectional life of our Lord to a mere show, and commends to us rather, as Scriptural, the simplicity which affirms that " the Son of God having clothed himself with our flesh, of his own accord clothed himself also with human feelings, so that he did not differ at all from his brethren, sin only excepted." He is only solicitous that, as Christ did not disdain to stoop to the feeling of our in firmities, we should be eager, not indeed to eradicate our affections, " seeking after that inhuman airdOeia com mended by the Stoics," but " to correct and subdue that obstin acy which pervades them, on account of the sin of Adam," and to imitate Christ our Leader, — who is himself the rule of supreme perfection — in subduing all their excesses. For Christ, he adds for our encouragement, had this very thing in view, when he took our affections upon himself — " that through his power we might subdue everything in them that is sinful." Thus, Calvin, with his wonted eagerness for re ligious impression, points to the emotional life of Jesus, not merely as a proof of his humanity, but as an incitement to his followers to a holy life accordant with the will of God. We are not to be content to gaze upon him or to admire him : we must become imitators of him, until we are metamorphosed into the same image. Even this is, of course, not quite the highest note. The highest note — Calvin does not neglect it — is struck by the Epistle to the Hebrews, when it declares that " it behooved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he 121 Piscator enlarges upon it and applies it thus : " Just as pure and limpid water when mixed with a pure dye if agitated, foams indeed but is not made turbid; but when mixed with an impure and dirty dye, if agitated, not only forms foam but is made turbid and dirty ; so the heart of Christ pure from all imperfection, was indeed agitated by the affections implanted in human nature, but was soiled by no sin; but our hearts are so agitated by affections that they are soiled by the sin which inheres in us." ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD 89 might be a merciful and faithful High-priest in things pertain ing to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people " (Heb. ii. 17). " Surely ", says the Prophet (Is. liii. 4), " he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows " — a general statement to which an Evangelist (Mt. viii. 1) has given a special application (as a case in point) when he adduces it in the form, " himself took our infirmities and bore our diseases." He subjected himself to the conditions of our human life that he might save us from the evil that curses human life in its sinful manifestation. When we observe him exhibiting the movements of his human emotions, we are gazing on the very process of our salvation: every manifestation of the truth of our Lord's humanity is an exhibition of the reality of our redemption. In his sorrows he was bearing our sorrows, and having passed through a human life like ours, he remains forever able to be touched with a feeling of our infirmities. Such a High Priest, in the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews, " became " us. We needed such an one.128 When we note the marks of humanity in Jesus Christ, we are observ ing his fitness to serve our needs. We behold him made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, and our hearts add our witness that it became him for whom are all things and through whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory to make the author of their salvation perfect through suffering. It is not germane to the present inquiry to enter into the debate as to whether, in assuming flesh, our Lord assumed the flesh of fallen or of unfallen man. The right answer, beyond doubt, is that he assumed the flesh of unfallen man : it is not for nothing that Paul tells us that he came, not in sinful flesh, but in "the likeness of sinful flesh" (Ro. viii. 3). But this does not mean that the flesh he assumed was not under a curse : it means that the curse under which his flesh rested was not the curse of Adam's first sin but the curse of the sins of his people : " him who knew no sin, he made sin in our behalf " ; he who 128 Westcott in loc : " Even our human sense of fitness is able to recog nize the complete correspondence between the characteristics of Christ as High Priest and the believers' wants." Davidson, in loc. : " He suited our necessities and condition." 90 ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF OUR LORD was not, even as man, under a curse, " became a curse for us ". He was accursed, not because he became man, but because he bore the sins of his people; he suffered and died not because of the flesh he took but because of the sins he took. He was, no doubt, born of a woman, born under the law (Gal. iv. 4), in one concrete act; he issued from the Virgin's womb already our sin-bearer. But he was not sin-bearer because made of a woman; he was made of a woman that he might become sin- bearer; it was because of the suffering of death that he was made a little lower than the angels (Heb. ii. 9). It is germane to our inquiry, therefore, to take note of the fact that among the emotions which are attested as having found place in our Lord's life-experiences, there are those which belong to him not as man but as sin-bearer, which never would have invaded his soul in the purity of his humanity save as he stood under the curse incurred for his people's sins. The whole series of his emotions are, no doubt, affected by his position under the curse. Even his compassion receives from this a special qual ity : is this not included in the great declaration of Heb. iv. 15 ? Can we doubt that his anger against the powers of evil which afflict man, borrowed particular force from his own experience of their baneful working? And the sorrows and dreads which constricted his heart in the prospect of death, culminating in the extreme anguish of the dereliction, — do not these consti tute the very substance of his atoning sufferings? As we sur vey the emotional life of our Lord as depicted by the Evangel ists, therefore, let us not permit it to slip out of sight, that we are not only observing the proofs of the truth of his human ity, and not merely regarding the most perfect example of a human life which is afforded by histoiy, but are contemplating the atoning work of the Saviour in its fundamental elements. The cup which he drank to its bitter dregs was not his cup but our cup; and he needed to drink it only because he was set upon our salvation. THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL An Address on Isaiah ix. 5 and 6 (English Version 6 and 7) John D. Davis The Messianic element in the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, Chapters vii-xii. The child of chapter ix. Three constructions given to the words of the name. The expectation awakened by the title Wonderful. The title that is translated Mighty God. The title that is ren dered Everlasting Father. The upholding of the kingdom. The attributes of the Messiah in the light of similar phenomena in Scripture, particularly identification with, yet distinctness from, Jehovah. THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL1 Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and of peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to establish it, and to uphold it with justice and with righteousness from henceforth even for ever. The zeal of Jehovah of hosts will perform this (Isaiah ix. 5, 6: English version 6, 7; American revision.) These words of the prophet are apt to send the music of Handel's Messiah surging through the mind. We hear again the burst and volume of sound and the crash of instruments as these names are repeated one after the other and emphasized by the beat of the loud kettledrum. One cannot do better, when meditating on these verses, than allow the strains of the oratorio to form an accompaniment to the thought and exalt the spirit ; for Handel made no mistake in giving this prophetic utterance a place in an oratorio of the Messiah. The verses are found in that section of the prophecies of Isaiah, extending from chapter vii. to chapter xii., which has received the title The Book of Immanuel or The Consolation of Immanuel2 1 An address. 2 Immanuel (Is. vii. 14) , however, is not understood by all students of prophecy to be the Messianic king. The main counter-theories are two: 1. Immanuel is not an individual; but is the representative of a new generation, the regenerate Judah. So von Hofmann, Budde (New World, 1895, p. 739), Kuenen (Einleitung, II. S. 41). Dillmann guardedly says that Immanuel, "if not the future Messiah himself, is at least the begin ning and representative of the new generation, out of which finally one occupies the throne (Commentar, 5te Aufl., S. 74). Smend, too, once held this view (Lehrbuch der alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte, S 215), but he has retracted it in favor of Immanuel's identity with the Messiah (2te Aufl., S. 229). 2. Any boy, born within a year, may be properly called Immanuel by his mother as a memorial that God's active presence has been manifested 94 THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL (Delitzsch). In these six chapters prophecies regarding the promised deliverer of Israel follow each other in rapid suc cession. The whole section is aglow with the Messianic glory. Judgment, indeed, is predicted ; but it is transfigured and glori fied by the hope centered in the remnant of Judah and in the ideal son of David (Giesebrecht, Beitrdge zur Jesaiakritik, S. 87) . And this particular passage in the ninth chapter of Isaiah has its own distinguishing Messianic marks. There are those, it is true, who question its authorship and the date when it was uttered; but questions of date and authorship do not obscure in Judah ; and the lad's increasing years will serve conveniently to meas ure the time of predicted events. Such substantially is the interpretation given by Roorda (Orientalia, 1840 I. 130-135), W. Robertson Smith (The Prophets of Israel, new ed., p. 272), Giesebrecht (Studien und Kritiken, 1888, S. 218 and Anm. 1), Hackmann (Zukunftserwartung des Jesaia, S. 63, 161), Volz (V orexilische Jahweprophetie und der Messias, S. 41), Marti (Kurzer Hand-commentar : Jesaja, S. 76), and Schultz (Alttesta- mentliche Theologie, 5te Aufl., S. 615, 616), who, however, prefers to re gard Immanuel as the prophet's son, and the bestowal of the name as a pledge that God will not forsake his people. Compare Kirkpatrick (The Doctrine of the Prophets, p. 189-191), who explains that a mother "may with confidence give him a name significant of the Presence of God with His people. That Presence will be manifested in deliverance and in judgement. . . . He is the pledge for his generation of the truth ex pressed in his name." Duhm's curious modification may be included in this class. He believes that superstitious meaning was attributed to the first words spoken by a woman after the birth of her child. The utterance was regarded as an oracle, and was used as a name for the new-born child. In the moment that the Syrians are obliged to withdraw God will prompt some woman, who has just borne a son, to call out Immanuel, God with us (Handkom-mentar sum Alten Testament: Jesaia, S. 53 f). In the judgment of Duhm, Hackmann, Volz, Marti, the genuineness of vii. 15 and 17 must be denied and the verses exscinded. It is significant that according to Duhm (S. 54), Volz (S. 41), Marti (S. yy, 85), Nowack (Die kleinen Propheten, on Mic. v. 2 [3]), and Wellhausen (Die kleinen Propheten, Mic. v. 2), the existence of passages like Is. vii. 15 and Mic. v. 2 [3], and Immanuel in Is. viii. 8, 10, prove that even in Old Testament times Immanuel in Is. vii. 14 was understood to be the Messiah. Umbreit "cannot with entire confidence explain vii. 14 as Messianic;" and Nowack is unable to convince himself of the correctness of the Messianic interpretation of it (Theologische Abhandlungen . . . fiir Heinrich Julius Holtzmann dargebracht, S. 58). THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL 95 the identity of the person upon whom the prophet's gaze is fixed. The child is the Messiah. Noted Jewish commentators, in deed, have explained him to be Hezekiah. This explanation was given by Solomon Jarchi, Abenezra, and David Kimchi during the Middle Ages, by Luzzatto in the middle of the nineteenth century, and yet more recently in Jewish circles by the Orientalist James Darmesteter {Les Prophetes d'lsrael, 1892, p. 60), the historian David Cassel (Geschichte der judischen Literatur, 1873, iste Abth., 2ter Abschnitt S. 182, Anm. 4), and by Professor Barth (Beitrdge zur Erkldrung des Jesaias, 1885, S. 15 ff.) ; and it lives among the rabbis (J. H. Schwarz, Geschichtliche Entstehung der messianischen Idee des Judenthums, S. 39; Hirsch, Das Buch lesaia). The same interpretation was offered by Grotius, Hensler, Paulus, Ge- senius, Hendewerk; but was rejected by their contemporaries Cocceius, Vitringa, Eichhorn, Rosenmiiller; and its general rejection by the more recent exegetes has made clear that it cannot be held (Hackmann, S. 130). The main reasons for dismissing it are sufficiently stated in the words of Dill- mann: 1. "All the tenses from viii. 23", onward relate either to the past or to the future; the impossibility of referring viii. 23", ix. 3, 4 to actual events of history is clear." There is a look forward into the future. (Cf. also Alexander.) 2. The titles given to the child " can be un derstood of Hezekiah only in greatly weakened manner " (so already Vitringa; and cp. Rosenmiiller). 3. "From viii. 9, 10, 16-18 it follows with certainty that Isaiah is treating of hopes belonging to the ideal future. And if the Messianic hope is certain in chapter xi., what interest has one to remove it from this passage [in the ninth chapter] by unnatural in terpretations ? " Modern exegesis and criticism have given their verdict: Without doubt the child is the great king of the future, of the house and lineage of David.3 The composer of the oratorio was right, too, in calling to 3 "The child of chap. 9 ... is admitted, on all hands, to be the Messiah of the house of David " (A. B. Davidson, Old Testament Prophecy, p. 357) ; e. g., within the last quarter of a century by Briggs, Cheyne, Driver, G. A. Smith, Kirkpatrick, Skinner, Davidson, Dillmann, 96 THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL his aid all the resources of the orchestra for a burst of triumph ant music at the mention of each name in the manifold title of the Messiah. For the prophet is bringing to the people of God tidings of greatest joy. He tells them, as they sit in darkness and despair, that the night is passing and the dawn is drawing nigh. Sorrow is vanquished forever, conflict ended, peace at last. The prophet proclaims to the oppressed people of God the advent of their deliverer, enumerates one by one his superb qualities, discloses his sufficiency for the task im posed upon him, and describes the peace without end under his beneficent reign. Three principal interpretations have been proposed for the name. i. The child's name is merely Prince of Peace (Solo mon Jarchi, David Kimchi, and recently Rabbi Hirsch). The other exalted epithets are titles of God. The translation should be: The Wonderful, the Counsellor, the mighty God calls his name Prince of Peace. There is, however, a fatal objection to this translation; namely, the order of the words. In He brew the word ' name ' cannot be separated by the subject of the sentence from the name itself. There is no exception to this rule. Cocceius demonstrated the fact {C onsideratio respon- sionis Judaicae, cap. vi. 14) ;4 and since his day, the middle of the seventeenth century, this interpretation of the name has had no standing before a court of scholars. 2. It has been proposed to take all the titles, given to the child, together and read them as a sentence. Names that con sist of a sentence are the rule rather than the exception in the Hebrew literature that is preserved in the Old Testament. To be sure there are names like Terah, ' wild goat ', Deborah, ' a bee ', Barak, ' lightning ', Hannah, ' grace ', Saul, ' asked ', Amos, ' a burden ', Jonah, ' a dove ', Nahum, ' compassionate '. But the majority of proper names are sentences, as Ishmael, Kuenen, Guthe (Zukunftsbild des Jesaia), Giesebrecht, Duhm, Cornill (Der israelitische Prophetismus", S. 60), Hackmann, Volz, Marti, Smend, Nowack). * Calvin had already stated that the order of words makes it impossible to construe all the titles, from Wonderful to Prince of Peace inclusive, as the subject of the verb call and thus obtain the meaning that God names the child. THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL 97 Israel, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel; and not a few are comparatively long sentences, and sometimes contain a direct object. Such are the names of Isaiah's two sons, Shear-ja- shub, ' a remnant shall return ', and Maher-shalal-hash-baz, that is, ' spoil speedeth, prey hasteth ' ; also Micaiah, ' who is like Jehovah? ', and Elihoenai, ' my eyes are toward Jehovah ', and Romamti-ezer, ' I have exalted him who is a help ', and Tob-adonijah, ' good is my Lord Jehovah '. Even Immanuel is a sentence : ' God is with us '. Following such analogies it has been proposed to read all the words in the name given to the child as a sentence. A verb is needed. Now the word rendered ' counsellor ' is in fact a participle, ' the counseling one '. Instead of treating it as a noun denoting the agent, it is taken as the verb of the sentence. Then the first word, ' wonderful ', is construed as the direct object, and is under stood to have been placed at the beginning of the sentence for the sake of emphasis. All the words that follow ' counsellor ' are regarded as titles of God and are construed as the subject. The sentence then reads : The mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace is counseling a wonderful thing. The prophet announces the birth of a child whose name being interpreted shall be, A wonderful thing does God the strong, the eternal father, the prince of peace, resolve. Luzzatto advanced this interpretation. It has caused merriment among solemn commentators. Dillmann calls it an unparalleled mon strosity, and Delitzsch speaks of it as a sesquipedalian name. The jest is dropped and objections are formally stated. " If the intention is to emphasize the Divine wisdom, why accum ulate epithets of God which do not contribute to that object? " (Cheyne). "Why employ the participle instead of the usual verbal form, viz., the imperfect or perfect? " (Cheyne, Duhm). Finally the title of ' Prince of Peace ' belongs to the child and not to God according to the unmistakable context. 3. The several words or word-groups are so many titles descriptive of the child. He is wonderful, he is a counselor, he is the mighty God, he is the everlasting father, he is the prince of peace. There are a number of familiar analogues to this composite name. Thus in the New Testament our 98 THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL blessed Master is frequently entitled Lord Jesus Christ. He is our Lord; he is Jesus, for he saves his people from their sins; he is the Christ, the long expected Messiah (see also Is. lviii. 12, lxii. 12; Amos iv. 13; Rev. xvii. 5, xix. 16). In the name of the child the number of titles is counted variously : six, as in the Vulgate and in Luther's Bible ; five, as in the English version; or four, as on the margin of the re vised version, each title being a pair of words. The very first of these titles, on any enumeration, introduces the child to us as an extraordinary person. A noun, great enough in meaning to denote the wonders wrought by the God of Israel (Ex. xv. 11; Ps. lxxvii. 14, lxxviii. 12; Is. xxv. 1; cf. Judg. xiii. 18), describes the character of the child. Undue impor tance is not attached to this fact; still the word does betoken the peculiar greatness of the child, and prepares the mind for the exalted predicates that follow; and when combined with its next neighbor so as to yield the meaning "A very wonder of a counselor," the title associates the child in a measure with "Jehovah, who is wonderful in counsel" (Is. xxviii. 29). Of these titles two, in the familiar translation Mighty God, Everlasting Father, at once attract attention. Marvelous at tributes for a son of David! What explanation is possible? Regarding the title which is rendered Mighty God, one may be tempted to see a formal similarity between 'el gibbor, mighty God, and 'eley gibborim in Ezek. xxxii. 21, and in this latter verse seek the meaning of the title. The words of Ezek iel are rendered in the English version by " the strong among the mighty " (so also by Delitzsch, Messianische Weissagung- en, S. 101 ). They may be translated literally, " the strong of the mighty, where ' strong ' is not a class among the mighty, but identical with them — the strong mighty ones, genitive of apposition (A. B. Davidson in Cambridge Bible; Ezekiel). Thus regarded, the phrase on its face might appear to be merely the plural of the Messianic title 'el gibbor (G. A. Smith, Expos itor's Bible: The Book of Isaiah, p. 137). The title accord ingly would mean, not ' a very god of a hero ', but ' the strong mighty one '. This construction is outwardly the same as that of the three other Messianic titles (when the number is thought THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL 99 of as four), since in each case a noun stands in the construct relation before another noun; but it yields a meaning that is not symmetrical with their meaning. The epithet strong mighty one is a form of words unlike that seen in ' wonder of a coun selor ', ' father of eternity ', and ' prince of peace '. A dif ferent interpretation is offered by Gesenius. He includes ' hero ' among the meanings which he assigns to the word 'el (also Brown, Hebrew and English Lexicon), and renders the title in Is. ix. 5 by 'mighty hero' (Thesaurus). On this in terpretation symmetry of construction does not exist among the titles. Dillmann denies that 'el is attested as meaning ' hero ' by Ezek. xxxii. 2 1 , xxxi. 1 1 , since in those passages 'ayil, ' ram ', ' leader ', may be at the basis of the forms (Commentar5 S. 94; Alttestamentliche Theologie, S. 210; Commentar zu Exodus xv. 15; so also Buhl's edition of Gesenius' Handworterbuch, and Siegfried-Stade, Hebrdisches Worterbuch) ; and he re tains the meaning God in the Messianic title. But Dillmann does not adopt the rendering " a mighty God ". Following Roorda (Orientalia, i. 173) he prefers the translation "a god of a hero ", because the three other names are formed by means of the construct state. There is attractiveness in this argument from symmetry. Then, too, each of the four titles consists of three syllables in Hebrew (if the word for 'won der', being a segholate, is pronounced as one syllable). And the theory receives some confirmation from the symmetrical form of the name given to Isaiah's son Maher-shalal-hash-baz, ' Spoil speedeth, prey hasteth '. In the name of the prophet's son the symmetry is both external and internal, both in form and meaning. But in the name of the Messianic king, if the second title is rendered ' a god of a hero ', the symmetry of the four titles is external only. It extends to the use of the con struct relation, and perhaps to the trisyllabic form, but ends there ; for even on the translation ' wonder of a counselor ', ' god of a hero ', ' father of booty ', or ' father of perpetuity ', ' prince of peace ', while the first and second titles would be similar in construction and force, they would not be similar in force with either the third or the fourth. Assuming, how ever, the correctness of the attractive theory that symmetry of IOO THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL construction does belong to each of the four titles so that in each case the first word of the pair is in the construct state be fore the second word, the second title may still be properly rendered ' mighty God ' ; for a noun not infrequently stands in the construct state before its adjective or, as the matter is sometimes stated, before an adjective treated as an abstract noun (Is. xvii. 10, xxii. 24, xxviii. 4, xxxvi. 2; Ps. lxxiii. 10, lxxiv. 15; Prov. vi. 24). On this construction ' mighty God ' is the correct rendering of the title. Two arguments in particular have had weight with exegetes against any other rendering than ' mighty God '. 1. The Hebrew word 'el is always used by the prophet Isaiah in the high sense of God (Delitzsch), always "in an ab solute sense .... never hyperbolically or metaphorically " (Cheyne). 2. In the very next chapter exactly the same phrase means 'the mighty God' (x. 21 ).5 The phrase was traditional among the Hebrews as a title of God (Deut. x. 17; Jer. xxxii. 18 ; Neh. ix. 32). The consideration of such facts as these drove Luzzatto to the expedient of combining the titles into a sentence, in order that he might retain the sense of ' mighty God ' without admitting it to be descriptive of the Davidic king. And Gressmann, whose premises allow him a free hand in exegesis, remarks : " Whatever the explanation be, the fact itself stands fast : a divine attribute is here assigned to the Messiah" (S. 282). 5 The attribution of x. 21 to a different author than the writer of ix. 5 does not destroy the force of these facts, for the usage of the phrase as an exalted title of God is still attested by x. 21. Nor is escape to be had by referring the title in both passages to the messianic king (Marti; Mitchell, Isaiah, p. 212) ; for even assuming that it does denote the king in the two passages, it must still be translated mighty God or given an equivalent rendering (Delitzsch; von Orelli), in accordance with the uniform usage of the word 'el, God, in the book of Isaiah and with the traditional meaning of the title. The reference of x. 21, moreover, is to Jehovah rather than to his Anointed (Gesenius; Ewald; Riehm, 116; Dillmann; Schultz, 611; Cheyne; Driver, 71; Kirkpatrick2, 193; Smend2, 232; Skinner; Volz, 41; Gressmann, 281), for "it is Jehovah who acts alone throughout this part of the prophecy" (Cheyne, Prophecies of Isaiah*, y3), in the paragraphs comprised in verses 16-34 (Ewald, Pro pheten2, ii. 461). THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL 101 What does this great title ' mighty God ' signify when be stowed upon the Messianic king? i. Ilgen lightly dismisses it as the flattery of a court poet (Paulus' Memorabilia, vii. 152). But in times of dire distress (Is. viii. 22, 23), flattery is seldom heard. The hope of deliverance held out to the op pressed people of God by the prophet would be a mockery of their plight were it based on empty or extravagant term's in which he spoke to them of the promised deliverer. The re mark may be made at this point that the titles given by the prophet to the Messianic king are often compared by commen tators with the epithets found in addresses to the ancient rulers who held sway in the valleys of the Nile and the Tigris. The comparison is sometimes made in order to discount the value of the titles given to the Messiah. But the epithets bestowed by the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Egyptians upon their kings were not always words of flattery. They often deserve respect, notably in ancient Egypt; for very frequently they express deep conviction and reveal genuine faith. 2. The title ' mighty God ' is explained as given to the Messianic king by popular hyperbole (Hitzig, Duhm). But even in extravagance of speech the Hebrews did not employ a form of words that might suggest even superficially identifica tion with God. They make plain that comparison only is in tended, and are careful to introduce a term that expresses comparison (Gen. xxxiii. 10; Ex. iv. 16, Zech. xii. 8; also 1 Sam. xxix. 9; 2 Sam. xiv. 17, xix. 27); and they use the word 'elohim, not 'el (Cheyne, Prophecies of Isaiah? p. 62). Quite different is Ex. vii. 1, 2. There Jehovah speaks, and not man. Jehovah makes Moses a god to Pha raoh; puts Moses in the place of God to Pharaoh, makes him the authoritative representative of God at the Egyptian court, to speak the words that God himself commands and do the deeds that God bids and empowers him to do. The passage demands and illustrates a far higher interpretation of Messiah's title than the explanation which sees nothing in it but hyperbole. 3. The Messiah is called God, not in a metaphysical sense, but as equipped of God with power that exceeds the human measure, by reason of the Spirit of God that rests upon him; 102 THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL Is. xi. 2 ; Mic. v. 3 [4] ; Zech. xii. 8 (Dillmann, Isaiah5 S. 94; Alttestamentliche Theologie, S. 530 f ; Marti on ix. 5 and xi. 2). The Messianic king is thus a glorified Samson. He is a purely human figure, but one whom the Spirit of God fills with might. He will not be a fitful deliverer of the people like Samson, upon whom the Spirit of God came occasionally ; but he will be a king permanently armed with might by the abiding presence of the Spirit. This explanation contains a precious truth (xi. 2; cp. Mat. xii. 28), but it does not set forth all the facts. 4. Perhaps, then, the prophet, when he uses the title ' mighty God ', thinks of " the Messiah, somewhat as the Egyptians, Assyrians, and Babylonians regarded their king, as an earthly representative of Divinity " (Cheyne, Prophecies of Isaiah,3 p. 61, referring to Is. xiv. 13). 6 If by this is meant " the Oriental belief in kings as incarnations of the Divine" (Cheyne on Is. xiv. 13; Rosenmiiller on Is. ix. 5, deum natura humana indutum), a term, ' incarnation ', is used to which a vague signification must be given, and not its technical theological sense. The ancient Hebrews believed, in deed, that Jehovah might manifest himself in human form, and had occasionally so manifested himself on earth (Gen. xviii. 1, 33) ; but that is quite different from an incarnation of himself in a son of man. And it is not the idea in Is. ix. 5, where a descendant of David is called mighty God; nor is it the Egyptian belief regarding the king, who was a son of man, and yet somehow a manifestation of the deity. In Egypt the king was addressed as god, regarded as the presence of the god, and approached with prayer and offerings (Wiedemann, Religion der alten Aegypter, S. 92 ; Brugsch, Aegyptologie, S. 203 ; Maspero, Damn of Civilization, pp. 262-265 ) . A certain " It is proper to remark that in his more recent work, The Book of the Prophet Isaiah: A new English Translation, 1898, p. 145, Professor Cheyne, speaking of the title 'el gibbor in ix. 5, refers to x. 21, " which shows ", he says, " that we are not to render divine hero [but Mighty Divinity (p. 15)] : the king seems to Isaiah, in his lofty enthusiasm, like one of those angels (as we moderns call them), who in old time were said to mix with men, and even contend with them, and who, as super human beings, were called by the name of 'el (Gen. xxxii. 22-32). THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL 103 vagueness remains about this Egyptian belief, even after the matter has been stated. Perhaps the conception was vague in the Egyptian mind ; but at least these three features appear in their attitude toward the king. Professor Cheyne suggests that the prophet conceived of the Messiah, " somewhat as the Egyptians . . . regarded their king, as an earthly rep resentative of divinity." If so, it was evidently a profound conception which the prophet entertained concerning the na ture of the Messiah, and corresponded more closely with the revelation of himself made by the Christ than some exegetes have been willing to believe. A just appreciation of the greatness of the idea which the Messianic title ' mighty God' conveyed to the Israelites may be formed by a consideration of the following facts. The Hebrews could readily think of a human being as a representa tive of God, and speak of the representative as God ('"lohim). Judges, as the representatives of God and invested with his au thority, are called gods (Ps. lxxxii. 1, 6; cp. Ex. xxii. 8, 9, 28). The conception becomes larger as the authority and power of God's representative increase. When Jehovah sent Moses as his agent and representative to the court of Pharaoh, made him superior to the Egyptian monarch, appointed him to lay commands upon Pharaoh, and empowered him to enforce obedience, he made Moses a god to Pharaoh (Ex. vii. 1 ). All this and more is true of the Messiah. A son of man, heir to the throne of Judah, he is declared to be the representative of Jeho vah, in the place of God on the throne; he is clothed with power unceasingly by the divine Spirit, and rules in the strength and majesty of Jehovah (Is. xi. 2, Mic. v. 4) ; and he is hailed by the prophet, or at least named, ' Mighty God * . No other human representative of God, equipped though this representative be by the Spirit, no judge, no prophet, no king, not even Moses, is ever called ' Mighty God '. That title is given to Jehovah alone and the Messiah. Let no one say to himself that " the Prince is only called by " this name. " It is not said that he is, but that he shall be called " the mighty God (Geo. A. Smith, The Book of Isaiah, p. 140). To argue thus is to deceive oneself. The meaning of the 104 THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL prophet is clear. It is written in the fourth chapter of Isaiah that, when the judgment has passed and Zion has been purified of dross, " he that remaineth in Jerusalem shall be called holy ". The prophet does not mean that in the new Jerusalem the in habitants shall be nominally holy. He means that they shall in truth be holy. Again it is recorded that the angel said unto Mary : " The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee : therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." He shall not be nominally divine, but actually. Even so the king whose advent the prophet announces is called ' Prince of Peace ' and ' Mighty God ', because he is such. Leaving this title for the present, we turn to that one which is rendered ' Everlasting Father '. This name of the Messiah, '" bi 'ad, has been interpreted as meaning ' possessor of etern ity ' (Dathe, Hengstenberg, Guthe), in accordance with the well-known Arabic idiom. The employment of the word ' father ' in construction with a noun for the purpose of para phrasing an adjective is not attested with certainty in Hebrew. Perhaps it is so used in proper names, like Absalom; but in every case a different interpretation is possible. The title has also been rendered ' Booty-father ', and sometimes explained as meaning a distributor of booty. The word 'ad in the sense of booty is very rare, but this meaning is fully attested for it by Gen. xlix. 2j. A stubborn fact lies against the translation ' Booty-father '. " The meaning is, owner, possessor, or dis tributor of booty " (Briggs, Messianic Prophecy, p. 200). The word ' father ' is thus given an interpretation that " verges on the unprovable sense of possessor" (Marti). And in partic ular the word father is never used in the sense of distributor. Nor does the title mean ' Producer or provider of booty ' (Siegfried-Stade, Wdrterbuch, art. 'ad; cp. art. 'ab) ; for al though 'ab is used tropically for the creator, who calls a thing into existence, and can be employed figuratively to denote a kindly provider, the assigned meaning, unless most carefully restricted, makes plunder an end sought in the conflict, and not the mere result of victory, and introduces into the description the spirit of selfish gloating over the rich spoil, whereas the THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL 105 salvation of the people and the reign of peace are the absorbing hope. Finally, the general objection to every interpretation which employs the word booty in the title is that the thought yielded thereby is incongruous among these designations of the Messianic king, and is too meager in content, when the preceding title is rendered mighty God ; and for this rendering of the preceding title substantial reasons exist. It is exegeti- cally needful, therefore, to give to the word 'ad in the Messi anic title its customary sense of endurance, continuance, and render the title ' father of endurance ' and understand the designation to denote a continual father, one who enduringly acts as a father to his people (Gesenius, Delitzsch, Dillmann, Riehm, Cheyne, Skinner, Marti). Is any limitation to be placed on the word continuance? None that appears. The Hebrew word may denote eternity, and not a few representa tive exegetes understand it in that sense in this Messianic title (e. g. Hengstenberg, Alexander, Delitzsch, Cheyne, Gress mann). But it does not necessarily signify endless time. A prepositional phrase formed with it is rendered forever, and has a latitude of meaning similar to that of the English word 'always' (Ps. xix. 9 [10] ; xxii. 26 [2y] ; lxxxix. 29 [30] ; cxii. 3; Prov. xxix. 14; Amos i. 11, "perpetually"; Mic. vii. 18; cp. "of old", Job. xx. 4). In the five cases where it is used in combination with a noun, as in the Messianic title, it certainly means very long time, unbounded time. Babylon fondly expected to be " a lady forever " (Is. xlvii. 7, see Hitzig, Cheyne, Duhm, Marti; literally, a mistress of duration). No limit is set or even thought of by the proud city of the Chaldeans, no time when she shall cease to be. The 'mountains of duration' (Gen. xlix. 26; Hab. iii. 6) are well spoken of as everlasting hills, eternal moun tains. 'Ages of duration' (Is. xiv. 17) mean world with out end, all eternity. And Is. lvii. 15 must be translated " the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity ". In the title of the Messianic king the word bears in it a like fulness of mean ing; for nowhere in prophecy is it intimated that the Messiah shall cease to reign. No limit of time is set to his administra tion. In fact, this particular title is explicit. It contains a 106 THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL word for the express purpose of withholding bounds of time from the Messiah's activity. He shall enduringly act as a father to his people. The Messianic king comes with the qualifications signified by the titles for a definite beneficent purpose, which the pro phet proceeds to state : namely, for the expansion of the rule, and for welfare without end over David's throne and kingdom, in order to establish the kingdom and to uphold it by means of justice and righteousness which he exercises from henceforth even forever. As one maintains his bodily strength by a mor sel of bread (Judg. xix. 5), as God's right hand supports one, and his mercy holds one up, when one's foot slippeth (Ps. xviii. 35 [36]. xciv. 18), as a king upholdeth his throne by mercy (Prov. xx. 28) ; so the Messianic king upholds the throne of David forever by justice which he administers and by righteous ness which he exercises (se dakah, not sedek). If the uphold ing hand is withdrawn, the faint and feeble fall; if the bread is withheld, the strength fails; if justice and righteousness are not exercised, the throne totters. This prophecy is a distinct advance over the promise made to David by the prophet Na than. The promise is that God will make David a house and establish the throne of David and of David's son forever (2 Sam. vii. 16, 19). But the prophet Isaiah declares that the Messianic king himself shall uphold the kingdom forever. To deny that a perpetual reign is promised the child (Marti), and to assert that the reference is " to the rule of David's descend ants " (Duhm), is arbitrary and not drawn from the words of the prophet. Professor Cheyne, commenting on the words " from henceforth even forever ", states the matter thus : " Two meanings are exegetically possible : 1. That the Messiah shall live an immortal life on earth, and, 2. That there shall be an uninterrupted succession of princes of his house. The lat ter is favored by 2 Sam. vii. 12-16; comp. Ps. xxi. 4, lxi. 6, 7; but the former seems to me more in accordance with the general tenor of the description." Certainly it is; for, 1. The prophecy marks a distinct advance over the promise of 2 Sam. vii. 16 and 19. 2. Unto us a child is born. It is a solitary figure in whom the hope of the nation rests. 3. To the prophet the final THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL 107 stage of history has been reached, and he beholds the prince upholding the kingdom. 4. No prophet ever contemplates an end of Messiah's reign or speaks of Messiah's successors. " Were the Messiah to cease to be, how could the Lord's people maintain their ground " (Cheyne). Whether the Messiah lives an immortal life on earth or on earth and in heaven, need not be discussed (Mt. xxviii. 20). The results of this study so far are : 1 . The title ' Mighty God ' indicates a personage of peculiar exaltation. No one save this king and Jehovah is called ' Mighty God '. 2. The title ' Father of duration ' not only describes him as the father of his people, but assigns to his fatherly activity duration from which bounds of time are expressly withheld. 3. The predic tion that the Messiah shall uphold the kingdom of David for ever demands in accordance with the usage of the word, the tenor of the passage, and the drift of other prophecies of the pre-exilic period the perpetuity of his reign. These three declarations are complementary and mutually explanatory. He is mighty God; a father to his people during long, un bounded time; and upholds the kingdom forever. At the same time the Messianic king is a man, a descendant of David (xi. 1). A problem is here; yet it cannot be solved by the at tempt to tone down the declarations concerning this child until they sound applicable to a human being. For not only have the titles shown inherent power to maintain themselves in full strength and value in biblical interpretation ; but nothing would be gained by the method, if successful, for the fundamental question does not concern the Messianic king alone. The underlying conception of identity with Jehovah and possession of his attributes, yet distinctness from him, comes to the front elsewhere in the Hebrew Scriptures. It is met in connection with the angel of the Lord and also with the suffering servant of the Lord, on any interpretation of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah which does not neglect the doctrine taught in Israel in the prophet's day concerning sin and atonement (Davis, Dic tionary of the Bible,3 art. Servant of the Lord). The illustra tion afforded by the angel of the Lord must suffice for the present discussion, although the important particular of human 108 THE CHILD WHOSE NAME IS WONDERFUL descent is not involved in it as in the case of the Messiah. Mention is made of an angel, and under the circumstances it is proper always to think of the same angel, who is distin guished from Jehovah, and yet is identified with him (Gen. xvi. 10, 13, xviii. 2, 33, xxii. 11-16, xxxi. 11, 13; Ex. iii. 2, 4; Josh. v. 13-15, vi. 2; Zech. i. 10-13, iii. 1, 2), who revealed the face of God (Gen. xxxii. 30), in whom was Jehovah's name (Ex. xxiii. 21), and whose presence was equivalent to Jeho vah's presence (Ex. xxxii. 34, xxxiii. 14; Is. lxiii. 9). The angel of the Lord thus appears as a manifestation of Jeho vah himself, one with Jehovah and yet distinguishable from him. How these things could be is not explained ; but the idea was familiar. The objection has been raised that neither the prophet nor his hearers " conceived of the Messiah, with the conceiving of Christian theology, as a separate Divine personal ity " (Geo. A. Smith, The Book of Isaiah, p. 137). Well, what if they did not? The conception of distinct persons in the Godhead may have been formed in the minds of men later, and be quite true. Likewise the formulated doctrine of the incarnation; it came later because important facts on which it rests came to man's knowledge later. The Messiah, a descend ant of David, is simply given a unique divine name and spoken of as the possessor of divine attributes. No explanation is of fered, no theory advanced. It is enough to know that in the. days of the prophets the conception of identity with, yet dis- tinguishableness from, Jehovah was present in Hebrew thought and was consistent with the pure monotheism which was taught in Israel. JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY John DeWitt Introduction. Relations between New England and Princeton. Edwards' self-consistent career. His dominating and unifying quality. Edwards and Emerson. Likenesses and contrasts. Spirituality the characteristic of each. I. Edwards' Spirituality. In what sense a racial trait intensified by Puritanism. Its manifestations, in his vision of the spiritual uni verse, his self-interpretation, his style, his emotional life, the work he did, his habits, his limitations. II. His intellect and work. Calvin and Luther greater than Edwards. Edwards' subtlety of intellect. His likeness to Anselm of Canter bury. Lack of historical culture and spirit. His three capital gifts. His distinct and complete world-view. His purpose to embody it in the History of Redemption frustrated by death. His portrayal and analysis of the religious life. His contributions to theological science. The impetus he gave to theological specula tion and construction. The polemic against his Freedom of the WiU. The attack on him as the author of the sermons on the punishment of the wicked. Edwards' sermons and Dante's Inferno. Conclusion. JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY1 I am deeply indebted to your Committee for the honor they have done me in inviting me to take part in this celebration. My hesitation in accepting their invitation was due solely to the feeling I had that a son of New England could more appropri ately than a stranger ask your attention to an appreciation of this great New Englander. This hesitation was overcome, partly by the cordiality with which the invitation was extended, and partly by the consideration that Princeton, where Edwards did his last work and where his body lies to-day, might well be represented on the occasion by which we have been assem bled. Moreover, Princeton College, when Edwards was called to its presidency, was largely a New England institution of learning. Both of his predecessors in that office, Jonathan Dickinson and Aaron Burr, were natives of New England, graduates of the College at New Haven and Congregational ministers. Associated with Dickinson and Burr in the plant ing of the College were not only other Yale men, but Harvard men also : Ebenezer Pemberton and David Cowell and Jacob * Address delivered in the Meeting House of the Parish Church of Stockbridge, Mass., October 5, 1903, at the celebration, by the Berkshire Conferences of Congregational Churches, of the two hundredth anni versary of the birth of Jonathan Edwards ; and repeated in Miller Chapel, Princeton Theological Seminary, October 16, 1903. It is reproduced here, because it seems peculiarly appropriate that, in a volume celebrating the Century of Princeton Theological Seminary, Jonathan Edwards should be commemorated. He was the earliest of the great theologians who have lived in Princeton. When he accepted the call to Princeton College he expressed his willingness " to do the whole work of a professor of divin ity ". He lived in Princeton only eight weeks. He came in January and died in March 1758. During the interval his only teaching was " in divinity," and from the chair which may be said to have been transferred from the College to the Theological Seminary when the Seminary was opened in 1812. 