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THE EEIGN OE CAUSALITY.

THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY:

A VINDICATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC PEINCIPLE

OF

TELIC CAUSAL EFFICIENCY.

BY

ROBERT WATTS, D.D,
•4
PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S
COLLEGE, BELFAST.

EDINBURGH :
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.
1888.

PRINTED BY LOBIMEK AND GILLIES
FOR
T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.
XONDON, HAMILTON, ADAMS AND CO.
DUBLIN, GEORGE HERBERT.
NEW YOP.K, SCRIBNF.R AND WELFORD.

PREFACE.
rilHE object of the discussions embraced in this
volume is indicated in the title. The chief aim
of the whole work is to vindicate ' the claims of the
Scientific Principle of Telic Causality. Persuaded that
the very unhappy attitude of antagonism to theology
maintained by a certain class of scientists, has arisen
from scientific speculations conducted in violation of
this principle, the author has endeavoured, in the
interests of both science and theology, to draw attention
to the gravity of this error, and to make it clear that
the existing antagonism is as unscientific as it is
gratuitous. The ground taken is, that the Principle of Causality,
revealed as a primary belief in consciousness, fairly
carried out and applied in scientific investigations,
leads up to an Ultimate Cause — a Causa causarum- —
possessed of all the attributes which enter into our
conception of personality. This ground, it is held, is
5

VI PREFACE.
truly philosophic and scientific, and ought to be
regarded as common ground in all controversies arising
out of the scientific study of the phenomena of matter
or of mind; for the foremost of those who set them
selves in array against the teleological bearings of the
facts of science admit that " philosophy is the mother
of the sciences." This, of course, is simply to admit
that philosophy lays down the lines, the laws, and
principles, on which science is to proceed. Now, the
primary fundamental principle which philosophy holds
forth as a lamp to light the pathway of the scientist is,
that every effect must have a cause, — and by this is.
meant an adequate cause, a cause that will account for
the production of all the phenomena under investiga
tion in the particular instance. Constituted as the
human mind is, it cannot accept, as an adequate cause,
anything which does not fulfil these conditions. The
principle ex nihilo nihil fit, forbids the acceptance of
any solution of the problem presented in any set or
series of phenomena which leaves some of the phenom
ena unaccounted for and unexplained; for the remain
ing phenomena would, in that case, be left in the
unscientific category of phenomena uncaused, and
would thus be reckoned as emanations ex nihilo, with
out a reason for their emanation.

PREFACE. Vll
The validity of this principle, moreover, is testified to
by consciousness, which must be accepted as the
ultimate authority in regard to all our mental opera
tions. What our consciousness bears witness to cannot
be questioned or gainsaid, and no authority can
generate belief in anything which contradicts the
findings of our consciousness. The only admissible
question where consciousness is concerned is, " What is
its testimony ? " In the present instance we have
simply to inquire in regard to what it testifies on the
subject of Causality. Does its testimony embrace, as its
central essential characteristic, the idea of efficiency or
productive energy ? or is its testimony summed up, as
held by Hume and his modern disciples, under the idea
of a mere order of sequence ? The view one takes on
this point must determine both his philosophy and his
science, and must determine, his attitude toward
theology, if he be capable of tracing the connection
between premises and their legitimate consequences.
He who accepts Hume's idea of a cause must agree
with him in the inference, that " anything may be the
cause of anything," inasmuch as anything may precede
or follow anything. When he reaches this conclusion,
however, he will find, if he will but analyse the
contents of his own consciousness, that this legitimate

Vlll PREFACE.
outcome of the theory is in manifest contradiction to
the verdict of that ultimate arbiter; and he will find,
moreover, if he holds by Hume's notion, and acts
upon it, that he cannot advance a single step in the
scientific investigation of the phenomena of either
matter or mind. On the theory that " anything may
be the cause of anything" scientific progress is
impossible, and no scientist of any school ever acts
upon any such unscientific conception of a cause. All
scientists, wittingly or unwittingly, act upon the
assumption that nothing is to be regarded as a cause
which has not revealed itself as such by the forth -
putting of causal, which is all one with efficient,
productive, energy.
It is hoped that the discussions embraced in this
volume will aid in drawing attention to the unphilo-
sophic conception of Causality entertained by the anti-
theistic writers of the day, who are availing themselves
of every channel of access to the public, to assail the
foundations on which are based the immortal hopes of
man. It is claimed in the following pages that the
principle on which the assault upon theology proceeds,
is subversive of sound philosophy and genuine science,
as, in every instance, it does violence to the scientific
fundamental of adequate Causality. And it is further

PREFACE. IX
claimed that within the sphere of the phenomena with
which science has to do, adequate Causality is invariably
telic. A superficial analysis may result in the discovery
of nothing beyond causal efficiency, and a still more
superficial analysis may discern naught save a mere
order of sequence, but it is held that a thorough
analysis of all the phenomena, revealing, as it must, the
adaptation of means to ends, ought to conduct the
investigator back behind the phenomena and the
ordered array of ends and means, to an antecedent,
presiding intelligence, to whose forethought and presi
dency both the ends and the means should be ascribed.
The concatenation and co-ordination of second causes,
admitted by all scientists as an unquestionable fact,
demand explanation, and no explanation will satisfy
the human mind which does not refer them to a truly
telic causal efficient.
In carrying out his purpose the author has availed
himself of papers and articles prepared by him and
given to the public from time to time, as occasion
seemed to require. The discussions embrace the chief
questions occupying the attention of the scientific and
philosophic world during the last quarter-of-a-century,
and especially those raised in connection with the visit
of the British Association to Belfast in 1874. The

X PREFACE. •
importance of the subjects brought under review, and
the bearing of the great Principle of Telic Causality, so
persistently assailed by antiteleologists,upon the progress
of philosophy and science, as well as upon theology,
will, it is hoped, be regarded as a sufficient justification
of the issue of these discussions in this more permanent
form.
ROBERT WATTS.

Assembly's College,
Belfast, November, 1887.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. I.

II.

III.

IV. V.
VI.
VII.
VIII. IX. X.
XI.

AN IRENICUM : OR, A PLEA FOR PEACE AND CO-OPERA
TION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY, . 1
ATOMISM — AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR TYNDALL'S
OPENING ADDRESS BEFORE THE BRITISH ASSOCIA
TION, 1874, . ... 27
AUTOMATISM — ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT ANIMALS
ARE AUTOMATA — AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR
HUXLEY'S BELFAST ADDRESS, ... .58
SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL HYPOTHESIS, . . 98
ON SOME QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE AUTHORS OF THE
"UNSEEN UNIVERSE," . . . . 149
AGNOSTICISM, . . . , . 191
THE HUXLEYAN KOSMOGONY, . 215
SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE, . . 251
EVOLUTION AND NATURAL HISTORY, .... 285
NATURAL LAW IN THE SPIRITUAL WORLD, . . . 318
UTILITARIANISM, . . 359

11

THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.

CHAPTER I.

AN IRENICUM: OR, A PLEA FOR PEACE AND
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY.
THE discussion of Scientific subjects by one who
is not, in the ordinary acceptation of the term,
a scientist, may seem to require a word of explana
tion. It may be asked, Why should theologians inter
meddle with such questions as claim the attention of
men of science — questions which have regard to the
constitution and laws of the organic and inorganic
worlds ? Should not the theologian restrict himself to>
the sphere of the purely spiritual, and leave to science
the domain of the material ? As faith pertains to the
unseen, and, as some allege, begins where science ends,
why should those who walk by faith intrude upon the
empire of the visible, or claim to have a voice in the
solution of problems arising out of the phenomena of
matter ?
It is scarcely necessary to say that such questions as.
1 B

2 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
these are sometimes put, nor is it necessary to add that
such questions are among the causes which have
helped to originate, and to widen a very serious breach
between physical science and theology — a breach which
is serviceable to neither, and which, if not healed, may
prove prejudicial to both. The existence of this feeling
of alienation and growing antagonism is sufficient
apology for the attempt adventured in this chapter — viz.,
the contribution of a few suggestions in the form of an
irenicum — suggestions which may, perhaps, serve to
raise the inquiry, whether the antagonism in question
be not wholly gratuitous.
I. To begin with the theological side of the conten
tion; a calm, candid review of the labours of the
scientific investigators ought to satisfy the mind of any
theologian, of the utter groundlessness of the notion,
that these labours have placed in peril any genuine
conclusion of theology. Whatever fears may have been
excited while the established scientific systems were
passing through their formative periods, there is now,
so far as these systems are concerned, no cause for
alarm. On the contrary, instead of regarding with
jealousy the mighty intellects, whose labours have
elicited from nature the key to her secrets, and
introduced all men, who have eyes to see and ears to
hear, into the magnificent halls of her enchantments to
gaze upon wonders outrivalliog the fondest dreams of
the most gifted imagination, and to listen to harmonies
evoked from an orchestra of which every atom and
molecule of the universe is a recognised member —

THEOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS. 3
instead of regarding such labours with jealousy, the
theologian has reason to join in the mighty anthem,
and thank the Keplers, and Newtons, and Daltons, and
Faradays, and Tyndalls, and Andrews, for the tribute
they have paid to the Eternal Power and Godhead of
the Creator. Not only is there no recognised fact or
established principle at variance with theology, whether
natural or revealed, but, on the contrary, these sciences,
without exception, are constantly appealed to by
theologians as very arsenals for the equipment of
theistic and Christian apologists. Whilst the working
hypotheses of the giants, in whose labours these
systems have had their origin, were in a state of quasi
incandescence, and whilst theologians were reluctant to
release themselves from the trammels of systems which
they had been taught by their scientific instructors,
such misgivings might be excused ; but now that these
hypotheses have given place to systems whose harmony
with the phenomena concerned, and with the demands
of the human mind, bespeaks their truth, antagonism
becomes inexcusable, and can exist only under the
ascendency of an intellectual night, too dense to be
penetrated by any illuminating agency known to
science. The fact is, that instead of looking upon such
investigators as their natural enemies, theologians
should regard them as theological pioneers, and, follow
ing in their wake, should cheer them onward in their
arduous, self-denying toils, and rejoice with them in
every successful onset made upon the vast territory of

4 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
mystery which must ever encompass the tiny sphere
of human knowledge. The benefits conferred upon
theology by science are sufficient, not only to disarm
antagonism, but to inspire the deepest gratitude. If
there is any class of the citizens of Belfast who should
hail with peculiar pleasure the advent of the British
Association, that class is the theological. While the
labours of this Association are good and profitable to
all classes and conditions of men, they are especially so
to theologians. The established sciences have shed
a light upon the majesty of God— upon His wisdom,
power, duration, beneficence, immensity — which should
thrill, with the most grateful emotions, the breast of
every man who names the name of God. How does
that night-piece of the sweet singer of Israel grow in
the range of its conceptions as we read it in the light
of the science of astronomy ! — " When I consider Thy
heavens the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the
stars which Thou hast ordained, what is man that
Thou are mindful of him, or the son of man that
thou visitest him ? " Surely the astonishment of the
shepherd of Bethlehem would have found no cause of
abatement in those astronomical revelations which
prove that the heavens, upon whose glories he gazed,
constitute but the vestibule of God's house ! Will not
a theologian who has studied the nicely-balanced
mechanism of the heavens, as expounded by astronomy,
be all the more competent to understand those passages
in which the sacred writers represent the Creator as
" meting out heaven with a span, comprehending the

SCIENTIFIC CONFIRMATIONS OF REVELATION. 5
dust of the earth in a measure, weighing the mountains
in scales, and the hills in a balance?" Is not the
expositor of the Book of Job a debtor to those investi
gators of molecular physics who have discovered " the
way where light dwelleth," and have revealed the
secret chamber of darkness ? Is it not something for
which an expositor of Scripture should feel grateful,
that science enables him to show that Job's interrogator
seems to have been acquainted with the recently
discovered fact, that light dwells in the pathway along
whose viewless lines it moves, and, as the question not
obscurely hints, that the same subtle pathway furnishes,
at the same time, the dwelling-place of darkness ?
Will not the questions relating to the guidance of
the constellations, have a deeper significance in the
estimate of one who has learned from the revelations of
the spectroscope, that Arcturus is moving with an
absolute velocity of seventy-five miles per second ?
Will not he who is aware that the arrest of the earth
in its orbit would reduce it into vapour, or that its fall
into the sun would develop an amount of heat equal
to that which would be produced by the combustion of
6435 earths of solid coal, or that a change in the rela
tion of its constituent elements effecting new chemical
combinations, would prove equally disastrous — will not
he who knows these scientific facts read all the more
intelligently, and with all the greater confidence, those
passages in which the pen of inspiration tells us that
there is a day coming when " the elements shall melt
with fervent heat," and when " the earth and all the

6 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
works that are therein shall be burned up " ? The
conditions of the fulfilment of this dread prediction,
science assures us, do exist, both within the bosom of
the earth itself and in its kosmical relations. Let but
the restraints by which these mighty agencies are held
in check be removed, and the onlookers from other
worlds would witness, in our own case, what onlookers
from ours have imagined they have beheld more than
once — the august spectacle of a world on fire, now
kindling into the dazzling radiance of a sun, and anon
fading away into the ashy paleness of planetary death !
Is not a theologian helped rather than hindered by
such scientific disclosures? In view of these facts,
there would seem to be but one alternative — viz.,
either that such men as the apostle Peter, an unlettered
fisherman, were eighteen hundred years in advance of
the philosophers of their day, or that they spoke by the
inspiration of the Almighty. Surely, if the most
eminent investigators of nature, unmoved by any over
ture from the theological world, feel constrained to
volunteer the acknowledgment that the conditions of
an event held forth with such prominence in the
Scriptures — an event so apparently at variance with
the phenomena — do exist in the forces of our system,
theologians have no reason to fear the issue of an
appeal from the Word to the works of God. Surely,
with such confirmations, tendered with such chivalry,
there is no cause for treating with suspicion those
patient sons of science, who, with a devotion as praise
worthy as that of the immortal Livingstone, are

SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF NATURE A DUTY. 7
prosecuting, often at the risk and peril of life, their
search after the head waters of a river whose mystic
wavelets, hitherto unseen, have all along been gladden
ing with light, and heat, and melody, the whole
universe of God. Theologians may rest assured it is
not from the fortresses of the established sciences, but
from the temporary stockades of plausible, though yet
unverified hypotheses, that scientists have come forth
to assail theology.
Nor is the attitude of an armed neutrality the
proper attitude of the theologian towards those who
are carrying their investigations into the province of
the ultimate forms, and forces, and capacities of matter.
Commanded of God, and challenged to the investiga
tion by the phenomena of His wondrous habitation,
and impelled to the inquiry by the very constitution
of his intellectual and moral nature, the theologian
is under the most imperative of all obligations to trace
in the visible, the invisible things of the Creator, even
His eternal power and Godhead. He who rests in
the phenomenal does not discharge this obligation.
The contemplation of the visible which does not carry
a man beyond the curtain under which the invisible
is veiled, is not religious contemplation, and has no
warrant either in our own nature or in the Word of
God. And as the visitor who wishes to make him
self acquainted with a piece of mechanism would not
be acting wisely if he were to decline the services
of one who had already mastered its details, neither
would that theologian be acting wisely who would

8 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
refuse to avail himself of the proffered aid of men
whose unquestionable achievements entitle them to
speak with authority in their own departments. Of
course this counsel is not to be understood as designed
to claim for unverified hypotheses any authority what
ever. No true scientist will advance the claim, and
no wise man will for a moment entertain it.
2. Passing to the other side of the contention it
is not difficult to show that the antagonism towards
theology, assumed by some scientific writers, is equally
groundless and gratuitous, originating, to a very large
extent, in misconceptions as to the principles and
sphere of theology.
(1.) It is assumed, without the slightest warrant,
that the empire of matter is so peculiarly the heritage
of science that the theologian has nothing whatever
to do with it, and is to be treated as an intruder
and trespasser when he crosses the boundary which,
it is alleged, separates theology from science. Nor
is there any warrant for the cognate assumption that
science is opposed to theology as sight is opposed
to faith ; or, as others put it, that faith begins where
science ends. So far is the primary assumption under
lying all these dicta, and animating the antagonism
they reveal, from being true, a moment's reflection
ought to satisfy any candid mind that it is utterly
fallacious. The sphere of science, as well as of theo
logy, is the unseen. A phenomenologist is not a
scientist. Phenomena are common to all men pos
sessed of the organs of sense; but it does not follow

SCIENCE LIKE THEOLOGY DEALS WITH THE INVISIBLE. 9
that all men thus endowed are thereby constituted
philosophers, or entitled to take rank as students of
science. The sphere of science lies beyond phenomena.
It begins, as theology does, where sight ends. It is
just as true of the causes to which science refers
phenomena as it is of the great First Cause of theo
logy, that no man hath seen them at any time. If
found at all, these causes must be sought within the
sphere of the unseen.
This truth is recognised and illustrated with great
pertinency by one whose attainments in science entitle
him to speak on this point. In a lecture on Radia
tion, delivered before the University of Cambridge,
Professor Tyndall thus expatiates on the very question
here at issue. "We have been picturing atoms, and
molecules, and vibrations, and waves, which eye has
never seen nor ear heard, and which can only be dis
cerned by the exercise of the imagination. This, in
fact, is the faculty which enables us to transcend the
boundaries of sense, and connect the phenomena of
our visible world with those of an invisible one. . . .
The outward facts of nature are insufficient to satisfy
the mind. We cannot be content with knowing that
the light and heat of the sun illuminate and warm
the world. We are led irresistibly to inquire, What
is light, and what is heat? and this question leads
us at once out of the region of sense into that of
the imagination. Thus pondering, and questioning,
and striving to supplement that which is felt and
seen, but which is incomplete, by something unfelt

10 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
and unseen, which is necessary to its completeness;
men of genius have discerned, not only the nature
of light and heat, but also, through them, the general
relationship of natural phenomena" (Fragments of
Science, pp. 212, 213).
Here, then, is the doctrine now advocated, given
out before the University of Cambridge, by one whom
the British Association has honoured with the high
office of President. His doctrine is ours. He holds
that the felt and seen have their TfKrjpa/Mi in the
unseen and intangible, and that the visible impels
us to seek its counterpart and complement in the
invisible. It must, therefore, be manifest to all, that
in what quarter soever the cause of this unhappy
antagonism is to be discovered, it is not to be found
in any diversity of opinion in regard to the sphere
within which .the causes of the things which are seen
are to be sought. It is just as true of the scientist
as it is of the theologian, that he cannot take a single
step towards the solution of the problems presented
by the phenomena of nature, without crossing the
boundary by which the visible is separated from the
unseen. Nor is this all. The scientist, as well as the theo
logian, crosses the boundary by faith. To the one,
as well as to the other, faith is the substance of
things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.
By it the Trpecrffinepoi of science, as well as those
worthies whose fame has been rendered deathless by
the pen of Inspiration, have obtained a good report.

SCIENCE ENTERS THE INVISIBLE BY FAITH. 11
Had Kepler, or Newton, or the Herschells, or the
men who have compelled nature to reveal under the
irradiation of the electric light, phenomena which
still point to a mystic cause unseen, been satisfied
to tarry where sight ends and faith begins, their
names had never been entered on the roll of fame,
and the universe had presented to the scientists of
Britain to-day, the very same riddle which puzzled
the schools of Greek philosophy thousands of years
ago. In a word, as it has been well put by Professor
Tyndall (Fragments, p. 73), " besides the phenomena
which address the senses, there are laws, and prin
ciples, and processes which do not address the senses
at all, but which must be, and can be, spiritually
discerned." Scientists themselves being the judges,
then, there is no ground for antagonism towards theo
logy to be found in any difference of opinion as to
the domain wherein the causes of the visible dwell
and operate.
(2.) Nor is the key to this antagonism to be found
in the rejection, on the part of theologians, of any
principle necessary to the most thorough investiga
tion of the laws and forces which are assumed to
exist and operate within the sphere of the unseen.
Theologians, as well as men of science, believe that
out of nothing, nothing can come. They believe that
every event comes forth upon the theatre of being,
because of the operation of an antecedent cause ; and
to the immediate and proximate elements of this
cause (elements in which physical science is too prone

12 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
to rest), they ascribe with scientists a veritable effi
ciency. When a religious man — and the greatest
scientific minds have been the most devout — enters
upon any process by which he would reveal the con
necting links by which the seen is bound to the
unseen, he does not feel that he is called upon to
offer, as a preliminary condition, his religious prin
ciples as a sacrifice to any scientific Moloch. A man
has not to become an atheist in order to become a
scientist, or to surrender his faith in the unseen, in
order to explore its wondrous arcana. Did Newton's
faith in God give way before he entered upon that
investigation which has rendered his name immortal ?
When he returned from the veiled mount of com
munion bearing in his hand that tablet, on which
was inscribed the law that every particle of matter
attracts every other particle with a force which varies
directly as the mass and inversely as the square of
the distance, did he feel constrained to abandon any
principle of theology? As a matter of fact no such
sacrifice was made by this prince of scientists; and
as a matter of principle, no such sacrifice was neces
sary. This is true of Newton; and, so far as the
question of principle is concerned, it is true of every
investigator who carries his inquiries into the domain
of causation. However it may be, as a matter of fact,
that some students of nature have abandoned the
idea of a God, it never has been shown, nor can it
ever be shown, that the tremendous sacrifice was
demanded by the collision of any ' principle of theo-

NO DISPUTE ABOUT KOSMICAL UNITY. 13
logy, with any principle of legitimate scientific inves
tigation. It cannot be questioned that theology holds
and insists on the scientific fundamental, that the
phenomena of the universe demand for their solution
the existence and operation of forces which lie within
the territory of the unseen.
(3.) Still further ; no cause of antagonism exists in
the views entertained respectively by scientists and
theologians, on the question of the correlation and
unity of the phenomena of nature. Turretine and
Humboldt, Hodge and Tyndall, are one on this ques
tion. It was the evidence of this unity that compelled
Humboldt to expand his projected physical geography
into " the Cosmos," and led him to the conclusion " that
nature considered rationally — that is to say, submitted
to the process of thought — is a unity in diversity of
phenomena, a harmony blending together all created
things, however dissimilar in form and attributes ; one
great whole (to irav) animated by the breath of life."
"To man," says Professor Tyndall, "no fact is either
original or final. He cannot limit himself to the con
templation of it alone, but endeavours to ascertain its
position in a series to which the constitution of his
mind assures him it must belong. He regards all
that he witnesses in the present as the efflux and
sequence of something that has gone before, and as
the source of a system of events which is to follow.
The notion of spontaneity, by which, in his rude state,
he accounted for natural events, is abandoned ; the
idea that nature is an aggregate of independent parts

14 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
also disappears, as the correlation and mutual depend
ence of physical powers becomes more and more mani
fest, until he is finally led, and that chiefly by the
science of magnetism, to regard nature as an organic
whole, as a body, each of whose members sympathises
with the rest, changing, it is true, from age to age,
but without one real break of continuity, or a single
interruption of the fixed relation of cause and effect "
(Fragments, pp. 373, 374).
On the question of correlation and unity, these
witnesses are true. The phenomena of nature, when
subjected to the process of thought, point inevitably to
the conclusion that nature is an organic whole. All
that telescope, or microscope, or spectroscope, or the
most dazzling radiance of the electric light reveals, are
but parts of this all-comprehending unity. He is not a
scientist who stops short of this conclusion, and neither
is he a theologian. The constitution of the human
mind, whether scientific or theological, will not brook
the idea that any finite thing exists out of relation, or
that all finite things do not constitute one harmonious
system. (4.) Passing from the negative to the positive, the
antagonism in question must be referred to the differ
ence which subsists between men of science and theolo
gians, in regard to the nature of the cause to which the
phenomena of the universe are to be referred. The
question, as already intimated, has not reference to the
immediate and proximate causes of the phenomena, but
to the ultimate. Scientists are satisfied with causes

THE REAL CAUSE OF ANTAGONISM. 15
which theologians maintain, are not sufficient to account
for all the phenomena. It is true the contrary repre
sentation is sometimes made. Theologians, it has been
said, " offer us intellectual peace at the modest cost of
intellectual life." This may be true of some theologians,
but it is demonstrably true of some scientists. Theo
logy demands, as an essential element in the complex
cause to which the phenomena of this universe are to be
referred, the presence and operation of a Personal
Intelligence, while some scientists are satisfied with the
assumption of the presence and operation of powers
resident in matter, acting in conformity with laws over
which no db extra intelligence has any control. The
whole phenomena of the organic and inorganic worlds,
it is held by this class of thinkers, may be accounted for
independently of the presence or presidency, or interven
tion of mind. A crystal of salt, or sugar, the stalk or
ear of corn, or the wondrous organism of the human
body, including the heart with its system of valves, and
the eye, or the hand, with their unrivalled mechanism,
are equally referable to the mysteries of molecular
physics. Many scientific thinkers believe "that the
formation of a crystal, a plant, or an animal is a purely
mechanical problem, which differs from the problems of
ordinary mechanics in the smallness of the masses and
the complexity of the process involved " (Fragments,
p. 119).
Those who will, may regard such speculations as
specimens of advanced scientific thinking, but those who
have regard to the constitution of the human mind and

16 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the laws of thought, will look upon them in a very differ
ent light. Whatever may be said of the initial stages
of such processes of thought, it is manifest that the
terminus prescribed, is one in which the laws of its
constitution will not permit the mind of man to rest.
The rest proffered by such thinkers can be accepted
only " at the modest cost " of holding in abeyance a
principle essential to all scientific and philosophic pro
gress — that constitutional principle which demands, not
simply a cause, but an adequate cause, for all the
phenomena submitted to investigation. Here, if any
where, " we have but one-half of a dual truth," and, if
the expression be allowable, the half we have is not the
half. Those who rest in molecular force as an adequate
solution of the problem presented in the phenomena of
crystallisation, vegetation, or animal life, leave out of
view the very factor whose agency is, of all others, the
most indispensable — that of an adequate intelligence
who employs the atoms and molecules for the pro
duction of a specific effect.
The merits and claims of these two methods of view
ing the phenomena of nature may be judged of, even by
referring to the least complex of the three instances of
constructive power just mentioned —that of crystallisa
tion. " The human mind," says Professor Tyndall, " is
as little disposed to look unquestioning at these pyra
midal salt crystals as to look at the pyramids of Egypt
without inquiring whence they came. How, then, are
those salt pyramids built up ? Guided by analogy, you
may, if you like, suppose that, swarming among the con-

ANALOGY BETWEEN CRYSTALS AND THE PYRAMIDS. 17
stituent molecules of the salt, there is an invisible popu
lation, controlled and coerced by some invisible master,
and placing the atomic blocks in their positions. This,
however, is not the scientific idea, nor do I think your
good sense will accept it as a likely one. The scientific
idea is, that the molecules act upon each other without
the intervention of slave labour ; that they attract each
other and repel each other at certain definite points or
poles, and in certain definite directions, and that the
pyramidal form is the result of this play of attraction
and repulsion. While, then, the blocks of Egypt were
laid down by a power external to themselves, these
molecular blocks of salt are self-posited, being fixed in
their places by the forces with which they act upon each
other" (Fragments, pp. 114, 115).
On this very pertinent analogy it may be remarked,
that theologians would agree with Professor Tyndall in
regard to the point wherein the analogy fails. They
would hold with the1 scientific writer, that the part
enacted by slave labour in the construction of the pyra
mids is, in the case of the crystals, performed by the
forces with which the molecules act upon each other.
In this respect it is at once conceded, the building of the
crystals differs from the building of the pyramids.
What was accomplished through the compulsory action
of slaves in the one case is, in the other, effected with
incomparable facility and exquisiteness of precision, by
the mutual attractions and repulsions of matter. Theo
logians, however, do not see how the dismissal of the
slaves, involves also the dismissal of their master. The

18 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
substitution of a piece of machinery for hand labour
does not involve the exclusion of mind from the work,
which is more efficiently performed by the machine
than by the hand; nor does the substitution of the
attractions and repulsions of molecules, at certain defi
nite points or poles, for slave labour, involve the exclu
sion of intelligence from the mystic machinery by which
crystals are built up. We may, for the convenience of
the expression, speak of the molecular blocks being self-
posited, just as we speak of the valves of the steam-
engine being self-adjusting; but the self-positing of the
molecules, as well as the self-adjustment of the valves,
must be referred ultimately to mind. This leads to the
remark, that the mind, in this comparison of the two
methods of architecture, is ruled by something beyond
mere analogy. As Professor Tyndall states, the human
mind is as little disposed to look unquestioning at
crystals as at pyramids. This is true, and implies all
that any advocate of teleology need ask. It implies
that the questioning is the result of our mental consti
tution. After this concession of the right and constitu
tional necessity of questioning the crystals, the only
point remaining for dispute must be as to the questions
to be asked. With regard to the pyramids of Egypt,
all are agreed. The questions are — 1. Who planned
them ? 2. What agencies did he employ in their con
struction? 3. For what object were they designed?
Now, it is admitted that the human mind cannot look
at the pyramids of Egypt without asking these, or
equivalent questions. How comes it to pass, then, that,

THE ANALOGY ABANDONED BY MATERIALISTS. 19
as soon as it turns to the contemplation of the other
pyramids, whose exquisiteness of finish outrivals all
architectural competition, such questions are to be
regarded as either altogether out of place, or are to be
reduced to the one question, What forces and laws
operated in their construction? Surely it is not
unreasonable to demand a reason for this apparent
arbitrary reduction of the catechism from three ques
tions to one. If, as the concession is, the very same
constitution of mind which compels us to question the
pyramids compels us to question the crystals, how is it
that we put three questions to the pyramids and only
one to the crystals? How is it that, whilst it is
admitted that the final form of the pyramid expresses
the thought of Cheops or Cephrenes, or of some one, it
is denied that the crystal expresses the thought of any
intelligence whatever ? Shall we be told that the
reason is to be found in the fact that the agencies by
which the crystals are built, are incomparably superior
to the agencies employed in the building of the pyra
mids ? This were to assume that the more exquisite
the agency employed the less manifest, or reliable, are
the evidences of the operation of the mind. If, as
science has shown, the work is done better through the
agency of forces and laws than by the labour of human
beings, directed by a superintendent, the conclusion is
inevitable, that behind these forces and laws there
exists a devising mind, arranging the agency and deter
mining the result.
This conclusion is inevitable, for it is demanded by

20 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the constitution of the human mind. No mind,
whether scientific or theological, can find a resting-
place in the play of atoms and molecules under the
operation of laws. The question must arise, how come
these ultimate atoms and molecules to act so har
moniously, and — to use the language of Professor
Tyndall (Fragments, p. 448) — " like disciplined squad
rons under a governing eye, arranging themselves
into battalions, gathering round distinct centres, and
forming themselves into solid masses," move with
unerring precision towards a manifestly predetermined
goal? This question, the human mind, by virtue
of its constitution, and not in consequence of its
experience, is compelled to ask ; nor will it be satisfied
with any answer which refers it to self-constituted
laws, or self-posited atoms, or self-adjusted molecules.
So far is such a reference from being satisfactory,
it leaves untouched the very thing to be accounted for.
What the mind demands a reason for is this exquisite
adjustment of the atoms and molecules, and this
reason is not rendered by referring the inquirer to
the operation of laws; for, apart from and outside of
matter, there are no such entities in existence as the
laws of matter. The laws of matter are simply the
modes in which matter, in virtue of its constitution, acts.
Oxygen unites chemically with hydrogen, in certain
proportions, under certain conditions, simply because
of the qualities or attributes wherewith these two
gases are invested. It is not the law which determines
the combination, but the qualities which determine

ULTIMATE ELEMENTS EXHIBIT MARKS OF DESIGN. 21
the law. These elements act as they act, simply
because they are what they are. Science has
rendered important service in discriminating these
elements, and specifying their attributes ; but in doing
so it inevitably and immediately raises the question,
how come these elements to possess these attributes ?
A man may reply, if he choose, that the data necessary
to the answering of this question do not exist; but
science has stripped him of this plea of ignorance ; for
by demonstrating the fact that if these elements did
not possess these qualities our world would possess no
water (and, consequently, no animal or vegetable life),
it has proved, beyond successful challenge, that the
elements of matter, bear on their foreheads the impress
of design.
The significance of this fact is manifest ; for as this
impress is revealed in the attributes or qualities ol
matter, and as these attributes are inseparable from
the essence of matter — as they simply inform us what
matter, in its essential nature, is — it must follow that
matter, in the very inmost elements and essence of its
constitution, exhibits marks of design. The chemist
may imagine as he prosecutes his analysis of the
organic and inorganic worlds, that when the mystic
process is completed all traces of design shall have
disappeared; but all such expectations are doomed
to a foreordained disappointment. From the ashes
of the crucible in which the gloomy incremation was
attempted, more than three score witnesses arise to
confound the atheism of the analyst, and to proclaim,

22 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
as with cloven tongues of fire, their testimony to the
existence of a design engraven on the very essence of
the ultimate elements of matter. This is, of course, all
one with saying that matter, in its ultimate elements,
is the product of mind ; for as those attributes bespeak
design, and are inseparable from the essence of matter,
the conclusion is inevitable, that the designer who
invested matter with such qualities must have
created it.
In a word, the data for answering all the questions
which the human mind, in virtue of its constitution, is
compelled to ask, do unquestionably exist. In its
inmost constitution, matter exhibits evidence of the
hand and purpose of its Author, and leaves no room for
the plea of dearth of evidence, preferred by those who
would have us repress the most important of all the
questions which the constitution of our nature impels
us to ask. From the portals of science no man need
turn away with these instinctive promptings of his soul
unsatisfied; and within those portals no scientist has
any authority to take his stand and tell inquirers, that
on the questions of authorship and purpose, the oracle
is mute. The antagonism which such proclamations
are fitted to engender is wholly gratuitous, and utterly
unwarranted by the facts.
To such conclusion do the revelations of science,
even within the sphere of inorganic, logically conduct.
The constitution of the mind of man is such that he
must ask, respecting a solitary crystal, every question
he is impelled to ask respecting an Egyptian pyramid.

CHEMICAL AFFINITY AND KOSMICAL HARMONY. 23
Nor is the urgency of the questioning impulse dimin
ished when, under the light of science, he learns that
the crystal does not exist in solitary isolation, but is a
constituent element of a harmonious system, towards
every member of which, under the proper conditions, it
is ready to manifest sympathies or antipathies without
which the unity and harmony of this wondrous
universe could not be maintained. If the scientific
mind can contemplate this modicum of matter in its
universal correlations, and rest satisfied without refer
ring it to any extramundane Intelligence, it must differ
in its constitution and instinctive longings, from the
human mind revealed in the phenomena of conscious
ness and in the history both of science and of the race.
He who can trace these correlations, as manifested by
those chemical affinities whereby the several elements
of matter are blended together into one beneficent
whole, or as expressed in those wide, space-pervading
attractions which interlace and hold in enrapturing
harmony the majestic array of the starry firmament,
and yet contend that the phenomena are accounted for
when they are referred to invisible atoms and mole
cules vibrating in an invisible ocean of ether, or to
invisible forces acting in conformity with invisible
laws, which are referable to no intelligence, and which
have no existence as distinct entities, and no causal
efficiency, must possess a mental constitution altogether
unique. Now, if the inorganic world itself, in its unquestion
able correlations, proves so manifestly the unwarrant-

24 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
ableness of the present scientific antagonism to
theology, surely the organic, with its flora and fauna,
must demonstrate the utter groundlessness of the
existing alienation. If the crystal, taken in its
internal structure and external relations, points inevit
ably, to a designing mind, much more manifest must
be the indications of design impressed upon the stalk
and ear of corn, or upon the wondrous organisms of the
various correlated forms of animal life. As there is not
time to enter upon this empire of evidence, indulgence
is asked simply for one illustration borrowed from the
myriad instances of correlation which subsist between
the inorganic world, so-called, and the organic. The
instance selected is that of the constitution of the eye,
and its adaptation to the constitution of light.
Science has proved that the optic nerve is insensible
to the calorific rays. It has been shown by experiment
that the retina of the human eye placed in the focus of
the calorific rays, which invariably enter into the
constitution of a beam of light, can encounter their
force with impunity, whilst a sheet of platinum foil,
placed in the same position, becomes red hot. To
what is this diversity of effect in the two cases due ?
The answer given by Professor Tyndall is, probably,
the true one — viz., that while the invisible waves of the
calorific rays generate synchronous vibrations among
the atoms of the platinum, on which they impinge, the
luminous waves alone generate synchronous vibrations
in the retina of the eye. Hence it is — "that those
rays, powerful as they are, and sufficient to fuse many

ADAPTATION OF THE EYE TO THE CALORIFIC RAYS. 25
metals, may be permitted to enter the eye and break
upon the retina, without producing the least luminous
impressions " (Fragments, p. 230). Will any mind,
scientific or human, conclude from these revelations
that the investigations of science have "tolled the death-
knell of teleology," or imposed upon theologians the
necessity of abandoning the immortal argument of
Paley from the marks of design presented in the organ
of vision with its manifold modifications ? Science, on
this point, has revealed something which Paley did not
know, but the revelation it has made, is simply a
contribution to Paley 's argument. It has revealed the
fact that the organ of vision formed and perfected in
darkness, has been so attempered and attuned in its
marvellous structure as to respond to the most delicate
vibration of the luminous rays, while it carefully
eschews, and repudiates all alliance with their dark,
destructive, kindred concomitants ! The mind which
can believe that such exquisite adaptations have been
brought about, and such perils uniformly eschewed
throughout the wide domain of vision, without the
intervention of any intelligence acting with reference
to a clearly defined end, must be either abnormal in
its structure, or abnormal in its habits and modes of
thought. And as it is in the instance just cited, so is it in every
other. The only effect which the marvellous discoveries
of science have had upon the teleological argument, has
been to add to its force and to extend its sphere. From
the ultimate atomic particles of matter, to the orderly

26 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
array of the terrestrial and celestial masses, and from
the tiniest organism of earth's flora, to the most
exquisite forms of its fauna, science has disclosed noth
ing on which there is not engraven the self-authenticat
ing signature of an antecedent design. Ground for
antagonism, therefore, there is none. Let theology
rejoice in the marvellous disclosures which science is
ever making of the manifold wisdom and power of God ;
and let science recognise that intelligent agency with
out which both the phenomena of the universe and the
forces they declare, must ever remain inexplicable to
man.

CHAPTER II.
ATOMISM — AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR TYNDALL'S
OPENING ADDRESS BEFORE THE BRITISH ASSOCIA
TION, 1874.
THOSE who have read the above address will
probably be reminded of Paul's encounter with
certain philosophers of the Epicureans and Stoics at
Athens. Epicureanism, as interpreted and expounded
by the poet Lucretius, constitutes the warp and woof
of Professor Tyndall's philosophy. His mission, like
that of Epicurus, is to rid the world of the gods.
'Epicurus aimed at the extirpation of the gods of
Greece; Dr. Tyndall aims at the extirpation of
the Jehovah of the Bible. By the magic wand of an
atomic deity, which it is his purpose to set upon the
throne of the Universe, he expects to free the world
from superstition and the fear of death. " Death only
robs us of sensation. As long as we are, death is not ;
and when death is, we are not. Life has no evil for him
who has made up his mind that it is no evil not to live."
Hear this ye suffering sons of toil, and struggle under
life's heavy load no longer. The President of the
British Association, by " a hint from Hamlet," indicates 27

28 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
an easy avenue of escape from the troubles of life. As
all the phenomena of the universe can be accounted for
by the endless dash and whirl of atoms acting through
time of immeasurable duration, there is no need of an
intelligent, conscious, author of the things that are
seen, or of those that are unseen, and, consequently,
there is no God to fear, no hell to shun, no heaven to
obtain. You may, it is true, find, as Epicurus did, that
when your philosophy, or your science, has freed you
from the disturbing notions arising from the doctrine
of a future state and a day of reckoning, that "the
ethical requirements of your nature " demand for their
satisfaction, substantially, all that your master has
taught you to discard. But what of that ? You can both
adore the gods and maintain your status as an Epi
curean. You can be both atheistic and theistic, both
godless and religious. You can cease to believe that
there is any room among the molecules for supplication,
and yet, without hypocrisy go to the house of prayer !
Such is the doctrine enunicated from the platform of
the British Association ! It is not new, as the historical
sketch by which it was introduced proves, nor do we
need to put it in practice in order to know what are its
fruits. The very name of Epicure has become a
synonymn for sensualist. The system has wrought the
ruin of the communities and individuals who have acted
out its principles in the past ; and if the people of
Belfast substitute it for the holy religion of the Son of
God, and practise its degrading dogmas, the moral
destiny of the metropolis of Ulster may be easily forecast.

GRAVE DEFECTS IN THE HISTORICAL SKETCH. 29
Referring to the historical section of Professor
Tyndall's address, it may be remarked: — 1. That as a
history of the philosophy, or science if he will, of the
historic ancestors of the race, it was certainly unaccount
ably defective. It was neither more or less than an
^discriminating, uncritical, summary of the usual hand
books of the philosophy of the Greeks. I do not stand
alone in this estimate, as may be seen by a reference to
a truly critical examination of this portion of President
Tyndall's address, by Professor Smyth of Aberdeen.
2. It is worthy of observation, that notwithstand
ing the narrowness of the sketch, the lecturer took
no notice whatever of one of the most significant
of the items of historical information it embraced. The
item referred to, is that in which he informs us, that one
of the conditions of the possibility of philosophy in
Greece, was the intercourse of the Greeks with the
Orientals. From this fact, there was one inference
which a philosopher might have drawn, and which has
been drawn by others — viz., that the light by which
nations have been raised from an estate of intellectual
and moral darkness, has invariably come from sources
without themselves. As the testimony of all history,
sacred and profane, points to the East as the primeval
source of this light, a calm, candid review of the subject,
might have led President Tyndall to have given the
Jewish Scriptures some credit in connection with the
intellectual birth of Greece. 3. Nor is it less remark
able that the lecturer should have overlooked the fact,
that the deliverance of Greece from the gods and demons,

30 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
was not affected by Greek philosophers, but by Christian
missionaries. When Thales, and Leucippus, and Demo
critus, and Epicurus, and Socrates, and Plato, and
Aristotle, had done their best, Greece was still given
over to the worship of gods innumerable. When the
great apostle of the Gentiles visited the arena, illumi
nated by these physical and metaphysical speculators, he
found the city given to idolatry. He found them, in
fact, where we now find Professor Tyndall, standing
before the record of their own ignorance, proclaiming to
the world that to them God was unknown, or as the
present head of the British Association expresses it —
the question, who made the starry heavens, "still
remains unanswered, and science makes no attempt to
answer it " (Fragments of Science, p. 93). 4. This
spirit of unfairness towards Christianity pervades the
lecture. The crude notions of Augustine and Boniface,
respecting the existence of antipodes, are spoken of as if
they were really sanctioned by the Bible, and the scien
tific attainments of the Arabs are contrasted with the
superstitions of Spain, without one hint of the atrocious
cruelties, which have rendered the word Saracen a term
of ignominy and reproach. In like manner, the safety
of Kepler, as distinguished from that of Bruno, or of
Galileo, is quietly ascribed to his German home, without
the slightest intimation as to the origin of that spirit of
freedom to which the safety of that home was due.
The historico-scientific critic who can ignore the Refor
mation as a factor in the progress of human thought, is,
ipso facto, proved incompetent to the task. 5. Nor

THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS AND THE SCHOOLMEN. 31
should it be omitted to note that Professor Tyndall's
estimate of the influence of the Schoolmen, does not
come very well from one who bepraises so unsparingly
the physical philosophers of Greece, who knew nothing
of science, in the modern sense of the term, and whom
no one, save the President of the British Association,
regards as scientists. To the whole Greek school, eulo
gised by Dr. Tyndall, the scientific investigation of
nature was impossible. Nor, after all, was their method
so alien from that of the Schoolmen, as he himself
incidentally acknowledges. If, as he tells us, their con
clusions rested on vague conjecture, and not on the
investigation of facts, was not their method, after all,
very closely allied to the a priori method of the
Scholastics ? It may be laid down as a rule that those
who are severest in their strictures upon the Schoolmen
know the least of their writings ; and that some of their
detractors are not slow to use their method when it may
serve their purpose. 6. In harmony with this method
of treating theologians, is his remark as to the qualifica
tion of Newton for expressing an opinion on theological
topics. Did Professor Tyndall mean to retort on New
ton his own criticism of Halley when he told Halley that
he was ready to hear him on any subject he had studied;
but that, as he had not studied the Christian evidences,
as he had done, he could not hear him on that subject ;
If he did, it is not presumptuous to reiterate the retort,
and tell the estimable President, that when he has
studied the Christian evidences as Newton did, he will
not be so ready to place Christianity and the mythology

32 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
of Greece under the same category. In the name of the
fadeless, peerless renown, of the greatest name known
to science, we reiterate the retort, and challenge its
author to show credentials such as Newton had, before
he ventures to assail the religion which shed its radiance
on the diadem of earth's greatest philosopher.
Passing from the historical, let us examine the
scientific department of this address. At the outset,
he lays down, as his scientific fundamental, the principle
that the human mind seeks to connect natural pheno
mena with their physical principles. " Determined by
an inherent impulse, by a process of abstraction from
experience, we form physical theories which lie beyond
the pale of experience, but which satisfy the desire of
the mind to see every natural occurrence resting on a
cause." It may be presumed that by a " physical
theory" Professor Tyndall means a theory respecting
physical phenomena, and that by the expression
" physical theories which lie beyond the pale of experi
ence " he means, not that the theories themselves lie
beyond the pale of experience, but that the causes
assumed in the theories lie beyond that pale. Inter
preted in the light of the address, the doctrine here
laid down is defective. It is perfectly true that the
human mind is so constituted that it must refer
phenomena, of whatever order, whether of matter or of
mind, to causes which lie behind the phenomena ; but
it is not the whole of the truth to say that the mind
seeks to refer physical phenomena to physical principles.
This the mind, by an instinctive impulse, does ; but by

MIND DEMANDS INTELLIGENCE IN ULTIMATE CAUSE. 33
the very same impulse it is compelled to do more.
Constituted as it is, it cannot rest at the boundary
prescribed for it by Professor Tyndall. When the laws
of Kepler are referred to the principle of gravitation,
the mind is gratified, but it is not satisfied. The
impulse which carries it thus far is just as urgent as
ever, and will not permit it to rest until it has solved
the question, Whence this principle of gravitation ?
It cannot but ask the question, How comes it to pass
that matter is possessed of this principle ? Nor will it
be satisfied by the information that every particle of
matter attracts every other particle with a force vary
ing directly as the mass, and inversely as the square of
the distance, because matter is what it is. The question
cannot be repressed, and must arise, How comes it that
matter is possessed of this marvellous quality, without
which the firm foundations of the earth, and the very
pillars of the universe must crumble into dust? If
without this quality in matter the fabric of the heavens
were an impossibility, who will dare to deny that the
existence of this attribute in the material of this
wondrous stellar temple, implies, of necessity, the
antecedent operation of mind ?
This final reference of the phenomena to mind,
Professor Tyndall and his so-called scientific school,
repudiate. In doing so, however, they abandon their
own primary principle — viz., that we must seek within
the domain of the unseen, causes which will satisfy this
instinctive impulse of the human mind. If they
acknowledge, as they do, their obligation to obey this
D

34 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
innate longing of man's nature, why do they arrest the
investigation in media via, and refuse to prosecute the
inquiry until this innate requirement is satisfied ?
Surely, it comes with the cast of no ordinary inconsist
ency from these apostles of liberty, to lay an arrest on
human thought. These friends are not slow to tell
theologians that they ask scientists "to purchase
intellectual peace at the modest cost of intellectual
life." I leave it with all intelligent, candid men, to say
who they are who lay this embargo on human thought.
It is these professedly liberal, free, enlightened investi
gators of nature who are amenable to the charge.
They refuse to go beyond the boundary of an inter
mediate station, at which no intelligent human being
can rest. Whilst professing to investigate what they
are compelled, by the very constitution of their own
being, to pronounce a system, they refuse to rise to the
conception of an intelligent Systematiser ! Recognising
the investigation as an exercise pre-eminently befitting
an intelligent being, they tell us that there is not, in
the whole phenomena, the slightest trace of intelli
gence !
It is well for the cause of truth that whilst the
lectures of the leaders of the British Association are
atheistic, their illustrations are eminently theistic. All
any man need ask, as a reply to Professor Tyndall's
atheism is Sir John Lubbock's lecture on the relations
of plants and insects, which was read on the same
occasion. That lecture won the most unqualified admira
tion. For it the lecturer merits thanks ; and especially

ESSENTIAL POINTS OF THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS. 35
for this, that whatever his own ultimate conclu
sions may be, he had the delicacy not to insult the
most cherished feelings of a Christian community.
In saying all this respecting one whom to hear is
to respect, I am not to be regarded as approving of
his Darwinism. The essential principle of that system
is in conflict with the fundamental on which we have
been insisting — it dispenses with' mind, save perhaps
at the outset, in the economy of earth's fauna and flora.
This is the Darwinian fundamental, and respecting it
I have no hesitation in saying that, constituted as the
human mind is, it cannot rest in any such system.
As this system has been presented and expounded in
Professor Tyndall's address, it will not be out of place
to examine it more closely. It assumes, as we are told,
several things which, it is alleged, no one can deny.
It assumes that the peculiarities of parents are trans
mitted to their offspring — that the fittest survive in
the struggle for existence ; and it assumes that those
peculiarities which are most favourable to the plant or
animal, may go on increasing from generation to
generation until an entirely distinct species is pro
duced. Such is the theory. What is the evidence on
which it rests ? The facts positively established are
those furnished by cattle-breeders and pigeon-fanciers,
together with certain variations beyond the sphere of
man's influence. Those occurring under the superin
tendence of man are, confessedly, the greatest which
can be historically traced. What, then, is the extent
of the variation ? Does it, in any case, amount to a

36 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
specific variation ? Does the history of the changes
wrought by the influence of man, present a single
instance of the origination of a new fertile species ?
Natural history answers, not one. We admit, therefore,
the law of variation, and we admit the law of heredity
— which, certainly, no Calvinist would deny — but we
demand the recognition of another law which sets
limits to both — viz., the law of maximum variation
from the original typical organism. The typical ideal
rules throughout ; and when the external influences,
under which the abnormal variations have been
induced, are withdrawn, the species reverts to the
original type ; for nothing abnormal can long abide in
nature. What have Darwinians to say to this ? They have
nothing, save unverified hypotheses. They are com
pelled to abandon the domain of fact, and make out
drafts upon a3ons of duration. No marvel that
Dr. Tyndall, in his address, felt compelled "to abandon,"
as he says, " all disguise, and confess that he prolongs
the vision backward across the boundary of the experi
mental evidence, and discerns (!) in that matter, which
we, in our ignorance, and notwithstanding our professed
reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with
opprobrium, the promise and potency of every form and
quality of life." Dr. Tyndall relies much on the
scientific uses of the imagination, and certainly he has
laid it under tribute here. In this instance, however,
he has drawn upon his imagination, not to conjure up
causes to account for existing phenomena, but to

DR. TYNDALL CONDEMNS A DARWINIAN CONCESSION. 37
conjure up facts from extra-experiential sources, for
whose existence he has no evidence within the domain
of nature, throughout the entire range of her history,
as reported by eye-witnesses, or as treasured up in the
strata of our globe. Darwinism, therefore, notwith
standing its pretensions, is unscientific, as it overlooks
the law of maximum departure from the normal type,
and as it requires for its support phenomena which
have hitherto abstained from entering upon the theatre
of existence, and which, in consequence of the law
referred to, can never, on Darwin's principles, come into
being at all.
Finally, against this hypothesis, we may cite no less
an authority than Dr. Tyndall himself. In the address
now under examination, with great candour he admits
that neither Mr. Darwin nor Mr. Spencer, has fully
faced the problem of the origination of life. " Dimin
ishing gradually the number of progenitors, Mr. Darwin
comes at length to one ' primordial form,' but he does
not say, as far as I remember, how he supposes this
form to have been introduced." As Mr. Darwin seems
to hold that the primordial form or forms were intro
duced by creative acts, our President is ultimately
compelled to confess that he does not see that much
advantage is to be gained by the diminution of the
number of created forms. The anthropomorphism,
which it seemed the hypothesis was intended to set
aside, he concedes is as firmly associated with the
creation of a few forms, as with the creation of a
multitude. " Two courses, and two only," he confesses

38 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
" are possible. Either let us open our doors freely to
the conception of creative acts, or, abandoning them,
let us radically change our notions of matter." This is
candid. It brings out, clearly and honestly, the ultimate
question raised by this hypothesis, and the ultimate
question raised by the atomic theory of the universe.
If the object be, as here avowed, to get rid of anthropo
morphism, or, to speak honestly, to get rid of mind,
then there is no alternative save that stated by
Professor Tyndall. We must change radically our
notions of matter. If we are to exorcise mind from the
domain of nature, we must transfer to matter the attri
butes of mind. Having done this, we shall find that
we have been engaged in the wonderfully intelligent,
and exceedingly philosophical exercise, of trying to
build again that which we thought to destroy.
In conclusion, attention is asked to that part of
the address in which the Lucretian, in the person of
the President, summons to the bar of the British
Association, the immortal Bishop Butler, and catechises
him on the so-called doctrine of instruments. The
Lucretian, reversing the process of the Bishop, begins
by the removal of the brain, or by a series of pressures
and relaxations of pressure, suspends and restores the
faculties of perception and action, or relates his own
experience under the effects of an electric shock. As
in all such cases the man himself is insensible, the
question is asked, Where is the man himself during the
period of insensibility ? Our first reply is that given
by Dr. Tyndall in the course of his dialogue with the

THE ATOMIC THEORY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY. 39
Bishop. It is simply this : " Can the atomic theory
account for the phenomena of sensation or thought ? "
" Can you extract from physical tremors these marvel
lous phenomena?" "Can you satisfy the human
understanding in its demand for logical continuity
between molecular processes and the phenomena of
consciousness ? " " This," as the Lucretian seems
inclined to confess, "is a rock on which materialism
must inevitably split whenever it pretends to be a
complete philosophy of life." In the second place, we
call upon the Lucretian to account for the phenomenon
of the feeling of personal identity throughout life by
his atomistic materialism. How is it that the President
of the British Association in his address in the Ulster
Hall, could confidently affirm that he was the same
person as that youth into whose mind the renowned
Thomson dropped, so many years ago, the germs of
those stores of knowledge he now possesses ? Seeing,
as all scientists will confess, that there was not a single
atom or molecule of the student boy existing in the
scientific president, how comes it that the president
feels conscious that" he is identified with the boy?
Here again, we ask, can the atomistic hypothesis
account for the phenomenon of human consciousness ?
Well, it has tried ; and let us hear what account it
gives of the matter. In his Fragments of Science, Dr.
Tyndall informs us that the departing atoms and mole
cules, as they leave the human organism, whisper the
secret to the new atoms and molecules as they arrive.
This is science we are, of course, bound to believe, for

40 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the gentleman who has enunciated it has since been
elected to preside over the discussions of the British
Association. The old worn-out atoms and molecules,
which never take their departure until they are
deprived of all vital energy, are, nevertheless, able to
give the password to new atoms and molecules— a pass
word, let it be observed, which must embrace not
simply their own history, but the history of the
antecedent elements of the organism from the very
dawn of memory ! Surely if the Lucretian was com
pelled to confess that the problem of the origin of
consciousness, was a rock on which materialism must
split, he is equally bound to concede that here is
another rock, on which the severed timbers of the tiny
craft must be broken into its original atoms. We
speak calmly, but with all the assurance which the
constitution of our nature can inspire, when we affirm
that the atomistic materialism of Dr. Tyndall is not
only silenced, but disproved, by the facts revealed in
the inextinguishable feeling of identity.
Finally, we find in the fable of the degradation of
Lucretius through his wife's philter, the material of a
pertinent retort. Speaking of the moral effects of
disease of the brain, Doctor Tyndall alludes to this
fabulous case. As, according to the fable, the brain of
Lucretius was so stimulated by base passions through
his jealous wife's philter, that he abhorred and slew
himself, we are asked to solve the riddle of this personal
antagonism. " How could the hand of Lucretius," we
are asked, " have been thus turned against himself if

RETORT FROM THE FABLE OF THE FILTER. 41
the real Lucretius had remained as before ? " Now
we accept the challenge given through the medium of
this story, and retorting upon the worthy President, we
ask, "who was the Lucretius that lifted his hand to
smite ? " If the brain be the man, and the brain be
debased, how are we to account for the man resisting
the promptings of his degraded self, and choosing life
rather than death before he would yield to the base
suggestions ? If the brain of Lucretius was Lucretius,
who was the Lucretius that rose up against that con
taminated brain, and dissolved the partnership ? The
materialist never walked the platform of the British
Association who could answer this question on material
istic principles. It may be said that the story is but a
fable, and does not merit attention. If it was worthy
the attention of the august savants of the British
Association, a review of it cannot be out of place by
those on whose most cherished hopes, the relator of it
would cast the dark shadow of an eternal night — a
shadow not greatly mitigated by the assurance of a
future in which " you and I, like streaks of morning
clouds, shall have melted into the infinite azure of the
past." It is but due to Dr. Tyndall to say, that he admits
his inability to answer such questions as we have been
propounding, and that he confesses, in his lecture and
in his Fragments of Science, the insufficiency of the
physical sciences to satisfy all the demands of man's
nature. This he does; but if he has the candour to
make this confession, how is it that he has not the

42 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
scientific justice to keep within the chosen sphere ? If
the physical sciences are not adequate to the task of
meeting the soul-longings after communion with the
mind, which, as we hold, lies behind the curtain which
hides the unseen, how is it that President Tyndall
attempts to account for everything by the atomistic
hypothesis ? Is this not trying to satisfy these immor
tal aspirations with atoms and molecules ?
And turning from Dr. Tyndall to the British
Association, is it too much to ask, why it is that their
President and others can be permitted to discuss the
very fundamental questions of theology from the side
of materialism, while they refuse to admit any paper
professedly on the other side ? We deny the charge so
persistently preferred against our common Christianity
— that it trammels and bridles thought, and lays an
arrest upon scientific progress. Such a charge can be
made to have an air of truth only by speaking of
religion in the generic, and identifying Christianity, as
Professor Tyndall has done, with systems of religion
from whose hands its professors have suffered martyr
dom. Judging by the fate of anti-Christian hypotheses
in the past, we can, with unfaltering confidence, face
the hypotheses of the passing hour and of the whole
future. When the advocates of these unverified
assumptions shall have done their worst, and when not
they, but their baseless anti- Christian conjectures, like
streaks not of " morning," but of evening cloud, shall
have melted into the infinite Erebus of an eternal
oblivion, that glorious old system, which has defied the

ATOMIC THEORY INDORSED BY HUMANTARIANISM. 43
whole power of earth's potentates to crush her, and put
to silence the mightiest champions of infidelity the
world has ever furnished, shall still shine on, its genuine
adherents increasing in numbers, in knowledge, and
holiness, until the whole earth shall be reclaimed from
the power of darkness and introduced into the light,
and life, and liberty of the sons of God.

humanitarianism accepts, provisionally, tyndall's
Impersonal Atomic Theory.
The London Inquirer of the 5th September, 1874,
a Humanitarian organ, indorses Dr. Tyndall's Atomic
theory. The substance of the article is expressed in the
following paragraph : —
" Taking up Tyndall's thought, we can now see that the
whole progress of science has seemed to strengthen the pro
test, and to give more strength to the doctrine of Lucretius
and Bruno : that ' matter, by its own intrinsic force and
virtue, brings these forms (of nature) forth.' Newton's
Principia went to show that, given in matter, the force and
law of gravitation and the laws of motion, there needed no
artificer now to construct the solar system. The nebular
hypothesis of Kant and Laplace set forth that matter originally
needed no artificer to mould it into worlds, if we suppose its
particles scattered abroad in space endowed with repulsion
and attraction. They would, of themselves, form rings,
planets, satellites, and sun. Dalton's chemistry showed that

44 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY
if we suppose a few kinds of primordial atoms of different
magnitudes, or endowed with different forces, and possessing
certain laws of attractive (elective 1) affinity, no artificer is
necessary to combine them into the innumerable compounds
and endow them with the qualities with which we are
familiar. Darwin's Origin of Species, and Descent of Man
suggested that, given certain organic forms of lowly type, no
artificer was needed to construct all the countless forms of
organic nature; for there were in these lowly forms, intrinsic
force and virtue, by which they develop into higher forms,
and these into higher, until the ascidian becomes the man.
Herbert Spencer, and now Tyndall, suggest that even in the
inorganic forms of air, water, phosphorus, and a few other
elements, there are intrinsic force and virtue to make them at
some period or other of the world's history — Bastian says to
make them now — of themselves combine and form organisms
of low type, which develop, according to Darwin's idea, ever
into higher type ; therefore these inorganic atoms possess a
latent life. Huxley would persuade us not only that these
inorganic atoms come in organic forms to Hve, but that in
the human brain they think, and feel, and will. Thus every
line of scientific inquiry seems to have led to larger and
larger belief in Bruno's intrinsic force and virtue of matter,
making more and more needless the conception of a Supreme
artificer." This defence, like all the attempts ever made to
account for the phenomena of nature, independent of
the antecedence or intervention of a Personal Intelli
gence, furnishes the material for its own refutation.
1. It recognises no such entity as mind existing apart
from matter. " Matter by its own intrinsic force and
virtue brings (all) the forms of nature forth." 2. The
ultimate atoms from which all the phenomena of the

THE THEORY ASCRIBES INTELLIGENCE TO MATTER. 45
inorganic and organic worlds come forth, are destitute
of life, or intellect, or consciousness, or will. 3. It is
not until these atoms enter into the human brain that
they begin to think, and feel, and will ! That is, mind
does not appear upon the theatre on which is enacted
this marvellous procession from formless to formed,
from blind force to conscious intellect and will, until
the astounding cycle is complete ! Such is the out
come of the long line of scientists, stretching from
Democritus to Tyndall and Huxley !
Now of this kosmogony it may be remarked — 1. That
he who can believe it should be careful not to speak of
the wildest of Greek or Hindoo kosmogonies as incred
ible. 2. That there is not a single step in this march of
nature from the atom to the conscious intellect and
will, which is not effected "at the modest cost" of
sacrificing the fundamental principle, that an effect
cannot transcend its cause. The writer in the
Inquirer may tell us that Tyndall's god is a great god,
and that his existence, "as the all-forming and all-
sustaining spirit of the universe," underlies Tyndall's
materialism, but the reply is obvious. As Tyndall's
god, in the antecedent inorganic world, is destitute
of life, or thought, or will, how comes it that
this lifeless, unconscious, unintelligent atomic deity,
can form or sustain anything ? and how comes it that
he acquires life, and clothes himself with the attri
butes of thought, and consciousness, and will ? These
philosophers bring in these attributes at the wrong end
of the progression, and can introduce them into the

46 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
series only at the sacrifice of the fundamental principle
of all sound philosophy, that the cause must account
for all the phenomena — that there must be in the
cause, that kind and degree of efficiency which will
rationally account for the effect.
The theory, therefore, leaves breaks in the chain for
which the human mind demands connecting links —
links which nothing but mind can forge. It is not
unnatural to ask, What gave to matter, " the force and
law of gravitation," and laid down "the laws of
motion " ? Given in matter this force and these laws,
these philosophers might manage to account for the
mechanism of the universe ; but when they have done
so, do they imagine that " the questioning impulse," on
which Dr. Tyndall lays such stress, will allow them to
escape the question, " How came matter to possess the
requisite conditions of this orderly array ? " Granting,
with Kant and Laplace, that matter endowed with
repulsion and attraction, however distributed through
space, needed no artificer to mould it into an orderly
array of worlds, will the constitution of the human
mind permit us to repress the question, " Whence the
qualities to which these antagonistic tendencies are
due, and how come they to be so nicely adjusted that
they eventuate in a precision of movement which is
absolutely mathematical, and indispensable to the
stability of the universe ? " Assuming that the various
chemical compounds found in nature, are the natural
outcome of "a few kinds of primordial atoms of
different magnitudes, or endowed with different forces,

THE LABORATORY OF NATURE REQUIRES A CHEMIST. 47
and possessing certain latus of attractive (elective?)
affinity" — assuming that, with such a primordial
atomic stock, " no artificer was needed to combine
them into the innumerable compounds, and endow
them with the qualities, with which we are familiar" —
assuming all these postulates, is it possible to repress
the question, "How came these primordial atoms to
possess these diverse qualities?" Is there a human
being in existence, unwarped by the bands of theoretic
prejudices, capable of holding with these philosophers,
that we have, in a sufficiently large laboratory, stocked
with the requisite kinds of primordial forms, all the con
ditions requisite to the production of our inorganic world ?
From the womb of such alchemy there could come forth
nothing save a huge meteoric stone. The mind which
can believe that our own fair earth, and the present
universe, with its stupendous array of suns and
systems, have come forth from some three score kinds
of primordial atoms shivering, dashing, whirling in the
alembic of infinite space, themselves uncaused, and
their combinations undirected, by any living, conscious
intelligence, presents a psychological puzzle which
absolutely defies solution, as its processes must be
carried on in defiance of the laws of thought. If, as
Professor Huxley has proved, and, to go no further, as
the tons of Australian meat now imported demonstrate,
no form of living thing ever comes into existence apart
from, or independent of, an antecedent life-germ, how
can "the indwelling" god of Dr. Tyndall and his
defender, furnish the vital germ, whilst he himself is

48 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
still destitute of life, existing in unconscious, unintelli
gent atoms ? Here, then, is another break in the chain
of these speculators, and who will furnish the missing
link? Darwin needs it, as the defence in the Inquirer
admits, for it asks for certain organic forms of a lowly
type to begin with. Given these, and an eternity for
development, and the ascidian — a headless mollusk—
becomes a man !
As to the final assumption of this defence — viz.,
" that even in the inorganic forms of air, water, phos
phorus, and a few other elements, there are intrinsic
force and virtue to make them at some period or other
of the world's history, of themselves, combine and form
organisms of low type, which develop, according to
Darwin's idea, ever into higher type" — as to this
assumption, both reason and the facts of science are
against it. The Darwinian hypothesis reaches here
the crucial point, where it must either admit the inter
vention of an extramundane intelligence, or find, in
inorganic matter, the attributes of mind. Herbert
Spencer and Professor Tyndall stand on the life side of
the chasm which divides the organic from the inor
ganic world, and, throwing into it " the inorganic forms
of air, water, and phosphorus, and a few other
elements," comfort Mr. Darwin with the assurance —
an assurance given in the face of Professor Huxley's
demonstration — that "at some period or other of the
world's history " he will find, if he returns, the much-
needed primordial germs ! Such is the science of
Herbert Spencer and Dr. Tyndall. It is but fair to

THE INORGANIC AND LIVING ORGANISMS. 49
Professor Huxley, to say that it is not his. No man of
science, such as Huxley confessedly is, could, without
imperilling his reputation as a scientist, take his stand
beside Spencer and Tyndall to await the evolution of
living organisms out of that medley of elements. Let
the "inorganic forms of air and water" be passed into
the chasm through a filter excluding all life-germs,
and if our expectations are to be regulated by the
recorded facts of scientific experiments, and not by an
unscientific imagination which seems to ascribe causal
efficiency to the mere element of time, we must look
upon the experimenters as chief mourners at the
grave's mouth of their atomic god. Their science,
falsely so-called, has bereft them of a Personal Intelli
gence, and genuine science has swept their " indwelling,
all-forming, and all-sustaining spirit " into a sepulchre
upon whose darkness the light of no resurrection morn
ing shall ever break. Rejecting Him who is the life
and light of men, and setting up in His stead an
impersonal kosmical life, they find themselves like the
worshippers of Baal on Carmel, invoking a god which
can give no response to their cries.
Absurd in their theology, they are equally absurd in
their religion. As an impersonal god is a god with
which no intelligent communion can be carried on, and
towards which no love can be cherished, their religion
is reduced to a something of which the writer in the
Inquirer attempts no account. The reader is solemnly
besought to observe this reticence. The writer dare
not, as he could not, expound the religion of this imper-

50 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
sonal theology. Let a man try to love, and hold com
munion with, the impersonal, atomic god of Dr. Tyndall,
and his moral and intellectual nature will rise up and
scatter to the winds the absurd imaginings of such vain
philosophy. The spirit of man cannot rest in a religion
which is not correlative to a living, conscious, Personal
Intelligence. It is for the Living God the human soul
fainteth and crieth out.
In a lecture on " Crystalline and Molecular Forces,"
delivered in Manchester, Professor Tyndall has so
far deferred to the religious feelings of the nation
as to read what some have regarded as a quasi
recantation. Referring, as he has already done in
his Fragments of Science, to the architectural
instincts of atoms, and rising from crystallisation
to the -manifestations of life in the sprouting leaves
and flowers of spring, he remarked that he had
often asked himself " whether there is no power, being,
or thing in the universe whose knowledge of that of
which I am so ignorant is greater than mine. I have
asked myself, Can it be possible that man's knowledge
is the greatest knowledge — that man's life is the highest
life ? My friends, the profession of that Atheism with
which I am sometimes so lightly charged would, in my
case, be an impossible answer to this question, only
slightly preferable to that fierce and distorted Theism
which I have had lately reason to know still reigns
rampant in some minds as the survival of a more
ferocious age."
Those who regard this deliverance as a recantation

DR. TYNDALL AND ATHEISM. 51
cannot be much accustomed to weigh the import of
language. The question asked is both equivocal and
inadequate. It is equivocal, inasmuch as it designates
the unknown something after whose existence it
inquires, by alternative terms, and these the vaguest
furnished by the English language — the terms " power,"
" being," and " thing." Whatever may be said of the
former, it is manifest that knowledge cannot be ascribed
to the latter without doing violence to language.
Let Professor Tyndall substitute the word person for
these vague terms, and the public will be put in a
position to judge of the force of his questioning.
The inadequacy of the question, even were it rendered
unequivocal in the way suggested, is obvious. He does
not ask, "Can it be that there is no One to whose
wisdom and power these things are to be ascribed ? "
but simply, " Is there no one who knows more about
them than Professor Tyndall ? " So long as knowing
is different from creating, search after one who knows
must be regarded as a different thing from search after
one who has created. As the order of existence of
which Professor Tyndall is in search belongs to the
former category, he must excuse those who refuse to
regard the raising of such an inquiry as proving that be
is not amenable to the charge of Atheism.
Equally unsatisfactory is Dr. Tyndall's answer to this
vague question. He simply asks his audience to infer
from the fact that he often put such questions to him
self, that the imputation to him of Atheism was
gratuitous and groundless. This inference, it would

52 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
seem, his audience drew ; but there is a wide difference
between the applause of a popular assembly, such as
that convened in the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, and
a legitimate logical deduction. Neither the question
put nor the profession of profound thought with which
it was introduced, warranted the conclusion that Dr.
Tyndall repudiates the Atheism wherewith he has been
charged. The Atheism charged against him is simply
this — that he denies the existence of an extramundane,
antemundane, personal intelligence, the Creator and
Governor of the universe; and the ground on which
this charge is based is, that by ascribing to matter the
attributes of mind, he leaves no room for any such out
side intelligence, and by teaching, as he does, even in
his Manchester vindication, that the power, or being, or
thing, about whose existence he often questions him
self, is resident in nature, he strips this hypothetical
deity of the essential attributes of personality. Our
God is a personal intelligence, antecedent to matter and
independent of it ; whilst Dr. Tyndall's god is an imper
sonal something, resident in matter, and incapable of
existing in a state of separation from it. Holding such
views (and his Fragments of Science, his inaugural
address, and his Manchester vindication, prove that he
holds them), it was neither a manly nor a righteous
procedure, to claim exculpation from the charge of
Atheism on the ground that his bosom is sometimes
stirred by that irrepressible "questioning impulse,"
whose catechism he has reduced to the one inquiry,
" Can it be that there is no power, being, or thing in

GROUND ON WHICH ATHEISM IS CHARGED. 53
nature that knows more about these things than he
does himself?" Let Professor Tyndall candidly and
explicitly say, that his god is a personal intelligence,
independent of matter and the creator and governor of
it, and his accusers will at once acquit him of the
charge of Atheism. Until he does this, he must be
regarded, for the reasons already stated, as lawfully and
righteously arraigned.
Nor is it unworthy of notice that the ground on
which Professor Tyndall asked the good people of
Manchester to acquit him of the charge preferred
against him by the people of Belfast, was not the
ground on which the people of Belfast based their
charge. He did not tell his audience in the Ulster
Hall what he told his audience in Manchester, about
the profound thoughts by which he is sometimes moved
in presence of the marvellous phenomena of matter.
On the contrary, he told us that by prolonging his
vision backward he could " discern in matter the pro
mise and potency of all forms of life,'' and held out
to us the enchanting prospect of an ultimate retro
gressive absorption "into the infinite azure of the
past." With these avowals before us, we thought
we were warranted in regarding the man who made
them an Atheist.
The principle on which this appeal from Ulster to
Lancashire is based, is, therefore, unfair. It is simply
this — that a man's opinions are not to be judged of
from his present avowal of them, backed by all pre
vious avowals, but by an avowal, in equivocal terms,

54 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
to be made in another place and at another time,
of which his present judges have no intimation. Or,
to put the case in the concrete, the people of Belfast
who heard Professor Tyndall lecture in the Ulster Hall
on the 19th of August, are to be condemned for not
basing their estimate of his lecture upon certain apolo
getic remarks, made in the course of another lecture
delivered by him in the Free Trade Hall, Manchester,
on the 28th of October following. This remark has
reference simply to the principle of this recent attempt
at vindication, and is not to be understood as imply
ing that the knowledge of the exercises of Professor
Tyndall's mind, detailed in the preface of his inaugural,
and afterwards avowed in Manchester, would warrant
any modification of the charge of Atheism of which
he complains. As already stated, an impersonal some
thing, which has no subsistence or being apart from
matter, cannot be regarded as the author of this uni
verse, or the lord of the human conscience ; and those
who applauded such utterances as amounting to a
genuine repudiation of Atheism, must be very easily
satisfied in the matter of evidence.
Whilst it is gratifying to witness the unity of Christian
sentiment evoked by these recent Atheistic utterances,
it is painful to observe the position taken by the
Roman Catholic hierarchy of Ireland in their answer
to Professors Tyndall and Huxley regarding the sphere
of science. As stated in the newspapers, their position
is this — " It is the duty and right of physical science to
observe the phenomena and laws of the material world-

ROMISH DOCTRINE OF THE SPHERE OF SCIENCE. 55
but the physicist, as such, will never ask himself by
what influence, external to the universe, the universe
is sustained, simply because he is a physicist. The
question is extra artem. It is simply unscientific to
speak of the theories of the universe as part of the
domain of physical science, and so called in the con
stitution of the Catholic Church, which sets forth the
entire conception of the just position of science in the
words of truth."
This deliverance is in conflict both with Scripture
and science, and leads, logically, to the secularisation
of the physical sciences. It is in conflict with Scrip
ture ; for the Word of God condemns the heathen for
not tracing the phenomena of the universe to God as
their author ; whilst this deliverance would terminate
the inquiry within the domain of law. If the heavens,
as the Word of God teaches, declare the glory of God,
is the astronomer to be shut out from beholding that
glory? If the earth showeth forth His handiwork,
is the geologist to be restrained from tracing the
evidences of His workmanship ? If these bodies of
ours are so fearfully and wonderfully made, as the
Psalmist informs us, is the physiologist to shut his
eyes lest he might see in the organism evidence
of an organiser? If the Word of God enjoins it
upon men as a duty to infer the invisible things
of the Creator from the things that are made, have
not the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Ireland taken
up an attitude of antagonism to that Word, by
prohibiting scientists, as such, from rising above

56 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the law to the infinitely wise, Almighty Law
giver? The position taken is as unscientific as it is unscrip-
tural. Science cannot rest in mere law. The principle
of causality forbids the human mind from taking up
its abode in any such resting-place. If, as all admit,
science seeks to ascertain the cause of phenomena, it
must go beyond law, for a law is not a cause. The
law of gravitation is not the cause of gravitation. The
immediate or proximate cause is to be found in the
qualities of matter. As these qualities are essential
to the stability, and orderly and beneficent arrange
ments of the universe, they point beyond themselves
to an Author infinite in wisdom, omnipotent, and good.
Can the investigator who enters upon the inquiry under
the impelling power of the " questioning impulse,"
directed by the principle that every effect must have
an adequate cause, be regarded as having finished his
task as a scientist until he has traced these palpable
products of mind to an adequate intelligence ? The
impulse and principle by which the scientist is carried
beyond the veil of phenomena into the unseen realm
of law, must, if not repressed by the icy hand of
Atheism, urge him onward and upward, to the inevit
able conclusion of a personal God ; and, on the other
hand, the principle that would restrain him within
the domain of law must, if carried into full operation,
doom him, absolutely and exclusively, to the sphere
of the phenomenal, and place all his questionings under
the ban of an utter repression.

ROME SEVERS SCIENCE FROM RELIGION. 57
It is scarcely necessary to add that the limitation
of science prescribed in this manifesto of the bishops
and archbishops of the Roman Catholic Church in
Ireland, involves the severance of science from religion.
If the physicist, as such, is going extra artem, stepping
out of his sphere, when he raises the question, who
or what sustains these phenomena, and gives them
their laws, it must be manifest that his class-room,
for the time being, is godless, and that it is rendered
such by no fault of his, but by the specified limits
of his subject. There may be some minds acute
enough to distinguish between this position and that
taken up by Professors Tyndall and Huxley, but they
must possess powers of discrimination beyond the
most of men. Between the position of the men who
deny that science reveals a personal intelligence, and
that of the men who deny that science entitles the
scientist to raise the question, who or what sustains
this universe, the difference is too infinitesimal to
justify further discussion.

CHAPTER III.
AUTOMATISM — ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT ANIMALS

THIS discussion owes its origin to certain proceed
ings connected with the meeting of the British
Association in Belfast. The programme embraced
two public lectures — one by Professor Tyndall, and the
other by Professor Huxley. The former was inaugural,
the latter was voluntary. These lectures now con
stitute a portion of the history of the learned body
under whose auspices they were delivered, and have
brought about a crisis in its organic life. They have
revealed to all men what to many needed no revela
tion — that between theism and atheism there can be
no fellowship on the field of science. These lectures
were an open proclamation of war — of war, not simply
against Christianity, but of war against the funda
mental truth of all religion and morality — of war
against the idea of a personal God. Having thrown
* Abridged from the Author's reply to Professor Huxley's
Address at the meeting ofa the British Association in Belfast, in
1874. 58

CRITICS NOT LIMITED TO THEIR OWN PROFESSIONS. 59
down the gauntlet on the platform of the Ulster Hall,
in terms by no means complimentary, the lecturer who
tendered it declined to meet, face to face, on that same
platform, one who accepted the challenge. There
was, therefore, no alternative left to men who are set
for the defence of religion and public morals, thus
ruthlessly assailed, but to examine, in some such way
as the present, the arguments advanced by these
eminent atomic, molecular chiefs. As my reply to
Dr. Tyndall's Atomic Theory of the Universe is already
given in Chapter II, I shall, in this chapter, devote my
attention to the examination of Professor Huxley's
lecture on the Automatism of Animal Organisms.
As an apology for venturing to criticise the argu
ments of so high a physiological authority, I may be
permitted to avail myself of one furnished by Professor
Huxley himself, in his reply to Sir Wm. Thomson's
Essay on Geological Time : " It is true that the charges
brought forward by the other side involve the con
sideration of matters quite foreign to the pursuits with
which I am ordinarily occupied ; but, in that respect,
I am only in the position which is, nine times out of ten,
occupied by counsel, who nevertheless contrive to gain
their causes, mainly by force of mother-wit and common
sense, aided by some training in other intellectual
exercises." Armed by such a precedent, and knowing,
as a matter of fact, that Professor Huxley's " training "
in physiology has not made him a psychologist,
I proceed to put my pleading before the reader.
At the outset, it is but due to this eminent physio-

60 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
logist to say that, notwithstanding the temper revealed
at the close of his lecture in the nicknames by which
he indicated his estimate of the morality and intelli
gence of Christian ministers, his exposition of that
part of the structure of animal organisms entitled the
nervous system, was exceedingly lucid. As one
followed him from point to point, it was very difficult
to refrain from exclaiming, in the language of the
Psalmist, "I will praise Thee, for I am fearfully and
wonderfully made." That no such utterance was
evoked from the lecturer, some may say was due to
the fact that he was not treating of the origin of the
organism, but simply of the action of one of its parts ;
that he was dealing with physiology and not with
psychology, and that it did not come in his way to
point out the teleological bearings of his subject.
Such an explanation will hardly suffice; for the
expositor, in taking the ground that all the phenomena
presented in the movements of animal organisms are
fully accounted for on the hypothesis that they are
mere automata, has left no room for any psychological
hypothesis. He may tell us, as he did, that his
automatic hypothesis leaves the question whether
animals have souls, and if so, whether these souls are
immortal, an open question ; but in doing so he merely
repeats, in the case of the soul, the argumentative
policy he has pursued in dealing with the momentous
question of the being of God. Giving all his energy to
the exorcism of mind from the organic and inorganic
worlds, he hesitates in presence of the ideal desolation

STATEMENT OF THE AUTOMATIC HYPOTHESIS. 61
wrought, and oscillates between theism and atheism.
To such an extent has this policy hitherto dominated
his deliverances, that some have regarded the charge of
atheism preferred against him as altogether groundless.
The prevalent misconception on this point will be a
sufficient apology for a somewhat formal statement of
the grounds on which this charge is based.
For this, and many other reasons, I feel con
strained, in my place, and according to my measure, to
examine the hypothesis that animal organisms are mere
automata. This hypothesis professes to find in the
physical organisms of animals, and their environment, a
sufficient cause for all their movements, independent of
their possessing any inherent power of self-determination.
All their actions, it is assumed, can be accounted for by
referring them to molecular changes in the sensor and
motor nerves, the latter causally connected with the
former, while they in turn owe their origin to the
action of their environments. Such is the doctrine;
and for it Professor Huxley claims the sanction of
Descartes and of modern physiology. In attempting
to establish this claim he undertakes to show that a
series of propositions, embracing the essential elements
of this hypothesis, constitute the foundation and
essence of the modern physiology of the nervous
system, and are fully expressed and illustrated in the
works of Descartes.
The first of these propositions is as follows: "The
brain is the organ of sensation, thought, and emotion ;
that is to say, some change in the matter of this organ

62 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
is the invariable antecedent of the state of conscious
ness to which each of these terms is applied."
In justification of his attributing such doctrine to
this renowned intuitionist, our learned physiologist
cites the following passage from the Principles of
Philosophy : —
"Although the soul is united to the whole body, its
principal functions are, nevertheless, performed in the brain ;
it is here that it not only understands and imagines, but also
feels; and this is effected by the intermediation of the
nerves, which extend in the form of deHcate threads from
the brain to all parts of the body, to which they are attached
in such a manner, that we can hardly touch any part of the
body without setting the extremity of some nerve in motion.
This motion passes along the nerve to that part of the brain
which is the common sensorium, as I have sufficiently
explained in my treatise on Dioptrics ; and the movements
which thus travel along the nerves, as far as that part of the
brain with which the soul is closely joined and united, cause
it, by reason of their diverse characters, to have different
thoughts. And it is these different thoughts of the soul,
which arise immediately from the movements that are
excited by the nerves in the brain, which we properly term
our feelings, or the perceptions of our senses."
To strengthen the evidence furnished in the preced
ing sentences, Professor Huxley adduces a sentence or
two from Les Passions de I'Ame, which run thus : —
" The opinion of those who think that the soul receives
its passions in the heart, is of no weight, for it is based
upon the fact that the passions cause a change to be felt in
that organ ; and it is easy to see that this change is felt, as
if it were in the heart, only by the intermediation of a little

MAKES DESCARTES A SENSATIONALIST! 63
nerve which descends from the brain to it ; just as pain is
felt, as if it were in the foot, by the intermediation of the
nerves of the foot ; and the stars are perceived, as if they
were in the heavens, by the intermediation of their light and
of the optic nerves. So that it is no more necessary for the
soul to exert its functions immediately in the heart to feel
its passions there, than it is necessary that it should be in
the heavens to see the stars there."
Having cited these passages, Professor Huxley
proceeds as if he had proved his proposition, and
affirms that " this definite allocation of all the pheno
mena of consciousness to the brain as their organ, was
a step the value of which it is difficult for us to
appraise, so completely has Descartes' view incorpo
rated itself with every-day thought and common
language." We were often told, during the meeting of the
British Association in Belfast, that science is distin
guished for its coolness; and certainly, if we are to
appraise Professor Huxley's claims upon the basis of
this exposition of the Cartesian Philosophy, he must
rank among the most eminent scientists. It required
no ordinary measure of this scientific grace to face the
philosophic and scientific world, both on the platform
of the British Association and through the pages of the
Fortnightly Review, and endeavour deliberately to
prove that Rend Descartes (the author of one of the
most notable of all the d-priori arguments for the
being of God) was a Sensationist — that he held and
taught that consciousness has, as its invariable ante
cedent, a change in the matter of the brain !

64 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
With regard to the passages cited in proof, it may be
remarked : —
1. That they furnish no ground for the doctrine
ascribed to Descartes in Professor Huxley's first propo
sition. His proposition is universal, embracing and
jumbling together the whole phenomena of conscious
ness, without discrimination and without exception —
all thought, all emotion, as well as sensation — whilst
the passages adduced have reference simply to thoughts
caused by sensation.
2. All that they teach is, that the soul, instead of
being diffused throughout the body, resides in the
brain, and holds communion with the body and external
nature through the intermediation of the nerves.
Descartes simply repudiates the notion that it is
necessary for the soul to be, or to exert its functions,
immediately in the place where it apprehends the
phenomena to exist ; as he says, in the very instances
specified by Professor Huxley, "It is no more necessary
for the soul to exert its functions immediately in the
heart, to feel its passions there, than it is necessary
that it should be in the heavens to see the stars there."
3. To infer from this statement in regard to the
habitat of the soul, and the medium through which it
holds communication with the members of the body
and the stars of heaven, the sweeping generalisation
that the soul has no thought or emotion, save those
received or excited by antecedent nervous or cerebral
thrills, is not only to outrun the data relied on in the
quotations, but to make Descartes contradict himself.

DESCARTES AN INTUITIONIST. 65
The proposition which Professor Huxley enunciates
as expressing the views of Descartes in regard to the
relation of the soul to the brain, is contrary to the
fundamental principles of the Cartesian Philosophy.
What Professor Huxley affirms Descartes denies. In
stead of holding that the soul is dependent upon the
molecular changes which take place in the brain for all
its thoughts and emotions, Descartes laid it down as
the first principle of his philosophy, that the soul knows
itself first, and knows the body in which it dwells, and
the external world, subsequently, and this because of the
primary truths which belong to, and are inseparable
from, its very being. It were to insult the intelligence
of our age, to enter formally on the proof of Descartes'
position as an intuitionist. Let the following suffice.
Referring to such thinkers as our modern atomists,
Descartes remarks : —
" Those who have not thought in an orderly manner have
had other opinions on this subject, because they have never
distinguished carefully enough their soul, or that which
thinks, from the body, or that which is extended in length,
breadth, and depth. For while they had no difficulty in
believing that they were in the world, and that they had
more assurance of it than of any other thing, nevertheless, as
they have not taken care that by them, when it was a
question of metaphysical certainty, attention ought only to
be given to their thought, but on the contrary have preferred
to believe that it was- their body which they saw with their
eyes, which they touched with their hands, and to which they
attributed preposterously (mal a propos) the faculty of feeling,.
they have not apprehended clearly the nature of their soul.

66 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
" But when the thought which takes cognisance of itself
in this way, notwithstanding that it persists still in doubting
other things, uses circumspection in trying to extend its
knowledge further, it finds in itself primarily ideas of several
things ; and while it contemplates them simply, and does not
assert that there may be anything outside of itself which may
be like these ideas, and also does not deny that there may, it
is not in danger of being mistaken. It finds also some
common notions, of which it constructs demonstrations which
persuade it so absolutely, that it cannot doubt their truth
while it applies itself to them. For example, it has in itself
ideas of numbers and figures ; it has also, among its common
notions, ' that if equals be added to equals, the wholes will
be equals,' and many others as evident as this, by which it is
easy to prove that the three angles of a triangle are equal to
two right-angles," &c. (Les Principes de la Philosophie:
Premiere Partie, §§12, 13).
The foregoing may suffice to prove that Rend Des
cartes was not a Sensationist. Holding, as the passages
referred to prove he did, that all knowledge has its
origin in the soul, that it is the soul which knows and
sees and feels, and that its knowledge of other things,
including the body, is possible only on the intuitive
perception of its own nature and powers and innate
principles, he could not, without an absolute surrender
of his whole system, turn round and adopt the sensa
tional, materialistic dogma, that the brain is the organ
of the soul in such a sense as that all our thoughts and
emotions — our innate ideas and primary beliefs, as well
as those excited by our sensations — require as their
invariable antecedent some change in its matter.
As Professor Tyndall has discussed the point here

CONSCIOUSNESS AND MOLECULAR CHANGE. 67
raised, it may not be uninteresting to hear his verdict.
In his Fragments of Science, pp. 119-121, this able
physicist remarks : —
" Associated with this wonderful mechanism of the animal
body we have phenomena no less certain than those of
physics, but between which and the mechanism we discern
no necessary connection. A man, for example, can say,
/ feel, I think, T love ; but how does consciousness infuse
itself into the problem ? . . . The passage from the physics
¦of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is
unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite
molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously ; we do
not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudi
ment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a
process of reasoning, from the one to the other. They
appear together, but we do not know why. . . . The chasm
between the two classes of phenomena would still remain
intellectually impassable. Let the consciousness of love, for
¦example, be associated with a right-handed spiral motion of
the molecules of the brain, and the consciousness of hate with
a left-handed spiral motion. We should then know when we
love that the motion is in one direction, and when we hate
that the motion is in the other; but the 'why?' would
remain as unanswerable as before."
Such is Professor Tyndall's account of the two classes
of phenomena in question — the phenomena of con
sciousness, and the phenomena of the molecular changes
of the brain. They occur simultaneously; and be
tween the two, he confesses, he can see no necessary
connection. " They appear together, but we know not
why." This is a very different doctrine from that advanced

68 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
in Professor Huxley's first proposition. According to-
Professor Tyndall, the change in the brain occurs
simultaneously with the thought or emotion ; accord
ing to Professor Huxley, it invariably precedes. The
invariable antecedence of the change to the state of
consciousness was necessary to the argument ; but here,
as in many other instances, the molecular chief has
broken the links of the physiological chain. The
antecedence destroyed, the causal relationship is
disproved, and with it the hypothesis that the environ
ment determines the molecular change in the sensor
nerves, and, through them, the changes in the motor
nerves, which determine the movements of the muscles,.
and, ultimately, of the whole organism. It is hard to
see one's offspring strangled in the very birth ; nor does
it tend to mitigate paternal anguish, to discover that
the hand which perpetrated the deed was the hand of a
trusted friend.
The only other proposition meriting formal notice, is
that which affirms that " the motion of the matter of a
sensory nerve may be transmitted through the brain to
motor nerves, and thereby give rise to contraction of
the muscles to which these motor nerves are distributed;
and this reflection of motion from a sensory into a
motor nerve may take place without volition, or even
contrary to it."
In support of this proposition, in behalf of which he
claims the results of recent research in nerve physi
ology, Professor Huxley cites, with approval, the follow
ing example adduced by Descartes : —

ALLEGED INVOLUNTARY ACTION EXAMINED. 69
" If some one moves his hand rapidly towards our eyes,
as if he were going to strike us, although we know that he
is a friend, that he does it only in jest, and that he will be
careful to do us no harm, nevertheless it will be hard to
keep from winking. And this shows that it is not by the
agency of the soul that the eyes shut, since this action is
¦contrary to that volition which is the only, or at least the
chief, function of the soul ; but it is because the mechanism
of our body is so disposed, that the motion of the hand
towards our eyes excites another movement in our brain, and
this sends the animal spirits into those muscles which cause
the eyelids to move."
Now, it will be observed that the doctrine of
Descartes, as expressed in the proposition and illustrated
by the example cited, comes very far short of the
doctrine advocated by Professor Huxley. Descartes
does not allege, nor could he (without placing himself
in direct antagonism with the fundamental principles
of his philosophy), allege, that the so-called reflex
action is the normal action of the organism. He
merely says, that through the mediation of the animal
spirits, and without the intervention of the soul, the
requisite action of the brain, and of the appropriate
muscles, may take place in certain cases. This, how-
over, is a very different thing from alleging that reflex,
unmediated, unvolitional action, is the rule. Invol
untary winking does not prove that men never will to
wink ! The fact that in some instances there occur
actions undetermined by our wills, cannot, without
doing violence to our consciousness, be regarded as
establishing the universal proposition that we are mere

70 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
automata, whose actions, one and all, are determined
by our environments, independently of understanding,.
reason, or will. We are conscious that our under
standing and reason, and will, do each according to its-
measure and function, deal with the data of sensation,
and that the actions which make up the history of our
daily activity are determined by their arbitrament.
A complete analysis of the phenomena presented in
the instance adduced, will disprove the alleged automa
tism of this particular action of winking. We have
phenomena belonging to each of the three great classes
into which metaphysicians divide the operations of the
human mind. 1. There is an act of cognition, by
which the mind apprehends what, under ordinary
circumstances, and without the guarantee of friendship,
must be regarded as placing the eye in peril. 2. There
is, consequent upon this apprehension, a feeling of pain,
which cannot be said to be purely physical, inasmuch
as no injury has as yet been inflicted, but must be
purely mental, arising from the anticipation of suffer
ing apparently imminent. 3. There is a cognate act of
conation, or effort to shield the imperilled organ from
the impending danger. This act of conation, it is
worthy of note, extends not simply to the closing of the
eyelids, but to the raising of the hands into a position
of defence, and to the sudden retraction of the head to-
avoid the stroke. In a word, we have, in the example
relied on by Professor Huxley, not only mental action,
but mental action in every category of nomological
psychology. We have cognition, feeling, conation.

A COUNTER TEST CASE STATED. 71
There is the apprehension of danger, the mental emo
tion consequent thereon, and there is the intelligent
use of such means of defence as are within the imme
diate reach and power of the agent. He who will, may
regard all these acts and passions as automatic, but he
can do so only by a superficial analysis which fails to
detect and estimate the determining elements of the
case. In confirmation of this analysis and estimate of the
instance of automatic action advanced by the expositor
of Descartes, it is simply necessary to substitute one's
own hand for that of the friend. Of course all the
purely physical phenomena incident to the pretended
blow, in the one case are brought into existence the
moment one moves his hand as if he would strike his
eye. Nevertheless, there is no movement of the eye
lids, no attempt to raise the other hand for defence, or
to retract the head to avert or avoid the blow. How,
or why is this ? The reason is as obvious as it is fatal
to automatism. It is simply this — the guarantee in
the latter case is perfect and absolute, whilst, in the
former, it was imperfect and unreliable. No one can
be sure that his friend, however friendly and well-
intentioned, may not, through inaccuracy of aim,
under-estimate of force, or from some other cause, err
in the direction or extent of the movement of his hand,
and thus inflict, however unintentionally, a serious
injury upon one of the most important of all the
members of this marvellous organism.
Thus, without raising any question in regard to

72 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
occult volitions, and dealing simply with the palpable
facts of the instance submitted by Professor Huxley
himself, it is manifest that they furnish no ground for
the conclusion that motions indicative of purpose can
be accounted for by mere unmediated molecular
change. But whilst the example adduced gives no counten
ance to the automatic hypothesis, it is unquestionably
fatal to a cognate hypothesis advocated by Professor
Huxley — the hypothesis which refers the whole
phenomena of the organic and inorganic world to blind,
unconscious, unintelligent force. It is eminently teleo
logical. Assuming for the present that the action of
winking is the offspring of a reflex action unconnected
with the will of the organism, directly or indirectly,
consciously or unconsciously, will " the questioning
impulse " permit us to rest satisfied with the reference
of it to " the animal spirits " of Descartes, or the
" molecular change " of Professor Huxley ? Descartes
himself held very different doctrine, and in the passage
quoted, seems to intimate a very different solution of
the alleged involuntary action — ascribing it to the
disposition of the mechanism of our body. If
mechanism implies a mechanic, if disposition, revealing
intelligent purpose, implies a disposer, the language of
Descartes, fairly interpreted, may be regarded as carry
ing with it the implication, that an action so admirably
adapted to the preservation of the organ of vision,
evinces the existence of an author of the organism,
possessing the marvellous constructive resource neces-

DEFENSIVE ¦ ARRANGEMENTS EVINCE DESIGN. 73
sary to the production of so exquisite a piece of
mechanism. But though Descartes and Huxley, backed
by the authority of the whole materialistic school,
should agree in referring such an action to a mere
purposeless wavelet in the matter of the nerves and
brain, the human mind must reject the reference. As
the action is brought about by a set of specific
mechanical arrangements, transcending anything ever
invented by man, it is impossible for any one, not
under the spell and fascination of a pet hypothesis, to
believe that it is accounted for by any such, reference.
Such reference can be made only " at the modest cost "
of sacrificing a primary belief fundamental to philoso
phy and science — the belief that every effect must have
an adequate cause. The phenomenon in question,
evincing, as it does, an admirable adaptation of means
to an end, exhibits marks of design, and therefore
demands as its cause an adequate Intelligence — an
Intelligence so careful of the organism, and so prescient,
that He devises a defensive apparatus, so nicely
adjusted and fitted for the ends aimed at, that it acts
with a promptness equal to almost any emergency, and
is so bent on the performance of its function of defence,
as almost to refuse obedience to the will, where there is
even the faintest possibility of peril to the priceless
treasure it has been set to guard. In whatever tower
" the death-knell of teleology '' is to be tolled, it will be
a long time before it is sounded forth from the watch-
tower within which Professor Huxley has sought a
lodgment for his materialistic automatism. No one

74 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
who will duly ponder the phenomena presented in the
structure and functions of the organ of vision, with, as
Mr. Darwin expresses it, " all its inimitable contriv
ances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for
admitting different degrees of light, and for the correc
tion of spherical and chromatic aberration," will wonder
that even the author of the Natural Selection hypo
thesis was staggered by them; or that he was compelled
to confess that such a solution of such phenomena
" seems absurd in the highest degree " (Origin of
Species, p. 143). Nor will Mr. Darwin's attempt to
vindicate such a solution reduce the hypothesis one
thousandth part of a second below the highest gradient
on the scale of absurdity, in the estimation of any mind
not already possessed by evolutionary prejudices.
It were a weary business to examine the remaining
propositions of this marvellous lecture, and profitless as
weary, inasmuch as the discussion in the line thus
marked out must leave out the principal facts to be
accounted for. These facts are presented in the follow
ing passage, quoted from Descartes by Professor
Huxley ; and to these the controversy must be limited.
" It appears to me," says Descartes, " to be a very remark
able circumstance that no movement can take place, either in
the bodies of beasts or even in our own, if these bodies have
not in themselves all the organs and instruments by means
of which the very same movements would be accomplished
in a machine ; so that even in us the spirit or the soul does not
directly move the limb, but only determines the course of that
very subtile liquid which is called the animal spirits — which,
running continually from the heart, by the brain, into the

ALLEGED INSTANCES OF AUTOMATISM. 75
muscles, is the cause of all the movements of our limbs, and
often may cause many different motions, one as easily as the
other. And it does not even always exert this determina
tion ; for among the movements which take place hi us, there
are many which do not depend. upon the mind at all — such
as the beating of the heart, the digestion of food, the nutri
tion, the respiration of those who sleep, and even in those
who are awake, walking, singing, and other similar actions,
when they are performed without the mind thinking about
them. And when one who falls from a height throws his
hands forward to save his head, it is in virtue of no ratiocina
tion that he performs this action ; it does not depend upon
his mind, but takes place merely because his senses, being
affected by the present danger, cause some change in his-
brain, which determines the animal spirits to pass thence
into the nerves in such a manner as is required to produce
this motion, in the same way as in a machine, and without
the mind being able to hinder it."
Of this passage Professor Huxley expresses his
unqualified approbation. He says : " I know in no
modern treatise of a more clear and precise statement
than this, or a more perfect illustration than this, of
what we understand by the automatic action of the
brain," — and Huxley's brain embraces the human brain.
Summing up this sketch of these phenomena as given
by Descartes, the Professor proceeds: "What he tells
us in substance is this — that when a sensation takes
place, the animal spirits travel up the sensory nerve,
pass to the appropriate part of the brain, and there, as
it were, find their way through the pores of the sub
stance of the brain ; and he says that when this has
once taken place — when the particles of the brain have

76 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
themselves been, as it were, shoved aside a little by the
single passage of the animal spirits — that the passage
is made easier in the same direction for any subse
quent flow of animal spirits ; and that the repetition
of this action makes it easier still, until at length
it becomes very easy for the animal spirits to move
those particular particles of the brain, the motion of
which gives rise to the appropriate sensation — until at
length the passage is so very easy that almost anything,
especially an associated flow, which may be set a-going,
allows the animal spirits to flow into these already open
pores more easily than they would flow in any other
direction ; and in this way a flow of the animal spirits
recalls the image — the impression made by a former
sensory act. That, again, is essentially, in substance, at
one," Professor Huxley tells us, " with all our present
physical theories of memory. That memory is a
physical process," he alleges, " stands beyond question."
Such is the theory of Descartes indorsed in the
Ulster Hall by Professor Huxley, and applauded by a
portion of the audience. Substituting "molecular
change " for " animal spirits," and leaving out the soul,
he accepts the theory unmodified. Let us look into it
in detail.
1. In the first place, there are several points in the
theory to which we do not only not object, but upon
which we insist, and insist as teleologists, to the con
fusion of atheists. We hold, with Descartes, that the
organs and instruments by which our bodily movements
are effected, are substantially the same as those by which

ANIMAL MECHANISM TELEOLOGICAL. 77
like movements would be accomplished in a machine.
We believe, as fully as Descartes or Huxley, in the
exquisite mechanism of the human body, and would, if
lecturing on the teleology of that mechanism, prefer
the learned Professor to all other demonstrators. Let
us hope that we may have the advantage of a public
exposition of this wrondrous machinery, by one who is
facile princeps in this department. . I shall be glad to
sit at his feet as he points out the hinge-joints, the
ball-and-socket joints, and the pivot-joint, and the other
marvellous mechanical arrangements of the human
skeleton. And I am sure it will delight us all to see
him lay on the sinews and the flesh, and cover them
with that wondrous envelope, the skin — pointing out
how the muscles are fastened on to the bones at the
proper points for exerting the requisite mechanical
power. And the time would not hang heavily on our
hands, while the accomplished physiologist would
picture to us the arterial and venous systems, in their
wondrous correlations; or while, beginning with the
teeth and the saliva, he would trace the process by
which food is prepared for, and conveyed to, the
stomach, and expound the whole apparatus of digestion
by which it is transmuted into chyme, and chyle, and
blood ; and the marvellous machinery of the heart, with
its exquisite system of valves by which the life-giving
life-sustaining stream, freighted with the appropriate
nourishment, is urged forward for the growth, or sus
tenance, of the bones, and muscles, and nerves, and
brain.