112 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY Green and, above all, Jonathan Belcher, sometime Royal Gov ernor of the Colony of Massachusetts and ex-officio Overseer of Harvard, his alma mater; who, when afterward he was com missioned Royal Governor of the Province of New Jersey, to repeat his own words, " adopted as his own this infant Col lege," gave to it a new and more liberal charter, and so largely aided it by private gifts and official influence that its Trustees called him its " founder, patron and benefactor ". I am glad as a Princeton man to find in the anniversary of the birth of one of its Presidents an opportunity to acknowledge the Uni versity's great debt to New England. And, if you will permit a personal remark, I cannot forget that in coming to these services I am returning to the Commonwealth of which I am proud to have been a citizen, and to the Massachusetts Associa tion of Congregational Ministers whose list of pastors for six successive years contained my name.2 I should have to efface the memory of a pastorate exceptionally happy, and of unnumbered acts of kindness from the living and the dead, in order not to feel grateful and at home to-day. But, after all, the highest justification of this commemora tion of a man born two centuries ago is not that his genius and character and career reflect glory on the people and the class from whom he sprang, but that they contain notable elements of universal interest and value. The great man is great be cause in some great way he adequately addresses, not what is exceptional, not what is distinctive of any class or people, but what is human and common to the race; to whose message, therefore, men respond as men; whose eulogists and interpre ters are not necessarily dwellers in his district or people of his blood; who is the common property of all to study, to enjoy, to revere and to celebrate. It is, above all, because Jonathan Edwards belongs to this small and elect class that we are gath ered to honor his memory by recalling his story and reflecting on the elements of his greatness. It would be inappropriate, certainly in this place and before this audience, for a stranger to repeat the well-known story of his life. I shall better meet your expectations if I shall 2 Pastor of the Central Church, Boston, from Dec. 1869 to Jany. 1876. JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 113 reproduce the impressions of the man made on me by a re newed study of his collected writings and his life. We shall agree that the inward career of Edwards was sin gularly self-consistent; that from its beginning to its close it is exceptionally free from incongruities and contradictions; that in him Wordsworth's line, " The child is father to the man," finds a signal illustration. When we are brought into contact with a life so unified, whose development along its own lines has not been hindered or distorted by external dis turbances as violent even as that suffered by Edwards at North ampton, we naturally look for its principle of unity, the domin ating quality which subordinated to itself all the others, or, if you like, which so interpenetrated all his other traits as to be come his distinctive note. We are confident that such a qual ity there must have been, and that if we are happy enough at once to find it, we shall have in our possession the master key which, so far as may be to human view, will open to us the de partments of his thought and feeling and activity. A century later than Edwards there was born another great New Englander — Ralph Waldo Emerson — between whom and Edwards there is a strong likeness as well as a sharp contrast. Because this is his centennial year, Emerson like Edwards is just now especially present to our minds, and one is tempted to compare and contrast the two. To this temptation I shall not yield. But in order that we may properly approach and seize for ourselves a fine formula of Edward's dominant qual ity, permit me to recall to you a study of Emerson by a littera teur of great charm and wide acceptance. Mr. Matthew Arn old in his well-known lecture, says that Emerson is " not a great poet ", he " is not a great man of letters ", he " is not a great philosopher ". Mr. Arnold, I think, does great injus tice to Emerson in two of these negations. If I did not think so I should not associate him with so great a man as Edwards. I am not, indeed, concerned to defend the claims of Emerson to "a place among the great philosophers ". His treatment of particular subjects was marked by discontinuity; and his ten dency to gnomic, sententious forms of speech betrayed him not seldom into overstatement or exaggeration. Now, than dis- n4 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY continuity and overstatement there can scarcely be conceived more deadly foes to system-building, to the construction of a world-theory ; and the construction of a world-theory is the end of all philosophizing. It may be questioned whether Emerson ever permitted himself to rest in any fixed theory of the uni verse. I have the impression that for a fixed view of the uni verse he never felt the need, and that from all actual views of the universe which have been fixed in formulas he revolted. And, therefore, when Mr. Arnold says, " Emerson cannot be called with justice a great philosophical writer — he cannot build, he does not construct a philosophy," I do not know on what grounds we can dissent from his statement. But when he goes further and, with the same positiveness, says, " We have not in Emerson a great writer or a great poet," Mr. Arnold passes from the region of opinion based on consid erations whose force all estimate alike, into the region of opin ion which has its source and ground in mere individual tem perament and taste. Moreover, greatness is a word so vague as scarcely to raise a definite issue ; and this fact might well have prevented so careful and acute a critic from employing it to deny to Emerson a quality which Mr. Arnold would have found difficult to define. Certainly this much can be said. If Emerson is not "a great writer, a great man of letters," yet, in his unfolding of ideas and in his portrayal and criticism of nature and of life, he has nobly fulfilled and is still fulfilling the function of a great man of letters to thousands of disciplined minds; interpreting for them and teaching them to interpret nature and man, educating their judgments, cultivating their taste, introducing them to " the best that has been thought and written," and stimulating and ennobling their whole intellectual life. And if he is not, as Mr. Arnold says he is not, " senuous and impassioned " in his poetry, we must not forget that reflec tive poetry is Emerson's best and most characteristic poetic achievement ; that reflective poetry cannot possibly be " sensu ous and impassioned"; and that Mr. Arnold is prejudiced against all reflective poetry, and, indeed, does not think it poetry, whether it be Emerson's or Wordsworth's. But though Mr. Arnold does Emerson injustice in these two JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 115 negative propositions; I think that, in his positive statement, he has firmly seized and happily formulated Emerson's dom inating quality. He has given us the real clue to the signifi cance of Emerson's literary product, regarded as a whole, when he says of him : " Emerson is the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit." The friendship of Emerson for " those who would live in the spirit " is, indeed, his character istic trait. He is also their "aider ", as Mr. Arnold says. But the aid he offers them is conditioned precisely by the fact that he is a man of letters and a poetic interpreter of nature and of life, and that he does not bring to them a philosophy. I say, the aid he offers is conditioned by this lack of a philos ophy; and by conditioned I mean limited. For because of it the realm of nature and spirit, as he presents it, is vast indeed, but vague and undefined and, so far forth, unrevealed. And therefore, as Mr. Arnold himself points out, his aid is confined to the sphere of the moral sentiments and action. Mr. Arn old does, indeed, express the opinion that " as Wordsworth's poetry is the most important work done in verse in our lan guage in the nineteenth century, so Emerson's essays are the most important work done in prose." But this is the language of purely personal judgment. Far more important for us in estimating Emerson, with Mr. Arnold's help, as " an aider of those who would live in the spirit," is the sentence in which he formulates the precise content of the aid which Emerson extends. And this is the sentence : " Happiness in labor, righteousness and veracity ; in all the life of the spirit ; happi ness and eternal hope — that was Emerson's gospel." A fair and felicitous description it is. And how clearly it reveals the limit of the aid which Emerson's gospel offers ! How clear ly it reveals that the aid extended is not the aid of a great thinker in the sphere of ultimate knowing and absolute being, but is aid confined to the sphere of the moral sentiments and action ! Thus, by a route somewhat circuitous indeed, but I trust not wholly without interest or propriety, we reach, in Mr. Arnold's characterization of Emerson, the formula of which I spoke as finely expressing Edward's dominating and unifying quality. Il6 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY Edwards like Emerson is, above all else and by eminence, " the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit." Who that knows him at all will deny to him a right equal to that of Emerson to this high title? Of course, they differ widely both in the aid they offer and in their methods of offering it. Emer son's aid is conditioned and limited, as I have already said, by his want of a firm and self-consistent doctrine of the uni verse, by his want of a philosophy. And we must be just as ready to acknowledge that Edwards' aid is as clearly condi tioned and limited by his unfortunate poverty in the humani ties, by his notable lack of feeling for poetry and letters. On the other hand and positively I think we may say, that it would be hard to name a man of letters who, having separated himself from all formulated philosophical and religious be liefs, has more nearly than Emerson exhausted the resources of letters and poetry in the service of " those who would live in the spirit." And among the great doctors of the Christian Church, it would be as hard to name one more distinctively spiritual in character and aim than Edwards, or one who, in cultivating the spiritual life in himself and promoting it in others, has more consistently or more ably drawn on the re sources of his philosophy, his world-view, his Christian doc trine of the universe. I am quite sure that this obvious likeness and difference be tween Edwards and Emerson is the right point of departure for any large study of their affinity and opposition. Such a study the day invites us to mention, but does not permit us to undertake. The day belongs, not to the great Puritan who gave up the Puritan conception of the universe for its interpre tation by poetry and letters, but to the great Puritan who denied himself the high satisfactions of literature, that through his distinctively Christian doctrine of God and man he might be " the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit." It is to his spirituality, and to his intellectual gifts and work, that I ask your attention. JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 117 How many writers have portrayed what one of them calls the " spirituality of mind " of the Northern and Teutonic peo ples ! One of the most striking passages in Taine's English Literature contrasts in this particular the Latin and Teutonic races. And a New England theologian and man of letters, in unfolding the truth that the Northern nations of Europe, unlike the Southern, were " spiritual in their modes of thought ", calls attention to the fact that " the Northern heathen had fewer gods than the Southern, and could believe in their reality without the aid of visible form. He hewed no idol, and he erected no temple; he worshipped his divinity in spirit, beneath the open sky, in the free air." How far this spiritual temper can be attributed to climate, to "the influences which rained down from the cold Northern sky," we cannot say. Racial character would best be accepted as an ultimate fact. The fact itself is certain, that among the European peoples, the race to which Edwards belonged was most strongly marked by this spiritual quality. Moreover, it was precisely by the greater strength and intensity of this racial quality that the Puritan class was separated as a class from their own people. Spirituality is what the logicians call the specific difference of Puritanism. The unshaken belief in the reality of the spiritual universe, the ability to realize its elements without the aid of material symbols, the strong impulse to find motives to action in the unseen and eternal, to feed the intellect and the heart on spiritual objects, and in distinctively spiritual experiences or exercises to discern the highest joys and the deepest sorrows and the great crises of life — these were the traits of the Puri tans. And these traits were exhibited, not by a few cloistered souls who obeyed the " counsels of perfection " and were se cluded from their fellows by special vows of poverty, celibacy and obedience, but by the mass of the population in Puritan New England; by countrymen and villagers and citizens and statesmen. This spirituality organized the governments and determined the politics of vigorous commonwealths. Theo- 118 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A. STUDY cratic republics, as spiritual as that which, under Savonarola, had so short a life in Florence, flourished for generations on American soil. It was in this Puritan society that Jonathan Edwards' American ancestors lived. They were typical Puri tans, justly esteemed and influential in the communities in which they dwelt. The convictions, traditions and spirit of the class were theirs. This was especially true of both his father and his mother. The simplicity, the sincerity, the spirituality of Puritanism at its best were incarnate in them; and it was the Puritan ideal of life which, before his birth, they prayed might be actualized in their unborn child. Belonging to this spiritual race, sprung frorra this spiritual class, descended from such an ancestry and born of such a parentage, we have the right to anticipate that his dominant quality will be this spirituality of which I have spoken. We have the right to look for what Dr. Egbert Smyth calls, " Ed wards' transcendent spiritual personality," and concerning which he says, that " the spiritual element " in Edwards " is not a mere factor in a great career, a strain in a noble charac ter. It is his calmest mood as well as his most impassioned warning or pleading, his profoundest reasoning, his clearest insight, his widest outlook. It is the solid earth on which he treads." Dr. Smyth has thus stated in suggestive phrase the supreme truth concerning Edwards ; the truth that his dominat ing quality, his differentiating trait, his prevailing habit of mind, is spirituality. The time at my disposal does not per mit the illustration of this great quality in any adequate way. I can only touch on a few particulars which may help us better to appreciate it. The careful student of Edwards is deeply impressed, first of all, by his immediate vision of the spiritual universe as the reality of realities. When I speak of the spiritual universe, I am giving a name to no indefinite object of thought. I mean God in his supernatural attributes of righteousness and love, the moral beings created in his image, the relations be tween them and the thoughts and feelings and activities which emerge out of these relations. This was the universe in which Edwards lived and moved and had his being. As he appre- JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 119 hended it, it was no mere subjective experience, no mere plexus of sensations and thoughts and volitions. It was the one fundamental substance and the one real existence. It was the one objective certainty which stands over against the shadowy and illusory phenomena that we group under the title matter. And his vision of it was vivid and in a sense complete. He knew it not only in its several parts, but as a whole; as an ordered universe ; as the macrocosm which he, the microcosm, reflected and to which he responded. All this is true in a measure, to be sure, of all the other saints and, indeed, of the sinners also. It is in what I have called the immediacy of his spiritual apprehension that his distinction lies. There is, of course, a sense in which the spirit ual world is immediately discerned by all of us. It is of spirit rather than of matter that our knowledge is direct. That consciousness of a self which cannot be construed in terms of matter, or that idea of self which is a necessary postulate of all our thinking brings us at once into the universe of spirit. But in order to the vivid realization of this spiritual universe, there is necessary for the most of us a special activity or exper ience. And by this activity or experience our realization of the spiritual world is mediated. Edwards, in this respect, is a remarkable exception in his own class. Consider some great and notable men of the spiritual type. Consider St. Augustine. How true it is that the great elements of the spiritual world became vivid to Augustine through the mediation of his ex perience of sin ! And that these spiritual elements were always interpreted by the aid of that experience his Confessions abund antly testify. Or think of Dante. As Augustine reveals in his Confessions the instrumental relation to his deepening spirit uality of the long period of sinful storm and stress. Dante makes perfectly clear to us in The New Life that it was the love of Beatrice which so mediated for him the spiritual world and so brought him under its sway, that in order to repeat and interpret the vision of it he laid under contribution his total gifts and learning. Or take John Calvin. That fruitful con ception — more fruitful in church and state than any other con ception which has held the English-speaking world — of the ab- 120 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY solute and universal sovereignty of the Holy God as a revolt from the conception then prevailing of the sovereignty of the human head of an earthly church, was historically the media tor of his spiritual career. Now Edwards is distinguished from Augustine, Dante and Calvin by the fact that his intuition of the spiritual universe was, in the sense which I have used the word, immediate. To a degree I should be unwilling to affirm of any other man I have studied, except one, his spirituality was natural. That he was a sinner, needing regeneration and atonement, he knew. That these were his blessed experience he was gratefully as sured. But except the apostle called by eminence " the Theo logian ", St. John the Divine, I know no other great character in Church History of whom it can so emphatically be said, that when he " breathed the pure serene " of the spiritual world and gazed upon its outstanding features, or explored its re cesses, or studied the inter-relations of its essential elements, he did so as " native and to the manner born ". To quote again the words of Dr. Smyth : " It is the solid earth on which he treads, its sleeping rocks and firm-set hills." The spiritual universe, thus vividly and immediately appre hended as the reality of realities, of course, became, in turn, the interpreter to himself of all he did and felt. It became even the regnant principle of his association of ideas, so that the unpurposed movements of his mind in reverie were determined by it. How influential in his earliest thinking it was, you will see if you study his Notes on mind and ultimate being ; and how persistent it was, you will see in his latest observations on The End of God in Creation. It governed his aesthetics also. The line between aesthetic emotion and spiritual feeling is sharp, and wide, and deep. Often as the two are confounded by those whose sensibilities are strongly stirred by beauty in nature or in fine art, it is still true that they are as distinct as spirit and matter. The aesthetic emotion is ultimate and never can be made over into spiritual affection. No one knew this better than Edwards. But through both reflection and experience he reached and formulated the conclusion, that the highest and most enduring aesthetic emotion is that which is called out not JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 121 by material beauty but by holiness. And he may be said to have unfolded the great mediaeval phrase, " The beatific vision of God ", into the doctrine of the highest beauty, in his epoch- making treatise — epoch-making in America certainly the treat ise was — on The Nature of Virtue. This seems to me a strik ing instance of the way in which his spirituality permeated and irradiated his thinking. I think that even the traits of Edwards' style are best ex plained by this same quality. It has often been said of him that style is precisely what Edwards lacked. We are told that, after reading Clarissa Harlowe, he expressed regret that in his earlier years he did not pay more attention to style. We may be thankful certainly that he did not form his style on that of the affluent Richardson. I am unable to share the regret he expressed ; unless, indeed, it was a regret that he did not al ways take pains to make his literary product eminent in the qualities of style which always marked it. Edwards was above all things sincere; and his style is the man. Its qualities are clearness, severe simplicity, movement and force. In these he is eminent, almost as eminent as John Locke; and he is more eminent in his later than in his earlier compositions. They finely fit his theme and his spirit. His theme in substance is one. It is the spiritual universe, in some aspect of it. And his spirit is that of a man dominated by those spiritual affections which he teaches us are a lively action of the will. It was ap propriate that his style should be calm and severe, and that even in his sermons it should lack the dilation and rhythm of a rapt prophet's emotional utterance. Edwards was no Montanist. He was a seer, indeed, but a seer with a clear vision ; and the spirit of the prophet was subject to the prophet. No man of his day was, so far as I know, the subject of stronger or deeper spiritual affections. But no one knew better just what spiritual affections are. He knew especially how different they are from mere sensibility; and he was always calm under their sway. No other style than his could have so well reflected and ex pressed this spiritual, unhysterical man. And I must believe that his is the direct fruit of his spiritual quality. Certainly, it was spiritually effective. Never did any one's discourse 122 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY make a more powerful and at the same time a more distinctive ly and exclusively spiritual impression on audience or readers. One of the most charming modern poems is that in which Tennyson portrays the Lady Godiva, that she might take the tax from off her people, riding at high noon through Coventry " naked, but clothed on with chastity." So seem to me the bare and unadorned sermons and discussions of Edwards. Straight through his subject to his goal this master moves; unadorned yet not unclothed, but clothed upon with spirituality. Or consider Edwards' emotional life. Dr. Allen, of Cam bridge, in his paper on The Place of Edwards in History has dwelt fondly on what he calls the spiritual affinity between Dante and Edwards. He makes the remark, that " the deepest affinity of Edwards was not that with Calvin or with Augus tine, but with the Florentine poet." Now, I am sure, that of his affinity with Augustine and with Calvin Edwards was dis tinctly conscious. But nowhere, so far as I know, is there the slightest intimation that he had any interest in Dante's New Life or The Divine Comedy. He was no idealizing poet, no literary artist, no allegorizer ; and he seems to have taken little or no pleasure in this kind of literature. Had there been a fun damental sympathy between Dante and Edwards, it would have expressed itself in Edwards' works with Edwards' character istic distinctness. But not only is Dante not mentioned, but, what is more striking, there is not an allusion, I think, in Ed wards' works to the poems of the Puritan John Milton or the allegories of the Puritan John Bunyan. This seems inexpli cable on Dr. Allen's theory of a strong affinity between the New England theologian and the Florentine poet. Most unhappy, however, is the palmary instance of this alleged affinity selected by Dr. Allen for remark. It is what he calls the striking spir itual likeness between Dante's words touching his first sight of Beatrice and Edwards' description of Sarah Pierpont. I refer to them, not to criticise Dr. Allen, but because the strik ing contrast between them helps us the better to appreciate the regnancy of Edwards' spiritual quality, even when he was under the spell of earthly love. And the contrast is striking. Dante in noble and beautiful JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 123 words describes the dress that Beatrice wore. " Her dress on that day was a most noble color, a subdued and goodly crimson, girded and adorned in such sort as best suited with her tender age." He exalts her in a way which Edwards would have se verely reproved, in the words, " Behold the deity which is stronger than I, who coming to me will rule within me." And he confesses in powerful and poetic phrases the violent effect upon his body which his strong emotion produced. The whole picture is charming, poetic, ideal, and was written in a book for the public years after the boy had seen a girl. The greatest poet of his time, if not of all time, in maturer life looks back upon the meeting and, with consummate art, I do not say with insincerity, transfigures it. How different is Edwards' well-known description of Sarah Pierpont! It was written in Edwards' youth, four years be fore his marriage ; not in a book for the public, but on a blank leaf for his own eye. In its own way it is as engaging as Dante's. But its way is not artistic or imaginative at all. It is distinctively and exclusively spiritual. There is no idealization, no translation of the object of his love into a symbol, no physi cal transport, no agitation, no " shaking of the pulses of the body." We learn nothing of Sarah Pierpont's dress or appear ance or temperament. All he tells us about her is about her spiritual qualities and her relations to the spiritual universe. And at the last, on his deathbed, he sends to his absent wife, this Sarah Pierpont, his love ; and again speaks of the uncom mon union between them as, he trusts, spiritual and therefore immortal. Read in connection with the brief references to bis household life to be found in his biography, these passages bring before us a man whose closest and tenderest earthly love was transfigured not by artistic genius but by what I have called his dominating spirituality. And both passages issue naturally out of that spiritual conception of beauty which he has so finely unfolded in the great essay on Virtue. This same quality manifests itself in the impartiality and im personality of his feelings under conditions well calculated to awaken strong partial and personal feelings. Go through the whole history of the unfortunate Northampton controversy. 124 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY Read the correspondence of Edwards, his speeches before the several Councils and the Farewell Sermon. Or mark his be havior under the trying conditions of a recrudescence in Stock- bridge of the enmity shown at Northampton. And you will see what I mean, when I say that his spirituality is exhibited in the impartiality of his feelings and the impersonality of their objects. You will agree with me that in all of it he was true to his thesis ; that private feelings must be subordinated to that benevolence, that spiritual love of being in general, which is the essence of virtue. Indeed, I recall no other instance of a severe and protracted trial, in which the chief figure appears so un concerned about everything except its spiritual significance. But it is in the work to which he gave himself, in the subjects on which he labored, in his method of treatment, in the con clusions he reached, that Edwards' spirituality is most impres sively revealed. He was interested apparently in nothing but the spiritual universe and the spiritual life. Of course, the whole of Edwards is not known to us. We rarely, if ever, catch sight of him in his avocations, so strong was his sense of vocation. I discover in him no interest in politics, in litera ture, in the plastic or even the intellectual arts. In distinctively intellectual pursuits other than religious he did at times engage. But he engaged in them, certainly in his maturer years, only in order to the thorough concentration of his powers on spiritual work. Thus, when his mind was strained by excessive study and would not hold itself to a severely spiritual train of thought, or when his imagination rose in rebellion and tempted him, he whipped each into subjection by setting his powers to the solution of a difficult mathematical problem; and so he re gained possession of himself solely for high spiritual purposes. And how spiritual his purposes were let the titles of his works testify, from the first published sermon to the great treatises on Sin, Virtue and the Will, and finally the great Body of Divinity in historical form, which in his letter to the Trustees of Princeton he describes as his coming work, and in describing which his soul expands and his style, almost for the first time, becomes rhythmical. We are therefore entitled to say with emphasis that the dom- JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 125 inant quality of Edwards is spirituality — spirituality of mind, of feeling, of aim and action. The spiritual universe was for him not only the most certain and substantial of realities, but the exclusive object of contemplation. Purely spiritual feel ing seems to have filled in his life the great spaces which in the lives of most men are occupied by passionate sensibilities and aesthetic pleasures. Or we may better say, that his excep tional personality was the alembic in which these sensibilities and pleasures were transmuted into the pure distillate of spirit ual feeling; until all his outgoing and active affections rested on spiritual qualities and objects, and all his reactions of emo tion were the blessednesses of the spirit. When his will ener gized and called the great powers of his intellect into action, it was on the most spiritual themes that his mind was wrought with the greatest ease and geniality. Distant in manner and reserved on most subjects, whenever he conversed about hea venly and divine things of which his heart was so full, " his tongue ", says Dr. Samuel Hopkins, " was as the pen of a ready writer." The spiritual world so completely possessed him that its contemplation and exposition seems never to have tired him. After receiving the invitation to Princeton, he told his eldest son that for many years he had spent fourteen hours a day in his study. Spiritual thinking and feeling were thus both his labor and his recreation. This exclusive spirituality of Edwards explains his lack of charm and interest. For obviously he is lacking here. Com pare with the lack of interest in Edwards the interest the world has always taken in Luther, in the stormy career of Knox, in the incessant and varied activity of Calvin, and earlier than these in the dramatic life of Augustine. Shall we say that he charms us less because he was a more spiritual man, or only because he was more exclusively spiritual; because he was less wealthily endowed with humane sympathies ? Is it be cause of his delicate organization and feeble vitality ? Or is it because, under the domination of the spiritual universe, and knowing well his own powers and limitations, he determined to know this one thing only? Or is it, after all, only the defect of his biographers? I do not know. Certainly he presents a 126 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY striking contrast to the other great spiritual men whom I have named. And I think we are bound to acknowledge that his remarkable separation in spirit from the feelings and tastes and occupations of the people seriously limited his usefulness, and seriously limits it to-day. But when all is said, his spirit uality is his strength. And in a world where social charm and sympathy is abundant, and where high and exclusive spiritual ity is in the greatest men as rare as radium; we ought to re joice that of one of the greatest it is true that he was bond slave to the spiritual world. The clue to Edwards then, his dominating and irradiating quality, the trait which gave unity to his career, is his spirit uality. His was indeed, to repeat the fine word of Dr. Eg bert Smyth, " a transcendent spiritual personality." II. I have detained you so long on this subject that I must treat briefly and inadequately Edwards' intellect and work. It was as a bond-slave then to the spiritual universe that all his work was done. Now his work was not that of a philan thropist or a missionary. It was the work of a thinker. The instrument with which he wrought was his intellect; and the word which describes the quality as distinguished from the subject of his writings is the word, intellect. This is as true of his sermons as it is of his elaborate treatises. And, as a whole, his works constitute an intellectual system of the spir itual universe. Eminently intellectual in his activity, Edwards, so far as I can see, had no intellectual pride. His intellect he regarded simply as an instrument to be employed in the service of the spiritual world. And as such an instrument, if we would do him justice, we must regard it. We must seize and estimate its outstanding traits, as they reveal themselves in this charac teristic activity which he solemnly accepted as his vocation. What, then, were the distinctive traits of Edwards' intellect, and what position must we assign to him among intellectual men, especially among theologians? The genius of Luther and that of Calvin have often been JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 127 contrasted. There is a general agreement that while Luther saw single truths with the greater clearness and the sooner recognized their capital value, to Calvin must be attributed in greater measure the gift of construction; the great gift by which he organized in a system the principles of the Protestant Reformation. Now though Edwards nowhere shows the bold ness and originality of either of these men; though he never inaugurated a new mode of Christianity like Luther or or ganized its theology like Calvin, and, therefore, holds no place beside them in history; he had both a gift of penetra tion like Luther's and a gift of construction like Calvin's. It is also true, I think, that in the subtlety of his intellect he was greater than either. The man of all men whom he seems to me most like intellectually and, indeed, every way — in the character of his religious experience, in his genial acceptance of the theo logical system he inherited, in his philosophical insight, in his power in the exposition of abstract truth, in his fruitfulness, in his constructive ability and in his failure nevertheless to leave behind him a completed system, in his fundamental philosophical and theological views, in his idealism and Pla- tonism — is Anselm of Canterbury. And, having regard to the works they have left behind them — the one, the Monologium and Proslogium, the Tract on Predestination, the Prayers and Meditations, the Essay on Free Will and the Cur Deus Homo, and the other, the great sermons, the treatises on The Nature of Virtue, The End of God in Creation, Original Sin, Justifica tion by Faith, The Religious Affections and The Nature of the Freedom of the Will — I think that Edwards stands fully abreast of the mediaeval philosopher and theologian. Had Dante known Edwards as we know him, he would have given him a place beside Anselm in the Heaven of the Sun. In saying that Edwards is like Anselm, I have also in mind the fact that there are two great classes of theologians. All Christian theology rests on Holy Scripture. But theologians strikingly differ among themselves in the importance they respectively assign to the history of doctrine and the Church's symbols on the one hand; and to the concord between the Word of God and the reason on the other. In the mediaeval 128 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY Church there were school divines who rested solely on history and authority ; who had no confidence in the argument from the reason ; who did not believe that there is a theologia naturalis- This tendency was strongest, perhaps, in the Franciscan, Duns Scotus. In modern Protestant Churches, the tendency is, perhaps, strongest in the high Anglican writers. Now while Edwards was in harmony with the Reformed Confessions, the absence of the Confessional or historical spirit is noticeable in all his theological treatises. The lack of it is explained partly by his training. In the curriculum of the American Colonial College historical studies were slight and elementary, while studies which discipline the powers were pursued with a vigor and sincerity which the modern University would do well to promote. We must regret, I think, the lack in this great American theologian of large historical culture and, by con sequence, of the historical spirit. Because of it there is, in the positiveness of his assertions, in his strong confidence in logical analysis and dialectic in themselves, and in his historical gen eralizations in The History of Redemption, a quality which it is right to call provincial. But if he is defective at this point, it is not too much to say, that he is one of the greatest Doctors of the Universal Church by reason of his singular eminence in three capital qualities. In the first place, he is far more powerful than most theologians in his appeal to the reason in man. I mean the reason in its largest sense and as distinguished from the understanding. The reason itself, he held, as if he were a Cambridge Platonist, has a large spiritual content. If I understand him, he went beyond the Westminster Divines in the value he put upon the Light of Nature. Of his actual appeal to the reason, includ ing under that term the conscience and the religious nature, I have time only to say that it permeates and gives distinction to his entire theological product. He addresses it with large confidence in his sermons, in his essay on The End of God in Creation, in* his chapter on the Satisfaction of Christ written in the very spirit of the Cur Deus Homo, in all his endeavors to quicken in reader and hearer the sense of guilt and the fear of its punishment, in his great discourse on Spiritual Light, and JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 129 in his great volume on the Religious Affections. In all of them a consummate theologian of the reason distinctly appears. To this we must add his supremacy in the related gifts of clear exposition, subtle distinction, and acute polemic. To this supremacy the world has borne abundant testimony. If he is like Anselm in his high estimate of the reason, he is like Thomas Aquinas in his dialectical acuteness. Nor is this acute ness mere quickness of vision and alertness in logical fence. His two greatest polemic works are probably the essays on Original Sin and The Freedom of the Will. Both of them are profound as well as acute; both are large in their conception of the subject; and in both he is fair to his antagonist, and, though not so largely, yet as really constructive as he is polemic. To these we must add, finally, a consummate genius for theo logical construction. No one can go through his collected works even rapidly, as I was compelled to do this summer, without seeing that a self -consistent World-view or theory of the Universe was distinct and complete in the consciousness of Edwards, and that it is the living root out of which springs every one of his sermons and discussions. No theological writer is less atomistic. None is less the prey of his temporary impulses or aberrations. No theological essays less merit the name of disjecta membra. The joy of the completed literary presentation of this universal system, this spiritual and intel lectual Cosmos, was denied him. But it is in his works, just as completely as Coleridge's system is in the Biographia Liter- aria and the Table Talk, just as clearly as Pascal's Pyrrhonism lies open to us in his fragmentary Thoughts. Had he lived to complete at Princeton his History of Redemption, his " body of divinity in an entire new method," it is my belief that the world would have seen in it the fruit of a constructive genius not less great than that which appears in the Summa of St. Thomas or in the Institutes of Calvin. Though no theologian more habitually conceived the spiritual world as objective, yet his great powers and special talents wrought best, and he produced his best work, when he was writing on the religious life. That life he knew well, because of his own profound and vivid religious experience. But he 130 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY never wrote out his experience alone. The spiritual universe as a whole is before him as he writes. It is always therefore the ideal religious life of the redeemed sinner he is describing. Hence its severity, its purity, its deep humility as it measures itself with the absolute ethical and spiritual perfection. If we do not wish to sink into despair, we must not forget this as we read the greatest of his tracts, the essay on The Religious Affections. A theologian, so profound and so individual as Edwards was, could not but have made many contributions of the highest importance to theological science. Now whatever Edwards' distinctive contributions to theology were, it is important to notice that they were contributions to the historical theology of the Christian Church. He was in full concord with the great Ecumenical Councils on the Trinity and the Person of Christ. He thoroughly accepted the formal and material prin ciples of the Reformation. And he was convinced of the truth of the great system known as Calvinism or the Reformed The ology. His greatness as a theologian and his fruitfulness as a writer are rooted in the consent of his heart, as well as the assent of his mind, to these historical doctrines. And though, as I have said, individually he was not distinctly informed by the historical spirit, yet he is in the line of the historical suc cession of Christian theologians. Turning to these distinctive contributions I have time to name only one ; but that one has been of immense historical im portance in America. Jonathan Edwards changed what I may call the centre of thought in American theological thinking. There were great theologians in New England before Edwards. I mention only John Norton of Ipswich, and Samuel Willard of Harvard. They followed the Reformed School Divines not only in making the decree of God the constitutive doctrine of the system, but in emphasizing it. Edwards did not displace the eternal Decree as the constitutive doctrine; but by a change in emphasis he lifted into the place of first importance in theological thinking in America the inward state of man in nature and in grace. He appears to have been led strongly to emphasize these related themes, partly by the Great Awak- JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 131 ening, and partly by the controversy on the Half-way Covenant which followed it. No one, however, but a man of genius could have made this change in emphasis so potent a fact in Ameri can Church history. It is impossible to exaggerate the influ ence thus exerted by Edwards on American theological and religious discussions and on American religious life. If I may so say, here is the open secret of the New England the ology from Samuel Hopkins to Horace Bushnell. And more than to any other man, to Edwards is due the importance which, in American Christianity, is attributed to the conscious experience of the penitent sinner, as he passes into the mem bership of the Invisible Church. Quite as important as this distinctive contribution is the tre mendous stimulus and impetus he gave to theological specula tion and construction. When I think of the Edwardean School of New England theologians from Samuel Hopkins to Ed wards Park, between whom are included so many brilliant men, too many even to be named at this time ; when I think of the Edwardean theologians in my own Church, like Henry Boyn- ton Smith and William Greenough Thayer Shedd; when I think of the fruitful history of his works in Scotland and England, and recall his real mastery over the minds he influ enced ; it seems to me that it is not too much to say that, up to this time, his influence in the English-speaking world — not on all thinking, but on distinctively dogmatic thinking — has been as great as that of either Joseph Butler or Samuel Taylor Coleridge. I have thus endeavored to set before you my impressions of Edwards' dominating quality, his intellectual gifts, and the kind of work he did ; and to state the place which in my view he holds among the theologians of the Universal Church. I have refrained from eulogy. He is too consummate and sincere a master for us to approach with the language of com pliment. But I should incompletely perform the duty you have devolved upon me, did I fail to speak of two of his works which have been violently and repeatedly attacked. One is the essay on The Freedom of the Will. The other is the Ser mons on the Punishment of the Wicked. 132 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY The essay on the Freedom of the Will is essentially a polemic, and only incidentally a constructive treatise. As a polemic, therefore, it must be judged. He had before his mind, not the whole voluntary nature of man as a subject to be investigated, but the special Arminian doctrine of the liberty of indifference as an error to be antagonized. What, there fore, the essay shows is, not his constructive ability, but his ability as an antagonist. I have read carefully only one other treatise in which the propositions as obviously move forward in procession, with steps as firmly locked together. This other treatise is the Ethics of Spinoza. If you dare consentingly to follow Spinoza through his three kinds of knowledge up to his definition of substance — which, since it is thought not in a higher category but in itself, is self -existent; which is and can be one only ; and whose known attributes " perceived to be of the essence of this substance " are infinite thought and infinite extension — if you follow Spinoza thus far; you will soon find yourself imprisoned in a universe of necessity, and bound in it by a chain of theorems, corollaries and lemmas impossible to be broken at any point. Your only safety is in obeying the precept, Obsta principiis. Quite equal to Spinoza's is Edwards' essay in its close procession of ordered argument. Like Spin oza he begins his treatise with definitions. And I cannot see how anyone, who permits himself to be led without protest through the first of the " Parts " of the essay, can refuse to go on with him at any point in the remaining three. In reading the treatise one should, above all, keep in view the fact that, though it is polemic against a particular theory, it was writ ten in the interest of a positive theological doctrine. I think we shall do justice to this doctrine if we state it in terms like the following : " Man's permanent inclination is sinful ; and his sinful inclination will certainly qualify his moral choices." This Augustinian doctrine Edwards defended by a closely reasoned psychology of the will. I am not sure that this great doctrine, which I heartily accept, was at all aided by Edwards when he involved it with and defended it by a particular psy chology. And my doubt is deepened by what seems to me his unnecessary employment, in the spiritual sphere, of terms JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 133 taken from the sphere of nature, like " cause ", " determina tion " and " necessity ". I can only call your attention to the fact that the defense of the religious doctrine, and not his psy chology, was Edwards' deepest anxiety. And who of us is not prepared to say, that the bad man's badness is a perman ent disposition certain to emerge in his ethical volitions, and that to revolutionize it there is needed the forth-putting of the power of the Holy Ghost? But it is Edwards' sermons on The Punishment of the Wicked which have awakened the strongest enmity ; an enmity expressed often in the most violent terms. The rational and Scriptural basis of the doctrine and the objections to it need not be set forth here. Edwards accepted, defended and pro claimed it, substantially in the form in which it has been taught in the Greek, the Latin and the Protestant Churches. It is the doctrine of the Fathers, the mediaeval Schoolmen and the Pro testant theologians. Edwards' doctrine of Hell is exactly one with the doctrine of Dante. Now it is of interest to note that there is a widespread revulsion from Edwards, considered as the author of these Sermons, which does not and so far as I am aware never did appear in the case of Dante, considered as the author of the Inferno. What is the explanation of the dif ference ? Dante is praised and glorified by not a few of those to whom the name of Edwards is for the same reason a name of " execration and horror ". Indeed, Dante has been defended by a great American man of letters for rejoicing in the pain of the damned; while no one of Edwards' sermons, unless it is Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God, has been more se verely criticised as inhuman than the discourse entitled, The Torments of the Wicked in Hell no occasion of Grief to the Saints in Heaven. We shall do well, therefore, to note the contrast between Dante's and Edwards' presentation of the same subject. When Dante was sailing through the Lake of Mud in the Fifth Circle of Hell, there appeared before him suddenly Philippo Argenti, who in this world was full of arrogance and disdain of his fellowmen, now clothed only with the lake's muck. Pathetically he answers Dante's inquiry, "Who art 134 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY thou that art become so foul ? " with these words, " Thou seest I am one who weeps." And Dante replies, " With weeping and with wailing, accursed spirit, do thou remain, for I know thee although thou art all filthy." Then Virgil clasps Dante's neck and kisses his face and says, " Blessed is she who bore thee ! " And Dante replies, " Master, I should much like to see him ducked in this broth before we depart from the lake." And Virgil promises that he shall be satisfied. "And after this ", continues Dante, " I saw such rending of him by the muddy folk that I still praise God therefor and thank Him for it. All cried, 'At Philippo Argenti ! ' and the raging Florentine spirit turned upon himself with his teeth. Here we left him; so that I tell no more of him." This is one of the passages in Dante's poem of that Hell over whose entrance he read these words ; " Through me is the way into eternal woe ; through me is the way among the lost people. Justice moved my high creator; the divine Power, the supreme Wisdom, and the primal Love made me. Before me were no things created unless eternal, and I eternal last. Leave every hope, ye who enter here." There is nothing in Edwards which, so far as I can judge, equals this in its horrid imagery and suggestion. And yet men enjoy Dante and the Inferno. They do not " execrate " him for a " monster ", as Dr. Allen says they do Edwards. And in his great essay on Dante, Mr. James Russell Lowell makes this very scene the text of an eloquent laudation of Dante's moral quality, in which he says of him ; " He believed in the righteous use of anger, and that baseness was its legitimate quarry." Why is it that the attitude of the general public, thus repre sented by Mr. Lowell, toward the Hell of Dante is so differ ent from the attitude of the same public toward the Hell of Ed wards? I think we shall find an answer to this question in what I may call Edwards' spiritual realism. Of course Dante is a realist also. How often this quality of his poem has been pointed out to us! But Dante's is the realism of the artist, the poet who appeals to our imagination. Our imagination being gratified, we enjoy the picture and even the sensations of horror which the picture starts. Of all this there is nothing JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY 135 in Edwards. There is no picture at all. There is scarcely a symbol. Here and there there is an illustration. But the illustrations of Edwards are never employed to make his sub ject vivid to the imagination. They are intended simply to explicate it to the understanding. The free, responsible, guilty and immortal spirit is immediately addressed; and the purely spiritual elements of the Hell of the wicked, separated from all else, are made to appear in their terrible nakedness before the reason and the conscience. The reason and the conscience respond. We are angry because startled out of our security. And we call him cruel, because of the conviction forced on us that we are in the presence of a terrible, even if mysterious, spiritual reality. Edwards always spoke, not to the imagina tion, but to the responsible spirit. Men realized when he ad dressed them that because they are sinners their moral consti tution judicially inflicts upon their personality remorse; and that remorse is an absolute, immitigable and purely spiritual pain, independent of the conditions of time and space and, therefore, eternal. The Nineteenth Century, in one of its greatest poets,3 look ing out on nature, sees no relief from this eternity of remorse ; that is to say, it sees no evidence, in nature's " tooth and claw " that God will ever interfere to end this spiritual pain and pun ishment. It only "hopes " that, "at last, far off ", " Winter will turn to Spring." I shall not attack any man for a hope, maintained against the evidence of remorse within and nature without, that the mystery of pain and moral evil will be thus dissipated in their destruction. It is not my business to de nounce a thoughtful and reverent spirit like Tennyson, because of any relief he may individually find, when facing the most terrible revelation of nature and of his moral constitution, in the " hope " which issues from our sensibility to pain and from the sentiment of mercy which God has implanted in us all. But I do say, that a man's private " hope " should never be ele vated to the dignity of a dogma, or be made a norm of teaching, or be proposed as a rule of action. And I do protest that it is the height of literary injustice, while praising Dante, to con- * In Memoriam, liii-lvi. 136 JONATHAN EDWARDS: A STUDY demn Edwards the preacher because, in his anxiety to induce men to " press into the kingdom," he preached, not the pri vate hope of Lord Tennyson, but the spiritual verity to which the conscience of the sinner responds. Thus, in his treatment of this darkest of subjects, that spirituality which I have said was his dominant quality is regnant; and here, too, he should be called, " the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit." With this protest I conclude. Let me say again, that I am deeply grateful to you for the opportunity you have given me to unite with you in this commemoration of the man we so often call our greatest American Divine. He was indeed inexpressibly great in his intellectual endowment, in his theo logical achievement, in his continuing influence. He was greatest in his attribute of regnant, permeating, irradiating spirituality. It is at once a present beatitude and an omen of future good that, in these days of pride in wealth and all that wealth means, of pride in the fashion of this world which pass- eth away, we still in our heart of hearts reserve the highest honor for the great American who lived and moved and had his being in the Universe which is unseen and eternal. THE SUPERNATURAL William Brenton Greene, Jr. I.— Definition. I. Though spiritual, the Supernatural: a. Is not identi cal with all the spiritual, nor is it plural ; b. Its distinction is that it is the Uncaused, the Self-Subsistent, the Autonomous. 2. The points specially to be guarded in this definition are: a. The separateness of the Supernatural from the natural; b. Its singleness as so separated. II. — Importance of this doctrine, i. In Christian Apologetics. 2. In Christian Dogmatics. 3. In Philosophy. 4. In Science. 5- In Ethics. 6. In Religion, Civilization and Human Achievement. 7. In the Christian Religion, according to its own claim. 8. With regard to the hope of the world. III.— The Reality of the Supernatural. 1. The Question. 2. The Oppos ing Theories : a. Positivism; b. Monism; c. Pluralism. 3. The Argument: a. From the Consent of Philosophy; b. From the Necessity of Religion ; c. From the Necessity in Thought. IV. — The Manifestation of the Supernatural. 1. The Question, 2. The Opposing Theories: a. Pantheism; b. Religious Positivism; c. Agnosticism. 3. The Argument : a. From the standpoint of the reality of the Supernatural ; b. From that of the reality of the natural. V. — The Personality of the Supernatural. 1. Summary of opposing views. 2. Statement of true position. 3. Argument : a. The Super natural can be personal ; b. The Supernatural must be at least personal; c. The Supernatural cannot be higher than personal. VI. — The Personal, in the sense of Immediate, Manifestation of the Supernatural. 1. What is meant by such manifestation. 2. The importance of the reality of such manifestation, not only to Christianity, but to all higher religion. 3. The denial of the pos sibility of miracles is based on the assumption that nature is and must be uniform. 4. Proof of the possibility and even of the probability of miracles, i. e., of supernatural interventions in the course of nature. VII.- — Conclusion. 1. Christianity is not established as the supernatural religion : this must still be decided by the appropriate evidence. But 2. the way, and the only way, for its establishment is laid open. 3. The reality of the Supernatural, of his manifestation through nature, of his personality, and of his personal intervention in nature — these are established or reason itself is denied. THE SUPERNATURAL I. Definition. By the Supernatural we do not mean the spiritual. Yet this has been and is a common conception of it. The distinc tion between the Supernatural and the Natural is held to be the distinction between moral freedom and physical necessity, between spirit and matter. Such thinkers embrace within the Supernatural not only God, but angels and men. That is, all that is truly spiritual and so, because self-initiating, able to modify and even to break through the necessary succession of physical causes and effects they call supernatural. Thus Bushnell1 defines the Supernatural as " Whatever it be that is, either not in the chain of material cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of causes and effects, in nature, from without the chain." So Hickok when discussing the " Valid Being of the Soul," says2, " The facts of a comprehending' — not merely conjoining, nor connecting — power over nature, and of an ethical experience, prove the soul to be supernatural." Thus, and in this representing many living and influential au thors, William Adams Brown writes3, " The insight that law is universal is matched by the higher insight that it is only in consciousness that we find law. Thus, the supernatural re ceives its true meaning of the personal, and the false anti thesis between nature and the supernatural is removed. The supernatural is the natural seen in its spiritual significance." So, too, he says4, " This sharp division between nature and the supernatural science no longer recognizes. It knows but one 'Nature and the Supernatural, p. 3y. 2 Rational Psychology, pp. 54°. 541- 2 Christian Theology in Outline, p. 229. 4 Methodist Review Quarterly, Jan., 191 1, p. 40. 140 THE SUPERNATURAL world, both natural and supernatural, or, as we express it in the more familiar terms, both material and spiritual." This way of thinking is, however, misleading, inad equate and untrue. It is misleading in that it assumes what is yet to be proved. As Henry B. Smith wrote,5 " The im plication or tacit assertion that the Supernatural and the spirit ual are identical' — that all which is truly spiritual is also super natural, is the unproved and disputable position." It is a ques tion, and a vital one, whether God and man are essentially the same. It is the question which divides the Old Theology from what is called the " New Theology." This definition, there fore, hides the issue. To accept it as a guide in controversy would blind us to the chief contention. Again, this mode of thinking is inadequate in that it does not reach to the heart of the question. This is not whether there is a kind of being above physical nature and so superior to the chain of necessary causes. There are many who deny even this; but there are many, too, who, while they admit both the reality and the trans cendence of spirit as spirit, take, as we have seen, the ground that the human spirit and the Divine Spirit are essentially one. That is, the question is not whether man is above nature ; it is whether there is anything above man. If there is not, then no argument is advanced by defining the Supernatural as the spir itual ; if there is, then the definition contains no reply. Hence, it is inadequate. To get any where, we must ask, not is there being which is supernatural in the sense of spiritual, but is there being which is supernatural in the sense of absolute, that is, independent and self-existent because uncaused. Once more, the definition under consideration is untrue. It assumes, even when it does not assert, that human freedom and divine free dom are one and the same inasmuch as both are superior to physical or necessary causation. This is the reason why both should be classed as supernatural. The truth, however, is that, though both are alike with respect to this superiority, yet in another and more important respect they are radically unlike. The law of cause and effect, while it differs, does not break down when applied to the human will. As H. B. Smith 5 Apologetics, p. 21. THE SUPERNATURAL 141 says,6 " If it did, then there would be pure contingence and the element of no law pervading the system." Physical and human nature, therefore, are alike in the most comprehen sive and significant respect. They are both of them, though differently, yet really, caused and determined. They both of them presuppose a creator and reveal a preserver and gov ernor. They are not, like that creator, preserver and governor, uncaused, self-subsistent and autonomous. This is the dis tinction in comparison with which all other distinctions are as nothing, and it is to this distinction that the definition of the Supernatural as the spiritual is untrue. Again, by the Supernatural we do not mean being that, though uncaused, self-subsistent and autonomous, is plural, that is, made up of many such distinct and independent beings. Such a conception is on its face a contradiction. To go no further, what is autonomous must be single. Absolute sover eignty and a plurality of even federated gods are inconsistent. By the Supernatural, then, we do mean, being that is above the sequence of all nature whether physical or spiritual; sub stance that is not caused, and that is not determined whether physically and necessarily as in the case of physical nature or rationally and freely as in the case of spiritual nature; in a word, unique reality the essence of whose uniqueness is that the reality is uncaused, self-subsistent and autonomous. We call this Supernatural the Infinite to denote the absence of limita tion. We call it also the Absolute to express perfect indepen dence both in being and action. We call it, too, the Uncondi tioned to emphasize freedom from every necessary relation. In short, we apply all three terms to it to affirm the absence of ev ery restriction. Such is the Supernatural that we are about to consider. Does it exist? Does it manifest itself ? What is its nature? If a person, can he reveal himself immediately as such? These are the inquiries which we shall raise. And the radical distinctness of the Supernatural from the natural, whe ther physical or spiritual; and the singleness of the Super natural, — these are the two positions which our definition as it has been unfolded will call on us to guard most carefully. " Apologetics, p. 22. 142 THE SUPERNATURAL II. Importance of the Inquiry. Though as abstract and difficult as any, it is more important, because more fundamental, than all. This may be seen in the various departments of thought and life. It is self -evidently so in Christian Apologetics. The subject-matter of this science is the proof, not of the su periority nor even of the uniqueness, but of the supernatural- ness of the Christian religion. The aim of apologetics is to show that Christianity is supernatural and, therefore, superior to and unique among the religions of the world. Thus Christ is to be presented as the Saviour of men, not because he grew up out of the natural, but because he came down from the Super natural. It is this that makes him, and it is only this that could make him, our almighty Redeemer. That is, apologetics presupposes the Supernatural. It would be as absurd were the the latter not real as would be the attempt on the part of one in Europe to prove that he was a citizen of the United States if there were no United States. Apologetics, therefore, cannot ignore our inquiry. Strictly speaking, it must begin with it. The first and the most necessary work of Fundamental Apol ogetics is to vindicate the Supernatural as a distinct and a single being. Similar is its place in Christian dogmatics. Deny the Super natural and the very substance of this science is evaporated. What it discusses is the Supernatural and the relation between it and the natural. Its chief topics are God, creation and providence, redemption, revelation and salvation: and God is the supernatural fact; creation and providence are su pernatural acts; redemption involves a supernatural covenant, a supernatural gift and a supernatural sacrifice and victory; revelation is a supernatural communication of supernatural information ; and salvation is the work of the Supernatural and issues in a supernatural transformation. Without the reality of the Supernatural, therefore, dogmatics would be as meaningless as astronomy would be if the stars were but THE SUPERNATURAL 143 spectres. Its subject-matter is the uncaused, the self-subsis tent, the autonomous. The case is much the same in philosophy. It must postulate, if it does not prove, the Supernatural. It fails to explain the reality in nature, if it denies or ignores the unique reality that is above nature. Thus positivism, in that it declines to go behind or beyond phenomena, ceases to be a false philosophy. It has no conception, not even a wrong one, of the aim of philosophy. Any explanation to be adequate must be ultimate, and no explanation can be ultimate till it rests on the un- , caused, the self-subsistent and the autonomous. It is so with science. This would observe, compare and classify phenomena. It would confine itself to giving an ac count of the outside of things. To do this, however, presup poses inquiry as to their inside. What a thing appears to be can be seen truly only in the light of what it is. To interpret the actions of a man, you must remember that he is not a stone nor even a dog. You will not see all that is to be seen in what he does, unless you regard it as the expression of a free self-conscious spirit. Precisely so, if science ignores what is above and behind nature, it fails to discern rightly and cer tainly to estimate justly what is in nature. The caused, the dependent, the determined must be read as a manifestation of the uncaused, the self-subsistent, the autonomous, the universe in its relation to its unique Creator, if it is to be understood or even if it is to be read as it really appears. Science's own development is establishing this most significant fact. " We can not overlook ", says Lindsay,7 " how truly Spencerianism has been tending to prove that no progress of science shall be able to dispense with supersensible Reality, or to displace meta physical intuition or belief ;" and the fourteen years that have passed since the utterance of this judgment have only confirmed it. Even more evidently is the Supernatural indispensable to morality. This presupposes a law above nature as well as objective to self. Its characteristic and unique sense of obli gation can not be explained otherwise. This is not satisfied, ''Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion, p. 74. 144 THE SUPERNATURAL if regarded merely as expressing the demand of the constitu tion of things. The force even of the latter points to an au thority above itself. Nature, spiritual no less than physical, is bound by the law of nature because this law has both its origin and sanction in that which is above nature. This is being appreciated as never before. As Lindsay says again,8 " The moral problem is now more clearly seen to have its ultimate ground or metaphysical basis in the Absolute." Doubt less, a morality may be developed independently of this re ligious basis. It must, however, lack permanence as reared on a superficial foundation. It must also lack completeness; for9 " the ideal law revealed in conscience is fully realized only as religion possesses the soul." This law must be the transcript of the nature and the revelation of the will of the being who is uncaused, self-subsistent, autonomous, that is, who is infinite and absolute and so unique in his holiness. In the sphere of moral law nothing short of this could be ideal. Fairly and fully interpreted, conscience itself affirms as much as this. In view of all this, it should go without saying that religion and civilization and so human achievement depend directly on the conviction of the Supernatural. It is the heroes of faith who, as a rule, have been the men of action. In comparison with them what has been accomplished by the champions of unbelief? This is yet more evident in the case of the na tion. Let a people, as the Anglo-Saxons, base their in stitutions on faith in the living God, and they move to the front and stay there. Let a race, as the Chinese, sub stitute agnosticism for religion, and they drop to the rear and keep there. Thus apologetics, dogmatics, philosophy, science, morality, religion, individual progress, civilization in general, presuppose and even demand the Supernatural. Of all truths the most metaphysical, no other is so intensely prac tical. Its atmosphere is necessary to life. Beyond this, it should be observed that by its own claim the Christian religion must stand or fall with the reality of the Supernatural. Unless our religion express the intervention in nature, both physical and spiritual, of what is essentially un- "Ibid., p. 62. 'Ibid., p. 62. THE SUPERNATURAL 145 caused, self-subsistent and autonomous and, as and because such, both radically distinct from the world and itself single, it is of all frauds the most unblushing and stupendous. It presents itself to us, not as an evolution of the divine in nature, but as a direct revelation of and from God, who, though in nature, was alone before it and is also distinct from it and alone above it. Thus the new life that is characteristic of its confessors it declares to be the result of a new birth, a birth from above, a birth by the spirit of God (Jno. iii. 3), and to be throughout a manifestation of his unique power (Gal. ii. 20). The doctrine that it teaches it affirms to be "the wis dom of God " (1 Cor. i. 24) ; and, so far from admitting that it may be known from nature, which does clearly reveal his everlasting power and divinity, it insists that it was " kept secret from the foundation of the world " (Mt. xiii. 35). The corner stone on which it rests, even the fact of Christ, it declares to be both " the power of God and the wisdom of God " ( 1 Cor. i. 24) : and it accounts for his person, by affirm ing that the eternal " Word was made flesh " (Jno. i. 14) ; for his death, by teaching that God gave him (Jno. iii. 16) to be " a ransom for many " (Mt. xx. 28) ; for his resurrection, by ascribing it directly and solely to " the working of the strength of the might of God himself " (Eph. i. 19, 20) ; and for the power manifest in the church and in its members, by referring it to the Holy Spirit as given by the exalted Christ and from the throne of God (Eph. iv. 7-13). In short, Christianity in sists on nothing so strongly as on this, that it is not of this world and so natural, but is directly of the sole because absolute God and thus supernatural. This is the message of its Scriptures. Unless, therefore, its supernaturalness can be vin dicated, it is discredited, and that, too, out of its own mouth. Nor may we fail to observe that it is just this supernatural ness of Christianity which makes it the hope of the world. It is the " good tidings of great joy which shall be to all people " because it is the way of salvation from the guilt and from the power of sin. It could not be this, however, were it not super natural. The condemned criminal cannot justify himself. Another, and one not like himself under the curse of the 146 THE SUPERNATURAL law, must bear his penalty. The diseased man can not cure himself. Another, and one not dying from his dis ease, must give to him of his blood and so of his life. Precisely thus, guilty human nature demands a supernatural redeemer, and corrupt human nature demands a supernatural regenerator and sanctifier; and under a moral government neither may come forward until authorized to do so by the absolute and so sole ruler. Our salvation in a word sup poses a new start; and the possibility of this, whether for the race or for the individual, is conditioned on such supernat ural intervention. If, as observation and experience no less than Scripture testify, we, as individuals and as a race, are "dead through trespasses and sins" (Eph. ii. i), we can be quickened and raised up to heaven in the likeness of Christ only as God himself reaches down from heaven and himself lifts us up. The natural evolution of a corpse, even though nature be conceived, as we conceive it, as created and sustained and guided by God, can issue only in increasing corruption. That is precisely the result in which he intends that nature, since he has permitted it to become corrupt, should issue. Ours, therefore, is no ordinary contention. Not only the truth of Christianity, but the hope of the world is bound up with the question as to the Supernatural; and the question as to the Supernatural concerns both his distinctness from the natural and his singleness as regards himself. III. The Reality of the Supernatural. The question is not whether the Infinite is, as many agnostics would hold, the all. Neither is it whether the Absolute exists and acts in entire isolation from the world. Nor yet is it whether the Unconditioned sustains no relation to anything. No one of these positions is essential to the conception of the Supernatural. The Infinite, because it signifies unlimited, need not mean the all. It may, at least as well, mean, not that it is not limited in the sense of being distinguished from other things, but that no limit is possible to it as so distinguished. THE SUPERNATURAL 147 The Absolute need not mean that which exists and acts in isolation from the natural. It may as well mean that which is not dependent on the natural. The Unconditioned need not mean that which sustains no relations to anything. It may as well mean that which sustains no necessary relations. Again, not only is no one of these positions of the agnostic essential to the conception of the Supernatural; no one of them is possible logically. The moral infinite can not be less than perfect. Hence, it can not be the all ; for the all, to be the all, must be the sum of good and evil. The phenomenal uni verse demands the Absolute as its ground; but just because it is its ground, the Absolute, as regards some of its activity, can not be existing in isolation from it. The order of the world implies an unconditioned governor; but if he be the governor of the world, the Unconditioned must have come into relation to it. All this is confirmed by consciousness. Its clearest and strongest testimony, a testimony that must be accepted if we are to be justified in thinking, is to our individuality. That is, consciousness insists that the infinite does not embrace us and so that it is not the all. In a word, not only need not the Supernatural, if it be, be such as has been indicated; but in the nature of the case it could not be such, even if consciousness did not testify that it is not such. The question, then, is, whether there is a being who, though he embraces nothing but himself, is in himself boundless ; whe ther there is a being who, though now he exists in connection with nature and ordinarily acts through it, is in both his being and his action independent of it ; whether there is a being who, though he is related to the universe as its creator and preserver and governor and redeemer, stands, so far as he himself is con cerned, in no necessary relation to it — in short, whether there is a being who is supernatural in the sense that, though he has chosen to come into the closest relations to nature, he was be fore it and is above it and is unrestricted by it, being himself uncaused, self-subsistent, autonomous, and so distinct and single. The reality of such a being is indicated by the untenableness 148 THE SUPERNATURAL of the opposing hypotheses. These are three: Positivism, Monism, Pluralism. 1. Positivism. — This is a negative and epistemological hy pothesis rather than an affirmative and ontological one. It tries to explain why we cannot know and so should not believe in the Supernatural; it does not essay to provide a substitute for the Supernatural. Nevertheless, in spite of its negative character, it is prevalent enough, and it is important enough, both in itself and because of the degree to which monism in corporates and uses it, to demand separate statement and dis cussion. By Positivism, then, we understand the doctrine that we can know phenomena and the laws by which they are connected, but nothing more. The reason assigned for this is that we have no knowledge prior to experience and all our knowledge is by induction from sensations. That is, the world of knowledge is that world, and only that world, which is revealed to us by sense-perception and so is the subject-matter of the Natural or Positive Sciences. Hence, as we cannot see, hear, touch, taste or smell the Supernatural, it must be incognizable; and if we thus do not know and can never know that it exists, what right have we to assert that it does or to believe that it does ? Such is positivism. It denies, as must have appeared, both the posi tions which, as we have seen, it is incumbent on us to guard; namely, the distinctness of the Supernatural from the natural and the singleness of the Supernatural. The theory of knowledge, however, on which it rests and in which it essentially consists is untrue. We have knowledge prior to experience and all our knowledge is not by induction from sensations. The most extreme advocates of positivism virtually admit this. Thus Comte, at once the boldest and the most consistent of them, himself the father of positivism, says :10 " If, on the one side, every positive theory must be necessarily founded on observation, it is, on the other side, equally plain that to apply itself to the task of observation our mind has need of some theory. If in contemplating the phenomena, we do not immed- 10 La Phil. Positive, chap. i. THE SUPERNATURAL 149 iately attach them to certain principles, not only would it be impossible for us to combine those isolated observations, so as to draw any fruit therefrom; but we should be entirely in capable of retaining them, and in most cases the facts would remain before our eyes unnoticed. The need at all times of some theory whereby to associate facts, combined with the evi dent impossibility of the human mind's forming, at its origin, theories out of observations, is a fact which it is impossible to ignore." What is this but an admission that, in order to ex periential knowledge, there must be a priori knowledge; a theory in the mind, if there is to be an induction from facts outside of the mind? Of course, Comte does not mean this. His explanation is that the mind invents its theory, and then, when it has made its observations with its aid, rejects it. Even this, however, allows that the mind must have a theory in order to observe and that it can itself form a theory prior to observation. The necessity of these admissions appears in the nature of induction. It proceeds in every case on the basis of an a priori truth; namely, that the same causes under the same circumstances produce the same effects. For example, you conclude that ice will melt, should the temperature rise to 32 ° F., because all observation has shown such to be the case. But why should you so believe? From the mere fact that one phenomenon always has followed another it may not be in ferred that it always will. If such a conclusion may be drawn, it is only because there is more in its premises than the observed sequence. It must be because we know that there is power in the antecedent, the temperature of 320, to effect the conse quent, the melting of the ice; and also because we know that, the power and the conditions of its exercise continuing the same, the consequent will be the same. These, however, are a priori truths. They are not in any way the results of observa tion or of sensation. All that is given thus is the mere sequence of the phenomena, the rising of the temperature to 32° and the ice beginning then to melt. This the positivists maintain as strenuously as any. This is all the explanation that they offer of the principle of cause and effect. They reduce it to a se- ISo THE SUPERNATURAL quence. Yet if they are to generalize with confidence from these sequences, they must admit the a priori truths that a cause is such because it has the power to produce its effect and that the same cause under the same circumstances must pro duce the same effect. And so it is that Comte speaks of the mind as obliged to invent a theory before it can observe pro fitably. Is it not more rational to believe that it finds itself furnished in advance with the true theory? Indeed, it is contradictory to speak of inventing something the elements of which are neither discovered without nor discerned within. Moreover, in sensation itself there is given more than mere sensation. As H. B. Smith wrote,11 " There is a material impact, and also a feeling of resistance, not material, but conscious — a resisting self, a person, an Ego — involved (whether or not this is given in the sensation itself is not material, it is certainly implied). And this conscious knowl edge cannot be derived from the external phenomena, but is a distinguishable state of the ego. The ego cannot be derived from the non-ego." Even J. S. Mill confesses12 that a series of sensations aware of itself is " the final inexplicability ". Positivism can describe the successive sensations, but that some thing whereby we know them as ours cannot come out of them. How can a mere sequence of feelings of pain generate the consciousness that it is I who feel the pain ? Must there not be already the consciousness of self in order to the identifica tion of the pain as my pain? I must recognize the particular peg as mine, if I am to hang my hat on my own peg. Admit that the sensation of pain may be the occasion of self-conscious ness and even its necessary occasion, still, can it be its cause? A tree is the occasion of my seeing a tree. If no tree were pre sented to me, I should not see one. Yet who may say that the tree by itself produces the vision of a tree; or, if we speak strictly, that it produces it at all? What the tree does is to call the faculty of vision into exercise by furnishing it an appropriate object, and thus to show that the faculty in ques tion existed prior to the presentation of the tree. It is the "¦Apologetics, p. 53. 12 Ex. of Sir W. Hamilton's Phil., Vol. i, p. 262. THE SUPERNATURAL 151 faculty of vision that produces the vision. Necessary though the tree is as an occasion, it is only an occasion. In like manner sensation is the occasion of self-consciousness. You may even argue that it is only in sensation that we become conscious of self. Yet who may maintain that sensation gives of itself the consciousness of self? All that it does is to call self-con sciousness into exercise and so to reveal the self as existing prior to sensation and thus as independent of it. When Leib nitz was told that the gist of Locke's philosophy was, " Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu," he replied, " Etiam, nisi intellectus ipse."13 Indeed, the intellect mani fests itself in sense ; a priori elements appear even in sensation itself. Beyond this, if there be no knowledge except as the result of induction from individual sensations, we are involved by the very process of so-called knowledge in utter ignorance even of what we claim to know. The position is, that we know only what we can observe; that this is the mere sequence of phenomena, phenomena as antecedents and consequents; and that we know the consequents only as modes or forms of the antecedents. In a word, scientific knowledge is simply the knowledge of these differing modes. Suppose, then, that we trace back to the utmost point within our reach the last in spected consequents. These can be known " only as we know the antecedents," only as "modes of the antecedents." Then they cannot be known at all ; for by the supposition, we cannot reach their antecedents, having already gone back as far as we can. Thus the whole process of knowing breaks down. As we do not know the ultimate antecedent, all our boasted knowledge becomes a chain of total ignorance. " It is a chain which ", as H. B. Smith wrote,14 " is all hanging and nowhere hangs." What is beyond sense being absolutely un known, we cannot know even what appears to sense. Hence, the positivist, to be consistent, ought to be agnostic as to every thing. If all that he can know be consequents of phenomena, he cannot know even this. Thus the denial of the Supernatural is the denial of the natural also. In a word, the refutation of *>Nouv. Ess. II, 1, 2. "Apologetics, p. 55. 152 THE SUPERNATURAL positivism is that it is a theory of knowledge which is destruc tive of all knowledge. Of course, this refutation does not prove the reality of the Supernatural. It does, however, dis pose of the objection that because the Supernatural cannot be known by sensation it cannot be known at all. Such a theory of knowledge is contradictory and so must be untrue. 2. Monism. — This hypothesis, unlike that just considered, is affirmative and ontological. It offers a substitute for the Supernatural as we have described it. It does this by denying the first of the two positions which, as we have seen, must be guarded. That is, it ignores the distinction between the Super natural and the natural : while either is to be conceived as single, this is so because they are both one and the same. This hypothesis itself assumes two forms according as the one abso lute reality is regarded as essentially matter or spirit. In the one case we have Materialistic Monism ; in the other, Idealistic Monism. a. Materialistic Monism. — Of this Professor Ernst Haeckel is probably the representative exponent. " By Monism ", he says, " we unambiguously express our conviction that there lives ' one spirit in all things ', and that the whole cognizable world is constituted, and has been developed, in accordance with one common fundamental law. We emphasize by it, in particular, the essential unity of inorganic and organic na ture, the latter having been evolved from the former only at a relatively late period. We cannot draw a sharp line of dis tinction between these two great divisions of nature, any more than we can recognize an absolute distinction between the ani mal and the vegetable kingdom, or between the lower animals and man. Similarly, we regard the whole of human knowledge as a structural unity; in this sphere we refuse to accept the distinction usually drawn between the natural and the spiritual. The latter is only a part of the former (or vice versa) ; both are one. Our monistic view of the world belongs, therefore, to that group of philosophical systems which from other points of view have been designated also as mechanical or pantheistic. However differently expressed in the philosophical systems of THE SUPERNATURAL 153 an Empedocles or a Lucretius, a Spinoza or a Giordano Bruno, a Lamarck or a David Strauss, the fundamental thought com mon to them all is ever that of the oneness of the cosmos, of the indissoluble connection between energy and matter, between mind and embodiment — or, as we may also say, between God and the world' — to which Goethe, Germany's greatest poet and thinker, has given poetical expression in his Faust and in the wonderful series of poems entitled Gott und Welt." 15 This " confession of faith of a man of science," as Haeckel calls it, contains at least the following articles : 1. The universe or God, or, if you prefer, God or the uni verse, is infinite ; for God " is the infinite sum of all natural forces, the sum of all atomic forces and all ether- vibrations."16 2. In the infinite God or the infinite universe there are no real distinctions. The organic is essentially one with the in organic ; the animal is essentially one with the vegetable ; man is essentially one with the animal; God is essentially one with the world; in a word, the Supernatural is essentially one with the natural. 3. This supernatural or natural God or universe is to be un derstood in terms of matter. That is, Haeckel's monism is materialistic monism. This is what he affirms. " Even clearer does it become that all the wonderful phenomena of nature around us, organic as well as inorganic, are only products of one and the same original form, various combinations of one and the same primitive matter."17 True, he would regard mind as well as matter as an aspect of what is most primitive and fundamental of all ; namely, " substance " : but that he would conceive of substance and so of mind mechanically rather than spiritually — this, too, is clear. Indeed, he says, Monism " strives to carry back all phenomena, without excep tion, to the mechanism of the atom." 18 In a word, materialistic monism starts with " animated atoms " ; it would develop in telligent atoms ; and it makes the Supernatural just " the infi nite sum " of these atoms. "Monism, pp. 3, 4, 5- "Ibid, p. 16. "Ibid., p. 78. "Ibid., p. 19. 154 THE SUPERNATURAL This hypothesis is invalid in at least the following three re spects : I. It begs the question. It starts with the life and con sciousness and mind which are the very things to be explained. That is, it assumes what is to be proved. Thus Haeckel says : " The two fundamental forms of substance, ponderable matter and ether, are not dead and only moved by extrinsic force, but they are endowed with sensation and will (though naturally of the lowest grade) ; they experience an inclination for con densation, a dislike of strain; they strive after the one and struggle against the other."19 " Every shade of inclination from complete indifference to the fiercest passion is exemplified in the chemical relation of the various elements towards each other." 20 " On those phenomena we base our conviction that even the atom is not without a rudimentary form of sensation and will, or, as it is better expressed, of feeling (aesthesis) and inclination (tropesis) — that is, a universal 'soul' of the simplest character."21 " Thus, then, in order to explain life and mind and conscious ness by means of matter," Sir Oliver Lodge writes, comment ing on this very passage, " all that is done is to assume that matter possesses these unexplained attributes." " What the full meaning of that may be, whether there be any philosophic justification for any such idea, is a matter on which I will not now express an opinion; but, at any rate, as it stands, it is not science, and its formulation gives no sort of conception of what life and will and consciousness really are." " Even if it were true, it contains nothing whatever in the nature of explanation ; it recognizes the inexplicable, and rele gates it to the atoms, where it seems to hope that further quest may cease. Instead of tackling the difficulty when it actually occurs ; instead of associating life, will, and consciousness with the organisms in which they are actually in experience found, these ideas are foisted into the atoms of matter; and then the properties which have been conferred on the atoms are denied 19 The Riddle of the Universe, p. 78. 20 Ibid., p. 79. aIbid., p. 80. THE SUPERNATURAL 155 in all essential reality to the fully developed organism which those atoms help to compose ! " 22 2. The hypothesis under consideration does not beg enough. Though it assumes what is to be proved, it must assume more to complete its proof. Starting with " animated atoms " " not without a rudimentary form of sensation and will," it develops out of them the inorganic world ; then, the inorganic world into the organic ; then, the vegetable into the animal ; then, the animal into man; then, man into all that he has become and even into all that he will become. Not less than this is what materialistic monism undertakes to do; and, consequently, it is according to its ability by means of its assumption to explain how this can be done that it must stand or fall. Now to do this, it has " animated atoms " " not without a rudimentary form of sensation and will." This is what it assumes and so is what it may work with ; yet though big and utterly unwarranted as an assumption, this is all that it assumes and so is all that it may work with. But much more is needed. If this vast scheme of development is to be explained, intelli gence, and not merely sensation and will, must come in, and must come in at the start. For feeling and inclination presup pose and are imposible without a condition or situation to be felt and to be inclined towards or against. As Haeckel says, " The two fundamental forms of substance, ponderable matter and ether, experience an inclination for condensation, a dis like of strain; they strive after the one and struggle against the other." Nor is this all. The result of an evolution start ing with and proceeding by means of this striving and strug gling must, in the nature of the case, depend on the kind and the degree of this condensation and of this strain, and on the kind and degree of them from the first instant of attraction and repulsion. Let there have been the smallest variation in these then from what there was, and it would be an entirely different universe that we should have now. How, then, came it about that the atomic feeling and inclination began to act under the one set of conditions that could have resulted in the existing state of things ? By the law of probabilities, if it was 22 Life and Matter, p. 42. I56 THE SUPERNATURAL by chance, the chances were at least practically infinitely against it. But if not by chance, it must have been by design. That is, intelligence must have been not only implicit in but actually operative at the beginning of evolution. Whence, however, this intelligence? The hypothesis under criticism essays to show its development, but it does not assume it as already in exercise. Yet this it must go on and do, if it is to show anything but its own imbecility. 3. The hypothesis that we are considering, not only begs the question and still does not beg enough, but what it does beg and must beg, even to save its face, is impossible. It as sumes that " the universe, or the cosmos, is eternal, infinite, and illimitable," " Its substance, with its two attributes (matter and energy), fills infinite space, and is in eternal motion". " This motion runs on through infinite time as an unbroken development, with a periodic change from life to death, from evolution to devolution." 23 That is, as we have seen, it as sumes that the sum of all atomic forces and of all ether vi brations is infinite and in that sense is God. This, moreover, must be assumed. As just indicated, there is no other way of escaping the necessity of positing an infinite intelligence dis tinct from the universe and operative at its origin. To do this, the cosmos must be regarded as itself " eternal, infinite, and illimitable." Evolution must be the ultimate fact; like God, it must have neither "beginning of days nor end of years ; " it must itself be God himself, and so ultimate and thus beyond either explanation or the need of it, if that which is determina tive of it be so rudimentary and inadequate as mere atomic feeling and atomic inclination. That is, we can get rid of the Supernatural only by putting the natural in its place. To do this, however, is impossible on any hypothesis, and it would seem to be specially so on the one under review. For the infinite substance which it assumes not only, as we have seen, " fills infinite space, but is in eternal motion." Now this is a contradiction. There are just two ways in which an infinite substance can be said to fill infinite space. It can really fill it. 28 The Riddle of the Universe, p. 5. THE SUPERNATURAL 157 That is, it can form a continuum. This, however, as Derr has pointed out, will mean " the annihilation of space." Indeed, there can be no space, if the ether of space be absolutely with out pores or vacuities or parts; and this is just what a con tinuum is, and what it must be to be a continuum."24 But " it is inconceivable that motion should take place in a con tinuum." 25 As Lucretius pointed out in his De Rerum Na- tura (II, 95 sqq.), if there were no void spaces in the universe, motion would be impossible. There would be no space to move in; there would be no parts to move. On the other hand, if ether does not form a continuum, if it does have pores, vacui ties and parts, if in a word, there is either space within it for its parts to move in or, we may add, space without it for it as a whole to move in, then the cosmos can not be " eternal, infi nite and illimitable." It could be conceived to be greater than it is. It would be greater than it is, if its pores and vacuities were filled and if it itself filled the infinitude of space. That is, from the physical standpoint the cosmos cannot both be con ceived as " eternal, infinite, and illimitable " and at the same time be regarded as " in eternal motion " either with respect to its parts or with respect to it itself as a whole. The two con ceptions are contradictory and so are mutually exclusive. Of course, it may be replied, and it is likely to be replied, to this argumentation that it is purely speculative. This is true. No scientist ever saw an atom or felt the ether. They are preem inently mental creations. We do not cognize them by the senses. As Ladd says, " It is only because of certain irresistable convictions or as symptoms of mind that we be lieve in their extra-mental reality." 26 Surely, then, criticism of inferences from these mental convictions and assumptions is in order. Thought-constructions must be tested by the laws of thought. If physicists will be metaphysicians, it is by metaphysics that they must be judged. b. Idealistic Monism. — In this, as its name indicates and as has been pointed out, the one absolute reality is conceived, not 24 The Uncaused Being and the Criterion of Truth, p. 72. "Elements of Physiological Psychology, p. 677. 25 The Uncaused Being, p. 73- I58 THE SUPERNATURAL as matter or substance, but as spirit or subject. The world is not composed of atoms; but it is a system of thought rela tions, and God is just the unity and the identity of these relations. All existence, consequently, is regarded as a mani festation of the Absolute and the Universal Intelligence ; and the inherent power of this "Absolute Idea " is conceived as the sole agency at work in all transformations. Thus, whatever is real is rational and whatever is rational is real ; and the rational and real is neither more or less than the process of the logical unfolding of the "Absolute Idea." In a word, if materialistic monism makes the natural physical and puts it in the place of the supernatural, idealistic monism makes the Supernatural an idea and puts it in the place of the natural. That is, as represented by the philosophy of Hegel, in an important sense its source and type, it identifies the Supernatural and the nat ural in a universal syllogism. That this scheme has advantages over that just considered should go almost without saying. It escapes the embarrassments which, as We have seen, mater ialistic monism encounters from the start. Thus it does not have to begin by begging animation and mind for matter ; for, as Balfour has well said, " it makes reason the very essence of all that is or can be : the immanent cause of the world-process ; its origin and its goal." 27 Again, it does not have to beg fur ther, in order to the evolution of the cosmos, the active and developed reason which it is the chief function of the evolution to evolve, for logical movement is of the essence of the Abso lute Idea. Once more, it does not have to solve the insoluble problem how the physical universe can be infinite and yet in eternal motion; for it denies that there is a physical uni verse. But in spite of these great advantages, this idealistic form of the monistic hypothesis has to encounter difficulties which would seem to be as fatal to it as are those that we have consid ered to materialistic monism. I. As Balfour has written, " In all experience there is a re fractory element which, though it cannot be presented in iso lation, nevertheless refuses wholly to merge its being in a 27 The Foundations of Belief, p. 143. THE SUPERNATURAL 159 network of relations, necessary as these may be to give it ' sig nificance for us as thinking beings.' If so, whence does this irreducible element arise ? The mind, we are told, is the source of relations. What is the source of that which is related? "28 We need not fall back on Kant's contradictory hypothesis of " a thing in itself ", but must we not admit his dictum that " without matter categories are empty ?" 29 That is, there is reality which even idealistic monism must leave unexplained. As an hypothesis of the universe, therefore, it is at least inade quate. 2. Even where it should be strongest it will not work. That is, it breaks down also when it encounters the individuality of the self or ego. The reality of this individuality it denies. It does this by bringing all self-consciousnesses to identity in the divine self-consciousness. Because the self-consciousness of men reveals a similarity of type, the Hegelian infers unity of substance. This, however, is as much a non-sequitur as though we were to argue that all oak trees were one because they were all alike. Nay, it is a much more glaring non-sequitur; for the distinguishing characteristic of every self-consciousness is consciousness of itself as an individual. In the words of Seth, " Though self-hood involves a duality in unity, and is describable as subject-object, it is none the less true that each self is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious, if I may so speak, to other selves — impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue. The self, accordingly, resists invasion; in its character of self it refuses to admit another self within itself, and thus be made, as it were, a mere retainer of something else. The unity of things (which is not denied) cannot be properly expressed by making it depend upon a unity of the Self in all thinkers ; for the very characteristic of a self is this exclusiveness."30 Moreover, this fact is one with which an Hegelian specially is bound to reckon, because with him self-consciousness is the ultimate category. How, then, may he deny that exclusiveness, that individuality, 28 The Foundations of Belief, p. 144. 28 Critique of Pure Reason, Mtiller's translation, p. 45. 80 Hegelianism and Personality, p. 216. i6o THE SUPERNATURAL which, as we have seen, is the essence of self-consciousness?1 No hypothesis can work which thus repudiates the innermost content of that for which it assumes to account. It is not, therefore, too much to say that " the radical error of Hegelian- ism is the unification of consciousness in a single Self." Though it gave a valid explanation of self-consciousness in other respects, its breakdown in this would be fatal; for this is fundamental. 3. Its explanation, however, is invalid throughout. Even if it might explain away the individuality of the self, it would have to be set aside on other grounds, chief among them the following : Man is put in the place of God. This is done by making, as we have seen, the human self-consciousness and the Absolute " identical quantities ". " God or the Absolute is represented in the system as the last term of a development into which we have a perfect insight; we ourselves, indeed, as absolute phil osophers, are equally the last term of the development." Thus in the philosophy of law, of history, of aesthetics, and in the his tory of philosophy itself, the Absolute is attained, being simply man's record and ultimate achievement along these lines. Spe cially is this so in the " philosophy of religion," where we should naturally expect to meet it least. The self -existence of God seems to disappear; he has his only reality in the conscious ness of the worshipping community. " God is not a spirit beyond the stars," says Hegel ; " He is Spirit in all spirits " :31 but this means, if not certainly to " the Master " himself, at least to many of his disciples, that anything like a separate personality or self-consciousness in the divine Being is re nounced. In a word, we are put in the place of God. Can any such explanation of the human self be valid? It contra dicts that which is scarcely less fundamental in our conscious ness than the sense of individuality, and that is the feeling of dependence on the Supernatural. As Bacon has said, ' Man looks up to God as naturally as the dog does to his master ; ' 32 but this he could never do, were there no God save " his own great self ". Again, man as well as God is deprived of real 31 Werke, xi. 24. "Essay on Atheism. THE SUPERNATURAL 161 existence. After putting the former in the place of the latter, the hypothesis under review proceeds to destroy the former also. This it does by dividing and so, of course, killing him. His one concrete self is split into two. Of these that one of which each of us is conscious is the man : and the other, that which, according to Kant, unifies the former, and, according to Fichte, thinks it, and, according to Schelling, is the ground of it, and, according to Hegel, attains to self-consciousness, and so truly manifests itself, in it, is the Absolute or God. This division, however, does not more truly, as we have seen, undeify God by practically identifying him with the human self-consciousness than it dehumanizes man. Man is not " the empirical self " ; or rather, the latter is only half the man, only the objective side of his consciousness. It is a half, too, that cannot exist, that cannot even be conceived, alone. If there are to be merely states of consciousness, there must be a subjective self of which they can be the states of consciousness. Nor does it help matters that the place of this subjective self is taken by what may be called the divine Self — a self identical in all men, a self, as we have seen, identical with man. " The individual seems thus to become no more than an object of the divine Self, a series of phenomena threaded together and re viewed by it — an office which it performs in precisely the same manner for any number of such so-called individuals." Surely this is to destroy man with a vengeance. He is made the mere object of an undeified God. Nothing in himself, he can be conceived to exist only in virtue of what cannot itself be re garded as self-conscious save in him and as far as he. As Seth puts it, " Human persons are, as it were, the foci in which the impersonal life of thought momentarily concen trates itself, in order to take stock of its own contents. These foci appear only to disappear in the perpetual process of this realization." 3S This is to hypostalize an abstraction. " The impersonal life of thought ", which is admitted to constitute the subjective side of human consciousness, is, of course, such. Apart from a person, without a thinker, thought can not be, it cannot 83 Hegelianism and Personality, p. 190. I02 THE SUPERNATURAL really be conceived as being; it is like an effect without a cause, it is an effect without a cause. But the empirical self, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, is, by itself, equally an abstraction. States of consciousness presuppose and neces sarily involve a subject of those states. As well think of qual ities as existing save as the qualities of some substance. Nor will it help matters to take " the impersonal life of thought," as is done by at least the Hegelians of the Left, as the ground of the individual self-consciousness. The combination of two abstractions will not make one concrete reality any more than zero plus zero will make unity. Hence, Seth is correct when he says of the hypothesis under review : " It takes the notion of knowledge equivalent to a real knower; and the form of knowledge being one, it leaps to the conclusion that what we have before us is the One Subject which sustains the world, and is the real knower in all finite intelligences. It seems a hard thing to say, but to do this is neither more nor less than to hypostatize an abstraction." 34 Now to do this is, in plain English, to make something of nothing. But this is not the worst. Having so deceived itself as to suppose that it has succeeded in working up mere abstractions into a real agent, the hypothesis goes on to ascribe to its abso lute Nothing an absolutely impossible achievement. This is the creation as it were of reality. Though the Absolute is but an idea, though it is merely abstract thought, the logical un folding of its categories is regarded as giving the whole actual world of nature and spirit. Hegelianism briefly expressed teaches, according to Schopenhauer, that the universe is a crys tallized syllogism. This, however, cannot be. " There is no evolution possible of a fact from a conception." Logic can develop the meaning of nature, but it cannot originate it. " It cannot make the real, it can only describe what it finds." Indeed, it itself presupposes nature or reality; and without it, it is, as has been already observed, as powerless as it is empty. How, then, may we posit a mere nonentity like the " Absolute Idea " as the creator of such realities as the physical realm and "* Hegelianism and Personality, p. 29. THE SUPERNATURAL 163 even the human soul? No hypothesis of the self can be ten able which leads to a result so irrational. c. Pluralism. — This is the doctrine that reality consists of a plurality or multiplicity of distinct beings. It may be atom istic as with the atomists, or hylozoistic as with Empedocles, or spiritual as with Leibnitz, or indifferent as with Herbart, whose " unknowable reals " produce the phenomena of both mind and matter. Be its character, however, what it may, it is essen tially the reverse of the hypothesis just considered. Monism, in both its materialistic and idealistic forms, admits that the Supernatural is single, but denies that there is any radical distinction between it and the natural. It is but the sum of the natural in materialistic monism ; it is but the unity and identity of the natural in idealistic monism. Pluralism, on the contrary, denies the singleness and, consequently, the absoluteness of the Supernatural, but admits the reality of distinctions. " The atoms of the Atomist are endowed with perpetual motion which they do not receive from a transcendent principle, but which belongs to the essence ". We find no " notion of elementary unity " in " the four elements " of Empedocles, but they are equally " original ". The monads of Leibnitz are each of them " little divinities in their own department." The " reals " of Herbart are themselves " absolute ". That is, instead of one all-comprehending substance or one all-unifying subject, we have a plurality of independent, if not unrelated, substances or subjects. This hypothesis, according to Ward the one now dominant (The Realm of Ends, p. 49), owes its special prominence and importance at present largely to the late William James. " Reality ", he says, " may exist in distributive form, in shape not of an all but of a set of eaches, just as it seems to."35 God, then, is not " the absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically. He has an environment, he is in time, he works out a history just like ourselves." 36 Distinct from us, he is not single among us or over us, being finite and relative as are we. That this view has not a little to commend it appears almost on its face. As William James 35 A Pluralistic Universe, p. 129. 3° Ibid., p. 318. 1 64 THE SUPERNATURAL points out, God, because finite and relative, " escapes from the f oreignness from all that is human, of the static timeless perfect absolute." 37 Inasmuch as he is like us even to the extent of being limited as we are, we can feel that he is one with us. Again, the problem of evil becomes much easier from this standpoint. " The line of least resistance," says William James, " both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all- embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once." 38 We need not then explain his permission of evil : we may hold that he would conquer it, but cannot. Though indefinitely superior to us, he is no more absolute than are we. Hence, God and we are bound together in a bond of sympathy such as can bind those only who are fighting shoulder to shoulder in an as yet uncertain battle. Once more, reality seems to exist distributively. Though the universe may, in the last resort, be what William James calls " a block-universe," 39 that is, an absolute system ; still, it is as " only strung along, not rounded in and closed," that we become aware of it. We know it simply as an aggregation of " eaches ". Why, then, should we admit more than this into any hypothesis with regard to it ? That is, in not positing a single because absolute Super natural, pluralism is at least true to what appears. On the other hand, however, this hypothesis encounters difficulties neither few nor small. Among these are the follow ing: I . Pluralism, though true to what appears, is not true to all that appears. It may be true to the world of reality as the senses make that known to us, but it is not true even to our sensations and perceptions as these are interpreted to us by self- consciousness. For we find in the latter, and all men, in propor tion as they develop mentally and their development is not biased by philosophy, find in the latter, the idea of the cosmos. That is to say, the human race, in so far as it thinks on these subjects, thinks naturally of the world as one system. Even S1 A Pluralistic Universe, p. 318. "Ibid., p. 311. "Ibid., p. 328. THE SUPERNATURAL 165 Zoroastrianism was not originally dualistic. Now there is no reason why this natural and well nigh universal belief in monism of some kind should not commend itself to us at least as much as the exceptional belief in pluralism. Indeed, the former stands better accredited. Pluralism in its denial of the cosmos denies one of those native principles of the mind which, as we saw in our discussion of positivism, must be admitted or knowledge even by sensation and perception becomes im possible. Were this not so, however, the bare fact of science would establish that the world is not what William James describes as " only strung along ", but is what he calls " a block uni verse " or what we prefer to term a cosmos. It is not, as the idealistic monist holds, only a system of thought-relations : but it is constructed throughout in accord with thought rela tions ; and so it is one system, that is, a cosmos. The proof of this is that reason can and does interpret it and that mind can and does understand it. Were it otherwise, there could be no science as there can be no science of any jumble of inde pendent facts. It is only as these can be viewed monistically rather than pluralistically that a science of them can be even conceived. The progress of science is, therefore, the denial of pluralism. Though this progress be small in comparison with the land yet to be possessed, enough has been systematized to warrant, if not to constrain, the belief that all can be possessed. Much of the universe may still, as William James would say, not be " closed in " ; but what has been " closed in " indicates as the reason why more has not been " closed in ", that our reason is limited, not that the world is not a rationalized whole. 