78 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
To all this demonstration we would listen with
rapture, and also with awe; and the words of the
Psalmist alone would express our instinctive conviction,
that we are fearfully and wonderfully made ! But oh !
how would our admiration of the demonstrator be
abated if, at the close, he should turn upon us and lay
upon the irrepressible emotions of our hearts towards
the Author of such marvellous mechanism — mechanism
without a parallel in the whole compass of human
invention or contrivance — the deadly chill of the
atheistic verdict, that this exquisite organism was not
made at all by the hand of any intelligence, but that it
came forth by a process of evolution, without the
intervention of any but " secondary causes," from the
womb of " blind force " !
2. Still further : we see no reason for dissenting from
the second element of this Cartesian theory — viz., that
the soul does not directly move the limb, but moves it
mediately, through the instrumentality of what he calls
" the animal spirits," or what scientists now call " mole
cular change." We believe, with Descartes and with
Huxley, that the immediate cause of the muscular
movement is the mystic change which takes place in
the molecules of the nerves of motion. Thus far we are
agreed. But having reached this point, we are brought
face to face with two mysteries of which Prof. Huxley
attempts no account at all. The one is the molecular
change in the nerves of motion ; the other is the con
nection between the change and the appropriate move
ment of the muscles, both as to degree and direction.

DESCARTES DEFECTIVE, HUXLEY ERRONEOUS. 79
How is it that the proper change takes place in the
molecules of the proper nerves, and that this is followed
by the proper contraction or extension of the proper
muscles ? Descartes accounts for the change in the
molecules of the nerves by referring it, ordinarily, to the
soul ; Huxley leaves out this part of his master's theory,
and assigns the change no cause whatever ; whilst both
the master and the disciple are content to say nothing as
to the nexus which links the change in the nerves to the
appropriate muscular movement. In the hands of the
master the theory is simply defective ; in the hands of
the disciple it is throughout at war with the scientific
fundamental, that every effect must have a cause.
Descartes, in tracing to the soul, in ordinary cases, the
molecular change in the nerves of motion by which the
proper muscles are stimulated and guided in their action
so as to move the proper limb in the proper direction, to
the proper extent, and with the requisite velocity, satis
fies, to some extent, that " questioning impulse " of our
minds which demands for all phenomena an adequate
cause. But Professor .Huxley, ignoring the existence of
any such impulse, would have us rest in the nervous
thrill of molecular change— which, although invariably
followed, except in abnormal physical estates, by move
ments indicative of intelligent purpose, is the offspring of
nothing save " blind force " ! And this is the philosopher
who complains that theologians will not allow him " to
think out his subject scientifically — to go as far as
reason leads"! Does reason lead up to. and rest in,
molecular change ? Can any process of thought, ruled

80 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
by the principle of causality, rest in a molecular wave
let as the ultimate cause of intelligent action ?
Now I think we have in the Atlantic cables, and
their arrangements at the Irish and American ends,
a very appropriate illustration of the utter inadequacy
of Professor Huxley's account of the movements of the
human organism. What would any person, of com
petent knowledge, think of an electrician, who, in
accounting for the perpetually varying movements of
the needles at Heart's Content, Newfoundland, would
simply say that they were caused by molecular changes
in the submarine cables ? Would it not be reasonable
to ask such an expositor the following questions ? —
1. How is it that there are such cables in existence ?
2. What originates the molecular changes in their
wires ?
3. What regulates the flow of the electric current, or
the tremor of the molecules, so that the needles are
moved in the proper directions, and so as to produce
intelligible signs ?
4. Who contrived the mirror for registering the
faintest thrill ?
These questions must arise in the mind of any
person endowed with "the questioning impulse," who
enters upon the investigation of these phenomena : and
no answer will satisfy the inquirer which does not
recognise in the structure of the cables the hand of an
intelligent, purposing fabricator, and place at the ends
an intelligent operator. He who stops with the
electric thrills of the wires, does not answer a single

QUESTIONS UNANSWERABLE BY AUTOMATISM. 81
question of the four just specified — questions, be it
observed, which the constitution of our nature compels
us to ask. And, in the case before us, he who informs
us that all our muscular movements are due to tremors
in the nerves of motion, connected in some undefined
way with like tremors in the sensor nerves, does not
answer a single question of the corresponding four, to
which our nature demands an answer at the hands of
the physiologist. We demand from him, on a warrant
issued by that philosophy which Professor Huxley
proclaims " the mother of the sciences," that he answer
the following questions : —
1. How is it that there are such nerve-wires in
existence ?
2. What originates the molecular changes by which
they are thrilled ?
3. What regulates the waves by which they are
agitated, so that the muscles are moved in the proper
measure and direction ?
4. Who contrived the apparatus by which the nerves
move the muscles ?
How is it that Professor Huxley in his elaborate
lecture evaded every one of these questions ? Surely
the phenomena warrant us in raising them ; and surely
the scientist who dare not face them must have a
theory that cannot bear a thorough investigation..
Descartes, by placing the soul at the fountain-head
of the movement, and giving to it, in ordinary cases,.
through " those very subtile parts of the blood " which
he calls the "animal spirits," command of the nerves, and.

82 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
through the nerves control of the muscles, and through
the muscles control and mastery of the members of the
body, answers at least two of the questions, whilst his
learned eulogist, claiming the support of the most
recent physiological discoveries, refuses to answer any
of the four, and refers the whole phenomena to
molecular change, and then complains, that he is
" deafened by the tattoo of the drum ecclesiastic " for
going as far as reason leads !
Now I put it to the intelligence of all men, whether
a physiologist who simply ascribes all these phenomena
to the molecular changes which take place in the
nerves, has finished his task as a physiologist ? Were
the molecular changes a steady, ceaseless, undiscri-
minating current, producing aimless, unintelligible
motions in the muscles, and thereby agitating the
members of the body as the winds of heaven vex the
waters of the sea, or agitate the trees of the forest,
there might be some apology for such abrupt repression
of the philosophical instinct ; but as the series of
molecular changes is so regulated as to produce in
the muscles the requisite contractions, or relaxations,
for the effecting of specific movements of the members
of the body — such movements as necessarily indicate
an antecedent purpose — the man who does not refer
the result, and the closely-linked machinery by which
it is brought about, to an antecedent purposer, is as
unscientific as he is morally inexcusable.
3. But the vo-Tepov trporepov of this Huxleyian
physiological psychology is yet to be stated. Bringing

HUXLEY ON CEREBRAL TELEGRAPHY. 83
up the Cartesian theory abreast of the advanced
thinking of his own school, he gives us an account of
the transit of the first molecular thrill, or tremor, from
the point of origination at the extremity of the sensory
nerve to its appropriate destination in the brain.
Having reached the proper point in the brain, the
atomic, or molecular wave, or whatever it may be
called, finds its way through the pores of that mys
terious substance, "shoving, as it were, aside" the
particles which may stand to thwart its progress.
This is the pioneer molecular thrill, and by its transit,
tunnelling, as it does, its way through the citadel of
thought, the passage is made easier in the same direc
tion, for any subsequent current of molecular change.
Now the chief difficulty suggested on reading this
account of the telegraphy of the nervous system of the
human organism, is to reconcile it with the manifest
intelligence of its author. We can see at once how, on
Professor Huxley's hypothesis, the transit of the first
flow of molecular change should prepare the way for a
second, and this again for a third, in the same direc
tion ; but the mystery of mysteries remains unsolved,
and must, on this theory, for ever remain unsolved —
viz., How did the first current happen to flow to the
proper point, and deliver its message " to those
particular particles of the brain, the motion of which
gi/ves rise to the appropriate sensation " ? Professor
Huxley is very profuse in his instructions on the former
point, but is absolutely silent on the latter. He tells
us how the first voyage prepares the way for the

84 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
second, and how this again makes easy the transit of
the third ; but he has not one word to say about the
only point requiring explanation at the hands of a
physiologist, and, especially, at the hands of a physio
logist who denies the intervention of intelligence in
this wondrous process. The question of questions here
is, of course, How is it that the first nervous thrill
found its way to the proper point in the brain, and
put itself into communication with the very particles
requisite to originate the appropriate organic action ?
Let Professor Huxley account for the transmission of
the first telegram to the proper cerebral functionaries,
in harmony with the theory that the nervous system is
not the offspring of an antecedent intelligence, and he
will have laid atheism under a debt of the profoundest
gratitude. Till he shall have solved this first problem,
we must be excused for holding that his attempt to
account for the actions of animal organisms, on the
bald hypothesis of molecular change, has proved a
failure. If there be no mind to receive the telegram
and issue the order, must not the cerebral particles
which perform these indispensable functions be them
selves intelligent ?
4. Nor does there seem to be any theological reason
for calling in question the automatism of those func
tions which Descartes has positively pronounced auto
matic — such as the beating of the heart, digestion,
nutrition, respiration in sleep — provided the term be
not employed in a sense exclusive of intelligence as
connected in any way with these wondrous movements.

AUTOMATIC ACTION TRACEABLE TO MIND. 85
These, we hold with Descartes and Professor Huxley,
go on, so far as we are aware, independent of any
exercise of our will. The efficient cause of these
movements comes not into the sphere of human
consciousness, and must be sought outside the sphere
of human volition. In this sense of the term — (viz., that
these motions are not dependent upon our will) they
may be called automatic, but in no other — most
certainly not in Professor Huxley's, which makes them
dependent upon the will of no one. It is utterly
impossible for the human mind to regard these
marvellously complex movements as accounted for,
when they are ascribed to mere molecular change.
Here the mind of man cannot rest. Carrying as they
do upon their forefront, the impress of design, they are
teleological and proclaim the doctrine enunciated by
Paul to the philosophers of Greece, that in Him we live
and move and have our being. No other conclusion
will satisfy that principle of the human mind which
demands for all the phenomena under investigation an
adequate cause. Professor Huxley rests, or tries to
rest, in molecular change, as a sufficient cause of all the
phenomena of these so-called automatic functions of
the human organism — functions furnishing the most
manifest evidence of the presence and presidency of
mind ; while we, with the apostle, recognise the
evidence, and infer their dependence upon the exercise
of the wisdom and power of Him by whom all things
consist, in whose hand our breath is, and whose are all
our ways.

86 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
In taking this ground, I am not to be understood as
indorsing the antiquated doctrine of "occasional causes"
recently advocated by Mr. Alfred Wallace, or as teach
ing that second causes are destitute of any causal
efficiency ; or that they do but furnish the occasion on
which the first Cause acts. The position taken is
simply this : that the organs to which automatic action
is ascribed, give unquestionable evidence, in their
structure, of the existence and operation of an ante
cedent intelligent Cause, and that their continuous,
incessant activity, implies the presence and efficiency
of that same Cause, maintaining them in the possession
of their properties, and sustaining them in the execu
tion of those mysterious functions for which they were
designed. He who fashioned the original germ, and
endowed it with life, watches over all its movements,
fostering its vital powers, preserving and governing its
so-called automatic functions. No objection to this
account of the automatic action of animal organisms
can be urged, which does not, ultimately, involve the
denial of an extramundane, omnipresent, omniscient
Intelligence. 5. But Professor Huxley goes still further, and while
he proceeds with a degree of hesitancy, he, never
theless, seems inclined to claim scientific authority
and sanction for the very conjectures of Descartes.
Descartes had ventured the conjecture that, as actions
of a certain amount of complexity are brought about
mechanically and without the intervention of conscious
ness, it may be that the whole of man's physical actions

SPECULATION IN REGARD TO BRUTES. 87
are mechanical — his mind living apart, like one of the
gods of Epicurus, but, unlike them, occasionally inter
fering by means of his volition. Mixing up this
conjecture with a Cartesian speculation in regard to
the psychology of brutes, which concludes them to be
both soulless and senseless, acting as if they saw, and
felt, and heard, whilst destitute of sight, or feeling, or
hearing, he reaches the conclusion that whilst science
cannot absolutely determine either for or against this
marvellous hypothesis, it has, nevertheless, received as
much and as strong support from modern physiological
research as any other of Descartes' notions! Theo
logians are sometimes accredited with saying hard
things about science, but it is questionable whether any
theologian ever uttered anything against science to be
compared with this. The sum and substance of this
disquisition on brutes, is simply this — that science can
not say whether they see, or feel, or hear ! The
natural clemency of Professor Huxley's nature, but not
his science, leads him to the conclusion that it is much
better not to concur with Descartes on this point, and
to treat the lower animals as if they were susceptible
of pain — as weaker brethren, who are bound, like the
rest of us, to suffer for the general good.
Well, we are, of course, to regard this as the out
come of modern scientific research. Surely it was not
for nothing that Belfast put on its gayest attire and
assembled in the Ulster Hall, seeing that we now have
it, on the authority of an eminent physiologist, that, on
the whole, it is better to gainsay science in our treat-

88 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
ment of our dogs : for example, to assume that they see
us when they look at us, that they hear us when they
answer to their names, or that they feel pain when we
inflict chastisement ! There is, of course, no place for
argument here. The only alternative left, is that
which the learned Professor has been compelled to
adopt — viz., to trust the testimony of the senses, and
reject scientific speculations when they come in conflict
with it. Having brought the speculation into such
manifest collision with unquestionable facts that he
dare not act it out in his treatment of the actual
animal organisms with which he is ever coming in
contact, he has done what any sensible man would do
in the circumstances, — he has rejected the speculation,
even though strongly countenanced by " recent physio
logical research," and, however reluctantly, has con
cluded in accordance with the testimony of his senses.
As he felt constrained to abandon this crotchet, it is
to be regretted that he should have devoted all but
one-half of the lecture to the discussion of it.
Nor is his abandonment of this Cartesian conjecture
to be wondered at, when the data adduced in support
of it from modern physiological research are considered.
These were, the automatic actions of the human
organism, already disposed of; those of a frog deprived
of certain portions of the brain, and those of a wounded
French soldier.
With regard to the case of the frog — a case which
figures in the hand-books, entitled Ooltz's Balancing
Experiment, Goltz placing a rough board, about eight

GOLTZ S BALANCING EXPERIMENT. 89
or nine inches square, where Professor Huxley, moved,
perhaps, by the sympathies of kinship, placed his hand
— with regard to this case, I have simply to say that
the inferences drawn in regard to the automatic
character of the movements were not proved. Dr.
Tyndall, in his Fragments of Science (p. 133), lays
down the principle — a principle which, on one occasion,
he applied to the actions of the President of the British
Association — that when our fellow-creatures behave as
if they were reasonable, we are warranted in the
conviction that they are reasonable. This principle is
as applicable to frogs as to men ; and when we see a
frog acting as if it were cognisant of danger — balancing
itself on Goltz's board or Huxley's hand ; or, not on
one occasion, but as often as the experiment is
repeated, jumping so as to evade an obstacle placed
before it, we are compelled, whatever the mere
anatomist may say to the contrary, to regard it as not
deprived of all the organs of sense, and as still capable,
however marred and maltreated by the knife of the
physiologist, of taking note of external things, and of
adapting its actions to its environment — of behaving,
in fact, as a frog in the circumstances ought to behave.
The principle on which this marvellous attempt at
physiological, as distinguished from a logical, modus
tollens, was conducted, is utterly fallacious. It is
utterly fallacious to infer from a partially disorganised
organic structure, what elements are concerned in the
movements of the perfect animal. The illustrations
given, instead of tending to establish the hypothesis

90 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
in question, must, if duly considered, prove subversive-
of it. If organisms, even when deprived of the
cerebrum, as in the frog experiments, give unques
tionable proof that they still possess the powers of
apprehension, and self-adjustment consequent upon the
apprehension, and clearly conformable to the exigencies
of their position, surely such experiments warrant us in
taking the ground of a triumphant a fortiori argument,
in reference to unmarred and unimpaired organisms,
with full cerebral power. These remarks apply as well
to the case of the wounded French soldier, cited by
Professor Huxley, as to the case of the frog, or any
other case which can be adduced. The principle is
invalid, and suicidal.
And now, before passing from this point, we would
ask Professor Huxley, who has evinced such discretion
in abandoning a conjecture, even at the sacrifice of
half the labour incident to the preparation of his
address, to exercise like caution in regard to the other
branch of his theme. If he dare not venture to carry
out a Cartesian crotchet in his treatment of dogs,
surely he will not venture to put his automatic hypo
thesis into practice in his treatment of men. If he
dare not, in his dealings with dogs, assume that they
are destitute of feeling, surely he will hesitate before
he risks the tremendous consequences of treating men
as if they had no souls !
6. It is scarcely necessary to say, that I do not agree
with Professor Huxley in regard to the relation of our
ideas to external things, affirmed in his lecture.

APPEALS TO NATURE TO PROVE HERSELF DECEPTIVE. 91
According to the doctrine advanced, we have really no
knowledge of the external world. In fact, the only
thing we know, is that we know nothing. If, as we are
told, there is no warrant for believing that external
objects are like what we take them to be, it is obvious
that we live amid delusive phantoms, and are the sport
of our own unreal imaginings. If this be the result of
the interposition of the nervous system between the
external cause of sensation and the phenomena of
consciousness, our interpretations of these phenomena
must be as delusive as the phantoms with which they
deal. When a philosopher takes this ground, he has not
only no reason to complain, but ought to be thankful,
if he be awakened from his unreasoning reverie by the
tattoo of the drum ecclesiastic. The belief that
external objects are as they appear — are what we take
them to be — is an element of that estate of conscious
ness incident to the apprehension of them. This
conviction cannot be shaken, except by shaking our
confidence in the trustworthiness of our nature. But if
the constitution of our own being is not to be trusted,
on what are those, who would subvert our faith in it, to
base their arguments ? Are not the faculties employed
by them in the argument a part of the very constitu
tion which they would persuade us not to trust ? That
is, they must trust nature in order to prove her
unworthy of trust ! Professor Huxley has not yet
adopted the formula of the Chian sceptic, Metrodorus,
"/ do not even know that I know nothing" but he

92 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
has manifestly adopted the premises from which that
nescient formula logically flows. Indeed, the premises
lead to absolute nescience ; for it is difficult to see how
either Huxley or Metrodorus could be sure even of his
own ignorance.
Before the avowal of his faith in this doctrine he
should have consulted his friend Dr. Tyndall, who,
following Herbert Spencer, lays it down as a crucial
test of a truth, that it be capable of presentation to the
mind under the form of an image. If all we know of
external things is, that they bear no likeness to this
image, surely it must follow that the image can be no
test of the truth or falsehood of our cognitions, or of
our judgments in regard to the phenomena, or of the
nature of the things in themselves. If so, what
becomes of Dr. Tyndall's system of molecular physics,
whose fundamental principle is, that the cause which
we conjure up by the mystic wand of the scientific
imagination be exactly like the mental image ? How
the two chiefs, starting, each with the same stock of
atoms and molecules, should reach such antagonistic
philosophic poles, it is difficult to conjecture. But we
have had, during the proceedings of the British Associa
tion, the open avowal of materialism from the one, and
the open avowal of idealism from the other ! It was
well and providential that these champions of Atomism
should thus publicly contradict each other. There is a
God above both the atoms and the atomists, who
bringeth the counsel of the wise to nought. Let it not
be forgotten, that the two scientists who refer all

HUXLEY CONTRADICTS TYNDALL. 93
phenomena to atoms, have refuted each other on the
platform of the Ulster Hall — the one proclaiming him
self a materialist, the other an idealist — the one
affirming that nothing is true which cannot be imaged,
the other affirming that all images of the external
world are unreal and fallacious, and bear no resemblance
to the things themselves, if things external there be.
Surely one may say of such speculators as Paul said of
the heathen philosophers of old : " They became vain
in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was
darkened. Professing themselves wise, they became
fools." We were told that these men would revolu
tionise thought in the metropolis of Ulster, and yet
God so ordered it that the one denied what the other
affirmed. '' Verily, He maketh the wrath of man to
praise Him, and the remainder of wrath He doth
restrain." In concluding my strictures on the scientific phase of
this lecture, I am constrained to add, that my estimate
of the line of argument by which Professor Huxley has
sought to conduct his audience to the conclusion that
animals are mere automata, is not very high. Viewed
from the physiological standpoint it was most unscien
tific. He utterly ignored the existence of a law
revealed in the phenomena of which he was treating,
the mere statement of which is sufficient to put to
confusion any automatic speculator. The law in ques
tion is, that as we ascend the scale of animal life, from
the frog, new parts of the brain and new powers of
intelligence and independent action appear ; till, after

94 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
a great many intermediate steps, we come to man, with
large cerebellum and enormously large cerebrum, still
having much of his system governed in part by auto
matic action, but having, besides, a powerful controlling
intelligence and will. If there is much in the
phenomena of Goltz's experiment, irreconcilable with
the assumption that even the frog is a mere automaton
— so much, indeed, as to make Professor Huxley
hesitate to pronounce its action automatic — surely the
argument against the conclusion of man's automatism
rests upon an absolutely irrefragable physiological basis.
If, as the facts show, the higher the organism stands in
the scale of life, the less potent and controlling are the
automatic powers, and the more potent and dominant
the voluntary, what scientific basis is there for Professor
Huxley's dogma that all animals are mere automata,
perhaps possessing consciousness ?
It only remains that notice be taken of a remarkable
claim set up by Professor Huxley, at the close of his
address. Having inculcated the doctrine that brutes
are mere machines, with a reserve as to the probability
of their possessing consciousness, and having confessed
" that the view he had taken of the relations between
the physical and mental faculties of brutes, applies and
is intended to apply, in its fulness and entirety to man,"
he claims for this doctrine the authority of Augustine,
John Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards ! That is, he
claims that these theologians taught that men are mere
(probably) conscious machines ! This he does on the
platform of the Ulster Hall, and is applauded by a part

AUTOMATISM FALSELY CHARGED ON EDWARDS. 95
of the audience, who, of course, assumed that so great a
physiologist must also be a deeply-read theologian.
That response must have confirmed the lecturer in the
conjecture that Edwards was not much read in Ulster,
and have assured him that he was comparatively safe,
before such an audience, in claiming doctrinal kinship
with the great New England divine. Had the tribunal
before which the claim was advanced been competent,
it had met with a very different reception ; for no one
acquainted with the views of Edwards could have any
other feeling than that of moral indignation evoked by
the attempt to identify him with such degrading,
demoralising dogmas. You will not think this language
too strong, when told that the doctrine ascribed by
Professor Huxley to President Edwards is expressly
repudiated and formally refuted by that prince among
theologians in his treatise on the Will.
Replying to those who, like our physiologist, attri
bute such consequences to the doctrine of the Will
advocated by him in that immortal treatise, he says : —
"That man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably
'different from a mere machine, in that he has reason and
understanding, with a faculty of Will, and so is capable of
volition and choice; in that his Will is guided by the
dictates or views of his understanding; and in that his
external actions and behaviour, and in many respects also
his thoughts and the exercises of his mind, are subject to his
Will ; so that he has liberty to act according to his choice,
and do what he pleases; and by means of these things is
capable of moral habits and moral acts — such incHnations
-and actions as, according to the common sense of mankind,

96 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
are worthy of praise, esteem, love, and reward ; or, on the
contrary, of dis-esteem, detestation, indignation, and punish
ment " (Edwards on the Will, pt. iv. § 5).
In view of this express repudiation of the doctrine
that men are mere machines, and the counter-demon
stration of their free, unfettered, moral agency, Professor
Huxley may be fairly asked, how he could ascribe such
doctrine to the great metaphysician and theologian ?
This question he must answer, or stand before the
scientific and theological world in the unenviable
position of one who has been silenced by the autho
rities he has invoked. Further comment on this
attempt to identify Edwards with the mechanical,
materialistic school of Hobbes and Hartley, Priestly
and Belsham, is unnecessary. " Ex uno disce omnes : "
from his treatment of Edwards, judge of his capacity
to interpret Augustine and Calvin.
And now, in conclusion, let me state my estimate of
the moral tendencies of the doctrine of animal auto
matism as applied to man. Let it be adopted, and
human society becomes an impossibility. If men are
simply conscious automata, whose actions are traceable
to nothing beyond the molecular changes of their
physical organism, all responsibility must be at an
end. On this theory of human actions, there is not
only no ground for future rewards or punishments, but
there is no ground for the pains and penalties pre
scribed by human legislation for the protection of
society. If virtuous actions differ from vicious actions
only as one molecular thrill differs from another, or as

THE THEORY SUBVERSIVE OF MORALITY. 97
a positive electric current differs from a negative one,
there is manifestly no more foundation for a system of
human ethics than there is for a system of magnetic
jurisprudence. If the ultimate analysis of human
actions lands us in mere molecular change, it must
follow that men are no more responsible for the thrills
and tremors of which they are the subjects, than are
the Atlantic cables for the messages they transmit.
Such doctrine would not only erase from the future
the judgment-seat, and the eternity of bliss or woe
beyond ; but it would abolish all earthly tribunals, and
make our earth the theatre of the very hell it would
obliterate. From such vain philosophy let us turn away as we
would from the pestilence. Its feet take hold on
death, and there is no peace for its votaries. It would
fondly link itself to great names ; but the men of
theological and philosophical renown, whom it claims,
would have spurned it as they would the companion
ship of a scorpion. Young men of Great Britain and
Ireland ! — will you identify yourselves with a science,
falsely so-called, which would identify you with brutes,
and, repressing the noblest aspirations of your nature,
would turn our world into a Sodom, and lay upon your
brightest hopes the blight of an eternal night ?

CHAPTER IV.
SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL HYPOTHESIS.
AS stated by himself, Mr. Spencer's aim in his
-£j- elaborate treatise on biology, " is to set forth the
general truths of biology, as illustrative of, and as
interpreted by, the laws of evolution : the special
truths being introduced only so far as is needful for
elucidation of the general truths." For aid in the
execution of this task, Mr. Spencer acknowledges his
indebtedness to Professor Huxley and Dr. Hooker, who
not only supplied him with information where his own
was deficient, but also looked through the proof-sheets,
pointing out errors of detail into which he had fallen ;
or, as he expresses it in the preface to his second
volume, furnished him with valuable criticisms, and
took the trouble of checking the numerous statements
of fact on which the arguments proceed.*
The candour of Mr. Spencer in this acknowledg
ment of his dependence upon others for information,
and of his indebtedness for correction and criticism, is
* ThiB paragraph is a sufficient vindication of the Author
against Mr. Spencer's charge of unfair treatment, preferred by
him in a late issue of his Biology. These were the words used on
the occasion referred to, and they are his own words acknowledg
ing his indebtedness to Huxley and Hooker,
98

SCIENCE MUST SUBMIT TO LOGICAL TESTS. 99
only equalled by his polemic chivalry in his review of
Professor Owen's theory of the vertebrate skeleton.
He prefaces his strictures by the following confes
sion: — "We confess that nearly all we know of this
department of biology" (the bony structure of the
vertebrata), "has been learnt from his lectures and
writings. We pretend to no independent investiga
tions, but merely to such knowledge of the phenomena
as he has furnished us with. Our position, then, is
such that, had Professor Owen simply enunciated his
generalisations, we should have accepted them on his
authority. But he has brought forward evidence to
prove them. By so doing, he has tacitly appealed to
the judgment of his readers and hearers — has practic
ally said, 'Here are the facts; do they not warrant
these conclusions?' And all we propose to do, is
to consider whether the conclusions are warranted by
the facts brought forward."
The position here assumed is not only just, but
generous. It is just, in that the reviewer judges of
Professor Owen's conclusions from the facts adduced in
their support ; it is generous, in that he holds himself
in readiness to accept Professor Owen's generalisations
on his own authority, without any proof whatever. It
is, of course, to be presumed that this profession of
generosity is to be accepted with all the abatements
demanded by the interests of science. Science cannot
afford to be generous, and it is peculiarly unscientific,
as it is unphilosophical and unwise, to accept general
isations on the mere authority of any man.

100 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
The chief object of these references to Mr. Spencer's
relation to the facts with which he deals in his work on
biology, is to vindicate the class to which he belongs
from the charge of presumption, in undertaking to
judge of the warrantableness of the conclusions which
scientists have deduced from the phenomena of nature.
Mr. Spencer confesses that he is not a scientist in the
ordinary acceptation of the term. He is not a chemist ;
he is not an astronomer ; he is not a physiologist ; he is
not a molecular or atomic physicist; he does not
profess to be a geologist or a botanist ; but he, never
theless, claims the right of judging of the conclusions
arrived at by the foremost of the practical investigators
in these departments of the wondrous phenomena of
nature. If a man come forth out of any of these
departments with his conclusions, and refer, in proof of
their validity, to facts, Mr. Spencer will meet him with
all the courtesy and grace of a knight-errant ; but he
will give him to understand that he must face him in a
logical tournament before he has earned his scientific
spurs. He will trust him as a witness of what he has
seen with the telescope or microscope, or of what has
been revealed to him under the torture of the crucible,
or the stroke of the hammer, or the all but atom-
disclosing radiance of the electric beam ; but as soon as
he passes from testimony to inference, he will apply to
his conclusions tests furnished, not by the laws of
matter, but by the laws of mind, to which, by the very
fact of his attempt at inference, he has appealed.
What Mr. Spencer has done in his review of Professor

THE TERM EVOLUTION EQUIVOCAL. 101
Owen, theologians claim the right to do in his own
case. " All they propose to do is to consider whether
his conclusions are warranted by the facts brought
forward " — facts, be it observed, which he, like them
selves, has merely at second-hand. In estimating his
work on biology, they raise no other questions than he
himself has raised in his treatment of the works of
others. They simply ask what are his conclusions, and
what are the facts to which he appeals in support of
them? In general terms, his conclusions may be character
ised by the one word evolution. The term biology
means simply the science of life, and Mr. Spencer's
hypothesis, on which he has built up this system of
biology developed in these two volumes is evolutionary.
The term evolutionary is here employed advisedly,
because of the equivocalness of the term evolution.
As evolution simply signifies the process of evoking, or
rolling out, something already existing, at least in its
elements (which is more than Mr. Spencer admits), it
has been employed by parties differing widely both in
regard to the agencies and instruments by which the
process of evolvement or evocation, has been effected,
or conducted. A man who holds that the present order
of things — embracing the orderly arrangements of the
universe, and the fauna, and flora of our earth — has
been evoked or evolved from previously created, or
previously existing, suitable material, by the skill and
power of an infinitely wise and infinitely powerful
Architect, may, nevertheless, be called an evolutionist.

102 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Or a man may entertain the crude notions of a Democ
ritus or a Lucretius, recently eulogised before the
British Association, and regard the existing order as
evolved from atoms equipped with hooks and claws,
and be none the less entitled to rank as an evolu
tionist ; or he may differ from Lucretius as much as a
modern worker in the domain of molecular physics
differs from a man absolutely destitute of the rudest
appliance of the laboratory, and yet belong to this
wide-reaching category. Democritus and Lucretius,
Dr. Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck, Mr. Charles Darwin
and Professor Huxley, Dr. Tyndall and Mr. Herbert
Spencer, theist and atheist, believers in a personal God,
and those who, stripping God of the attribute of
personality, would identify Him with nature, and deny
that He possesses any independent antemundane or
extramundane life — may all, so far as the signification
of the term is concerned, be designated evolutionists.
In a word, the term is equivocal, and therefore mislead
ing, until it is defined. It may be used to designate a
general class, but only where the design is to express
the very general notion, that those embraced under the
class agree in holding that the present order of things
is the outcome, whether by natural or supernatural
agency, of previously existing states of matter. As
soon as it is proposed to treat of an evolutionary
hypothesis, it is demanded alike by perspicuity and
honesty, that it be differentiated from others bearing
the same general class-name.
Mr. Spencer's hypothesis differs from all the evolu-

SPENCER'S THEORY DIFFERENTIATED. 103
tionary hypotheses which, as far as I am aware, have
hitherto been broached. He is not, it is scarcely
necessary to say, a Lucretian, and he is not a Darwinian
of the type of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, or Lamarck, or
even of Mr. Charles Darwin. He rejects every theory
which might militate in any way against the assump
tion that mind has nothing to do, either directly or
indirectly, with the evolutionary process ; and therefore
he will not admit that there exists in organisms even a
primordial impulse impelling them to unfold into more
heterogeneous forms. Had he been in the vicinity
of Professor Tyndall on the occasion of his recent
Manchester recantation, when he admitted that " every
where throughout our planet we notice this tendency
of the ultimate particles of matter to run into sym
metric forms," and affirmed that "the very molecules
seem instinct with a desire for union and growth," he
would have warned him that he was treading on the
margin of very dangerous concessions, and would have
informed him that, not "tendency to unfold," but
" liability to be unfolded," * is the present position of
the advanced thinkers of the evolutionary school. Nor
is he satisfied even with this safeguard against the
intrusion of mind. He is careful to add, as a qualifying
clause, that even this " liability to be unfolded arises
from the actions and reactions of organisms and their
fluctuating environments." His hypothesis may be
termed the mechanical-genesis hypothesis. Adaptation
becomes, in his hands, "direct equilibration;" and
* Principles of Biology, vol. i. pp. 430-31.

104 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Mr. Darwin's "natural selection" is translated into
"indirect equilibration." But whilst he criticises, or
rejects, or modifies, all previous scientific hypotheses,
the chief design of his work is to overthrow the
Scripture doctrine of special creations. Singling out
this doctrine, which he entitles a hypothesis, he says :
" Either the multitudinous kinds of organisms that now
exist, and the still more multitudinous kinds that have
existed during past geologic eras, have been from time
to time separately made ; or they have arisen by
insensible steps, through actions such as we see habit
ually going on. Both hypotheses," he adds, " imply a
cause. The last, certainly as much as the first,
recognises this cause as inscrutable. The point at
issue," he alleges, "is how this inscrutable cause has
worked in the production of living forms. This point,
if it is to be decided at all, is to be decided only by the
examination of evidence. Let us inquire which of
these antagonistic hypotheses is most congruous with
established facts." *
It will be seen from this statement that Mr. Spencer
admits a cause, but holds this cause to be inscrutable.
In this he claims agreement with what he is pleased to
designate the creation hypothesis, which he rejects.
Now, this is not a fair account of the views of his
opponents in regard to the ultimate cause. Creation
ists do not regard the ultimate cause as inscrutable.
They do hold that the ultimate cause cannot be known
to perfection ; but this is a very different thing from
* Ibid. vol. i. pp. 331-32.

INSCRUTABILITY EXCLUDED BY CAUSALITY. 105
holding that they know nothing whatever about that
cause. The point here raised is, in fact, the chief point at
issue. Mr. Spencer alleges that the ultimate cause is
inscrutable ; and here the issue is joined. We do not
admit the right of any man to refer phenomena to a
cause which is inscrutable; for the very obvious reason,
that before the reference is thought of, he must observe
something in the phenomena warranting and suggest
ing the reference. No such reference is ever made by
any intelligent being, except on the observance of
qualities or actions in the phenomena which can, in his
estimation, be accounted for only on the assumption
that a cause possessing certain attributes has produced
them. This is, of course, all one with saying that
before he makes the reference he has some conception
of the cause to which he makes it. Mr. Spencer
regards the unthinkableness of the creation hypothesis
a sufficient reason for rejecting it. This hypothesis, he
remarks, "implies the establishment of a relation in
thought between nothing and something — a relation of
which one term is absent — an impos'sible relation."*
Now if it be impossible to establish a relation in
thought between nothing and something, or to estab
lish a relation where one term of the relation is
wanting, how are we to establish a relation between
the phenomena of the universe and an alleged inscrut
able cause ? An inscrutable cause is an unknown
cause, and with an unknown thing no relation can be
* Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 336.

106 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
imagined. The term of the relation represented by
the unknown cause, is a term which cannot be present
to thought, and must, therefore, be regarded as not
furnishing the additional element of the relation,
which, according to Mr. Spencer, is indispensable "to
the framing of coherent thought." Judged, therefore,
by his own crucial test of all truth, and his own
postulated condition of all thinking, this position is
indefensible. It is not only unphilosophical to ascribe
phenomena to an inscrutable cause, but the ascription
is absolutely unthinkable. Let any man make the
experiment, and he will soon be convinced that the
thing adventured is impossible even in imagination.
Of an inscrutable thing, nothing can be affirmed save
that it is inscrutable, and to it nothing implying
knowledge of it can be ascribed or referred ; and of all
the imaginable predicates, the predicate proposed by
the evolutionists is at the farthest remove from
admissibility. The predicate embraces the entire
phenomena of the entire universe, including the
evolutionist himself; whilst the something of which
all these are predicted is, in his own view of it (if view
of the inscrutable be possible), absolutely unknowable
and unknown !
It is well that the laws of thought will not permit
even the ablest philosopher to conduct with impunity
a process of thinking involving an absolute absurdity.
Of the truth of this maxim, Mr. Spencer's writings
furnish abundant illustrations ; and of these, one of the
most notable is his account of the manifestation of this

MANIFESTATION PRECLUDES INSCRUTABILITY. 107
same inscrutable cause. In his First Principles * he
informs us that " matter and motion, as we know them,
are differently conditioned manifestations of force ; "
and, in the very same breath, he affirms that this same
force, of which matter and motion are the manifesta
tions, " must for ever remain unknown " ! It would
seem impossible to write down two sentences more
palpably at variance than these. First, we are told
that force manifests itself under the conditions fur
nished by matter and motion; and then we are told
that these "differently conditioned manifestations" of
it give us no information whatever of what force is !
That is, force manifests itself, and yet does not make
itself manifest ! When a man can believe that a thing
can be, and at the same time not be, he may be able to
believe that a thing can manifest itself, and yet impart
no information respecting itself.
On the relation of matter to force, Mr. Spencer is
exceedingly unphilosophical. He regards matter as
simply a condition of the manifestation of force. This
is exactly the reverse of the actual relation, and involves
the subordination of a substance to its own qualities.
Matter sustains to force no such relationship. Of the
force referred to, matter is the source ; and were there
no matter in existence, there would not only be no
manifestation of this force, but there would be no such
force to be manifested. The force in question is not an
entity existing outside and independent of matter,
availing itself of matter as a medium of manifesta-
* First Principles, p. 169.

108 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
tion ; it is itself the offspring of the qualities of matter,
and through it matter reveals itself. The fact is,
Mr. Spencer's notion of the relation in question would
reduce matter to the rank of an occasional cause, and,
stripping it of all claim to causal efficiency, would make
the elements of which it consists a source of perpetual
delusion. It is not only the common conviction of
mankind, but it is the conviction of those who have
investigated most thoroughly the domain of molecular
physics, that matter is the possessor, and not the mere
revealer of force.
It is unnecessary formally to establish this position.
The .physical sciences are founded upon it. The
astronomer, and the molecular physicist, alike proceed
upon the assumption that the forces with which they
are dealing, are not extra-material entities, but qualities
or attributes inherent in matter itself. This fact is
fatal to the claims put forth in behalf of Mr. Spencer's
" ultimate of ultimates," as it reduces it to the category
of a mere quality of matter. A mere quality can never
take the rank of an ultimate cause. An ultimate cause,
and especially the ultimate of ultimates, must exist
prior to, and independent of, all things except itself,
and must account for their existence. This a mere
quality cannot do. As it implies, from its very nature,
the existence of a substance in which it inheres, and
without which it can have no being, it is manifest that
it cannot be regarded as antecedent to that substance,
or independent of it. As all this is true of force in its
relations to matter, it follows, of necessity, that force

MERE FORCE CANNOT BE THE ULTIMATE CAUSE. 109
cannot be regarded as the ultimate cause from which
this stupendous universe, with its fauna and flora, has
come forth.
But even though it were conceded that there is out
side and independent of matter, a distinct entity called
force, it is difficult to see how this concession would aid
the cause of the Spencerian evolutionist; for either
this entity is possessed of intelligence, or it is not. If
it be intelligent, and display that intelligence in the
determination of ends to be wrought out, and the
adaptation of means for working out the ends deter
mined, it must be possessed of all the essential
attributes of personality — must be capable of purpose
and contrivance — must, in fact, possess reason and
will, as well as power. In a word, it must be the
very entity for whose existence theologians contend —
it must be God. If, however, it do not possess intelli
gence and will, it is, ipso facto, disqualified for the
exercise of the imperial prerogatives assigned to it by
the evolutionists. Stripped of all ambiguity, what is
this entity? As described by men of science, its
functions are expressed by the two terms, attraction
and repulsion, or, to use the popular language of
Dr. Tyndall, by the terms "push" and "pull." Will
any man, who has any regard for his reputation,
venture to say that all the phenomena of the universe
are the offspring of " push " and " pull " ? Does any one
imagine that any amount of pushing and pulling would
ever originate matter ? Does any evolutionist believe
that, by pushing and pulling, matter absolutely neutral,

110 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
if there could be such a substance, could be invested
with diverse attributes; or that one kind of matter
could be differentiated into the distinct elements which
actually exist? Or, to go farther back, can any
intelligent being believe that, prior to the existence
of any substance, whether material or spiritual, there
could be any such actions as are expressed by " push "
and "pull"? He who speaks of "push" and "pull"
as ultimate, simply uses language without import.
The idea attempted defies thought. Let Mr. Spencer
test it by his own crucial test of all truth — let him try
a mental presentation of "push" and "pull" where
there is nothing to push or pull, and nothing to be
pushed or pulled, and he will find that the elements
necessary to coherent thought are wanting.
Common sense repudiates the Spencerian ultimate as
absolutely unthinkable. If, as all admit, out of nothing
nothing comes, there can be no " push " or " pull "
apart from an antecedent pusher or puller. Nor is
this all ; for this same principle of causality demands
the existence of suitable materials to be pushed and
pulled. To take an example from magnetic pushing
and pulling; "push" and "pull" intelligently regu
lated, will account for the systematic grouping of iron
filings around the poles of a magnet ; but if one
substitute for the magnet, a piece of lead, or for the
iron filings, a number of marbles, he will find that
there will be neither pushing nor pulling, and that the
systematic grouping which elicited his admiration in
the former case is altogether wanting in the latter.

FORCE NOT AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY. Ill
And as it is with proximate, so it is with more remote
effects. The "push" and "pull" incident to gravita
tion will account for the movement of our earth around
the sun, and for the modifications of its orbit, which
extend over cycles embracing, perhaps, more than a
million of years ; but let there be a globe of iron, or
even of carbon, or of any other single element of
matter, hung in the place of our wondrously con
stituted orb, and "push" and "pull" may put forth
upon it all their might through all the seons of the
coming eternity, without originating a single form
of animal or vegetable life, much less an organism
possessing conscious intellect and will.
In a word, the evolution hypothesis advocated by
Mr. Spencer breaks down at the very outset. It is
only by veiling itself in a haze of so-called first
principles, which seem plausible in the abstract, that
it can for a moment impose upon any intelligent being.
Its ultimate cause, which it dignifies with the superb
title of " the ultimate of ultimates," on which it hangs
the mighty burden of the entire universe, is absolutely
unthinkable, except as a quality or attribute of those
substances for ' whose existence and phenomena it
undertakes to account. In other words, the only
conditions under which force is thinkable as having
existence at all, are such as to render it simply pre
posterous to assign to it the position of the ultimate
cause. If there can be no force apart from a substance,
material or immaterial; and if the qualities or attri
butes of a substance cannot be the cause of the

112 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
substance in which they inhere, it must follow that
force, which is itself but a quality, cannot be the
ultimate cause of all substances and of all phenomena.
However limited our knowledge of the ultimate cause
may be, we know of a certainty that it cannot be the
mere quality of something else. That which is sub
ordinate and dependent cannot be ultimate.
Wrong in his conception of the ultimate cause,
Mr. Spencer is also in error as to the ultimate question
at issue respecting its operation. The question is not,
as stated by him " How has it worked ? " but the far
easier one, " Has it worked with design ? " These are
very different questions, presenting widely different
problems. It is one thing to inquire how the opera
tions of nature are carried on, and another to inquire
whether they are so carried on as to indicate a design.
So diverse are these inquiries, that the one may be
successfully prosecuted where the other transcends
finite capacity. A passage which I take the liberty of
quoting from a sermon by Professor Huxley, on The
Origin of Species, will enable us to judge of the
warrantableness of the distinction referred to, and of
the comparative feasibility of the two lines of investi
gation : —
" The student of nature," says this eminent physiologist,
" wonders the more, and is astonished the less, the more
conversant he becomes with her operations ; but of all the
perennial miracles she offers to his inspection, perhaps the
most worthy of admiration is the development of a plant or
of an animal from its embryo. Examine the recently-laid

CHANGES DURING INCUBATION TELEOLOGICAL. 113
egg of some common animal, such as a salamander or a newt.
It is a minute spheroid, in which the best microscope will
reveal nothing but a structureless sac, enclosing a glairy
fluid, holding granules in suspension. But strange possi
bilities lie dormant in that semi-fluid globule. Let a
moderate supply of warmth reach its watery cradle, ' and
the plastic matter undergoes changes so rapid, and yet so
steady and purpose-like in their succession, that one can only
compare them to those operated by a skilled modeller upon a
formless lump of clay. As with an invisible trowel, the
mass is divided and sub-divided into smaller and smaller
portions, until it is reduced to an aggregation of granules not
too large to build withal the finest fabrics of the nascent
organism. And then, it is as if a delicate finger traced out
the line to be occupied by the spinal column, and moulded ¦
the contour of the body ; pinching up the head at the one
end and the tail at the other, and fashioning flank and limb
into due salamandrine proportions in so artistic a way that,
after watching the process hour by hour, one is almost
involuntarily possessed by the notion that some more subtle
aid to vision than an achromatic would show the hidden
artist, with his plan before him, striving with skilful
manipulation to perfect his work." *
Now, if we are to trust the testimony of Professor
Huxley, who has watched with an achromatic the very
process about which the inquiry is raised, our verdict
must be given against Mr. Spencer's statement of the
question at issue in this controversy. According to
Professor Huxley, the question raised by Mr. Spencer
cannot be answered. The how of the operation by
which that semi-fluid globule is transformed into the
* Lay Sermons, Sc, pp. 260, 261.

114 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
resultant organism, is the very point on which physio
logical research has thus far shed no light.
But, whilst science cannot answer Mr. Spencer's
question, it can answer the one raised by creationists.
While it cannot detect the artist in the act of moulding
the plastic material into the nascent organism, it
declares that the changes which take place are "so
steady and purpose-like in their succession " that " one
is involuntarily possessed by the notion " that if he had
keener vision he would see the artist at work. In a
word, the facts of embryology, as testified to by Pro
fessor Huxley, on whose testimony Mr. Spencer acknow
ledges he has to depend, reveal a process of modelling
in harmony with a plan. The how of the process is not
revealed — the trowel, and the hand that wields it so
dexterously, elude all scrutiny— but voluntarily, or
involuntarily, the observer becomes possessed of the
notion, or the conviction, that the mystic process is
carried forward under the guidance of a designing
mind. Whether, then, we inquire into Mr. Spencer's
doctrine of the unknowableness of the ultimate cause,
or into his position in regard to the question respecting
its operation, we find his views to be indefensible. In
the one case he is at war with philosophy, and in the
other, with the inevitable convictions generated by a
careful observation of the chief phenomena in question.
Science proves that, behind matter and its qualities,
there is a cause which works with design.
Reserving for future criticism the specific arguments

ARGUMENTS AGAINST SPECIAL CREATIONS. 115
by which Mr. Spencer endeavours to sustain his
hypothesis, it is proposed, at present, simply to examine
his reasons for rejecting the doctrine of special
creation. His first reason is that there is a presumption
against it because of its association with primitive
beliefs. "The primitive beliefs of the race respecting the structure
of the heavens were wrong ; and the notions which replaced
them were successively less wrong. The original belief
respecting the form of the earth was wrong ; and this wrong
belief survived the first civilisations. The earliest ideas that
have come down to us concerning the natures of the elements
were wrong ; and only in quite recent times has the com
position of matter in its various forms been better understood.
The interpretations of mechanical facts, of meteorological
facts, of physiological facts, were at first wrong. In all
these cases men set out with beliefs which, if not absolutely
false, contained but small amounts of truth disguised by
immense amounts of error. Hence," Mr. Spencer concludes,
" the hypothesis that living beings resulted from special
creations, being a primitive hypothesis, is probably an untrue
hypothesis. If the interpretations of nature given by
aboriginal men were erroneous in other directions, they were
most likely erroneous in this direction. It would be strange
if, while these aboriginal men failed to reach the truth in so
many cases where it is comparatively conspicuous, they yet
reached it where it is comparatively hidden."
Mr. Spencer tries to strengthen this argumentum ad
invidiam by classing this primitive belief with the
abandoned conceptions of fetichism and polytheism,
and the various anthropomorphic conceptions of the

116 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
unknown cause, which he alleges are "everywhere
fading away." If all the other parts of the story put
into our minds in childhood have long since been
rejected, this remaining part of it, he expects, will ere
long be relinquished also.*
On this argument, or rather attempt to create prejudice
against the doctrine attacked, it may be remarked —
1. The principle on which this objection to the
doctrine of creation is founded, is strangely out of
harmony with the position assumed by Mr. Spencer, in
his First Principles, in regard to ancient and widely-
prevalent beliefs. In his Principles of Biology, he
assumes that the probability is against the truth of a
primitive hypothesis, whilst in his First Principles he
takes the ground that the probabilities are always in
favour of "beliefs which have long existed and are
widely diffused."-f- Now, if there be, in the wide range of
human beliefs, one of which it can be said that it has
existed long, and is widely diffused, it is that belief against
which Mr. Spencer here urges the invidious argument
of an d priori improbability. The belief in question is
as old, and as widely spread, as the human race. There
is no well-authenticated instance of any section or tribe
of our species, which has not confessed the conviction
that the universe, together with its living organisms, is
the workmanship of an Almighty Creator. If this be an
unquestionable fact, does it not follow, on Mr. Spencer's
own showing, in his First Principles, that there exists
a very strong probability in favour of the truth of the
* First Principles, pp. 333-36. t Ibid. pp. 3, 4.

ASSUMPTIONS INVALIDATED BY FACTS. 117
belief which he here antagonises on the assumption that
the probabilities are against it ? If his own principles
are to be carried out in estimating this ancient,
universal belief, there will be found, as the residuum,
the primary, ineffaceable truth, that whatever exhibits
marks of design must have had an intelligent author.
When all the superstitions and crude notions where
with the belief in creation has been associated, have
been dissipated, this conviction abides. Constituted
as the human mind is, it cannot ignore the evidence of
the operation of mind presented in the universe,
and must reject, as unphilosophical, any system of
biology which dispenses with intelligence in the struc
ture of the earth's fauna and flora.
2. That it assumes that man's primitive estate was
that of a savage. As this assumption is contrary to
historical facts, and has nothing to rest upon save a
few remains of prehistoric man, which admit of inter
pretations differing widely from that put upon them by
scientists of the school of Mr. Spencer, he need not be
surprised if this, his primary assumption, be rejected as
a mere begging of the question.
3. That it assumes that all the tribes of the human
race, existing throughout the earth at the time the
remains in question were deposited, were in the estate
indicated by the remains. Granting that the remains
prove the savage estate of the individual and of the
tribe to which he belonged, does it follow that other
tribes, inhabiting other and more congenial regions of
the earth, were in the same estate ? Men of science

118 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
have need to be reminded of what the doctrine of
Scripture on this point is. Scripture does not teach
that the human race retained its moral integrity, or
that each of the families into which it was divided
retained the knowledge possessed by the common
ancestor. On the contrary, it tells a sad story of
apostacy, dispersion, and degradation — a degradation
retarded by special Divine interposition in the case of
some, but allowed to go on in the case of others. If
the morally degraded wandered away from the primitive
seat of the race, and descended lower and lower in the
scale the farther they receded from the parent stock and
penetrated into uncongenial environments, might it not
be expected that their remains would testify, as the
remains in question do, to a low estate of civilisation ?
But what is there in all this to warrant the sweeping
generalisation assumed by Mr. Spencer as a premiss
from which to argue ? Do these instances, exhumed
from European caves, warrant the conclusion, that the
tribes resident in the Asiatic fontal centre, were, at the
time indicated, in the same estate of social degradation ?
Never was there a more unwarrantable inference ; and
yet it is assumed by some of the most eminent scientists
of the day as absolutely unchallengeable !
4. In the next place, it may be remarked that the
belief in the doctrine of a special creation can be proved,
and has been proved historically, as well as by internal
evidence, to have been handed down to us, not by
savages, but by men whose writings demonstrate that
they have no mental or moral superiors in the school of

POSITION SUBVERSIVE OF PRIMARY BELIEFS. 119
Mr. Spencer. On the score of its credibility, as well as
of its harmony with scientific facts, we can afford to
compare the kosmogony of Moses, or David, or Isaiah,
or Paul, or Peter, with the biology of Herbert Spencer
any day, notwithstanding all the advantage he has
derived from the writings of Tyndall and Huxley, or
the prelections of Professor Owen.
5. However little store Mr. Spencer may set by
primitive beliefs, if primitive man had not been
possessed of some, he would never have ascribed the
phenomena of his environment to any cause whatever.
And if we are to speak of the necessity of some of these
beliefs as compared with others, we would specify one
which is subversive of that form of the evolution
hypothesis which he has set forth in his biology. The
belief referred to is the intuitive, innate conviction, that
a phenomenon implies the existence and operation of a
cause. This primary belief is universal, and involves
the principle that the phenomenon reveals the attributes
of the cause concerned in its production. It is, there
fore, irreconcilable with the position, which is really the
ultimate one of Mr. Spencer's biology — viz., that the
ultimate cause is inscrutable. Either the principle
which ascribes inscrutability to a cause is universal, or it
is not. If it be universal, it must apply to immediate
and proximate causes, as well as to ultimate ; and, if so,
the immediate cause to which we instinctively refer the
phenomenon, is to us, at the time of the reference,
inscrutable, and therefore unknown ; in which case the
reference is as unintelligent as it is unwarrantable. If

120 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
it be alleged that it is not universal, but true only of
the ultimate cause, the question arises, on what
authority is this limitation of the dark attribute of
inscrutability to the case of the ultimate cause made ?
As already shown, there can be no reason for regarding
the thing pronounced inscrutable a cause at all, which
is not equally valid for denying its inscrutability.
This belief is as old as humanity, and as wide as the
human race; and it is fatal, not only to the specific
argument which Mr. Spencer has tried to draw from the
other alleged primitive beliefs with which the belief in
the doctrine of a special creation is found to be
associated, but fatal to the fundamental principle of
his whole system, which postulates the inscrutability of
the ultimate cause.
6. Moreover, it were very easy for the advocates of
the doctrine of special creation to retort this argu-
mentum ad invidiam. Evolutionists should be the
last to reproach their opponents with holding opinions
" belonging to an almost extinct family of beliefs.'' It
is not so long ago since we were told, on the high
authority of the president of the British Association,
that the evolution hypothesis was as old as the Greek
philosophy. Now, however, if we are to credit
Mr. Spencer, "it is a conception born in times of
comparative enlightenment." We are quite ready to
compare the enlightenment of the age of Moses with
that of the age of Democritus, or to compare the
prophets of Israel with the sages of Greece. And if we
were to pass in review the various evolution hypotheses

EXTINCT FAMILIES OF EVOLUTION HYPOTHESES. 121
from the time of the Greek evolutionists to Mr. Spencer,
we might be able to show that the one advocated by
him belongs to a very large family of not only almost,
but altogether, extinct hypotheses. Where now, is the
hypothesis of Thales, who held that water is the
original of all things, and that God is the intelligence
who from water formed all beings ? or, the hypothesis
of Anaximander, who substituted an absolutely indeter
minate thing called infinity for the elementary water of
Thales ? or, the hypothesis of Anaximines, who traced
all things to air ? or <that of Anaxagoras, who referred
all things to a number of primitive elements called by
him homceomeriee ? . Where, now, is the hypothesis of
Pythagoras, who deduced all things from a monad,
embracing in its constitution both matter and spirit
fused together into an absolute unity of substance ? or
the same hypothesis as more fully developed into
hylozoism by his followers ? What scientist would now
accept, unmodified, the atomic theory of Democritus,
who represented all things as proceeding from eternal
atoms possessing the same qualities and specific gravity,
aDd differing only in size; and that their general
compounds, such as lead and iron, differ from each
other merely in the arrangement of their atoms ? It
is questionable whether even Professor Tyndall or
Mr. Spencer would embark in the business of world-
building with a stock of such atoms, however diverse in
size, or however unlimited in number. With atoms
whose qualities are generated by their own movements,
and whose movements are not the offspring of their

122 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
previously existing qualities, it is more than probable
that even our modern atomic chiefs might fail to
construct even our inorganic world. And as to their
entering upon the task with such material as water, or
air, or the primitive elements of Anaximines, or the
monad of Pythagoras, of course this were out of the
question altogether.
This brief review of some of the evolutionary hypo
theses is sufficient to prove that, however it may be
with others, evolutionists should be the last to speak of
the presumption which exists against an opinion found
associated with " an almost extinct family of beliefs."
If Mr. Spencer's hypothesis is to be judged upon this
principle, it must be condemned ; for it is associated
with a class of speculations which no scientist, except
for the purpose of producing a temporary sensation,
would entertain or endorse for a moment.
Equally liable to retort is our author's next reason
for rejecting the doctrine of a special creation. He
alleges that it is not countenanced by a single fact.
" No one," he says, " ever saw a special creation." " No
one," he adds, " ever found proof, of an indirect kind,
that a special creation had taken place." Quoting a
remark of Dr. Hooker's, he continues, " Naturalists who
suppose new species to be miraculously originated,
habitually suppose the origination to occur in some
region remote from human observation. Wherever the
order of organic nature is exposed to the view of
zoologists and botanists, it expels this conception ; and
the conception survives only in connection with

SPENCERS TESTS APPLIED TO HIS HYPOTHESIS. 123
imagined places, where the order of organic phenomena
is unknown."* Here is an appeal to facts, and we accept the
authority invoked. It is a fact that no one ever saw a
new species of organism created ; but it is also a fact
that no one ever saw one brought into existence by a
process of evolution ; and it is a fact that no one ever
found proof, of an indirect kind, that such an evolution
of new species had taken place. Wherever the order
of organic nature is exposed to the view of zoologists
and botanists, as in the case already quoted from
Professor Huxley's sermon on the origin of species, it
expels the Spencerian conception of evolution without
the intervention of intelligence, and supplants it by the
irresistible conviction that the process of organisation
is under the guidance of a skilful artist ; and the
conception for which the authority of facts is claimed
by Mr. Spencer survives only in connection with flights
of the so-called scientific imagination, by which " the
vision is prolonged backwards beyond the boundary of
experimental evidence." There is not a single fact
presented in these two volumes which gives the
slightest countenance to the hypothesis which its
author advocates ; nor is there one which, when fully
analysed, does not add strength to the argument in
support of a presiding intelligence and a special
creation. After the author had reached the 351st page of his
first volume, he felt constrained to make the following
t* Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 336.

124 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
confession: — "Though the facts at present assignable
in direct proof that, by progressive modifications, races
of organisms that are apparently distinct may result
from antecedent races are not sufficient, yet there are
numerous facts of the order required." Is this not a
distinct and explicit acknowledgment that no one has
ever seen the evolution of a new species ? If he regards
this fact as furnishing an argument against special
creation, how can he refuse to admit its force as against
his own evolution hypothesis ?
But if he has not direct proof sufficient for the
establishing of this hypothesis, he has, he informs us,
" numerous facts of the order required." What are
these facts ? Here they are : — " It has been shown
beyond all question, that unlikenesses of structure
gradually arise among descendants from the same
stock. We find that there is going on a modifying
process of the kind alleged as the source of specific
differences — a process which, though slow in its action,
does, in time, produce conspicuous changes — a process
which, to all appearance, would produce in millions of
years, and under the great varieties of conditions which
geological records imply, any amount of change."*
And yet he confesses that the pakeontology of these
records cannot be held to prove evolution, and that
only some few of them yield it support ! -f-
Such, then, are the facts ; what is their value in this
argument ? It will be observed that, while Mr.
Spencer speaks of the gradual rise of unlikenesses of
* Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 351. f Ibid. p. 399.

&

DARWIN'S INFERENTIAL BOLDNESS. 125
structure among descendants from the same stock, he
has not ventured to say that these have, in any
instance, amounted to the origination of a new species,
and that he confesses that palaeontology does not
furnish a single instance. All he says is, that this fact
is of the order required ! His hypothesis requires
structural change, and here is a fact of this class. It is
true the change to which it testifies is not great enough
for his purpose ; but it " bears as great a ratio to the
brief period in which it has been produced," as the
whole change required " bears to that vast period
during which living forms have existed on the earth."
This is very like a confession wliich Mr. Darwin makes
at the close of his remarks on the effects of increased or
decreased use of parts. " Although man," he concludes,
" may not have been much modified during the latter
stages of his existence through the increased or
decreased use of parts, the facts now given show that
his liability in this respect has not been lost ; and we
positively know that the same law holds good with the
lower animals." Such is his confession ; what is his
conclusion ? With an inferential boldness that brooks
no barrier, he adds : — " Consequently (!) we may infer
that when, at a remote epoch, the progenitors of man
were in a transitional state, and were changing from
quadrupeds into bipeds, natural selection would pro
bably have been greatly aided by the inherited effects
of the increased or diminished use of the different parts
of the body!"* It is truly painful to observe in the
* Descent of Man, vol. i. p. 121.

126 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
writings of these really able men, so persistent an
endeavour to establish their favourite hypotheses by
facts which they are compelled to admit do not furnish
the evidence required. Frustrated by the facts, not
only of historic and prehistoric times, but of palaeon
tology also, they overleap the boundary of experimental
evidence, and assume transitions and structural changes
which they have failed to prove. When the facts
adduced, even as estimated by themselves, do not give
the slightest indication of a specific change, they
comfort themselves with the reflection that changes of
the class observed must, if continued long enough,
effect the change required ! Of course, a change of the
right kind, however small in amount, if increased by
however small an increment, must, if unchecked, at
some future epoch of duration, amount to the quantum
required ; but only if unchecked. Ay, there 's the rub
— only on the assumption that the change shall be
unchecked ! What warrant is there for this assump
tion ? Certainly there is none in the phenomena of the
observed changes of the kosmos.
Speaking of the external factors of evolution, Mr.
Spencer refers to the fact that our earth, in its annual
motion round the sun, does not move constantly along a
rigid, unvarying curve, but along a curve constant in its
inconstancy — now approaching a circle, and anon an
ellipse. This change is a very slow one, and the cycle
which embraces its extremes has the astounding range
of one or two millions of years. Now, suppose that an
astronomer, who was not aware of the demonstrations of

VARIATION LIMITED BY LAW. 127
La Place, were watching the movements of our globe
referred to, and observed that, in a given period, the
divergence towards a more eccentric curve amounted to
several miles, might he not, if he reasoned with Mr.
Spencer and the evolutionists, begin to apprehend an
elongation of the major axis of its orbit, and a shortening
of the minor, which must eventually evolve extremes of
heat and cold absolutely destructive of organic life in
our world ? As an evolutionist, he might thus reason ;
but the scientific astronomer would inform him that his
fears were groundless, and had their origin in a too nar
row induction. He would allay his alarm by assuring
him that this variation in the orbit of the earth has its
limits, and that when these were reached, the appa
rently errant orb would swing gradually back to the less
hazardous curve.
Now, we charge upon the evolutionists the perpetra
tion of a like error, in their argument from the observed
structural changes which have been induced, or de
veloped, in vegetable and animal organisms. The
organic variation has been shown, again and again, to
have bounds set to it Avhich it cannot pass. Even Mr.
Darwin, as quoted by Mr. Spencer, remarks that
" ' sports ' are extremely rare under nature, but far from
rare under cultivation." And Mr. Spencer himself
admits * that competent judges do not doubt that our
extremely variable domestic animals have become vari
able under the changed conditions implied in domesti
cation, and holds that these animals were constant prior
* Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 262.

128 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
to their subjection to man. Is this not a palpable sur
render of the very citadel of evolution ? It is neither
more nor less than an acknowledgment that constancy
is the rule, whilst variation is the exception ; or, as Mr.
Spencer puts it, " the wild race maintains its type with
great persistence," whilst " the domestic race frequently
produces individucds more unlike the average type
than the parents are." * " The life of a species, like
that of an individual," he says, " is maintained by the
unequal and ever-varying actions of incident forces on
its different parts." -f-
This is conclusive, but it is conclusive against the
evolution hypothesis. If, as Mr. Spencer has shown,
variation is essential to specific life, what becomes of
the notion that, by the operation of this same law of
variation, new species can be originated ? Can the
causes which are held to be capable of transmuting one
species into another be held capable of rendering such
transmutation impossible? If uniformity, as "inter
breeding " demonstrates, produces specific deterioration,
whilst variation, as those skilled in cattle-breeding
inform us, promotes the well-being, and tends to the
perfection of the species, surely it is most unwarrantable
to infer that variation may eventually result in specific
destruction by improving one species into another. It
is no wonder, then, that these two classes of related
facts led Mr. Spencer to enunciate the foregoing remark
able law of specific life. The law, as we have seen, is
universal, extending to the very orbs of heaven. The
* Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 261. + Ibid. p. 286.

DR. STRUTHERS ON VARIATION. 129
stability of the universe, as well as the stability of the
species of earth's fauna and flora, is maintained by
variations which are limited and bounded by an unseen
power which ever acts in reference to the original type,
and maintains its image, substantially, in every indivi
dual movement or organism, through the instrument
ality of the very forces which evolutionists regard as
all-potent to effect its destruction.
The case of a particular family, in which digital
variation occurred, adduced in support of the evolution
hypothesis,* will serve to illustrate this point. The
case is cited from an essay by Dr. Struthers, and the
conclusion drawn is quoted with approval by Mr.
Spencer. After stating the history of the variation
through four generations, Dr. Struthers, referring to a
daughter who was born with six fingers on each hand
and six toes on each foot, says : —
" In this, the most interesting sub-branch of the descent,
we see digital increase, which appeared in the first generation
on one limb, appearing in the second on two limbs, the
hands ; in the third on three limbs, the hands and one foot ;
in the fourth on all the four limbs. There is as yet no fifth
generation in uninterrupted transmission of the variety.
The variety does not yet occur in any number of the fifth
generation of Esther's descendants " (the female ancestor to
whom the variety is traced back), "which consists as yet
only of three boys and one girl, whose parents were normal,
and of two boys and two girls, whose grand-parents were
normal. It is not known whether, in the case of the great-
grandmother, Esther P., the variety was original or
inherited." * Principles of Biology, vol. i. pp. 258-60.

130 REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Such is the case ; what conclusion does it warrant ?
Does it prove that variation may go on indefin
itely ? or does it prove that it is held in check by a
specific law restraining it, like the motions of the
planets, within unalterable limits? The case proves
that the normal type rules; for in the generations
specified, only six instances of variation occur, whilst
there are one hundred and two of the normal type?
If Mr. Spencer can adduce nothing in favour of his
hypothesis better than a woman who has acquired,
through the mystic process of evolution, three digits
more than her great-grandmother, he had better be a
little more modest in his averments about the absence
of evidence in support of the doctrine of a special
creation. It would, indeed, seem as if he felt the
weakness and unprofitableness of this argument; for
he immediately tries to buttress it with an a priori
borrowed from his First Principles, to the effect that
an idea which cannot be presented to the mind in a
definite shape or form, is a false idea, and is to be
rejected. In addition to what has been said on the
point here raised, when speaking of the impossibility
of regarding an inscrutable thing as a cause, it may
be sufficient to cite a passage from Mr. Spencer's
Principles of Psychology, from which it appears that
he does not always regard the unimaginableness of a
thing as a sufficient reason for rejecting it. Avowing
"the belief that mind and nervous action are the
subjective and objective faces of the same thing," he
confesses that " we remain utterly incapable of seeing,

INSTANCE OF BELIEF IN THE INCONCEIVABLE. 131
and even of imagining, how the two are related.
Mind," he adds, "still continues to us a something
without any kinship to the other things ; and from the
science which discovers by introspection the laws of
this something, there is no passage by transitional
steps to the sciences which discover the laws of these
other things."*
Here, then, is a belief which cannot abide the crucial
test of one of Mr. Spencer's first principles, and yet he
holds it ! If he can hold this belief, despite its incon-
ceivableness, with what show of consistency can he
reject, on the ground of its inconceivableness, the
belief in the doctrine of a special creation ? To quote
his own words, at the close of this argument against
the Scripture doctrine, if "belief, properly so-called,
implies a mental representation of the thing believed ;
and," as he confesses, " no such mental representation
is here possible," how can he believe that there is any
relation between "those thoughts and feelings which
constitute consciousness," and the action of the nervous
system ? In a word, then, even though the doctrine
objected to were that of the creation of an organism,
ex nihilo, Mr. Spencer could not consistently reject it on
the ground specified. As the common and Scriptural
doctrine, so far as organisms is concerned, is not that of
a direct creation ex nihilo, but a mediate creation out
of previously existing matter, Mr. Spencer is con
strained to frame his objection so as to meet this
aspect of the question. This hypothesis, he alleges,
* Principles of Psychology, vol. i. pp. 140-56.

132 REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
involves, ultimately, "the creation of force; and the
creation of force is just as inconceivable as the creation
of matter." He asks, " The myriad atoms going to the
composition of the new organism, all of them previously
dispersed through the neighbouring air and earth, does
each, suddenly disengaging itself from its combinations,
rush to meet the rest, unite with them into the appro
priate chemical compounds, and then fall with certain
others into its appointed place in the aggregate of
complex tissues and organs ? " This, he says, is " to
assume a myriad of supernatural impulses, differing
in their directions and amounts, given to as many
different atoms," and is, therefore, " a multiplication of
mysteries rather than a solution of a mystery. Every
one of these impulses, not being the result of a force
locally existing in some other form, implies the creation
of force ; and the creation of force is just as inconceiv
able as the creation of matter."
Now, it will be observed that Mr. Spencer has some
difficulty in bringing his mental-representation principle
into conflict with the doctrine of the creation of
organisms out of existing matter. Not only is the
doctrine, on his own showing, capable of mental
presentation, but he has himself given us a sketch of
the process. He has figured the atoms disengaging
themselves and entering into new combinations, and
taking, as if by magic, their places in the aggregate
of complex tissues and organs. He has put before us
a process not unlike the process of crystallisation, so
beautifully described by Professor Tyndall in his

MEDIATE CREATION NOT INCONCEIVABLE. 133
Fragments of Science, and in his late Manchester
lecture on " Crystalline and Molecular Forces," and one
which is actually realised in the evolution of the
animal from the embryo, as described by Professor
Huxley. In the following passage, Dr. Tyndall gives
a very graphic sketch of the progress by which,
materialists allege, the thing pronounced by Mr.
Spencer to be inconceivable, may be done.
" And now let us pass from what we are accustomed to
regard as a dead mineral to a living grain of corn. When
it is examined by polarised light, chromatic phenomena
similar to those noticed in crystals are observed. And why 1
Because the architecture of the grain resembles the archi
tecture of the crystal. In the grain, also, the molecules are
set in definite positions, and, in accordance with their ar
rangement, they act upon the light. But what has built
together the molecules of the corn? I have already said,
regarding crystalline architecture, that you may, if you please,
consider the atoms and molecules to be placed in position
by a power external to themselves. The same hypothesis
is open to you now. But if, in the case of crystals, you have
rejected this notion of an external architect, I think you
are bound to reject it now, and to conclude that the mole
cules of the corn are self -posited by the forces with which'
they act upon each other. It would be poor philosophy to
invoke an external agent in the one case, and to reject it in
the other.
"Instead of cutting our grain of corn into slices, and
subjecting it to the action of polarised light, let us place it
in the earth, and subject it to a certain degree of warmth.
In other words, let the molecules, both of the corn and of
the surrounding earth, be kept in that state of agitation

134 REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
which we call warmth. Under these circumstances, the
grain, and the substances which surround it, interact, and
a definite molecular architecture is the result. A bud is
formed; this bud reaches the surface, where it is exposed
to the sun's rays, wliich are also to be regarded as a kind
of vibratory motion. And as the motion of common heat
with which the grain and the substances surrounding it were
first endowed, enabled the grain and these substances to
exercise their attractions and repulsions, and thus to coalesce
in definite forms, so the specific motion of the sun's rays
now enables the green bud to feed upon the carbonic acid
and the aqueous vapour of the air. The bud appropriates
those constituents of both for which it has an elective attrac
tion, and permits the other constituent to resume its place
in the air. Thus the architecture is carried on. Forces are
active at the root, forces are active in the blade, the matter
of the earth and the matter of the atmosphere are drawn
towards the root and blade, and the plant augments in size.
We have in succession the bud, the stalk, the ear, the
full corn in the ear ; the cycle of molecular action being
completed by the production of grains similar to that with
which the process began.
"Now, there is nothing in this process wliich necessarily
eludes the conceptive or imagining power of the purely
human mind. An intellect the same in kind as our own
would, if only sufficiently expanded, be able to follow the
whole process from beginning to end. It would see every
molecule placed in its position by the specific attractions and
repulsions exerted between it and other molecules, the whole
process and its consummation being an instance of the play
of molecular force. Given the grain and its environment,
the purely human intellect might, if sufficiently expanded,
trace out d, priori every step of the process of growth, and
by the application of purely mechanical principles demon-

GROWTH RESOLVABLE INTO MOLECULAR FORCE. 135
strate that the cycle must end, as it is seen to end, in the
production of forms like that with which it began. A
similar necessity rules here to that which rules the planets
in their circuits round the sun.
" You will notice that I am stating my truth strongly, as
at the beginning we agreed it should be stated. But I must
go still further, and affirm that in the eye of science the
animal body is just as much the product of molecular force
as the stalk and ear of corn, or as the crystal of salt or
sugar. Many of the parts of the body are obviously me
chanical. Take the human heart, for example, with its
system of valves, or take the exquisite mechanism of the
eye or hand. Animal heat, moreover, is the same in kind
as the heat of a fire, being produced by the same chemical
process. Animal motion, too, is as directly derived from
the food of the animal, as the motion of Trevethyck's
walking-engine from the fuel in its furnace. As regards
matter, the animal body creates nothing; as regards force,
it creates nothing. ' Which of you by taking thought can
add one cubit to his stature ? ' All that has been said, then,
regarding the plant may be re-stated with regard to the
animal. Every particle that enters into the composition of
a muscle, a nerve, or a bone, has been placed in its position
by molecular force. And, unless the existence of law in
these matters be denied, and the element of caprice intro
duced, we must conclude that, given the relation of any
molecule of the body to its environment, its position in the
body might be determined mathematically. Our difficulty
is not with the quality of the problem, but with its com
plexity ; and this difficulty might be met by the simple
expansion of the faculties which we now possess. Given
this expansion, with the necessary molecular data, and the
chick might be deduced as rigorously and as logically from
the egg as the existence of Neptune from the disturbances

136 REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
of Uranus, or as conical refraction from the undulatory
theory of light." *
So far, therefore, as Mr. Spencer's own crucial test
is concerned, Dr. Tyndall has shown that the doctrine
of creation out of existing matter can abide the ordeal.
It may be said, and is said, that the hypothesis
postulates "the necessary molecular data," or, as
Mr. Spencer says, organic matter, to begin with ; but if
vital, and chemical, and mechanical forces be, as the
school of Mr. Spencer would have us believe, both
quantitative and qualitative equivalents, surely one
who is master of the laws of chemical and mechanical
forces ought to be able to construct living organisms,
without creating a new force. If vital forces be the
same both in quality and quantity with chemical and
mechanical forces, there can be no difficulty about
producing vegetable or animal embryos.
It was doubtless this fact which led him to fall back,
by way of supplement, on the creation ex nihilo
hypothesis, which he had, in his own opinion, already
demolished. The doctrine of a creation out of existing
matter, involves, ultimately, the doctrine of "the
creation of force ; and the creation of force is just as
inconceivable as the creation of matter." This is the
fable of the wolf and the lamb over again. If you did
not do it, your father or grandfather did, and you must
pay the forfeit.
Here, then, is a plain issue raised by Mr. Spencer,
* Fragments of Science, pp. 116-19.

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS NOT CREATIVE. 137
and we accept it. The question at issue is simply this
— Does the disintegration and reintegration of matter
imply the creation of force ? The mere statement of
the question is sufficient for any man competent to
form an opinion on the subject in dispute. If the
process referred to involves the creation of a force not
" locally existing in some other form," how is it that
processes of disintegration and integration can be
carried on by chemists, who have confessedly no power
of creating new forces ? The disengagement of atoms,
and the recombination of them into new compounds,
pronounced impossible except on the assumption of the
creation of a new force not locally existing in some
other form, take place in every instance of chemical
analysis and synthesis, without any such adventitious
aid. All that is needed in either case is an operator
possessing the requisite knowledge of the elements
concerned. If the chemist can perform such wonders
in his laboratory without the help of a new force, is it
incredible that the author of the elements should be
able to employ them in the construction of living
organisms ? There is no escape here possible to an
evolutionist of the school of Spencer. If vital force be
the correlate of chemical and mechanical, the origina
tion of life cannot, as Mr. Spencer alleges, imply the
creation of a force not previously existing. It is, there
fore, only on the assumption that vital force is not the
correlate of mere material forces, that Mr. Spencer's
objection can have any meaning. The thing assumed,
however, is fatal to his biological hypothesis, which

138 REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
rests, ultimately, on the convertibility of material forces
into vital.
Assuming that those who hold the doctrine of special
creation regard the demonstration of Divine power
made in the origination of species as designed solely
for the benefit' of mankind, Mr Spencer asks, to whom
was the demonstration made ? As " the great majority
of these supposed special creations took place before
mankind existed, to what purpose," he asks, " were the
millions of these demonstrations which took place on the
earth when there were no intelligent beings to contem
plate them ? Did the Unknowable thus demonstrate
His own power to Himself? Few," he remarks, " will
have the hardihood to say that any such demonstration
was needful. There is no choice but to regard them
either as superfluous exercises of power, which is a
derogatory supposition ; or as exercises of power that
were necessary because species could not be otherwise
produced, which is also a derogatory supposition."*
Now, in the first place, no person properly instructed
in the Scriptures would, for a moment, think of
representing the entire series of creative acts as having
for their sole end the demonstration of the power of
God to man. Other ends by no means derogatory
to the Creator may be assumed, such as delight in the
exercise of His wisdom, and power, and bounty, and
sovereignty. Mr. Spencer assumes that if His acts had
not reference to man alone, they must have been
designed to demonstrate His power to Himself, or were
* Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 339.

WHY SHOULD SPECIAL CREATIONS PRECEDE MAN ? 139
necessary because species could not be otherwise
produced — both of which suppositions, he alleges,
are derogatory. As we have seen, the alternative
assumed is not the only one open to the advocates of
special creations. Besides the one mentioned above,
the student of the Bible can specify many others. It
were not a derogatory supposition that God, in those
remote creations, was demonstrating His attributes to
other orders of intelligences of which the Scriptures
speak, and against whose existence science has no facts
to urge. Or it might be said in reply, that, as the
Author of the earth, with its successive orders of
vegetable and animal organisms, knew that in the
latter days scoffers would arise, who would call in
question His existence, and endeavour to prove that all
organic forms were evolved from uncreated, eternal
matter, by an impersonal power resident in matter
itself, or conditioned by it, He so ordered the mani
festations of life on our globe, as to show that the links
of the great biological chain have been separately
created, and not consecutively evolved.
And lastly, it may be observed, that if this earth
were to furnish a text-book for geologists, it was
necessary that it should be printed before it was
published or read. If our earth was to instruct men,
and serve as a school for their mental and moral
discipline, it was essential that, prior to their matricu
lation, it should be properly furnished. That admirable
scholastic arrangements have been made, is attested by
the earnest competition and enthusiasm displayed by

140 REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the ever-increasing band of scientists who crowd its
halls; and few who have thoroughly investigated the
problems prepared for them, have ever imagined that
they were propounded by a blind, unintelligent, uncon
scious force.
Mr. Spencer regards it as an objection to the doctrine
of special creation, that beings endowed with capacities
for wide thought and high feeling did not exist on our
globe millions of years before man appeared. The
answer has been given already, and is obvious. It
is simply this — Our globe was not fit at an earlier
stage to receive such beings. Special creation does not
set aside order and adaptation ; and is perfectly consis
tent with an original incandescent state of our globe,
watched over by the Creator, who, at the proper stages
in its history introduced such organisms as were suited
to its condition, and fitted to prepare it as a dwelling-
place for man.
Equally unhappy is the argument against design
drawn from the structure of animals of prey, exhibiting,
as such structures do, countless pain-inflicting appli
ances — appliances which have been doing their deadly
work all through the geological eras. " How happens
it," our author asks, " that animals were so designed as
to render this bloodshed necessary ? " * For the
advocate of design, he alleges, there is but the one
alternative — viz., that the Creator was either unable or
unwilling to make animals so as to avoid the infliction
of such misery. Still greater, he thinks, is the diffi-
* Principles of Biology, vol. i, p. 341.

DOES DESIGN IMPLY BENEVOLENCE ? 141
culty when we consider that branch of the arrangement
in which provision is made for the support of the
inferior by the sacrifice of the superior, as in the case
of parasites.
To these objections we reply, that they assume several
things which are not conceded — 1. They assume that
the design of creation, as held by teleologists, is the
production of the greatest possible amount of happiness
throughout the entire orders of organic, sentient life.
For this assumption there is no warrant to be found
either in teleology, or in nature. There is a manifest
subordination running throughout the whole chain of
sentient existence, from the mollusc to the man. No
inferior order lives for itself or simply for its own enjoy
ment. It is a link in a series constituting one great
whole, from which no member can be removed without
causing universal detriment, and the final link of which
lives, not for himself, but for Him to whom he owes his
being. The theology of the whole may be expressed in
one sentence : each inferior order not for itself, but for a
higher ; all the inferior for man, and man for God. Such
is the testimony of the organic worlds, and such is the
doctrine of man's moral nature and of the Word of God.
In this system there is suffering, but it is none the less
in harmony with the facts.
2. Mr. Spencer's objections assume that if we cannot
point out a beneficent design, there is no proof of design
at all. Such an objection may possibly have force with
one under the fascination of an hypothesis which he
would fondly sustain against all comers ; but no man,

142 REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
whose mind is not warped by prejudice, can for a moment
believe that benevolence is a necessary element in
design. Any arrangement embracing means for the
attainment of a definite end carries with it evidence of
design, and is so regarded by all men as soon as the
arrangement and the end are apprehended. It matters
not whether the end be benevolent or malign, whether
the arrangement be ingenious or clumsy, the moment
the connection between the means employed and the
end aimed at, is discovered, the mind instinctively infers
a design and a designer.- The horn of the sword-fish,
the teeth of the lion, the talons of the eagle, are regarded
by all men, whether evolutionists or creationists, as
instruments of design ; and the philosopher who chal
lenges the evidence does but proclaim his folly, and
reveal his prejudice.
3. It is obvious that Mr. Spencer's objections to the
doctrine of design are drawn, not from the facts under
investigation, but from certain inferences in regard to
the effects of this doctrine upon our views of the char
acter of the Creator. He finds organisms not constructed
so as to prevent suffering, and immediately concludes
that organisms have not been designed. Why ? Because
the designer must have either been unable or unwilling
to design them so as to prevent suffering. This alter
native he thinks fatal to the doctrine of design, as it
either casts an imputation on the Divine character or
involves a limitation of the Divine power.*
Now, as we have already seen, our recognition of the
* Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 341.

SPENCER EVADES THE QUESTION OF FACT. 143
marks of design does not depend upon the character of
the end aimed at in the contrivance, but simply upon
the adaptation of the means to the attainment of the
end, whatever the end may be. Constituted as we are.
it is absolutely impossible to discover such adaptation
without immediately inferring a design and a designer.
This is a first principle which the human mind cannot
relinquish without doing violence to its own constitu
tion. It is, in fact, but another form of the principle
that every effect must have a cause. In view of this
fact, it is manifest that the only course open to the
impugner of the doctrine of design, is to meet the
teleologist on the question of fact, and to prove that
animal and vegetable organisms bear in their structure
no traces of design. If he cannot do this (and Mr.
Spencer's work on Biology, by leaving it not only undone
but unattempted, is sufficient proof that he cannot), he
must surrender at discretion. Instead of facing the
facts and divesting them of those marks of design which
the human mind instinctively recognises, our author
carefully avoids the real question at issue, and raises an
entirely distinct one respecting the effect of the doctrine
of design upon our views of the Divine character. This
procedure is as unmanly as it is unphilosophical and
unscientific. It is unmanly not to face the facts pre
sented in the structures of the fauna and flora of our
world ; and it is unphilosophical and unscientific not to
follow out, to their legitimate conclusions, irrespective
of imaginary ulterior consequences, the principles re
vealed by a fair analysis of the phenomena they present.

144 REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
With a philosopher, the question is not, " What effect
will a fair interpretation of these facts have upon some
other doctrine ?" but simply, "What do the facts, fairly
interpreted, teach?" To borrow a manly and truly
philosophical sentiment, uttered by Professor Huxley in
his address before the late meeting of the British Asso
ciation, "Logical consequences are the scarecrows of
fools and the beacons of wise men."* Theologians are
not afraid of the logical consequences of the doctrine of
design upon their views of the Divine character ; nor
will Mr. Spencer be able to turn them aside from the
question at issue, by hanging up, for the thousandth
time, the old weather-beaten scarecrow of optimism,
fashioned, to suit his own purpose, out of the straw of a
false speculative theology.
Of course, if the God of the Bible be the God assumed
in Mr. Spencer's critique on His works, and the end
aimed at by Him be the end ascribed to Him by His
reviewer, it might be difficult to reconcile the actual
phenomena of the organic world with the character of
such a Being. If the Creator possess but two attributes
— benevolence and power — and if His design in crea
tion be the production of the greatest possible amount
of happiness, it might puzzle the ablest of optimists
to reconcile those pain-inflicting contrivances which
abound in the actual organic arrangement, with the
character, and aim, and capacities of this optimistic
Deity. But, as the God of the Bible possesses more
attributes than the two specified, and set before Him
* Fortnightly Revieic, Nov. 1874, p. 577.

SENTIENT HAPPINESS AN INFERIOR GOAL. 145
higher ends than the mere happiness of His creatures
—as He is holy and just, as well as almighty and
benevolent, and regards the interests of His moral
creatures as superior to those of the mere sentient
orders of animal organisms, and considers their moral
culture a higher end than their happiness, yea, has
linked their happiness to their moral and spiritual
character, and set His own glory before them as their
highest end, and the source of their highest enjoyment
— as this is the character, and these the aims, of the
God of the Bible, Mr. Spencer's objections are as irrele
vant as the premises on which they are based are false.
As our critic cannot take in the whole issues of the
mighty cycle embraced in that plan of which these
phenomena strewn on the shores of time are but the
initial movements, it is nothing short of arrogance to
pronounce, as he has ventured to do, upon the moral
character of the Author of the system.
4. Mr. Spencer's objections proceed upon the assump
tion that a theory which does not account for every
class of phenomena, however remotely connected with
the subject under investigation, is, ipso facto, dis
credited. For example, as in the present instance, if
the advocate of design cannot solve the problem of the
ultimate design of the various orders of animal and
vegetable organisms, he is not to be permitted to speak
of the immediate and proximate design of these closely
correlated kingdoms of nature. If he cannot tell why,
or for what ultimate end, God made great whales, and
then constructed sword-fish equipped with a weapon
L

146 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
for their destruction, he must be told that he has
failed to prove that either whales or sword-fish are the
offspring of design ! If a teleologist cannot tell why
God created acari to burrow in the skin and torture
man, he has failed to prove that either man or his
tormentors exhibit marks of intelligent purpose ! If he
cannot take in the vast range of organic relations
(embracing, as multitudinous orders do, organisms
which nothing but the most powerful microscope can
reveal), and grasp the scheme of creation in its entirety,
he is not entitled to speak of any class of relations as
evincing contrivance !
In a word, so long as anything remains unexplained,
nothing is explained. Will any scientist accept this
principle ? Will any astronomer venture to affirm that
Kepler had explained nothing, when he enunciated
the law that " planets revolve in elliptic orbits about the
sun, which occupies the common focus of all these
orbits," because he had not then discovered the second
great law, that " if a line be drawn from the centre of
the sun to any planet, this line, as it is carried forward
by the planet, will sweep over equal areas in equal
portions of time " ? Or, is it to be held that the fore
going laws explain nothing, because Kepler had yet to
ponder the relations of the members of the solar system
for seventeen years before he discovered the third law,
that the squares of the periodic times of the planets are
to each other as the cubes of their mean distances from
the sun ? Are all these laws to be repudiated, because
their discoverer was not able to tell why the orbits of

EVOLUTION EXPOSED TO LIKE OBJECTIONS. 147
the planets and satellites should be ellipses rather than
any other curve, or to tell, as Newton has done, what
power holds these mighty masses " steady in their swift
career, producing the most exquisite harmony of motion,
and a uniformity of result as steady as the march of
time."* Will Mr. Spencer abandon the evolution
hypothesis, because, as confessed by himself, it does not
explain the connection of consciousness with nervous
action ? Will he give up his hypothesis because of its
failure to explain this mysterious relationship ? Tele-
ologists are entitled to press this question with all the
confidence of an a fortiori, for they are asking evolu
tionists to give up a hypothesis for which there is no
positive proof, and which fails, absolutely and con
fessedly, at the most important point in the evolutionary
sequence; whilst, on the other hand, the doctrine of
design is engraven on every organism within the realm
of organic nature, and engraven so manifestly, that the
ablest advocate of the evolution hypothesis — the
philosopher of the school — has nothing to advance
against it, save certain consequences which he alleges
flow from it — consequences which, as we have already
seen, lie only against a speculative, theological optimism
which has no basis in the Word of God.
In a word, then, it is only by petty criticisms, based
on the assumption that the theology of the Bible is
optimistic, that this prince of evolutionists can make
even a show of argument against the doctrine of design
in creation. His assumption is false, and his critique
* Mitchell's Orbs of Heaven, p. 71.

148 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
pointless and worthless. To use his own language in
his estimate of the doctrine he assails, his hypothesis
must be pronounced worthless — "worthless by its
derivation " from Democritus and Lucretius ; " worthless
in its intrinsic incoherence," as demanding continuity,
and yet admitting the existence of impassable gulfs
between the most important elements in the series;
" worthless as absolutely without evidence," no evolu
tionist having as yet been able to point to the evolution
of a single new fertile species from any other ; " worth
less as not supplying an intellectual need," failing, as it
does, to conform to the primary belief that evidence of
design implies the existence of a designer ; " worthless
as not satisfying a moral want," repudiating, as it does,
the very idea of the existence of a personal, moral
intelligence, who sustains to us the relations of Creator,
Governor, and Judge. " We must, therefore, consider
it as counting for nothing, in opposition to" that
Scripture doctrine of Creation which fulfils all these
conditions, and meets all the intellectual and moral
requirements of our nature. Constituted as man is, he
cannot rest in any theory of this wondrous universe,
which does not place an omnipotent moral intelligence
first in the absolute order of existence, as the efficient
cause of all forces, whether chemical, mechanical, vital,
or mental.

CHAPTER V.
ON SOME QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE AUTHORS
OF THE "UNSEEN UNIVERSE."
nnHE ground taken in this remarkable book is "that
-¦- the expressions in the Scriptures regarding the
future of man and the constitution of the unseen
world, taken in their obvious, if not absolutely literal
meaning, are not inconsistent with scientific deductions
from the principle of continuity." Such is the position;
and certainly no intelligent friend of the Word of God
will call it in question. If the writers are to be met at
all, they must be met upon the field of a fair Scriptural
exegesis, and confronted with unquestionable scientific
deductions. Infidels they are not ; and no one who will
carefully and candidly study this, their irenicum, can
avoid the conclusion that they are highly accomplished
Christian men, endeavouring to the utmost of their
ability to effect a reconciliation between Christianity
and Science. Going still further, it may be claimed
that no one seeking instruction can, if he possess the
necessary subjective conditions, fail to profit by the
information on scientific subjects summarised so perspi-
149

150 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
cuously by our authors, or come away from the study
of the problems discussed, without having his views of
the Divine Majesty greatly enlarged, and his conceptions
of the destiny of the Universe and of man vastly
enhanced, or fail to be still more deeply impressed with
the tremendous consequences of uncancelled sin.
Having said thus much in favour of the object and
spirit of this work, it is with great regret that we feel
constrained to question some of its most important
interpretations of Scripture, as well as some of its
chief deductions from the principle of continuity.
In the first place, the theory of creation it propounds
cannot be reconciled either with the teaching of
Scripture or with that fundamental principle of all
science and all philosophy, the principle of causality.
The theory advanced, whilst it assumes " as absolutely
self-evident, the existence of a Deity who is the Creator
of all things " (p. 72), and ascribes to the Governor of
the Universe the high prerogative of conditioning the
beings contained therein as regards time, place, and
sensation (pp. 14, 72, and 216), also assumes the pre-
existence of an unseen universe out of which the seen
has been framed, and ascribes to this antecedent unseen,
under one form or other, an absolutely eternal existence.
" We are led by it (the principle of continuity) not only to
regard the invisible universe as having existed before the
present one, but the same principle drives us to acknowledge
its existence in some form as a universe from aU eternity "
(p. 215).
" Now, what the principle of continuity demands is an end-

MATERIAL OF THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE ETERNAL. 151
less development of the conditioned. "We claim it as the
heritage of intelligence that there shall be an endless vista,
reaching from eternity to eternity, in each link of which we
shall be led from one form of the conditioned to another,
never from the conditioned to the unconditioned or absolute,
which would be to us no better than an impenetrable intel
lectual barrier" (p. 216).
"As far as we can judge, the visible universe — the uni
verse of worlds — is not eternal ; while, however, the invisible
universe; or that which we may, for illustration, at least,
associate with the ethereal medium, is necessarily eternal "
(p. 239).
In criticising the vortex-ring atomic hypothesis intro
duced by Sir W. Thomson, our authors object —
"The act by which the atom was produced must neces
sarily, by this hypothesis, have been an act of creation in
time, that is to say, an act impressed upon the universe from
without, and it must therefore have denoted a breach of con
tinuity ; for, if the invisible universe be nothing but a perfect
fluid, can we imagine it capable of originating such a develop
ment in virtue of its own properties, and without some
external act implying a breach of continuity? We think
most assuredly not. In the production of the atom from a
perfect fluid we are driven at once to the unconditioned, to
the great first cause ; it is, in fine, an act of creation, and not
of development. But, from our point of view, creation be
longs to eternity, and development to time, and we are there
fore induced to modify the hypothesis so as to make it
consistent with this view" (pp. 155, 156).*
It is manifest, then, that this book judges of the
universe itself, and of everything respecting its nature
or origin, upon the assumption of the absolute inviola-
* All cpiotations are from the fifth edition.

152 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
bility of the principle of continuity — a principle which
will brook no interruption, and will admit of no
PHYSICAL CONSEQUENT WHICH HAS NOT AN IMMEDIATE
physical antecedent (pp. 89, 90). The existing
universe, with all that it contains, is to be referred,
not to a creative act or a series of creative acts, but to
a process of development out of previously existing
material, and this material again from a' still more
refined substance, and this again from another in an
eternal series. Our intelligence, we are told, " demands
an endless vista" of the conditioned, and "can never
be led from the conditioned to the unconditioned."
Now, it must be obvious, at the first blush, that this
theory assumes as its basis, not simply the principle
of continuity, but, also, a philosophy of the uncon
ditioned, and that it is not the pure and simple out
come of a scientific analysis of the phenomena of the
universe. He who speaks of the unconditioned, does
not speak as a scientist, but as a transcendentalist,
and, moreover, speaks unintelligibly to the human
mind. The Being designated by the term uncon
ditioned, called also in this book, the Absolute One
(p. 216), cannot be regarded as the creator or author
of anything. He is, as that philosophy teaches, with
out personality or consciousness as He is without
limitation, and destitute of knowledge as He is of
relation. He cannot know and He cannot be known,
nor can He be a cause, as causality implies action,
and action implies succession, and succession implies
existence in time. All this is implied in the doctrine

THEORY BASED ON PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE. 153
of the unconditioned, which is assumed as the basis of
the hypothesis of creation taught in this book, and
applied by our authors to the first person of the
adorable Trinity. What transcendentalists say of the
unconditioned in regard to His (or its) acting, is
applied by them to God the Father (p. 224), the only t
persons of the thrice holy Three capable of acting on,
or through the unseen substance which antedates all
time, being the Son and Spirit. It is vain to allege
that this is a conclusion to which one is driven through
loyalty to science. Before reaching any such conclu
sion, our authors must have taken leave of the
scientific fundamental involved in the principle of
causality, and adopted as their primary principle an
abstract a priori speculation regarding the mode of
the Divine being and action. What has a scientist,
as such, to do with the philosophy of the absolute — a
philosophy which regards the absolute and causality
as contradictory and mutually exclusive ? It is a
¦ fundamental principle both in philosophy and science,
and in the latter, because of its filial relation to the
former, that effects are to be referred to adequate
causes, and, correlatively, that in the domain of
causality, nothing is to be assumed which does not
manifest itself by its effects. Instead of acting upon
this principle, and seeking for the phenomena of the
visible an adequate ultimate cause in the unseen, our
authors (as may be seen on referring to their third
edition, p. 47), have started with Herbert Spencer's
incomprehensible power, and, coupling this inscrutable

154 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
something with the principle of continuity, have tried
to construct, as he has done, a science of the universe
on a philosophy of the unknowable ! In the present
edition, the passage from Spencer is deleted, but the
doctrine has survived the deletion. Whilst they
assume that the principle of continuity is ever carrying
us towards this unconditioned something, they deny
that it can ever bring us into its presence. If so, what
warrant have they for the assumption that any such
thing exists? Such assumption can be justified,
scientifically, only on the ground that along the retro
gressive march there are strewn evidences of its
existence, and evidence of its existence, such as science
can take cognizance of, must be neither more nor less
than evidence of its operation, for the unseen cannot
be " spiritually discerned," save through its manifesta
tions in the seen. This latter, however, is the very
thing our authors will not allow, for the Absolute One
cannot act in time, and, in fact, cannot act so as to
produce a physical effect, either in time or eternity.
If so, He (or it) cannot initiate or originate any physical
thing, however refined, and the ascription of creation
to such a source is as misleading as it is scientifically
unwarrantable. The principle which excludes the
absolute from acting in time must exclude him from
acting in eternity, so as to give being to the mystic
unseen, out of which, by the agency of others, the seen
has been evoked. This, of course, is all one with saying
that neither in the seen nor in the unseen is there any
scientific warrant for the assumption that any such

TRANSCENDENTAL TRINITARIAN ISM EXAMINED. 155
being exists at all. In a word, the hypothesis of our
authors rests ultimately upon an unscientific and
unphilosophic d priori assumption, and does violence
to one of the most patent principles of scientific investi
gation — the principle of causality. If the absolute
cannot be a cause, and if the Son and Spirit cannot
act except through an existing medium, creation ex
nihilo is, of course, excluded.
It is scarcely necessary to inform any theologian, or any
reader of the Bible, that the transcendental trinitarian-
ism of this book is not the trinitarianism of the Word
of God. Our authors identify the Unconditioned and
Absolute One of the transcendental philosophy with the
Father, and affirm of the Father all they have affirmed
of the Absolute, claiming for the Son and Spirit, to the
exclusion of the Father, all forms of activity revealed
in the development of the universe. In opposition to
all this, the Scriptures, whilst they reveal an order of
action, ascribe both thought and action to each person
of the Trinity. They reveal the Father as transacting
with the Son before all worlds, as giving Him for us,
laying our sins upon Him, putting Him to grief, holding
personal intercourse with Him in the days of His flesh,
bearing witness to Him by word and by works, raising
Him from the dead and setting Him above all princi
pality at His own right hand in the heavenly places.
Similar representations are made in regard to His
relations to the mission of the Holy Ghost, who pro-
ceedeth from, and is sent by, the Father. If the
Father be the Unconditioned Absolute One of the

156 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
transcendental philosophy, and of this book, how comes
it that the Scriptures represent Christ as praying Him
to send the Holy Ghost the Comforter ? and how is it
that He is spoken of as bearing witness, both at Christ's
baptism and transfiguration, by direct audible utter
ances from heaven, to our Redeemer's Sonship ? Will
any reader of the New Testament brook or accept for one
moment, the substitution of the Unconditioned Absolute
One of this book, for that Father addressed by Christ
in Gethsemane, or that God appealed to on Calvary ?
The utter inconsistency of this doctrine of the
Father's relations with the doctrine of our Sonship is
beyond intelligent question. Were it not for the per
suasion that its authors are Christian men, one might
be tempted to regard this section of the book as an
attempt to reduce the children of God to an estate of
eternal orphanage. What is it short of mockery to
call the Unconditioned and Absolute of this work, our
Father, telling us at the same time that, between Him
and us there is an interminable series of conditioned
forms of existence, animate and inanimate, yea, a series
of universes, which the principle of continuity will
never permit us to outrun or surpass — a series which,
ever leading up to God, is still an illimitable avenue
(p. 96), never leading " from the conditioned to the
unconditioned or absolute " (p. 216), and which, from
its very nature, can never bring us face to face
with Him who has raised us by the gift and death
of His Son, and by the agency of His Spirit, to the
rank of children and heirs, and to the high privilege

UNSCRIPTURAL VIEW OF CHRIST'S MIRACLES. 157
of ineffable fellowship with Himself? It is therefore
impossible to accept the account which the Scriptures
give of the Father's relations and activity, and, at the
same time, to adopt the Trinitarianism of this book.
From the relation of God the Father to the universe,
we pass to the consideration of the relation sustained to
it by His Son, Jesus Christ. The ground taken by our
authors is, that Christ's work was " done not in violation
of the order of things as established by God the Father,
but rather in strict obedience to it" (how the Absolute
One could establish this order we are not told), "and
the doctrine that represents Christ's miraculous works
as manifestations of His Divine nature, so changing the
order of things as to denote something wrought upon
the universe rather than something wrought through
it, and by its means," is rejected (p. 53). It is alleged
that the former, and not the latter, is the doctrine of
Scripture ; and, in support of this view, appeal is made
to the words of Christ Himself (John v. 30) : " I seek
not Mine own will but the will of the Father who sent
Me." Now, surely these words do not warrant the
inference that Christ's works were all wrought through
the universe and in strict obedience to the established
order of things, and in no instance wrought upon it
independent of and superior to its own forces and laws,
and producing results above anything which could be
effected through their mediation. Surely it might be
the will of the Father that some of the works which
Christ was sent to accomplish should be of the latter
class. There is manifestly nothing in the words

158 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
specified to justify the position assumed by the authors,
except on the assumption of the thing to be proved —
viz., that it was the will of the Father that Christ's
works should, without a single exception, be wrought in
strict obedience to the established order of things. As
the writers have not established this position, they have
no right to assume it.
In support of the same view, the language of Paul
(Galatians iv. 4) is adduced, " When the fulness of time
was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman,
made under the law, to redeem them that were under
the law, that we might receive the adoption of Sons."
Here, the authors confound moral law with physical
law ; the apostle is treating of the moral law and of
its claims upon those whom Christ came to redeem.
To meet these claims, both preceptive and penal,
Christ must, of course, work in strict obedience to the
established moral order which the subjects of His
redemption had violated. To redeem them from the
curse of the law, He must Himself be made a curse for
them, and to entitle them to the reward of eternal life,
He must, as their daysman, fulfil its precepts. To
infer from a passage designed to teach this central
doctrine of Christianity, that Christ was also, in all
respects, subject to the established order of the
universe, is certainly not a logical procedure.
In support of this view of Christ's relation to the
laws of the universe, appeal is next made (p. 54) to
the fact that "He frequently represents His works as
wrought by the Father" (how this working of the Father

CHRIST'S WORKS PRESCRIBED YET SUPRA-KOSMICAL. 159
in time is to be reconciled with the Trinitarianism
sketched by our authors, is beyond our comprehension).
The instance given is John viii. 28 : "I do nothing of
Myself, but as the Father hath taught Me I speak these
things." This passage proves that both the words and
the works of Christ were determined by the. Father ;
but surely it does not follow that all the works thus
determined should be wrought in accordance with the
laws of the universe — i.e., wrought through it and by
virtue of its forces, and not wrought upon it by virtue
of a power resident in Himself. Might not the Father,
so far as this and other like passages are concerned, be
the determiner of the works ; and yet the works, whilst
wrought upon the theatre of the world, be absolutely
supra-kosmical, effected by a power not existing among
the forces of nature or subject to its laws? This
position is in harmony with such passages and is
unchallengeable, except on the assumption that the
forces of the universe are the full equivalent, or rather
the sum total, of the power resident in God Himself,
and that action through these is the only mode of
action open even to omniscience ! Except it be assumed
that God cannot act apart from a material organ (which
were, of course, simply to deny the possibility of crea
tion), there is no warrant for such restriction of Christ's
works. The representation that Christ's works differed
from those that any mere man can accomplish, solely
because His relation to the universe was different
(p. 54), is utterly without warrant in anything recorded
" in the books of the Christian religion."