2. Where pluralism claims to be strongest it is weakest. The doctrine of a finite God appears to commend itself to the heart. At first sight a God who would prevent evil, but cannot, is more attractive than one who permits it though, since he is omnipo tent, he could prevent it. On second thought, however, not only is the mind unable to tolerate a finite God, but even the heart can " see no beauty in him that it should desire him ". On the one hand, omnipotence and omniscience may be variously conceived; but, whether as held by the savage or by the 1 66 THE SUPERNATURAL scholar, they are essential to his conception of God. The rea son for this is that man has a primitive belief in the infinite. As, therefore, he must naturally believe in God, so he must naturally believe him to be infinite. He could not think of God as the greatest and the best that he knows unless he did so. On the other hand, it is precisely the omnipotence and the omni science of God which give its unique worth to God's love for us and sympathy with us. These can be supremely precious be cause they differ from all other love and sympathy not only in degree but in kind. It is just because we can feel that God can do for us and can be to us all that " love which passes knowledge " can prompt that we stay our hearts on him and find perfect peace in him. It is easier far to trust that he loves us even when he chastens us and that he chastens us " for our profit that we may be partakers of his holiness " than it would be to rest our souls on him if we had even to suspect that, in spite of all his greatness, he was limited in power and wis dom as are we. There would always be the fearful possibility that at last we might be cast away. Even Paul, had he been a pluralist, could never have exclaimed, " For I am persuaded that nothing shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord " (Rom. viii. 38, 39). Thus pluralism fails just where it thinks itself the strongest. It compromises with the head for the sake of the heart only to be repudiated by the heart. 3. Logically, pluralism must give the lie to our religious nature and thus silence and at last destroy it. As Derr has written, " The religious implications of pluralism are obvious. All the various ' Eaches ' are coeternal and therefore coequal, and enter into unions or combinations with one another of their own free will. Nothing can be compulsory amid the vast de mocracy of uncaused beings, for they are all independent of one another, and exist by the necessity of their own nature. They are all finite in power, for the sphere of activity of each is limited by each, hence a multitude of infinite beings is impos sible. Nor can we, with any show of reason, assume that any one of these equal beings can lift itself so high above the rest as to assert sovereignty over them. All the eaches being THE SUPERNATURAL 167 gods in their own right, there is no such a being as A God; the word, indeed, loses all its significance. And thus pluralism or modern polytheism ends in absolute nihilism, and the re ligious sentiment must necessarily go by default."40 Can any hypothesis be true which thus destroys that which is noblest in the noblest being in the world that it is assumed to account for? These, then, are the hypotheses which contradict that doc trine of the Supernatural which Christianity presupposes and which, accordingly, we would vindicate : positivism, which de nies the Supernatural altogether, both its separateness and its singleness; monism, which, in either of its forms, admits its singleness but denies its separateness from the world; and pluralism, which denies its singleness but admits its separate ness. Inasmuch as each one of these has been shown to be untenable, does it not follow that we should approach the only other hypothesis possible in the nature of the case, the hypothesis that there is a real Supernatural both separate from the world even as immanent in it and single in it and over it — does it not now follow that we should take up this hypothesis with a presumption at least that it is true? Some world-view that really explains the universe there must be, and this would seem to be the only other possible. This presumption is strengthened by the fact that the Chris tian doctrine of the Supernatural would, if true, meet all the necessary conditions. Thus positivism, as we have seen, fails to interpret even the world as made known by the senses, through denying those innate ideas only under whose guid ance can the senses conduct to knowledge: but the Christian doctrine of the Supernatural both recognizes and guarantees these ideas; as an idea it is one of them, and its subject, the supreme Intelligence, is the author of them, " the light that lighteneth every man coming into the world." Again, if monism breaks down, in its materialistic form be cause it denies an absolute Spirit separate from the physical world, and in its idealistic form because it denies the separate ness of such a Spirit from all finite spirits ; so the view of the a The Uncaused Being and The Criterion of Truth, p. 39. t68 THE SUPERNATURAL Supernatural that we would vindicate supplies in both cases the deficiency by holding that God is not only single in him self, but absolutely distinct from the world whether of matter or of spirit. Once more, if pluralism fails, and must fail, permanently to satisfy man's mental, emotional and religious natures for the reason that its Supernatural is not single and so cannot be absolute, the Christian doctrine of the Supernatural comes up to the requirements even in this respect; for it con ceives of the Supernatural as him " by whom were all things' created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions, or principali ties, or powers : all things were created by him, and for him : and he is before all things, and by him all things consist" (Coll. i. 16, 17). Moreover, the Christian doctrine of the Supernatural is a satisfactory hypothesis in fact as well as in logic. To prove and to illustrate this, it is necessary simply to recall what has been said with reference to the " Importance of the Supernatural ". As we have seen, not only do Chris tian apologetics and Christian dogmatics presuppose the Super natural in the sense in which this paper conceives it as the end of the former and the subject of the latter ; but philosophy, science, morality, religion, human progress and civilization, — all depend on its reality and, were there opportunity, could be shown to prosper in proportion as this reality is recognized. Could this be, if the Christian view of the Supernatural were untrue ? That a doctrine will work does not of itself prove it to be true ; but that it has worked well — this must, at any rate, raise a presumption that it is true, and must greatly strengthen any presumption of this sort already existing. Can less than this be meant by the Highest of all authorities when he says of false prophets, " Ye shall know them by their fruits " (Mt. vii. 16) ? Clearly, then, the burden of proof is on those who would deny the existence of the Supernatural. It is for them to refute, it is not for us to establish, the Christian position. Strictly, according to the law of parsimony, no argument for the Christian hypothesis is called for. It is the only one that THE SUPERNATURAL 169 has not been proved to be untenable ; it has been shown to be satisfactory in theory ; it has been found to be indispensable in practice. Therefore, the threefold argument about to be ad vanced for it ought at least to be received with the highest respect and to be considered as from the start having every thing in its favor. 1. The argument from the consent of philosophy.. — Most schools of philosophy declare for the Supernatural. In a sense, all of them do. Thus Comte, the founder of positivism, re pudiates the Supernatural avowedly, but he devises a very com plicated system of worship and finds in " aggregate humanity " an object for it. Even this most significant concession does not satisfy his successors. Herbert Spencer, whether we re gard him as a positivist or a monist or an agnostic, not un justly represents them; and he comes out clearly and strongly for the Supernatural. " The axiomatic truths of physical science unavoidably postulate Absolute Being as their common basis. The persistence of the universe is the persistence of that Unknown Cause, Power or Force which is manifested to us through all phenomena. Such is the foundation of any possible system of positive knowledge. Deeper than demon stration — deeper even than definite cognition — deep as the very nature of the mind is the postulate at which we have arrived. Its authority transcends all other whatever; for not only is it given in the constitution of our own consciousness, but it is impossible to imagine a consciousness so constituted as not to give it . . . Thus the belief which this datum consti tutes has a higher warrant than any other whatever." 41 Even Haeckel, the great exponent of monism, while repudiating all being above nature, concludes his " Monistic Confession of Faith " with the words : " May God, the Spirit of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True, be with us."42 So, too, the first of modern pluralists, William James, even when arguing for a finite God, admits that the hypothesis of the absolute " must in spite of its irrational features, still be left open,43 and seems to claim as the reason why it must be so that " it 41 First Principles, pp. 256, 258, 98. a Monism, p. 89. a A Pluralistic Universe, p. 125. t7o THE SUPERNATURAL gives peace ",44 These concessions do not class their authors with the Supernaturalists ; but are they not testimony, strong just because it was unexpected and is unwilling, to the truth of the supernaturalistic position? Thinkers can not leave this position and not try to find a substitute for it. Thus they prove at least its necessity and so indirectly its truth. If such is the force of the teaching even of antisupernatural- ists, it is not too much to claim that philosophy as a whole on the whole declares for the reality of the Supernatural, if not in the precise form of the Christian doctrine, yet in what ap proximates and tends towards it. Did not our limits forbid, nothing could be easier than to illustrate and establish this statement from such masters in philosophy as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Bacon, Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Hamilton, Lotze, and many others. Indeed, as Lindsay writes, " We may surely say that it has become more clearly manifest that what thought as to the Primal Reality known as God testifies to is, above all else, the fact that such Inscrutable Reality, or the Unknowable, does undoubtedly exist." 45 This amounts to a great deal. It shows that the ablest thinkers in all ages, though they may not speak as religious teachers and though some of them may speak even as the enemies of the Christian religion, nevertheless, give it as the last result of their deepest and best thinking that the Supernat ural both does and must exist. This, of course, is not demon stration. The objective cannot be deduced from the subjec tive. The general consent, however, that we have been con sidering does prove that belief in the reality of the Super natural is not the idiosyncrasy of some peculiar thinkers, and that we must grant it to be a true belief or allow the useless- ness and even the folly of the best thinking in every age and the world over. But this is not sufficient. It may be urged that philosophy is the product of an artificial humanity, and that, consequently, it does not voice the natural and so best judgment of the race. We need, therefore, to appeal to, 2. The necessity of religion. — Religion is a universal phe- 41 A Pluralistic Universe, p. 114. 45 Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy, p. 5. THE SUPERNATURAL 1 71 nomenon. All men as men and because men are religious in one way or another. Even those thinkers who have yielded themselves to an intense and absorbing skepticism and whose religious nature has in consequence become atrophied confess the moral and spiritual necessity of religion, and their skepti cism makes their reluctant confession all the more impres sive. We have seen this to have been so in the case of Comte. It might as readily have been shown to have been so in the case of J. S. Mill and of many others. What is even more to the point is that no tribe has been found so degraded as not to evidence at least the beginnings of religion. The claims that such had been discovered of scientists like Sir John Lubbock and of travelers like Sir Samuel Baker have all been refuted by wider and more careful investigation. For example, Roskoff has declared that " no tribe has yet occurred without trace of religious sentiments." Peschel has decidedly denied " any tribe having been found quite without religious emotions and ideas." In like vein, Hellwald affirms that " no tribes completely without religion have thus far been met with." 46 The universality of religion would seem, therefore, to be a commonplace of anthropological science; and the fact that, no matter how debased, man is never observed to be destitute of something which to him is religion would appear to show that it belongs to his essence. In a word, religion is so universal among men that it must be necessary to man. As Kellogg puts it, " Its beliefs have been so universally ac cepted in all ages by men of both the highest and the lowest degree of culture, that we can hardly avoid the conclusion that they must be due to a certain instinct of man's nature." 47 So far as can be seen, he can no more get away from religion than a beast can escape the power of instinct. Indeed, the religious feeling is man's instinct, and so the highest and noblest of all instincts. In the next place, religion is impossible, if there be no under lying sense of the reality of the Supernatural. Were this ab sent, whatever we might have, we should not have what we ''Lindsay's Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy, p. 54. "Handbook of Comparative Religion, p. 10. 172 THE SUPERNATURAL recognize as religion. From the highest religion to the lowest, this belief in the reality of the Supernatural, of that which is above the world and which, in so far forth, is distinct from the world and itself single, is the one common and characteris tic element. Let there be nothing left of religion but a vague sentiment, an undefined aspiration, an unintelligent impulse; still, so far as it goes, this is a belief in and a craving for a real Supernatural and such a Superntural as we would vin dicate. " In most, if not in all cases where men worship gods many," says Kellogg, " there is discoverable in the back ground of the religious consciousness the dim outline of one sole Power, of which the many who are worshipped are either different manifestations, or to which they hold a position strictly subordinate." 48 Were this not so, however, our argu ment would not be weakened. What is significant is not that the Supernatural is conceived in all religions essentially as we have defined it, or that it is conceived at all; it is that all religions, even the lowest, reveal in their development the ten dency toward such a conception: just as in appetite the sig nificant thing is not that animals have from the first a clear idea of nourishment or that they have any idea of it ; it is that the tendency to suck always develops into the desire for and the eating of what will nourish. That is, as Edward Caird has so well shown in his Evolution of Religion, it is the end and not the beginning of a process of development which re veals its nature. Hence, if religion be, as we have tried to make plain, the expression of man's distinctive instinct; so the religious instinct is the instinct for a true Supernatural just as the young animal's tendency to suck is because of an instinct for real food. Now we find that every instinct has an object fitted to grat ify it. According to all observation, the belief in the reality of the object that its craving implies is justified. There is its mother's milk to satisfy the sucking child. There is the southern land to satisfy the swallow's instinct in early autumn to fly to the southern land. There is the ocean to satisfy the young fish's instinct, which constrains it, though it has never "Handbook of Comparative Religion, p. 7. THE SUPERNATURAL 173 been away from the spawning grounds far up the stream, to swim toward the ocean. Hence, to prove the existence of an instinct is to prove the reality of the object fitted to gratify it. Why, then, should it not be so in the case of the instinct for the Supernatural ? Nay, how could it not be so ? This does not demonstrate the reality of the Supernatural. It does, however, demonstrate that the Supernatural exists: or else, that there is an exception to the apparently univer sal and beneficent law of instinct; that this exception is in the case of the highest of all animals, man ; and that it is in the in stance of w*hat in him is noblest. That is, the law of instinct breaks down, so far as we can see, only in the one creature that is capable of appreciating it, and with reference to that element of his nature which exalts him most. This is not demonstration, but is it not a reductio ad absurdum? This will be shown yet more clearly, if we consider, 3. The necessity in thought. — There is thought. This no one can deny. In denying it we should affirm it : the denial involves thinking, it is itself thinking. Thus thought itself is a necessity. There is a necessity in thought. Not only can we not help thinking, but we must think in accord with certain rational principles. For example, if you think of finite being, you must believe in other being that is its ground. The former, because it is finite, cannot but be dependent; and what is con ceived as dependent can be conceived only as we posit, defin itely or not, that which can be its ground. We can no more think otherwise than we can think of a building that stands and yet has nothing on which to stand. There is a principle in the case that thought cannot set aside any more than it can cause itself to cease. Again, you cannot think of an event, a change, an effect, and not act on and thus really think in accord with the principle that everything that is finite, that begins to be, must have a cause. If you are in pain, you try to find out what produces it, and thus you show that, whatever may be your theory, you believe that there must be something or must have been something with power to produce it, that is, a real cause of it. You may even teach with Hamilton, that there is no I74 THE SUPERNATURAL positive power in a cause; that the cause of each and every phenomenon is " a negative impotence " ; that we believe in the reality of causation, not because it is real, but because we cannot think it unreal. Still, even this theory will not make us any abler to think it unreal. Indeed, our denial of the prin ciple of causation will only render more conspicuous and sig nificant our practical recognition of it. We can no more help acting on it than we can cease thinking. Once more, we cannot think of acts and not regard them as the acts of some subject, of some agent. We can consider acts, as gov erning, as making, as upholding, as creating, by themselves; but we cannot conceive of them as taking place by themselves. Even when our abstraction of them as acts from their subject is complete, it never occurs to us to suppose that in reality they are either separated or separable from it. Though we may think of them singly we must believe the act to be impossible apart from its subject. This is a principle that thought is bound to observe. It can no more transcend this principle than it can arrest itself. Other necessary laws of thought might be mentioned, but these are sufficient for our purpose. These principles reveal the necessity of the Supernatural. For example, the ground that, as we have seen, every thought of the finite presupposes is, in the last analysis, the Super natural. Unless you posit this and thus find in it a self-subsis tent ground of being, the finite universe, which cannot be con ceived without a ground, is left without one. Thus this prin ciple of thought discloses the necessity, if not the nature, of the Supernatural. Though it does not show us all that it is, it does show us that it must be. Only its real existence can satisfy the demands of thought. In like manner, the manifold changes and effects which make up the world require an absolute or un caused cause, and so reveal the necessity of the Supernatural. Unless we assume this Supernatural cause, nature becomes at last a causeless effect; and this, because nature is essentially finite, is a contradiction. Nor will it help us to regard the series of finite causes and effects that constitute the world as infinite. This pushes the difficulty off where we cannot see it, but in so doing it only aggravates it. An infinite series of finite causes THE SUPERNATURAL 175 and effects is as truly without a sufficient reason as is a finite series of such causes and effects. The main difference between the two is that the former is an infinite contradiction, whereas the latter is but a finite one. Nor does the fact that we cannot go back in the former case even in thought to the point at which the series ends and where we discern the necessity of the Self-subsistent Uncaused Cause render it less a necessity. As vigorously as though it could discern just where such a cause was required does the mind insist on its necessity. Only in such a cause can it find the power that it cannot conceive of the universe as not demanding. Thus this principle, too, makes known to us the necessity of the Supernatural. It does not set it before us as in a picture, but it will not suffer us not to think of it as the painter of the passing world-picture that we cannot help seeing. So also the Absolute Subject that such acts as the creating and the upholding of the universe postu late is the Supernatural. As every act evinces a subject in action, so these acts cannot but evidence an Unconditioned or Supernatural Subject. The reason for this is that these acts are and must be themselves unconditioned, and so can be the acts only of an unconditioned subject. Nor may it be disputed that these acts are and must be themselves unconditioned. Let it be remembered that by the universe we mean the organ ism into the constitution of which enter all finite, related, con ditioned beings and things, and this will at once appear. It is not more evident that such a universe requires, because it is finite, relative, conditioned, to be upheld than that the uphold ing of it cannot depend in any way on it, and so must itself be essentially unconditioned.- This should be as clear as that the unfailing energizing of Atlas in the fable would have had to be absolutely unconditioned by the world that he was supposed to support on his broad shoulders. Thus this principle, as those already noticed and as others that could be adduced, is not only a necessity of thought, but necessarily makes known in thought the Supernatural. If it does not unveil all its lineaments, it does reveal its necessity in the necessity of its acts. In short, the Supernatural is at the end of all thinking. Take a blade of grass and think long enough and deeply enough with 176 THE SUPERNATURAL reference to it, and you come up against the Supernatural. Every line of consistent thinking as to reality brings you to it as directly, as inevitably, as under the Roman Empire all roads led to the " Eternal City." If any do not find this to be so, it is not because it is not so; it is only because they do not follow their thought to its conclusion. Thought is not more a necessity than the Supernatural is the necessity in thought. We cannot think truly and deeply and not believe practically in its reality. Hence, again, the already noticed universality of religion. It is not only the manifestation of what we may call the instinct of humanity; it is also the expression of the most profound necessity of rational thought. As Calderwood puts it, "All intelligence moves toward the Absolute or Self- existent;"49 and, "The essential implication of intelligence is that all finite being is traced to a self-existent fountain of Being." 50 Now " we find that whatever is necessary to thought in the sphere of the natural has its correspondent reality in being." Does thought affirm that every finite object requires a ground of support? Scientific investigation discovers it: even the earth, that seems to hang unsupported in mid air, swings se curely in an orbit made by the action of well-known forces. Does thought declare that every effect must have a cause? The scientist ferrets it out : though with the naked eye he can not see the microbe that causes the pestilence, he detects and studies it with the microscope. Does thought refuse to con ceive of acts save as the acts of some subject? We always find the subject, if we look long and carefully enough: by the ripple on the water far away we may know that it is blow ing, though we neither hear nor feel the wind; but let us pull toward the ripple, and soon the breeze itself strikes our droop ing sails. If, then, these principles are thus found to be trust worthy in the sphere of the natural or finite, why should we not trust them in the sphere of the Supernatural or Infinite? Nay, we must trust them. Grant that they are " regulative principles." Still, it is not of intelligence in itself, but of in telligence as that concerns itself with reality that they are 49 Handbook of Moral Philosophy, p. 257. M Ibid., p. 259. THE SUPERNATURAL 177 regulative. As Calderwood puts it, " The whole force of these principles is seen to be concerned with objective re ality."51 Whether there be reality or not outside of the think ing process, the significance of these principles is that they point to it and insist on it. They would not be what they are, they would not be at all, if they did not do this. This demand of theirs for reality objective to themselves is what gives to them their character. It is their significance. Moreover, as we have already seen, the reality which they demand is, in the last analysis, self-existent, uncaused and unconditioned. This, if we may so speak, is the significance of their significance. If, therefore, we verify or prove these principles on their lower side, as we have seen that we do, we may not distrust them on the higher. As Calderwood writes, " We cannot regard them as trustworthy in their application to the concrete yet un trustworthy in their very significance."52 Thus, though we were not able to verify them on their higher or supernatural side, verification on their lower or natural side would imply verity on their higher. We should be bound to believe in the objective reality as well as in the mental necessity of the Supernatural, even though we had no faculties with which to apprehend it; just as the astronomer without a telescope is sure that, if he had a telescope, he would find a splendid planet where his calculations, which hitherto have been invariably sustained, tell him that one must be. That is, a principle could not justify itself in every case within the limits of observation, if in its very significance it were untrue; and the regulative principles that we have been considering would be untrue in their very significance, if the Supernatural, on whose objective existence they insist as the reality of realities, were not itself of all realities the most real. It is not the fact, moreover, that the principles in question have no verification when applied to the Supernatural. On the contrary, there is a consciousness of God. As Shedd says, it is " a universal and abiding form of human conscious ness." 53 In addition to the craving after, the instinct for, 11 Handbook of Moral Philosophy, p. 264. " Ibid., p. 264. 58 Dogmatic Theology, Vol. i, p. 210. 1 78 THE SUPERNATURAL the Supernatural, which has already been noticed as the universal and necessary root of religion, all men may know, and, as a matter of fact, most men do know, the Supernatural. Though they can neither see nor hear nor touch nor taste nor smell it, they are often awed by it; in their more serious moments they feel its presence ; and so they must be conscious of it. Thus the principles which we have been considering are verified in the case of the Supernatural as in that of the natural. The telescope of Galle revealed the planet which the calcula tions of Leverrier and of Adams necessarily called for as the cause of certain perturbations of the solar system; and, in like manner, we are conscious of the Supernatural that reason with equal urgency demands as the ground and cause of the universe and the agent involved in its creation and preservation and government. Nor may it be said that this consciousness of the Supernatural is a mere hallucination. It is too general and especially too constant to be thus explained. Illusions vanish when the light is turned on them. The so-called illu sion of the Supernatural, however, continues, though from the very first every effort has been made and is being made to ex pose it. Nor may it be urged either that some have lost this God-consciousness and some seem never to have had it. This amounts to nothing in view of its prevalence and persist ence. He who does not use his eyes in the light will lose them, and the fish that are now hatched in the streams in the Mammoth Cave have none to lose. The significant fact is not that there are a few men who appear to have no conscious ness of the Supernatural; it is rather that not a single indi vidual was ever conscious that there was not a Supernatural. Says La Bruyere, " Je sens qu'il y a un dieu et je ne sens pas qu'il n'y en ait point." 54 Beyond all this, the ultimate facts, the best attested realities, when considered objectively, that is, in themselves, quite as much as when viewed subjectively, that is, as necessities of thought, reveal the Supernatural as the fact which they all presuppose, as the reality which alone gives to them reality. Thus they evidence the Supernatural as truly as a building evi- 54 Les Caracteresj c. 16. THE SUPERNATURAL 179 dences its foundation. For example, finite reality implies infinite or self-subsistent reality. But for this as its ground, it could not continue reality. The more real the world may ap pear the more deeply is this dependence written on it. In like manner, duality testifies to the reality of the Supernatural. How could real mind and real matter interact and together form the cosmos, did they not have a bond and controller as real as they, but superior to them and so supernatural? Such also is the witness of personality. The reality of the finite ego involves the Infinite Ego. As the human spirit, because finite, must depend on something; so because he is a spirit and thus a higher reality than matter, he can depend only on another and Infinite or Supernatural Ego. Hence, we observe that, in proportion as men come to know themselves, does their con sciousness of the Supernatural develop. Indeed, self-conscious ness cannot be true and not develop God-consciousness. As Calvin writes, " No man can take a survey of himself but he must immediately turn to the contemplation of God in whom he ' lives and moves '." 55 So, too, morality. Its objective obli gatory ideal, its law, reveals a law giver and moral governor; and in the fact that his law is universal, eternal, and immutable, we see that he himself must be the Absolute, the Supernatural. Thus do these first and fundamental facts reveal the Super natural. One and all, they involve it as the reality of realities. It is possible to object that all this is only subjective delu sion. We may affirm with J. S. Mill, that even the necessary principles of thought have no necessary validity; that, for ex ample, from the fact that two and two make four in this world it does not follow that they do so in any other ; and that consequently, the necessity to thought of the reality of the Supernatural argues nothing as to its actual reality. We may hold with Maudsley, that the individual consciousness is un trustworthy; that, therefore, though Maudsley, with blessed inconsistency, denied this, the general consciousness of the race is not to be depended on [ and, hence, that the practically universal consciousness of the Supernatural affords no real verification of our necessary belief in its reality. We may K Institutes, i. 1. 180 THE SUPERNATURAL after the manner of Kant, in his Critique of the Pure Reason, declare that we see things, not as they are, but as our minds project themselves into them; and that thus we discern the Supernatural as implied in all the ultimate verities, only be cause of what we are, not because of what they are. All this we can do. But is it rational so to do? This is the ques tion. Can we think thus and not commit intellectual suicide? That is, can we think thus and thought not contradict and so destroy itself? If its necessary principles, if its deepest con sciousness, if its ultimate verities, are all to be set aside, it itself must be utterly discredited. This happening, what is left ? Not the external world : we know it only as the object of thought. Not the knowing self : we know it only as it re veals itself in thought. Not even the certainty that we do not know the world without or the self within : to know even this involves the trustworthiness of thought. Thus the denial of the objective reality of the Supernatural issues in and so means absolute nescience and practical nihilism. In a word, as H. B. Smith says, " All minds believe and must believe in the Supernatural, unless they proclaim all Truth and all Being to be a mockery and a delusion." 56 It may still be replied that even this reductio ad absurdum is no formal demonstration. It should, however, be answered, What use for a demonstration of the Supernatural can they have whose position with reference to the Supernatural gives the lie to those very intellectual processes in which demonstration con sists. Moreover, that we have not framed, and cannot frame, a formal demonstration of the objective reality of the Super natural is itself confirmation of such reality. If we could ground it in any thing deeper and so prove its existence strictly, we should only prove that it was not the Supernatural whose existence we had proved. From its very nature the Super natural must be incapable of formal demonstration. m Apologetics, p. 26. THE SUPERNATURAL 181 IV. The Manifestation of the Supernatural. The question is not whether the Supernatural has manifested itself fully nor whether it could so manifest itself. As the only manifestation with which we are concerned is to us, and thus to the natural, such manifestation of the Supernatural as the above must, in the nature of the case, be impossible and even inconceivable. Because infinite and absolute, the Super natural cannot but be, in the most real sense, unknown and un knowable. It is true that the pantheists dispute this. They hold, not only that the Absolue is known, but that knowledge of the Ab solute is absolute knowledge. Their postulates are, that there is one Infinite Substance or Absolute Idea of which all rela tive and finite phenomena are but modifications; that, conse quently, the development of the finite and relative from the Infinite and Absolute, inasmuch as it is a process necessarily implied in and resulting from the very nature of the Infinite and Absolute, must be demonstrable; and that thus man, be cause himself one with the Infinite and Absolute, and identical in his own consciousness and life with its processes, can and does know it. That is, since man's thinking is the immediate activity of the Supernatural, his knowledge of it is as direct and as complete as it is of himself. In knowing the latter he really knows the former. We have seen, however, that this position is contradicted by consciousness. Its deepest and most characteristic testimony is to the individuality of the self. So far from identifying it with the Supernatural, it affirms the sharpest distinction between them. Thus we cannot take the pantheistic standpoint and not invalidate consciousness; but consciousness is the foundation of philosophy, even the basis of knowledge. Still further, pantheism exposes weakness fatal to itself in the claim which it makes and must make. This claim is that the transition from the Infinite and Abso lute to the finite and relative, from the Supernatural to the T82 THE SUPERNATURAL natural, can be demonstrated and explained. This cannot be done. As H. B. Smith says, " The real problem — equally a problem with pantheist and theist — is not to show that the one includes the other, but rather to show how the transi tion must or may be made from the one to the other." 57 On either system here is the mystery. Both find at this point a knot that cannot be untied. The difference between them is that theism need not untie it, whereas pantheism must. On the one hand, theism accounts for the natural as the creation of the Supernatural. It is the result of an infinite and absolute self-conscious Will. The method of this will's operation, however, the theist is not obliged to set forth. He need only show, as he can show, that creation is possible to an absolute will ; and he may grant that the mode of creation is a mystery necessarily beyond the scrutiny of human science. We our selves so often make what is other than we are that we should not stumble at the creation of the natural by the Supernatural. The latter act is one whose possibility does not depend on its comprehension by us. Nay, it is one that could not be the kind of act that it must be were it comprehended by us. On the other hand, however, pantheism would explain, and be cause it admits but one substance, must explain, the natural as an emanation from or an outgoing of, the Supernatural. That is, it may not, as we have just seen that theism may, leave the mode of transition from the Infinite and Absolute to the finite and relative a mystery : but it is obliged to explain the transition as a passing of the Infinite and Absolute into the finite and relative; as one thing, not making, but itself becoming, a radically different thing. Now this is not a mys tery; it is a contradiction, an impossibility. We need not, therefore, and, indeed, may not, inquire as to the truth of the pantheistic position, that a knowledge of the Absolute is abso lute knowledge. In view of what we have just seen that this position involves, such an inquiry becomes irrational. The question, however, is, whether the Supernatural has so manifested itself that, though partially, it can be and is known by us. " Apologetics, p. 69. THE SUPERNATURAL 1 83 This is denied, at least in large part, by the school of Ritschl. In general, their position is that religious knowledge consists merely of value-judgments, while other knowledge consists of existential judgments. That is, knowledge in religion is not the recognition of wihat is; it is the experience of what is spiritually helpful : whereas knowledge elsewhere is real knowl edge because composed of affirmations ascertained to corres pond to actuality. Hence, this school claims to be independ ent of philosophy and denies the legitimacy of natural theology. Religion is wholly an affair of the heart. Science is wholly a matter of the head. The two spheres are distinct and exclu sive. As Flint says, " no recognition of any revelation of God is granted except that in Scripture, and only there in so far as there is the revelation of God in Christ. Theology is repre sented to be incapable of attaining to any theoretic knowledge of God, and to have to do only with what God is felt to be in the religious experience of the Christian. That is to say, it is described as having for its task to set forth regarding God, not theoretical but practical judgments, — not affirmations which really apply to God in himself but affirmations which tell us what he is worth to us — that is, value-judgments, which, although they in no way express what God really is, may en able us to overcome the evil in the world and to lead a Christian life." 58 Thus this position, though it may not call itself agnos ticism, is such. It would banish knowledge from religion and would reduce it to an affair of feeling only. It may be refuted on the following grounds : 1. Its pretension to independence of philosophy and its con sequent denial of natural theology are inconsistent in the ex treme. It is on nothing but an unsound philosophy that this pretension bases itself. " It rests wholly on agnosticism as to reason and on the Kantian reduction of religion to a mode of representing the moral ideal. It assumes that Kants' philo sophy as modified in certain respects by Lotze is the basis of theology." This, however, is an enormous assumption; it is an assumption wholly in the sphere of philosophy; and, last but not least, the epistemology assumed is wrong. 58 Agnosticism, pp. 593, 594- 1 84 THE SUPERNATURAL 2. The school that we are examining proceeds on a false psychology. It presupposes that what are called man's different natures can operate in independence of each other. Hence, the religious and the theoretic spheres can be kept apart, and so a doctrine can have high religious value even though it have no foundation in objective fact. The truth, however, is that man's natures do not operate independently. They are not even separate themselves. Man's spiritual being is one and indivisible. It does not have even different powers. Its so- called faculties are but so many functions of one power, and these functions invariably involve each other. Intellect and will, for example, cannot be divorced, and thus the religious and theoretic spheres cannot be exclusive. That they could be, man would have to be other than he is. 3. The place assigned by this school to judgments of value is destructive of their value. That they have an important place in religion is not to be denied. Religion is animated by a practical motive. It does prize truth according to its effect on the heart. Further, religious judgment includes an element of ethical decision. It is he who wills to do the will of God who knows the doctrine. Finally, only the religious man can appreciate spiritual truth; for it is "spiritually judged". In these ways religious judgment does differ from pure intellect ual or theoretic judgment, as, for example, in geometrical demonstration. The element of value does enter into the for mer. In a true sense the head depends on the heart. ' No man can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost.' All this, however, implies that the judgment of value rests on a theo retic judgment; and not vice versa, as Kaftan holds and as Ritschl would seem to mean. The spiritual helpfulness of a doctrine depends on its truth ; its truth is not proven by its ap parent helpfulness. The deity of Christ is a precious doctrine, because it is the interpretation of a fact ; and it would lose all its preciousness, if his body were still lying dead in a Syrian grave. The position that we would establish as to the manifestation of the Supernatural is denied again by the avowed agnostics. They admit, and many of them strongly insist on, the objective THE SUPERNATURAL 185 reality of the Supernatural; but they hold yet more tenaciously that it is unknown and even that it must be unknowable. For example, Mansel, though he believes firmly in the reality of the Infinite and Absolute, denies that it can be present to us in consciousness; Max Muller, though he finds the princi ple of religion in the consciousness of the Infinite, holds that we are conscious of it only as the " Beyond ", as the mere negative of the finite, and so, of course, that we cannot know it; and Spencer, though he claims that we are conscious of the Infinite and Absolute as the positive basis of all our conscious ness of the finite and relative, nevertheless, insists that we are conscious of this positive basis as without limits and thus as unknown and unknowable. This theory whose chief forms in its distinctly religious reference have just been indicated is, generally speaking, exposed to the following objections : 1. It proceeds on a false theory of the nature of knowledge. This is, that to know anything we must know it in its essence and be able to define it itself. This, however, cannot be a true theory of knowledge. If it were, there could be no knowl edge. Not even a blade of grass do we know absolutely; that is, in its essence and apart from its relations. More over, we often know certainly what we cannot define at all. You can be sure of your friend's handwriting, though you cannot give the marks by which it is distinguished from that of others. In short, knowledge may be real, though it is neither absolute nor definite. You can know something, though you do not know anything fully or exactly. 2. The denial that the Supernatural can so manifest itself as to be known by us proceeds on a false theory of the con dition of knowledge. This condition is the identity of the sub ject knowing with the object known. " Quantum sumus sci- mus " and " Simile simili cognoscitur ". Hence, to know the Supernatural, we must be ourselves supernatural. While, how ever, in order to knowledge, there must be a kinship between subject and object, this is far from being, and, indeed, differs radically from, the identity claimed. We know the external world, though we are not the external world. Were the theory true, self-knowledge would be the only knowledge. 1 86 THE SUPERNATURAL 3. The denial that we are considering proceeds on a false view of the Infinite and Absolute. It is regarded as the all and the unrelated. Hence, as to know is to distinguish what is known from other things, the Infinite cannot be known ; for if it could be so distinguished from other things as to be known, or even from the knowing self, it would no longer be the In finite that was known : and as we can know only what has come into relation to us so as to be known, it would no more be the Absolute. That is, the Infinite and the Absolute, as regards the capacity for being known, is like a vase which is bound to go to pieces as you take hold of it. As we saw, however, when we were considering just what was the question with regard to the reality of the Supernatural, there need not be, there is not, and there could not be, any such Infinite and Absolute as agnosticism presupposes. That is, the conception of the Supernatural on which it is founded is con tradictory. Nor is this all. As should now be evident and as Flint has taught us in his classic work on Agnosticism, agnosti cism as to the Supernatural must, unless inconsistent, become agnosticism as to everything ; and " agnosticism as to every thing, whether in the form of doubt or of disbelief, involves a fatal contradiction. In a word, together or singly, these objections are a reductio ad absurdum of the agnostic position; and thus, though they do not prove the reality of the mani festation of the Supernatural and of our knowledge of it, they do open the way for the following proof : 1. There is no a priori impossibility that the Supernatural should manifest itself and should be known as manifested. Admitting that only its bare existence has been established, it does not follow that no more can be established. Nay, that a thing is often raises a presumption or expectation that what it is will appear. This presumption or expectation is attested by the spirit of discovery which it produces. Nor may it be urged that all this applies only to the sphere of the natural. That is to beg the question. It is to assert the thing to be established. 2. The reality of the Supernatural cannot be known and its nature not be known also to some degree at the same time. THE SUPERNATURAL 1 87 There is not anything the existence of which can be appre hended without an idea of at least some of its qualities. It is by means of the acts or the noises or the peculiarities in appearance of a strange beast that men in the first instance become aware of its existence, and there is no other way in which they can be assured of it. Knowledge that it is in volves by a necessary law of thought some knowledge of what it is; and to this extent the establishment of its reality estab lishes also that it has, in so far forth, manifested itself and this manifestation been recognized. It cannot be otherwise in the case of the Supernatural. Because the law just referred to is a necessary law of thought as such, if we know the reality of the Supernatural, we know that to some degree it has mani fested itself, and been recognized. We cannot know that it exists and not know something of what it is. Thus the mere question whether the Supernatural can manifest itself implies that it has done so sufficiently to be apprehended. But this raises the presumption at once, and it is from this presumption that our inquiry should proceed, the presumption that this manifestation of the Supernatural and the consequent recog nition of it by us will keep on. Other things being equal, the antecedent likelihood is that what has been going on will con tinue. 3. In knowing the existence of the Supernatural we know it as that whose nature it is to manifest itself. For example, as we have seen, we know the Supernatural as Infinite Being and so as the ground of all finite being. Now it is not claimed that the former simply as being tends to manifest itself in the latter. In order to this, there must be, in addition to Infinite Being, a principle of movement, an act. Still, Infinite Being looks toward finite being, and thus toward manifestation in it, so far as this, that it can be the ground and condition of it. Again, as we have also seen, we know the Supernatural as the First Cause. It is not only Infinite Being. It is also a principle of movement ; it has the power to act, to create. Now we do not hold that the First Cause must produce an effect and so manifest itself in it. The First Cause need not be, as we might show that it could not be, one that acts neces- 1 88 THE SUPERNATURAL sarily. Yet, when there is nothing to the contrary, the pre sumption in the case of power is that it will exert and so mani fest itself. Indeed, ordinarily, the power of self-manifestation implies a tendency toward it. Once more, as we have seen, too, we know the Supernatural as the Infinite Agent of the infinite acts that the universe, because finite, presupposes and thus itself evidences ; namely, creation, preservation and gov ernment. It must be, then, that in these acts, and so in their results, the Supernatural itself is really manifested. It is as impossible that an agent should not express himself in his acts as that these should not involve an agent. They are the agent himself in exercise. In simply knowing the existence of the Supernatural, then, we know it as that whose very nature it is to manifest itself. In the Supernatural as Infinite Being we have the necessary ground of the finite and to this extent the possibility of its manifestation in it. In the Supernatural as the First Cause we have the power of self -manifestation and in so far forth a tendency toward it. In the Supernatural as the Infinite Agent of the infinite acts that the finite universe implies, we have the actual manifestation of the Supernatural itself. 4. The same result may be reached, and just as conclusively, from the standpoint of the natural and phenomenal. This is the effect of the Supernatural. As we have already shown, we cannot really think otherwise, and it cannot be otherwise. See, however, what this law of cause and effect involves. The existence of the universe as an effect not only demands the ex istence of the Supernatural as its cause; but inasmuch as a cause must express itself more or less in its effect, it implies that the universe, though a partial, cannot but be a real mani festation of the Supernatural. In the natural, therefore, the Supernatural must appear and, in so far forth, must be known by us. We could no more avoid this than we could avoid seeing and knowing the artist in his work. This is true on any rational theory of the universe. Both the possibility and the fact of such a manifestation of the Supernatural must be conceded by all who hold to evolution as much as by those who believe in creation. Evolution — of what? Evolution in THE SUPERNATURAL 1 89 the abstract is only a name for a possibility, a term descriptive of a process. There must be a Supernatural Something, an Absolute Reality; if the possibility named is to become actual ity, if the process conceived is to operate. Darwin demands living germ cells if he is to work his development hypothesis. Huxley dispenses with life, but cannot get along without pro toplasm. Lucretius does not require this, but even he must have atoms. Whence, however, the atom? Science says that it is evidently " a manufactured article." It, therefore, be cause an effect must be a manifestation of its cause. Whence protoplasm with its assumed power of generating life? Yet more, as being a more pregnant effect, must this be a more pregnant manifestation of its cause. Whence life ? This is the highest and richest of all. Must not, then, its successive evo lutions be a continuous as well as the fullest manifestation thus far considered of the First Cause and so of the Super natural ? As H. B. Smith says, " This cuts the roots of the theory that the Supernatural is simply something in itself inscrutable, remote, isolated — an unintelligible abstrac tion — for we have obtained not only the Supernatural itself, as a datum of reason and philosophy, but also the Supernatural manifested, as necessary to any evolution, development, prog ress, or construction of a universal system." 59 That is, the manifestation of the Supernatural in nature and our conse quent knowledge of it is as much a necessity of thought and so as truly a reality as we have seen to be its objective existence. ' The heavens must declare its glory '. ' The firmament must show its handiwork '. ' Its everlasting power and divinity must be understood from the things that are made '. ' The spirit of man must be the candle of the Lord '. ' Christians must be epistles of Christ known and read of all men '. ' The church must make known the manifold wisdom of God.' ' The angels, since they are his ministers, must reveal his will.' In a word, all nature, both spiritual and physical, must manifest the Supernatural ; and in all the universe we should discern the manifestation. In this nature finds the sufficient reason for its being, the ultimate condition of its existence. Throughout, as 59 Apologetics, p. 41. 