160 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Besides, if the passages relied on (and they belong to
a numerous class) prove that Christ's working was
subordinate to the laws of the universe, they prove
also that the Father's working is subject to the same
limitation, for Christ ascribes His works not merely to
the Father's instruction, but to the Father's operation.
The works that He did were not His works, as He tells
the Jews, but the works of His Father, and proved that
the Father was in Him and He in the Father (John
x. 37, 38), " Believest thou not that I am in the Father,
and the Father in me ? The words that I speak unto
you, I speak not of Myself: but the Father that dwelleth
in Me, He doeth the works " (John xiv. 10). There can
be no doubt, therefore, that the principle upon which
the authors here proceed, must, if carried out, land
them in the position of those who subordinate the
Father as well as the Son to the laws of the universe.
If Christ's works agreed with the work of any other
man, in that they were effected through the agency of
second causes, employed in accordance with their
qualities and laws, and differed from those wrought by
human agency only in the extent to which He could
summon into operation the forces and laws of nature,
it must unquestionably follow that the Father's works,
in attesting the Messiahship of Jesus of Nazareth, were,
in kind, simply human, and revealed a power simply
finite. Our authors tell us that " the whole genius of
Christianity would point towards a total submission of
Christ in every respect towards all the laws of the
universe " (p. 54), but against this assumption may

REDEMPTION TRANSCENDS THE POWERS OF NATURE. 161
be set, authoritatively, the antagonistic dogma, that the
whole genius of an economy which embraced the
co-operation of the fountain-head of all the forces and
laws of the universe, points towards a supra-mundane
power resident in Christ the Administrator, which it
were unreasonable to regard as limited and bounded by
anything outside the Divine nature. If the object of
Christianity was to make a revelation of the Divine
glory transcendently above any disclosure possible
through the medium of nature and her laws, then
any theory which would subject the Revealer " in every
respect to all the laws of the universe," is self-excluded.
In the administration of such an economy, the human
mind instinctively anticipates manifestations of supra-
mundane authority and power. It must be laid down
as a fundamental truth that the object of Christ's
mission was to deliver men from an estate of moral and
intellectual confusion and guilt ; and, side by side with
this unquestionably Scriptural doctrine, it must also be
held that the natural moral order, broken by man's sin,
contains no provision for his recovery. By the law is
the knowledge of sin, but by it, or by deeds of trans
gressors wrought in satisfaction of its penal claims, shall
no flesh living be justified. Hence, while it behoved
Christ to be made in all things like unto His brethren,
it behoved Him also to be the brightness of the
Father's glory and the express image of His person.
There can be no reason for limiting such a personage
with such a commission in His workings, to the powers,
capacities, and modes of Second Causes, which must, of
M

162 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
necessity, be included within the mundane and tem
poral. As there dwelt in Him all the fulness of the
Godhead bodily, and as the objects of the economy
embraced unfoldings of the Divine character to the
principalities and powers in heavenly places, above
anything made known in the sphere of the natural, it
is not only not unreasonable to infer, but unreasonable
to deny, that Christ's work must have embraced acts
transcending the capacities of the finite, or the works
of Providence. Both the objects of the Christian
economy and the current representations of Scripture
are irreconcilable with the doctrine that Christ was
subject, in every respect, to the laws of the universe.
Had there been a law given that could have given life,
verily, righteousness had been by the law; and had
there been a natural economy through which the mercy
and truth and justice of God could have been revealed,
or the many sons rescued from thraldom and led to
glory, there had never occurred such events as the incar
nation, death, and resurrection of the Son of God. Here,
if anywhere, the law of parsimony should have place.
So rigid is the principle of continuity, as interpreted
and applied by our authors, that it will not admit of
any such thing as the direct intervention of the
Supreme Governor of the universe. " The Principle of
Continuity " it is affirmed (p. 88), " may be said to be
the definite expression in words of a trust that He (the
Supreme Governor) will not put us to permanent intel
lectual confusion, and we can easily conceive similar
expressions of trust with reference to the other faculties

WAS LAZARUS RAISED BY MEANS OF SECOND CAUSES ? 163
of man." Applying " this principle to the discussion of
those events that are alleged to have taken place in
connection with the life of Christ," the ground taken is
that the method of regarding them which represents
them " as absolute interferences of the Divine Governor
with His usual physical procedure," or as events having
" no physical relation to anything that went before or
that followed after," is not only without foundation, but
essentially opposed to the genius of Christianity (p. 89).
Now, the scientific consideration determining our
authors to this position, is simply their inability to
reconcile one class of miracles (works wrought
independently of the mediation of second causes), with
the principle of continuity as interpreted by them
selves. Such interference by interrupting the
continuous flow of orderly physical sequence, would
introduce intellectual confusion ! To put the case
in the concrete: when our Saviour by a word
called Lazarus from the grave, Mary and Martha
and the Jews would have been, and we now, in reading
the narrative, must be, intellectually shocked, except
on the assumption that He had availed Himself
of certain occult Second Causes ! In a word, the
human mind according to this notion of causation, not
only demands the recognition of the principle of
causality, but it demands that effects shall never be
traced directly to the First Cause Himself! More of
this anon. Let it suffice at present to enter a protest
against this unscientific assumption.
But our authors claim that this method of regarding

164 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Christ's wonderful works is essentially opposed to the
genius of Christianity. That is, a method of working
implying on the part of our Saviour the exercise of a
Causative power not resident in Second Causes, would
be in antagonism with the economy of grace ! The
assumption here, of course, is the supra-lapsarian notion
that the Christian economy is embracedwithin the sphere
of God's natural administration. On no other assump
tion can it be alleged that the ascription of Christ's
works to an immediate and direct Divine interposition,
is essentially opposed to the genius of Christianity;
and it is difficult to imagine an assumption more at
variance with the leading facts, and doctrines, and genius
of the Gospel. It is impossible to reconcile it with
the doctrine of the incarnation of the Eternal Logos, or
with the doctrine of regeneration, or with the doctrine
of the resurrection of the dead. As the economy
of redemption is the offspring of the Divine will, and
not the result of any necessity, either moral or physical
— a matter of pure sovereign grace — -so all its elements
assume the action of an agency above and independent
of the powers of the universe, whether visible or
invisible. The agency which this book holds to be
excluded is the very agency which the genius of
Christianity demands. Whilst the Christian scheme
assumes the immediate interposition of God, our
authors teach that any such mode of action on the
theatre of the universe, is not only at war with a
scientific fundamental, but " essentially opposed to the
genius of Christianity."

THE THEORY RESTS UPON A FALSE METAPHYSIC. 165
Certainly the writer who places the Principle of
Continuity, or any other principle, across the pathway
of the Divine agency, and invests it with such obstruc
tive prerogatives, should have reasons to advance of no
questionable cogency. Now, the reasons alleged by
our authors amount to this : that any mode of action
on the part of the First Cause, by which the agency of
Second Causes is superseded and dispensed with, must
produce intellectual confusion. The Principle of Con
tinuity will admit of no break in the chain of Second
Causes, much less will it tolerate the operation of an
ab extra cause setting aside the entire chain. In
taking this ground, the writers have crossed the bound
ary and invaded the territory of metaphysics. They
are not to be blamed for this, nor treated as intruders,
for, apart from metaphysics, there can be no science
either of matter or of mind. As a recent writer has
truly remarked, " What is any science but a system of
cognitions ? But a system of cognitions must imply
principles of cognition of some sort, and what are
these but a metaphysic ? " Our authors, it is true, have
endeavoured to avoid metaphysics, but, by raising the
question of intellectual confusion, they have stirred the
profoundest depths of that science. Intellectual con
fusion can occur only where violence is done to the
laws of thought, and the question, therefore, is reduced
to this : Does the ascription of phenomena to the First
Cause directly, and not mediately, through Second
Causes, do violence to the laws of the human mind ?
Our authors object to the doctrine of an immediate

166 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
interposition of the First Cause, because such inter
position, by doing violence to the Principle of Continu
ity, must render the phenomena inexplicable to science.
"Inexplicable to Science," of course, is but another
expression for " inexplicable to the human mind." The
scientific mind, linked to the Chariot of Continuity,
cannot admit of physical phenomena which " have no
physical relation to anything that went before or that
followed after."
It is obvious, then, that the question thus raised is
one which comes fairly and necessarily within the
province of mind, and must be determined in accord
ance with the laws of thought. Coming, therefore, at
once, to direct issue on the question of "intellectual
confusion," our authors may surely be called upon to
show how such interference of the First Cause can
produce the mental revulsion alleged. The only con
secution of phenomena fitted to perplex or confound
the human mind, is that in which effects seemed to
be coupled to inadequate causes, for in such case a
fundamental law of thought (causality) would be
violated; and this law takes precedence of the so-
called Principle of Continuity, and cannot be ruled by
it without doing violence to the very constitution of
the mind itself. The human mind demands homage
to this law above all rival claimants, and will permit
no pretender, however ancient or honourable' his phy
sical pedigree, to usurp the throne as an ultimate
arbiter. This law simply demands for all phenomena
an adequate, not necessarily a physical, cause. In a

CAUSALITY OUTRUNS PHYSICAL CONTINUITY. 167
word, "intellectual confusion" can take place only where
this law has been violated, and this is out of the
question where there is evidence of the immediate
agency of the omnipotent God. Indeed, our authors
themselves, in accounting for the phenomena of energy
and life, find it necessary to assume the existence and
operation of other than mere physical' elements in the
grand aggregate of causal influences. To this assump
tion they are driven by the very constitution of their
minds, which will not tolerate a reference of these
phenomena to merely physical causes. This is, of
course, all one with saying that, in accounting for such
phenomena, "intellectual confusion" can be avoided only
by the assumption of a living intelligent agency. In a
word, the Principle of Causality demands more than
the analyist, or the anatomist, or the mere physicist
can reveal. It demands an element which is above
matter and antecedent to its existence, and when the
human mind descries this element upon the theatre of
action, as in the instances referred to, producing effects
beyond the capacities of physical causes, so far is it
from any feeling of revulsion, that it experiences all
the enjoyment incident to the satisfaction of a funda
mental law of thought.
As already intimated, our authors reject the doctrine
of the resurrection, in what they call "its vulgar
acceptation" (p. 57), as a doctrine which cannot
possibly be true to scientific thought. Indeed the
chief object of this book is, on the one hand, to prove
the utter incompatibility of the doctrine of the

168 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
resurrection as ordinarily held, with " recent advances
in physical science," and, on the other, to show that
science has all its demands satisfied in the Sweden-
borgian doctrine of an internal, psychical, body,
connecting us with the invisible universe (p. 200).
Any form of the doctrine involving the resurrection of
any portion of the gross material deposited in the
grave, is, in the opinion of the writers, to be rejected as
implying a violation of the Scientific Principle of Con
tinuity. This doctrine, they seem to think, may be
fairly met by the old argument from cannibalism,
carrying with it the awkward and inconvenient con
tingency of " rival claimants " at the final distribution
(p. 57). Nor do they regard it as beneath the dignity
of the subject to supplement this argument by a
humorous allusion to the story of the Irishman's coat
(p. 58), which, despite the transformations incidental to
perpetual patching, retained its identity. Such an
analogy might help in the emergency of a debate
before an audience with whom ridicule is more potent
than argument, but it is difficult to imagine how this
metamorphosed vesture has found its way through the
channel of scientific thought into a scientific treatise
on the sublime theme of the resurrection. Such
analogies are not likely to lead many to abandon the
hopes of a veritable resurrection for the illusions of
Emanuel Swedenborg. Let us take an illustration
more in keeping with the dignity of the subject, and
one which should have more readily suggested itself to
scientific thought. Let us take the familiar instance

ORGANIC NOT MOLECULAR IDENTITY. 169
furnished by our own bodies throughout their mar
vellous transformations in the present life. All that
our scientific friends have urged against the identity
of the coat will bear, with tenfold force, against the
identity of our bodies, through the successive stages of
growth and decay ; for, while the process of change was
not continuous in the case of the coat, it is absolutely
ceaseless in the case of our earthly tabernacles. The
garment of cloth has, even under the hands of the most
inveterate patcher, occasional intervals of rest ; but the
vesture of flesh, under the mystic power that wove it at
first, is ever in the loom, perpetually implemented by
fresh supplies of vital warp and woof. Will our
authors question the facts revealed in the continuity of
living organisms, or, recognising the facts, will they
challenge the identity ? The very doctrine which they
would turn into ridicule, is one unceasingly illustrated
throughout the wide domain of earth's fauna and flora.
In no instance is the identity of an organism held to
be dependent upon the sameness of the molecules
which enter from period to period into its structure.
In every case, identity is determined and maintained
by an inherent organific principle which is at once
specific and individualising — a principle characteristic
of the species, and peculiar to the individual, by virtue
of which, the matter of the organism is moulded and
fashioned in strictest conformity to the idiocratic ideal.
In terms of ridicule, not much in harmony with the
gravity of the subject, the writers speak of the absurdity
of that theory of the resurrection which teaches tbat

170 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
some particles of the old body, " worked up along with a
large quantity of new material, into a glorious and im
mortal garment," shall form " the clothing of a being
that shall live for ever " (p. 58). To this statement of
the case they append a note of exclamation, as if the
notion were self-refuting, simply adding the remark that
" we have only to compare this hideous and grotesque
conception with the noble and beautiful language of
Paul, to recognise the depth of abasement into which
the Church had sunk through the materialistic concep
tions of the dark ages" (pp. 58, 59). To this comment
another note of exclamation might be added. The very
conception spoken of in terms of such unmitigated
contempt, is not only in harmony with " the noble and
beautiful language of Paul " referred to, but may, on
any fair principle of exegesis, be deduced from the
apostolic account of the resurrection body, and its rela
tion to the body at death. Whilst the Apostle teaches
(1 Cor. xv.) that the body which is sown shall be greatly
changed at the resurrection, he nevertheless teaches
that it shall not be so changed as to lose its identity.
The subject of the corruption, dishonour, weakness, and
infirmities of the natural estate, is also the subject of
the incorruption glory, power, and spirituality. Paul
recognises no change destructive of the continuity of
the material tenement. At the resurrection, Christ's
redeemed shall be invested with a glorious body, but the
aoifia •^u%tKW shall furnish the material out of which
the <rS>p.a irvev/xaTiicov shall be fashioned by that mighty
Worker, who is able to subdue all things unto Himself.

PAUL'S TEACHING IDENTICAL WITH CHRIST'S. 171
Nor was this a new idea, largely due, as our authors
affirm, " to the contact of the apostolic pioneers with the
acute minds of the ancient philosophers." What Paul
teaches, Christ taught. When He came in contact, not
with " the acute minds of the ancient philosophers," but
with the sceptical minds of the Sadducees. His teach
ing embraces the following points : — 1. That there would
be a bona fide resurrection, and not the mere "substantial
and bodily reality of the future state " (p. 50). 2. That
the resurrection body should differ greatly from the
body at death. 3. That the difference should be so
great as to exclude the sensual appetites and passions.
4. That the resurrection body should be immortal, and
the redeemed equal to the angels. " They which shall
be accounted worthy to obtain that world and the
resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given
in marriage ; neither can they die any more ; for they are
equal unto the angels, and are the children of God,
being the children of the resurrection " (Luke xx. 35, 36).
This is just as clear as anything taught by "the
apostolic pioneers," after their intellectual contact with
the acute minds of Greek philosophers. The <r5>p,a
•jrvevfidriKov of the apostle gives us no clearer conception
of the resurrection body, than that conveyed to Peter,
and James, and John, when they beheld the glory of
Christ's person revealed in the Transfiguration ; nor does
Paul's account of the change add a single item of infor
mation to that expressed in the language of our Saviour
quoted above. Two things, therefore, are beyond ques
tion. 1. That our Saviour and His disciples taught the

172 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
doctrine of a veritable resurrection, and not simply that
of a future state of existence. 2. That this doctrine
was not shaped by the New Testament writers, through
the influence of the Greek philosophy. The doctrine
rejected is the doctrine of the Scriptures — the doctrine
on which the claims of Christ as the Messiah are staked,
as well as our hopes of eternal life ; and however
" hideous and grotesque " the " working up of the effete
and loathsome rags of what was once the body," may
seem to some scientists, who forget that they are speak
ing of matter in terms of disparagement, which genuine
science has stamped with well-merited reprobation, it
will nevertheless bear scientific scrutiny.
It is scarcely necessary to state, that the principle at
stake here is involved also in the miracle of the loaves
and fishes. There is no objection against the nucleus,
or (if, in a modified sense, we may be allowed the term),
the histological theory of the resurrection body, which
will not lie with equal force against the enlargement of
the five loaves and the two fishes (Luke ix.), into a suf
ficient quantity of bread and fish to feed five thousand,
leaving behind twelve baskets of fragments, a quantity
many times greater than that given by the disciples
into Christ's hands at the outset. Here we have the old
bread and fishes " worked up, with a large quantity of
new material," into a more than abundant supply of
food for five thousand men. Will our scientific theolo
gians place, in pity or in contempt, a note of exclamation
at the close of the narrative in which this miracle is
recorded ? It is difficult to see on what grounds they

FINAL GOAL OF THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE. 173
can withhold it here after placing it there. What was
the material held in the hands of Christ, save the nucleus
of that wondrous repast? and what was the amazing
increment, save " new material," embodied with the old
into one aggregate, which was regarded by all as
inseparably identified with the original material out of
which it seemed to be worked ? If these friends hold
to the miracle, while they reject the doctrine of the
resurrection, will they be kind enough to assign their
reasons ? The man who laughs at the nucleists had better
take heed lest he soon laugh at Christ and His apostles.
In Chapter III. the conclusion is reached " that the
available energy of the visible universe will ultimately
be appropriated by the invisible;" that it began in
time, and will in time come to an end," and the infer
ence is deduced that " immortality is impossible in such
a universe." This is the outcome of Chapter III. ; and
that of Chapter IV, though expressed in the modest
form of an allowable imagination or possibility, is " that
the separate existence of the visible universe will share
the same fate, so that we shall have no huge, useless,
inert mass existing in after ages to remind the passer
by of a form of energy and a species of matter which
will then have become long since out of date and
functionally effete. Why," it is asked, " should not the
universe bury its dead out of sight ? " (pp. 157).
The process by which this goal of the eternal rest
and final disappearance of the visible universe is to be
reached, is given in detail. It is simply this — 1. The
persistent operation of those laws and forces by which

174 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the matter originally distributed through space has been
broken up into discrete stellar systems, will, in time, by
the convergence of the planets and satellites upon their
respective suns, and of all the suns upon one common
centre, bring the whole matter of the visible universe
together into one mass, whose potency to originate new
systems, gradually exhausted by the process of cooling,
shall ultimately cease altogether.
2. "In fine, if we suppose the material universe to be
composed of a series of vortex-rings developed from an
invisible universe, which is not a perfect fluid, it will be
ephemeral just as the smoke-ring which we develop
from air, or that which we develop from water, is
ephemeral, the only difference being in duration, these
lasting only a few seconds, and the others it may be for
billions of years" (p. 157).
Such is the conclusion of our authors. Will it bear
scientific scrutiny ? In the first place, if the doctrine of
the conservation of energy advocated in the present day
by scientists universally, and assumed throughout this
book, be true, no such fate as an eternal rest or a final
disappearance can be in store for the visible universe.
That doctrine does not admit any such result as the
absolute exhaustion of energy through dissipation of
light and heat, except through some material medium ;
and if there be a law of this nature, it must follow that
the energy resident in matter, whether kinetic or
potential, can never pass out of the sphere of matter
(for matter is matter and not spirit, however refined),
but must ever, so long as matter exists, be treasured up

ABSOLUTE EVANESCENCE UNSCIENTIFIC. 175
therein. If it be said that the only thing contended for
is the ultimate vanishment of the visible into the
invisible, the reply is obvious. The evanescence of
matter, apart from the direct act of its Creator, is
impossible except by a process of dissipation and diffu
sion by which the ultimate atoms or " vortex rings " shall
gradually subside into that mysterious " imperfect fluid "
called the invisible universe. Having passed back into
that ethereal reservoir from which it was originally
evoked, what warrant is there for the conclusion that it
has for ever disappeared, or that it shall for ever after
wards elude the scrutiny of the " passer-by " ? Why, it
shall then have simply returned to the estate from
which, according to our authors, the whole visible uni
verse has been evolved, and must, if the doctrine of the
conservation of energy be true, have all the potential
energy it ever had, and be as potent for a second cycle
of evolution as it was for the first. Potent, for poten
tial energy possessed by a substance in distribution
must result in future cosmical efficiency. The only
possible modes of escape from this conclusion must be
either (1) that the dissolution of the elements shall
divest them of their gravity, or (2) that, despite their
mutual attraction, the process of diffusion shall be eter
nal, and tbat the light and heat generated by the
stupendous collision of the systems and suns of the
existing universe shall, independent of any medium,
travel irretrievably beyond the invisible universe itself.
It is scarcely necessary to remark that it is a little too
late in the day to propound such a theory. It is not

176 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
only in conflict with the most authoritative deliverances
of modern science, but with the fundamental postulates
of the book in which it has been elaborated. If nothing
finite can divest matter of its qualities, if no transfor
mation can despoil it of the force of gravitation, if the
potential energy of the visible universe, when converted
into light and heat, cannot travel except through a
material pathway, it must follow that when the cycle
described by our authors shall have been completed, the
to irav of the then invisible universe in which the
stupendous aggregate of energies (call them kinetic or
potential, or what we will), shall have been treasured up
(for treasured up and not lost they must be, if physical
science is to be credited), shall be neither more nor less
than the equivalent of the potencies whence the visible
has been evolved. Dissipation into space cannot be
dissipation beyond the invisible parental substance, and
cannot, therefore, be destructive of energy. If all
this be unquestioned by physicists, surely there is no
ground for the conclusion that the visible, when it is
reabsorbed by the unseen, shall abide eternally invisible.
There is no possible argument in favour of such a con
clusion, or imagination, which would not be equally
valid against the very process of evolution described and
advocated in this book. The principle of continuity
admits of no increment of energy, nor will it admit of
any diminution. The kinetic energy of the visible can
be neither more nor less than the full and fair equiva
lent of the potential energy of the antecedent invisible,
and when the kinetic shall have acquiesced in the

EVANESCENCE SCIENTIFICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. 177
potential, it must be potent for the full re-enactment of
the mystic drama on which the curtain shall then have
fallen. When, therefore, our authors have, in imagina
tion, tolled the passing bell of a departed kosmos, and
cast upon the imaginary resting-place of its most
attenuated vortex -rings, the viewless immortelles which
bespeak no future epiphany, they are suddenly
awakened from their funeral reverie by their own trump
of continuity as it summons to the rehearsal the
dramatis personce of the buried past.
It is true, our authors speak of the dread issue of
evanescence in terms of studied and characteristically
scientific caution. They merely say that it may perhaps
be imagined as at least a possibility. In the previous
chapter, however, as already seen, in terms which be
speak absolute scientific certainty, it is predicted that
through a cyclical process of kosmical catastrophes,
the energy of the entire universe shall at length be
completely exhausted, and the huge material of defunct
suns and systems enter, at least so far as visible motion
is concerned, upon an eternal rest. How the latter
member of this singular alternative can be certain, and
the former, nevertheless, possible, it were unprofitable
to consider. According to either, the immortality of
the resurrection body is impossible. A catastrophe
which is to give to the whole matter of the universe
an eternal quietus, by which it shall be rendered for
ever " functionally effete," leaves no room for the future
activity of that portion of matter, however small in
quantity, or refined in quality, out of which the

178 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
crwfia Trvevfiarticov is to be fashioned, nor does it afford
much relief to one whose cherished hopes have been
dashed by this form of the speculation, to be told that
" we may now perhaps imagine, at least as a possibility, '
that this functionally effete universe shall be appro
priated by the invisible, and buried out of sight. In
neither form of the predicated finality can the principle
of continuity permit the voice of the archangel or the
trump of God to awaken to eternal life the treasured
dust of Christ's redeemed; and if such doom awaits
the universe, no eye of man or angel shall ever see the
dead, small and great, come forth from land and sea to
stand before the great white throne.
This scientific speculation, founded upon the so-
called ultimate principle of continuity, is, therefore,
irreconcilable with the doctrine of the resurrection as
revealed in the Scriptures. The gravity of the con
clusion would certainly seem to warrant a thorough
investigation of the scientific claims of the principle.
The principle of continuity is simply this — " a material
effect implies a material antecedent." Within the
domain of science, therefore, all material effects are
to be traced to material causes. Hence " the material
as well as the life of the visible universe are (is)
regarded as having been developed from the Unseen
in which they (both the material and the life) had
existed from eternity." This, the authors tell us,
" appears to them to present the only available method
of avoiding a break of continuity, if, at the same time,
we are to accept loyally the indications given by ob-

CREATIVE AGENCY DEPENDENT ON MATTER. 179
servation and experiment." "In fine, life as well as
matter comes to us from the Unseen Universe " (p. 244),
and must come through the materialistic chain of
sequence demanded by the principle of continuity.
"Taking the universe as we find it, and regarding each
occurrence in it, without exception, as something upon which
it was meant that we should exercise our intellects, we are
led at once to the principle of continuity, which asserts that
we shall never be carried from the conditioned to the un
conditioned, but only from one order of the fully conditioned
to another. Two great laws or principles come before us :
the one of which is the conservation of energy, that is to
say, conservation of the objective element of the universe ;
while the other is the law of Biogenesis, in virtue of which
the appearance of a living being in the universe denotes the
existence of an antecedent possessing life. We are led from
these two great principles to regard, as at least the most
probable solution, that there is an intelligent agent operating
in the universe, whose function it is to develop energy ; and
also that there is a similar agent whose function it is to
develop life. Perhaps we ought rather to say that if we are
not driven to this very conclusion, it appears, at least, to be
the one which most simply and naturally satisfies the principle
of continuity. But this conclusion hardly differs from the
Christian doctrine, or, to speak properly, the conclusion, as
far as it goes, appears to agree with the Christian doctrine "
(pp. 244-51).
The sum and substance of all this is, that the
principle of continuity must rule throughout all our
investigation of the phenomena of the universe. Intel
ligent agency is to be recognised ; but only in the
capacity of superintendence, guidance, or direction of

180 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
previously and eternally existing sources of phenomena.
The agents are the Son and the Spirit, but the
material subject of their action is traceable, and that
on the principle of continuity, to a substance beyond
their agency, called the unseen universe, in which
they exist and reside, through which alone they can
act, and which is absolutely eternal, and by impli
cation, uncreated — a something which is not God, and
which is not to be traced to the Eternal Father,
as He, being unconditioned, cannot act in time !
And this, we are told, hardly differs from the Christian
doctrine !
The line of thought by which our authors have been
conducted to this conclusion, is, in a word, simply this :
the most probable conclusion from observation and
experiment is, that the visible universe is not eternal,
and that it has not the power of originating life.
Proceeding upon this high probability, life as well as
matter is referred to the unseen universe. As the
phenomena of energy and life imply intelligence,
intelligent agency must exist in the unseen, and our
authors accordingly, consulting the Christian records,
assume the existence of two such agents — one whose
function it is to develop energy, and another whose
function it is to develop life. These agents, however,
reside and operate in the universe, and deal with an
already existing substance in accordance with its laws.
This substance, under the agency of these two mighty
workers, has produced the visible universe, embracing
all its marvellous material structures, organic and

ENERGY AND LIFE IMPLY INTELLIGENT AGENCY. 181
inorganic. The principle of continuity is thus satisfied,
as energy and life are referred to the operation of an
adequate intelligent and living agency upon a previ
ously existing substance. But, as this principle of
continuity demands a physical antecedent for every
physical effect, it will not admit of any such break
in the physical chain, as a creation, ex nihilo, of this
substance would necessarily imply. Hence all develop
ments, whether of energy or of life, by the intelligent
agents hypothecated, must have been from some
physical substance, however attenuated. In a word,
creation is by this alleged scientific principle necess
arily excluded, and this unseen substance is declared to
be eternal, and, by implication, uncreated. "The
principle of continuity demands an endless development
of the conditioned."
This speculation conducts us, as our authors claim,
"if we go infinitely far back to a universe possessing
infinite energy, and of which the intelligent developing
agency possesses infinite energy" (p. 220). This con
clusion, with the grave qualification already suggested,
may be accepted on one point, as no mean contribution
to the theistic argument. It is something demanding
grateful recognition in these days of materialistic scien
tific degeneracy to find men who are manifestly masters
in the domain of physics proclaiming, as the result of
their investigations of matter, that the visible points
backwards and upwards to an infinitely energising
intelligence working in the unseen. They have not been
able, like Dr. Tyndall, to find in matter itself " the pro-

182 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
mise " or " the potency " of " all forms of terrestrial life,"
however far they have lengthened the vista, either into
the past or the future. Dispensing, as science ought,
with the dubious aid of the so-called "scientific imagina
tion," they have chosen the humbler yet surer method
of " scientific experiment " (save in the grave instance of
an unscientific draft upon the transcendental philosophy
of the unconditioned), and have reached the grand con
clusion that the visible universe cannot be accounted
for scientifically, except on the assumption of an
antecedent intelligence. For this service the authors
deserve the best thanks, not only of the friends of the
Bible, but of all who believe in the existence of the
living God. It is, however, to be regretted that these
able men have stopped short with the application of
the (borrowed) principle of adequate causality to the
visible universe. One is surprised to find that whilst
they demand an intelligent agent in order to account
for the development of energy, and a living agent to
account for the development of primordial life germs,
they do not feel it necessary to demand an intelligent
agent to account for the existence and nature of the
unseen substance out of which these agents, in the
exercise of their respective functions, develop such
marvellous results. If the production of energy drives
a scientist to the assumption of an antecedent agent
possessing intelligence and infinite energy, and the
development of life compels the conclusion of an ante
cedent Lord and giver of life, surely the existence
of a material or substance out of which both energy

MATTER ITSELF IMPLIES ANTECEDENT INTELLIGENCE. 183
and life may be evoked, must demand an explanation,
and point to an antecedent intelligent cause.
Constituted as the human mind is, it cannot termi
nate the investigation by a blind wholesale reference of
the seen to the unseen. If the reference to the unseen
be warranted at all, there must be within its causal
arcana the appropriate and adequate elements for the
construction of the seen. Whatever theory of the ulti
mate elements may be adopted, whether we regard them
as threescore, or reduce, in the exercise of the " scientific
imagination," the threescore to one simple element out
of which they have all been built up, it is impossible
to avoid or evade the question, " Whence this marvel
lous constitution, this fundamental substance ? " " The
questioning impulse " will force this inquiry upon us,
and the mental constitution which this impulse be
speaks, will be satisfied with no answer which does not
refer the elements themselves, or (if our authors will)
the unseen substance whence they have been evolved
to an intelligent agent, not resident in and operating
through, but antecedent to and independent of, this
mystic material or substance, whence the visible has
been evoked. If the design of a watch is in the wheels
prior to their collocation, and if the designer is not the
mere collocator, but the original constructor of the
wheels and pinions and levers and springs, surely the
authorship of the visible universe must be carried into
the sphere of the substance out of which it has been
framed, and embrace an act of ineffable intelligence and
power, giving birth to that substance itself. Giving birth

184 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
to that substance itself: for the adaptation of the sub
stance to the ends attained arises from the qualities or
attributes with which it has been endowed, which are
to it what the teeth or other mechanical contrivances
are to the substance employed in a watch. But, as
these qualities or attributes are inseparable from the
very essence of the substance in which they inhere, or
rather of whose nature they are the index, it follows
that the marks of design are graven upon the very
essence of the ultimate substance. This, of course, is
all one with saying that science, even acting upon the
subordinate principle of continuity, carries us inevit
ably back to a point in the constitution of the universe
where we are compelled, by virtue of the very consti
tution of our minds, to abandon a mere physical con
tinuity, and refer what our authors regard as ultimate
and eternal, to an antecedent omnipotent intelligence.
In conclusion, the following points seem to be
established : —
1. That the principle of continuity is not of itself
sufficient to solve the problems furnished by the
phenomena of the universe. Our authors themselves,
who seem inclined to subordinate everything, both
within the sphere of the natural and the revealed to
this principle, are compelled to eke it out by the intro
duction of two intelligent agents without whose
causal efficiency there could be neither energy nor
life. 2. That this principle is utterly and confessedly
helpless when, in obedience to "the questioning

SUMMARY OF POINTS ESTABLISHED. 185
impulse," we raise the inquiry, " whence this so-called
ultimate substance with all its wondrous endowments
and adaptations ? " This question must be asked, or the
instinctive demand of our rational nature must be
repressed ; and no answer will satisfy the human mind,
which assumes that such a substance has the cause of
its existence in itself, or which does not ascribe it to an
independent, all-wise Creator.
3. That the principle of causality is a higher
scientific principle than that of mere continuity, giving
to it, as it does, all its scientific, value, binding together
all the members of the series, and linking the series in
its entirety, to an adequate antecedent in which alone
" the scientific mind " can rest.
4. That, even on the assumption of this speculation,
the predicted issue of either an eternal rest or a final
evanescence, is not a necessary result of the causes at
work. If, as the hypothesis is, there are in addition to
the totality of the causes embraced in the substance of
the seen and the unseen, two intelligent agents whose
functions comprehend the development of energy and
life, it must follow that so long as these agents exist
and choose to exercise their functions, the matter of the
universe can never become " functionally effete " or
" immortality " become " impossible in such a universe."
Whatever warrant there may be, on a purely scientific
hypothesis framed upon the basis of a mere physical
continuity, for predicting these dread catastrophes,
there can be none on the hypothesis of continuity
amended by the introduction of two intelligent agents

186 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
invested with the high functions of developing energy
and life. The introduction of these agents is the intro
duction of will, and this volitional element takes the
case out of the mere category of physical continuity
and places the issue beyond the pale of scientific fore
cast. There would certainly seem to be no alternative
for our authors but either to exclude these agents or
abandon the prophetic office. Prophecy regarding the
issue of such a universe, in the hands of such agents as
the eternal Son and co-eternal Spirit, is manifestly out
of the question, save on the assumption of a direct
communication of their will. It were easier, by far,
to forecast the final disposition of a quantity of iron-
ore when subjected to the initial process of a smelting
furnace. If, as our authors teach, these agents possess
the high functions of developing energy and life,
surely it is not unreasonable to assume that in the
exercise of these functions, they will be able, despite
local kosmical catastrophes, to provide and preserve a
home for the resurrection bodies of the redeemed. As
our authors have admitted among the forces of which
they feel bound to take cognisance, the agency of Him
who said, " I go to prepare a place for you," and " I will
come again and receive you to Myself, that where
I am there ye may be also," they would do well to take
heed to this more sure word of prophecy, and believe
that He who has promised is able also to perform. As
the universe at present exhibits to science the process
of world-making in actual progress through almost
every stage, from the faintest nebulte to the gorgeous

THE SWEDENBORGIAN RESURRECTION EXAMINED. 187
array of planets and suns, what reason is there to con
clude that there will ever come a time when this
process shall cease, and all diversities disappear in one
common final catastrophe, followed, ultimately, by
eternal rest, or eternal evanescence. The conservation
of energy, as has been already seen, precludes any such
issue, and the character and promises of Him to whom
the development of energy is ascribed in this book, are
our guarantee that, despite " the wreck of matter and
the crush of worlds," this mortal shall put on immor
tality and this corruptible be clothed with incorruption.
It is unnecessary to enter upon a formal refutation of
the Swedenborgian doctrine of the resurrection as
advocated in this book. No amount of ingenuity can
reconcile it with a future rising of the dead. Our
authors have felt this difficulty, and have therefore
modified the theory by adding to it the conjecture
" that the spiritual body may remain veiled or in abey
ance until the resurrection " (p. 203). If so, this
psychical body must at death be severed from the spirit,
and cleaving to the material body, be deposited in the
grave. In that case, the spirit must enter the future
state (if the theory of memory advocated by this book
be true) destitute of a single reminiscence of its earthly
history and thus not only unfitted for worshiping the
slain Lamb by whose blood it was redeemed, but, if the
theory be true, unfit to think or act or live during the
interval between death and the last day ! If " one of
the essential requisites of continued existence be the
capability of retaining some hold upon the past," and if

188 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
" this hold implies an organ of some sort," and if this
be true throughout the whole range " of finite organised
intelligence, from the archangel to the brute " (p. 78)
then for a disembodied spirit there can be no possibility
of existence or action. This is no misstatement of the
position taken, for on the very next page we read : —
" To sum up, it thus appears that there are two general
conditions of organised life. There must in the first
place be an organ connecting the individual with the
past, and in the next place there must be such a frame
and such a universe that he has the power of varied
action in the present. We particularly request our
readers," it is added, " to keep well in mind these two
propositions, since it is upon these that our argument
will ultimately in great part be built" (p. 79). This
is, of course, merely the extension to the finite of a
principle already applied to the Divine Being.
In a word, the sum of all is this, neither God, nor
angel, nor spirit, finite or infinite, can act without an
organ. This wide and dreadful conclusion seems
implied, for the Unconditioned, it is alleged, does not
act and cannot act in time, nor does it appear that He
ever acts. The two intelligent agents who have pro
duced the visible, live in and act through the organ of
the invisible. This rule, which is the offspring of the
principle of continuity, holds, therefore, throughout the
whole range of spiritual being, and, of course, precludes
the possibility of life or action on the part of the dis
embodied spirit of man. The natural inference, of
course, is that the soul must take its organ with it at

PSYCHOPANNYCHIA OR SOUL-SLEEP. 189
death into the future state, or cease to be or act. If it
did this, however, there would be no meaning in those
passages of Scripture which speak of a future resurrec
tion of the body. Hence the device of a spiritual body
"veiled" or "remaining in abeyance." As this veiling
or holding in abeyance of the spiritual body, if it is to
serve the purpose of harmonising the theory with a
future resurrection of "all who are in the grave,"
must mean an actual identification or connection of this
body with the body laid in the tomb, the veiling must
be its burial. But as the soul cannot live or act with
out this essential spiritual organ, it has no alternative
but either to cease from the theatre of existence and
action, or to lie " veiled " and " remain in abeyance "
with its organ in the grave. How far this is beyond
the doctrine of Priestly, or how it is to fit into the
analogy of the faith, it were useless to inquire. As such
doctrine would doubtless be spurned with just indigna
tion by our authors, there remains for them no alterna
tive position, save that of "Hymenseus and Philetus,
who concerning the truth have erred, saying that the
resurrection is past already ; and overthrow the faith
ofsome"(2Tim. ii. 17, 18).
As regards the apologetic value of this book, it is
with regret we are constrained to regard it as theistic
rather than Christian. It demonstrates, as already noted,
the impossibility of accounting scientifically for the
origin of energy and life in the universe, save upon the
assumption " that there is an intelligent agent operating
in the universe, whose function it is to develop energy ;

190 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
and also that there is a similar agent whose function it
is to develop life." It is true our authors enunciate
this solution in terms which abate to some extent its
apologetic value ; but even with the appended qualifica-
cation, this conclusion reached by these eminent
scientists, must be regarded as an important contribu
tion to the science of theistic apologetics.

CHAPTER VI.
AGNOSTICISM.*
THE term Agnosticism is from the Greek yiyvcbo-Kw,
to know, and a privative, and means, literally, a
theory which hypothecates a state of ignorance or
absence of knowledge. In usage, the term is restricted
to the designation of the doctrine of a modern school of
philosophic scientists, who hold that the substance
which is assumed to underlie and give birth to the
phenomena of the Universe is unknowable. The
discussion of the doctrine expressed by this term will
not be considered out of place at this time by any one
who is acquainted with the present drift of a certain
school of scientific speculation. Day unto day is utter
ing speech respecting the inseparable connection which
obtains between Theology and Science, whether mental
or physical. Scientists and theologians may warn each
other off from their respective domains, but the warning
must ever prove abortive. Impelled by the very
constitution of their nature, scientists cannot rest in
second causes scattered and unrelated ; and, admonished
* From the Princeton Presbyterian Review of January, 1885.
191

192 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
by the Divine Word, which condemns men for not
studying the visible universe so as to discover the
invisible things of its Author, theologians dare not
consent to their exclusion from an empire which
furnishes, in every department of its stupendous wonders
hitherto subjected to intelligent scrutiny, the most
unquestionable proofs of His eternal power and godhead.
Under the dominion and sway of what has been very
happily termed " the questioning impulse," the scientist
can find no scientific resting-place outside the empire
of Theology; and, on the other hand, the theologian,
who is not otherwise constituted than the scientist,
feels the impelling power of this same impulse enforced
and sanctioned by the Word of God. In a word, the
exclusionists, whether scientific or theological, are, as a
matter of fact, constantly invading the proclaimed
territories, and are thus illustrating the vanity of the
prohibition, the irrepressible character of human
instincts, and the infallibility of Holy Scripture.
This questioning impulse is but another name for the
principle of causality, and, under its operation, scientists
are constrained to seek for a cause which shall account
for the manifest correlation and concatenation of second
causes, and are thus led to the recognition of a First
Cause. On this point there is no dispute. Agnostics,
Atheists, and Theists are all agreed that there is a
First Cause of this Universal Frame, including our
earth and "all that it inherit." The only question
admitting discussion at all, is the question in regard to
the nature of this First Cause. Atheists deny that it

SPENCER'S DEFINITION OF THE UNKNOWABLE. 193
possesses those attributes of intelligence and will which
Theists ascribe to God, while Agnostics hold that its
nature is unknowable. It is with the latter the present
discussion is held. Notwithstanding the characteristic
vagueness with which writers of this school speak of
this ultimate, as an unknowable something, they find it
very difficult to avoid the use of terms which compro
mise their position. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his
recent controversy with Mr. Harrison, informs his
readers that he found, when he came to correct the
proof of his article on Religion, that he had defined his
unknowable as "An Infinite and Eternal Energy by
which all things are created and sustained." This
definition, so perilous to an Agnostic polemic, was
instantly stricken out, and in its stead there appeared
the scarcely less perilous definition, " An Infinite and
Eternal Energy from which all things proceed." This
incident illustrates the difficulty, or rather the impossi
bility, of defining the Agnostic Unknowable without
foreclosing the discussion. If to define is to state the
genus and cite the essential difference, and if Knowable
means conceivable, or thinkable, that which is definable
must be knowable, and that which has been defined
must have been thought, and so fully thought out as to
have been differentiated from all other objects of
thought, and, consequently, must be thinkable or
Knowable. This foreclosure of the discussion is chargeable upon
the agnostics themselves, for, in classifying it as the
First Cause, and speaking of it as "An Infinite and

194 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Eternal Energy from which all things proceed," they
have defined that ultimate substance which they pro
nounce unknowable. Before assigning it this rank,
they must have known it as a Cause, and as the Cause
which is supreme over all other causes, and this implies
extensive knowledge of its attributes, relations, and
prerogatives. So self-asserting is this truth, that
agnostics cannot speak of their Ultimate without
implying the possession of the knowledge which they
disavow. In criticising the Hamiltonian doctrine,
which denies that the Absolute and Infinite are objects
of thought or consciousness, Mr. Spencer contends that
"In the very denial of our power to learn what the
Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is,
and the making of this assumption proves that the
Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a
nothing, but as a something. Similarly with every
step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld.
The Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of
the Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of
as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive
that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances
only, without at the same time conceiving a Reality of
which they are Appearances ; for appearance without
reality is unthinkable."*
Mr. Spencer has here refuted both Hamilton and
himself. In teaching that our knowledge extends
beyond appearances to "a Reality of which they are
Appearances," he has conceded what is fatal to
* First Principles, p. 88.

SPENCER'S ARGUMENT SELF-REFUTING. 195
Agnosticism ; for the Reality which underlies Appear
ances, and which he here not only pronounces conceiv
able and thinkable, but declares to be actually embraced
within our knowledge, is identical with the Agnostic
ultimate which he, nevertheless, pronounces unknow
able ! All that is necessary to justify a verdict of
Agnostic suicide, is to adopt his method of dealing
with Hamilton and the Absolute, and to " strike out
from his argument the terms " Reality and Actuality,
and Noumenon, " and in the place of them write "
ultimate substance and its equivalents, and then
predicate of the latter what he has predicated of the
former. It is true the point here before the critic's mind is
the existence and not the knowableness of the Absolute,
but his admission that the Absolute can be present to
the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something, is
virtually an admission of its thinkableness and know
ableness, and not of its mere existence. His distinc
tion between an " indefinite " and a " distinct "
consciousness of the Absolute, affords no help to his
theory. If an indefinite consciousness of it warrants
the conclusion that it exists, it must warrant the
conclusion that it is knowable, for to be conscious of
the Absolute existing, as the Absolute,- is to know, not
only that it exists, but that it exists as the Absolute.
It is only through a defective analysis of the contents
of consciousness that any one can fail to perceive this
truth. This knowledge, however, according to the
account of the Absolute as given by Hamilton and the

196 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Transcendentalists, may not amount to much, but it is
nevertheless conclusive against Agnosticism, for the
question has not reference to the amount or measure
of the knowledge of the First Cause which is attain
able, but simply to the possibility of attaining any
knowledge of it at all. Such is the Agnostic position.
It affirms that the ultimate something, which it
recognises as underlying all things, is unknowable,
while it ascribes to it persistence and causality.
This doctrine, in its progress toward absolute
nescience, far outruns its Athenian prototype. The
altar which Paul found at Athens was dedicated " to an
unknown god;" the Agnostic altar is erected to an
unknowable god. The Athenians simply confessed a
present ignorance of their god: the Agnostics add to
this nescient creed an article couched in the language
of eternal despair, which places between moral intelli
gences of whatsoever order, and the source whence it is
admitted they and all things proceed, a gulf which is
absolutely impassable. While the Athenian motto was
ignoramus, that of these Agnostics is ignorabimus.
Of the existence and persistence of this god, however,
they have no doubt; but despite these items of
information it abides unknowable. How these items of
knowledge and of nescience can dwell together as
associated mental states, is certainly inscrutable. Nor
is the difficulty of harmonising them lessened, when
account is taken of the fact that the Ultimate, of whose
existence, persistence, and inscrutability Agnostics are
certain, is recognised by them as sustaining causal

ADORATION OF THE UNKNOWABLE IMPOSSIBLE. 197
relations to the entire universe. They designate their
Ultimate by the term Cause, and classify it as the
First Cause, and yet pronounce it unknowable !
The chief difficulty which occurs to one on hearing
this Agnostic position stated, is to conceive the
possibility of any intelligent being accepting it. This
difficulty is vastly increased, or rather gives place to
astonishment, when it is found that men, claiming to
lead the philosophic and scientific thinking of the age,
profess their faith in the doctrine, and write treatises in
support of it, representing the inscrutability of the
Ultimate Cause, for which they claim the homage of
moral intelligences as an essential condition of religious
worship. Now, at the very threshold of this discussion, the
question forces itself upon our attention, " How has the
existence of this Ultimate, of which Agnostics speak
with such unquestioning certitude, been discovered ? "
From what premises, and by what process, have they
reached the conclusion that any such entity exists ?
As non- transcendental philosophers and scientists,
there is but one pathway to this discovery open to
them, and the fact that they designate this Ultimate
object of their veneration by the term Cause, and
assign it the supreme seat over all causes, as the causa
causarum, " from which all things proceed," is
sufficient evidence of what this pathway is. They
have scaled, by means of the ladder of Causality,
scientific heights, whence they have discovered the
existence of this Unknowable, and it is surely not out

198 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
of place to ask, " Why have they cast the ladder away
by which they have been enabled to make this dis
covery ? " If this ladder has conveyed them to a point
in the ascent from which they can see that this
Ultimate exists, and not only so, but to a point from
which they can see that it is the cause of all causes,
there can be no excuse for throwing it aside when it
has rendered such signal service, and abandoning the
investigation. Such arrest of scientific thinking may
suit Agnosticism, but the laws of thought and the
interests of science forbid the arrest, and pronounce it
illegal. In ascribing to this unknown something,
which is assumed to lie behind the things that are
seen, the attribute and prerogative of causality, they
show that the process by which they have been led to
the conclusion that it exists, is one which, if fairly
carried out, will not permit them to rest in the
conclusion that it is unknowable. Causality and
unknowableness are mutually exclusive predicates.
In affirming the former we deny the latter, and in
affirming the latter we deny the warrant of the ascrip
tion implied in the former. In speaking of anything
as a cause of any other thing, we profess to know both,
and to have discovered their mutual relations. The
fact that our knowledge of the former is mediate-
acquired through the scrutiny of the latter — does not
warrant us in discrediting it, or casting doubt on its
validity. If the principle implied in such treatment of
knowledge thus acquired were acted on, there would be
nothing left to mankind save their intuitions, or

PARTIAL AGNOSTICISM SCIENTIFICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. 199
primary beliefs, and their cognitions. The principle on
which it is denied that the First Cause can be known
must logically lead to the denial of the knowableness
of second causes, for our knowledge of these is as truly
mediate as is our knowledge of the existence of this
universally recognised First Cause. The Agnostic has
other opponents to encounter than those with whom
alone he imagines he has to deal. His fundamental
principle, when its logical consequences are appre
hended, must summon to the conflict the whole
scientific world, the validity of whose conclusions in
every department of science, whether of matter or of
mind, the Agnostic has by implication called in
question. Partial Agnosticism is out of the question.
One cannot be an Agnostic in theology and a Gnostic
in science. If he will be an Agnostic in the depart
ment of the science of sciences, he must be an Agnostic
throughout the entire empire of human knowledge.
Denying the knowableness of the First Cause, he must,
if he will maintain his consistency, deny the knowable
ness of any cause whatever, and thus, ruling himself
out of the sphere of philosophic or scientific recogni
tion, be justly treated as a mere phenomenologist, and
righteously prohibited, or self-excluded, from crossing
the threshold of the temple of the sciences.
This verdict is not a strained inference. Mr. Herbert
Spencer openly avows the doctrine here charged. In
his Principles of Psychology he has a chapter entitled
" The Substance of Mind," written, as he informs his
readers, "for the purpose of showing that nothing is

200 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
known, or can be known, of the subject which the title
of the chapter indicates." To prevent misapprehension,
he distinguishes between the substance of mind and
(what he is pleased to call) the multitudinous modifica
tions of it which rise into the sphere of consciousness.
Of these latter he teaches we do know something, and
may eventually know more, but of the former — the
underlying substance of which they are the modifica
tions — we know nothing, and never can know anything
about it. " It is not enough," he adds, " to say that
such knowledge is beyond the grasp of human intelli
gence as it now exists ; for no amount of that which we
call intelligence, however transcendent, can grasp such
knowledge." In a word, the doctrine which the writer
undertakes to prove, and which he admits will need a
good deal of elucidation, is that the substance of mind
cannot be known by any order of intelligence, whether
finite or infinite.*
Such is the proposition ; what is the proof, and
where is the promised elucidation ? The principle on
which the argument is conducted is indicated in the
statement of the point which the writer undertakes to
establish, as given above. It is simply this, that
consciousness is simply knowledge of mental activity,
and as a mental activity is not the substance of mind,
but a modification of that substance, the substance
unmodified cannot be present in any state of mind.
Stripped of the veil woven around it by its author,
whose forte and safety lie in the use of unintelligible
* Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 145.

SUBSTANCE OF MIND PRONOUNCED UNKNOWABLE. 201
abstractions, this is the argument by which the
unknowableness of the substance of mind is demon
strated ! The only element of truth in this argument
is, that we are conscious only of the activities of mind,
and not of the substance of it. This is true, but it does
not follow, as our author assumes, that the substance,
of which he holds these activities are modifications
(and whose existence, as against Hume, he asserts as
necessary to account for the notion of continuous
existence or reality), transcends the most transcendent
intelligence, and, despite the activities, which are
simply its own activities, remains unknown and
inscrutable. Mr. Spencer has imposed upon himself
by attaching a peculiar meaning to the term " modifica
tion." He speaks of the modification of mind as a
transformation of mind, and infers, from the varying
forms which he alleges it assumes, the impossibility of
knowing the substance of it. While the author, when
" the alternative of translating mental phenomena into
physical phenomena, or of translating physical pheno
mena into mental phenomena " is formally before him,
prefers the latter to the former,* he, nevertheless,
seems unable to free himself from materialistic con
ceptions when treating of mind. His present argument
furnishes a singular instance of this confusion of
physical and mental phenomena. He speaks of a
modification of mind as a chemist might speak of a
modification of a simple element through its combina
tion with another element. As in common salt we
* Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 159.

202 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
have chlorine and sodium as modified, and not in their
respective simple states as chlorine and sodium, so in
those activities which manifest themselves in conscious
ness, we have present, not the simple substance of
mind, but mind under different modifications. A
chemist may analyse the compound, and bottle up
the chlorine by itself and the sodium by itself, and
the oxygen which modified and mediated both, by
itself, but such scientific analysis of mental modifica
tions is out of the question. Mind cannot be subjected
to the methods of the laboratory, and treasured up,
separately and without modification, for inspection by
the mental chemist, and hence never can be known in
its native simplicity. Such seems to be the analogy
which has ruled the author's speculation regarding
"the Substance of Mind," as a something having a
distinct and separable existence apart from its attri
butes and properties, as it reveals itself in conscious
ness. And yet the analogy fairly carried out is against
the Agnostic theory, for capacity to enter into combina
tion is taken by all chemists as evidence, not simply of
the existence, but of the nature of an element.
The only refutation which such an argument merits
is simply to substitute for the term " modification " the
term "manifestation." In passing from one state to
another, the mind does not change or modify its
substance. It is not one thing in Cognition, another
in Feeling, and another in Conation. These activities
are not modifications of the substance of Mind, but
manifestations of its nature, through its different

ATTRIBUTES AND SUBSTANCE INSEPARABLE. 203
faculties, or capacities for diverse functional action, and
instead of furnishing proof of its unknowableness, are
at once the evidence both of its existence and nature.
They proclaim, through the unchallengeable testimony
of Consciousness, that Mind is a substance which differs
from all other substances in this, that it apprehends,
reasons, feels, and wills. Strip it of these attributes
and you annihilate it. Behind these and apart from
them, as having a separate or separable existence, there
is nothing. This is true of all substances in the
Universe. There is no substance existing in a state of
separation from its attributes. The attributes are not
distinct entities added on to the substance, but qualities
of the substance, and reveal its nature. To say that
the attributes of a substance may be known while its
nature remains unknown and unknowable, is simply to
say and unsay the same thing in the same sentence.
Knowledge of essential attributes is knowledge of the
essential nature of the substance they reveal. If
Agnostics will insist on the separation of substance
and attributes, let them become transcendentalists out
and out ; for it is impossible to distinguish their sub
stance, disrobed of its attributes, from the transcen
dental Absolute. When they have done so, however,
they must speak as transcendentalists do of their
Absolute, and cease to ascribe to their Ultimate the
prerogative of Causality. Such a substance forfeits
all claim to take rank as a Cause.
The principle at issue here is fundamental to all
science, whether physical or metaphysical. The

204 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
phenomena which prove the existence of anything are
invariably taken by all, save those who are at war with
sound philosophy, and whose methods of philosophising
do violence to common sense, as revealing its nature.
Through the phenomena revealed by the spectroscope
we are not simply informed of the existence of luminous
bodies, but of their constituent elements also ; and
when these elements are examined they are assumed
to be, in their essence, what their respective properties
indicate. Constituted as we are, we cannot regard any
species of matter as different in its nature from what
its several qualities express. The position taken by
Professor Flint on this point* is subversive at once of
both science and Natural Theology. If the properties
of matter are not, as he alleges, what they appear to be,
science, in assuming that they are, is, simply a
delusion; and Theism, in so far as it infers the
invisible from the visible, has no claims upon our faith.
The position, however, is unscientific. Those properties
which declare a gas to be Oxygen or Hydrogen, and
which determine its action and fit it for its place in
nature, are never regarded as separable from its
essence; but, on the contrary, are always, and of
necessity, looked upon as expressing what it is in its
essential nature.
As Mr. Spencer himself teaches : " To be conceived
at all, a thing must be conceived as having attributes.
We can distinguish something from nothing only by
the power which the something has to act on our
* Theism, pp. 110-111.

SPENCER'S DING AN SICH AN ILLUSION. 205
consciousness." * If so, what becomes of the Ding an
sich, the Ultimate, on the assumption of whose
separableness from its attributes the whole Agnostic
hypothesis proceeds.")" If, as he tells us, the power of
a thing to act on our consciousness resides in its
attributes, it must be manifest that the Agnostic
Substance which has been divested of all attributes,
must be deprived of all power to affect our conscious
ness, and must, consequently, be destitute of the
prerogative of Causality. The Agnostic Ding an sich,
therefore, is dethroned as a cause, and as already
intimated, is identical with the transcendental
Absolute. To define it, after such denudation, as
"An Infinite Eternal Energy from which all things
proceed," as Mr. Spencer has unwittingly done, is to
gainsay the Agnostic fundamental, and to reinvest it
with the very attributes of which, in the interests of
that theory, it has been so ruthlessly and unscientifi
cally despoiled. Mr. Spencer's appeal to space and
time as illustrations (pp. 48-50), will not help him out
of the dilemma in which he has involved Agnosticism,
for no one attributes to these conceptions any causal
prerogatives. From this dilemma there is no escape
for Agnosticism; either the Ultimate Substance has
attributes, or it has not. If it have attributes, it is
* First Principles, pp. 47, 48.
-j- This Ding an sich of the Kantian Philosophy is properly
estimated by Schopenhauer in his Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung," Erster Band, Seite 5, as Ein Frtrdumtes Unding
dessen Annahme (ist) Ein Irrlicht in der Philosophic,"— a dreamy
nothing whose acceptance is a Will-o'-the-Wisp in Philosophy.

206 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Knowable; if it have no attributes, it cannot be a
Cause. On either horn the Agnostic must be impaled.
In a word, properties which reveal to us the
existence of anything, necessarily reveal, to the same -
extent, its nature. The revelation may be very
imperfect. It may be even as intangible as the vision
of Eliphaz, the Temanite, revealing its presence while
it veils its form ; but, like that same vision, as far as it
makes known its existence at all, it makes its nature
known. So deeply is this truth inwrought in our
mental constitution, that all men act upon the assump
tion of it as ultimate and final. By all men, a thing is
assumed to be exactly what its properties indicate.
And this assumption is found to be indispensable to
our safety in our present material environment. The
principle assumed is one which guides the investiga
tions of the scientist and the hourly actions of all men.
He who will proceed upon the contrary assumption in
his intercourse with matter, taking things to be
different from what their properties indicate, will very
soon bring his intercourse with matter to a close ; and,
even though he should escape the peril of his own
principles, he certainly would never, by his adherence
to them, contribute much to the advancement of
science, for all science is built upon the chief corner
stone which he has rejected — viz., that a cause is
known by and through its effects, and is, in its nature,
what its effects indicate. Astronomical science has
furnished a very remarkable illustration of the truth of
this principle. Two astronomers, Leverrier and

CAUSES REVEALED BY THEIR EFFECTS. 207
Adams, conducting their investigations independently
of one another, were led to the discovery of a new
planet from the perturbations of the planet Uranus.
Regarding these perturbations as effects, they were led
to estimate the mass and position in space, of their
cause. From the alternate retardation and acceleration
of the planet whose orbit, and mass, and motions were
known, they concluded that the operating cause (or
" persistent force," as Mr. Spencer would call it) must
be a planet of a certain mass, and that it must occupy
a position in space from which alone it could produce
the anomalies which had proved such a puzzle to
astronomers. These conclusions, reached through a
careful study of phenomena, were verified by the
telescope, which, on being turned to the point in space
determined by calculation, disclosed to an admiring
scientific world, the planet Neptune, which, though
veiled from scrutiny through the unmeasured cycles of
the astronomic aeons, had been asserting its kinship
with its sister planets of the solar array.
It is difficult to imagine how an Agnostic would deal
with such a fact as this. It is manifestly irreconcilable
with the Agnostic fundamental, that a cause can reveal
its existence and yet conceal its nature. Though unseen
by human eye, this unknown planet, by the effects it
wrought upon a sister orb, made known its mass, posi
tion, and motion ; and yet, to be consistent, an Agnostic
must contend that Neptune was, after all, inscrutable
to its discoverers. The only reply open to an Agnostic
in this case would be, that besides the mass, and place,

208 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
and motions of the newly-discovered planet, there still
remained much in regard to the nature and constitution
of that body inscrutable to science. This is all that an
Agnostic could say ; but this is nothing to the point, for
no one contends that we know everything about any
thing. If such were the character of a genuine human
knowledge, all men must submit to be enrolled as
Agnostics, for no man knows anything through and
through with a knowledge which leaves nothing con
nected with its nature and relations unmastered or
unknown. What is true in regard to the things of God,
is true in regard to all things, whether human or divine,
that we know but in part. The position which it be
hoves an Agnostic to vindicate is, that an entity whose
existence he recognises as established beyond question,
and which has revealed itself as a persistent force,
sustaining causal relations to all second causes, is, not
withstanding, inscrutable. This is a fair statement of
the Agnostic position, whether it be confessed or not.
The nature of the question in debate will not permit
or warrant any other form of statement. Recognising
the objective entity whose knowableness is in question,
as a cause, and as a First Cause, the Agnostic cannot
claim exemption from those laws in accordance with
which the human mind must act in tracing effects to
their causes, and in judging of causes by their effects.
Hume's fallacy of a singular effect must not be inverted
into the fallacy of a singular cause. There can be no
such thing as a singular effect, nor can there be any such
thing as a singular Cause. An effect, in virtue of its

HUME'S FALLACY OF A SINGULAR CAUSE. 209
character as an effect, comes under the law common to
all effects, and must be ruled by it ; and a Cause, in
virtue of its character as a Cause, must come under the
law common to all causes, and be judged of by its effects.
Hume's assumption that the world must be treated as
a singular effect because no one had ever seen a world
maker at work in the production of a world, carries
with it the instrument of its own subversion, for, in
admitting that the world is an effect, it is admitted that
it comes under the common category of effects, and is
to be judged of just as any other effect. In like manner,
the Agnostic in proclaiming his ultimate object of blind
veneration a Cause, has forfeited all right to speak of it
as a singular Cause which must be regarded as exempt
from the law of Causality. In pronouncing it a Cause,
he has brought it under a category into which there
entereth nothing which has not established its right of
entrance by the production of effects by which its exist
ence, nature, and relations have been revealed.
Starting from these recognised scientific principles,
let us judge of this recognised First Cause by the effects
which have constrained Agnostics themselves to acknow
ledge its existence. Standing out pre-eminent among
these effects are our own solar system, and the kindred
systems which make up the stellar heavens. These
several systems are constituent elements of one system,
embracing within its stupendous compass the whole
material universe. On this point all Astronomers are
agreed, and their verdict regarding the unity of the
entire kosmos is endorsed by the leading experimenters

210 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
in the field of the physical sciences. The conclusion
reached is, not only that no orb of heaven, but that no
particle of matter, exists out of relation. Nor are these
interrelations the offspring of a blind concurrence of
atoms. On the contrary, they are such as to furnish the
material for that science which stands confessedly at
the head of the exact sciences — the science of Astronomy.
That science is built upon the lines revealed in the
architecture of the heavens, and is but an exposition of
the principles on which the Architect proceeded when
he meted out the heavens with a span, and weighed the
mountains in scales and the hills in a balance. It is
because this wondrous fabric has been framed on strictly
scientific principles, and balanced according to me
chanical laws, that the movements of the hosts of the
sidereal array can be predicted with such unerring pre
cision, and every change and phase of our planetary
system determined to a second of time. If there is any
faith to be placed in the science of Astronomy, the
scientific accuracy of the mechanism of the heavens is
an unchallengeable fact. Plato gave utterance to a
demonstrable truth when he said, "God has geome-
trised." " The first guiding principle of all the sciences
is the conviction that the phenomena are governed
according to the laws of the understanding."*
Such, then, is the character of one class of the effects
to be taken into account in judging of the character of
that Ultimate Cause, of whose existence Agnosticism
has no doubt, and, except upon the assumption that the
* Modern Physics, by Ernest Naville, p. 160.

AGNOSTICISM DISCREDITED BY ASTRONOMY. 211
principle of causality does not hold in this instance, the
Agnostic doctrine of its unknowableness is utterly inde
fensible and inexcusable. But to contend that this
principle does not hold in this case, were all one with
contending that the relation implied in the very term
by which the Agnostics themselves have designated
their Ultimate, does not exist, and this were simply to
acknowledge the scientific impropriety of the designa
tion. If the term be applicable, the relation must
exist, and if the relation exist, then the Cause which
sustains the relations revealed in the stupendous effects
with which we are confronted bythe science of Astronomy,
must be transferred from the Agnostic category of the
Unknowable, as scientifically entitled to be classed
among the known. The theory which teaches that a
cause to which the mechanism of the heavens, with all
their complex arrangements and adjustments of masses
and motions, are traceable, is unknowable, is a theory
which merits the reprobation of all men who have any
regard for accuracy of thought or speech. No unpre
judiced intelligence can survey the heavens in all the
magnificence of their marshalled array, and in all the
matchless orderliness of their mighty evolutions, without
ascribing to that First Cause, which both Atheists and
Agnostics recognise, the possession of a wisdom and a
power, before which the mightiest finite intellects should
bow with holy reverence and sacred awe. The Agnostic
attitude toward such a cause is as unscientific as it is
profane. The theist, however, is not restricted to the science

212 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
of Astronomy in adducing arguments to demonstrate
the essential nature of this Ultimate Cause. There
is not a single department of science from which he
may not draw verdicts in condemnation of the Agnostic
doctrine. The whole realm of nature, whether organic
or inorganic, stands ready for his summons, and eager
to appear at the bar of human Reason, to bear testi
mony to the intelligence, goodness, will, and power of
its originating Cause. Surely it is not too much to
claim that the Cause of earth's flora must understand
botany, or that the Cause of earth's fauna must under
stand zoology and physiology, or that the Cause of
moral agents must understand ethics, or that the cause
of earth's philosophers and scientists must be "the
Light which lighteneth every man that cometh into
the world." He who acknowledges that there exists
an Ultimate Cause to which all these marvellous
phenomena, not only may, but must, be referred, and
yet pronounces its nature inscrutable, must stand
rebuked and silenced in the presence of such testimony.
Shall the Cause that planted the ear, not hear ? Shall
the Cause that formed the eye, not see ? Shall the
Cause which teacheth man knowledge, not know ? In
the domain of actual phenomena fairly analysed, Ag
nosticism must stand confounded. It is only by turning
aside from the field of fact to the abstract fictions of
an unscientific imagination, that the Agnostic can
impose upon himself and the small school of unscientific
devotees he represents, his groundless hypotheses as
established scientific truths. A force which not only

THE MORAL, LIKE THE .ESTHETIC, IMPLIES AN OBJECT. 213
persists, but always persists intelligently, must be an
intelligent force, or be under the guidance of another
force possessing the attribute of intelligence.
It may seem strange that, in the treatment of this
subject, nothing has been said about the religion of
Agnosticism. Suffice it to say, that the Agnostic
doctrine leaves no room for religion. It is true, Agnostics
put forth high claims for their theory on the ground
of the reverence and awe which their unknown ultimate
is fitted to inspire. This boasting, however, is as vain
as the principle underlying it is unphilosophical. There
can be no affection cherished toward anything unknown.
All our affections are correlative to some object, and
never rise into the sphere of consciousness save when
their appropriate objects are present in thought. This
principle holds, and is recognised as holding, in the
sphere of the aesthetic. The mind does not experience
the emotion of the beautiful, or the grand, or the sub
lime, when the objects necessary to awaken it are
absent, or kept in abeyance. The same is true of the
moral emotions. They can have no existence where
there have not been presented to the moral agent the
materials for a moral judgment. In all these cases,
the objects must be present in thought and apprehended
in their nature and relations, before the correlative
emotions can have birth or reveal themselves in con
sciousness. The emotion of reverence or awe is no
exception to this law of Mind. Throughout the realm
of the finite we know what we regard with reverence,
and we experience the emotion of awe toward nothing

214 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
which does not impress us by the manifestation of
awe-inspiring attributes. And when these emotions
of awe and reverence rise into the sublime rapture of
genuine adoration, their elevation is due, not to cessa
tion of thought, nor to a relapse into an agnostic
negation of knowledge, but to the apprehended glory
of Him before whose presence the Seraphim veil their
vision with their wings. In a word, Agnosticism,
despite its pretensions, must be adjudged unphilosophic,
unscientific, and irreligious.

CHAPTER VII.
THE HUXLEYAN KOSMOGONY.*
IT is not proposed in this article to renew with Professor
Huxley the controversy over the Mythologies of
Heathendom. The early Christian Fathers, in their
Apologies, have weighed and estimated these monu
ments of human folly and depravity, and pronounced
upon them a verdict of condemnation, which no candid
mind, conversant with the facts, will venture to call in
question. Those comparative mythologists who, in our
day, are renewing the old warfare, and who would
fondly class, as Professor Huxley has done in recent
articles in the Nineteenth Century, the Mosaic account
of creation under the same category, seem to be so
fascinated by their success in discovering traces of
resemblance, as to lose sight of points of difference
which must for ever preclude such classification.
It were indeed strange if the several tribes of the
human race, proceeding from the one common centre,
with a stock of knowledge in regard to things human
and things divine common to all, should not present in
* British and Foreign Evangelical Review, July, 1886. 215

216 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
their reminiscences marked points of resemblance. But
it is certainly as unwarrantable, as it is unphilosophical,
to classify these reminiscences under the one common
head of myths, on the ground of the community of their
subjects, while the character of one class of them — the
non-Semitic legends — stamps them as degenerate modi
fications of the one primeval communication, which, as
given in the Hebrew oracles, bears upon its forehead
the impress of its divine origin. The argument from
the fact that such a record should have been made
at all is, as pointed out by Mr. Gladstone in the Nine
teenth Century, poorly parried by Professor Huxley's
remark, that "most peoples have their kosmogonies."
This remark merely gives more force to the argument
it was designed to meet. It is true that most people
have their kosmogonies, but it is not true that any
other people under heaven have such a kosmogony as
the Mosaic. No unprejudiced mind can compare this
kosmogony with the others, however high their authors
may have stood in the scale of civilisation, without
being struck with its transcendent beauty and sub
limity. How came it to pass that such a record was
penned at so early a period in human history, and by a
writer belonging to a race who, as Mr. Gladstone has
so forcibly put it, " dwelling in Palestine for twelve
hundred years from their sojourn in the Valley of the
Nile, hardly had force to stamp even so much as
their name upon the history of the world at large,
and only then began to be admitted to the general
communion of mankind when their Scriptures assumed

THE MOSAIC KOSMOGONY PEERLESS ABOVE ALL. 217
the dress which a Gentile tongue was needed to
supply"? The force of this question, pointing out the unques
tionable fact of the infinite superiority of the Jewish
record over those of the most cultivated nations of
antiquity, cannot be so easily turned aside as our
Anti-reconciliationists imagine. In fact, the very best
defence of the Mosaic record, and the most damaging
exposure of the unfairness of those who would classify
it with the Gentile kosmogonies, is to place the latter
in parallel columns beside it. The contrast will prove
too marked to require elucidation or comment, and
sufficiently patent to put to shame all attempts at
comprehension under a common category. It will be
seen that these mythological kosmogonies admit of no
defence at all ; while, as the pages of the Nineteenth
Century bear witness, the Hebrew kosmogony admits
of a defence which one of the most eminent physiolo
gists of the age is driven to his wits' end to meet, even
when he has reinforced the data furnished by his own
department, by drafts upon the unverified data of
kindred nascent sciences. Having, within the domain
of Geology, the testimony of such investigators as
Professors Dana and Guyot, and Principal Dawson, in
corroboration of the Mosaic record, the friends of the
Bible need not feel much alarm at the geological dog
matism of Professor Huxley.
Even within his own province, our critic has reached,
ere now, generalisations which it is to be hoped time
and reflection have led him to abandon or modify.

218 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Not content with the reduction of animal organisms to
the rank of mere automata, as in his Belfast address,
he has invoked the aid of the crucible, and reduced
these automata to the rank of mere chemical compounds,
and proclaimed with manifest exultation over the ruin
he thinks he has wrought, and the erasure of all traces
of design he imagines the crucible has achieved, that these
organic forms are just so much carbonic acid, water, and
ammonia, or so much carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and
nitrogen — only these and nothing more ! All living
organisms, however diverse in form, are thus brought
down to the common level of the one ultimate matrix
of Mother Earth !
Professor Huxley, in the course of one of his Lay
Sermons in Edinburgh, announced to his auditors his
intention of recruiting his exhausted powers by dining
on mutton ; and added that if he proceeded homewards
by sea, and happened to be drowned, the fishes might
recruit their wasted energies by making a meal of him.
In the one case, the sheep would be transmuted into a
man (yea, we may add, into a philosopher), in the
other, the man would be changed into a fish ! Thus, as
he claimed, man, and sheep, and fish, and, perchance,
crustacean, are proved to be possessors of a common
nature ! Impelled by his love of unity, this eminent
physiologist has thus reached a scientific goal, where
all the lines of organic life meet in, and radiate from,
one common centre — one common physical basis of
carbonic acid, water, and ammonia ! Even the once
celebrated but now extinct Bathybius merely shed

SKETCH OF THE HUXLEYAN KOSMOGONY. 219
light on the way in which these corner-stones of the
organic temple were combined in the primordial
physical basis of all forms of terrestrial life.
Having attained such exceptional eminence as a
critic of God's works, Professor Huxley has been giving
to the literary world, in the pages of the Nineteenth
Century, a specimen of his critical ingenuity in a
similar treatment of God's Word ; and we find that the
account of the genesis of the heavens and the earth, as
given in the sacred oracles, fares as badly at his hands
as the teleology, whose basis in the work of Creation he
claims to have completely subverted. It may be a
service to both science and theology to turn attention
for a while from the kosmogony of Moses, which our
physiologist has placed in the pillory so long, to an
examination of the kosmogony which he has proposed
to the scientific world as a substitute, with a view to an
estimate of its claims to scientific recognition.
Professor Huxley has put us in a position to under
take this task, for, in his Evidence as to Man's Place
in Nature, p. 108, he has sketched his kosmogony in
no equivocal terms.
" But even leaving Mr. Darwin's view aside," he writes,
"the whole analogy of natural operations furnishes so
complete and crushing an argument against the inter
vention of any but what are termed secondary causes, in the
production of all the phenomena of the universe, that in
view of the intimate relations between man and the rest of
the living world, and between the forces exerted by the latter
and all other forces, I can see no excuse for doubting that all

220 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
are co-ordinated terms of Nature's great progression from the
formless to the formed, from the inorganic to the organic,
from blind force to conscious intellect and will."
Here, then, is Professor Huxley's substitute for the
Mosaic kosmogony. For Darwin's creative inter
vention, which neither he nor Dr. Tyndall can brook,
he substitutes the intervention of "what are termed
secondary causes." His ultimate cause is " blind force,"
the mediating agencies are " secondary causes," and the
whole phenomena of the universe, embracing the
astronomical array, with all its matchless splendour and
exquisite mechanism, and this terrestrial sphere, with
its fauna and flora and man himself, are the outcome of
this " great progression " !
The scheme, at least by the law of contrast, recalls
the admonitory remark of Bacon in regard to the evil
effects of partial attainments in philosophy upon one's
attitude toward religion.
" It is," says Bacon, " a Httle philosophy that inclineth
man's mind to atheism, while depth in philosophy bringeth
men's minds about to religion ; for, while the mind of man
looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest
in them, and go no further ; but when it beholdeth the
chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs
fly to Providence and Deity."
It is manifest from this verdict of the great originator
of the new departure in scientific investigation, that,
however Professor Huxley's philosophy may be esti
mated or classified, it cannot be styled Baconian.
According to Bacon, and according to common sense,

RELATION OF SECOND CAUSES IMPLIES INTELLIGENCE. 221
there is no rest for the mind of man in second causes,
for the very obvious reason that these second causes do
not stand separate and unrelated, but present them
selves as members of a confederacy, linked together, or,
as Professor Huxley himself expresses it, " co-ordinated,"
as parts of one whole. As Professor Tyndall, one of
our ablest materialistic experimentalists, puts it —
nothing in the universe exists out of relation. A
scientist, therefore, has not completed his task when he
has referred certain classes of phenomena to their
immediate causes. When he has done this, which is
a real piece of scientific work, he has still [to account
for the fact, which cannot be ignored by any one
entitled to take rank as a scientist, that these secondary
causes are confederate and linked together. As soon
as the scientist enters upon the solution of this
additional problem, he has parted company with
Professor Huxley, and has outrun the measure of his
unphilosophic kosmogony. The readers of the Nine
teenth Century may, if they please, accept the leader
ship of the author of the above scheme, but it is
respectfully submitted that, in doing so, they have
repudiated Bacon, and abandoned a principle which
lies at the foundation of all sound philosophy and
genuine science. This principle is the principle of
causality, or what Professor Tyndall calls "the question
ing impulse." He who accepts this principle — and it
is a primary belief, having its foundation in the con
stitution of the human mind — he who accepts this
principle, and applies it according to the promptings of

222 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
his own nature, will be slow to rest where Professor
Huxley has drawn the circumference of his narrow
horizon. He will find — as Humboldt found when he
proceeded to write his Physical Geography — he will
find that the phenomena of one department of science
hold fellowship with those of other departments, and
contribute in their measure to the orderly arrangements
of this stupendous kosmos. He will find that it is a
kosmos, and not a Chaos, he has to investigate, and
that the impulse that moved him to enter upon the
inquiry will not permit him to rest until he has
discovered a cause sufficient to account for the exqui
site correlation and adjustment of its constituent
elements — from its atoms and molecules to its satellites
and suns ; from the hyssop on the wall to the cedar in
Lebanon ; from its humblest forms of animal life to
Him who is the goal of the progression and the
ordained Heir and Lord of all.
In prosecuting this search, no scientist, acting on the
scientific fundamental already mentioned, can imagine
he has discovered the cause of the kosmos when he
has reached the half-way house where Professor Huxley
takes up his abode. The hospitalities of the establish
ment may be offered him with all courtesy and kind
ness, but, having no faith in the foundation on which
the edifice rests, he will not risk a lodgment in it even
for a night, as he has no guarantee that it may not
come down about his ears before the dawn. And
besides the deterrent influence of the instability of the
Huxleyan shelter, his appetite is too keen, and too well

TELIC ACTION OF KOSMICAL FORCES. 223
cultured by a more generous dietary, to be satisfied
with the menu of his host. His intelligence cannot
live and thrive on " blind force." He cannot accept it
even as a first course, much less as the alpha and the
omega of the entire repast. It can neither whet the
scientific appetite nor satisfy the soul-cravings stirred
into activity by the " questioning impulse."
To pass from figure to fact : there is not a single
link in this kosmical chain forged by the scientific
imagination of the author of the Evidence of Man's
Place in Nature, which will bear the strain of the
mighty weight which the author has hung upon it.
Whatever else "blind force" may achieve, it cannot
carry the kosmos, for the simple reason that the
phenomena that blend so harmoniously in its magnifi
cent array imply the operation of forces which are not
blind. He who denies this, denies the first principle'
of all scientific investigation, and may yet come to
accept the arithmetic of Mr. Mill, who did not think it
impossible that there might be a world so differently
constituted from ours that its inhabitants might regard
2 and 2 as equal to 5.
On Professor Huxley's theory of the kosmos there is
no room left for the operation of an antecedent
intelligence. The doctrine taught is that the entire
phenomena presented in the inorganic and organic
worlds have come forth upon the scene through the
operation of an unintelligent, purposeless, " blind force,''
and that too " without the intervention of any but what
are termed secondary causes." Indeed, this statement

224 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
fails to set forth the theory in the native nakedness of
its scientific antagonism ; for the avowal is that the
phenomena have come forth from, and not simply
through the operation of, " blind force." The ultimate
to which the phenomena are referred is "blind force,"
and the intervening agencies through whose action the
various phenomena are evoked from the womb of this
unintelligent, unconscious ultimate are simply "what •
are termed secondary causes." Professor Huxley,
therefore, in recognising secondary causes as factors in
this general melee of causal agency, from whose marvel
lously fertile and intelligent-like efficiency Nature's
great progression in orderly march moves on, cannot be
regarded as recognising the existence of an antecedent
extra-mundane Intelligence.
Such is his position. Is it defensible ? Only on one
condition — viz., that an effect may transcend its cause.
If the ultimate, and, at the outset, the sole cause in
existence, be force, and force be blind, then, except on
the assumption that the effect may transcend its cause,
no offspring of that cause can have eyes. If the
fountain-head of the whole phenomena of the whole
universe be destitute of intelligence, it is surely most
unphilosophical to infer intelligence in the streams.
If, as we are told, and as the constitution of our nature
compels us to hold, nothing can come out of nothing —
not to hold with Hume, who is Huxley's patron saint,
that anything may come out of anything — how comes
it to pass that Professor Huxley (who, by the way,
recognises Philosophy as the mother of the sciences)

VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE EX NIHILO NIHIL FIT. 225
can educe, by a process of evolution, from this same
blind, unconscious, unintelligent cause the marvellous
phenomena of " conscious intellect and will " ? If out
of nothing nothing comes, how are we to account for the
emergence of consciousness, intellect, and will from the
womb of an unconscious unintelligent thing called force?
How is it that Professor Huxley reasons back from
the phenomena of a conscious intellect and will to a
thing destitute of such attributes, and pronounces it
the author of them all ? How is such a process of
scientific speculation to be vindicated before the bar of
this same conscious intelligence ? Why, the fact is,
that the process can be conducted only " at the modest
cost " of the surrender of the very fundamental principle
of all science and philosophy upon which Professors
Tyndall and Huxley insist — viz., that the cause must
account for all the phenomena ; or, to put it thus, that
out of nothing nothing comes. This principle, atheists
imagine, is subversive of the doctrine of creation ex
nihilo; but a moment's reflection ought to satisfy
any candid intelligence that it is subversive of the
doctrine of the evolution of an intelligent, conscious,
personal being from a cause destitute of intelligence
consciousness, or will.
Their fundamental is ours also ; and all we ask is
that they speculate in conformity with it. When they
reconcile with the principle that the cause must
account for all the phenomena, the dogma that
unintelligent, unconscious force is a cause sufficient to
account for the wondrous phenomena of consciousness,

226 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
intelligence, and will, they will have achieved two
grand results — (1) They will have subverted the founda
tion of all reasoning ; (2) they will have made scientific
progress in the future an impossibility. Till these
results have been attained, they must excuse those
whose minds are governed by laws of thought, which
compel them to demand for all the phenomena of the
universe, including intellect and will, an adequate
cause, if they cannot surrender their intellectual birth
right, to accept a dogma which rests on the unscientific
assumption that the cause need not necessarily account
for all the phenomena !
It is worth while to look at the reasons which led
Professor Huxley to utter this marvellous verdict. His
reason is the intimacy of the relations of man and the
rest of the living world, and that intimacy which
obtains between the living world and all other forces.
In other words, man is so exquisitely adapted to his
surroundings, so much at home amid the fauna and
flora of his dwelling-place, and these fauna and flora
again so well adapted to their environments, that the
scientist regards the whole arrangements as " furnishing
a complete and crushing argument against the inter
vention of any but secondary causes," and warranting
the conclusion that this whole array of orderly, intimate,
harmonious relations has come forth from " blind force " !
This is but another way of saying that the more
exquisite the arrangements and adaptations, the less is
the evidence of intelligence. Professor Huxley need not
any longer regard the Darwinian hypothesis as merely

THE THEORY OUTDARWINS DARWIN. 227
provisional, or speak of it as not proven. The funda
mental principle of that hypothesis lies at the basis of
the doctrine here expressed. If the phenomena of the
universe be products of a self-evolving force, destitute
itself of the faintest kindling of intelligence, and if these
phenomena, including man, be so intimately related
to one another, and to the "blind force" whence
they spring, then the Darwinian hypothesis ought to
receive from him no merely equivocal or halting
advocacy. Indeed, the Huxleyan evolution far outruns the
Darwinian. Darwin admitted the intervention of the
First Cause in the origination of certain primordial
forms, for which concession Dr. Tyndall felt it necessary
in the interests of Materialism, to arraign this prince of
evolutionists before the British Association in his
Belfast address. But Professor Huxley leaves himself
open to no such arraignment, for his primordial is with
out form, and blind as it is formless. It is true he
admits the intervention of " what are termed secondary
causes," but the " questioning impulse " compels the
inquiry, Whence these " secondary causes " ? If there
was nothing but "blind force" at the outset of the pheno
menal march, over what unscientific stile, or by what
unphilosophic side-path, have these uncaused interlopers
managed to find access to the sole fountain of all pheno
mena, to manipulate, and fashion, and " co-ordinate " it
with such success that the resultant Kosmos enkindles
the enthusiastic admiration and adoring wonder of all
save the purblind ? It is vain to attempt to satisfy this

228 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
"questioning impulse" by vague allusions to the influ
ence of environment, for this same impulse will raise the
same inquiry regarding the environment. And not
without warrant; for an environment working such
transformations upon "blind force" at once kindles
the scientific enthusiasm, and impels the scientific
votary to fathom the mysteries of this all-potent
evolutionary agency, whose aid and interposition
are ever invoked in times of theoretical embarrassment.
Constituted as the human mind is, it cannot, and it will
not, rest in such vague unscientific references to environ
ment. If the theory be true, this same environment to
which all change and progress are continually referred
must itself be a modification of the one original "blind
force." If so, the question meets us again, " Whence
this modification ? " Are we to be referred to another
antecedent modifying environment, to account for the
immediately antecedent environment by which this
modification has been wrought ?
It is time that men who have regard to the interests
of science should cease to employ a terminology so
fitted to mislead. If the sole fountain whence all
things have sprung was force — " blind force," — it is idle
to talk of environment as a distinct entity. An environ
ment with a modifying organic function, such as Mr.
Herbert Spencer and others ascribe to it, must exercise
the prerogatives of this function by the exertion of
energy, which is but another name for force. Thus we
are again brought back to the starting-point after this
professed scientific excursion, and find that, despite the

DISCIPLES OF HUME CANNOT RECOGNISE FORCE. 229
variation in the terms employed, we have been merely
amused with an exercise in synonyms.
But, coming closer to the elemental links in the chain
of this Huxleyan Kosmogony, the question seems not
altogether out of place, Whence did this disciple of
Hume get these anti-Hume ideas of force and secondary
causes ? They are manifestly out of place in a system
framed by the Edinburgh eulogist of David Hume. If
there be no relation between the phenomena of the
universe save that revealed in the mere order of their
progressional sequence, there can be no warrant for
ascribing them to the action of a force whether with or
without eyes. A disciple of Hume has no right to
speak of force or " secondary causes '' as sustaining any
relation whatever to the production or modification of
the phenomena of the universe. These terms belong to
the school of common sense, which must ever stand at
an infinite remove from the unphilosophic, inconsistent
terminology of Hume and his followers. If, as Hume
teaches, " anything may be the cause of anything," all
investigation of Nature must cease, for, according to this
dictum, the sequent phenomenon can never be regarded
as an index to the character of its predecessor on the
phenomenal stage. It is true Hume himself is com
pelled to speak of " power," but, in doing so, he only
demonstrates the antagonism of his philosophy to the
constitution of the human mind, which is thus proved
to be not the mind of Hume. In a word, the language
employed by Professor Huxley, in this sketch of his
Kosmogony, is language which he has no right to use,

230 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
and while the causes to which he traces the phenomena
are utterly inadequate, his recognition of them at all is
inconsistent with the philosophy he has espoused.
But let us look at some of the salient points pre
sented in this Mosaic record. The record is pledged
to the doctrine that the heavens and the earth have
had a beginning, that they are not eternal. Has the
science of our day anything to allege to the contrary ?
Not only is it true that science has nothing to allege
against the finite antiquity of the universe, but it is
claimed that science has much to say in confirmation
of it. If the doctrine of the tendency of energy to
degenerate from the kinetic to the potential be true
(and it is spoken of now as if it were a scientific common
place), then it must be true, as the first utterance of
the sacred narrative proclaims, that the heavens and
the earth began to be. This is manifest, for if the
universe had no beginning, it must have existed from
all eternity, and must, through all the immeasureable
aeons of that infinite duration, have been subject to this
law of kinetic degeneracy, and must therefore, if the
theory be true, have lost all its kinetic energy, and been
reduced to an estate of absolute effeteness. It could
not have taken an eternity for the mightiest suns that
still blaze with such radiant energy in the firmament of
heaven to have been reduced to the fifth solar category,
or to have sunk into an estate of darkness and death
such as has befallen our silent sister satellite the moon.
It is true, as has been already shown, Chap. V,
that the energy given out by the. heavenly bodies is

TRUE GUARANTEE AGAINST FINAL EFFETENESS. 231
treasured up, as in a store-house, within the universe
itself. It is alleged, however, that it has ceased to be
kinetic and has passed into the degenerate estate of
the merely potential. But, e concessis, this estate of
mere potentiality is not necessarily the final goal and
terminus of the kosmos ; for, if we are to credit the
authors of The Unseen Universe, these effete suns and
systems may be reabsorbed by the mystic Invisible
whence they came ; and if so, surely the Invisible must
possess appropriating power, which is but another name
for kinetic energy.
Besides, as these eminent scientists hold that the
kinetic energy displayed in the universe has originated
through the action of an intelligent agent, there is,
manifestly, a sufficient Cause for its maintenance so
long as that agent exists and sees fit to sustain it " by the
word of His power," — a conclusion which they have not
accepted, although it is logically inseparable from their
premiss regarding the origination of kinetic energy.
On the former hypothesis, then, the matter of the
universe cannot have existed from eternity, as an eternal
process of degradation must, ere now, have rendered it
absolutely effete. On the latter hypothesis, the form of
theuniverse mayundergo untold changes from the kinetic
to the potential, and vice versa,.but these changes, both
as regards their character and their duration, must
depend upon the fiat of that agent to whom the author
ship of material energy has been ascribed.
Closely connected with the foregoing is the question
broached rather than discussed, by Professor Huxley, in

232 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
regard to the origin of matter. He imagines that he has
only to quote the aphorism, Ex nihilo nihil fit, and his
task is accomplished — matter is proved to be uncreated
and eternal! It is submitted that "the questioning
impulse," to which all science and philosophy owe their
origin, will not brook such unphilosophic repression.
Impelled by this constitutional principle, the human
mind has invaded and explored the domain of matter,
and has discovered therein proof sufficient to satisfy
it that matter is not self-existent, and that it owes its
origin to the action of an antecedent intelligent Cause.
Without basing any conclusion upon what has been
alleged by men of the highest authority in their own
departments respecting the characteristics of manufac
tured articles, revealed by the action of the atoms of
matter, let us weigh impartially the testimony to a
creative origin furnished by the qualities of the
ultimate elements as described by the chemist, taking
as a familiar example the two elements oxygen and
hydrogen, which, when chemically combined in proper
atomic proportions, form water. It is unnecessary to
point out the indispensable necessity of this resultant
fluid to the life of our globe. Without it there could
be neither vegetable nor animal life sustained upon its
surface. Now, the question is forced upon us, How is
it that elements possessing qualities which fit them for
entering into such indispensable beneficent combina
tions exist ? Those who claim, as Professor Huxley
does, that Teleology has been ruled out of court, may
lay an arrest upon the inquiry, and inform the inquirer

CHEMICAL AFFINITIES REVEAL INTELLIGENCE. 233
that it is simply a matter of course that such kinds of
matter, possessing such extremely convenient qualities,
should be found ready to hand in the great laboratory
of Nature ; but human nature has rights, intellectual
and philosophical, which it cannot but assert, and will
not permit itself to be turned back on its way toward
the ultima ratio of such phenomena by the police of
any coterie, acting in the interest of theories which
would exorcise intelligence from this gloriously ordered
Kosmos. Having discovered marks of design in the
mutual affinities of these elements— affinities arising
from their respective correlative qualities — the philo
sophic investigator must proceed further, and account
for these qualities ; and this he can do only by referring
them to an antecedent designer. Short of this philo
sophic goal, he cannot, and will not, stop. He will not
rest satisfied in an unphilosophic Agnosticism which
severs the qualities from the essence of the elements,
and which proclaims the essence a separate entity,
unknowable and unknown. Knowing the qualities
which are inseparable from the essence, and through
which the nature of the essence is revealed, he knows
the elements in their essential nature, and will not
accept Professor Huxley's agnostic definition of matter
and spirit, as " but names for the imaginary substrata
of groups of natural phenomena." *
Having reached this stage in the investigation, he
will take the final step, and claim, for the Author of
the qualities on which is so legibly engraven the signa-
* Lay Sermons, p. 143.

234 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
ture of design, the authorship of both qualities and
essence, — that is, he will hold it as scientifically demon
strated that matter, both in its qualities and essence, is
not the offspring of "blind force," but a product of an
antecedent intelligence, of whom, and through whom,
and to whom, are all things.
Here, then, are two of the most important points in
the Mosaic Kosmogony placed beyond successful scien
tific challenge. This universe, both as regards its
architecture and its material, has had a beginning, and
the cause to whose "intervention" the human mind,
acting in accordance with the laws of thought, is com
pelled to refer both, cannot be regarded as " secondary,"
as Professor Huxley alleges, but must be recognised as
antecedent and primary, antedating and' originating,
preserving and governing, all " secondary causes."
Nor does the harmony between the Mosaic record
and science end here. Genuine science does not restrict
the intervention of the great First Cause to the origina
tion and collocation of the materials of the universe,
assigning to "what are termed secondary causes" the
origination of the fauna and flora of our world. Science,
eschewing abstract dogmatism, and scrutinising by the
powerful aid of the microscope the actual concrete
forms under which life presents itself, has proclaimed
it as a biological law that life springs from antecedent
life. If the reader ask for proof of this biological law,
he is referred to the unanswerable arguments of Dr.
Lionel Beale in his work on Bioplasm. In presence of
the graphic demonstration portrayed in Dr. Beale's

BIOGENESIS POINTS TO ANTECEDENT LIFE. 235
plates, the inquirer will be in a position to judge of
the claims to scientific recognition of Professor Huxley's
complex causal agency of " blind force " and " what are
termed secondary causes." Hemmed in by the physicist
and the mathematician, he reaches a temporal boundary
beyond which there was no life upon our globe ; and
knowing that the Thomsonian suggestion of meteoric
importation only serves to transfer the problem from
planet to planet, he accepts at once, what he knows he
must accept at length, even though he should extend
his survey throughout the entire field of the stellar
array, and refers the first being of life in our world to
the intervention of an Agent who transformed dead
matter into living matter, not by the intervention of
" what are termed secondary causes," which were them
selves destitute of life, but by His own direct omni
potent act. In a word, led by the hand of science, he
acquiesces in the Mosaic doctrine, that all forms of life,
whether animal or vegetable, were originated by a
Divine act, endowing matter with properties which it
did not previously possess, and which cannot be im
parted to it or evoked from it by " blind force " through
the agency of what are but different modifications of
itself. Thus the inspired narrator is again vindicated
on another point in his unparalleled Kosmogony.
But still further, science has something to say in
favour of Moses in regard to a question which, for a
long time, has perhaps attracted more of the attention
of the scientific world than any other subject — viz.
the origin of species. On this question the Mosaic

236 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Kosmogony has taken a very decided position, and is
anti-evolutionary throughout the whole range of animal
and vegetable organisms. Whether the record speaks
of the origin of herb or tree, of fowl or creeping thing,
of cattle or beast of the earth, it is careful to state that
each was made " after its kind." As if forecasting the
antagonism of our modern evolutionists, this anti-evolu
tionary phrase is repeated again and again, so as to
bring the doctrine of a direct creative origin into special
prominence, and proclaim it with special emphasis.
According to Moses, the several species were brought
into existence by distinct creative acts, not mediately
through the utilisation of previously existing organisms
modified and adapted to new ends and habitats.
Now, it is claimed that science, whether within the
field of natural history, or geology, or palaeontology, is
on the side of Moses, and against the evolutionists.
These departments of human knowledge reveal a
progress in the fauna and flora of our world — from
lower forms to higher — but they furnish not one
particle of evidence that any one of the higher forms
has been evolved from a lower. Men talk loosely
about evolution as a thing of everyday occurrence, and
adduce as an instance the evolution of the chick from
the egg. This, however, is not what theoretic evolu
tionists mean by evolution. Their doctrine is that the
higher organic forms have been evolved from lower
forms, the great pioneer of theory, as we have already
seen, recognising the intervention of the Creator at the
outset in the creation of certain primordial forms. In

EVOLUTIONARY DATA EXAMINED. 237
support of this theory, we are referred by its advocates
to the varieties which have come forth under the
manipulation of pigeon-fanciers and cattle-breeders, to
the phenomena of embryology, to certain abnormal
modifications of particular forms in which Nature has
seemed to move per saltum, and to the testimony to a
progression from lower to higher forms furnished by
the fossil remains of extinct species.
As to the first class of arguments, it is neutralised by
the two facts : — (1) that nothing beyond a variety of
the same species has ever been produced ; and (2) that,
when the hand of man is withdrawn, Nature asserts
itself, and testifies to the truth of the Mosaic doctrine
by obliterating every trace of what through his agency
has been wrought, and by restoring the variety to the
original specific type.
With regard to the second class of arguments, those
drawn from embryology, or the different forms or types
which the embryo assumes prior to birth, suffice it to
say that, so long as the diversity in form of different
species increases with the progress of gestation, and so
long as the process invariably results in the birth of an
organism made in the likeness and image of its parents,
the inference drawn from this source must be regarded
as illogical and unscientific. Uniform diversity of
" result must always imply uniform diversity of cause.
Nor is there any reliance to be placed on the argu
ment from the similarity of structure between Man and
the gorilla, the chimpanzee, the orang, and the lower
monkeys. It is pleasant here to be able to adduce the

238 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
testimony of Professor Huxley. While holding " that
the structural differences which separate Man from the
gorilla and the chimpanzee are not so great as those
which separate the gorilla from the lower apes," this
eminent physiologist takes occasion to repudiate the
charge sometimes preferred, that he regards "these
structural differences as small and insignificant. Let
me take this opportunity, then," he says, "of distinctly
asserting, on the contrary, that they are great and
significant ; that every bone of a gorilla bears marks by
which it might be distinguished from the corresponding
bone of a man ; and that, in the present creation at
any rate, no intermediate link bridges over the gap
between Homo and Troglodites." *
Finally, the testimony of the rocks yields no support
to the evolution theory. The gradual progression from
the lower structures to the higher, through an ever-
ascending series of slight modifications, which the
theory demands, has left no record in the rocks. On
the contrary, as the above passage acknowledges, there
is not only one missing link, but many missing links.
There is not only no link to bridge the gulf between
the gorilla and man, but there are no links to connect
the gorilla with the chimpanzee, or the latter with the
lower apes. On the evolution theory these gaps
should not exist, for one element of that theory is " the '
survival of the fittest." If so, the links that are
missing are just the links that should survive, for the
links nearest to the higher order should possess powers
* Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature, pp. 103, 104.