190 THE SUPERNATURAL regards both its origination and its continuance, the workman ship of the Supernatural, it could not be otherwise. What, then, does nature show the Supernatural to be ? V. The Personality of the Supernatural. In affirming this we deny, on the one hand, the rude and antisupernaturalistic materialism of Lucretius, which would account for all things by means of atoms and motion ; modern materialism, which for atoms and motion would substitute physical force; idealistic materialism or monism, as that of Tyndall, Huxley and Mill, which in place of matter and force would put an inscrutable mode of being whence they both come ; East Indian pantheism, which regards the Supernatural as spirit abstract and undefined ; materialistic pantheism, as that of Spinoza, whose Supernatural is the absolute substance; idealistic pantheism, as that of Hegel, which would conceive the Supernatural as thought, with logical law, and as developing by logical law the universe ; the theory of the pessimistic phil osophy of Schopenhauer, that the basis and cause of the uni verse is unconscious will : and, on the other hand, the position of the " cosmic philosophy " of Spencer and Fiske, that the Supernatural is " superpersonal "; that is, it is infinitely higher than personal, and so is unknown and must be unknowable. In opposition to all these views, on the criticism of which our limits forbid us to enter, we hold that the Supernatural is an identical, self-conscious, self -determining being; such as we are, a person, only infinite and absolute and unconditioned. This we would vindicate as follows : 1. The Supernatural can be personal. This is denied by many, notably by Spinoza and by Fichte in his earlier teaching, on the ground that personality is necessarily relative. The es sence of it, it is said, is that it implies another outside of itself. Hence, the Supernatural, because the Absolute, cannot be personal. The condition of absoluteness is freedom from con ditions of every kind. This position, however, confounds personality with individuality. The latter is a mere relation. THE SUPERNATURAL 191 It consists in separation from other things. It could not be if there were not other things. That is, its existence depends on its relation to other things. But personality is not a mere relation. As says H. B. Smith, "It is a point of fixed being."00 Its essence is, not that it is marked off from other persons or things; for were this so, beasts would be persons. Its essence is self-consciousness and self-determination; for it is this internal distinguishing of the self as object from the self as subject, not any relation to other selves, or things, that constitutes personality. The objection, therefore, falls. Nec essary relativity is inconsistent with the Absolute, but person ality as such is entirely self-dependent and so altogether inde pendent. As it appears in us it is relative. This relativity, however, is the result of our finiteness. We are persons, not because of it, but in spite of it. Indeed, the perfection of per sonality is possible only in the case of the Infinite and Absolute. Nor may it be replied, that, though self -consciousness and self-determination do not involve any external relativity, they are determinations; that, according to the Spinozan maxim, " every determination is a negation ; " and that on this ground, consequently, if on no other, the Supernatural or the Infinite and Absolute cannot be personal. This is to confound the laws of being with those of thought. That all determination or definition limits is true of mathematical quantities and of logi cal general notions, but it is not true of concrete beings. To hold that even Spinoza meant this is to misconceive him. As to beings, the opposite is true. As Harris says, " The more determined or specific a being is by the increase or multipli cation of its powers, the greater and not the less or more limited, is the being." 61 Indeed, being without any determina tions and specifications becomes an abstraction. We can con ceive of it as real, and so as being rather than thought, only as we conceive of it as constituted in this way or in that. Thus do the laws of thought itself themselves witness to the differ ence between themselves and the laws of being. Hence, as we have all along insisted that we must do, we can be true to the 80 Introduction to Christian Theology, p. 97. 81 The Philosophical Basis of Theism, p. 29. I92 THE SUPERNATURAL necessity in the former only as we recognize this difference. Indeed, as Lindsay puts it, " It is precisely in denying the Supernatural the power of being personal that his infinitude is parted with. This self-limitation of the Infinite — the great renunciation — is yet really its self-assertion and its self-revela tion."62 Evidently, therefore, the Supernatural can be per sonal : at least without some such determination as that of personality the Supernatural could not be. 2. As there must be a real Supernatural, so he must be at least personal. Three considerations will evince this clearly: As much as this is involved in the nature of a first-cause. Whatever the Supernatural may not be, it is, as we have ob served, of his essence that He should be the First-Cause. It is not more certain that there must be such a cause than it is cer tain that this cause cannot but be supernatural. " Now we have a real, though limited, experience of such a cause within ourselves, and there alone." We are conscious of being able to originate action, to initiate events, even in a measure to mod ify the processes of nature, in virtue of our free will or power of self-determination. That is, the only finite first-cause, if we may so speak, known to us is found to be such because of its personality. Its personality is what makes it, in spite of its limitations, a kind of first-cause. Would it, then, be other wise were all restrictions to be removed? Nay, could it be so? It is of the essence of a first-cause that it should be personal. It could not originate action were it not self-determining. Unless, then, it continue such, it must cease to be a first-cause. And this will be true whether it be finite and natural or infinite and supernatural. The only difference between the two cases will be, not that in the latter it will not be personal, but that it will be the perfection of personality. This is so because even the transition from finite to infinite, while it must involve the perfection of what is under consideration, cannot change its essence and not destroy it itself. Hence, unless the Super natural is to cease to be the First Cause, he must be at least a person as we are. This follows as surely from the law of " causal resem- 82 Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion, p. 315. THE SUPERNATURAL 193 blance ". The gist of this law is that nothing can be in the effect which is not potentially in the cause; or that the cause must always be, in its nature and possibilities, superior to its effect. Thus, while we can believe that a man has made a machine, we could not believe that any mere machine could make a man. In the former case the cause would transcend the effect. In the latter the cause would fall below the effect, and for this reason would appear to be and would be impos sible as its cause. Now the universe contains the personal. The personal or man is that in it which is highest. It is that toward the development of which all tends. In short, the per sonal is both the crown and the goal of the world considered by itself. As the evolutionists say, ' the personal is the meaning of the whole process of evolution.' How, then, can the First- Cause of the world, the originator, sustainer and director even of evolution itself, be himself less than personal? As the in spired psalmist says, " He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? " " He that formed the eye, shall he not see? " (Psalm xciv. 9) ; so consistent thought must decide that the source of that self-consciousness and self-determination in which creation culminates cannot himself be less than personal. If he were, the law of causal resemblance, elsewhere universally true, would break down precisely where, unless the world were a chaos, it should hold most strictly. The law of universal development just referred to necessi tates the same conclusion. In the words of Lindsay, " Do we not see the creation struggling toward personality, and mount ing step by step through the preliminary stages of the vegetable and animal world, until in man it actually attains to individ ual personality, and becomes a self-conscious mind? Whence this universal tendency of all that lives toward personality, if it be not the law of the world; and whence this law, if the Principle of the world is an impersonal one? And if person ality constitutes the preeminence of man over the inferior cre ation, can this preeminence be wanting in the highest Being of all? Can God, the most perfect Being imaginable, be devoid of personality the most perfect form of being?"63 May it u Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion, p. 329. 194 THE SUPERNATURAL not be, however, it is replied, that the Supernatural is superper- sonal? Hence, it should be observed, that, 3. The Supernatural, though he must be at least personal, cannot be higher than personal. This does not mean that man is the measure of the Supernatural. Because infinite and abso lute, as we have already seen, the Supernatural must always be unknown and unknowable to even the highest form of the natural. Spinoza himself, though holding that the infinite Substance has infinite modes, teaches that we know but two of them, thought and extension. Even with respect to the es sentials of personality the Supernatural Person must be in finitely higher than ourselves and so quite different from us. What self-consciousness is that has absolutely no limitations, what self-determination is that has absolutely no restrictions, we cannot imagine and we never shall be able to imagine. To the natural, even in the respects in which they are most akin, the Supernatural is the eternal as well as the supreme mystery. The very love of Christ, for example, " passes knowledge ". That the Supernatural cannot be higher than personal, how ever, does mean, on the one hand, that he cannot be higher in the sense of less determinate. The reason is that in the case of being, as we have already observed, highness is directly proportional to determinateness. Absurdity is inherent in the position of those thinkers who, as Spencer and Fiske, in postu lating that the Supernatural, though personally non-existent, may yet be higher than personality, as Lindsay says, " place being plus intelligence below that which has it not, and who, in spite of the self-evidencing power of the theistic idea, assign that which is self-conscious and self-determining to a lower platform than that which blindly moves on to its end." 64 In a word, the Supernatural cannot be supernatural in the sense of impersonal, because the supernatural in this sense is really the sub-personal. Nor, on the other hand, can the Supernatural be more deter minate than personal, and so, in this way, if not in that just noticed, be superpersonal. Personality is of all possible modes of existence the highest. It is not simply the highest known 84 Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion, p. 271. THE SUPERNATURAL 195 to us, it is not merely the highest of which we can conceive ; it reveals itself as finished, perfect, ultimate. It seems to say, not only has development never been traced beyond me, but devel opment ends, and must end, with me. There may be higher and lower kinds of personality, but no other mode of being can be so high as personality. If the ground of this assertion be demanded, the one but the sufficient answer is that it is an ulti mate truth. Just as in the sphere of thought reason reveals itself as alone because ultimate, so that we are sure that in thought there is not and could not be anything higher than reason; so in the sphere of being personality reveals itself as alone because ultimate, so that we are sure that in being there is not and could not be anything higher than personality. In self-consciousness and self-determination, that is, in person ality, we meet determination which is as evidently ultimate as it is self-evident. Even the evolutionists would seem at least to have felt this. If not, why does Fiske say that the moral sense in which the reality of personality comes out most clear ly — the moral sense is " the last and noblest product of evo lution which we can ever know." 65 Thus the existence of the Supernatural and his manifestation in and through the universe of which he is the creator and preserver and governor are not more truly necessities of thought and so realities than is his personality. Not to admit this is to give the lie to our own personality, and, consequently, to all else; for it is in our in tense consciousness of our own personality that the conception and conviction of reality arise. In a word, if there be reality, we must be real; if we are real, the Supernatural whom we presuppose must be so ; if the Supernatural exists, as he cannot be less than self-conscious and self-determining, so he cannot be more. Such, that is, personal being is the apex and the foundation of all being. This is the last and highest testimony of our own personality, the most evidently real of all realities. 85 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, Vol ii. p. 324. 196 THE SUPERNATURAL VI. The Personal or Immediate Manifestation of the Supernatural. By this we mean, such a manifestation as would be such a direct communication from the Supernatural as it is claimed that the Decalogue is ; such supernatural works as the miracles, if they were wrought, must have been; such a supernatural act as regeneration, if it be a real act, evidently is; such a super natural person as Christ could not but have been, if he was, as he said, both " the Son of God " and " the Son of man." The characteristic of these manifestations of the Supernatural is not that they are more truly personal than is his manifesta tion of himself in and through the universe. No matter how many instruments a person may use, his action is always personal. No matter how numerous may be the media in and through which he reveals himself, his revelation is always personal. In the cases under consideration, however, no instruments are employed, no media intervene. God him self spoke and wrote the words of the Decalogue; God with his own arm, as it were, wrought the miracles ; God by his own power alone quickens into newness of life the soul " dead through trespasses and sins ;" Christ is " the image of the invisible God ", he reveals him by himself becoming " God manifest in the flesh." Such supernatural acts as these, then, are not simply truly personal ; they are only personal : indeed, they appear conspicuously supernatural just because they are only personal; though they occur in nature, and though they need not and should not be conceived as violating or even as suspending any law of nature, they are so evidently not at all of nature, they are so manifestly due wholly to wisdom and power independent of it and superior to it, that they must pro ceed from the Supernatural Person alone. If they took place, they cannot but be interventions of his in the ordinary course of nature. Could they, then, take place ? This is the question of questions to the Christian. If they could not, Christianity is a lie. Its most positive and characteristic claim is that it is THE SUPERNATURAL 197 based on the direct personal intervention of the Supernatural in the history of the race, in the development of the universe. As we saw when considering the importance of a true doctrine of the Supernatural, the New Testament cannot be honestly interpreted and yield any other teaching than this. But this is not all. The question just raised is even more fundamental. Not only Christianity, but all higher religion is at stake. The reason for this is that the immediate knowledge of God as the supernatural Person is involved in the very con ception of religion as based on the self-revelation of a personal God. The operatives in a factory may sustain a real and a conscious relation to the manager of it, though he never comes among them or speaks to them or interposes in the direction of affairs. He may 'have revealed himself so clearly in the plan of the factory, in sustaining it in operation, and in the orders of the foreman whom he has placed over it, that all in it can and, if rightly disposed, will, discern his wisdom and ac knowledge his power and respect his authority. It will not, however, be nearly so natural and easy for them to do this as it would be if the manager came daily among his people and listened to them and himself personally took part in the control of the work; and if his people are not rightly disposed toward him, it is certain that they will not recognize him as they should, if there is no personal intervention on his part. They will lose sight of him himself in the machinery which he has designed and is operating. Just so, there might be true religion, did we know of God only what is clearly seen from " the things that are made." That " we live and move and have our being in him " ought to dispose us to " acknowledge him in all our ways ", and the ' earth is so full of the goodness of the Lord ' that it would seem' that we could not help loving him. All this, however, though true religion, would be only an undeveloped form of it. It is a form, too, which, it is certain, would not be attained by a sinful race. As already implied, not liking to retain God in their knowledge,' they would look only at his works, and so these works would in time even hide him himself from them. In order, therefore, to the higher exercises of religion and to 198 THE SUPERNATURAL any true exercise of it in the case of sinners, we need to feel, that God himself is in the midst of us; that he not only acts through the laws of nature, but independently of them; and that he can and, on occasion, does, put out his own hand and solely by his own personal power effect what the forces of nature though under his direction could not do and what may even seem to set them aside. In a word, as things are, in order to the development of religion, we must not only recog nize the Supernatural as the personal God, but we must rec ognize him also as only personal or as simply personal ; that is, as one who, in addition to presiding over nature and working through it, can and does also manifest himself by interposing personally in it and by operating independently of it, though on it and in it. Only thus can we appreciate sufficiently the reality because the personality of God's revelation to us. Even the impression of the Supernatural made in the crea tion, if it is to abide, needs to be deepened by supernatural interventions in history. Unbelief should not, but does, con clude that, if the Supernatural manifested himself immediately and so simply personally only at the beginning, he does not manifest himself as a person at all, and so did not even then. This is substantially the position of the whole modern ration alistic school. Not less truly do belief in a personal God and in supernatural interventions stand or fall together than belief in a true creation and in supernatural interventions stand or fall together. As there can not be true religion save as we believe that God himself has spoken to us, so we shall not long or truly believe thus save as we hold to an immediate knowledge of God as only or simply personal. The ultimate reason for this is that the self -revelation of a personal God cannot be authenticated sufficiently as such, un less it be accompained by supernatural interventions. An effect, reason dictates, can be assigned to a particular cause only as it reproduces what is distinctive of that cause. Hence, the necessary inference is that if the Supernatural Person reveals himself, the revelation will be, at any rate, at times, both above nature and in contrast with, if not in opposition to, nature.' Accordingly, were such a revelation to be throughout natural, though, as we have seen, necessarily presupposing and thus THE SUPERNATURAL 199 indirectly revealing the Supernatural, reason would hesitate to recognize it as really supernatural. Though it would be such, it could not be certainly discriminated as such. Even, the cry of a man would seldom be mistaken for that of a beast : it always has a human quality. Nevertheless, it is only as it utters itself in speech that we can be altogether sure that it is a man whom we hear. Just so, the supernatural Person can, and ordinarily does, confine his manifestations within natural instrumentalities; but it is only as he breaks away from these and reveals himself both in contrast with nature and above it, that is, as only the supernatural Person could — that his revelation as a whole can be authenticated absolutely as being what it really is. Thus belief in the personal inter vention in nature, and so above and in contrast with it, of the supernatural Person is indispensable to the highest conviction of the reality of his self-revelation. Without such interven tions, the latter could not be recognized infallibly. The proof of these conclusions is the history of religion. Whenever men have persuaded themselves that they are divine messengers they have adopted likewise the belief that they are able to work miracles. Among such in modern times are Swedenborg and Irving the Scotch preacher. Impostors also, perceiving that miracles are necessary in order that the human mind may receive a religion as divine, have invariably claimed miraculous powers. Such instances recur constantly from the days of Elymas the Sorcerer down to the Mormon Joseph Smith. Though, too, the founders of false religions have not themselves made these pretensions, their followers have made them for them. Witness the miracles that came to be attributed to Gotama and to Mohammed by their disciples. Thus it would appear that men are so constituted that if they are truly to see God in nature, they must recognize him as a person who can and, on occasion, does manifest himself im mediately and in contrast with nature, and that even the revelation of himself in nature can be sufficiently authenticated only by such immediately personal and exclusively super natural interventions. No question, therefore, can be more important that this, if so important as this. Are such inter ventions, that is, are miracles possible; and if so, can they 200 THE SUPERNATURAL be recognized? The very existence of all religion worthy of the name would seem to be suspended on the answer to this inquiry. The denials of the possibility of supernatural intervention in the course of nature may be reduced to one. They all take their stand, whether positivistic or transcendental, on the po sition that the course of nature is and must be uniform. If they do not always hold that what has been is what will be, they do hold this to be true at least to this extent, that the order and method of the new will be the same with that of the old in that everything will still be accomplished through the forces of nature; there will not be, as there could not be, the personal intervention of the Supernatural. This hypothe sis, however, prevalent though it is, is exposed to the follow ing objections : I. It may not be decided by a priori considerations. We can argue for or against the uniformity of nature only from what nature and the Supernatural have been found to be. Antecedently, there is as much reason to infer that nature must not be uniform as that it must be uniform; and that is no reason. In a word, the question is one of fact; it does not involve a necessary principle. There is no must in the case. 2. It begs the question. ' It is at any rate an open question whether the course of nature has been uniform. There is the best of testimony that it has not been. It is hard to see how the testimony for the resurrection of Christ, for example, can be set aside and all testimony not be invalidated. 3. It begs a question to beg which is for these theorists suicidal. As has just been implied, in doing so they knock the ground from under their own feet. Whether the course of nature has been violated or has not been violated, can be known only from testimony ; there is and can be but negative testimony, that is, the absence of testimony, that it has not been; there is the most positive and the best testimony that it has been. To decide, therefore, that it has not been is to decide against the testimony, and this is to invalidate the one possible ground of judgment. It is like appealing to reason to disprove reason. 5. Nor may it be replied that the very point at issue is THE SUPERNATURAL 201 whether any testimony can extend to the Supernatural. If this be so, it follows that we do not know that there have been supernatural interventions in the course of nature, but it follows just as surely that we do not know that there have not been any. The possibility of the personal manifestation of the Supernatural is left just where it was before. 5. Nor does the objector gain anything, if we concede that the uniformity of nature never has been interrupted. Were this so, we might not infer that it never could be. Induction from individual facts, however numerous or well attested, cannot give necessary truth. That things have been so and so does not prove that they will so continue. It is always possible that there are other facts which, if considered, would show the possibility, if not the certainty, of change. 6. This will appear more clearly when we remember just what the uniformity of nature is. It is not a principle; it is only the name of a mode of action. It does not state why things are as they are; it states only how they are, or rather how it is assumed that they have been. It amounts to no more than this, that the same causes acting under the same conditions produce the same results. This is the only princi ple, the only ultimate truth, the only immutable law, in the case. What is there in this to hinder at any time the personal intervention of the Supernatural? There is nothing in this principle to forbid the introduction of a new cause in the course of nature. All that it secures is that nature shall be uniform if no new cause be introduced. So far as the so-called prin ciple of the uniformity of nature is concerned, the Super natural may come in at any point, and when he does his strictly personal manifestation must ensue. 7. The modern doctrine of the conservation and the cor relation of energy, so far from opposing, tends to confirm this position. Indeed, this doctrine implies the constant manifes tation in nature of the Supernatural himself. The sum of force in the universe can continue the same only because the. Infinite and Absolute Force is " ever reenforcing finite waste, change and decay." As Herschel has pointed out, " vital force " does pass away. When, for example, a beast dies, his chemical elements appear in other forms, but what becomes of 202 THE SUPERNATURAL his life, his soul? Thus vital force, at least, would run out, if the Supernatural did not intervene to supply it. Even the modern " physicist proper declares that the laws of matter alone will not explain life." 66 In a word, the very uniformity of nature depends on the coming of the Supernatural into nature. It has been planned with reference to it. So far, then, from the objection based on the uniformity of nature, disproving the personal intervention of the Supernatural in nature, it would seem to suggest and demand the proof of its possibility and even probability. The following mere outline of this proof is the utmost- that our limits will permit. i. The abstract possibility of supernatural interventions in the course of nature cannot be rationally questioned. Sir Oliver Lodge is reported to have said lately : " The possi bility of what we call miracles has been hastily and wrongly denied. They are not necessarily more impossible or lawless than the interference of a human being would seem to a colony of ants. They should be judged by historical evidence and literary criticism." Indeed, the most consistent skeptics and agnostics have not denied them. J. S. Mill was ready to admit the Supernatural, if it could be found. Matthew Ar nold, though he held that with the progress of science all miracles would be explained away, did not regard them incon ceivable. Even Hume, though he was the author of the fa mous objection that no amount of testimony could prove a miracle, again and again allows its abstract possibility.67 Be yond this, it could easily be shown that men generally and, as it would seem, naturally believe that there are such inter ventions. In a word, if the bare existence of the Supernatural be admitted, his intervention in nature must be possible a priori. Otherwise, he would not be the Supernatural. 2. This possibility becomes much clearer in view of the fact that the Supernatural, as we have already shown, is a person and is constantly acting in and through nature. This granted, no objection can be raised to strictly personal action on his 68 Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. ii, p. vi. "Essays, ii, pp. 131, 132, Ed. ed., 1788. THE SUPERNATURAL 203 part. As Mozley says, " The primary difficulty of philosophy relating to Deity is action at all. ... If action is con ceded at all there is no difficulty about miraculous action." 68 A being who can use tools can certainly work with his own hands. 3. It is probable that the Supernatural will choose to do so. This follows from the fact that he is a person. It is charac teristic of a person, not only to manifest himself in action, but also in strictly personal action. We see this in our own case. It does not satisfy us to hold intercourse with others by proxy alone. We wish to speak to them ourselves face to face. It does not develop us to do nothing but tend a machine. Unless there is room for handicraft, production will be at the cost of manhood. Hence, it is only to be expected, that the Supernatural would manifest himself in a strictly personal way ; that he would speak to us ; that he would act directly on us; that he would do something with his own hand alone in the course of nature; that he would even himself come and dwell among us, at least for a time, as a man with men. Were the Supernatural Person not to do something of this kind, we could scarcely conceive of him as the Supernatural Person. So far as we know, a person will certainly choose to act thus. 4. This conclusion is much strengthened by the consider ation that nature would seem to have been constituted with a view to such action by the Supernatural Person. As Godet says, " Nature is from, by, and for spirit " ;69 and, though, as we have seen, the Supernatural and the spiritual are not identi cal, yet the Supernatural, because the Person, must also be the Spirit. That is, as is involved in Godet's statement and as this paper has tried to show, the Supernatural must be behind nature; the Supernatural must uphold nature; the Super natural must be the end of nature: that all this should be so is the necessity of thought. This, however, implies that na ture has been so arranged as to presuppose the personal inter vention of the Supernatural. Otherwise, it would fetter him; and depending on him and existing for him, as it does, that it should fetter him is inconceivable. 88 On Miracles, p. 84. 89 The Defense of the Christian Faith, p. 127. 204 THE SUPERNATURAL 5. But we are not left to inferences like the above, trust worthy though these could be shown to be. We know that the Supernatural has acted in a purely personal manner. All historic time, whether of the heavens or of the earth, of the earth or of man, must have begun with such an act. Get rid of all miracles, if you please; admit only the uniform sequence of natural phenomena, if you will : and the great miracle of creation remains on any natural theory of the universe, evo lutionary or not; and creation is an absolutely personal act. It must have taken place; the uniformity of nature, if nothing else, is the demonstration of that : and it could have taken place only by the immediate and so personal action of the Supernatural; for before the creation there was nothing in which and through which he could act. Whether, therefore, the Supernatural has so acted again or does so act to-day is for us candidly to inquire. His nature as a person renders it probable that he will ; and the fact that he must have done so once, that is, at the creation, increases this probability. 6. The progressive development of religion is inexplicable unless the Supernatural does continue so to manifest himself. Religion, at least in all its higher forms, presupposes, not only the possibility or even the probability, but the fact of such personal manifestations of the Supernatural. It believes in communion with God himself. Were the reality of that to be disproved, its life would be destroyed. If God did not make himself known to those who are in sympathy with him save as the " heavens declare his glory and the firmament showeth his handiwork," if he could not himself dwell in us as " a prin ciple of a new and a divine life " ; the power of such re ligion as tends to persist as man develops would be gone. Can it be, then, that such personal manifestation of the Supernatural is not real? Can it be that religion is only the most solemn of all delusions? If so, there is no mystery so- great as that of its persistence. Nothing has been able to overthrow it, yet it itself rests on nothing. 7. This conclusion is much strengthened by the fact that the course of human development, and specially of human religious development, has been interrupted and perverted by sin. Hence, though the normal religious needs of men did THE SUPERNATURAL 205 not demand, as we have just seen that they do demand, the personal intervention of God in human life and history, his abnormal needs brought about by the entrance of sin would so require. Thus, because sin has marred the workmanship of God in physical nature and has defaced his image in the hu man soul and has deflected his development of the race, the revelation of the Supernatural in and through the natural is far from being as extensive as or what otherwise it would have been. Again, because of the noetic efforts of sin we can not discern fully or interpret truly even the partial and perverted revelation of the Supernatural which the natural still affords. Once more, and as what is most important, sin makes necessary the revelation of a new kind of knowledge, of that with regard to God which nature could by no possibility reveal. Nature can reveal only the essential attributes of God, only what he must be and, consequently, must require be cause he is God; but what guilty sinners need to know is his grace and how it can be obtained, that is, the free purpose of his heart, and this can be known only as he himself shall di rectly declare it. Therefore, even were we to allow that the personal intervention of the Supernatural in the natural would be unlikely, the world continuing to develop along its original and God-laid lines; the presumption would all be the other way, the world having been deflected from its first and true line of development. In a word, to quote B. B. Warfield, " Extraordinary exigencies (we speak as a man) are the suf ficient explanation of extraordinary expedients." 8. Must not, then, directly and exclusively supernatural works, such as we designate miracles, be expected, both to call attention to the messengers bringing the good tidings of the grace of God and to authenticate them as his ambassadors and so to attest the truth of their proclamation? Moreover, as such supernatural interventions, because their purpose is as just stated, might not be expected when no new revelation was being made ; so at the epochs characterized and constituted by such revelations, as, the age of Moses when God revealed him self as Jehovah the redeeming God, and, above all, in " the days of the Son of man " when the eternal " Word was made flesh and dwelt among us " and " fulfilled all righteousness " 206 THE SUPERNATURAL in our behalf and " died for our sins " and " was raised again for our justification " and ascended to the right hand of God to be " head over all things to the church " — at such times and under such circumstances would it not be the most difficult of miracles in the sense of wonders, if we did not discern mir acles? Thus, so far from their being credible only because they occur in connection with Christianity, Christianity itself would be incredible because impossible without them. To use the thought and almost the exact words of Robert Hall, it could not be supposed that God would give even his Son to save us and not himself ring his bell for us to hear him. 9. Nor may it be replied that were the Supernatural thus to intervene directly in nature, such manifestations could not be recognized as such by us. This overlooks the fact that it is the manifestation of a person to persons that is under consider ation. Now personality is known immediately by personality, and more especially if there be a moral affinity between the persons. You do not need to see every beast to be sure that a man is not a beast. You feel at once, and you can not help feeling, a unique kinship between him and yourself. You know directly what he is. And somewhat so, it is not neces sary that you should have surveyed all nature in order to recognize the Supernatural as supernatural. You feel im mediately both the unique kinship between him and yourself, and also the infinite difference. Because he is a person, you recognize at once his personality and the supernaturalness of his personality. You know directly what he is, if only a little of all that he is. Of course, this will depend greatly on the moral affinity between you and him. A bad man may become insensible to the supernaturalness of the Supernatural, but he becomes at the same time unconscious of the personality of the Supernatural. Both go together; and the former reveals, and cannot but reveal unmistakably, the latter. Hence, truly to know the manhood of Christ is to feel him to be "the Son of God." In a word, as persons we are too much like the Super natural Person and too conscious of our superiority to all else than ourselves in nature not to recognize at once his infinite superiority. In the unique light of the kinship between us and him we cannot but see his supernaturalness. Thus in THE SUPERNATURAL 207 every respect is the reality of the strictly personal interven-i tion of the Supernatural in the natural a real necessity of thought. VII. Conclusion. What, then, is the net result of the discussion? It is not that Christianity is thereby established as the supernatural re ligion. This must still be decided by the appropriate evi dence. The way, however, has been opened, and the only way, for the fair consideration of this evidence; and this has been done in that we have established the reality of the ex istence of the Supernatural, of his manifestation through na ture, of his personality, and of the possibility and even prob ability of his personal intervention in nature. It is true that no one of these has been in the strict sense demonstrated. But in the nature of the case this is impossible. Himself the ground and so proof of everything, there is nothing that can be the ground and so proof of the Supernatural. Yet as the building necessarily evidences the foundation on which it rests; so all nature, and especially that in it which is highest and surest, namely, reason, demands the reality in the above respects of the Supernatural. This must be granted or reason must be stultified. To have shown this is thus both the utmost that could be shown and in itself enough. THE ESCHATOLOGICAL ASPECT OF THE PAULINE CONCEPTION OF THE SPIRIT Geerhardus Vos Emphasis in recent biblico-theological discussion on the eschatological outlook of the early church. Its influence traced in various as pects of the Pauline teaching. Abuse of the method and rela tive warrant for its application. Paul's conception of the Spirit to be examined as to its eschatological affinities. Eschatological aspects of the Spirit in the Old Testament. The inter-canonical development of the doctrine. The Gospels. The early chapters of Acts. Paul's statements: i) As to the Spirit in connection with the end; 2.) As to the relation of the Spirit to the exalted Christ; 3.) As to the semi-eschatological character of the be liever's state, both objectively and subjectively considered; 4.) As to the Christian's connection through the Spirit with the world of heaven; 5.) As to the Spirit's function in revealing the eschatological content of " wisdom " ; 6) As to the Spirit in op position to evil spirits. Inferences drawn from the discussion : The eschatological significance of the Spirit 1) throws light on Paul's conception of the uniformly pneumatic character of the Christian life at every point; 2) proves the non-availability of the Spirit for explaining the personal constitution of the preex- istent Christ; 3) furnishes the most impressive witness for the supernaturalism of Paul's view of the Christian life. THE ESCHATOLOGICAL ASPECT OF THE PAULINE CONCEPTION OF THE SPIRIT Like other parts of New Testament Theology the interpre tation of Paul's teaching has strongly felt the influence of the emphasis placed in recent discussion upon the eschatological outlook of the early Church. It is said that, since the person of the Messiah and his work form already in the Old Testa ment part of an essentially eschatological program, and since the acceptance of Jesus as the Messiah was the distinctive fea ture of the new faith, therefore the whole perspective in which the content of this religion presented itself to the first Christians had of necessity to assume eschatological form. They could not help correlating more closely than we are accustomed to do their present beliefs and experiences with the final, eternal is sues of the history of redemption, and interpreting the for mer in the light of the latter. To an extent we can hardly appreciate theoretically, far less reproduce in our mode of feeling, they were conscious of standing at the turning- point of the ages, of living in the very presence of the world to come. It is true that contemporary Judaism had not consistently kept the Messiah and his work in that central place of the es chatological stage which the Old Testament assigned to him. From within the coming aeon he had been removed to its threshold, and his kingdom relegated to the rank of a mere pro visional episode in the great drama of the end. This, however, was due to the inherent dualism of the Jewish eschatology. Because it was felt that the earthly and the heavenly, the sen sual and the spiritual, the temporal and the eternal, the political and the transcendental, the national and the cosmical would not combine, and yet neither of the two could safely be abandoned, 212 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL the incongruous elements were mechanically forced together in the scheme of two successive kingdoms, during the former of which the urgent claims of Israel pertaining to this world would receive at least a transient satisfaction, whilst in the latter the higher and broader hopes would find their everlast ing embodiment. Under this scheme the Messiah and his work inevitably became associated with the provisional, temporal order of affairs and ceased to be of significance for the final state. But no such necessity for keeping apart the Messianic developments and the consummated state existed for the Chris tian mind. Here from the outset the emphasis had been placed on the virtual identity of the blessings and privileges pertaining to the rule of Christ with the eternal life at the end. While as a matter of history the opening days of the Messiah are seen to lie this side of the ultimate world-crisis, this is much more a chronological than a substantial distinc tion, the Christ is not kept outside of the future world, nor is the future world regarded as incapable of projecting itself into the present life. On the contrary the whole Messianic hope has become so thoroughly spiritualized as to make it in distinguishable in essence and character from the final kingdom of God. Through the appearance of the Messiah, as the great representative figure of the coming aeon, this new age has be gun to enter into the actual experience of the believer. He has been translated into a state, which, while falling short of the consummated life of eternity, yet may be truly character ized as semi-eschatological. In view of this it can cause no surprise, we are told, when the mind of the New Testament writers in its attempt to grasp the content of the Christian salvation makes the future the interpreter of the present, eschatology the norm and example of soteriological experience. Strange as this movement of thought seems to us, it must have been to the believers of the apostolic age quite natural and familiar. The coming of the Christ had fixed their attention upon the eternal world in all its absoluteness and fulness and with this in mind they interpreted everything that through the Christ happened for them and in them. Even in our Lord's teaching we are in- ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 213 vited to observe the influence of this factor. Not as if the kingdom proclaimed by him were altogether a kingdom of the future having no existence in the present. Such a view is too palpably at variance with his plain teaching to gain ac ceptance with any except a few " thoroughgoing eschatolo- gists ". But the firmness with which the two aspects of the kingdom are held together under the same name and repre sented as one continuous thing and the absolute newness and incomparableness which are predicated of the whole as re gards the Old Testament conditions, all this proves that Jesus viewed his work as in the most direct manner interlinked with the life to come, to all intents the beginning of a new creation. And in the early chapters of the Book of Acts the same thought is found to color the outlook of the mother- church, a feature which must be true to the facts, because it does not quite coincide with Luke's own point of view. As for Paul, his attitude in regard to this matter was from the outset determined by the fact, that he views the resurrection of Christ as the beginning of the general resurrection of the saints. The general resurrection of the saints being an eschatological event, indeed constituting together with the judgment the main content of the eschatological program, it follows that to Paul in this one point at least the eschatological course of events had already been set in motion, an integral piece of " the last things " has become an accomplished fact. Nor does this remain with Paul an isolated instance of the principle referred to. We are asked to observe in several other connections that the Apostle thinks in eschatological terms even when speaking of present developments. The sending forth of Christ marks to him the irXrjpco/jia tov XP°V0V (Gal. iv. 4), a phrase which certainly means more than that the time was ripe for the introduction of Christ into the world : the fulness of the time means the end of that aeon and the commencement of another world-period. As the resurrection of Jesus an ticipates and secures the general resurrection, so the death of Christ, usually represented by Paul as an atonement, occas ionally appears as securing and embodying in advance the judgment and destruction of the spiritual powers opposed to God, thus bringing the other great eschatological transaction 214 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL within the scope of the present activity of Christ and the pres ent experience of believers, Rom. viii. 3; I Cor. ii. 6 (where notice the present participle KaTapyovpevcov: "who are al ready coming to nought "). Even the idea of awT^pla " sal vation ", which is to us predominantly suggestive of our Chris tian state and experience in this life, is shown to have been with Paul in its original signification an eschatological idea denoting deliverance from the wrath to come, salvation in the judgment, and from this it is believed to have been carried back into the present life, first of all to express the thought, that even now the believer through Christ possesses immunity from the condemnation of the last day.1 The idea of " re demption ", so closely associated with the death of Christ, none the less has its eschatological application, although it is not asserted that this is the older usage, Rom. viii. 2351 Cor. i. 30; Eph. i. 14, iv. 30. Justification is, of course, to Paul the basis on which the whole Christian state rests, and in so far eminently concerns the present, and yet in its finality and comprehensiveness, covering not merely time but likewise etern ity, it presents remarkable analogies to the absolute vindication expected at the end. And the subjective renewal of the be liever likewise is placed by the Apostle in the light of the world to come. The icaivh ktio-is spoken of in 2 Cor. v. 17 means the beginning of that world-renewal in which all eschatology culminates. Undoubtedly in all this there is some one-sidedness and ex aggeration. Altogether too much has been made, in calling attention to the above and other allied facts, of the element of time, as if the peculiar perspective in these matters could be 1 Cf . the early passages 1 Thess. v. 8, 9 ; 2 Thess. ii. 13, 14, but also in the later epistles, Rom. v. 9, 10, xiii. 11; Phil. i. 28, iii. 20; 2 Tim. iv. 18. In all of these the awrripla is eschatological. Paul, however, knows also of a "being saved" i. e. being in process of salvation, 1 Cor. i. 18, xv. 2; 2 Cor. ii. 15, in all of which the present tense is used, and of a " having been saved ", Eph. ii. 5 ; 2 Tim. i. 9, where the perfect and aorist occur. From the original eschatological sense the fact may be explained that aJ> words which imply the imparting of something that remains; also in: "to give" and "to put into", are found, Ez. xxxvi. 27, xxxvii. 14. Notice the verbs expressing permanence in Is. xxxii. 16: " Then justice shall dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness shall abide in the fruitful field." According to Ez. xxxix. 29 the continuance of the favor of God is secure to the people, because they have received the Spirit : " Neither will I hide my face any more from them : for I have poured out my Spirit upon the house of Israel." 220 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL aspect of " the wind ", which is at the same time a concrete force, and a supernal element.7 But the Spirit stands for the supernatural not merely in so far as the latter connotes the miraculous, but also in so far as it is sovereign over against man : it " blows where it listeth ". In man the pneumatic awakes the awe which pertains to the supernatural and its presence exposes to the same danger. Because of this close association with the higher world the Spirit appears in closest conjunction with God, who is the center of that sphere. Every bearer of the Spirit forms a link of connection between man and the higher world. In the ecstatic state the Spirit lifts the prophet into the supernatural sphere which is peculiarly its own. And even in his ordinary life the prophet is, on account of his pneumatic character, as it were concentrated upon a higher world, " he sits alone because of Jehovah's hand ", Jer. xv. 17. All this, while not eschatological in itself, be comes of importance for our present purpose, because it is a recognized principle in New Testament teaching that in one aspect the eschatological order of things is identical with the heavenly order of things brought to light. If the Spirit stands representatively for the latter, he will naturally reappear in the same capacity as regards the former. In the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature and in the Rabbinical theology we meet again most of these ideas, and in one respect note a further development in the direction of the New Testament doctrine. The Messiah becomes bearer of the Spirit not merely for the discharge of his own official functions, but also for the purpose of communicating the Spirit to others. The Messiah pours out on men the Spirit of grace, so that henceforth they walk in the ways of God, Test. Jud. xxiv. 2. In " the Elect ", i. e. the Messiah, " dwells the Spirit of wisdom, and the Spirit of him who gives under standing, and the Spirit of instruction and power, and the Spirit of those who are fallen asleep in righteousness ", En. xlix. 3. Thus not merely the ethical but also the escha tological life of the resurrection is derived from the Messiah. ' Cf. Jno. iii. 8, where the wind comes from above, out of the region of mystery, and also Ez. xxxvii. 9 : " Come from the four winds, O breath." ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 221 It will be observed, however, that the Spirit does not become any more than in the Old Testament the constituent principle of the Messiah's Person, he remains as before the Spirit of official endowment. Cf . further En. lxii. 2 ; Test. Lev. xviii. 7 ; Test. Jud. xxiv. 2; Or. Sib. iii. 655 ff. ; Ps. Sol. xvii. 37. The possession of the eschatological Spirit is ascribed to the future saints also irrespective of Messianic mediation. It is in them a Spirit of life, En. lxi. y,8 a Spirit of faith, of wisdom, of pa tience, of mercy, of judgment, of peace and of benevolence, En. lxi. 1 1 ; a Spirit of eternal life, Or. Sib. iii. 771 ; a Spirit of holiness pertaining to paradise and named in connection with the tree of life, Test. Lev. xviii. 1 1 . The Rabbinical Theology also brings the Spirit in connection with the resurrection: " Holiness leads to the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit leads to the resurrection ", R. Pinhas b. Ja'ir in B. Aboda s. 20" (quoted by Volz p. 114).9 In comparison with the Old Testa ment period this thought of the Spirit's eschatological opera tion appears more developed and receives greater emphasis, a feature by some explained from the fact, that in the later times the present activity of the Spirit was felt to be rare or entirely in abeyance. What the present did not offer was expected from the future. None the less the fourth line of thought is as prominent as in the canonical literature. The im pression that the period of Judaism was to itself an unpneu- matic period is apt to be based on the comparison of these times with the immediately following Spirit-filled days of the early Christian church, rather than on an estimate of the period considered in itself. The " wise men " speak of them selves as " divine ", " immortal ", as the prophets of their age ; Sap. Sol. vii. 27, viii. 13; Sir. xxiv. 33. The Apocalyptic writers also feel themselves men of a higher divine rank, in- 3 Sokolowski, Die Begriffe Geist und Leben bei Paulus, 1903, pp. 201 ff. de nies that pre-Christian Judaism associates the Spirit with the resurrec tion or the resurrection-life. On the other side cf. Slotemaker de Bruine, De Eschatologische Voorstellingen in I en II Corinthe, 1894, p. 57 and Volz, p. 114. "Hence it is said that the people of the time of the deluge cannot attain unto the resurrection, because they are deprived of the Spirit (Gen. vi. 3) Sanh. xi. 3. 222 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL itiated into mysteries hidden even from the angels, capable of forecasting the future, the authors of inspired writings, En. xiv. 3, xxxvii. 3, lxxxii. 2, xci. 1, xcii. 1 ; 4 Ezra, xiv. 18 ff. 46; Slav. En. xviii. 8, xxiv. 3. We also read that the pneu matic state of these men assumed the specific form of a trans lation into the heavenly sphere10 It is, however, difficult to determine how much in all this was actual, sincere experience, and how much was artificially conceived, or part of the tra ditional imagery of which all these writers availed themselves. The fact that the Pneuma is most frequently associated with the charisma of wisdom and general ethical virtue may be an indication that the specifically supernatural did no longer at test itself strongly to the consciousness of the period as a pres ent possession. In the Gospels the eschatological aspect of the Spirit is not much in evidence. This, however, is but part of the wider observation that the Spirit in general remains in the back ground. It is a striking proof of the high Christology of the Synoptical writers that they do not refer to the pneumatic equipment of Jesus in explanation of the supernatural char acter of his Person, and even make comparatively little of it in explanation of the supernatural character of his work. Ob viously the Evangelists (Synoptics as well as John) had a higher, ontological aspect of the Person of Jesus in mind by which to account for the supernatural phenomena.11 The Baptist makes the Holy Spirit the element wherein Jesus will baptize, and thus the distinctive element of the coming king dom, Mk. i. 8. (=Mt. iii. 11 =Lk. iii. 16). 12 This implies 10 The later Jewish tradition knows of four Rabbis who penetrated into Paradise, B. Chagiga I4b-I5b, quoted by Volz p. 118. On the other hand, cf. the statement Tanchuma 114*: "In this world I impart wisdom through my Spirit, hereafter, I will myself impart wisdom." a Cf. Joh. Weiss, Das alteste Evangelium, 1903, pp. 48, 49: "In Mark the representation that the Spirit is an equipment for Jesus' activity, receives very little prominence." 12 For the combination iv Tveipan dylo. Kai irvpl in Mt. and Lk. cf. an interesting parallel in the statement of the Avesta (quoted by Volz p. 176) : " Mazdah will prepare the recompense of blessedness and damna tion through the holy spirit and fire.'' This favors the interpretation of the fire as an instrument of judgment. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 223 that the Messiah imparts the Spirit. But in the Fourth Gospel the Baptist goes one step farther by bringing this baptism to be conferred by Jesus into connection with the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus, which is the first intimation in the New Testament, that the Spirit will rest on the Messiah and the members of his kingdom, passing over from him to them, i. 33. As the Spirit of the Messiah the Spirit appears in the accounts of the birth of Jesus, of the baptism and of the temptation; Cf. also Mt. iv. 14.13 Our Lord himself refers to the Spirit in this capacity in the sayings of Mt. xii. 28 (=Lk. xi. 20) and Lk. iv. 18. Of the Spirit as communicable to the disciples in the kingdom speak Mt. x. 19 (=Lk. xii. 12) and Lk. xi. 13. It will be noted that here the giving of the Spirit is ascribed to God, not to the Messiah. To the closing chapters in John reference has been made above. The Spirit, while predominant in this intermediate period, is not confined to it, and the period, as well as the Spirit's operation in it, are conceived as semi-eschatological. Both the Father and Jesus send the Spirit, xiv. 16, 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7, xx. 22. In the earlier part of the Gospel the Messianic Spirit appears in i. 33, iii. 34, vi. 63 ; the future Spirit in vii. 39 ; the Spirit as repre sentative of the supernatural, heavenly world in iii. 3, 5, 6, 8. We have already seen that in the early Petrine teaching, traceable in Acts, the outpouring of the Spirit is, in depend ence on the Joel-prophecy, represented as belonging to " the last days ", ii. 17.14 It does not, however, follow from this, that the pneumatic phenomena appeared to the early disciples in the light of eschatological symptoms exclusively. It is evi dent from the whole tenor of the narrative that the possession of the Spirit had a subjective value for the disciples them selves. It is the sign of acceptance with God, of participation in the privileges of the Christian state, x. 45, 47. It is there fore represented as the fulfilment of the promise, which ful filment Christ after his ascension received from the Father, 13 Cf. also Acts i. 2, iv. 27, x. 38. 11 Luke in his own narrative does not refer to the Spirit from this point of view, but speaks of him only in connection with the work of missions. Harnack appeals to this in proof of the accurate historical coloring of the Petrine speeches by the author of Acts. 224 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL i. 4, ii. 33. 15 It signalizes the present no less than it portends the future. Still the characteristic feature, that the present enjoyment of the Spirit's gifts is an anticipation of the world to come seems to be wanting. The Spirit's work is prophetic and at the same time symptomatic of salvation, but these two ideas are not as yet organically connected, the intermediate thought which would explain both features, viz. that the final salvation consists in the full endowment with the Spirit, finds no expression. The problems of the sphere to which the operations of the Spirit belong and of the personal relation of the Spirit to the exalted Messiah, can be more satisfactorily dealt with at a subsequent stage in comparison with the Pauline teaching on these points. Coming to Paul himself we notice first that the Apostle ex plicitly links the Christian possession of the Spirit to the Old Testament eschatological promise. This dpes not mean that the presence and operation of the Spirit in the Old Testament are denied.16 Cf. Acts xxviii. 25; Rom. vii. 14; 1 Cor. x. 3, 4; Gal. iv. 29 and 1 Tim. iv. 1. These things, however, so far as they do not relate to the inspiration of the Scriptures, were of a typical nature and therefore took place in the physical sphere. The true era of the Spirit's activity was still outstanding. The two aspects of the Messianic Person, that Kara irvev/Ma as well as that icara adpica were part of the prophetic promise in the Holy Scriptures Rom. i. 1-4. The Spirit is an object of 15 Harnack, Die Apostelgeschichte, 1908, p. 109 thinks that in ii. 33 the promise of the Spirit (not the promised Spirit) is represented as having been first given to Jesus after his ascension. But i. 4 shows that this is a mistake, for here Jesus, before the ascension, speaks of "the promise of the Father " for which they are to wait at Jerusalem. And in the Gospel xxiv. 49 Jesus says : " I send forth the promise of my Father upon you ". In all three passages iirayye\la is = " the thing promised ", cf. Gal. iii. 14 where the same phrase IvayyeXta toS irveiparos occurs in the same sense. (For the variant reading see below.) 10 2 Cor. iv. 13 will also belong here, if to airb irvevpa be construed with Karb. rb yeypap.phov i. e. the same Spirit of faith as finds expression in the word of the Psalmist. But probably Paul means that the same Spirit is in himself as in the Corinthians, although death works in him, life in them, v. 12. Cf. Gloel, Der Heilige Geist in der Heilsverkiindigung des Paulus, 1888, p. 87. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 225 ivayyeXia, Gal. iii. 14; Eph. i 13. While in the latter passage Paul probably has in mind the prophetic predictions of the out pouring of the Spirit, the context shows that in Gal. 3 he thinks of the evXoyia given to Abraham as relating to the Spirit.17 We first examine the statements which introduce the Spirit in a strictly eschatological capacity, as connected with the fu ture state. The Spirit and the resurrection belong together, and that in a twofold sense. On the one hand the resurrection as an act is derived from the Spirit, on the other hand the resurrection-state is represented as in permanence dependent on the Spirit, as a pneumatic state. In Rom. viii. 11 it is affirmed that God, Bia rov evoncovvro<; ainov irvevnaros (or to eV- oikovv avrov irvevfia) iv vpiv shall give life to their mortal bodies. In verse 10 the body and the Spirit are contrasted : the former is dead on account of sin, the latter is life on account of righteousness. Still irvevfia is here not the human spirit, psychologically conceived; it is the divine Pneuma in its close identification with the believer's person. Hence in verse 1 1 there is substituted for the simple to irvev/ia the fuller phrase " the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead ". The fact that God is thus designated is of importance for the argument. What God did for Jesus, he will do for the be liever also.18. It is presupposed by the Apostle, though not expressed, that God raised Jesus through the Spirit. Hence 17 So correctly Gloel pp. 96-97 against Meyer who finds the content of the ei\oyla in justification. But justification is proven from Abraham's case in so far as it is the indispensable prerequisite of receiving the eiXoyla . The latter =K\ripovop.la v. 18, and Rom. iv. 13 shows that with reference to the xKiipovopla justification is a means to an end. Or evKoyla = fijv vss. 10, 12 and life is based on justification, Rom. i. 17. The identification of the Spirit and ei\oyla is also found in Is. xliv. 3. If, with Zahn, on the basis of D. G d g and some patristic authorities, we read in Gal. iii. 14 eSkoylav rov irveip-aros, we obtain an explicit identification of the blessing and the Spirit. 13 It should be noticed how significantly Paul varies in this connection the name of Christ. First he speaks of the raising of Jesus from the dead. Here the Saviour comes under consideration as to his own Person. Then he speaks of the raising of Christ Jesus from the dead. Here the Saviour is considered as the Miessiah in his representative capacity, which furnishes a guarantee that his resurrection must repeat itself in that of the others. 226 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL the argument from the analogy between Jesus and the believer is further strengthened by the consideration, that the instru ment through which God accomplished this in Jesus is al ready present in the readers. The idea that the Spirit works instrumentally in the resurrection is thus plainly implied, al together apart from the question whether the reading Sid c. Gen. or Sid c. Ace. be preferred in verse 1 10.19 As to nc itself, when the textus receptus is followed, this part of the verse will only repeat in more explicit form the thought already implied in 11°: If the Spirit of God who raised Jesus dwells in you, then God will make the indwelling Spirit accomplish for you what he did for Jesus in the latter's resurrection. On the other reading we may paraphrase as follows : If the Spirit of God who raised Jesus dwells in you, then God will create for that Spirit the same bodily organisation, that he created for him in the resurrection-body of Christ. In the latter case there is added to the idea of the Spirit as the instrumental cause of the resurrection-act, the further idea of the Spirit as the permanent basis of the resurrection-state. A second passage is Gal. vi. 8. Between verse 7 and verse 8 the figure varies, inasmuch as in the former the correspondence between the seed and the harvest, in the latter the corre spondence between the soil and the harvest is affirmed. But the idea of correspondence is common to both forms of the figure. The reaping of eternal life follows from the sowing into the Spirit because the Spirit and eternal life belong to gether through identity of content, just as the adp%~ soil is reproduced in the <£f?o/>a-harvest, because the adp% is in herently and necessarily the source of corruption. The phrase fan alcovioi; , with Paul (in distinction from John) always strictly eschatological, proves that the reference is to the day of judgment. The future deplcrei is chronological. We, therefore, obtain the thought that the heavenly life, regarded as a reward for the believer, will essentially consist in pneuma, which, of course, extends to its bodily form, although it is "The reading of the textus receptus Sid c. Gen. rests on X , A, C, Clem. Al. ; the other is supported by B, D, E, F, G, Orig. Iren. Tert. and the Old-Syriac and Old-Latin versions. Cf. Gloel, pp. 362 ff., who de cides in favor of the latter. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 227 not confined to this.20 Nothing is here said of the act of the resurrection and its dependence on the Spirit. It is the harvest as a product, not the harvesting as a process, of which the pneumatic character is affirmed. It might be said, however, that in these two passages the thought has its point of departure in the soteriological concep tion of the Spirit as a present factor in the Christian life and from here moves forward to the future, so that the eschat ological function of the Spirit would be a doctrinal inference, rather than something inherent in the nature of the Spirit itself.21 We therefore turn to a third passage, which clearly starts from the eschatological end of the line and looks back ward from this into the present life. This is 2 Cor. v. 5. Here Paul declares that God has prepared him for the eternal state in the new heavenly body, as may be seen from this that he gave him the hppafiwv tov irvevjxaro'; . The appa/3d>v eon- consists in the Spirit ; " of the Spirit " is epexegetical, just as in Gal. iii. 14 the eirayyeXia tov irveviJ,aTo<: means the promised thing consisting in the Spirit.22 But the Spirit possesses this significance of an appaficov because it is a preliminary instal ment of what in its fulness will be received hereafter. The an alogous conception of the a-wapy)) tov irvevpaTos, Rom. viii. 23, proves this.23 The figure of the appaficbv itself implies this 20 For this aspect of the resurrection cf. 1 Cor. xv. 30-32, where it appears as a recompense for the KivSweiuv and daily diro0vi\o-Keiv : " what doth it profit me?" and v. 58: "be ye steadfast. . . forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord." 21 This is the ordinary way of representing the matter. Even Swete in his recent book The Holy Spirit in the New Testament, 1910, falls into it, when he puts the question as to the eschatological significance of the Spirit in this form : " Is the work of the Spirit preparatory only, or is it permanent, extending to the world to come ? " p. 353. That a move ment of thought in the opposite direction may also have been familiar to the Apostle does not seem to suggest itself to the author. 22 In Eph. i. 14 on the other hand the dppap&v rris k\r}povop.tas is the Spirit which pledges the inheritance, so that the construction is different, while the thought is the same; the pledge consists in the Spirit and assures of the inheritance. 23 Another analogous conception, that of the o-ippayls, does not express the identity of the pledge and the thing pledged, cf. 2 Cor. i. 22; Eph. i. 13, iv. 30. 228 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL relation no less than that of the airapxr), for it means " money which in purchases is given as a pledge that the full amount will be subsequently paid ".24 In this instance, therefore, the Spirit is viewed as pertaining specifically to the future life, nay as constituting the substantial make-up of this life, and the pres ent possession of the Spirit by the believer is regarded in the light of an anticipation. The Spirit's proper sphere is accord ing to this the world to come; from there he projects himself into the present, and becomes a prophecy of himself in his eschatological operation.25 Undoubtedly more statements to the same effect would be found, but for the circumstance that it was more natural for the Apostle to express the idea in connection with the eschat ological life of Christ, as already a present reality, than in connection with the eschatological state of believers, which still lies in the future. We, therefore, inquire in the second place to what extent eschatological side-lights fall on the resurrection and the resurrection-life of Christ. We begin with Rom. i. 4. Here, we read that Christ was opiadeh uto? 0eov iv Svvd/j,ei Kara irveufia ayicocrvvrt^ i% avaa-Tacrecos veicpujv. The statement stands in close parallelism to verse 3 tov yevo- pevov etc o:irepfjiaTo<; AavelS xaTa, crdpica. The following mem bers correspond to each other in the two clauses : yevofievos opicrOek KaTa. adpica KaTa irvevfAa dyicoavvrj'S in aireppjaTos AavelS if; dvaaTaaeoK veKpwv. 24 So Suidas sub voce. 25 Charles, Teichmann and others assume that the derivation of the resur rection from the Spirit is a later development in the mind of Paul, that his earliest eschatology, represented by 1 Thess., was un-pneumatic, which in volves that at this stage he expected the resurrection of the original body unchanged. But this is an argument e silentio and not even quite that. To meet the difficulty of the Thessalonians the fact of the resurrection, not its mode, or the nature of the resurrection-life, had to be emphasized. Besides, the pneumatic character of the resurrection is clearly implied in Chap. iv. 14, for if the death and resurrection of Jesus jointly considered furnish the guarantee of the believer's resurrection, this must be under stood on the principle that in Christ's experience that of the Christian is prefigured. But of such reproduction of the experience of Christ in be lievers the Spirit is with Paul everywhere the mediating cause. Cf. also the phrase oi veKpol iv Xpto-rip, which has a pneumatic background. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 229 The reference is not to two coexisting sides in the constitu tion of the Saviour, but to two successive stages in his life: there was first a yeveaOai KaTa adpva, then a opiadfjvai KaTa, irvevpa. The two prepositional phrases have adverbial force : they describe the mode of the process, yet so as to throw emphasis rather on the result than on the initial act: Christ came into being as to his sarkic existence, and he was intro duced by opio-fios into his pneumatic existence. The opiC,eiv is not an abstract determination, but an effectual appointment ; Paul obviously avoids the repetition of yevofie'vov not for rhetorical reasons only, but because it might have suggested, even before the reading of the whole sentence could cor rect it, the misunderstanding that at the resurrection the divine sonship of Christ as such first originated, whereas the Apostle merely meant to affirm this late temporal origin of the divine sonship iv Swdftei, the sonship as such reaching back into the state of preexistence. By the twofold KaTa the mode of each state of existence is contrasted, by the twofold e'« the origin of each. Thus the existence Kara adpica origi nated " from the seed of David ", the existence icaTa irvevfia originated " out of resurrection from the dead ". The point of importance for our present purpose lies in this last con trast. How can resurrection from the dead be the counter part of an issue from the seed of David? There are in the Pauline world of thought but two answers to this question, and both will have to be combined in the present instance. The resurrection is to Paul the beginning of a new status of sonship:26 hence, as Jesus derived his sonship KaTa o-apva from the seed of David, he can be said to have derived his divine-sonship-in-power from the resurrection. The implica tion is that the one working in the resurrection is God: it is 23 Cf. Rom. viii. 23 where vloBeala is equivalent to diroXfrrpojo-is tov o-oj/jjxtos. In v. 29 the elKiiv of Christ unto conformity to which believers have been predestinated is the eUJjv of sonship (toO vlov airov and " that he might be the first-born among many brethren ") and it is eschatologically conceived for the elKiiv looks forward to the iSb^ao-tv at the end of the catena. But the thought of eschatological sonship, and that specifically through the resurrection, is also met with in our Lord's teaching, cf. Mt. v. 9, xiii. 43; Lk. xx. 36. 230 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL his seed that supernaturally begets the higher sonship. And in all probability the Genitive dytcoo-vvr)^ which is added to " Spirit ", is meant as a designation of God from the point of view of his specific deity, sharply distinguishing him as such from David. Still, all this might have been expressed by Paul writing " effectually appointed according to the Spirit of Holiness the Son in power of God who raises the dead ". That, instead of doing this, he writes if; avao-Taaeoyi veKp&v must be explained from a second motive. He wished to contrast the resurrection-process in a broad generic way with the processes of this natural life; the resurrection is characteristic of the beginning of a new order of things, as sarkic birth is character istic of an older order of things. What stands before the Apostle's mind is the contrast between the two aeons, for it was a familiar thought to the Jewish theology that the future aeon has its characteristic beginning in the great resurrecjion- act. This also will explain why in if; avaarTaa-ea)8opd, ciTifila, and acrOeveia. The proximate reference is to the body and the contrast is between the body in the state of sin and the body in the resurrection-state. It will be noticed, however, that in verses 45, 46 the Apostle generalizes the antithesis so that it no longer concerns the body exclus ively, but the whole state of man, and at the same time en larges the one term of the contrast, that relating to the pre-eschatological period, so as to make it cover no longer the reign of sin, but the order of things established in creation. To irvev/jiaTiKov and to ¦tyvyucov in verse 46 are generalizing expressions, after which it would be a mistake to supply a&fia ; they designate the successive reign of two compre hensive principles in history, two successive world-orders, a first and a second creation, beginning each with an Adam of its own.28 Even apart from sin these two stand related to ning-to-be- Kara o-dpxa is contrasted with a beginning to be something else than pneuma in harmony with a given pneuma. Gloel himself acknowl edges this difficulty on p. 115, note 1. The above interpretation does not, of course, imply that Paul denied the presence of a pneumatic element in the pre-resurrection life of Jesus, in other words that he denied the supernatural conception and the equip ment with the Spirit at baptism. Precisely, because he speaks of the pneumatic state in the absolute eschatological sense, he could disregard in this connection, the twofold supernatural equipment just named, for the reason that it did not give rise to a state iv Svvdpei Kara irvevpjj. such as characterizes the life of the risen Christ. He could equally well say here that Christ became /card wevpa at the resurrection, as he can say in 1 Cor. xv. 45 that Christ at the resurrection became a life-giving Spirit. As above stated, the emphasis rests not on the initial act of the resur rection but on the resulting state. In regard to the act as such Paul would not have denied that the entrance of Jesus upon the o-dp% was likewise kotA wevpa . 23 The question why Paul, after having up to v. 43 (inci.) constructed 232 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL each other, as the natural and the supernatural. This is ex pressed by the contrast e'« yr)vxvv £&o-av "he was made into a living soul", which in a certain sense presupposes (at least rhetorically) his previous existence. 82 The Sept. expresses a similar thought in Is. ix. 6 where it renders "U? '2K by irar-rip tov alwvos p.£k\ovTos " father of the age to come ". 234 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL only irvev/jta %a>v but irvevpa ^woiroiovv . This is of great im portance for determining the relation to eschatology of the Christ-worked life in believers, as we shall soon have occasion to show. In a few other passages the resurrection of Christ is ascribed to the Spirit indirectly, being represented as an act of the owa/«s, the Soga of God, both of which conceptions are regularly associated with the Spirit, cf . Rom. vi. 4 ; I Cor. vi. 14; 2 Cor. xiii. 4. In none of these, however, is any reference made to the permanent presence of the Spirit in Christ's life. But apart from the resurrection the S6f;a is to Paul the specific form in which he conceives of the exalted state of Jesus, and this S6f;a is so closely allied to the Spirit in Christ also, as to become almost a synonym for it. Thus, as God the Father is said to have raised Christ Sid ttj? 8o'£?;? avTov, believers are said to be transformed curb 00^77? ek Sogav i. e. from the glory they behold in (or reflect from) Christ unto the glory they receive in themselves, 2 Cor. iii. 18. We have found that the Spirit is both the instrumental cause of the resurrection-act and the permanent substratum of the resurrection-life. The question here arises : which of the two is the primary idea, either in order of thought or in point of chronological emergence. It might seem plausible to put the pneumatic derivation of the resurrection-act first, and to explain this feature from what the Old Testament teaches concerning the Spirit of God as the source of natural life in the world and in man, especially since in the allegory of Ezek. xxxvii. this had already been applied to the (meta phorical) resurrection of the nation of Israel. If the Spirit worked physical life in its present form, what was more reasonable than to assume that he would likewise be the author of the restoration of physical life in the resurrection? As a matter of fact, however, we find that the operation of the Spirit in connection with the natural world recedes into the background already in the intercanonical literature and re mains so in the New Testament writings themselves. In reality Paul connects the Spirit with the resurrection not be cause he conceives of the future life in analogy with the pres ent life, but from the very opposite reason, because he con- ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 235 ceives of it as essentially distinct from the present life, as moving in a totally different element. It is more probable, therefore, that the thought of the resurrection-life as pneu matic in character is with him first in order, and that, in partial dependence on this at least, the idea emerges of the Spirit as the author of the act of the resurrection. For this there was given a solid Old Testament basis in trains of thought which had fully held their own, and even found richer develop ment in the intermediate and in the early New Testament period. The transcendental, supernatural world is already to the Old Testament the specific domain of the Spirit. And, quite apart from references to the resurrection, this thought meets us again in Paul. The heavenly world is the pneumatic world, even irrespective of its eschatological complexion, 1 Cor. x. 3, 4 ; Eph. i. 3. From this the transition is not difficult to the idea that the eschatological state is preeminently a pneumatic state, since the highest form of life known, that of the world of heaven, must impart to it its specific character. This will become clearer still, by inquiring in the next place to what extent the soteriological operations of the Spirit reveal eschatological affinity. Here a twofold perspective opens itself up to us. On the one hand in the forensic sphere all salvation is subsumed under the great rubric of justification. On the other hand in the pneumatic sphere the categories of regeneration and sanctification play an equally comprehensive part. The antithesis between the forensic and the pneumatic already indicates on "which side the soteriological activity of the Spirit will chiefly lie and where we may expect traces, if such there be, of eschatological modes of approach to the subject. Still it would be rash simply to exclude on that ac count from our inquiry the topic of justification. Into the transaction of justification also the Spirit enters. In saying this we do not refer to the function of the Spirit in the pro duction of faith on which as its subjective prerequisite the justifying act of God is suspended. Nor is it possible, con trary to Paul's plain and insistent declarations on this point, to assign the vlodeala in part to the subjective sphere, mak ing it consist in the impartation of the Spirit of sonship.33 ssThis Sokolowski attempts to vindicate as the true Pauline position, 236 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL Nor can the work of the Spirit in the subsequent production of assurance come under consideration for our present purpose. What we mean is something else than all this. The possession of the Spirit is for Paul the natural correlate, the crown and in so far the infallible exponent of the state of SiKaioo-vvq. This highly characteristic line of thought can perhaps most clearly be traced in its application to Christ. For the same reason that the resurrection of Jesus is in a very real sense the justification of the Christ,34 this can likewise be affirmed of the resurrection-life which ever since that moment Christ lives. The life and glory of the exalted Saviour are the product and seal and exponent of his status of righteousness. Speaking in our own terms, and yet faithfully rendering the Pauline conception, we may say that in his resurrection-state Christ is righteousness incarnate. Hence also justification is made dependent on a faith terminating upon the living, glorified Christ, for in this living, glorified state, his efficacious merit is most concretely present to the believer's apprehension. Now it must be remarked that the resurrection-state which is thus exponential of righteousness is entirely based on the Spirit, cf. 1 Tim. iii. 16 iSiKauoOrj iv irvexjfxaTi. By becoming Pneuma Christ has become the living witness of the eternal presence of righteousness for us in the sight of God.35 This will help us to understand the association between the Spirit and right eousness where it appears in the case of believers. It op. cit. pp. 67 ff. in opposition to Weiss and Pfleiderer, who both rightly insist upon it, that the vioBco-ia, like the Simioio-is, is to Paul a strictly declara tive act. \ 34 Rom. iv. 25 TfyipB-q Sib, rrjv Smalojaiv -qpav probably refers to our representative justification in Christ as preceding his resurrection, just as in the corresponding clause our iraparTiip.aTa precede the irapeSbB-q. Accord ing to 1 Cor. xv. 17, if Christ has not been raised, the faith of the readers is vain, futile i. e. without effect of justification. Rom. viii. 34 teaches that the crowning reason, why, after God's justification of us, no one can condemn, lies in Christ's resurrection. To ask in despair of obtaining righteousness : " Who shall descend into the abyss ? " is accord ing to Rom. x. 7 tantamount to declaring the resurrection of Christ not accomplished. 33 Cf . for an admirable exposition of this whole train of thought : Schader, Die Bedeutung des lebendigen Christus fiir die Rechtfertigung nach Paulus, 1893. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 237 must here have the same significance, on the one hand that of a seal attesting justification as an accomplished fact, on the other hand that of the normal fruit of righteousness. And it is the former because it is the latter: the possession of the Spirit seals the actuality of righteousness, because in no other way than on the basis of righteousness could the Spirit have been bestowed. In this sense Paul says that the Pneuma is life Sid SiKaioo-vvrjv , Rom. viii. 10; and stakes the whole question as to the method by which the Galatians were justi fied on this, how the Spirit was supplied to them, Gal. iii. 5. The redemption from the curse of the law had the intent and effect of bringing to believers the promised Spirit, Gal. iii. 14. The status of sonship carries with it the mission of the Spirit into the heart, Gal. iv. 6. In Tit. iii. 5, 6 the gift of the Holy Spirit proves the connecting link between justification and re newal, being the effect of the former and the source of the latter. The irvevfia vioffecrias in Rom. viii. 15 is a Spirit which results from (or goes with) adoption, not a Spirit which effects adoption. In 1 Cor. vi. 11 the washing, sanctifying and justifying of the Corinthians is attributed to the Spirit of God as well as to the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and on the exegesis, which takes the dyido-6r)Te in the sense of " ye were consecrated ", the whole transaction in its three stages belongs to the forensic sphere, and the Spirit receives a specific function within that sphere.36 It is plain, however, that all these statements with reference to the Spirit's presence in believers have for their background the presence of the Spirit in the same capacity as a seal and fruit of justification in the exalted Christ. And it is from this that they receive their eschatological coloring. For in Christ this Spirit which is the seal and fruit of righteousness is none other than the Spirit of the consummate life and the consum mate glory, the circumambient element of the eschatological state in general. The conclusion, therefore, is fully warranted that the Spirit as a living attestation of the state of righteous- 3* If ayido-BrjTe be taken in its technical sense of " sanctification ", the two Datives iv bvbpjxn and iv irveipuTt will have to be chiastically dis tributed, the former going with " ye were justified ", the latter with " ye were washed ", " ye were sanctified ". 238 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL ness in the believer has this significance, because he is in prin ciple the fountain of the blessedness of the world to come. And this is verified by observing how Paul combines with righteous ness the peace and joy in the Holy Spirit, and finds in this Spirit-fed peace and joy the essence of the kingdom of God, Rom. xiv. 17; how the first-fruit of the Spirit looks forward to the eschatological vioOeaia Rom. viii. 23 ; how the KaTaXXayrj and the resulting justification (not first nor merely the sub jective renewal) open up to the Christian a Kaivrj ktio-i$ , that new world in which the old things are passed away and new things have come,37 and which, as contradistinguished from the o-dp!;, must be the ktio-i? of the Pneuma. Finally, most in structive is here Gal. v. 5 : irvevfiaTi e'/c iriaTecoi iXiriSa SiKaioo-vvrj<; aireKSexdfieOa . Here the righteousness of the world to come which is to be bestowed in the last judgment is represented as a thing which the Christian still waits for.38 This waiting, however, is determined by two coordinated factors : on the one hand it takes place iK irCo-Teax;, on the other hand irvev/iaTi ,39 and these two designate the subjective and the objective ground respectively on which the confident expectation is based. In the Spirit, not in the o-dpf; , in faith, not in epya vo/xov, has the Christian the assurance that the full eschatologi cal righteousness will become his. (Cf. also Tit. iii. 7.) More specifically, however, the Spirit belongs to the other hemisphere of soteriology, that of the subjective renewal and the renewed state of man. It needs no pointing out how inti mately this is associated with the Spirit. Hvevfian irepiiraTevl is a comprehensive phrase for the God-pleasing walk of the Christian, Gal. v. 16; KaTa irvevfia designates the standard of ethical normality, both as to being and striving, Rom. viii. 5. — 3T Thus yiyovev Kaivd should be rendered, not : " they have become new ". 33 'EXirls is here objective "the thing hoped for" and SiK&ioo-ivrfs is Gen. of apposition : " the hoped for thing consisting in righteousness." HveipaTi and iK irlo-Teois are not to be construed together, so as to make out the meaning " the Spirit received out of faith ". Both go co- ordinately with the verb. Cf. for this passage the very lucid exposition of Zahn, in his Commentary, pp. 249 ff. He renders the verse as follows : "Wir erwarten im Geist im Folge Glaubens einen Hoffnungsgegenstand, welcher in Gerechtigkeit besteht." ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 239 The contrast between o-dpf; and wevfia is an ethical contrast, Gal. v. 17. Paul represents the Christian virtues and graces as fruits and gifts of the Spirit, Gal. v. 19 and Rom. xii. 8 ff. In particular love, which the Apostle regards as the essence of fulfilment of the law is derived from the Spirit, Rom. xv. 30; Col. i. 8. The whole range of sanctification belongs to the province of the Spirit, whence it is called ayiao-ftb<: irvev/jtaTO1;, 2 Thess. ii. 13, and likewise, of course, the " renewal " at the beginning, Tit. iii. 5. But not only the specifically-ethical, also the more generally religious, graces and dispositions are the Spirit's work, such as faith,40 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5 ; 2 Cor. iii. 3 in connection with 1 Cor. iii. 5; 2 Cor. iv. 13; joy. Rom. xiv. 17; Gal. v. 22; 1 Thess. i. 6; peace Rom. viii. 6, xiv. 17, xv. 13; 1 Cor xiv. 33; Gal. v. 22; Eph. iv. 3; hope Rom. iv 5, xii. 12; Gal. v. 5; Eph. i. 18, iv. 4. Now the comprehensive conception under which Paul subsumes all these ethical and religious states, dispositions and activities is that of " life ". It is the " Spirit of life " which as a new principle and norm sets free of sin and determines the Christian, Rom. viii. 2. Whilst the letter kills, the Spirit gives life, 2 Cor. iii. 6, and that not merely in the forensic sense, but also in the ethico- religious sense (on account of verses 2, 3). Because believers live by the Spirit, they can be exhorted also to walk by the Spirit, Gal. v. 25. Life is to Paul by no means an exclusively physical conception,41 as Rom. vii. 8-1 1; Eph. iv. 18 will show. The Apostle even approaches the conception that it springs from communion with God, Rom. viii. 7; Eph. iv. 18, and explicitly defines its goal as lying in God Rom. vi. 10, 11 ; Gal. ii. 19. We find then that on the one hand the renewal and the renewed state are derived from the Spirit, and that on the other hand they are reduced to terms of life. This cer tainly suggests the inference that the connecting link between the things enumerated and the Spirit lies in their being viewed as phenomena of life. The Spirit works all this, because he is 40 So correctly Sokolowski pp. 71 ff. against Weiss and Pf leiderer ; cf. also Titius, Der Paulinismus unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Seligkeit, 1900, p. 43, against Wendt. "Against Kabisch, Die Paulinische Eschatologie, 1893. Kabisch is the Schweitzer of Paulinism. 240 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL the author of life. With this agrees the fact that in the pas sages cited above, where the ethical renewal of the Christian is attributed to the Spirit, Rom. viii. 2 ; 2 Cor. iii. 6; Gal. v. 25, the conception of " life " in each case accompanies the other two, being, as it were, the conception in which these meet and find their higher unity. Our inquiry, therefore, resolves itself into this, whether when Paul calls the new state and walk of the believer life, a life by and in the Spirit, this has anything to do with or can receive any light from the eschatological aspect of the Spirit. It might be thought that the whole subsumption of the ethico-religious content of the Christian state under the cate gory of the pneumatic, which is so characteristic of Paul, is nothing else but a simple working out of the prophetic teaching which, as we have seen above, derives from the Spirit the new heart, the new obedience, the state of acceptance with God. In that case the soteriological operation of the Spirit on its subjective side would not be in any way affected by his eschatological associations. Paul's movement of thought in conceiving of the Spirit as the new element of the Christian state would have been exclusively in the direction from the present to the future : because the Spirit is and does this now, he will also be operative after the same fashion in the future.42 We do not mean to deny that this correctly reproduces a train of thought with which Paul was familiar. After once the Spirit was clearly apprehended as the substratum and element of the present Christian state it was inevitable that from this point of view the line of his characteristic activity should be prolonged into the future. Thus we find it in Rom. viii. 11. But this does not by any means exclude that alongside of this there may have been a perspective in the opposite direction, or that this may even represent the earlier and more fundamental mode of viewing the subject. Direct action and reflex action "Thus Sokolowski thinks that the Pauline doctrine of the Spirit as the author of the resurrection arose, because to Paul the Spirit as the author of ethical processes on the one hand, and on the other hand the idea of the resurrection, stood equally in the foreground, " und das um so sicherer als sich seine" (d. h. des Geistes) " Fahigkeit physisches Leben zu wirken aus dem gegenwartigen Dasein des Menschen ausweist", p. 205. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 241 here naturally go together as again Rom. viii. 11 strikingly shows. Against exclusive insistence upon the former construction we would urge the following. First 2 Cor. v. 5 is one of the three directly eschatological passages where, as we have seen, the present Spirit is an anticipation of the future Spirit. Sec ondly, the close association of the ethico-religious function of the Spirit with life in itself creates a presumption in favor of the view that the future here in part at least colors the present. For " life " is undoubtedly with Paul, and before Paul with Jesus, especially in the Synoptical teaching, and idea that is in the first instance eschatologically conceived and thence carried back into the present. It is the 0*7 auovioi of the world to come. In the third place Paul speaks of the present pneumatic state in terms which are either directly borrowed from the eschatological vocabulary, or strongly reminiscent of it. The Kaivr) ktio-is of 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15 is such a term, and also the KaivoTrj1; 7rvev/iaT0'; of Rom. vii. 6 and the Kaivif SiadrjKr] irvev/jtaTos of 2 Cor. iii. 6, may here be remembered. Fourthly, even in the Old Testament where the ethical operation of the Spirit is mentioned, this is done in the form of a promise, so that from the outset it appears in an eschatological environment.43 Fifthly, here also, as before, we must take into account the Christological background of the soteriological process. The pneumatic life of the Christian is a product and a reflex of the pneumatic life of the Christ. It is a life iv irvev/j,aTi to the same extent as it is a life iv Xpio-Tm 44 It is important sharply to define the peculiarity 43 In this connection it should be noted that the prophets, while ascrib ing to the Spirit the task of ethico-religious renewal, do not speak of the state thus produced in terms of life. The combination between the two ideas Paul did not borrow from the prophets. 44 It is not essential to the above position to assert that the two for mulas are entirely synonymous and coextensive, or that the formula iv Xpio-Tip is formed after the analogy of iv irveipan, as Deissman, Die Neutes- tamentliche Formel in Christo-Jesu, 1892, thinks. Walter, Der religiose Gehalt des Galaterbriefs, 1904, PP- 122-144, has, in our opinion, convincingly shown that the usage of iv Xpio-rb} considerably overlaps the limits within which iv irveipan would be applicable. It has a large forensic connota- 242 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL on this point of the Pauline doctrine on the relation between the Spirit bestowed by Christ and the Saviour's own glorified life, and the extent to which it marks a development beyond the pre-Pauline teaching. In the Petrine speeches recorded in the earlier chapters of Acts the Spirit indeed appears as a gift of the glorified Christ. It was given to Jesus in fulfilment of the promise of the Father and having received the promised Spirit he immediately poured it forth upon the disciples, Acts ii. 33. But according to Paul Jesus at the resurrection receives the Spirit not merely as an objective gift, something that he can dispense; the Spirit becomes his own subjective possession, the Spirit dwelling in him, the source of his own glorified life, so that when he communicates the Spirit he communicates of his own, whence also the possession of the Spirit works in the believer a mystical, vital union with Christ. While Peter's teaching leaves full room for this whole rich Pauline develop ment, it does not yet contain this development.45 Paul em phasizes repeatedly that the Spirit who works life in believers is the identical Spirit who wrought and still is life for the ex alted Lord, Rom. viii. 9, 1 1 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 4. When Jesus was raised from the dead, he did become Pneuma, but this Pneuma was more than £&v he was ^coottoiovv, communicating himself tion. But where iv Xpio-Tip relates to the mystical sphere, the two formulas are practically interchangeable. 45 A point of contact for it has been found in Acts iv. 2. When it is said that the Apostles " proclaimed in Jesus the resurrection from the dead", this might, so far as the words are concerned, have the pregnant Pauline meaning, to the effect that the general resurrection (of the mem bers of the kingdom) was potentially given in Jesus' resurrection. The opposite extreme is to understand the Apostolic preaching as a simple affirmation of the possibility of the resurrection as illustrated in the concrete case of Jesus, with an anti-Sadducaeic point. But there can be no doubt that from the beginning the resurrection of Jesus was appre hended in its eschatological as well as in its Christological importance. The best view is to find in the words the affirmation by the Apostles that the resurrection of Jesus guaranteed the resurrection of believers in general, without reflection upon the vital connection between the two. The same idea of the typical significance of the resurrection of Jesus finds expression in the phrases dpxvybs fai)s iii. 15 and dpxyybs Kdl o-ojri)p in v. 31, if at least dpxyybs be given the pregnant sense of one who first experiences in himself what he effects for others. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 243 to others, 1 Cor. xv. 45. This only will explain why Paul cannot merely say Christ has the Spirit but can say: 6 Se Kt5/otos to ¦jrvev/j.d io-Tiv and can speak of Christ as Kv/mos •jrvevyi.aTO'i , 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18.46 The gospel is the gospel of the glory of Christ, 2 Cor. iv. 5. And in the light of all this it must be further interpreted when Paul speaks of the process of renewal and sanctification in terms which are not merely derived from the death and resurrection of Christ, for this might be a purely figurative usage, but in terms which posit a real, vital connection between the two, so that what takes place in the believer is an actual self-reproduction of what was transacted in Christ. To be joined with the Lord is to be one Spirit with him, 1 Cor. vi. 17. Now all this tends to confirm the conclusion already drawn from the four preceding considerations. If the pneumatic life of the Christian bears this relation to the pneumatic life of the exalted Lord, then it must to some extent partake of the eschatological character of the latter.47 It will perhaps repay us to pursue this thought somewhat further from a different angle. Especially in the later epis- 43 In dirb Kvplov irveiparos the preposition governs Kvplov and irveiparos is Genit. qualitatis. It means "from the Lord of the Spirit" not "from the Spirit of the Lord ". Gloel, p. 123 : " Geistes Herr ist Christus sofern er als Herr zu einem Stand erhoben ist im welchem Geist den Charakter seines Wesens ausmacht." An interesting parallel to 1 Cor. xv. 45 and 2 Cor. iii. 17 is Is. xxviii. 5, 6 " Jehovah will become a Spirit of justice." The parallel shows how close the identification between the Spirit and Christ is ; it is in some respects like unto that between Jehovah and the Spirit in the Old Testament. Parallel with the union between the Spirit and Christ's human nature runs that of the believer and the Spirit. Henee the peculiar phraseology Tb UvevpA p.ov, rb TLvevpd. oiroiovv "became" (iyeveTo).48 This will also explain why the new contrast between two simultaneous worlds does not supersede the eschatological perspective for the future. The two spheres still are in conflict, the two ages still labor to bring forth their respective worlds, a crisis is still outstanding. Cf. Eph. i. 14, i. 21, ii. 7, 12, iv. 4, 30, v. 6; Col. iii. 4, vi. 24; Phil. i. 6, ii. 16, iii. 20. Precisely here lies the point in which the Pauline doctrine of the Spirit and the 48 Here the difference between Philo and Paul is very striking, for ac cording to Philo Adam already possessed the Pneuma-power, Opif. 144 quoted by Volz, p. 106. 246 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL Hellenic or Hellenistic conception of the pneuma are sharply differentiated, striking though their similarity in some other respects may be. The Greek philosophical pneuma, whether in its dualistic Platonic or neo-Platonic form, or in its hylozoistic Stoic form, lacks every historic significance, it is, even where it appears in contrast to an opposing element, the result of a bisection of nature, not the product of a supernatural divine activity. With Paul, both in regard to the o-dpf; and the ¦Kvevjxa, the historical factor remains the controlling one. If the sphere of the o-dpl; is evil, this is not due to its natural con stitution, because it is material or sensual, but because it has historically become evil through the entrance of sin.49 And when Paul views the pneumatic world as the consummated world, this also is not due simply to its natural constitution as the ideal nonsensual world, but because through the Messiah it has become the finished product of God's designs for man.50 Even into the revealing work of the Spirit the eschatological associations enter. From the nature of the case this has its primary reference to the present life, just as the glossolalia and the cognate phenomena are rather premonitions of the world to come than constituent elements of that world itself, sub- eschatological rather than semi-eschatological manifestations.51 Revelation, however, while providing for a present need, may have for its object the realities of the future life, and thus the thought emerges that the Spirit, who is so closely identified with the future life in general, when thus disclosing the things to come, discloses what in a very special sense is his own. With this thought we actually meet in 1 Cor. ii. The wisdom which Paul speaks among the TeXeioi, verse 6, but which he could not speak among the Corinthians (iii. 1 irveviiaTiKoi = TeXeioi ) , a wisdom therefore to be distinguished from his ordi nary preaching, God's wisdom iv /livottj/oiw (ii. 7) is ac cording to verse 10 derived from the Spirit. The point of 43 Notice the studied avoidance of the term aapKiKbs in the context of 1 Cor. xv. 44 ff., where Paul wishes to contrast the pneumatic with the natural-as-such, irrespective of its sinful quality. 60 Cf. Titius, Der Paulinismus, pp. 242-250. 81 Cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 22, xiii. 10-13 ; but, on the other hand xiii. 1 " the tongues of angels " ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 247 view from which Paul makes this last affirmation is partly theo logical : the Spirit is the appropriate organ for revealing such things, because he stands in as intimate a relation to God as the spirit of a man to man. He can search all things, even those deep things of God with which the higher o-ocbia deals, for he is the Spirit of God. Intertwined with this, how ever, appears the other consideration, that the " wisdom " has to do with eschatological facts and that for this reason it be longs to the particular province of the Spirit to reveal it. It re lates to something that has been hidden, which God foreor dained before the aeons, and which concerned the S6%a of be lievers, verse 7. More particularly it is defined as that " which eye saw not and ear heard not, and which entered not into the heart of man, whatsoever things God prepared for them that love him ",52 It comprises " the things that were freely given to us of God ", verse 12. In contrast to it stands a wisdom tow alS>vo<; tovtov " of this age " and of " the apyovrts of this age " who are already coming to nought, verse 6. Those who belong to " this age " can not know it, verse 8. Obviously this implies that believers can know it because they belong to " the age to come."53 Because they have part in the future world, the mysteries of the future world are communicable to them. Now, it should be noticed that Paul expresses the same idea also in the other form that the Christian is, or may be irvevfi- anKO'i, whereas the man who belongs to the present age is 1/rv^t/co'?, ii. 14-16, iii. 1. It is as irvev paTiKos that he has access to these transcendental things from which the yjrvxiKov is by his very constitution excluded. To belong to the world to come and to be irvevp,aTiK6<; are used as interchangeable conceptions. Not merely, therefore, because the Christian is the recipient of revelation, but for the further and more speci- 82 According to Origen Comm. ad Matth. xxvii. 9 these words stood in the Secreta Eliae Prophetae which tends to confirm their eschatological reference (cf. Schiirer, Gesch. des. Jiid. Volk. Ill, pp. 361 ff.). Dibelius, Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus, 1909, p. 91 note.i. 88 In the reading ipuv ydp (v. 10) the ydp is highly significant, be cause it attaches itself to the intermediate (unexpressed) thought: "We do not share in the ignorance of the alijv oZtos" — " for to us God has revealed them through his Spirit." 248 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL fie reason, that he already partakes of that which is the distinc tive quality of the future life, can he be initiated into the mysteries of the latter. The spirit is the source of the escha tological fivo-Tijpiov both in the sphere of being and in the sphere of revelation. Hence also in verse 11 Paul draws a for mal distinction between the Trvevpa of the koo-/j,oos ovtos and 6 alojv olros are used promiscuously, I Cor. i. 20, ii. 6, 12, iii. 18, 19. 