TESTIMONY OF PALEONTOLOGY ANTI-EVOLUTIONARY. 239
of survival in "the struggle for existence" which
should have assured their triumph over their less
potent competitors. Add to these unquestionable facts,
the fact proclaimed by Dr. Wright in his address as
President of the British Association, that, in his
reading of the rocks, he had found no trace of this
alleged development of lower orders into higher, but
on the contrary, had observed that the first representa
tives of the different species (the writer quotes from
memory) are among the most perfect.*
Another salient point presented in the Mosaic
narrative is the special character of the Divine inter
vention in the production of man. While in all other
instances the speciality and immediacy of the Divine
action are clearly implied, in the genesis of man it is
explicitly enunciated and emphasised. When different
species of herb, or tree, or fowl, or living creature, or
creeping thing, or beast of the earth, or cattle, are
brought into being, the language employed to describe
the Divine agency is such as to limit it to specific
differentiation of class from class, or of species from
species ; the language by which the Divine action in
the origination of man is described is such as not only
to differentiate him from all creatures of kindred
structure or habitat, but such as to proclaim his kin
ship to the Author of bis being. In the former cases,
whether of plant or of animal life, the narrator intro-
* For demonstrative proof of this position, in the case of Man
see Principal Dawson's Fossil Men and their Modern Repre
sentatives.

240 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
duces the Creator as simply giving utterance to an
omnific mandate, which is followed by the eventuation
of the designed effect: — "God said, Let the waters
bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath
life, and let fowl fly above the earth in the open firma
ment of heaven ; " or " God said, Let the earth bring
forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and
creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind :
and it was so." " He spake and it was done ; He
commanded and it stood fast." The effect follows upon
the Divine volition.
As soon, however, as the sacred writer reaches the
final stage in the creative progress, his language is such
as to indicate a special and altogether peculiar creative
work. It is no longer the imperative ad extra, " Let
there be," or " Let the earth bring forth," but the terms
employed are — " Let us make man in our image, after
our likeness ; and let them have dominion over the fish
of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the
cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping
thing that creepeth upon the earth." And still more
explicitly when the narrator enters more into detail:
" And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the
ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ;
and man became a living soul." " And the Lord God
caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and he
slept : and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the
flesh instead thereof. And the rib, which the Lord
God had taken from the man, made He a woman, and
brought her unto the man."

EVEN DARWIN RECOGNISES CREATIVE POWER. 241
In a word, the Mosaic record recognises and pro
claims the existence of that gulf between man and the
highest of all other orders of life upon the globe, which
science finds itself unable to bridge, and whose exist
ence Professor Huxley, as above shown, candidly
admits. The existence of this gulf is not only affirmed
in the Divine record, but there is given us an intel
ligible and rational account of its nature and origin.
What no series of experiments conducted on the
Darwinian theory of natural selection, combined with
the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest,
could ever effect, God Himself has effected, by the
direct forth-putting of His own infinite creative power
under the guidance of His own infinite wisdom.
There is here no petitio principii to which a
Darwinian can take exception, for the Mosaic record
attributes nothing to the Creator in the genesis of
man more decidly supernatural than is implied in the
genesis of Darwin's primordial forms. The Irreconcii-
ables may regard all this as purely mythical, but as
science is compelled to confess its inability to account
for the origin of life upon our globe, even in its
humblest forms of manifestation, by referring it to
the operation of natural causes, it is not in a position
to gainsay or challenge a solution which refers its
origin to a supernatural source. The sacred historian,
as already stated, has simply made record of a specific
action of a specific Cause, already recognised by the
father of the evolution theory. The Author of Darwin's
primordial forms is the Author of man, and there is no
R

242 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
reason that can be assigned for regarding the Mosaic
narrative mythical, that is not a thousandfold more
cogent for pronouncing Darwin's descent of man an
evolutionary myth.
If the objector single out the account of the origin of
woman as bearing a somewhat mythical look, it may be
found that any account of the differentiation of the sexes,
which an evolutionist may construct by the exercise of
" the scientific imagination," may be just as open to the
same charee. It will be found as difficult to account
for the origin of sexual distinctions, without a special
intervention of the First Cause, as it is to account for
the origin of life or the origin of species. The Power
that fashioned an helpmeet for Adam out of carbonic
acid, water, and ammonia, through a process of transub-
stantiation, rising step by step from the lower apes to
the gorilla, and from the gorilla to Eve, might, without
much tax or strain upon the faith of an evolutionist, be
regarded as equal to the task of fashioning a companion
for our first father from one of his own ribs. The fact
is, evolutionists are the most credulous of mankind.
They accept an hypothesis which rests upon another
hypothesis, which has no other basis than other un
verified hypotheses. In presence of the scientific ark
of causality, the Darwinian Dagon cannot stand. Like
the men of Ashdod, his votaries have set him in his
place again, but he has fallen so often on the threshold'
of the temple of science, that naught save the idol's
stump remains. Acephalous in his origin, he is acepha
lous in his end.

GRATUITOUS CONCESSIONS BY DODS AND DRUMMOND. 243
In view of these clearly established truths of science,
one is constrained to ask again, How came it to pass
that the record in which they are stated was written at
such a time, and by the representative or representatives
of such a race ? How are we to account for the fact
that the true doctrine of the origin of species and of the
supremacy of Man should have been so early enunciated
and set forth with such marked emphasis ?
It would involve a departure from the design of this
article to enter further upon the vindication of the
Mosaic record, or to reply to the critique on the order
of the creative acts — a critique which, on this point, it
seems, Professor Drummond and Dr. Marcus Dods are
quite ready to indorse. These representatives of the
Newer Criticism are but acting in harmony with the
principles of their school when they try to reconcile the
Irreconcilables by surrendering the citadel. As a speci
men of this style of apologetic, take the following,
•quoted by Professor Drummond with approval in the
Nineteenth Century, from Dr. Dod's Genesis. "This
narrative [the Mosaic] is not careful to follow the actual
order in which life appeared on the globe : it affirms,
¦e.g., that fruit-trees existed before the sun was made ;
science can tell us of no such vegetation." Why does
Dr. Dods not go a step further, and question the creation
of the fruit-trees, as well as the order of their appear
ance on the globe ? If the fact that fruit-trees cannot
bear fruit without the light and heat of the sun, is
sufficient to prove that they did not appear on the
¦earth till the sun appeared in the firmament, might it

244 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
not be concluded from these same naturalistic principles
that the earth, even with the help of the sun, could not
give birth to fruit-trees, or any other kind of trees ?
Of the latter as well as the former, Dr. Dods might say,
" Science can tell us of no such vegetation." Science
knows nothing of spontaneous generation, whether of
plant or animal. It knows nothing of the earth, even
under the most congenial conditions of solar and other
vegetative influences, producing any organism by virtue
of a life-originating power inherent in itself. Biology
knows nothing of any form of life springing from any
thing save from a life-cell, and it knows nothing of any
life-cell which has not come from an antecedent parent
life-cell. Its fundamental is, " Omnis cellula e cellula."
And therefore, as the human mind cannot rest in an
endless series of alternate parental and filial life-cells,
science must admit the necessity of the intervention of
a power whose action gave' birth to the series by creat
ing the first life-cell. But if it be once admitted (and
for biological science there is no alternative) that there
was a first fruit-tree, then what becomes of the objection
which has frightened these brethren into such igno
minious surrender on the question of order ? If God
could make the earth bring forth a fruit-tree, one might
not unnaturally conclude that He could make the earth
which did so, sustain, at that peculiar stage in its geolo
gical history, its own offspring until He should make
other arrangements, which, after all, might consist
simply in the purification of our atmosphere, so as to
unveil the orb of day. In a word, no scientist is ir a

LIGHT CREATED BEFORE VEGETABLE LIFE. 245
position to affirm that the conditions of plant life did
not exist on our globe prior to the appearance of
the sun.
And this unveils a point which our gratuitous con-
cessionists have, in their unscientific haste, entirely over
looked. While the sacred writer represents plant life
as originated prior to the appearance of the sun, he does
not place its origin before the creation of light. No
form of vegetable life appears until light has been in
conflict with the chaos for two creative periods. Is any
biologist or any scientist of any class in a position to
say that this " offspring of heaven first-born " bore not
in its mysterious beams all the essential elements of
solar light, or that it did not furnish all that was
requisite to the maintenance of plant life upon our
globe ? At any rate, it can not be pronounced unscien
tific to hold that the light which held alternate sway
with the remnant gloom of chaos possessed that vital
¦warmth which is one of the conditions of terrestrial
vegetation. Now, taking their stand on this position, against
which science has nothing to urge, and in whose favour
it has much to say, the defenders of the Mosaic record
may be permitted to put a rather perplexing question
to the assailants of this wondrous Kosmogony. They
may fairly ask, " How are we to account for the order
of events adopted by the writer ? " How is it that a
writer, who displays ability of the highest order, should
have ever thought of an order which apparently repre
sents light as created before the sun, or should, to all

246 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
appearance, have pledged himself to the position that
the flora of our world could have subsisted independent
of his beams ? Is it not singular that the language
chosen is such as might be employed by one who held,
what few geologists will deny, that our earth, in cooling,
may have reached a stage, prior to the appearance of
the sun, at which it furnished all the conditions neces
sary to vegetable life ? It is very questionable whether
there is any scientific problem raised by the record more
difficult of solution than this. On the assumption that
the writer was framing a theory of the origin of the
heavens and the earth, in the exercise of his intelligence
upon the data furnished in the phenomena of nature,
the order adopted is absolutely inexplicable. The order
which a mere theorist, ignorant of the facts of science,
as a writer in the Mosaic age, apart from supernatural
instruction, must have been, would undoubtedly have
seized upon, would have been the order upon the viola
tion of which scientific sciolists have based one of their
objections. He would have represented the creation of
light as coincident with the creation of the sun, never
imagining that light was simply a form of energy, or
that the dense vaporous swaddling-bands which swathed
our orb might have been rendered luminous by the sun
before his disc appeared in the heavens. That the
writer has not committed this scientific blunder can be
fairly accounted for only on the assumption that he
wrote under the inspiration of the Almighty Author of
the work he has so graphically described.
But a still more remarkable specimen of the length

MOSES VINDICATED AGAINST DR. DODS. 247
*
to which the " New Apologetic " is ready to go in the
line of concession is furnished in this same quotation
from Dr. Dods on Genesis : —
"The most convincing proof," he says, "of- the regardless-
ness of scientific accuracy shown by this [the Mosaic] writer is
found in the fact that in the second chapter he gives a diffe
rent account from that which he has given in the first, and
an account irreconcilable with physical facts. . . . He
represents the creation of Man as preceding the creation of
the lower animals — an order which both the first chapter
and physical science assure us was not the actual order
observed." This is not an apology ; it is a gratuitous charge of
inaccuracy and self-contradiction preferred against the
sacred record. For the grave charge here tabled against
Moses, there is not one particle of proof in the narrative
impugned save this, that the writer, for a specific pur
pose, presents facts, whose order had been already given,
without reference to the order of their occurrence. The
author deals freely with his own material for his own
purpose, omitting the minute details of the first chapter
in regard to the lower animals, and giving, what had
been omitted in the first chapter, a minute and detailed
account of the creation of man and of his helpmeet, and
this in such a way as to proclaim the lordship of man
over this lower world.
Besides, if we are to give the narrator credit for the
intelligence displayed in a narrative unapproached in
the sublimity of its theme, and the majestic simplicity
of its style — a narrative which has elicited the most

218 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
enthusiastic encomiums of the most accomplished
judges,- — we cannot accept the allegation that he has
contradicted in the second chapter what he had written
in the first. So obvious is the fairness of this principle,
that it is a rule of literary criticism which all fair-
minded critics recognise before preferring a charge of
inconsistency or of self-contradiction. All right-
minded critics will consider whether the language of the
writer, fairly weighed, will admit of another interpreta
tion. In the present case, the latter alternative leads
to a perfectly natural and satisfactory result. All that
is necessary is to change the tense of the first verb in
our translation of chap. ii. 19, and instead of " Out of
the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the
field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto
the man," read, " had formed," &c. This is allowable,
and natural as it is allowable, as the reader is thus
referred to what had been already stated in the first
chapter, the writer singling out certain points for special
elucidation. For this change of tense we have the
precedent set us by our translators, who have thus har
monised Isaiah xxxviii. 21, 22, with the account of
Hezekiah's recovery in -2 Kings xx.
In the first chapter, the account of the creation of
man is given in brief, without any intimation of a
distinct- action in the creation of woman. No one
would infer from it that " Adam was first formed, and
then Eve." In the first chapter, the relation which
man is to sustain to the other orders of earth's inhabit
ants is authoritatively announced, but it is not formally

GENESIS, CHAPTER II. SUPPLEMENTARY. 249
instituted. Man is as yet but an heir-apparent await
ing the coronation ceremonial. In the second chapter,
which bears on its face the characteristics of a supple
mentary, expository document, these omissions are sup
plied. The chapter furnishes in detail an account of
the creation of woman, which proclaims at once her
personal dignity, her intimate relationship to man, and
her subordination as his helpmeet, while it supplies
the missing link respecting the inauguration of Adam
as the viceroy of the new creation, accompanied with
a formal presentation of the various orders of his
dominion to him as their rightful lord. To regard
this supplement as a distinct, independent, contra
dictory account of the proceedings of the creative week,
is a piece of hypercriticism much more befitting the
pages of a Kuenen or a Wellhausen than the writings
of a Christian apologist. An interpretation of a com
position revealing intelligence of the highest order,
which makes the writer contradict himself within the
¦compass of two or three pages, bears on the face of it
the stamp of its own condemnation.
But, without further remark on the question of order,
.suffice it to say that men of science who stand as high
in the departments covered by the sacred narrative, as
Professor Huxley deservedly does in his own, and who
are as earnest searchers after truth as any adverse
¦critic can claim to be, have given their suffrages in
favour of the order set forth in this matchless Kos
mogony, as harmonising in all its essential elements
and features with all that science can claim to have

250 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
been scientifically established. It is not with the
established sciences that Moses and his defenders have
to contend. Their assailants are men who take their
stand on the ever-shifting sands of the nascent sciences,
searching eagerly for whatever the waves of a sceptical
speculation may chance to wash ashore, or the dredge
may rake from the slime of the vasty deep. If by
sheer dint of construction it can be made to wear an
adverse look, it is at once hailed as an important con
tribution to science, labelled with a high-sounding
name, such as Bathybius, and sent forth, amid a chorus
of applause, to do battle against Divine Revelation.
But however it may fare with the Mosaic Kosmogony
(and its past victories presage its future triumphs), one
thing is clear — the Huxleyan Kosmogony cannot be
adopted as a substitute. In the interest of Science as
well as of Theology, we must hold by the scientific
Principle of Causality, and reject the doctrine that the
entire phenomena of the universe, including " conscious
intellect and will," are the offspring of a " blind force,"
whose activities are mediated and modified by nothing
but " what are termed secondary causes," which must,
in their turn, have originated in this same blind,
unconscious force.

CHAPTER VIII.
SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE*
rilHIS is the title of a very remarkable article by
J- Professor Huxley, in the April number of the
Nineteenth Century. The title is designed to indicate
the writer's estimate of the scientific attainments of the
Duke of Argyll. In the course of his remarks on the
Duke — for they are almost as much on the Duke as on
the Duke's science — the critic brings forth from his
scientific treasury some of the chief characteristics of
the philosophy he has been advocating for more than a
quarter of a century, and arrays them once more before
the British public. As some of these dogmatic deliver
ances are irreconcilable with recognised primary beliefs,
which lie at the foundation of sound philosophy and
genuine science, it may not be out of place in this review
to subject them to a brief examination.
On page 488 we find the following : —
" The Duke of Argyll affirms that the ' law of gravitation,'
as put forth by Newton, was something more than the state-

From the British and Foreign Evangelical Review, for July 1887.
251

252 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
ment of an observed order. He admits that Kepler's three
laws ' were an observed order of facts and nothing more.'
As to the law of gravitation, it contains an element of causa
tion, the recognition of which belongs to a higher category of
intellectual conceptions than that wliich is concerned in the
mere observation and record of separate and apparently
unconnected facts."
Such is the Duke's remark regarding the distinction
between the discovery of Kepler and the discovery of
Newton. Let us hear what Professor Huxley has to
say about it, and his reason for writing it down under
the head of Pseudo-science : —
"There is," he says, "hardly a line in these paragraphs
which appears to me indisputable. But to confine myself to
the matter in hand, I cannot conceive that any one who
had taken ordinary pains to acquaint himself with the real
nature of either Kepler's or Newton's work could have written
them. That the labours of Kepler, of all men in the world,
should be called ' mere observation and record,' is truly
wonderful. And any one who will look into the Principia,
or the Optics, or the Letters to Benlley, will see, even if he
has no more special knowledge of the topics discussed than I
have, that Newton over and over again insisted that he had
nothing to do with gravitation as a physical cause, and that
when he used the terms attraction, force, and the like, he
employed them, as he says, mathematics, and not physice."
In support of the interpretation here given of New
ton's doctrine, we are favoured with the following : —
" How these attractions [of gravity, magnetism, and elec
tricity], may be performed, I do not here consider. What I
call attraction may be performed by impulse, or by some

PROF. HUXLEY AS A SCIENTIFIC EXEGETE. 253
other means unknown to me. I use that word here to signify
only in a general way any force by which bodies tend toward
one another, whatever be the cause.''
Such is his textual reference. Will the reader pause
for a moment, and " look into " his exegesis of it ? He
says : —
" According to my reading of the best authorities on the
history of science, Newton discovered neither gravitation nor
the law of gravitation ; nor did he pretend to offer more than
a conjecture as to the causation of gravitation."
The result arrived at by our scientific exegete of the
text of Newton, aided by the light shed upon his work
by those who have written the history of science, is that
Newton restricted his definition of the law of gravitation
to the mere order of sequence, and excluded from it the
idea of causation. This is what Professor Huxley
teaches ; and if this be not what he intends to teach,
his criticism of the Duke of Argyll's estimate of New
ton's discovery, as distinguished from Kepler's, is as
gratuitous as it is pointless.
Professor Huxley, at points seemingly suitable to his
object, introduces quotations from the Duke of Argyll
which, in their isolation, seem somewhat incongruous
with other passages, and with the findings of science as
interpreted by his critic ; but here we have the critic
himself, when bent on confounding the subject of his
strictures, citing from Newton a passage which sustains
the Duke's interpretation and negatives his own. The
point in dispute between the Duke and his critic is

254 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
" whether Newton's law of gravitation added to the
idea of mere order of sequence that of causation." Such
is the point, and Professor Huxley, who takes the nega
tive, adduces, in proof, a sentence pregnant with this
very idea of causation from beginning to end. The only
point which the passage relied on establishes is, that
Newton did not undertake to say how or by what means
attraction may be performed. It is manifest, however,
that while he did not profess to solve the mystery of
gravity, magnetism, or electricity, he regarded the
masses, of whose movements he was taking cognisance,
as impelled by some force. From his statement of the
law of gravitation, the idea of force, or causation, is
inseparable. The law as laid down by him was that
every portion of matter in the universe attracts every
other, with a force varying directly as its mass, and
inversely as the square, of its distance. Is it possible to
eliminate from this definition the idea of a force of some
kind, to whose action the movements of the astronomical
masses are ascribed by the father of astronomy ? So
far is such elimination from being possible, the patent
fact is, that it is with a force and its action that Newton
is dealing throughout. He finds every portion of matter
in the universe obeying its mandate and acting under
its sway with mathematical precision. It is true he
does not confound the" ruler with the law. The law is
simply the rule in accordance with which the adminis
tration is conducted ; but he is careful to recognise the
existence and action of a force which, however inscrut
able in its essence, gives unmistakable evidence that its

NEWTON DISCOVERED BOTH THE FORCE AND ITS LAW. 255
acts are in accord with the demonstrable principles of
mathematical science. In a word, Newton has demon
strated the teleology of the astronomical array, while
such scientists as Professor Huxley, and such agnostic
philosophers as Mr Herbert Spencer, in defiance of the
first principles of both philosophy and science, have been
proclaiming its death-knell in every department of the
works of God.
Indeed, Professor Huxley cannot speak on the
subject in question without implying, in the language
his subject constrains him to use, if he will make him
self intelligible, the very doctrine of causation which he
wishes to rule out of the field of science. For example,
on page 489 he uses the term physical as an appro
priate designation of astronomy. Now, take away from
this term the idea of force, and it is divested of all
import as a designation of the science elaborated by
Newton. The science whose laws he worked out was
a science which deals with material substances — sub
stances possessing, by virtue of their constitution,
qualities which, as subordinate causes, determine the
movements of the masses which constitute the sidereal
systems of this marvellous universe. It may be very
desirable for Professor Huxley to get rid of causation,
for so long as it remains a recognised scientific principle
the doctrine of the teleologists abides impregnable.
But the last name in the world he should invoke
against the principle of causality is the venerabile
nomen of the author of the Principia. Had Newton
not recognised that principle, and followed it out to its

256 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
consequences in the field of astronomy, the Principia
had never had birth.
It may, perhaps, be said that all that Professor
Huxley aims at is to correct the Duke of Argyll's
conception of law, restricting the use of the term to
the order in which facts take place, and excluding from
the idea covered by it the idea of causation. If this
were all, he has certainly put himself to much
unnecessary labour. One page of the Nineteenth
Century might have sufficed to settle such a dispute.
But he has made it pretty clear that his chief objection
to the Duke's doctrine is not simply that he has
embraced causation under the conception of law, but
that he recognises the conception at all. This is
manifest from what he says on page 489, 490 : —
" To talk of the law of gravitation alone as the reason of
Kepler's laws, and still more as standing in any causal
relation to Kepler's laws, is simply a misuse of language. It
would really be interesting if the Duke of Argyll would
explain how he proposes to set about showing that the
elliptical form of the orbits of the planets, the constant area
described by the radius vector, and the proportionality of
the squares of the periodic times to the cubes of the
distances from the sun, are either caused by the 'force of
gravitation ' or deducible from the ' law of gravitation.'
I conceive that it would be about as apposite to say that the
various compounds of nitrogen with oxygen are caused by
chemical attraction and deducible from the atomic theory."
Here is a distinct repudiation of the doctrine that
gravitation sustains any causal relation to the move
ments of the planets, or that it has anything to do

THE PLANETARY ORBITS DETERMINED BY FORCES. 257
with the determination of their orbits. According to
Professor Huxley's reading of astronomy the orbits of
the planets might have been elliptical, and the radius
vector in every instance might have moved as it does
over equal areas in equal times, and the squares of the
periodic times of the several planets might have been
to each other as the cubes of their distances from the
sun, although there had been no such force as gravita
tion in existence ! So much for Professor Huxley's
astronomy. It is not too much to say that had the
Professor made such a statement to Newton, the
formulator of the law of gravitation would have sent
him back to begin his astronomical studies over again.
But, really, are we to take this statement of the
Duke's critic as a deliberate conclusion ? Is it possible
that all we have been told by astronomers about
centripetal and centrifugal forces holding each other in
check, and through their combined, yet antagonistic,
action preserving the planets in their orbits, and
maintaining the orderly adjustments of the solar array,
is a mere mythical hypothesis, without any foundation
in fact or in the nature of things ? If it were not for
the touching solemnity of the words with which
Professor Huxley has closed his critique, one could
hardly regard him as putting on record his sober
conviction in the foregoing sentences. A more
untoward illustration for a disciple of David Hume
than the one he has here adopted cannot well be
imagined. His object is to exorcise causation out of
the sphere of astronomy, and yet he has furnished the

258 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
material for one of the most convincing proofs of its
action to be found in any department of the physical
sciences. The case adduced by him is that of the
radius vector — the imaginary line connecting a planet
with the sun in his position in one of the foci of its
elliptical orbit — passing over equal areas in equal
times. Such is the instance, and regarding it Professor
Huxley does not hesitate to allege that it is not
deducible from the law of gravitation, nor caused by
the force of gravitation. Now, mark what the actual
phenomena connected with the movements of this
radius vector are. As the orb approaches its perihelion,
its velocity is constantly accelerated, and when it
passes this point, its rate of motion as constantly
diminishes, until it reaches its aphelion on the opposite
side of the ellipse. The nearer the planet is to the
sun, the faster it moves, and the farther its recedes
from him the slower is its motion. Will any one
claiming the rank of a scientist venture to risk his
reputation by accepting the position here taken by
Professor Huxley, which amounts simply to this, that
the sun exerts no controlling influence upon the
movements of his satellites ? It is not too much to
say that it is only by suppressing Dr. Tyndall's
" questioning impulse," — that is, by holding in abey
ance the instinctive primary principle of causality,
without which there can be neither philosophy nor
science, — that causation can be ruled out of court in
this case. It is impossible for the human mind,
constituted as it is, not to connect, causally, the great

THE THEORY TESTED BY THE SCIENCE OF CHEMISTRY. 259
central orb as he holds his royal seat in that focus of
the ellipse, with the ever-varying movements of his
attendant satellites. He who repudiates the causal
relationship, as Professor Huxley has done, may adopt
the unphilosophic, unscientific maxim of Mr. Hume,
that " anything may be the cause of anything.''
But, not content with the exclusion of causation
from the science of astronomy, our critic enforces his
strictures by an act of excommunication designed to
exclude it from the science of chemistry. " I conceive,"
he says, " that it would be about as apposite to say
that the various compounds of nitrogen with oxygen
are caused by chemical attraction, and deducible from
the atomic theory." This is a truly "apposite"
illustration. It shows us that we have not misappre
hended Professor Huxley's aim in this marvellous
critique. It places the fact of his repudiation of
causal efficiency beyond question. But as in the
astronomical illustration, so is it in the chemical : the
instance adduced does not help the cause in whose
behalf it is invoked. Take, for example, that chemical
combination of nitrogen and oxygen which results in
the production of aquafortis; will any chemist
deserving of the title agree with Professor Huxley in the
assertion that the resultant compound was not caused
by the mutual attractions of its constituent gases ?
This were all one with saying that this new product
was uncaused ; and when one accepts this view of
chemical combinations, he would be as well out of the
laboratory, and much safer at less perilous experiments.

260 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
But the illustration borrowed from chemistry is not
only impertinent and injurious to the cause it is adduced
to support ; as employed by Professor Huxley, it is
unkind to his great atomic philosophic chief, Mr.
Herbert Spencer, as it belittles his kosmic philosophy.
According to the statement of the case, the various
chemical compounds are not deducible from the atomic
theory, while the eminent philosophic speculator at whose
feet Professors Huxley and Tyndall do homage, has
spent a considerable portion of a long life in the attempt
to deduce the entire kosmos, with its various streams of
animal and vegetable life — yea, its entire organic and
inorganic contents, including thought and emotion —
from the atom and its laws. According to his own
belauded philosopher, the atom occupies the throne of
causality, and is the efficient causal factor of all things
that have, or ever have had, being in the universe. If
the atomic theory, as amended by Mr. Spencer, is to be
so quietly set aside as impotent to account, in any
measure, for chemical combinations, the whole life's
labours of this master of abstract formulae are set at
naught. If it be impossible to deduce from the atoms
of oxygen and nitrogen the various compounds,
chemical and mechanical, into which they are capable
of entering, what are we to think of the claims
advanced by Mr. Spencer in his philosophic and
scientific speculations regarding the virtues of his
atomic Ultimate, even when stripped of every attribute
which would justify the ascription to it of an efficient
causality ? The Spencerian kosmos, it is true, is a mere

KOSMIC SPECULATIONS PLACED IN PERIL. 261
chimera evolved from principles, which are not " first
principles," by the exercise of a very unscientific
imagination; but Professor Huxley should have had
more care for the scientific reputation of his friend, and
should have been more on his guard in speaking of the
atomic theory, and should not have placed deductions
from it under the category of the impossible. However
the account may stand between the Professor and the
Duke, certainly Mr. Spencer owes him no thanks for his
remarks respecting the possibility of forecasting the
achievements of the atoms and molecules from which
he has evolved his artistic kosmos.
It may be, however, that when Mr. Spencer takes
into consideration the fact that Professor Huxley has,
in this same rejection of causation, placed his own
kosmic speculations in peril, he will look more leniently
upon the offence offered to himself in the implied
disparagement of speculations on the potency of atoms.
That the Professor has done this is very easy of
demonstration. In his book on Evidence as to Man's
Place in Nature, we have, as has been shown already
in a former chapter, pp. 215-250, a full outline of his
kosmical theory.
"But even leaving Mr. Darwin's view aside," he writes,
"the whole analogy of natural operations furnishes so
complete and crushing an argument against the intervention
of any but what are termed secondary causes in the
production of all the phenomena of the universe, that, in
view of the intimate relations between man and the rest of
the living world, and between the forces exerted by the

262 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
latter and all other forces, I can see no excuse for doubting
that all are co-ordinated terms of Nature's great progression
from the formless to the formed, from the inorganic to the
organic, from blind force to conscious intellect and will."
Now, if the reader will take note of the terms
" operations," " intervention," " secondary causes,"
" production," " forces exerted," and " blind force," he
will see at once that the idea of causation pervades the
statement from beginning to end. There can be no
"operation" without some operator or something that
operates, and there can be no "intervention" where
there is nothing to intervene, especially where the
"intervention" is by a cause, whether primary or
" secondary," and there can be no " production " where
there is no productive energy brought into action ; and
certainly a " force," whether " blind " or argus-eyed,
which has given birth to the co-ordinated series of
kosmic phenomena, ending in conscious intellect and
will, leaves no " excuse for doubting " that it is entitled
to take rank as a cause — a cause compared with which
all others must be regarded as subordinate and
" secondary." It is not a bad way of testing a man's philosophic or
scientific theories to observe whether the language he
uses when he is off his guard be in harmony with the
doctrine he professes. The school to which Professor
Huxley belongs do not consent to the application of
this test, and give as their reason, that the vocabulary
on which they have to draw has been so vitiated by
association with erroneous theories, that it is difficult

THE THEORY UNUTTERABLE IN HUMAN SPEECH. 263
to press it into the service of the genuine scientific
Renaissance without conveying impressions akin to the
abandoned notions of effete systems. Such, in effect, is
their apology when pressed with the obvious implica
tions of their own phraseology, but it does not seem to
be satisfactory. They are perfect masters in the art
and science of technical manufacture ; and if, as the
fact is, with the treasures of the living and the dead
languages open to them, they cannot describe their
scientific novelties without using terms which imply
the very principles they are avowedly repudiating, the
inference is that their doctrine is not congruous to
human thought or speech. In fact, the ark of teleology
is like " A vase in which roses have once been distilled ;
You may break, you may ruin the vase, if you will,
But the scent of the roses will cling round it still."
Despite the chemical compounds of their great
apothecary, wherewith they have endeavoured to
neutralise every trace of design contained in this
notable theistic palladium, the odour of the Divine
Name still reveals itself as ointment poured forth. No
better illustration of the failure to dissipate the
teleological conception of causation could be given than
the one furnished by Professor Huxley in the foregoing
sketch of his kosmogony. In the one sentence he has
employed no fewer than four terms, which, if they mean
anything at all, express or imply the operation of an
efficient cause. Surely if it had been possible to
expound the system he wished to set forth by terms

264 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
which would give no quarter to the idea of causation,
the author of the Bathybius was just the man to have
discovered or invented them.
It would seem to be one of the chief objects of his
strictures on the Duke's science to dissociate law from
causation. He not only repudiates the alliance, but
gives examples of laws where, he alleges, no such rela
tion can be said to exist. "I presume," he observes
(p. 492), " that it is a law of nature that a straight line
is the shortest distance between two points. Whether
the notion of necessity which attaches to it has an a
priori or an a posteriori origin is a question not rele
vant to the present discussion. But I would beg to be
informed, if it is necessary, where is the compelling
force out of which the necessity arises ? and further, if
it is not necessary, whether it loses the character of a
law of nature ? "
This illustration is hardly fair in dealing with the
point at issue. The Duke was not speaking of the
intangible lines and points with which the science of
mathematics deals, but of the material entities which
make up this universe, and of the laws of their con
stituent elements and motions. It is from instances
within the domain of the material that tests of the
scientific accuracy of the definition in question should
have been drawn by his critic. No one contends that
there is any causal efficiency in a mathematical point
or line ; but no one, without repressing his philosophic
instincts, can hold that when, instead of mathematical
points, we have posited material orbs, the element of

THE IDEA OF FORCE INSEPARABLE FROM MOTION. 265
force does not enter upon the scene, and give a new
character to the problem of the scientist. His mathe
matics will be indispensable in the exposition of the
properties of the orbits along which the material masses
move, but, in solving the mystery of their motions, he
must fall back upon qualities inherent in, and insepar
able from, their native constitution. Whether the
question be raised in reference to the phenomenon that
all the orbs of the solar system have assumed the
spheroidal form, or in reference to the phenomena of
their motions described by Kepler and Newton, no
answer will satisfy the human mind which does not
ascribe both the form of the orb and the peculiarities of
its variant motion, along its viewless mathematical curve,
to a " compelling force."
But Professor Huxley comes fairly out, and enters
the domain of physics for another illustration.
"I take it," he says, "to be a law of nature, based on
unexceptionable evidence, that the mass of matter remains
unchanged, whatever chemical or other modifications it may
undergo. This law is one of the foundations of chemistry.
But it is by no means necessary. It is quite possible to
imagine that the mass of matter should vary according to
circumstances, as we know its weight does. Moreover, the
determination of the ' force ' which makes mass constant (if
there is any intelligibility in that form of words) would not,
so far as I can see, confer any more validity on the law than
it has now."
On this attempt to sever the connection between
force and law, it may be remarked — (1.) That it is not
very complimentary to the science of chemistry, denying

266 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
as it does the necessity of one of the laws on which that
science is built. If the foundations be destroyed, what
can the chemists do ? (2.) It may, as Professor Huxley
says, be quite possible to imagine the inconstancy of
the mass of matter, for it is hard to say what such
scientists as Professors Huxley and Tyndall may not be
able to imagine, when the latter, projecting his vision
backward over the boundaries of the experimental
sciences, could discern in matter the promise and
potency of all forms of terrestrial life. (3.) The point
at issue is not the possibility of determining the nature
of the force by whose action the constancy of the mass
of matter is maintained, but whether the constancy is
due to the operation of " force " at all. This is the
point, and suffice it to say that, if there were no force
constituting the atoms into a mass and maintaining
them in their mutual relations, each atom asserting its
right to dance (if a thing incapable of exerting force"
could dance), would form a universe of dust. Professor
Huxley has blinked a most important previous question
— viz., whether there could be any such thing in the
universe as " a mass of matter," if there were no such
thing as force ? (4.) His concluding remark is alto
gether gratuitous and beside the mark. He says that
" the determination of the force would not confer any
more validity on the law than it has now." Who says
that it would ? The question is not about the conferring
of validity upon the law of constancy of mass, but
whether there could be any such law at all if there were
no " force " to combine the atoms composing the mass,

IS MAN CONSTITUTIONALLY MORTAL ? 267
and to exert its energy in the maintenance of its con
stancy. The Professor's next instance is that of man's mor
tality, which he says is a law of nature, but of whose
necessity he does not find any conclusive evidence ; and
he asks again, What is the "compelling force" of this
law ? Some theologians might perhaps take advantage
of this concession, and claim that it is in harmony with
the Scripture doctrine that, in the case of man, death
is a penal infliction. The law that all men are mortal,
he tells us, " is simply a statement of the observed order
of facts that all men sooner or later die." He is " not
acquainted with any law of nature which is more con
stant and uniform than this. But will any one tell
me," he asks, " that death is necessary ? Certainly," he
adds, " there is no d priori necessity, for various men
have been imagined to be immortal. And I should be
glad," he continues, " to be informed of any ' necessity '
that can be deduced from biological considerations"
(p. 492).
This is certainly a wonderful specimen of scientific
argumentation. To give it a guasi-philosophic cast, its
author introduces the phrase d priori necessity, and at
once sets such necessity aside by a reference to the fact
that " various men have been imagined to be immor
tal" ! Now, as a matter of fact, the question of man's
immortality has nothing whatever to do with any d
priori principle. It is simply a question of facts and
their interpretation. Professor Huxley admits the facts,
and admits the law, and even goes so far as to admit

268 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
that he is " not acquainted with any law of nature more
constant and uniform." The only point at issue, there
fore, is whether this constant uniform law implies the
existence of a " compelling force." In denying that it
does, he sets himself in antagonism against a scientific
canon which lies at the foundation of all genuine
scientific progress — viz., that a quality or characteristic
common to all the individuals of a class must have its
root in the constitution of the class. If it is found that
all cows chew the cud and divide the hoof, it is not
unnatural to infer that these phenomena are the neces
sary outcome of their constitution. And if it is found
that animals of the horse species neither chew the cud
nor divide the hoof, the inference is unavoidable, that
these characteristics are inseparable from their nature.
In a word, the nature of the thing determines the law
of its action or mode of life. This holds true throughout
the whole range of creaturely existence, whether animal,
vegetable, or mineral. The law is simply the statement
of the mode in which the nature of the thing moves it
to act.
Nor does this principle hold good simply in regard to
the character or mode of action of an organism. It is
equally true of the duration of its organic existence.
Each kind has its period of growth, maturity, and
decay, and these are determined by its constitution.
And to this law man in his present estate is no excep
tion. His earthly house of this tabernacle has not been
built for eternity. Its dissolution is assured by its
architecture, and none of the sons of men, save those

UNIFORM EFFECT IMPLIES UNIFORM CAUSE. 269
who are alive and remain till the coming of the Lord,
shall be exempt from the tremendous necessity of death.
It must be a desperate cause indeed, and a very vain
philosophy, which compels a man to deny that uni
formity of result does not imply the existence of a
uniformly operating cause. This principle is too deeply
rooted in the constitution of the human mind to be
eradicated by either Mr. Hume's sceptical philosophy or
Professor Huxley's lay homilies. Quoting from one of
these lay homilies a sentence its author has quoted from
a Roman poet, there may indeed " be written over the
portals of life "" Debemur morti nos nostraque."
But our critic's disquisition on the possibility, or at
least the imaginary possibility, of the immortality of
man, is completely thrown into the shade by the lesson
he reads the Duke of Argyll on the mutual convertibility
of all forms of energy. After delivering such a lecture
to His Grace as a Professor might think it necessary to
give a class commencing the study of physiology, he
recommends him "to devote some study to Book II.
chap. v. section 4 of my friend Dr. Foster's excellent
text-book of Physiology (1st edition, 1877, p. 321) which
begins thus : — ' Broadly speaking, the animal body is a
machine for converting potential into actual energy.
The potential energy is supplied ; this the metabolism
of the body converts into the actual energy of heat and
mechanical labour.' "
This is the sum and substance of the long lecture
administered to the Duke on the conservation and

270 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
transmutation of energy, and the lecturer evidently
imagines that it must put him to absolute confusion.
Well, one cannot say how the Duke may have felt
when he read this passage, after giving ear to the
monitions with which it is introduced; but it is very
questionable whether his cheeks grew red with the
blush of confusion. The fact is, the lecture and the
proof-text recommended to his noble pupil are a
destructive critique on the philosophy espoused by
Professor Huxley himself, in the interest of which he
has been at pains to pen this most unphilosophic and
unscientific article. The philosophy of David Hume,
glorified in the Professor's lay homily delivered in
Edinburgh, " almost within ear-shot " of the sceptic's
house on a Sunday in November, 1868, substitutes
" order of sequence " for causal efficiency, and here we
have a philosophic excursus whose every sentence is
pervaded with the doctrine of energy, which is but
another name for causal efficiency — that is, another
name for the doctrine denied !
In the course of this physiological prelection he
disabuses the Duke's mind of the notion that when a
man's arm is raised, in sequence to that state of
consciousness we call a volition, the volition is the
immediate cause of the elevation of the arm : —
" On the contrary," he says, " that operation is affected by
a certain change in form, technically known as ' contraction,'
in sundry masses of flesh, technically known as muscles,
which are fixed to the bones of the shoulder in such a
manner that, if these muscles contract, they may raise the

ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXECUTING VOLITIONS. 271
arm. Now, each of these muscles is a machine, in a certain
sense, comparable to one of the donkey-engines of a steam
ship, but more complete, inasmuch as the source of its
ability to change its form, or contract, lies within itself.
Every time tbat, by contracting, the muscle does work,
such as that involved in raising the arm, more or less of the
material which it contains is used up, just as more or less of
the fuel of a steam-engine is used up when it does work.
And I do not think," he adds, " there is a doubt in the mind
of any competent physicist or physiologist that the work
done in lifting the weight of the arm is the mechanical
equivalent of a certain proportion of the energy set free by
the molecular changes which take place in the muscle. It is
further," he continues, " ajolerably well-based belief that
this and all other forms of energy are mutually convertible,
and therefore that they all come under that general law
or statement of the order of facts called the conservation of
energy. And as that certainly is an abstraction, so the view
which the Duke of Argyll thinks so extremely absurd is
really one of the commonplaces of physiology."
On this exposition of what physiology teaches
regarding the wondrous arrangement provided for
carrying into execution the fiats of the will, it may be
observed— -first, by way of correction in its metaphysical
branch, that it confounds a volition with a state of
consciousness. This may seem too small a matter for
criticism, but the misapprehension it reveals has much
to do with the false philosophy of both Hume and
Huxley. Neither the one nor the other has made a
careful analysis of the sentence, / am conscious of a
volition. The volition gives birth to the state of
consciousness, but except on the assumption that a

272 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
cause is to be identified with its own effect, the volition
and the consciousness of the volition are not to be
spoken of as one and the same thing. Even according
to the "sequence" theory, the volition must precede
the state of consciousness, and cannot; where that
notion is fairly carried out, be coincident with it. But
this " sequence " theory is not in accordance with the
findings of consciousness. When we are conscious of
a volition, we are aware that we are exercising our
volitional faculty, — in a word, that our mind is
changing its potential energy into actual energy, and
not simply that one state of mind has followed, in
order of sequence, upon the heels of another. In
a word, we here reach the seat of information regarding
the fundamental principle of all genuine philosophy,
and, consequently, of all true science — viz., the
principle of causality. It is in the phenomena of our
own consciousness that this principle is revealed, and
as it there discloses its nature, it produces the conviction
that its essential idea is that of efficiency, and not that
of mere order of sequence. As such is the birth and
origin of the very conception of a cause, no one has
authority, when speaking correctly, especially when he
is delivering lectures of remonstrance and rebuke to
others, to transform this primary belief into the
unphilosophical notion of a mere order of events,
sustaining to each other no such relation as the very
term of necessity implies.
But, secondly, passing from the metaphysical to the
physical branch of the exposition, we find ourselves at

STEAM-ENGINE AND MUSCULAR MECHANISM. 273
every step face to face not simply with an " order of
sequence," but with "energy" in actual, efficient
manifestation. The speech of the expositor bewrayeth
him at every turn and winding of his excellent physio
logical demonstration. He speaks not of the rising of
the arm, but of the raising and elevation of it. He
tells us, quite correctly, and in scientific phrase, how
this is effected. The muscles contract, and, doing so,
must raise the arm. To impress this very lucid lecture
on our minds, he has recourse to an exceedingly apposite
illustration, which he finds in the machinery and opera
tions of a steam-engine. One point of difference
between these two pieces of mechanism he very
properly points out, is that the muscular arrangement
is " more complete " than its analogue the steam-
engine, "inasmuch as the source of its ability to
change its form, or contract, lies within itself." For
the main point of the demonstration he claims the
consensus of all competent physicists and physiologists,
who hold with him that " the work done in lifting the
weight of the arm is the mechanical equivalent of a
certain proportion of the energy set free by the
molecular changes which take place in the muscle."
As one might expect from so eminent a physiologist,
the exposition is as lucid as science can make it, but
the trouble is that it is just too lucid for the cause of
the expositor. If the analogy to which he has pledged
himself be fairly carried out, mere order of sequence
must give place to causal efficiency, for the operations
of a steam-engine leave no room for " doubt in the
T

274 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
mind of any competent physicist," however they may
impress a Huxleyan physiologist, that there is energy
at work, attended by effects due to an unquestionably
causal agency. Are we to be told that the heat in the
furnace, the steam generated in the boiler, the move
ments of the piston in its cylinder, the motions of the
crank, and the revolutions of the wheels, are simply so
many disjointed facts, following one another in an
invariable order of sequence, without any " compelling
force " determining the order of their procession ? Yes,
this is what we are asked to accept as the outcome of
physiological investigation into the springs (if one
may use the word springs in speaking on such a
subject) of organic activity. Whether the organism be
a steam-engine or " the human form Divine," the
phenomena presented in its operations (sit venia
verbo) are not to be regarded as springing from any
fontal source possessing productive energy, nor to be
looked upon as sustaining among themselves any such
relation as obtains between a cause and its effect.
Such is the demand made upon our credence by men
claiming to lead the scientific thought of Great Britain ;
but, before the thing demanded can be granted, the
present constitution of the human mind must undergo
a radical transformation. The primary belief designated
by the term causality is so rooted in the mental
texture of man's nature that it cannot be eradicated,
and, while it holds its place, the rival negation of David
Hume will never establish its claims to scientific or
philosophic recognition.

THE MUSCULAR APPARATUS TELEOLOGICAL. 275
Finally, one cannot have failed to observe that the
exposition is subversive of the position taken by the
anti-teleologists. If there be a teleological arrange
ment in the steam-engine — and he who denies that
there is, cannot have much acquaintance with its
marvellously ingenious mechanism — there must be a
pre-eminently more perfect teleological apparatus in
the structure of the human body, which Professor
Huxley has compared with it. " Each of these
muscles," he tells us, " is a machine, in a certain sense,
comparable to one of the donkey-engines of a steam
ship, but more complete, inasmuch as the source of its
ability to change it's form, or contract, lies within
itself." If the donkey-engine, in the structure and
arrangement of its several parts, and their subordina
tion to an end manifestly aimed at by its inventor,
exhibits marks of design, surely the more complete
muscular machine, with its attachments and inherent
contractile power, and its more exquisitely contrived
self-adjustments for the attainment of ends essential to
the existence and well-being of the organism itself, and
the execution of its functions towards kindred organisms,
cannot be ruled out of court when it is cited as a
witness on behalf of a design whose evidence is engraven
on every part of its wondrous mechanism. He who
challenges its right to bear testimony in the case must
abstain from comparing it to a steam-engine, or must
hold that the more exquisite the machine the less
evidence does it furnish of contrivance or design.
Before closing his critique, Professor Huxley pro-

276 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
pounds a psycho -physiological or psycho -physical
problem, which he evidently thinks sufficient to
confound the Duke of Argyll. As this problem raises
very important metaphysical, scientific, and theological
issues, it is but proper it should be carefully investi
gated. As stated (pp. 495, 496), it reads as follows :—
"There is no more difficult problem in the world than
that of the relation of the state of consciousness, termed
volition, to the mechanical work which frequently follows
upon it. But no one can even comprehend the nature of
the problem who has not carefully studied the long series of
modes of motion which, without a break, connect the energy
which does the work with the general store of energy. The
ultimate form of the problem is this : Have we any reason
to believe that a feeling, or state of consciousness, is capable
of directly affecting the motion of even the smallest conceiv
able molecule of matter ? Is such a thing even conceivable ?
If we answer these questions in the negative, it follows that
volition may be a sign, but cannot be a cause, of bodily
motion. If we answer them in the affirmative, then states
of consciousness become undistinguishable from material
things ; for it is the essential nature of matter to be the
vehicle or substratum of mechanical energy."
It will be observed that the problem is introduced by
a repetition of the metaphysical misconception which
lies at the root of the theory of Hume, that order of
sequence exhausts the entire contents of the idea of
causation. Volition is confounded with the state of
consciousness — that is, to will and to be conscious
of willing are all one and the same thing ! As already
stated, this may not seem a great error on the part of

ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENON OF VOLITION. 277
the Professor, but a little reflection will serve to satisfy
any competent judge that the gist of the controversy
between the advocates of causal efficiency and their
opponents, who find nothing save order of sequence
among the phenomena presented in a causal series,
lies just here. It is here, and not as Professor Huxley
seems to think, " in the long series of modes of motions
which, without a break, connect the energy which does
the work with the general store of energy," that the key
to the solution of the problem is to be found. The
fundamental, all-determining question is, " What is the
testimony of consciousness regarding this problem ? "
In other words, when we are conscious of a volition in
regard to effort ad extra, are we conscious that we
directly affect and put into motion the mechanical
apparatus of muscles and nerves provided for carrying
out the mandates of our wills ? This question must be
answered in the affirmative, for it is simply a matter of
fact that such is the conscious belief of all men when
actively engaging in the execution of their purposes.
When a man raises his arm, he is conscious that he has
set the machinery in motion for raising it, and he is
conscious of effort in doing so ; and surely this conscious
ness does not reside in the muscles and nerves called
into activity by his fiat. The Ego is the seat of the
consciousness, because it is the seat of the causal
efficiency. In fact, it is just where Professor Huxley
seems to think there is nothing but a " sign " and not a
" cause " that we obtain our primary belief of causality,
or where that belief rises into the sphere of consciousness.