65 Reitzenstein, Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen, 1910, proposes an interpretation of the antithesis fvxmbs — irvevfj.aTiKbs. which would detach it altogether from its eschatological background, and in the place of this make it a form of expression of the essentially Hellenistic and Gnostic contrast between the supernatural world of the spiritual and the natural world of sense. According to him the technical sense of fvxiKbs arose from the belief that in the mysteries through regeneration a new ego is created which traverses the heavens and attains to the vision of God. This new ego is distinct from and replaces the old self ^z^vxi, because it is deified. Holy Spirit has entered into such an one, his own person he ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 249 The passage just examined suggests the query to what ex tent, if to any, the Holy Spirit is by Paul placed in contrast to Satan and evil spirits in general. Inasmuch as evil spirit- powers undoubtedly play a role in connection with the present aeon and their conquest is plainly a considerable part of its pass ing away, every pointed opposition of the Spirit to such powers has left behind. In the ecstatic state also the God who enters, mentem priorem expulit, atque hominem toto sibi cedere jussit pectore (quoted from Lucanus). Here i^ux^=self and irvevpa are mutually exclusive (pp. 44-46). What the pneuma produces is a " Gottwesen " (p. 55), the process is an diroBiwtris , and in this sense Reitzenstein interprets the Pauline terms Soidfriv and perapopipovv (p. 168.) The Trvevp.aTiKbs is " uber- haupt nicht mehr Mensch " (p. 168). Pfleiderer's quotation from Rohde's Psyche, in Urchristenthum2 I, p. 266, also suggests the same solu tion. Reitzenstein is well aware that such ideas must have stood in flagrant contradiction to Paul's fundamental type of thought, because, as he him self admits, the magical, transformation of a sinful man into a " Gott wesen " runs contrary to the profound moral earnestness of the Jewish re ligion (p. 56.) He further admits that Paul has not been able to surmount this contradiction (ib.). The only thing that might commend this hypothesis it that it seems to offer a plausible explanation of the technical use of \pvxiKbs . But even if this could not be explained in any other way, it would not be permissible on that account to entertain a solution so flagrantly at variance with Paul's fundamental religious convictions. As to the passages themselves which Reitzenstein discusses at great length {Paulus als Pneumatiker pp. 160-204), there is only one expression that seems to favor his proposal, viz. the depreciatory characterization of the Oorinthians as dvBpwiroi, 1 Cor. iii. 4. But, as has already been said, it would be absurd to press this to the extent of finding in it the deification of the Christian and the denial of his true humanity. Nor can the fact that in contrast to fvxiKbs &vBpairos Paul puts the simple irvevpdTiKbs (without dvBponros) in ii. 15 be appealed to in proof of such a view, for in iii. 1, 3 both o-apdvois and irvevp-aTiKott occur without the noun. Reitzenstein also argues from the phrase rd tov irveipviTos tov Beov in ii. 14, because the addition of tov Beov is in his view intelligible only on the supposition that "previously to the miraculous transmutation of being man and God belong to two different worlds ". But the thought is all the time that the wisdom of man is a wisdom of the Kbo-pjos and of a definite aliiv of the Kbo-pss, so that its counterpart, the wisdom of God will also have its own domain in a definite sphere and period. It can be called the wisdom of God, because God is supreme in that sphere and age. What Paul, therefore, means is not that man must become God, but that he must be translated from the Kbo-fws into the world of God. The true contrast to " ye are men " in iii. 4 is not " ye are divine " but " ye 250 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL would carry with it more or less of an eschatological atmo sphere.56 As a matter of fact, however, not much material of are of God and of Christ '', v. 22, and the same is implied by way of con trast in the clauses " I am of Paul ", " I am of Apollos " iii. 4. The absurdity of this nomenclature does not lie in the fact that they act like men while being divine, but is that they act as belonging to men, while being the property of God. And, what decides everything, in 1 Cor. xv. 45, 47 the pneumatic Christ is distinctly called " man ". Reitzenstein gets around this only by altering the text. He proposes (p. 172) to read in v. 45 iyivero 6 dvBpiuiros (instead of iyivero b irpiirros dvBpojwos "ASap), which not only eliminates, through the omission of irp&Tos, the implication that there is a second man, but also imparts the idea that the second Adam is not man, because the first is called " the man " specifically. It might, of course, be said, that the true manhood of Christ even so is presupposed in his being called b Seirepos dvBpom-os in v. 47, but Reitzenstein interprets this on the basis of a belief on Paul's part in a God named "AvBpojiros (with a capital), which God is identified with Christ, so as to warrant the conclusion, that the latter is n-vevpjx t;oioiroi6v (p. 173.) This change of the text is absolutely uncalled for, and the introduction of a God 'AvBpimros entirely foreign to the Apostle's trend of thought, which is throughout governed by the principle of the true unity and parallelism between Christ's human nature and ours as appears with sufficient clearness from v. 21 : " For since Si dvBpilnrov came death, Si dvBpiinrov came also the resurrec tion of the dead." The " mere man " who is transcended by the " deified man " Reitzenstein also would find in 2 Cor. xii. 4 : " which it is not lawful for a man (i. e. ' a mere man ') to utter." This may be answered by pointing to v. 2 where the recipient of the revelation described, i. e. a highly pneumatic subject, is spoken of as "a man in Christ". Reitzen stein, to be sure thinks he can escape the force of this by taking " a man in Christ " as one idea = a pneumatic person. Still even so he remains to Paul a man, and besides in v. 3 we have the simple " such a man " (without iv Xpio-rty) . The whole explanation of fvxiKbs from the ecstatic state breaks down, because in ecstasy, as defined by Philo and others, the \pvxv of man simply vacates and, far from forming a new divine subject, the man becomes a receptacle for the divine Pneuma. The man disappears and God takes his place : the technical phrase is Karixeo-Bai ix Beov. The contrast between a " psychical " and a " pneumatic " man can not have arisen through reflection upon this. As to the impossibility of irvevpjxTiKbs meaning in contrast to fvxwbs " one who has not only a *j/vxt) but also the ILvevpa,'' to which Reitzenstein appeals in support of his view, we may refer to Zielinski in Theol. Literature. 1911, no. 24, col. 740, who shows that the contrast between proletariats and assiduus is of precisely the same nature, the former being one who has only children, the latter one who has landed property, but is not necessarily childless. 63 Cf. the Synoptical statement, Mt. xii. 28 = Lk. xi. 20 (where, how ever, iv SaKriXu. Beov takes the place of the iv irveipari 0eoOin Mt.). ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 251 this nature can be gleaned from the Pauline epistles. As we have seen in 1 Cor. ii. 12 the kosmos has its own spirit which governs the psychical man. At the same time the kosmos has its own rulers in the supernatural sphere, for of such the apxovTes tov aicbvo1; tovtov in verse 6 will probably have to be understood. It is not clear whether in verse 12 the concep tion of " receiving " the spirit of the kosmos points to a trans cendental influence brought to bear upon men from the outside. If so, it will be natural to connect this irvev\i,a tov koo-jiov with the dpxovTe^ tov alwvos tovtov It must also be remem bered that Satan is called in 2 Cor. iv. 4 6 Oebs tov alcovos tovtov , and the very point of this bold comparison seems to lie in this that, as the true God by his Spirit illumines the minds of believers enabling them to behold the glory of Christ in the gospel, so the false God of the present age, has a counter- spirit at work (or is a counter-spirit) which blinds the minds of the unbelieving that the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ should not dawn upon them. Here both the con ception of S6l;a as the content of the gospel and the parallel ism between the first and the second creation in verse 6 impart an unmistakable eschatological flavor to the comparison. Where the thought of the wisdom-passage in 1 Cor. ii. recurs later in Col. ii. 2 ff. with many striking reminiscences even as to the form, the contrast becomes one purely between Christ and the spirits, and the conception of the irvevfia tov xoo-piov in its opposition to the irvev/Jia to eVc tov Oeov does not reappear. This suggests that the relative ab sence of the antithesis between the Holy Spirit and the evil spirits is largely due to the fact that, wherever such compari sons occur with Paul, Christ himself is personally opposed to the Satanic power and the Spirit not explicitly mentioned.57 In Eph. ii. 2 on the other hand we read again, as in 1 Cor. ii. 12, of a " pneuma that now works in the sons of disobedience ", which pneuma is moreover distinctly associated with the aeon of this present kosmos, so that the corresponding conception 87 Cf. Col. i. 11, where the iiomla toO o-k6tovs is contrasted with the f3ao-i\ela tov vlov and only the characterization of the inheritance of the saints as a Khrjpos iv rip Bopd to which the creation is subject have a demoniacal background, which does not appear either in Rom. viii. 20, 21 or anywhere else. Dibelius, who care fully traces all the demonological references and allusions in Paul, and even recognizes in 'Apaprla and Qdvaros personal spirits, is entirely silent about the o-dpi ¦ "Die Wirkungen des Heiligen Geistes nach der populdren Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit und nach der Lehre des Apostels Paulus, 1888, 2d ed. 1899. Sokolowski, p. 199 is more fair in the estimate placed upon the Old Testament statements in regard to the ethical functions of the Spirit; as to the early apostolic teaching he throws out this caution that much may have existed in the minds of the first Christians, of which no record fs made in Acts, and so with reference to Jesus. Still, where the sources do not speak, he deems it scientifically more correct " vor der Hand " to deny to Jesus and the early church the specific Pauline conceptions than the reverse, p. 196. Volz, pp. 194 ff. thinks that the contrast as usually drawn between Synoptics-Acts and Paul is wrong, that there should be substituted for it the contrast between Matthew and Mark on the one hand and Luke and Paul on the other hand, that is, the contrast between Palestinian Christianity and Pauline-Hellenic world-Christianity. But why not say that it is simply a contrast between the records of the earlier and the records of later history, so that the prominence of the Spirit in the documents reflects the lesser or greater prominence of the Spirit in the development of events? That Luke in the Gospel makes more of the Spirit than Matthew is contraindicated by his substituting xi. 20 iv SaKriXip for iv vvetipjxTi Mt. xii. 28. 254 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL the originality of Paul in this respect and underestimated the preparation made for this development by the Old Testament prophetic and earlier New Testament teaching. Still a simple comparison between the Petrine speeches in Acts and the Paul ine statements abundantly shows, that Paul was the first to as cribe to the Spirit that dominating place and that pervasive uni form activity, which secure to him alongside of the Father and the Son a necessary relation to the Christian state at every point. The question arises whether we can trace in Paul's teaching the roots out of which this conception of the Spirit grew, or at least the other elements in his thought to which it sustained from its very birth a relation of interdependence and mutual adjustment. Probably more than one factor will here have to be taken into account. The theocentric bent of Paul's mind makes for the conclusion that in the Christian life all must be from God and for God, and the Spirit of God would be the natural agent for securing this. The impotence of sin ful human nature for good, one of the Apostle's profoundest convictions, would likewise postulate the operation of the Spirit along the whole range of ethical movement and activity. The marvellous efflorescence of a new ethical life among the early Christians in its contrast with pagan immorality, and its impulsiveness and spontaneity as compared with Jewish formalism, would of themselves point to a miraculous, super natural source, which could be none other than the Spirit of God. Still further, the fact that to Paul the Spirit is preemi nently the Spirit of Christ and therefore as thoroughly equable and ethical in his activity as the mind of Jesus himself, will have to be remembered here. But, alongside of all these mo tives, there worked probably as the first and most influential cause the idea that it is the Spirit of God who gives form and character to the eschatological life in the broadest and most pervasive sense, that the coming age is the age of the Spirit par excellence, so that all that enters into it, forms part of it, or takes place in it, must necessarily be baptized into the Pneuma as into an omnipresent element and thus itself become " spiritual " in its mode of existence and quality. This will explain not only the uniform and equable infusion of the Spirit into the Christian life at every point ; it also accounts for the ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 255 strong emphasis thrown upon the ethico-religious life as within the larger sphere the most characteristic of all the Spirit's pro ducts. For if the Spirit be the Spirit of the almv peXXcov, then his most distinctive task must lie where the coming aeon is most sharply differentiated in principle from the present age. And this, as all the Pauline references to the two aeons go to prove, is the ethical quality of both. The alcov iveo-Tax; is before all other things an ala>v irovripos, Gal. i. 4. One to whom this ethical contrast stood in the foreground, and who was at the same time accustomed to view the future aeon as the world of the Spirit, would of necessity be thereby led to place the ethico- religious transformation at the center of the Spirit's activity. He would interpret not only the whole Christian life in terms of the Spirit, but would also regard the newness of the moral and religious life as a fruit of the Spirit in its highest po tency.61 Our second inference concerns the Apostle's Christology. A widely current modern construction of the Pauline doctrine 31 The question may properly be raised at this point whether Paul's characteristic conception of the o-dpi does not likewise have its eschat ological antecedents. It is so antithetically determined by its correlative, the Pneuma, that a certain illumination of the one must more or less affect the coloring of the other. To discuss the question here would lead us too far afield. We confine ourselves to the following. While the trdpi chiefly appears as a power or principle in the subjective experience of man, yet this is by no means the only aspect under which Paul re gards it. It is an organism, an order of things beyond the individual man, even beyond human nature. It is something that is not inherently evil, the evil predicates are joined to it by means of a synthetic judg ment. Still further it has its affiliations and ramifications in the ex ternal, physical, natural (as opposed to supernatural) constitution of things. Now if o-dpi was originally the characteristic designation of the first world-order, as Pneuma is that of the second, all these features could be easily accounted for without having recourse to Hellenistic- dualistic explanations. From its association with the entire present aeon, the odpt, could derive its pervasive, comprehensive significance, in virtue of which a man can be iv traprt as he can be iv weipari; like the aeon it lends a uniform complexion to all existing things. It would also de rive from this its partial coincidence with the somatic, because the whole first aeon moves on the external, provisional, physical plane. Finally it would derive from this its synonymy with evil, for according to Paul, the present aeon has become an evil aeon in its whole extent. 256 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL of Christ finds in the Spirit that element which formed the true inner essence of the Son of God in his preexistent state, so that his being the Son of God, and his being the Spirit come to express the same thing, the one from a formal the other from a material point of view. Christ carried over this origi nal pneumatic character from the preexistent state into his earthly life and from his earthly life again into the post-resur rection state, the only difference being that, while in the first and the third stages the Spirit ruled supreme, in the inter mediate stage his presence was obscured and his activity re pressed by the o-dp% . In this construction the place of the divine nature is taken by the pneumatic personality. The ab solute sense of the /Mopcbrj Oeov of Phil. ii. 6 is weakened so as to make it appear the equivalent of the e'lKoov Oeov or the 60'fa Oeov of which elsewhere Paul represents Christ as the bearer. For the divine Christ is substituted a Spirit-being, a creature of high rank but still a creature.62 Now, if we have succeeded to any degree in elucidating the actual perspective in which the Christ-Pneuma appears with Paul, it will be easily felt what gross violence this modern construction does to the " Especially Bruckner in his work Die Entstehung der Pawlinischen Christologie, 1903, has strenuously advocated this theory, in the special form that he places the origin of this pneumatic Christology back of Paul in Judaism. According to him the " Wesensveranderung " of the Messiah into a pneumatic person was due to this that the enemies of the Messiah had come to be regarded as celestial powers, angels and de mons, no longer as mere men p. 116. In order to make him equal to the requirements of a conquest of these, it was necessary to believe him super human. But it is far from clear why pneumatic endowment should not have been thought sufficient for this. As a matter of fact all that Bruckner succeeds in gleaning from the apocalyptic literature amounts to no more than this. Of equipment we read in Psalt. Sol. xvii. 37 ; xviii. 7. As to Enoch (Similit.) Bruckner himself admits, that the author does not reflect upon the relation between the Messiah and God, p. 140. Here also we meet with the idea of equipment, xlix. 3. To be sure he thinks that here the endowment with the Spirit is more of a " Wesensbestimmung " than in Psalt. Sol., but this is scarcely borne out by the facts p. 144. The only thing Bruckner can find in 4 Ezr. to connect the Messiah with the Spirit is the stream of fire proceeding from him for the destruction of his enemies, xiii. 9-11, p. 156, but this~is rather far-fetched. In the Ap. of Bar. there is no reference to the Messianic Spirit at all. In Test. XII Pat. we have again the idea of endowment, Test. Lev. 18. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 257 main principle which governs that part of the Apostle's teach ing. For we have found that the peculiar identification be tween Christ and the Spirit, on which the construction de pends, is dated by Paul from the resurrection, that it has a strictly eschatological significance, that it is used exclusively to describe what Christ is in his Messianic capacity with ref erence to believers, and never recurred upon to define the origi nal constitution of Christ's Person as such. Paul everywhere approaches the endowment of Christ with the Spirit from an eschatological-soteriological point of view, and the fundamen tal error of this modern reproduction of his Christological teaching arises from its failure to appreciate that fact. What the Apostle places at the end of the Messianic process is mis takenly carried back into the earlier life of the Messianic Person and there made to do service for explaining the mys tery of the origin of the Son of God. The fallacy of this procedure will become doubly apparent by observing, that on the one hand, where Paul introduces the pneumatic Christ he uniformly refers to the state of exaltation, and on the other hand, where he speaks of the preexistent Christ every reference to the Pneuma is conspicuously absent. Paul himself did not confound, as his modern interpreters do, what belongs to Christ as a Person and what belongs to him in virtue of his office. The third and last observation suggested by our inquiry touches the heart of the Pauline pneumatology itself. It is often asserted by representatives of a certain school of theo logical thought, that the development of New Testament doc trine moves along the line of " deeschatologization." The great service rendered both by Jesus in his teaching on the present kingdom and by Paul in his teaching on justification and the life in the Spirit is held to consist in this, that they translated the transcendental blessedness expected from a fu ture world into experiences and privileges of a purely imma nent character to be enjoyed now and here below. To the same degree as they succeeded in doing this they divested the eschatological of its intrinsic importance and made it a mere fringe or form to the true substance of Christianity which can and does exist independently of it. It would seem to us 258 ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL that in most representations of this kind the dislike of the eschatological revealed springs from a suspicious mo tive. It is easy to speak disparagingly of the gross realistic expectations of the Jews, but those, who do so, often under the pretense of a refined spiritualism attack the very essence of Biblical supernaturalism. At bottom it is the spirit of the evo lutionary philosophy, which here voices its protest against the idea of consummation, as at the other end of the line of Bibli cal history it protests against the idea of creation. Besides the supernatural it is the soteriological that is resented in eschat ology. The eschatological is nothing else but supernaturalism and soteriology in the strongest possible solution.63 Hence the religion of the present, what is so highly extolled in Jesus and Paul, is depicted largely in the colors of an ideal natural re ligion. The eschatological kingdom not merely becomes pres ent, but the present kingdom becomes a mere matter of son- ship and righteousness without redemptive setting and realized by subjective internal processes. And the essence of the Chris tian state, as Paul describes it, is sought in much the same things. The " Spirit " is supposed to stand for that side of the Apostle's conception of religion, on which it is least affected by the abnormal, the miraculous, in a word for the " spiritual " in the conventional sense of that term. We, therefore, have to do here not with an innocent shift from the future to the present, but with a radical change from one clearly defined type of religion to another.64 With the setting aside of the eschatological something else of inestimable value and im portance that lies enshrined in it and cannot exist without it, evaporates. 63 This goes far to account for the modern dislike of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus and the doubt of its historicity. Messianism is the most typical expression of an eschatological world-view and carries with it all the implications of the latter. 64 In a recent work by Von Dobschiitz, The Eschatology of the Gos pels, 1910, this tendency finds typical expression. The author speaks of Jesus' doctrine of the present kingdom as " transmuted eschatology ". Transmutation implies that a change in character and tone, not in mere chronology, has taken place. " Anticipation of eschatology " would far more accurately describe the actual process both in the mind of Jesus and of Paul. ESCHATOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT IN PAUL 259 If our investigation has shown anything, it has shown how utterly foreign all this is to the plain intent of the Apostle's teaching on the Spirit. For Paul the Spirit was regularly associated with the world to come and from the Spirit thus conceived in all his supernatural and redemptive potency the Christian life receives throughout its specific char acter. In the combination of these two ideas, that the Spirit belongs to the alav fieXXav and that he determines the present life, we have the most impressive witness for the thorough going supernaturalness of Paul's interpretation of Christianity. In its origin and in the source from which in continuance its life is fed Christianity is as little of this world as the future life is of this world. The conception of the Spirit proves that what Paul meant to do is precisely the opposite of what is imputed to him. Not to " transmute " the eschatological into a religion of time, but to raise the religion of time to the plane of eternity — such was the purport of his gospel. THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL Robert Dick Wilson Purpose of the article is to review certain statements of Dr. Driver about the Aramaic of Daniel. Citation of Dr. Driver's statements. The four propositions contained in these statements. A. Discussion of the first proposition, that Daniel belongs to the Western Aramaic. i. Proof that the preformative ' y' was not in Daniel's time a distinctive mark of Western Aramaic. 2. Proof that the' ending a retained its definite sense up to 400 B. C. among the Eastern Arameans. B. Discussion of the second proposition, that the Aramaic of Daniel is all but identical with that of Ezra. C. Discussion of the third proposition, that it is nearly allied to that of the Targum of Onkelos and Jonathan and to that of the Naba- teans and the Palmyrenes. I. Signs and sounds. 1. Use of Aleph. 2. Use of Wau. 3. Use of He. 4. Use of Lomadh. 5. Use of d and z. 6. Use of m and n. 7. Further discussion of n. 8, Interchange of Sadhe, Ayin and Qoph. 9. Use of other letters. II. Forms and Inflections. 1. Pronouns. 2. Nouns. 3. Particles. 4. Verbs. a. Imperfect of the Lomadh Aleph (He) verbs. b. The Hophal. c. The Pe'il. d. The 3rd pi. fem. perfect. e. The Nun of Pe Nun verbs in the imperfect. f- tvn g. Shaphel. h. The preformative He in the causative stem. III. Syntax : the manner of denoting the direct object. IV. Vocabulary. a. Of Onkelos. 1. Verbs denoting the idea "to put" 2. Foreign words employed. (1) Greek. (2) Persian. (3) Babylonian. b. Of the Nabateans. c. Of the Palmyrenes. d. Of the Targum of Jonathan. D. Discussion of the fourth proposition, that the Aramaic of Daniel is that which was spoken in or near Palestine at a date after the conquest of Palestine by Alexander the Great. Conclusion: The evidence points to Babylon as the place and the latter part of the 6th century B. C. as the time of the composition of Daniel. THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL Every student of the Old Testament who has read the chap ter on Daniel in Dr. Driver's Literature of the Old Testament (LOT latest edition 1910) must have been forcibly struck by the arguments presented in favor of a late date for the book which are based upon the alleged agreement between the Ara maic contained in it and that found in the dialects of the Nabateans, of the Palmyrenes, and of the Targums of Onke los and Jonathan. So impressed was the writer of this arti cle by the significance of these statements, backed up as they are by an imposing array of evidence, that he determined to undertake a new investigation of the whole problem of the relations existing between the various dialects of Aramaic. Such an undertaking necessarily involved as complete an in vestigation as was possible of the documents which consti tute the extant literature of these dialects, in so far as they bear upon grammar and lexicography. Fortunately, a large part of the work involved in the investigation had already been completed by him. But, needless to remark, the ac complishment of such a task — and the writer does not regard it as yet accomplished, although he is firmly convinced that further investigation will only serve to strengthen and con firm the conclusions which he has put forward in this article — would have been utterly impossible, had there not been already to hand so many grammars, lexicons, and texts, of scientific value. Largely for convenience of treatment the writer has divided the material into ten parts, each of which he calls a dialect. These dialects are ( 1 ) Northern Aramaic, embracing all inscriptions found outside of Egypt down to the year 400 B.C., (2) Egypto- Aramaic, (3) Daniel, (4) Ezra, (5) the Nabatean inscriptions, (6) the Palmyrene, (7) the Targum of Onkelos, (8) the Syriac, (9) the Mandean, and (10) the 264 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL Samaritan. The works to which he has been most indebted are the Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum and the works of De Vogue, Euting, Pognon, Sayce-Cowley, Sachau, Littmann, Cooke, Lidzbarski, Brederek, Noldeke, Petermann, Kautzsch, Strack, Marti, Brockelmann, Norberg, Levy and Dalman. The invaluable Sachau papyri (Leipzig, Heinrichs 191 1) ar rived in time to be made available in their bearing upon most of the points discussed. The views advanced by Dr. Driver to which the writer takes exception will be found on pages 502-4, and 508 of his LOT, where we read as follows: " The Aramaic of David (which is all but identical with that of Ezra) is a Western Aramaic dialect, of the type spoken in and about Palestine.1 It is nearly allied to the Aramaic of the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan; and still more so to the Aramaic dialects spoken E. and SE. of Palestine, in Palmyra and Nabatsea, and known from inscriptions dating from the 3rd cent. b.c. to the 2nd cent. a.d. In some respects it is of an earlier type than the Aramaic of Onkelos and Jonathan; and this fact was formerly supposed to be a ground for the antiq uity of the Book. But the argument is not conclusive. For (1) the differences are not considerable,2 and largely ortho- 1 Noldeke, Enc. Brit" xxi. 647° — 8° = Die Sem. Sprachen2 (1899), 35, 37 ; Enc. B. i. 282. The idea that the Jews forgot their Hebrew in Babylonia, and spoke in " Chaldee " when they returned to Palestine, is unfounded. Haggai, Zechariah and other post-exilic writers use Hebrew : Aramaic is exceptional. Hebrew was still normally spoken c. 430 b. c. in Jerusalem (Neh. xiii. 24). The Hebrews, after their Captivity, acquired gradually the use of the Aramaic from their neighbours in and about Palestine. See Noldeke. ZDMG. 1871, p. 129 f . ; Kautzsch, Gramm. des Bibl. Aram. § 6; Wright, Compar. Gramm. of the Semitic Languages (1890), p. 16: "Now do not for a moment suppose that the Jews lost the use of Hebrew in the Babylonian captivity, and brought back with then into Palestine this so- called Chaldee. The Aramean dialect, which gradually got the upper hand since 5-4 cent. b. c, did not come that long journey across the Syrian desert ; it was there, on the spot ; and it ended by taking possession of the field, side by side with the kindred dialect of the Samaritans." The term " Chaldee " for the Aramaic of either the Bible or the Targums is a mis nomer, the use of which is only a source of confusion. 2 They are carefully collected (on the basis, largely, of M'Gill's investi gations) by Dr. Pusey, Daniel, ed 2, pp. 45 ff., 602 ff. (an interesting lexi- THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 265 graphical: the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan did not probably receive their present form before the 4th cent. a.d. :3 and we are not in a position to affirm that the transition from the Aramaic of Dan. and Ezra to that of the Targums must have required 8-9 centuries, and could not have been accomp lished in 4-5 ; (2) recently discovered inscriptions have shown that many of the forms in which it differs from the Aramaic of the Targums were actually in use in neighbouring countries down to the ist cent, a.d.4 " Thus' the final n (for x)in verbs tt"h , and in rus, no, mn, &c., occurs often in Nab.; the Hofal {not a Hebraism: Nold. GGA., 1884, 1015; Sachau; Wright), and in the pass, of Pe'al (Dan. iii. 21 al. : Bev. pp. 37, 72), in the Palm. Tariff (Sachau, ZMDG. 1883, p. 564 f . ; Wright, Comp. Gr. p. 224 f. ; otherwise Cooke, 334) ; note also HT3J was made in Cooke, No. 96s (Nold, Z. f. Ass., 1890, p. 290; cf. Dalman, Gram, des Jiid.-Pal. Aram. 202 C253) n.) ; the s in the impf. of verbs x""7 not changed to ' , repeatedly in Nab. and the Tariff ; kjxid (with x ) Dan. iv. 16, 21 ; Kt. Nab, Cooke 813, 824, 94s, Eut. 27 (= CIS. ii. 224)13; 60.7.2; ^K-lD 49.2 and CISi44A.i,2; HK1D 49.2 and CIS145AF; JN1D 1.1, 2.18, 23, 3V.17, 22, 4.5.7, 12, 12, 5. 1, 5; W 11. 1, 12.1, 12; TIK1D 13.12V.1.2.3. Without Aleph, DiTnD ? 15,15.6; in SC possibly *n» M.a.2(?) and ]")¦& P.2. c. In Daniel KID in the construct ii. 47, v. 23; ''KID iv. 16, 21. d. In Ezra, no form found. e. In Nabatean, KID in the construct CIS235A2 ; K3K1D Pet. i. 3. CIS199.8, 201.4. f. In Palmyrene, KID in the construct, Vog.73.1, Tay.i; pnio Vog.28.4, po Vog.23.2, 25.3; vino Vog. 103.6; jinmo Vog.294(?) g. In all the Targums, we have "ID, in the construct '•ID but never K*ID ¦ h. In Syriac, Mandean, and Samaritan, the Aleph is always dropped. From the above examples it will be seen that while a late writer of Aramaic might have written the word as Daniel does, the almost universal usage is against it. The Nabateans and Palmyrenes in the central desert still employed it, but to the east, north and west of them it was dropped by all. Among the older writings, however, it was almost as universally em ployed, but one certain example of its omission being known. 2. Use of Wau. Every student of ancient Aramaic texts knows that variations in the use of Wau and Yodh are no sure indications of the age of a document. In inscriptions from the same age and dialect, we frequently find the same word written both with and without one or the other of these letters. For example, take in Palmyrene the word " to save ". It is written aft? in Cooke No. 101, from A.D. 45, and 2W in another document from 96 A.D. (id. note). Take also KD"1 (Sachau papyri 64.2) instead of the usual KDV (id. 2.20; 3V.19; 20.K.7.1; 33-33-4; 45-1; 63.^.2). Further, it must be kept in mind in discussing Wau and Yodh, that thousands of variations in the use of them are to be found in the Hebrew MSS. of the Old Testament. We should remember also that the vowel signs now in the Hebrew THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 275 and Aramaic texts of the Bible do not antedate the 6th century A.D. Bearing these facts in mind we shall enter upon a discus sion of Dr. Driver's statement on page 504 of LOT, that we have the same manner of writing tf/13K in the Kethiv of Daniel iv. 13, 14 and in the Nabatean (Cooke 79.7, 86,3,5,6, etc.). This remark must refer to the spelling, since the use of the word in the sense of " one " is found in Palmyrene (Cooke p. 311) and we may add, in SC, K8, 10, and in Sach. 36.39 and 46.14; but in Daniel it means "men, mankind, Menschheit " just as in Sach. Pap. 46.6 and 48.1.4. The papyri distinguished between B>JK and KtWK using the former for " one " and the latter for " mankind ", just as Daniel does, for in iv. 13, 14 the latter writes KtPiJX (or KtMK if we follow the Qre), while the Nabatean has tPUX. In other words, the meaning of the form used in Nabatean differs from that used in Daniel in the verses cited. Still, as Daniel does elsewhere use tMK in the sense of " one ", we may waive this point. It has been customary to call these two cases Hebraisms, as Marti did in the first edition of his Aramaic Grammar. This would seem probably correct, in view of the fact that Daniel eight times elsewhere in the Aramaic portions spells the word KEOK and that the word is spelled with the 0 42 times in the Hebrew portion of the Bible. The Massoretes have con sidered the 6 to be a mistake in the text of iv. 13, 14 and have corrected it by changing the vowel from 6 to a in harmony with the usual spelling elsewhere in Daniel. In view of the fact that the Hebrew in nearly all cases has changed an a to 6, and especially in view of the further fact that in the West Syriac an East Syriac a is pronounced as 0, it is easy to see how a writer or copyist might vary in the spelling of a word con taining a sound that shifted from a to 0. Especially would this be true of a Hebrew writing Aramaic. This variation of sound may account also for the fact that the Palmyrene has 1MK while the Nabatean has PUK • For ourselves, we prefer to consider it an error of a Hebrew scribe, just as the Massoretes have done. But at any rate, that the writer of 276 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL Daniel should have spelt the word twice with an a as against eighteen times with an 6 does not show a very close relation be tween him and the Nabatean scribes who wrote the inscrip tions in that language in the first century A.D. ; for they always write it with an 6. 3. Use of He. Dr. Driver says that Daniel may have been late, because a final He in verbs Lomadh Aleph occurs often in Nabatean, although the Targums have uniformly em ployed Aleph. This statement is ambiguous. No verb that had originally an Aleph as its third radical has been found either in Nabatean, or Palmyrene. What Dr. Driver means us to understand is, that verbs whose third radical was Wau or Yodh have had this third radical elided and that its place is taken by the vowel letter He, instead of by Aleph as in the Targums. How a verb whose third radical was Aleph could have been written in Nabatean or Palmyrene, we do not know, because no such verb has yet been found. The evi dence for the use of the final He, or Aleph, in the verbs whose third radical was originally Wau, Yodh, or Aleph, is as follows : a. The Syriac, Mandean, and the Aramaic of the Targums never use He. b. The early inscriptions always use He for verbs whose third radical was Wau or Yodh and Aleph for those whose third radical was Aleph. c. The Nabatean and Palmyrene and the book of Ezra have no verbs whose third radical was originally Aleph. In writing those which had originally Wau or Yodh, they some times employ He, sometimes Aleph. d. Samaritan commonly employs Aleph for verbs that origi nally had Aleph and He for those that had Wau and Yodh, though for the latter Wau and Yodh are sometimes employed, perhaps in imitation of the Arabic method of writing them. e. The text of Daniel presents a method of writing differ ent from that found elsewhere. (1) The originally Lomadh Aleph verb KtW is written with an Aleph. (2) The verb KDD which the Sachau papyri treat as an THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 277 originally Lomadh Aleph verb, Daniel writes KDD once and twice, HDD . (3) Kit? is written with an Aleph, (once only). Possi bly this verb is found in the K1fin:iJ> of CIS696.3. (4) rUD, rD") and flflK are written with a He, though Ezra writes the latter with an Aleph. (5) Kin and KJD are written once each with Aleph and once each with He. Marti's text reads HTrl both times and KP3 both times, mn is written seven times and Kin four times without variants, and once we find each one in the Kethiv and the other in the Qre. Since the latter two verbs are always written with a He in Egypto-Aramaic and KtDD with an Aleph, it would require merely the harmonizing of these variant readings of Daniel to bring his text into complete accord with the spellings of the Aramaic Egyptian documents of the 5th century B.C. The same may be said of rUK, !1D, and mn which is Egypto-Aramaic and always spelled with a He. 4. Use of Lomadh. a. In Daniel. In the verb p^D the b is assimilated backwards whenever the D comes at the end of the syllable; e. g., a. "^pSil iii. 22, pen vi. 24. Instead of the doubling of the D, the Inf. Hoph. inserts a Nun before it. e. g. npDJn vi. 24. But J^fiD iii. 25, iv. 34. b. In Ezra, the b of ^>n is dropped, e. g., ^ v. 5, vii. 13, Ifizb vii. 13. c. In N. Syr. the verbs containing these peculiarities have not been found. d. In Egyptian Aramaic, we have "ann Sak. B.4 C6 (=CISi45 B4C6) and SCG 25, 28; ty-iN SC.D22; "nnp Sach. 63.5.2, but "^HD 42.9; |"DiT» Sach. 29.19. e. In Nabatean the verbs containing these peculiarities have not yet been found. f. In Palmyrene we find IpDK T. 1.5, pDD T. 1.8; pDK Vog. 74. We find in Pal. also tfnbz Sem. vi. 4 for BAKHttO. g. In Onkelos b is (1) dropped in the Imv. Peal of p^D and in the Impf. and Inf. Peal of tbil (Dalm. 66.1, 70.9.), e. g. IpD N. xiii. 17, pD G. xxxv. 1, '•pD N. xxi. 18, ^if D. xx. 6, pan'1 E. xxxii. 1, ^ilD^ D. xxix. 17. 278 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL (2) Assimilated in pD N. xiii.31, pDK E. xxxii. 38, TpDK G. viii. 20. h. In Sam. b is dropped in the Imv. Peal of ]br\ and p^D e. g., ^HK G. xxviii. 2, lpID N. xxxiii. 17, pD G. xxxv. 1 ; but ''p'jD N. xxi. 18. It is assimilated in pDKG. viii. 20, pDD E. xix. 23. i. In Syriac (see Noldeke § § 29 and 183 (5)) the first ^ is not pronounced in K^DD and K^tOD' and falls away in some forms of ^TK and in the Peal and Aphel of p^D. j. In Mandean we have pXD'O, pKDJ>, pKD^D, p^DK, pDKD, pKD, i^D. From the above collection of facts as to the manner of writ ing Lomadh we find that it is assimilated backwards in all the forms of Peal and Aphel perfect and imperfect which have a preformative. Unfortunately, such forms are found only in Daniel, Onkelos, Syriac, Mandean and Samaritan. Daniel is peculiar in inserting a dissimilative Nun in the infinitive of the causative active stem of this verb. Further, Daniel agrees with the Egypto-Aramaic in re taining the Lomadh in forms of "]bft in which the preforma tive is Mem. 5. Use of d and z. The primitive Semitic seems to have had three sounds corresponding to our d, dh, and z. From whatever source they adopted their alphabet there seem to have been but two signs to express the three sounds. One of these signs was used exclusively to denote d and another to denote z. There being no sign for the third sound, three methods were followed. The Arabs invented a third sign. Hebrew, Ethiopic and Babylonian expressed dh prevailingly by the z sign but sometimes by the d sign. The old Aramean inscriptions of Northern Syria and of Assyria from the 9th to the 7th century inclusive always use z. The Palmyrene, the Syriac and the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan always use d. The Aramaic papyri use either with almost equal fre quency. The Samaritan Targum and the Mandean dialect also, vary in their use even in writing the same words. The earliest Nabatean inscription, dating from 70 B.C. (CIS 1 349) always uses z, but all the other inscriptions regularly use d. In the Assyrian transliterations of Aramean names THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 279 as early as 855 B.C., Hadadezer is rendered by Dad-idri. Daniel and Ezra always use d for this sound except in Ezra's writing of "12U where Daniel has 1313. This variety of sign to express the same original sound would seem to confirm the opinion that we have here to deal not with a linguistic or dialectic change of sound but with the endeavor to compel two signs to serve for three sounds. The Arabic denotes it by putting a dot over the ordinary sign for d. The other dialects avail themselves of the usual sign for d or z, just as we English avail ourselves of the sigh th in thin and that. The oldest Arameans consistently used z. The book of Daniel, if written in the latter part of the 6th century B.C., would be the first known document to use the sign d for dh. Being an educated man the author used it consistently and exclusively. After his time, the writers in Egypt and the Samaritans and Nabateans wavered in their usage ; but the Targums and those books whose writ ers were under the influence of Daniel came to use d exclus ively. The Arabs not being under this influence pursued their own way of expressing dh. In studying this difficult question we must keep two matters in mind ; first, that Daniel had stud ied both Hebrew and Babylonian and in each of these dh was written by means of both d and z; and secondly, that somebody must have started this spelling reform and Daniel's position would have enabled him to do it. 6. Use of Mem and Nun. These two letters vary in the different languages and dialects of the Semitic family in the absolute masc. plural of the noun and in the second and third personal pronouns. The latter only enters into the discussion of Daniel because he always uses the forms kon and hon where some other Aramaic dialects use kum and hum, or hon and kon. The question is : Can the book of Daniel have been written in the 6th century B.C. and yet have used n instead of m in these cases? We think it can. (1) Because all Aramaic documents of any age written in the East have used n instead of m. This is true of everything in Syriac, Mandean, and the Talmud as well as of Palmyrene. (2) It is true of all documents in Assyrian and Babylonian. 280 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL (3) Ezra, whose composition Dr. Driver puts at 400 B.C., uses n as well as m. (4) The Samaritans used m as well as n. (5) While it may be said, that the Sendshirli and other early Western documents used m in imitation of the Hebrews and Phenicians, or in the case of the Nabateans, of the Arabs ; so it may be said, that the eastern dialects used n in imitation of the Assyrio-Babylonians. Ezra being composed largely of letters between the eastern Arameans and the western uses both. (6) The variations in the transliteration of proper names in the use of m for n and n for m, and between mimmation and nunnation present a problem that cannot yet be solved and that should make us hesitate to dogmatize on the reasons for the variations in the different dialects and languages in the use of these letters. (7) The earliest document outside the Scriptures and the Assyrio-Babylonian to make use of n is the Palmyrene inscrip tion of 21 A.D. The earliest Syriac is from 73 A.D. The latest Nabatean inscription to use these suffixes uses the form with m. It is dated according to Cooke (North Semitic In scriptions p. 252) in 65 A.D. If the writer of Daniel could have used the n in 165 B.C. in Palestine, as his critics would have us believe, although those " in and about Palestine " were using m, why may he not have used n in Babylon in 535 B.C. where all in and about Babylon were using nl 7. Further use of Nun. The following uses of Nun are to be noted. (1) It is dropped : a. In Daniel, li^fi iii- 26. b. In Ezra, KB> v. 15. c. In No. Syr", vjn CIS.1506. d. In Eg. Ar., nn, ID, KB>. See Sach. Pap. e. Nabatean, no form occurs. f . Palmyrene, no form occurs. g. In Onkelos, pis, mn. See Dalman p. 293. h. In Syriac, pis, mn, ID, and many others. See Nol deke pp. 22, 115. THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 281 i. In Mandean, only in 2ND, ^S, mn and pKS- Noldeke p. 240. j. In Sam., 3D, JinK. See Petermann pp. 8 and 34. (2) It is assimilated : a. In Daniel, b& iii- 6, 10, 11, p^fin iii. 5, 15, bw vi. 28, n^niii. 29, nm^yn vi. 15, num iv. 14, 22, 29, jji-ip ii. 6, 48, ^rariD v. 17. b. In Ezra ^fii vii. 20, nnn vi. 5, nns v. 15, pnnno vi. 1. c. In N. S. ]m Hadad 23 ; larv Hadad 4 ; KttfN Zakir i. 11 ; inD"" Ner i. 9. d. In Eg. Ar. jm CIS149 BC12 ; pjnM CIS138 B2; pnm CIS145 B6; N3MD Sach. Pap. vi. 2, 7, 11, 12. e. In Nabatean [«n]lDD Litt. i. 3; nnns CIS, 1584. f. In Pal. p£K Tnb43, p3«D Tn ci2; SDK Vog. 74, pDD Ti8, ]n-> Tn aS, b20, pnmiD Eph. 11 278s, nnK id. 298s. g. In Onkelos the Nun is almost always assimilated, except when before He or Ayin. Dal. p. 101. h. In Syr. "almost always '', Nold. § 28, except before He. i. In Mandean "often". pifiK, bW), Kmt? "year", Nol deke §§ 56, 178. j. In Sam. nj-tf, 3D''. See Petermann pp. 8 and 34. (3) It is inserted : a. In Daniel, jnjn iv. 22, 23, 29, 30 ; jnjN ii. 9 ; pjHJi iv. 14; JHJD ii. 21, iv. 31, 33, v. 12; npDJn vi. 24; tyan ii- 25 ; n^in iv. 3- b. In Ezra, jnjn iy- IS- c. In N. S. No examples. d. In Eg. Ar. DJH3D Sach. often; jnja Sach. 43.1. 5; 133D Sach. ix. 17, ii. 28, 3R27 ; IBJ^ Sach, ter. e. In Nab. No examples. f. In Pal. No examples. g. In Onkelos. Only in p;tjn Ex. xxxii. 19. SeeDalman, p. 102. h. In Syr. only in K"D3J ; but " Nun stroked out later ", Noldeke §28. i. In Man. "manchmal", and especially ndiox dd, ng for gg, mb for bb. Noldeke, §68. 282 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL j. In Sam. apparently never. The so-called Nun epen thetic is not an insertion. See Petermann, p. 9. (4) It is epenthetic : a. Always with the impf. before suffixes. Marti §52b. b. Always with the impf. before suffixes, id. c. In N. S. T^HTdl Had. 31 ; but, ntSTiDi? without Nun in the same line, nJD3mi Zakir 11 20. d. In Eg. Ar., it is frequent, inj^pm Sak. A6 nJ^n[n] id C3 (unsicher, Lidg). And almost always in the Sachau papyri. (See id. p. 272). e. In Nab. no examples have been found. f. In Palm. n^D11 T 11. b23 ; but tmnrifi'' CI. Gan. I6- g. In Onk., always with impf. before suffixes. See Dal- man pp. 368-374. h. In Syriac it is not found. See Noldeke §28. i . In Mandean it is apparently not used. See Noldeke §200. j . The Samaritan often employs it. See Petermann p. 9, and numerous examples on p. 32. (5) It is retained at end of syllable: a. In Dan. DSJn v. 2, ipBJfi v. 3, \rw ii. 16, n^JK iv. 9, nran v. 20, ihibjk fi. 46, pmiK , nni« b. In Ezra psin v. 14 bis., vi. 5, fipun iv. 22, pHHfi iv. 13, nDWHD iv. 15, JfUD vii. 20, jnjn vii. 20, jun^ iv. 13, pta:n vi. 9. c. In N. S. '•mnDJ'1 Tay. 14, [pS]jm Tay. iii. 21, iW Ner. i. 13, 1S3n Ner. i. 12. d. In Eg. Ar., almost always. In Sayce-Cowley 34 exs ; in Sachau pap. 34 exs. See SC, p. 18, and Sachau p. 271. e. In Nab., pfiji CIS.I978, ]rV CIS.197M, 1985, nnnjK Litt. ii. 8. f. In Palm., never in examples found. g. In Onk., 2D3',D, SWJ, Kn^ff and before and n and y, Dalm. p. 101, and often at end of word. id. 102, e. g. jon for non. h. In Syr., sn:3, KnrOtf, KWID and before He. See Noldeke §28. THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 283 i. In Mand., n^k, Kfirw, Kny*ID, ««ij. See Noldeke Gr. p. 52. j. In Sam. pfijn, and often. See Pet. p. 35. It will be noted that so far as examples are found there is an exact agreement in the use of Nun between Daniel and the North Syrian and Egypto-Aramaic. The latter is in perfect agreement with Daniel in every one of the five particulars. The examples of the uses of Nun are extremely rare in the Nabatean and Palmyrene, so that no comparison can be made. The agreement in the Onkelos is close, but an agreement for a late date and a " near alliance " of the dialect of Onkelos with that of Daniel loses its force in view of the like close agreement between the dialect of Daniel and that of the in scriptions of Northern Syria and of Egypt. 8. Use of Sodhe, 'Ayin and Qoph. The fact that Daniel writes the word for " earth, land " with an 'Ayin instead of a Qoph is taken by Dr. Driver as a positive proof that " the Aramaic of Daniel was not that spoken at Babylon in Daniel's age ". In support of this position he cites the fact that in CIS 1-4, 7, 11, 28, 35 from Nineveh and in Clay's Aramaic Endorsements, Nos. 5, 8, 11, 29, 40 from Babylon the word is written KplK and in Daniel KJPlK- He might have added, that in the Sendshirli inscriptions in like manner this is the case not merely for this word but for two others ; and that the inscription from Zakir, also writes 'arqa. Further, he might have said that in some of the Aramaic papyri from Egypt the word is written with a Qoph. But, he should have added, also, in order that we should have a fair statement of the case, first, that the papyri of the 5th century B.C. have already begun to write this word with an *Ayin. Some of them use 'Ayin alone, as for example, the Sachau papyri and Sayce-Cowley A and G. Some use Qoph alone, as C, D, E, of Sayce-Cowley and B uses both. Secondly, it might be added that the papyri also write KIDp for IDS "wool" and pj> for J>J> Bib. Aram. J>K as also both piy and J71J? where the Targum and Syriac have ]TlK " to meet ". Thirdly, it should be added that the Targum of Onkelos writes pTJH where the Syriac has plpl* 284 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL Fourthly, that the Nabatean inscription of El-Hejra A.D.I. has Dip for the Phoenician and Hebrew tMJ? " fine ". Fifthly, that the Samaritan Targum has IJ?"1 (e. g. Lev. ix. 10) where the Syriac has Ipi . Further, it often writes pop for j;db\ Sixthly, the Mandean writings (6th to 9th cent. A.D.) still write KplK* They also write KIDpK for IDS, KISKpK for ISP, KJpK for KJKJ? = jKX (See Noldeke Mand. Gram. p. 72) ; but they use the Hebrew spelling for pj? " tree ". Seventhly, in the Aramaic verse in Jeremiah (x. 11) both writings of the word for earth occur. Eighthly, Ezra always uses 'Ayin just as Daniel does. From the above statements it will be seen that Qoph was used to denote this sound from the 9th century B.C. to the 9th century A.D., and 'Ayin from the 5th century to the present. It is true that if Daniel were written in the 6th century B.C., it will have been the first record known in which 'Ayin was used. But it must be borne in mind, first, that in the 5th century Ezra also uses it always just as Daniel does; secondly, that in the same century the Aramaic papyri use both; thirdly, that there may have been two uses side by side at Babylon in the 6th century B.C. as well as at Syene in the 5th ; and lastly, that someone must have used this writing first, and why not Daniel? 9. Use of Other Letters. With regard to the letters, Teth, Tau, Shin, Sin and Samekh, it is only necessary to say that they are written in general in the same way as in the Aramaic papyri and in Ezra, both from the 5th century B.C. II. Forms and Inflections 1. With regard to the pronouns of Daniel, it may be said, that with the exception that dh is written with Dolath instead of with Zayin, they agree more closely in writing, form and inflection with those of the old Aramaic dialects found in the papyri and in the inscriptions of Syria than they do with those of the later inscriptions and Targums, or with those of the Syriac, Mandean and Samaritan documents. 2. With regard to the nouns, also, not merely in the forms THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 285 found but in the way they are written and in the inflection, they show an almost exact resemblance to the Northern Syrian inscriptions from the 9th to the 7th century B.C., and to the nouns found in the Egyptian papyri from the 5th cen tury B.C. 3. With respect to the particles, the dialects differ so much both in the character and number of the particles used and in the meanings attached to them, that we shall have to postpone treatment of them to another time. Suffice it to say that with regard to the writing, forms, inflection and use, of those found in Daniel there is no good reason for supposing that they may not have characterized a dialect written at Babylon in the 6th century B.C. 4. With regard to the verbs used in Daniel, we shall go more into particulars. Next to the spelling of words in gen eral the forms of the verbs and the spelling of them are made by Dr. Driver the principal ground upon which he bases his conclusion that the Aramaic of Daniel is late. As to agreements in forms, all of the old Aramaic dialects, from the earliest to the old Syriac and Mandean inclusive, have the three active stems Peal, Paal, and Aphel or Haphal, and the two reflective or passive stems Ethpeel and Ethpaal, varying mostly only in certain particulars of spelling. We shall not go into these variations except as it is necessary to make clear the three points specified by Dr. Driver in LOT p. 504. a. His first point is, that the imperfect of Lomadh Aleph verbs in Nabatean and in the Palmyrene Tariff is found with Aleph and not with Yodh. The inference that we are intended to draw is, that inasmuch as Daniel has in like manner Aleph and not Yodh, therefore it is from the same region and age. But, first, while it is true that Yodh alone has thus far been found in the inscriptions antedating 600 B.C. as the con cluding consonant of Lomadh He verbs, it is questionable if they should be brought into this comparison. For in Egypto- Aramaic, the forms ending in Yodh are all apparently Jussive forms, (See Sachau p. 270) and these forms are carefully distinguished from the forms ending in He which are the regular indicative forms. In the Sendshirli inscriptions also, 286 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL three of the forms are also certainly Jussives, one of them oc curring with the negative 'al as in the Sachau papyri ; and the fourth follows a Wau that is probably a Wau conversive, since it follows a perfect and is used in the same sense. Fol lowing the analogy of the Hebrew, which uses the Jussive, or a form like it, after Wau conversive, we would classify this fourth imperfect in the Hadad inscription as a Jussive also. The use of a Wau conversive in the Aramaic of the Hadad inscription is rendered probable by its certain use in the Zakir inscription, where we have 1DK',1, KDK1 and ''Jijm* The forms in Yodh of the early inscriptions being thus ruled out of the discussion, we find that the Egypto-Aramaic except in the Jussive employs consistently a He at the end of the imperfect of Lomadh He verbs and Aleph at the end of Lomadh Aleph verbs; whereas Daniel employs Aleph usually for both and exceptionally He for both. Nabatean goes one step further and never employs anything but Aleph for both. The Palmyrene Tariff uses He once; but everywhere else, both in the Tariff and elsewhere uses Aleph. The Aramaic of the Targums and Talmud has uniformly a Yodh at the end. The Syriac as uniformly has Aleph, while the Mandean has Yodh followed by Aleph. The Samaritan commonly em ploys Yodh, but He is occasionally found. From all which it appears: First, that the only Aramaic that employs He at the end of its Lomadh He verbs in the imperfect is the Aramaic that was written by Jews, or those directly influenced by Jews, such as the Aramaic papyri of Egypt, and the works of Daniel and Ezra. The few sporadic cases of its employment in Samaritan and the one instance of its use in Palmyrene may be attributed to the same influence. Secondly, it appears that Yodh was used by the Arameans who lived and wrote in Palestine after Ezra's time as is evi dent from the usage of the Jewish Targums and of the Tal mud and of the Samaritans. It was used, also, by the Jews who wrote the Babylonian Talmud; and in the forms of the imperfect used in the Hadad inscription from Northern Syria. Thirdly, Aleph was, with the one exception in Palmyrene noted above, the universal ending in the dialects between Palestine and Syria on the one hand and the Mandeans on the other, THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 287 i. e., among the Nabateans, the Palmyrenes, and the so-called Syrians. Fourthly, the Mandeans used both at once and to gether, i. e. a Yodh followed by an Aleph. Fifthly, Daniel being in the central country between the two extremes may well have used Aleph, as all other dialects in the central zone have done, his exceptional use of He being due to Hebrew influence. b. Dr. Driver's second point is, that the Aramaic of Daniel is late, because a Hophal has been discovered in the Palmyrene Tariff, written in 137 A.D. He might have added, because another is found in the Targum of Onkelos, and two in the Jerusalem Targum I. (See Dalman p. 253). These last are probably not mentioned by him because they are so sporadic and obviously due to Hebrew influence. As to the first point, it may be said, (1) That it is doubtful if there be a Hophal form in the Tariff. The words STD"1 and pP may be otherwise ex plained in perfect harmony with common Aramaic usage, and are so explained by Duval and Cooke. If 1tt>K be a passive of the causative stem and not the active, it is formed rather after the analogy of the Arabaic 4th stem than after that of the Hebrew, or Bib. Aramaic Hophal. Our readers will no tice that these verbal forms are without any vowel, or other points that distinguish species or stem. Whether they be Hophals or not depends upon the pointing that you insert. (2) That in this same Tariff, we find the Ittaphal used six times in the passive of the causative stem. Now, it is a noteworthy fact that no dialect that uses the Hophal uses the Ittaphal also, and vice versa. The Sendshirli inscriptions have the Hophal once in the participle DD'D from HID • Daniel has the Hophal of nine verbs in eleven different forms. Ezra has but one Hophal. But none of these three dialects (or two, if you put Ezra in the same dialect with Daniel) has an Ittaphal. On the other hand, the Aramaic of the Talmud and Tar gums, of the Palmyrene inscriptions, of Syriac and Mandean, and Samaritan, employs the Ittaphal to the entire exclusion of the Hophal or Ophal, unless these unpointed Palmyrene words be treated as such. The Targum of Onkelos has 20 verbs in the Ittaphal and not one case of the Hophal, unless a variant 288 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL reading in Ex. xix. 13 be classed as such (See Dalman Gram. der jud.-pal. Aram. § § 59.6 and 64). (3) If it is right for Dr. Driver to make as much as he does of the agreements between Daniel and the Nabatean and Palmyrene inscriptions as regards the writing of Aleph and He in certain forms in order to prove that they are or may have been written near the same time, it is no more than fair to suggest that the fact that Daniel uses a Hophal while in Palmyrene we find an Ophal might better be regarded as supporting the theory that the two dialects were spoken at different dates. In fact, since the bulk of the population of Palmyra was Arab and since many proper names, especially of gods, and several common names of Arabic origin appear in their literature, we might expect to find in the Palmyrene traces of Arabic grammatical usages. (Cooke N. S. Insc. p. 264). This 1tPK might indeed be the passive of the 4th stem 'ushira and be due to Arabaic influence; just as the Hop- hals in Daniel and the Niphals in Samaritan are due to He brew influence. The relations of the dialects, so far as the forms of the verbs are concerned, will be best seen from the series of tables to be found in the Appendix. From these tables it will ap pear that no two dialects agree exactly in the forms used by them. As to forms in general it appears that Daniel agrees more nearly with Ezra and Egypto-Aramaic than with any later dialects. As to the Hophal, the possible use of one form of it in Pal. and Onk. is offset by the certain use of the Hophal in Ezra and its probable use in Hadad 24 and 26. c. Dr. Driver uses the fact that JYTOJ? , the third singular feminine perfect passive, is found in CIS 196:7, a Nabatean inscription from 37 A.D., to show that Daniel may have been written late. We, also, think that this is a perfect passive ; though in regard to the other example cited, the 31"0 of the Palmyrene Tariff, we agree with Prof. Cooke (NSI p. 334), that it is not necessary to treat it as a passive, whether Pual, or Peil. We do think, however, that it would have been right for Dr. Driver to have cited the Samaritan fODJ the translation in Gen. iii. 19 of the Hebrew nnp1? "was THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 289 taken"; as also the flTHK of Meg. Taan. (See Dalman P- 253)- But that our readers, most of whom are not specialists, may be able to estimate these facts at their true value in their relation to the question of the date of Daniel, it may be well to add, that not merely Ezra but the Aramaic papyri also, make use of this form. Ezra has "DW in v. 14 and the Sachau papyri have l^BD in i. 17 and ii. 15, nmD^ in 56 V.1.1; Ofi^Kty in SC, 11 8; all of which are certainly true Peil forms. Prof. Sachau adds further the forms 7,|Dp , TO? , 3VD , and n^ty . So that while admitting that this perfect passive may have been written late, the arguments from analogy and from frequency of use are decidedly in favor of an early date, inasmuch as Ezra and the Aramaic papyri are admittedly from the 5th century B.C. Further, the argument that the late isolated forms (one each in Nabatean, Samaritan and the Talmud) may have been used through imitation of, or under the influence of, the Arabic, which forms its pas sive regularly in this way, cannot be used with regard to the Aramaic of Egypt in the 5th century B.C. d. The third plural of the feminine of the perfect ends in Wau in Daniel v. 5, vii. 20 and also in Nabatean in Cooke 80:1 and 85 :i. It is well known that in Hebrew the one form l^Dp serves for the third feminine plural as well as for the masculine. In Daniel, this usage may have been derived from the He brew. Unfortunately, the old Aramaic inscriptions have no example of the feminine plural of the perfect. The best possible explanations of the form VT2J? in Naba tean are (1) that, like the Hebrew, there was no feminine form, or (2) that the sculptor followed the common manner in other inscriptions, where the masculine form is always used, or (3) that he used the masculine, because the nearest noun in each of the two cases is masculine in form, although the name of a woman. The Sachau papyri, however, give us one form of the femi nine plural imperfect and it agrees with the form in Daniel. I refer to pIT . p. 169 of Sachau's papyri. This is exactly like the \i2VP of Dan. iv. 18. The Nabatean gives us but 290 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL one example of the imperfect third plural feminine and it has the same form as the masculine, i. e. pi3pm (See Cooke NSI p. 221 and p. 240). It will be noticed, that the Qre in Daniel has corrected the ending 1 to nT , in all cases in the perfect where it has a feminine subject. This . harmonizes the form with that in use in the Assyrian and in the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan. In the Jerusalem Targum, the third feminine perfect plural ends in an; in Syriac in en or a silent Yodh, or the ending has disappeared; in Mandean, in JK11 or K, but usually the ending has entirely disappeared ; in Samaritan, in ^ . p . or } . To sum up, the third feminine plural in the Kethiv of Daniel agrees with the form found in Nabatean, and the Qre agrees with the forms found in the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan. The third feminine imperfect plural in Daniel agrees with that found in the Sachau papyri but differs from that found in Nabatean. In this case, all the other dialects agree with Daniel, the Nabatean standing alone. e. The Nun, says Dr. Driver, is retained in the imperfect of Pe Nun verbs in the Nabatean just as in Daniel. A more exact statement of the case would be, that the Nun has been retained in all of the examples of the imperfect of Pe Nun verbs thus far found in Nabatean, agreeing in this respect with the comparatively few examples found in Daniel where Nun is not assimilated. A fuller statement of the facts with regard to the writing of Nun in all the dialects will give our readers an opportunity of judging for themselves as to the re lation in this regard between the Aramaic of Daniel and of the other dialects. 1. As to the retention of a Nun in the imperfect of verbs Pe Nun, Daniel retains once only, Nabatean always, whereas Daniel assimilates eight times and Nabatean never. In Ezra, the Nun is retained three times, assimilated once. In Northern Aramaic (Sendshirli et al.) Nun is retained four times, assimi lated four. In Egypto-Aramaic, Nun is retained about sev enty times, assimilated about three. In Palmyrene, it is assimi lated almost always, except before He or Ayin. In Samaritan, Nun is often retained, but most frequently assimilated. In THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 291 Syriac it is assimilated almost always and in Mandean often. 2. Nun is inserted often in Daniel and Mandean and not in frequently in Egypto-Aramaic; never in Nabatean, Palmyrene and Samaritan, nor in the North Syrian inscriptions ; in Onke los, Ezra, and Syriac, in only one word for each. Daniel here agrees on the one hand with the dialect nearest his own time and on the other with that nearest to Babylon. 3. In regard to dropping the Nun in the imperative Peal, all of the dialects in which imperatives are found agree. No examples have been found in Nabatean or Palmyrene. 4. In regard to Nun epenthetic, it is always found with the imperfect before suffixes in Daniel, Ezra, and Onkelos ; never in Syriac and Mandean and there are no examples of it in Nabatean ; nearly always in the North Syrian inscriptions and in Egypto-Aramaic and in Samaritan; and once in Palmyrene and once not. f. Dr. Driver suggests that Daniel may be late because the word for " there is " is written the same way in Nabatean as in Daniel, i. e. TPK • This he says to overthrow the supposi-i tion that Daniel cannot be late because Onkelos has rPK • A fuller statement with regard to TT'K may be made so as to avoid misunderstandings. The long form is used in Daniel without suffixes, ten times; in Ezra, twice; in Sayce-Cowley, fifteen times ; in Sachau papyri, six times ; in Nabatean, twice. The short form is used in the Targums always; in Palmyrene once (the only time found) ; in Syriac and Mandean always ; in Egypto-Aramaic once only. (i. e. in Sachau xxxi. 3). g. Dr. Driver might well have added to his collection of similarities in the use of verb forms between the Nabatean and Daniel the remarkable fact that each of them has but one Shaphel form and that from the same root, i. e., 3W Cooke No. 101 :i2 (or 5W in one other insc. Duss and Macleane, No. 62). To be sure, this form is found in other late dialects, but not from this verb exclusively. The Gali lean dialect has also *nj?B>, WW and iftbw. Onkelos has all of these and in addition b^2W and 2nbw ¦ The Targum of Jonathan adds DDJW and mm. The Jeru salem Targums use seven additional forms. The Syriac has at least twelve of these forms; the Mandean, six; and the 292 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL Modern Syriac, four. Besides these, we find half a dozen forms in New Hebrew. In the Bible, Ezra has the form from two verbs, to wit WW and bb^W . Fortunately, the form WW the only one that Daniel employs, is found also in the old Aramaic inscriptions and it is the only form yet found. It occurs in the Sachau papyri xxxxii. 14, xii. 5 and 56 obv. i. 6. So that the use of this form in Aramaic documents can now be traced back to a time when men who may have known Daniel were still living. h. Dr. Driver might also have mentioned the fact that the preformative He in the causative stem, which Daniel employs so often, is no evidence of an early date, because it is found, also, in Nabatean in the form D^pn CIS 161. 1.1 and 349.2. To be sure, he may have thought this to be unnecessary, be cause Onkelos also has He in the causative of the verb to know (JJTin) and in the borrowed Hebrew word pen ¦ As we, however, think that Daniel's use of He in this form is one of the strongest proofs of its early date, we shall present the facts as to the preformative of the causative stem in the Aramaic dialects. 1. The Syriac and Palmyrene always have Aleph. 2. The early inscriptions of Zakir, Sendshirli and Assyria and the Aramaic papyri always have He. 3. The Nabatean always has Aleph except in two cases, both from the same verb; the Targum of Onkelos has Aleph in scores of cases, He in but two verbs, one of them certainly borrowed from the Hebrew; the Mandean uses He nearly al ways, Aleph only occasionally; the Samaritan usually has Aleph, but sometimes He; the Targum of Jonathan uses He in the one form JJSin and the Jerusalem Targums have He in eight or nine verbs, manifestly under the influence of He brew, as is doubtless the case in the Samaritan also. 4. Ezra has Aleph once only and He everywhere else. 5. Daniel has Aleph but twice and He in numerous in stances. It will thus be seen, that in this respect, the usage of Daniel is decidedly with the earlier dialects and against the later ones. THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 293 III. Syntax We shall not have space here to discuss fully the syn tactical relation of Daniel to the other dialects. As an ex ample of the importance of this subject in determining the dialectical affinities, we shall mention only the manner of de noting the accusative. 1. All of the dialects agree in that they employ no particle before the indefinite direct object and in that they frequently omit it before the definite direct object as well. 2. Regarding the use of the particles, the following points are to be noticed : a. Daniel, the Egyptian papyri, the Syriac and the Man dean, frequently employ Lomadh before the definite direct ob ject, but not without many variations of usage one from the other, especially in the case of the Mandean. The Zakir, Sendshirli and Nabatean inscriptions never employ Lomadh with the direct object, and Palmyrene but once only. Ezra and the Samaritan seldom employ it. Onkelos sometimes uses it, but preceded by a pronominal suffix after the verb. In this respect it agrees with the common usage in the Mandean. b. The Zakir inscription always uses JVK before the defi nite direct object except when it is accompanied by a dem onstrative pronoun. Onkelos, the Samaritan, and the Nabatean often use it (writtenm). Palmyrene, Daniel and the Sendshirli inscriptions have it once each. In Syriac it is seldom employed, and then mostly in the Bible to render the Hebrew DK . Ezra, the Egyptian papyri, and the Mandean, never employ it. It will be seen from the above that in respect to the use of Lomadh Daniel disagrees with all the dialects with which Dr. Driver says it is " nearly allied ", and that it agrees most nearly with the Egypto-Aramaic, the one written just about the time that Daniel is said to have lived, and with the Syriac 294 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL and Mandean, that were written in the regions the nearest to Babylon. With regard to the use of m as the sign of the definite object, Daniel employs it but once. In this respect he differs decidedly from Onkelos and the Nabatean, and agrees most nearly with the Sendshirli of the 8th century B.C., and with the Palmyrene. That it is employed so frequently in the earliest of all the inscriptions, that of Zakir and also in the Sendshirli, permits of its use by Daniel in the 6th century B.C. IV. Vocabulary In discussing the vocabulary of Daniel we shall consider in order the relation that it bears to the vocabularies of Onkelos, the Nabateans, the Palmyrenes, and the Targum of Jonathan. a. Onkelos. As a matter of fact, the vocabulary of Daniel is not " nearly allied " to that of Onkelos as will sufficiently appear from the following evidence which the writer has se lected from a large number of similar proofs. i . Let us call up the testimony of the verbs employed in the two dialects to denote the idea " to put, to set ". Daniel employs WW ten times in this sense. It is the only word used by him to express this idea. Ezra uses it sixteen times; Zakir four times; Sendshirli, four; Nerab, three; the Sachau papyri, thirteen times; and Teima, once. Onkelos never uses it but once for certain (Ler. 1914) and perhaps in one other place (Gen. 1. 26) where the text is disputed. This is most noteworthy inasmuch as W*W " to put " occurs in the Hebrew Pentateuch 151 times and SVW of like meaning, eighteen times. The common word in Onkelos to render these words is Nlff by which he translates the Hebrew WW 130 times and SVW fourteen times. The Hebrew WW he renders also by KJD twelve times; KIP and TTD three times each; 1H, "Tip and 1DK once each. The Hebrew rvw he renders also by KJD, 3m, and 31J? once each. The one time that Onkelos does use D^W (Lev. xix. 14), it is a translation of pO- Further, it should be remarked with regard to WW -. that neither the Targum of Jonathan, nor the Nabatean nor the Palmyrene uses it at all. THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 295 And again, it should be observed, that in Syriac and Man dean, both belonging to what is called Eastern Aramaic, WW is the ordinary verb for " to put " just as it is in the North Syrian and Egypto-Aramaic inscriptions and in Ezra and Daniel. Again, it should be observed on the other hand, that Daniel does use Kit? twice (iii. 29, v. 21), but never in the sense in which it is employed in Onkelos. In Onkelos it always means " to set, to put, to make " ; but in Daniel it means " to be or make like ". This meaning in Daniel is like that found in the Egypto-Aramaic, the Syriac, and the Mandean, where the primary meaning was " to be at par ", " to be equal to " ; hence, " to be worth " in a business sense and " to be worthy " or " to agree " in a moral sense. It is so used seven times in the SC papyri and frequently in both Syriac and Mandean. Finally, of the other eight verbs which Onkelos uses to translate WW and IVW Daniel employs all but TTD and 1DK ; but all of them only and always in a sense different entirely from that in which they are employed in Onkelos as a render ing for the two Hebrew words for " to put ", except in the case of the one word 12J? which Onkelos uses for WW but once and for rw not at all. Thus nJD is used in Daniel in the sense of " to number " (three times), Pa. " to appoint " (three times). So also in Dan. vii. 25, X1P "to loose" (five times) ; 1TJ " to cut out ", (twice) ; am " to give, deliver over" (twenty times, in Ezra eight times) ; a*lj? "to mix", (four times). We hope our readers will peruse the preceding paragraphs twice at least, that they may fully appreciate the data therein presented. Here is an idea for the expression of which the Hebrew Pentateuch uses two words 169 times. That one of these two words which the Hebrew employs 151 times is ren dered in Onkelos by a word that is never used in this sense in Daniel, whereas Daniel uses to denote the idea the same word that is found in Hebrew. Further, the Targum of Jona than, the Nabatean, and the Palmyrene agree with Onkelos in not using D*W while the old inscriptions on the one hand and the eastern dialects on the other, agree with Daniel in using it and also in their use of KW. Lastly, of the eight other words 296 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL found in Onkelos to render WW and mtP, Daniel uses six, but only one of them in a sense that might be deemed equiva lent to that of the verb " to put ". If we had space, we would like to add a number of other demonstrations of like character with the above, some of which would be almost or quite as convincing. We hope that this one will be sufficient to make the reader pause at least for further light upon the subject before accepting the statement that the Aramaic of Daniel is " nearly allied " to that of On kelos. 2. Not merely, however, in the pure Aramaic words em ployed, but also in the foreign words that are found in them, do the dialectical differences between Daniel and Onkelos ap pear. (1) Daniel uses three words which seem to be Greek. These words are names of musical instruments, and things of this kind nearly always even to this day bear names which indi cate more or less definitely the source, national or personal, from which they came. We are not going to discuss at this time the possibility of Greek words having been found in Aramaic in the 6th century B.C. We shall only remark in this connection, that Prof. Sachau thinks he has discovered three Greek words and one Latin one in the papyri of the 5th century B.C. But, when comparing the vocabulary of Daniel with that of Onkelos with which it is said to be " closely al lied ", the great question is not how does it happen that there are three Greek words in Daniel, but rather why are there no more than three. Dalman in his Grammar of the Jewish- Palestinian Aramaic, pages 184-187, gives a list of twenty- five Greek nouns that occur in Onkelos. On page 183, he gives two denominative verbs found in Onkelos that are de rived from Greek nouns that had been taken over into the dialect of the people from among whom the Targum origi nated. Moreover, these Greek words do not all occur in one section and in one phrase as in Daniel, but they are scattered all through the Pentateuch from the first chapter of Genesis to the latter part of Deuteronomy. These words do not de note articles of commerce merely, as is the case in Daniel, but governmental, geographical, and scientific terms, such as could THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 297 have come into use only after the conquest of Alexander. So that, as far as Greek words are concerned, the dialect of Onkelos differs from that of Daniel : a. In the number of words that occur. b. In the frequency of their occurrence. c. In that they are scattered through the whole book in one case and confined to a single section and phrase in the other. d. In that one borrows names of musical instruments mere ly, whereas the other has borrowed names of stuffs, stones, colors, and geographical, commercial, governmental and scien tific terms. In Daniel, such borrowed terms are prevailingly Babylonian and Persian, never Greek. e. In that the dialect of Onkelos has verbalized two Greek nouns at least, whereas all of Daniel's verbs are Aramaic (or Hebrew), except one, and 1 it is Babylonian. (2) The Aramaic of Daniel, according to Dr. Driver, has thirteen Persian words. We think this estimate is probably correct. The Targum of Onkelos, however, has but five Per sian words. The most common of these, DSfiS, occurs in the Hebrew of Esther and Ecclesiastes, once in each, and four times in the Aramaic of Ezra and twice in that of Daniel. Another, ptSHS, occurs also in the Hebrew of Ezra once and in the Aramaic three times. In Onkelos, it occurs only in Deut. xvii. 18. The other three are found in Onkelos once each. The Egyptian papyri have ten to fifteen Persian com mon names besides a large number of proper names. Ezra has at least ten. The Greek and Babylonian writers of the Persian period have also a large number of persian words (See Prof. John D. Davis in the Harper Memorial Volume). The Nabatean, on the other hand, has no Persian word and the Palmyrene only one common name (from 264 A.D.) and one proper name (from 125 A.D.) In the Targum of Jonathan there are but a very few Persian words. So that in regard to the Persian words employed, Daniel is seen to agree with the writings from the Persian period, and not as Dr. Driver suggests with the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan and with the Nabatean and Palmyrene inscriptions. (3) An important element in the vocabulary of Daniel, to 298 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL which, however, Dr. Driver pays no attention, are the Babylon ian words contained in it. The lately discovered documents of this once important language have enabled us to explain a number of words as of genuine Semitic origin, which were formerly supposed to be of Persian origin, or to be Aramaic words peculiar to Daniel. Of the former kind are many proper names such as Ashpenaz, Beltshazzar, Abednego and others. Of the latter class are jWK , VT, nwn , C\WK, WW, 7fD, and perhaps "pi and pm ¦ Of these Babylonian words, Ezra has about eight common names and a number of proper ones, such as Sheshbazzar and Zerubbabel. The Egypto-Aramaic, also, is rich in Babylonian terms of both kinds, there being from eleven to sixteen Babylonian common names and a large num ber of proper names in the Sayce-Cowley papyri alone. On the other hand, the Targum of Onkelos has probably only six or seven words of Babylonian origin and all of them are found in, and perhaps most if not all of them derived by, Onkelos from the Babylonian through the earlier works of Daniel and Ezra. b. Vocabulary of the Nabateans. It is impossible for the writer to conceive how anyone who had read the Nabatean inscriptions could assert that, so far as vocabulary is concerned, the language is " nearly allied " to that of Daniel. Take for the sake of comparison with Daniel the El Hejra inscription of A.D.I (Cooke p. 220). There are sixty-three words in this inscription. Fourteen of these are proper names, of which one is the name of a place, one of a month, five the names of gods, and seven the names of persons. All of these are Arabic except the name of the month Tebeth which is Babylonian. There are forty-nine other words, twenty-five of which are found in Daniel. But of these three are pronouns and eleven are particles. The five verbs are 12]} , ]r)i , ana , pSJ and pT, to which may be added Tl^K " there is ", all of which are found in Egypto-Aramaic and all but pT in Ezra. They are found in Syriac, Mandean, and all in Onkelos, except pT (one or two derivatives of which are found, however). Palmyrean, also, has all of them. The nouns are 5]7K , m , nm , TMW , and ^J7D , all words that are found in Babylonian and Hebrew as well as in Egypto-Aramaic and all later Aramaic THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 299 dialects. As to the twenty-four words that are not found in Daniel five are Arabic nouns and two are Arabic verbs, i. e., Arabaic roots in Aramaic forms. Moreover one word is pos sibly Babylonian and one possibly Latin ; six are particles, one of which is probably Arabic; one is of doubtful origin and meaning; and the others are the words for " nine ", " self ", "posterity", "daughter", "good", "love", and for "to bury ". This is a fair sample of the longest and most distinctively Nabatean inscription. Occasionally, we meet with a Greek word, or even a Latin word, and there is possibly one Babylon ian word, but there are no Persian words and no Hebrew ones. The distinctive feature of this dialect is its Arabisms. We leave the intelligent reader to form his own judgment as to whether the Nabatean dialect is " nearly allied " to that of Daniel, in which there are no Arabic words, but many Hebrew, Persian, and Babylonian ones. c. The Vocabulary of the Palmyrenes. As an example of the Palmyrene inscriptions, we shall give an analysis of No. 129 in Cooke's NSI. p. 249, (A.D. 264). The first line has one Aramaic, one Latin and two Greek words; the second, one Aramaic, two Latin, and one Persian word; the third, one Aramaic, two Latin, and one Greek word; the fourth, three Aramaic, one Greek, and two Arabic words; the fifth, five Aramaic, and one Babylonian word ; the sixth, one Ara maic word followed by the date. We shall give also a translation of No. 127. " Septimius Worod, most excellent (Gk) procurator (Gk) ducenarius (Lat) which has been set up to his honor, by lulius Aurelius Nebu-bad, son of So'adu (son of) Haira, strategos (Gk) of the colony (Lat), his friend. The year 574 (i. e. 263 A.D.), in the month Kislul." Finally, we shall give a translation of No. 121. " Statue of Julius Aurelius Zabd-ile, son of Maliku, son of Maliku, (son of) Nassum, who was strategos (Gr) of the colony (Lat) at the coming of the good Alexander Caesar; and he served when Crispinus the governor was here and when he brought here the legions (Lat) many times; and he was chief of the market and spent money (Arab) in a most generous manner; and he 300 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL led his life peaceably ( ?) ; on this account the good Yarhibal has borne witness to him, and also Julius, who fosters and loves the city; the council (Gk) and people (Gk) have set up (this) to him to his honor. The year 554." (i. e. AD. 242-3). The above are good examples of the composition of the Palmyrene Aramaic dialect. Our readers will perceive that the language is a mixture of pure Aramaic with Greek, Latin, Arabic, and (in the case of proper names and names of months) of Babylonian. Only one Persian word is here; but this word is the title of a governmental official and was taken over from the Sassanian Persians and not from the old Achae- menids of Daniel's time. Our readers will please notice that in the Palmyrene we have a conglomerate of very different composition from that in Daniel, which, as we saw above, is composed of Aramaic, He brew, Old Persian, Babylonian and Greek (3 words) ; whereas Palmyrene is composed of Aramaic, Greek, Arabic, Latin, Babylonian and New Persian (one word) with no Hebrew. We have placed the names of the languages making up the two dialects in the order of their relative frequency of oc currence. The reader may make his own conclusion as to whether they are " nearly allied ". d. The Targum of Jonathan. What we have said above about the Targum of Onkelos is even more true of that of Jonathan. See especially Dalman's Grammar and Levy's Dic tionary. D. As to Dr. Driver's fourth proposition, that the Aramaic of Daniel is " that which was spoken in or near Palestine " and " at a date after the conquest of Palestine by Alexander the Great ", we shall address our remarks first to the statement that such a dialect was spoken near Palestine, and we shall begin by asking when was it spoken near Palestine and by whom. The only evidence we have is ( 1 ) that from the North Syrian inscriptions, but this language is not like that of Daniel, for it has no Persian, no Babylonian, no Greek; (2) that from the Nabateans, but we know that they were an Arab people speaking or at least writing Aramaic and that of a kind, as we have seen, unlike that found in Daniel; (3) that from the Palmyrenes, but we have seen that the language of THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 301 the Palmyrenes was not like that of Daniel; (4) that of the Syrians, but their earliest document goes back only to 73 A.D. and the next to 201 A.D. ; besides, as is well known, Syriac is not written in the dialect of Daniel. In other words, there is no evidence, that any dialect resembling Daniel's was ever spoken by anybody near Palestine. Nor have we any evidence from in Palestine. Dr. Driver says that the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan received their present form between the 4th and 6th century A.D. Now be tween the time of Ezra which he places in Palestine at 400 B.C. (probably c. 400 B.C., LOT p. 504) and that of the Targums, what evidence can be produced to show what the people living in Palestine spoke? There are no Aramaic in scriptions from Palestine from any time. The other Targums are certainly later than those of Onkelos and Jonathan. Be sides, if anything earlier than these were forthcoming, we doubt not Dr. Driver would have produced it. Of course, there are the writings of the Samaritans ; but in the first place, they are not written in a dialect resembling that of Daniel, and sec ondly, no one probably would contend that they reached their present form until long after the year 400 A.D. But perhaps by near Palestine, Egypt might be meant. Here, however, we are met by two serious objections to Dr. Driver's proposition. First, the latest dated document from Egypt is from the year 400 B.C. ; and secondly, the Aramaic of Egypt differs in some very important respects from that of Daniel. For example, it has no Hophal, nor is it full of Hebrew common words as Daniel is. Besides, it has Egyp tian words, both proper and common, and Daniel has neither. But, perhaps, Babylon is near Palestine. We are of the opinion that it is near enough for the dialect in which Daniel is written to have been spoken there. This provenience and this alone would in our opinion suit the peculiarities of the dialect of the book of Daniel. This would account for the absence of Egyptian words. This would account for the Persian and Babylonian and Hebrew elements that mix in with the pure Aramaic to form this dialect. Then, also, 150 years after Sennacherib had conquered the Greeks of Cilicia, thirty years after Nebuchadnezzar had conquered the Greek mer- 302 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL cenaries of the king of Egypt, and long after he had taken Greek hirelings into his own service, we might expect to find the names of three Greek musical instruments in the language spoken by probably the major part of his subjects. But how about the Persian words? There is no difficulty whatever about them. The children of Israel had been settled in the cities of the Medes for almost 200 years before Daniel is supposed to have been written. Some of these Israelites and many of the Jews were settled in Assyria and Babylonia where most if not all of the people spoke Aramaic. Nineveh and northern Assyria were conquered by the Medes about 606 B.C. Here were seventy years before Daniel was written for Israelites and Jews and Arameans to adopt Medo-Persian words. All the witnesses from antiquity unite to prove that the Medes and Persians were akin and spoke dialects of the same language. The Greeks and the Hebrew prophets use their names at times interchangeably. The proper names of gods and persons used among them are the same, or similar. No one can affirm with any evidence to support him that the words in Daniel called by us Persian might not rather be called Median. The difficulty arising from the way in which the author of Daniel writes a few of the sounds is more than offset by the fact that nowhere else than in Babylon at about the year 500 B.C. could such a composite Aramaic as that which we find therein have been written. Grammar and vo cabulary alike can be best accounted for by supposing that the book was written by a Jew living in Babylon at about that time, that is, when Aramaic was the common language of the world of commerce and diplomacy and social intercourse, when Babylonian and Medo-Persian were contending for the uni versal dominion over the nations, and when Greek words were just beginning to appear in the Lingua Franca of international commerce. THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 303 Conclusion In conclusion, we would express the hope that we have been able to convince our readers that in so far as philology is concerned there is no such evidence existing as Dr. Driver alleges, in support of the late date and western provenience of the book of Daniel. The evidence for the early date derived from the orthography is not as convincing in the case of every individual letter as could be desired; but taken as a whole, it is in favor of an early rather than of a late date. The evi dence derived from forms and inflections and syntax is de cidedly, and that from the vocabulary is overwhelmingly, in favor of an early date and of an eastern provenience. What may be called the pure Aramaic matrix of this unique con glomerate, which we call the dialect of Daniel, presents evi dence in the words that it used to express the most common ideas that it differed materially from the dialects with which Dr. Driver affirms that it was " nearly allied ". These same words show that a close relationship existed between it and the dialect of Egypto-Aramaic of the 5th century B.C., and also a remarkable agreement with the Syriac and Mandean, among the most eastern of all the dialects. So that the evi dence of the strictly Aramaic vocabulary of the dialect of Daniel is predominantly in favor of the early date and of the eastern provenience. But, it is when we consider the foreign elements in the language, that we must be convinced that the evidence for the composition of the book at or near Babylon at some time not far removed from the founding of the Persian empire is simply overwhelming. At no other time could such a conglomerate have been composed. The nearest dialects to it in variety and kind of commingling elements are those of Ezra and of the Egyptian papyri, both from the 5th century B.C. At a time later than this, there is no evidence that any such dialect was in use. At a place far removed from Babylon, a composition of such heterogeneous elements could never have been produced. For there never has been a time and place known to history save Babylon in the latter 3°4 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL half of the 6th century B.C., in which an Aramaic dialect with just such an admixture of foreign ingredients and in just such proportions could have been brought into existence. For, it must be borne in mind, that the place and time of all the Aramaic dialects can be determined approximately by the kinds and proportions of extraneous elements contained in them. Thus the Zakir inscription of 850 B.C. has no foreign elements, except perhaps Hebrew. The Sendshirli inscriptions of the latter part of the 8th century B.C. have Assyrian in gredients. The Egypto-Aramaic of the 5th century B.C. has Persian, Babylonian, Hebrew, and Egyptian terms, and perhaps one Latin and three Greek words. Ezra has Persian, Babylon ian and Hebrew. The Nabatean has Arabic in large measure, one Babylonian word and a few Greek ones. The Palmyrene has Greek predominantly, some Arabic, and two Sassanian, or late Persian words. The Targum of Onkelos has mainly Greek words, (two of which have been verbalized after Ara maic forms), five Persian words, and some Hebrew and Babylonian elements. The Targum of Jonathan has yet more Greek nouns and three verbs likewise Aramaic in form derived from Greek nouns, at least one Latin word, apparently no Persian words, and only one Babylonian word or form, except such as are found in the Scriptures, and a considerable number of Hebrew words. The Syriac (Edessene) has hundreds of Greek words, a considerable number of which are verbalized ; scores of Latin words; many Hebrew words, a few of them verbalized; a few Babylonian words and forms; many late Persian nouns, perhaps none of which are verbalized; a little Sanskrit, and in later works many Arabic nouns, especially names of persons and places. In New Syriac the foreign ele ments are predominantly Turkish, Arabic and Kurdish loan words. Therefore, it being thus apparent that on the basis of foreign elements imbedded in Aramaic dialects, it is possible for the scholar to fix approximately the time and the locality in which the different dialects were spoken; all the more when as has been shown in the case of Daniel such a date and locality are required by the vocabulary of the pure Aramaic substratum and favored or at least permitted by its grammati- THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL 305 cal forms and structure, we are abundantly justified in conclud ing that the dialect of Daniel containing, as it does, so many Persian, Hebrew, and Babylonian elements, and so few Greek words, with not one Egyptian, Latin or Arabic word, and so nearly allied in grammatical form and structure to the older Aramaic dialects and in its conglomerate vocabulary to the dialects of Ezra and Egypto-Aramaic, must have been used at or near Babylon at a time not long after the founding of the Persian empire. 306 THE ARAMAIC OF DANIEL APPENDIX. The verbal forms used by the Arameans may be denoted to the eye by three tables, giving the forms used between 900 and 400 B. C, between 400 B. C. and 700 A. D., and by the writers of Daniel and Ezra and the dialects of the Nabateans and Palmyrenes respectively. Table I. Sendshirli Zakir & Nerab Ec.-x\ramaic Peal Peal Peal Paal (?) Paal (?) Paal Hafal HafalEthpeelHafal (?) Peil Hafal EthpeelEthpaal Peil Shafel Table II. Trg. Onkelos . Trg. Jno. Syriac Sam. Mandean Peal Peal Peal Peal Peal Paal Paal Paal Pail Pail Afal Afal Afal Afal Afel Ethpeel Ethpeel Ethpeel Ethpeel Hafel Ethpaal Ethpaal Ethpaal Ethpaal Shafel Ittafal Ittafal Ettafal Ittafal Safel Pael Ishtafal Shafel Nifal Ethpeel Pael Pael Safel Pual (?) Ethpael Palel Palel Ethpauel (?) Hafal' (?) Ettafal Palpel Palpel Palel Palpel Ethpaulel (?) Peil 1 Eshtafal Hofal 1 (?) IthpalpelHofal 1 (?) Paiel (?) Eshtafal Table III. Daniel Ezra Nabatean Palmyrean Peal Peal Peal Peal Paal Afel Paal Paal Hafel Afel Paal Paal Afel Hafel Afel Afel Shafel 1 Shafel 2 Hafel Ethpeel Ethpeel Shafel 1 Ethpaal Ethpaal Ethpeel Ethpeel Palel 1 PailHafal 1 Ethpaal Peil 1 Ethpaal Hofal 9 Hishtafal 1 Hithpolel 1 Hithpoal 1 Peil Peil THE PLACE OF THE RESURRECTION APPEARANCES OF JESUS William Park Armstrong Introduction: Faith, fact, and method; the witness of the New Testament; later tradition. I. The Galilean Theory. Strauss; Weizsacker; Wernle; P. W. Schmiedel; Harnack; Rohrbach ; W. Bruckner ; Volter ; Wellhausen ; Kreyenbuhl. II. The Jerusalem Theory. Loofs; Galilee on the Mount of Olives (Hofmann, Resch, etc.). III. The Double Tradition. Von Dobschiitz ; T. S. Rordam ; Lyder Brun ; Riggenbach ; Zahn ; Voigt; constructive results; critical principles. Appendix: Extra-canonical tradition — Gospel according to the Hebrews ; Gospel of Peter; a Coptic Document; the Syriac Didascalia; Ter- tullian's Apologeticum xxi ; Acta Pilati. Abbreviations. THE PLACE OF THE RESURRECTION APPEARANCES OF JESUS The early Christian c6mmunity in Jerusalem believed that Jesus of Nazareth, who had been crucified under Pontius Pil ate, was the Messiah. This belief according to the earliest tradition had its origin in the consciousness of Jesus himself, for he both accepted the expression of it from others1 and gave explicit witness to it by his own words2 and actions.8 It was shared by his disciples. Through his death an element quite incongruous with their expectations was introduced into it.4 Yet the belief persisted and became a world-historic force. In the earliest form of which we have knowledge, — that is, of the faith of the primitive Christian community — it included two distinctive features : — the death and the resurrection of Jesus. There are clear indications in the Gospels that both of these elements entered into Jesus' conception of his Mes- siahship;5 but even if these indications be regarded merely as reflections of early Christian faith they imply by contrast a 1 Mit. xvi. 16 ; Mk. viii. 29 ; Lk. ix. 20. 'Especially in the self-designation "Son of Man"; cf. Holtzmann, Das mess. Bewusstsein Jesu, 1907; Lehrbuch d. neutest. Theologie? i, 191 1, pp. 295 ff . ; Pfleiderer Das XJrchristentumf usw. i, 1902, pp. 660 ff. Tillmann, Der Menschensohn, BSt. xii. 1-2, 1907 ; Schlatter, Der Zweifel an der Mes- sianitdt Jesu, BFTh. xi. 4, 1907; E. Klostermann, Markus, HB. ii. 1907, pp. 67 f.; B. B. Warfield, The Lord of Glory, 1907, pp. 23 ff., etc. sMt. xxi. 1 ff; Mk. xi. 1 ff; Lk. xix. 29 ff. *Mk. viii. 32, ix. 10, 32, x. 35 ff., xiv. 27 ff., 51; Lk. xxiv. 21; cf. 1 Cor. i. 23 ; Gal. vi. I2ff ; on the idea of a suffering Messiah in Judaism cf. Bousset, Religion d. Judentums?, 1906, p. 26s; Schtirer, Gesch. d. jiid. Volkes* usw. ii, 1907, pp. 648 ff.; J. Weiss, SNT? i, 1907, pp. 148 ff.; Schweitzer, Von Reimarus zu Wrede, 1906, pp. 368 f., 383 ff. ; Volz, Judische Eschatologie usw, 1903, p. 237; Bertholet, Biblische Theologie d. Alten Testaments, ii. 191 1, p. 45°- ¦ Mk. viii. 30 f, etc. 310 THE RESURRECTION APPEARANCES change in the content of faith which was not without a cause. And if this cause be not, or not alone, in the consciousness of Jesus and his teaching, it must be sought in the experience of the disciples subsequent to his death. How then did the faith in Jesus as the Messiah, which embraced his death and resur rection, emerge in the consciousness of the disciples? There can be no doubt that it did emerge and that it did contain these elements. This is proven by the testimony of Paul.6 Con verted to this faith within a few years after Jesus' death, he not only shared it from the beginning of his missionary ac tivity,7 but in it knew himself to be in full accord with the early Christian community in Jerusalem.8 There is no trace of any difference of opinion on this subject.9 The difficulties in Corinth about the resurrection concerned not Jesus but be lievers.10 There is every reason to think that it had its origin 6 I Cor. XV. 2-8: TapiSojKa yap vpXv iv irpihrois, 6 Kai irapfKaflov, bri *%.pujTbs airddavev inrip twv ap/xpriGiv r)p.un> Kara ras ypa0rj 4irdv(a ncvraKoalois aSehcpols l — a fact of their experi ence12 — its true explanation. The New Testament accounts of the self-manifestations or appearances of Jesus constitute an important element in the ex- Christ, for the whole argument of St. Paul is based on the fact that there was a general consent on that subject. It has sometimes been thought that this implies that the Corinthians had no hope of any future life be yond death. But this view is an unjustified conclusion from 1 Cor. xv. 17-19. St. Paul is here arguing that there must be a resurrection, because a future life is impossible without one, and that the hope of the Chris tian to share in the life of Christ necessitates that he should rise from the dead just as Christ did. Moreover, the idea that there was no future life is as wholly foreign to the point of view of the "Mystery Religions" of the Corinthian world, as it was to that of Jewish theology. The ques tion was not whether there would be a future life, but whether a future life must be attained by means of a resurrection, and St. Paul's argument is that in the first place the past resurrection of Christ is positive evidence for the future resurrection of Christians, and in the second place that the conception of a resurrection is central and essential in Christianity, which offers no hope of a future life for the dead apart from a resur rection." Cf. also Lake's estimate of the significance to be attached to the elements of Christian faith held in common by Paul and his readers and therefore presupposed in his Epistles, ibid., pp. lis, 132 f., 233 n., 277, 424, 437, and Exp. 1909, i, p. 506. "This is witnessed by all the Gospels and is implied in 1 Cor. xv. 3 f. by the close association of the burial and the resurrection on the third day. It was thus part of the primitive apostolic tradition. On the recent discussion of the empty tomb cf. A. Meyer, Die Auferstehung Christi usw. 1905, pp. io6ff; K. Lake, The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. 1907, pp. 240 ff. ; H. J. Holtzmann, ThR. 1906, pp. 79 ff., 119 ff., ThLz. 1908, pp. 262 f. ; P. W. Schmiedel, PrM. 1908, pp. I2ff; Korff, Die Auferstehung Christi usw. 1908, pp. I42ff; W. H- Ryder, HThR. 1909, pp. 1 ff. ; C. R. Bowen, The Resurrection in the New Testament, 1911, pp. 204 ff. u Cf. Lk. xxiv. 23 ; Jno. xx. 3 ff . 3 12 THE RESURRECTION APPEARANCES planation which the early Christians gave of an essential fea ture of their faith. If these accounts are trustworthy, there can be no reasonable doubt concerning the ground upon which the primitive faith in the resurrection rested. Undoubtedly they reflect the belief of the early Christians. But are they for this reason or because of their contents and mutual rela tions witnesses only to faith and not to fact? Historical criticism, it is true, is concerned primarily with the narratives, — their exact content, mutual and genetic relations, and their value ; but the final judgment which it must render concerning the truthfulness of the narratives, their correspondence with reality,^ — involving as this does the idea of causation — cannot be made apart from a general world-view or ultimate philo sophical theory.13 And since the end of the process may be first in -thought, the process itself will sometimes disclose the influence of theoretical considerations. In considering the relation of early Christian belief to his torical fact, critical investigation enters upon a historico- genetic analysis of the documentary evidence in which search is made in the details of the different narratives for traces of the stages through which the final result, — i. e. the belief whose origin the narratives professedly set forth — was attained. Among the details which may be expected to throw light on this process the indications of place or locality in the narra tives of the appearances are not only important in themselves but have, since the time of Reimarus, Lessing, and Strauss, held a central place in modern discussion of the subject. The witness of the New Testament to the place of the ap pearances is in general quite plain. In the list of appearances which Paul gives in I Cor. xv. 5-8 no mention is made of 13 On this aspect of historical criticism cf. PrThR. 1910, pp. 247 ff. ; Kiefl, Der geschichtliche Christus und die moderne Philosophie, 1911 ; and the discussions of the " religious a priori " by Bousset, ThR. 1909, pp. 419 ff., 471 ff. (cf. ZThK. 1910, pp. 341 ff. ; 1911, pp. 141 ff.) ; Dunkmann, Das religiose Apriori und die Geschichte, BFTh. xiv. 3, 1910 ; Wobbermin, ZThK. 1911, Ergdnzungsheft 2; Troeltsch, RGG. ii. pp. 1437 ff., 1447 ff. ; Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu fiir den Glauben, 191 1 ; Mackin tosh, Exp. 1911, i. pp. 434 ff. ; Beth, ThR. 1912, pp. 1 ff. ; also C. H. Weisse, Evangelische Geschichte, ii. 1838, pp. 441 ff. THE RESURRECTION APPEARANCES 313 place, although the Apostle incidentally alludes elsewhere to the place of one of them in a manner which presupposes knowl edge of it.14 In Mt. xxviii two appearances are narrated, — one to certain women in Jerusalem on Easter Sunday,15 and one at a later time to the disciples in Galilee.16 Mark in its earliest transmitted form ends abruptly at xvi. 8 without men tion of an appearance; but the message of the young man at the sepulchre gives promise of an appearance in Galilee.17 Lk. xxiv records at least two appearances, — one to Cleopas and his companion at Emmaus,18 and one to the disciples in Jeru salem on the evening of Easter Sunday19 — allusion being made also to a third, the appearance to Peter on Easter Sunday and by necessary implication in or near Jerusalem.20 Jno. xx re lates an appearance to Mary Magdalene at the sepulchre,21 an appearance to the disciples — Thomas being absent — on Easter Sunday and in Jerusalem,22 and an appearance to the disciples again — Thomas being present — a week later and most prob ably in Jerusalem.23 Jno. xxi describes an appearance to 14 Gal. i. 15 f. and 17 (toi irdXiv inrio-Tepa els JsapatTKov). 15 xxviii. 9-10. Kai iSoi 'Iitjrovs inriivT-qaev abrais \iywv xaipere. ai Si irpo