278 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
It is no answer to this argument, or rather statement
of the facts of consciousness, to say that it sheds no
light upon the point raised — viz., " the relation of the
volition to the mechanical work which frequently
follows upon it." It is true it sheds no light upon the
how of the mind's action upon the material organisation,
but it certainly, if consciousness is to be trusted, proves
that the mind does act upon it, and guide its movements
throughout. Such is the testimony of consciousness,
and the more carefully we study " the long series of
modes of motion which, without a break, connect " the
volition with the work done, the stronger will our
conviction be that the mind is constantly acting upon
the physical apparatus, and using it as its instrument
for the achievement of previously determined ends.
Professor Huxley says there is no break in " the long
series of modes of motion," but he has, by his imperfect
physiological exposition, broken the chain right off at the
muscular attachments to the shoulder, for he does not
give even a hint that there are motor nerves, which do
not terminate where the muscles that raise the arm
terminate. This is certainly a strange omission. The
mind, if we are to accept this physiological sketch, must
deal directly with " masses of flesh, technically known as
muscles " whereas there are mediating factors known as
motor nerves, by whose agency the mind awakes the
muscles into action. These nerves convey mandates,
as the electric wires do, from the presiding intelligence
at head-quarters, and obey its volitions.
If this doctrine be accepted, the critic alleges that

MIND ACTS ON MATTER AND CONTROLS IT. 279
" then states of consciousness become undistinguishable
from material things." It is not unreasonable to ask
scientific authority for this ex cathedra deliverance.
The reason assigned is that " it is the essential nature
of matter to be the vehicle or substratum of mechanical
energy." Such is the reason assigned. Does it justify
the dictum that, if the volition sustains a direct causal
relation to muscular motion (the motor nerves, be it
observed, again ignored in the series), the volition must
be a material, and not a spiritual agency ? There never
was a clearer instance of a non sequitur. It may be
true that it " is the essential nature of matter to be the
vehicle or substratum of mechanical energy," and yet it
does not follow that the mind, which sets the mechanism
agoing and guides its action, is but a form of material
energy. One might as well say that the engineer who
drives the engine is nothing but ten or a dozen stones'
weight of matter. That which knows matter, and con
trols and guides its energies, must be other and greater
than matter, and that which avails itself of " the essential
nature of matter as the vehicle of mechanical energy,"
and employs it for the attainment of intelligent ends,
as our consciousness affirms our minds do, must be dif
ferent, and essentially different, from all forms of matter
or mechanical energy.
In a word, Professor Huxley gains nothing by his
dilemma. There is not a step, from the forth-putting
of the volition to the realisation of the thing willed,
that does not imply the action of an intelligent, self-
determining mind upon the wondrous apparatus of

280 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
nerves and muscles by which the end designed is finally
attained. There is a vast issue involved in the question
here raised by our critic. Its range cannot be restricted
to the human will and its capacity to act directly upon
matter. The principle laid down, if applicable at all,
must apply as well to the action of the Divine will.
The doctrine propounded is irreconcilable with what the
Scriptures teach regarding the relation of the universe
to its Author. It precludes the conceivability or possi
bility of a volition putting in motion even the smallest
conceivable molecule of matter, and, of course, will not
tolerate for a moment the idea of a volition bringing a
molecule, or even an atom of matter, into being. This,
it is true, is what Professor Huxley claims; but his
positions, and the arguments advanced in support of
them, are as unpbilosophical and unscientific as they are
unscriptural. The constitution of both the inorganic
and organic creation gives evidence of the action of
intelligence, which leaves those who gainsay it without
excuse. As this evidence extends to the ultimate
elements of matter, it proclaims the antecedent volition
and action of a Being who gave birth to the material
as well as the orderly arrangements of the universe.
But, while the foregoing dilemma has failed to place
the theistic argument from design in peril, its author
has furnished the teleologists with material for com
pletely circumventing their opponents. Whether we
accept his incomplete physiological sketch of the instru
mentality by which the arm is raised, or implement it
scientifically by the addition of the motor or efferent

A GULF IMPASSABLE SAVE BY MIND. 281
nerves, there is still, between the mind and the imme
diate agency by which the elevation is effected, an
acknowledged gap which neither the physiologist nor the
gross materialist can fill up. This is a grave fact for
those who are ever trying to sound the death-knell of
teleology on the evolutionary bell, so rudely cast in the
Darwinian foundry. On the one side of this gap there
exists nothing but matter, and yet its movements are
purposeful, and admirably adapted to the attainment of
the purposes with which they are charged. This is, of
course, but another way of saying that, on the material
istic side of the gap, there is nothing to account for the
orderly arrangement of means, nor for the manifest
intelligence displayed in the result. From whatsoever
quarter, therefore, help may arise, there is manifestly
no scientific ground for expecting relief from this side.
Constrained by the exigencies of the situation, and
moved by the instinctive principles of its own constitu
tion, the mind looks across the chasm, and discerns in
the contents of consciousness, fairly analysed, the key to
the solution. It finds in that camera lucida an intelli
gent, self-determining agent, conscious of its own
activities, of activities which do not terminate upon
itself, but which bridge the gulf and control the mater
ialism beyond, so as to achieve its own purposes.
Such is the result of a candid, fairly-conducted process
of introspection, and, except the constitution of the
human mind be an ingeniously devised contrivance for
the express purpose of deception, it proves that the true
cause of the entire phenomena in question is to be found

282 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
in a designing mind acting upon, and directing for
determined ends, the marvellous machinery constructed
for its use, and subordinate to its commands. A mere
phenomenologist may not see deep enough to see this.
He may be so engrossed with anatomical investigations
into the physiological mechanism of the body that he
cannot see anything save bones, and muscles, and mus
cular contractions, and may, on occasion — as, for
example, when reviewing an opponent — overlook the
motor nerves, without whose interposition the muscular
action would never take place ; but, if he comes forth
from his physiological reverie with the deliverance that
this is all that can be seen by an eye illumined by the
light of science, it is respectfully submitted that he is
simply uttering unscientific, unphilosophic dogmas —
dogmas subverted by his own physiological labours,
which prove that the human body is an organism, artis
tically constructed as a habitation and an instrument
for the accommodation of an agent possessing what
matter, whether organic or inorganic, does not possess
— viz., intelligence and will.
Nor is the principle underlying this teleological de
monstration to be limited to the microcosm presented
in the organism presided over and governed by the
spirit of man. There is another gap, just as patent and
palpable as that already recognised, which materialism,
however refined, cannot fill up. This gap is revealed in
the macrocosm of the universe, whose movements imply
the exercise of an intelligence and will not found in its
atoms or molecular constituents. Fairly carried out,

EXTERNAL NATURE REVEALS THE ACTION OF WILL. 283
that innate principle which impels the human mind
to seek an adequate cause for the phenomena under
investigation, must lead on to the conclusion that there
is a Spirit at work, before whom all finite spirits should
bow in adoration, whose volitions cross the gulf which
separates material essences from spiritual, and controls
and guides to the achievement of infinitely wise ends
the vast complex machinery of this stupendous kosmos.
We cannot see how these volitions produce the designed
effect, but the effects are such as to necessitate the
assumption that they are the products of intelligence,
and not the mere offspring of atomic or molecular
vibrations. In this conclusion we are confirmed by the
only philosophical source of information open to us — viz.,
our own consciousness. As we have already seen, our
minds are so constituted that we cannot rid ourselves
of the conviction that our wills are the efficient causes
of the action of those organs which are called into exer
cise for the carrying of our purposes into effect. In a
word, if there be a spirit in man, there must be a
Supreme Intelligence in the universe.
What is thus attested by external nature, and receives,
as we have seen, unquestionable confirmation in the
findings of our own consciousness, cannot be set aside
by the unscientific scepticism of Hume or Huxley.
However mysterious the mode in which the human
spirit, by a volition, moves the mechanism it inhabits,
no man can doubt that it does so without placing him
self at war with one of the deepest convictions of his
own nature. The school represented by Professor

284 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Huxley may try to keep one another in countenance by
a system of mutual eulogy, varied with expressions of
contempt for all who challenge their unphilosophic
postulates, but, as the Duke of Argyll has said, the
revolt is begun, and abdication or deposition cannot be
long delayed.

CHAPTER IX.
* EVOLUTION AND NATURAL HISTORY, f
THIS volume of 306 pages is one of the series of
" Chambers's British Science-Biographies," now
in process of publication. As might be expected, the
book is neatly printed and bound, and is rendered all
the more attractive by engravings representing some of
the more noteworthy naturalists whose lives and labours
it portrays, and by some woodcuts, including a rude
representation of the Cicada, as given in a work of the
seventeenth century, and the fish-hawk as sketched by
Alexander Wilson, the ornithologist.
Of course, the author was at liberty to exercise his
own taste and judgment in the selection of his men, and
it is but fair to say that none of those selected could be
passed over in an impartial review of the rise and
progress of Natural History in Great Britain. It does,
* Natural History : its Rise and Progress in Britain, as de
veloped in the Life and Labours of Leading Naturalists. By H.
Alleyne Nicholson, M.D., D.Sc, Regius Professor of Natural
History in the University of Aberdeen. W. & B. Chambers,
London and Edinburgh, 1886.
t Prom the British and Foreign Evangelical Review for April,
1887. 285

286 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
however, seem strange that in such a review, especially
by a Scotchman and a Professor in a Scotch University,
the name of Hugh Miller should not have found a place.
The cruise of the Betsy may not have been as fertile in
its contributions to science as the cruise of the Beagle,
but certainly the labours of the Scotch stone-cutter,
whose genius rose above all the disadvantages incident to
birth in a Cromarty skipper's humble home, might have
secured for him a place among the students of Nature in
the onward march of science in his fatherland. A work
which pays a just tribute to the memory of Alexander
Wilson, the Paisley weaver, Scotch pedlar and poet, and
American ornithologist, might have laid a wreath or
dropped a tear upon the tomb of the Cromarty stone
cutter, geologist, editor, and author. Whatever names
the author may have been constrained to omit, under the
necessary limitations of this Science-series, this name
had claims to recognition on any British list which should
have forbidden its exclusion. An apology for its exclu
sion cannot be found in the all but exclusively geological
character of his scientific investigations, for geology is
too closely related to Natural History to justify or admit
of an absolute severance of its phenomena from those
which come under the cognisance of the natural his
torian. Surely the fishes disentombed by Miller from
their imprisonment in the Cromarty boulders are not to
be ruled out of the domain of Natural History. If they
are, then what becomes of Palaeontology and the recog
nised tests and indices of the relative antiquity of the
strata of our globe ? But, if the Cromarty fishes are to

HUGH MILLER'S CLAIMS TO RECOGNtTION. 287
be kept in, the man who revealed them to the scrutiny
of British science should not have been left out.
Nor can a reason for this singular omission be found
in the play of Miller's imagination, for on this principle
the names of Lamarck and the author of the Vestiges
of Creation, and that of Darwin himself, should have
met with similar treatment. Miller's Vision of the Six
Days' Creative Work was doubtless the offspring of
that imaginative faculty which served him so well in
stone-cutting, enabling him, as it did, to idealise with
such vivid definiteness the figure of the body he had to
extract from the block of stone ; but, in this respect, that
vision differed from the unverified hypotheses and
baseless generalisations of the evolutionists only in the
poetic grace and grandeur of its diction and the sub
limity of its imagery. The gaps in the evolutionary
chain which Mr. Darwin and his allies have endeavoured
to fill up by perpetual drafts upon immeasurable aeons
of duration, and imaginary intermediate organic forms,
furnish sufficient proof that Dame Fancy, rather than
the strictly " scientific imagination," has had charge of
the evolutionary chariot. For this proof, one need not
go outside this book itself, as we shall soon see.
In fact, we are met at the very threshold of the
work with unquestionable evidence of our author's
dalliance with this enchantress. The entire introduc
tion is the offspring of her wand. She has conjured up
before him the primitive man as a savage, and assigned
as his habitat "the trackless forests of Western
Europe." Now, this is a piece of pure imagination.

288 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
It assumes that man made "his first appearance
upon the earth " in " the trackless forests of Western
Europe," for which assumption there is not one particle
of evidence save the fact that, amid the regions once
occupied by these forests, there have been discovered
human remains, associated with roughly-chipped flint
weapons, and the remains of divers species of animals
now extinct. Does this fact warrant the inference that
these forests were the original dwelling-place of man ?
All that the premises will carry is that man did, at a
remote date, roam these wilds, and that he used such
weapons. These facts furnish no warrant for the
assertion that man was " cast," or created, or evoluted
in such environment. He may have, for aught these
facts attest, been a wanderer from a more congenial
home, and his wanderings may have wrought a
deterioration, both in person and property, such as
these Palaeolithic remains reveal. Indeed, the very
constitution of man would seem to point to a different
fontal centre. Had the homo sapiens made his first
appearance on the same theatre with "the cave-lion,
the cave-bear, and the mammoth," unequipped by any
previous experience, it is questionable whether he
would have left to science any evidence of his
sapientia. It is not unlikely that his remains would
have been found in even closer proximity to the
remains of these ancient denizens of the forests.
The author, however, supports this evolutionary
theory of man's primitive estate by reference to modern
savages. If we would know what the primitive man

EVOLUTION NEGATIVED BY HISTORICAL FACTS. 289
was, and how he lived, we are to betake ourselves to the
homes, and enter upon the study of the habits of savage
races. Here again Dame Fancy has taken the reins.
What warrant is there for the assumption that modern
savages are true representatives of primitive man,
either socially, morally, or religiously ? The assertion
is simply a petitio principii, constantly perpetrated by
evolutionists because of the exigencies of their
hypothesis. The hypothesis requires that man should
have made his appearance on the earth as a savage,
and, therefore, as a savage he must have appeared.
Now, against this assumption there are two facts to
be adduced, which seem, on any fair interpretation, to be
absolutely fatal to it. In the first place, history knows
nothing of the evolution of a state of civilisation from a
state of savagery, apart from any outside civilising agency.
As far as history goes back, or, in other words, as far as
there are any facts to shed light on the question, no
savage race has ever risen from its estate of degradation
without the helping hand of civilisation. In the
second place, races once in the enjoyment of the arts of
civilised life have, in the struggle for territory with
mightier neighbouring races, been driven to more
ungenial regions, and have been reduced to poverty,
and, through poverty, in some instances, to savagery ;
in others, to a condition bordering upon it. In a word,
the history of the human race, fairly interpreted,
is against the evolution hypothesis of a savage origin,
and justifies the conclusion that the savage estate is
the outcome of that struggle for existence from which
u

290 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
evolutionists, most illogically, deduce the improvement
of the species.
Indeed, our author, in the last paragraph of this
evolutionary introduction, has conceded the premises of
this argument. " Philology," he says, " teaches us that
among particular groups of nations — as, for example,
among all the main stems which have diverged from
the great Aryan stock — the names of particular
domestic animals are based upon some common root.
We are thus furnished with decisive evidence that the
animals so designated were known to the Aryans prior
to the commencement of their dispersal. Thus almost
all our most valuable domestic animals, such as the ox,
the sheep, the pig, the horse, and the dog, are
designated in Sanscrit, Latin, Greek, Gothic, and often
in German, English, and other allied languages, by
names which can be shown to have originated in the
same root-form."
It is here admitted that, so far as " the great Aryan
stock '' is concerned, its home was not amid " the track
less forests of Western Europe." There was a time in
the history of that stock when it consisted of one
unbroken family, possessing oxen, sheep, horses, pigs,
and dogs ; and there came a time when the place was
too straight for it that its tribes might dwell together,
and when the struggle for subsistence, as in the case of
Abraham and Lot, necessitated a " dispersal." Surely
it is not too much to assume that those tribes which
felt constrained to abandon the ancestral home, and seek
the means of subsistence amid previously untrodden

DEGRADATION INCIDENT TO MIGRATION. 291
wilds and trackless forests, must have been placed at
great disadvantage socially, morally, and religiously, and
in regard to all the previously known and practised
arts of Aryan civilisation. Would it be fair, or logical,
or scientific, to place these Aryan exiles, as they appear
in the forests of Europe, before the scientific world as
furnishing, in their habitats and weapons of aggression
or defence, evidence of the state of civilisation in the
ancestral Aryan home? Is it not manifest that the
migrating tribes, in their westward march or flight,
must have encountered obstacles most inimical to
mental or moral culture, or to the transmission of the
knowledge, originally possessed, to their posterity ?
Engrossed with family and tribal cares, crossing rivers
and clearing pathways through hitherto unpenetrated
jungles or dense forests, it would have been singular if
they had not, in the course of a few generations, sunk
vastly in the scale of that civilisation which they had
once enjoyed in the cradle of the race. May it not be
fairly assumed that during their movement westward,
whether that movement was a self-originated, peaceful
emigration, or a compulsory flight enforced by the
superior prowess of a hostile tribe, much of the original
wealth of the emigrants must have been exhausted in
supplying their daily necessities ? Nor is it at all
improbable that their implements of husbandry and
weapons employed in the chase were, after reaching
their uncongenial settlements, manufactured from the
only available substances as substitutes for worn-out
instruments of a higher order of workmanship and better

292 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
material. In a word, these Aryan emigrants may
have been reduced to the necessity of employing
flint where their ancestors employed some of the
metals, as it has been ascertained even some of the
Indian tribes of the New World were wont to do
contemporaneously with the use of instruments of
stone. It may, however, be said in reply that, in speaking of
the men of the palaeolithic age, the author had not
reference to the Aryan race, but simply to the prehistoric
homo sapiens. Be it so. Even though this unwarrant
able evolutionary petitio be allowed, and the concession
made that the homo sapiens was evolved from the
homo insapiens (though the Psalmist's theory of the
evolution of the latter from the former is more in
accordance with fact), may not this evolution have taken
place on the same congenial theatre afterwards occu
pied by the Aryans ; and may not the homo, having
become sapient, been subject to the same degrading
influences as they, ere he roamed the trackless forests in
which our author would have us believe he had his
origin ? To this conclusion, the uncongenial birthplace
assigned by our author to these mythical Palaeoliths,
the facts conceded regarding the possessions of the
Aryans prior to their " dispersal," and the degeneracy
incident to migration inevitably point. What history
and philology prove to have occurred in the case of the
Aryans, it is not unreasonable to assume may have taken
place in the case of this so-called homo sapiens. In
taking this ground, we are simply arguing from the

EVOLUTION INVERTS THE PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. 293
known to the unknown, while the evolutionists take
leave of history and invade the unknown from the bases
of their own pet evolutionary hypotheses. Such pro
cedure is as unphilosophic as it is unscientific. Why
should students of nature frame their theories regarding
the original state of man from the scanty materials fur
nished in the caves of Western Europe, and overlook
similar materials which have been proved to have been
in use within the historic period among the Indian
tribes on the Western Continent ? Are theories deduced
from the discovery of a few human bones commingled
with those of extinct animals, and associated with spear
and arrow-heads of flint, to be set up against historic
facts, testified to by credible witnesses, who have seen
the very same kind of instruments in actual use among
comparatively civilised Indian tribes of the American
Continent ? Such theories are scattered to the winds by
the historic fact that these instruments were employed by
tribes that had considerable acquaintance with the arts
of civilisation. Very different is the conclusion reached
by Sir John William Dawson from human remains, and
earthen vessels found with them, in different parts of
North America. " In North America," he says, " a com
paratively civilised and well-developed race would seem
to have precedence of all others, a statement which we
shall find may apply to Europe also, notwithstanding
the mythical notions of a palaeolithic age of barbarism "
(Fossil Men, p. 56).
As it has been in America, so, this eminent authority
says, it may have been in prehistoric Europe : —

£94 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
"Simple and industrious colonists spreading themselves
over new lands ; barbarous and migratory tribes and families
wandering from the centre of civilisation over the untitled
wastes, and then recoiling in successive waves on the
more cultivated tribes with rude and desolating violence.
So the struggle of opposing races would go on from century
to century, strewing the land with strange and unaccountable
traces of semi-civilisation and barbarism — the forests growing
over them, and river-floods sweeping them away, and
depositing them in unlikely places, until Borne did for
Europe what Europe has been doing for America ; and then,
in both cases, the prehistoric ages recede into dim obscurity,
and, under the manipulation of the arch geologist, may be
stretched indefinitely into the past, and arranged according
to his fancy in successive periods of barbarism and semi-
civilisation. "It is true that this view seems in direct contradiction to
the theories, promulgated with so much confidence, of the
primitive barbarism or semi-brutal character of man. Yet,
there are facts in the old world, as well as in the new,
which point in the same direction. For example, it is
admitted that the wild Veddahs of Ceylon are proved by
their Sanscrit tongue and their physical characters to be
a degraded branch of that great Aryan family to which the
civilised Hindu belongs. The Hottentot, and even the
Bushmen of South Africa, can be shown by language and
customs to be merely depauperated descendants of that great
Ethiopian nation which in Upper Egypt founded one of the
oldest known civilised kingdoms. Physiological considera
tions point in the same direction ; for man, unarmed and
naked, must originally have been frugivorous, and then to
some degree, a horticulturist, before he could have developed
into a savage hunter and warrior. To suppose tbat the
savage hunters of our day are the primeval type of man is

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD FATAL TO EVOLUTION. 295
one of the most unfounded assumptions of that materialistic
philosophy which disgraces the intellect, as well as the right
feeling of our time. At the same time, it has been the
policy of the philosophy to gather up and parade all that is
discreditable and low in the condition and manners of the
modern savage, so as to approximate him as nearly as
possible to brutes ; and, having done this, to exhibit him as
the existing representative of our prehistoric ancestors.
Thus there is created at once a double prejudice, hostile to
true views of human origin and history and to the brother
hood of humanity, as well as to his spiritual relations and
higher aspirations " (pp. 66-69).
Scientific in his method — " reasoning from existing
causes to explain ancient facts" — Principal Dawson
has entered the Palaeolithic Valley of Vision, and,
clothing the dry bones with the garniture of our
common humanity, has broken the magic spell by
which the evolutionists have metamorphosed them
into the likeness of brutes.
Before passing from the introduction, further note
should be taken of the fact stated in its last paragraph,
— viz., "that among particular groups of nations — as,
for example, among all the main stems which have
diverged from the great Aryan stock — the names of
particular domestic animals are based upon some
common root." From this testimony of philology our
author concludes " that the animals so designated were
known to the Aryans prior to the commencement of
their dispersal." This is a natural conclusion, fully
warranted by the fact referred to ; but it is certainly a
conclusion rather out of keeping with the aim of this

296 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
evolutionary Introduction. If, as our author alleges,
" almost all our most valuable domestic animals, such
as the ox, the sheep, the pig, the horse, and the dog, are
designated in Sanscrit, Latin, Greek, Gothic, and often
in German, English, and other allied languages, by
names which can be shown to have originated in the
same root-form," does it not follow that these animals
must have maintained their specific identity among all
branches of the Aryan family from the time of their
" dispersal " up to the present ? If pigs, sheep, oxen,
horses, and dogs, as known to us, were known to our
Aryan ancestors, it would seem a not unnatural
conclusion that, throughout the immense period covered
by the history of this great branch of the human race,
these several animals, however varied in form, have
adhered loyally to the specific type. A pig, or sheep,
or dog, &c, before the Aryan dispersal, would be
regarded as such in the present day. In a word, the
verdict of the cycle is condemnatory of the evolution
hypothesis. The bearing of this and like untoward facts upon
the doctrine of the transmutation of species has
been perceived by the advocates of that theory,
and attempts have been made by Lamarck and by
others, up to the present hour, to break down the
barriers which divide species from species. These
barriers, however, have proved as impregnable to the
latest disciple of Mr. Darwin as to Lamarck or the
author of The Vestiges. They have been marching
around these " specific " walls, blowing their trumpets

PERSISTENCE OF SPECIFIC TYPES ACKNOWLEDGED. 297
for three-quarters of a century, and yet, to all appear
ance, the walls are as stable to-day as when they
echoed back the first blast of the evolutionary priests.
Not relying exclusively on their trumpets, but never
abandoning their use, they have tried to effect a breach
by means of what they regard as a very battering-ram
— the engine of specific variation. Those who boast
the breaching prowess of this instrument must have
forgotten Mr. Darwin's own testimony regarding the
stability of the walls. It is impossible to reconcile the
doctrine of a specific variation, amounting finally to the
origination of a new species, with the doctrine of the
persistency of specific types acknowledged by this
eminent evolutionist. As Mr. Spencer puts it, in
speaking of domestic animals, "the wild race maintains
its type with great persistence," whilst " the domestic
race frequently produces individuals more unlike the
average type than the parents are." * He says further,
that " the life of a species, like that of an individual, is
maintained by the unequal and ever-varying actions of
incident forces on its different parts." f
These are grave admissions. If, as Mr. Spencer
alleges, variation is essential to specific life, what
becomes of the above-mentioned instrument of
specific demolition ? Can it be a valid scientific
principle which operates to the maintenance, and also
to the reduction, of the middle wall of partition by
which species is kept in isolation from species ? Can
the causes which are held to be capable of safe-
* Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 261. t Ibid. p. 286.

298 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
guarding " the life of a species " be regarded as capable
of transmuting one species into another ? If uniformity,
as "interbreeding" demonstrates, produces specific
deterioration, whilst variation, as those skilled in cattle
breeding inform us, promotes the well-being and tends
to the perfection of the species, surely it is most
unwarrantable to infer that variation may eventually
result in specific destruction by improving one species
into another. It is not wonderful, then, that these two
classes of related facts — modification and maintenance
of type by variation — should have led Mr. Spencer to
enunciate the foregoing remarkable law. This law is
universal, extending to the very orbs of heaven. The
stability of the universe, as well as the stability of the
different species of earth's fauna and flora, is maintained
by variations which are limited and bounded by an
unseen power, which ever acts in reference to the
original type, and maintains its image substantially in
every individual movement or organism through the
instrumentality of the very forces which evolutionists
regard as all-potent to effect its specific destruction.
But let us hear what the author of this Natural
History has to advance in support of this doctrine of
transmutation : —
" We may pause for a moment here to ask the bearing of
the above explanation [as given by Lamarck] of the long
neck of the giraffe on the ordinary doctrine of design as
explained in nature. In the coarse and rude teleology of the
first half of the present century, and of preceding periods, the
lonfr neck of the giraffe would have been adduced as one

THE GIRAFFE SUMMONED TO THE BAR OF SCIENCE. 299
striking proof, out of many, that the Creator had produced
each species of animals as we now find it, and had specially
fashioned each to meet the conditions present in the area in
which it had been created. To a teleology pf this sort
Lamarck's view is necessarily and absolutely fatal. At the
same time, it is to be remembered that Lamarck's theory is
entirely compatible with the belief in the existence of a
Creator, and of design in nature. It is possible, namely, to
believe that the power enjoyed by the neck of the giraffe of
lengthening under a given set of conditions formed an
integral part of the original design of the animal, or of the
species from which it was evolved. It may even be held
that the design which embraces the power of indefinite
adaptation to varying conditions is of an infinitely higher
order than the design which merely adapts an animal for one
set of conditions, it being beforehand certain that those con
ditions must ultimately give place to a different set. In the
same way, a much higher conception underlies the theory of
creation by evolution than is involved in the older view of
the separate creation of each species" (p. 254).
This passage is given at length, because it furnishes
a fair specimen of the method by which evolutionists
endeavour to evolve their theories from the facts of
nature. To support the theory in any of its forms, a
great and palpable variation from the original type is
necessary ; and as the giraffe has a marvellously long
neck, it is one of their favourite witnesses, which they
are ever summoning to the bar of science. True
science, however, will decline to admit that this long-
necked witness can be cited in the interests of evolution.
In cross-examination, it is not a violation of the law of
evidence to raise the question, ' Is the neck of this

300 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
witness longer than the neck of the father of all giraffes ? '
What answer can an evolutionist give to this very
lawful and common-sense questioning? On scientific
principles his answer must be based on facts, and the
only admissible facts must be either the neck of the
ancient father of the species, or a series of necks
gradually increasing in length as generation succeeds
generation. A competent scientific judge wrould say
to these theorists, ' Gentlemen, exhibit your cervical
chain, or withdraw your giraffe from court.' It is
regarded by our evolutionary friends as a strong
presumption against the doctrine of a distinct specific
creation that no one has ever seen a new species
created.* Why should it not be an equally strong
presumption against the theory that long-necked
giraffes have been developed from short-necked giraffes,
that no one has ever seen a short-necked giraffe,
whether living or dead, whether extant or fossil ?
If such be the fact — and that it is a fact not even the
advocates of the evolution hypothesis will deny — there
is no scientific basis for the theory of Lamarck here
indorsed by our author. It is simply a gratuitous
assumption without a single fact to justify it, even as a
provisional hypothesis. There is no objection to a
scientist framing a working hypothesis to help him in
the investigation of phenomena, but his hypothesis
must start from and be sustained by facts. In this case,
the facts to be accounted for are those presented in an
* See Mr. Spencer's evolutionary hypothesis referred to in pp.
122, 123 of this volume.

TESTS TO BE APPLIED TO A HYPOTHESIS. 301
unbroken, uninterrupted series of long-necked giraffes.
May the question not be asked, ' What is there in these
facts to justify the hypothesis that the series originated
in the efforts of remote ancestral giraffes to find in the
foliage of the forest a substitute for the humbler
herbage of the plain when smitten by long-continued
drought ? ' The conditions necessary, even to the sug
gestion of such a hypothesis, are absent throughout the
entire series, for it does not present a single trace of
development. Nor is the question raised over this case by our author
at all in place in connection with the point in dispute —
viz., whether the theory of development be not '' entirely
compatible with the belief in the existence of a Creator
and of design in nature ? " One can imagine many a
hypothesis regarding the origination of things, which
would be perfectly consistent with the belief that they
are the offspring of the wisdom and power of a Creator ;
but such hypotheses would not be thereby scientifically
established. The sole tests of a hypothesis are its har
mony with facts, and its sufficiency to account for them.
Ruling this question out as illegitimate, then the
hypothesis advanced to account for the long neck of
the giraffe must be tested by the facts of its natural
history, and as these, so far as known, furnish no basis
for it such as science demands, it must be rejected as a
mere unscientific myth.
But our natural historiographer has still more won
derful things of the Lamarckian stage of evolution to
propound and indorse. He even goes so far as to claim

302 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
that Lamarck's theory of the transmutation of land-birds
¦into water-fowl is not inconsistent with universally
admitted biological laws. The following passage will
put the reader in possession of what Lamarck held on
this subject: —
" The bird wliich necessity conducts to the water for the
purpose of obtaining its food separates its toes when it wishes
to strike the water or move upon its surface. The skin
which unites the toes at their bases acquires, in consequence
of the ceaselessly repeated separation of the toes, the power of
extension. Thus, in the course of time, are formed the ex
tended webs which unite the toes of ducks, geese, and the
like. Similar efforts to swim — that is to say, to progress in
a fluid element by striking the water — have in like manner
given rise to the extension of the skin between the toes in
frogs, turtles, otters, beavers, and suchlike animals. On the
contrary, a bird which is habituated by its mode of Hfe to
perch on trees, and which is descended from individuals all
of which have had a similar habit, necessarily possesses toes
more elongated than, and differently constructed to, those of
the aquatic animals just alluded to. Its claws, in course of
time, become lengthened, pointed, and curved, so that it can
grasp the branches of trees on which it so often reposes "
(pp. 257, 258).
What has already been remarked on the alleged
lengthening of the neck of the giraffe renders it unne
cessary to dwell at much length on the cases presented
in this passage. In the first place, there are no facts
on which to base the hypothesis that land-birds were
transmuted into water-fowls and have acquired web-
feet in the way described. In the second place, our
theorist has more to account for in the case than the

TRANSMUTATION UNSUPPORTED BY FACTS. 303
web-feet of the natatores. He has not accounted for
the acquisition of a waterproof plumage. It is true,
"hunger will break through stone walls," but hunger
will not transmute the plumage of land-birds into the
waterproof covering of the feathered denizens of our
seas, and rivers, and lakes.
Equally baseless is the hypothesis advanced to ac
count for the " lengthened, pointed, and curved " claws
of the birds that perch on trees. The theory is that
their toes have become lengthened and curved to enable
them to grasp and rest securely on their perch by their
habit of perching ! Like their brethren who proceeded
to push their fortune in the waters, their toes were not
suited to such mode of life, but by patience and perse
verance their toes acquired the requisite power of
prehension, and perching became in the course of time
as easy as it was natural.
Now here, again, evolution has to draw upon its
imagination and upon our credulity. It assumes an
original type of all perchers not properly equipped for
perching. If long and curved toes have been acquired,
the original stock must have been neither long nor
curved. Surely it is not unreasonable to ask our friends
for proof of this allegation. Can they point to any
¦fossil specimens of these alleged short-toed ancestors of
our modern perchers, or can they point to any living
specimens trying, like acrobats, to balance themselves on
our trees with nascent toes ? This they cannot do, and
the reason is, that no such specimens exist. It is un
necessary to add that this fact invalidates the hypothesis,

304 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
and places it outside the pale of scientific recognition ;
for, as already stated, no hypothesis merits such recog
nition which is not suggested by facts, and which does
not furnish the most reasonable explanation of them.
As the theory of " progressive development," advo
cated by the author of The Vestiges, has been set aside
by evolutionists of the Spencerian school, because of its
recognition of primordial impulses determining the
subsequent progressive development of the forms of life,
we may pass it by, and hear what our author has to say
on behalf of the theory of the origin of species by means
of " Natural Selection," as propounded by Mr. Charles
Darwin : —
"To Darwin," he says, "is incontestably due the pre
eminent merit of having established a theory which satis
factorily explains the method in which species have been
produced by evolution from other previously existing forms.
No naturalist at the present day, it may safely be said, doubts
that the theory of the origin of species, by means of natural
selection, is true so far as it goes, and that it satisfactorily
explains the principal difficulties which it can be legitimately
called upon to explain. Natural selection is, in other words,
universally recognised as a vera causa. The chief point that
can be said to be at issue among naturalists is not whether
it be a genuinely active cause, but only as to the extent to
which it can be applied — some regarding it as the sole factor
in the production of 'species,' while others look upon it as
being only one of many concurrent factors " (pp. 276, 277).
On this statement of claim, it may suffice for the
present to remark tbat it requires considerable abate
ment to bring it into harmony with fact. It may not

DAWSON'S ESTIMATE OF EVOLUTION. 305
be safely said that no naturalist at the present day
doubts that the theory is true so far as it goes, if by
this is meant that it accounts, in any measure, as a vera
causa for the origin of species. One very eminent
authority, who has the honour of having been appointed
President of the British Association at its last meeting,
ia criticising the theory, says that, in attempting this
operation, he is like one who is "taking a shot at a wild
duck." (If he had drawn his illustration from a shot at
a snipe, he would have been still nearer the mark.)
Any one who will carefully read his work on Fossil
Men, already referred to, will be inclined to think that,
at least so far as the human species is concerned, he has
made a considerable breach in the Darwinian brutal
lineage of man. In fact, all that can be claimed is that
a species may be greatly modified, injuriously or bene
ficially, by unfavourable or favourable circumstances,
and that the chief modifications have been effected
under the agency of man. This is all that can' be
claimed, and it furnishes no ground for boasting, inas
much as the resultant variety, even under the] manipu
lation of man, retains all the essential characteristics of
the species from which it has been evolved. As already
admitted by the author himself, the original dogs,
sheep, horses, and pigs of the Aryans, notwithstanding
the ever-varying environments to which they have been
exposed, have so persisted in their adherence to the
ancestral type, that they may still be labelled by names
radically identical with those they bore prior to the
dispersal of that great family of the human race. Now

306 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
these animals were throughout this vast period subject
to what Mr. Darwin admits to be the most potent
agency of variation (the agency of man), and yet, despite
man's agency, the Aryan pigs have persisted in being
pigs, and Aryan sheep remain sheep to this day, in all
lands of their habitation. Surely here are facts which
may well form the basis of a scientific theory ; but the
theory warranted by them negatives the Darwinian
hypothesis. No one can admit what these facts testify
regarding the persistency of species, and, at the same
time, accept the hypothesis of the origin of species by
means of natural selection. When one turns from the
immutable basis on which the doctrine of the perman
ency of the specific type rests, to the basis on which the
Darwinian hypothesis rests, one is astonished that
any man claiming scientific status would venture to
risk his character by accepting it. Its sole foundation
is "sports," which are admitted to be "rare" by Mr.
Darwin himself, except through the influence of man.
Now, we put it to the intelligence of the advocates
of the hypothesis, ' Is it a scientific procedure to base a
biological theory upon specimens which are so abnormal
in origin and structure, that they must be labelled
" sports," such as Seth Wright's Ancon ram, or Esther
P.'s posterity with their extra digits ? ' * If theories
may be based upon mere lusus natures, science itself
may become a mockery and a "sport." Nor is the
scientific claim of such procedure at all strengthened
by what our author alleges on page 246 : " that some
* See Mr. Spencer's biological hypothesis already referred to, p. 127.

FALLACY OF A NARROW INDUCTION. 307
organisms which are otherwise clearly recognisable as
distinct species are undoubtedly capable of producing
fertile offspring by interbreeding. This," he says, " is
seen in the case of various plants, and in a few instances
among animals." This latter statement indicates the
evidence on which the former rests, and it so modifies it
as to seriously weaken its scientific value. It amounts
simply to this, that some cases have occurred in which
hybrids have been fertile, and these have taken place
chiefly among plants, and only in a few instances among
animals. Assuming that what is here alleged has
actually taken place, what follows ? Do these alleged
facts warrant the conclusion that the multitudinous
species of plants and animals on our globe have
originated in this way? To warrant so sweeping a
conclusion, something more than " sports " and excep
tional cases of hybrid fertility must be adduced. A
biological law must be founded upon the whole facts
exhibited in the organic life of our globe, so far as
known, and must not be built upon a few isolated
phenomena. The premises of this very sweeping
evolutionary conclusion lack one most important
scientific qualification — they have not been subjected
to the test of time. There is no evidence that these
sporadic productions, which are manifestly exceptions to
the 'law which governs the life of earth's fauna and
flora, shall maintain themselves as distinct species.
Indeed, not^only'is there no evidence to warrant the
expectation that^such abnormal organisms shall per
petuate their kind, but there is positive evidence

308 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
against their permanence. Nature abhors the abnormal,
and dooms it to destruction. Even where man has
interposed to originate and perpetuate deviation from
the specific type, as soon as Nature is permitted to
reassert her sway, she proceeds to obliterate every
trace of his work, and restores the modified forms to the
standard of the typical organism.
Singular to say, our author draws the directly
opposite conclusion from the results of variation by
"artificial selection." On page 292 we find the follow
ing : — " The unquestionable facts, therefore, as to the
production of our domesticated breeds of animals from
wild species by means of ' artificial selection,' afford a
strong presumption in favour of the theory that our
existing wild species have been produced by the
modification of pre-existing wild species through the
operation of natural selection." If the reader will
simply emphasise the terms " breeds " and " species " in
this statement, he will be in a position to judge of the
legitimacy of this marvellous inference. Our author
here assumes that a process which produces a new
"breed" might produce a new "species," and that
" natural selection " may have been as efficient in
specific modification as •' artificial selection " has been.
But, in the first place, it is one thing to produce a new
" breed," and a very different thing to produce a new
" species," for a " breed " is not a " species." And, in
the second place, as " natural selection " is but another
name for the operation of nature upon living organisms,
we are not left to conjecture what it may achieve, for,

NATURAL SELECTION A FOE TO ARTIFICIAL. 309
as evolutionists themselves admit, and as has been
already stated, nature operates to the restoration of
the original type. In a word, the argument in support
of "natural selection" from "artificial selection" not
only breaks down, but is absolutely negatived by the
fact that " natural selection " is the avowed enemy of
" artificial selection." The author, it is true, tries to
eke out this argument by a draft upon infinity, claiming
for the operation of •' natural selection " " an infinitely
longer period," and "methods more subtle and far-
reaching," but it is difficult to see how this helps to
fortify his position. If the fact must be admitted, that
Nature, with her forces, whether ' subtle ' or otherwise,
operates to the restoration of varieties to the original
types, it is idle to argue that by " operating through an
infinitely longer period " she will at length neutralise
her own handiwork, and subvert the type she had been
endeavouring to protect.
The facts for and against the immutability of species,
given in his Elementary Text-Book of Zoology, by Dr.
C. Claus, of the University of Vienna (translated), 1884,
do not invalidate the position taken in this review.
On p. 142 we have the following: —
" It is a commonly known fact that animals which belong
to different species pair with one another, and produce
hybrids — e.g. horse and ass, wolf and dog, fox and dog.
Widely differing species, which are placed in different
genera, have been known to cross with one another, and to
produce progeny, such as the he-goat and sheep, and the she-
goat and ibex. The hybrids, however, are as a rule sterile.

310 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
They are intermediate forms, with imperfect generative
system, without the power of propagation ; and even in
those cases where there is a power of reproduction (such
cases are most frequently met with amongst female hybrids),
there is a tendency to revert to the paternal or maternal
species. There are, however," he alleges, " exceptions to the
steriHty of the hybrid which appear to afford weighty proof
against immutability of species."
In support of this claim, he adduces " experiments in
inbreeding between the hare and rabbit, made on a
large scale in Angouleme by Roux," which have shown
that their progeny, the hare-rabbit, is perfectly fertile
through many generations of inbreeding.
Now, the drawback to the scientific value of these
facts is, that they are the result of man's interference
with the course of nature, and are therefore no index
to what has occurred outside and apart from his agency.
It is true, the author claims that " in a state of nature,
too, hybrids of various kinds are found." He admits,
however, that " such hybrids have frequently been taken
for independent species, and have been described as
such." From all this, the scientific conclusion is that
the course of nature is set against the evolutionary
hypothesis, which rests on the transmutation of species.
It is instructive to observe the way in which Mr.
Darwin tries to meet his opponents when he is pressed
with the fact of hybrid sterility. " To grant to species
the special power of producing hybrids, and then to stop
their further progress by different degrees of sterility,
not strictly related to the facility of the first union

MIVART'S CRITICISM OF DARWIN. 311
between their parents, seems," he says, " a strange
arrangement" (Origin of Species, p. 314). Mivart's
criticism on this deliverance is well merited :—
" This," he says, " only amounts to saying that the author
himself would not have so acted had he been the Creator.
. . . Mr. Darwin says, as to the sterility of species, that the
cause lies exclusively in their sexual constitution ; but all that
need be affirmed is that sterility is brought about somehow,
and it is undeniable that ' crossing ' is checked. All that is
contended for is, that there is a bar to the intermixture of
species, but not of breeds; and if the conditions of the
generative products [powers 1] are that bar, it is enough for
the argument, no special kind of barring action being con
tended for " (p. 125).
In fact, it is only by making drafts upon time, which
may be measured by the '' precession of the equinoxes,"
that these friends can transform a variety into a species.
As one cannot follow them along the aions of this mighty
cycle, to note the progress of the nascent organism
toward maturity, one must be content to deal with the
phenomena. of the organic world as presented in its fossil
remains and in its extant species, and their established
relations to one another.
In the last six pages of his book, our author gives a
fair outline of the arguments advanced in favour of the
doctrine that species have originated by modifications
through descent, and it is but due both to the author
and the doctrine that these arguments be scientifically
examined. The first argument is thus stated : —
"(1.) All the animals belonging to each great primary
division of the animal kingdom are constructed upon one

312 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
fundamental plan, which is capable of endless modification,
but is never lost. Thus, to give one example, the fishes,
amphibians, reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds, which together
constitute the ' sub-kingdom ' of the vertebrate animals, are
built according to one common plan. However unlike they
may be to one another in the details of their organisation,
' homologous ' structures can be traced throughout the ground-
plan of them all. This unity of plan in the types of life
which compose each sub-kingdom is, however, inexplicable
upon any other view than that it is the result of blood-rela
tionship, and depends upon descent from a common ancestor,
which possessed the essential structural characters distinctive
of vertebrates as a whole" (p. 301).
It is very difficult seriously to address one's-self to
the exposure of this palpable fallacy. Its major premiss
is a groundless assumption. The ground taken is that
all organisms constructed upon one fundamental plan,
however unlike in the details of their organisations,
must have descended from a common ancestor through
the channel of flesh and blood ! That is, unity of
ground-plan necessarily implies unity of ancestry !
These friends talk of " sports " in nature, but we have
here a "sport" in logic of their own manufacture.
Whence have they imported this abnormal major pre
miss ? Is it an axiomatic truth, admitting of no dispute,
that organisations built upon one ground-plan, however
diverse in structural detail, present a scientific problem,
inexplicable on any other view than that of descent
from a common ancestor ? There can be no question
that in this argument, if assertion may be called argu
ment, it is stated as an axiom to which assent is to be

INSTANCE OF A FALSE POSTULATE. 313
given, as to a first principle or primary truth. Suppose
we substitute for a common ancestor a common Author,
who has modified the ground-plan to suit the intended
habitats of the organisms, is the community of ground-
plan not fairly accounted for ? This postulate has this
to recommend it, in opposition to its evolutionary rival,
that it has not to encounter, as that postulate has, all
the natural laws which combine to maintain, in their
specific, typical integrity, the various forms of the
animal kingdom in its sub-divisions, despite the action
of their ever-varying environment. In view of this
fact, it is not too much to claim that the problem pro
pounded by our author here is only scientifically solved
when the postulated evolutionary ancestor gives place
to an antecedent Author, whose original plan is so per
fect in its fundamental structural principles, that He
had not to abandon, but simply to modify them in the
origination of diverse species.
He states the second argument in favour of evolution
as follows : —
" (2.) The animals composing each sub-kingdom are con
structed upon the same plan, and the ' sub-kingdoms,' taken
as a whole, stand therefore separate and apart. But there
exist transitional forms by which one sub-kingdom is linked
with another. Thus the singular marine animals known as
the sea-squirts (Tunicata) form a link between the true
sheU-fish (Mollusca) and the vertebrate animals. In
certain points — namely, in their organisation — they approach
the ordinary shell-fish, while in others they show a
relationship with the lower vertebrates" (pp. 301,
302).

314 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Now the question is, Do these facts furnish a scientific
basis for the evolution hypothesis, that these several
sub-kingdoms sustain to one another a flesh-and-blood
relationship? Does the fact that sea-squirts approach
more closely to the vertebrates than the true shell-fish
do, prove that the Tunicata are passing from the mol
luscous to the vertebrate organic structure ? Here,
again, Dame Fancy has taken the reins from the hands
of reason. These facts warrant no such conclusion as
the evolution hypothesis demands. Until it can be
shown that the Mollusca have, in some instances at
least, made the transition across the gulf which separates
them from the Tunicata, and that these again, encour
aged by their elevation in the organic scale, have
become naturalised in the sub-kingdom of the verte
brates, the essential link in the chain of scientific
evidence is missing. Evolution has no scientific war
rant for pronouncing these forms transitional, or
representing them as links connecting one sub-kingdom
with another. These terms are illegal importations, con
cealing the petitio which evolutionists are ever perpe
trating. The very thing to be proved is assumed in
the use of these terms. Let it first be proved that these
forms are transitional, and that their position in the
finely graduated scale of living organisms is that of
living links in a living chain, and then, but not till
then, may any one who claims scientific standing import
these terms into this controversy.
The next arguments advanced are based upon the
phenomena of embryology, rudimentary organs, and

ARGUMENT FROM EMBRYOLOGY EXAMINED. 315
Palaeontology. The palpable defect in all these is the
one already noted in treating of the preceding two —
they do not present a single instance of an actual transi
tion from one species to another. As a specimen of the
scientific reasoning under Embryology, take the follow
ing : — " It seems impossible to satisfactorily explain the
possession of visceral clefts by mammalian embyro,
except upon the supposition that the Mammals and the
Fishes alike have descended from a common ancestor
in which these structures were present " (p. 302). The
principle here laid down is, that the possession of any
structural peculiarity in common by two existing species
implies descent from a common ancestor. Now, as we
have seen again and again, persistence of type forbids
the recognition of any such doctrine as a biological law.
Besides, it cannot be claimed that there is no other
explanation of these visceral clefts in the mammalian
embryo than the evolutionary one. It may be, for aught
any one knows, that these clefts are necessary to the
particular organism in the embryonic state, with its
fluid environment. At any rate, such an explanation
has some countenance from the nature of the temporary
habitat of the embryo, while the evolutionary solution
of the problem assumes the existence of an anomalous
ancestor capable of originating specific series as diverse
as quadrupeds and fishes !
Another instance of unscientific argumentation occurs
under the head of the argument from rudimentary
organs (p. 303). "The whalebone whales have no
teeth ; but they exist nevertheless in the young animal,

316 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
though they remain buried in the jaw and never cut
the gum. The same is true of the upper front teeth in
Ruminant animals, which also do not cut the gum, and
are therefore of no use to the animal." Such are the
facts ; what is the evolutionary inference ? Let us hear
it. "We should judge that the whalebone whales
were descended from some type of Mammal which pos
sessed teeth in its jaws," and "that the ancestral type
of the Ruminants possessed well-developed front teeth ! "
Such is the inference, but it is an inference for which
there is no scientific warrant in the facts adduced. It
is assumed that these rudimentary teeth, which never
cut the gum, are useless, while for such assumption no
physiological law can be cited. On the contrary,
though they never cut the gum, they serve to strengthen
the gum-wall, and may, through the generation or ex
citation of the saliva, contribute to digestion.
In conclusion, while this book evinces an extensive
acquaintance with the speculations of evolutionists, it
does not impress one with the ability of the author to
estimate these speculations at their proper value. As
we have seen, he accepts, as unquestionable principles,
assumptions which are not only not axiomatic, but
which have no basis in fact, and indorses processes of
reasoning from facts which set the laws of thought at
defiance. But in all this he is not singular. The
speculative system he has espoused is irreconcilable
with a fair analysis of facts, and can be made to wear a
scientific appearance only by illicit deductions and
illogical processes. Despite the efforts of evolutionists,

FINAL ESTIMATE OF THE BOOK. 317
the laws which protect and perpetuate specific distinc
tions remain unrepealed, and Science joins its testi
mony to that of Revelation in condemnation of the
degrading hypothesis that man is the offspring of a
brute.

CHAPTER X.
NATURAL LAW IN THE SPIRITUAL WORLD.*
TEN years ago there issued from the press, under
the joint authorship of two eminent professors of
physical science, a book entitled The Unseen Universe.
The book was designed by its authors to serve as a
scientific contribution to the defence of the doctrine of
immortality, or, at least, of the possibility of life after
death. Its fundamental principle was what is called
"the Scientific principle of Continuity," which, being
interpreted, means that there can be no physical effect
without a physical antecedent. Adhering to this prin
ciple, the authors, while establishing with great ability
the doctrine of the necessity of a living, intelligent
agency as operating in the universe, felt constrained to
take a position inconsistent with the doctrine of creation
ex nihilo,-^ and to deny the possibility of miracles,
including the great final miracle of the resurrection of
the dead. To this they added, most inconsistently, as
a scientific conclusion, that the entire universe must
* From the British and Foreign Evangelical Review, October,
1885. f Unseen Universe, pp. 64, 6a, and 139, 207.
318

OBJECT AND PRINCIPLE OF THE BOOK. 319
become eventually effete — a conclusion irreconcilable
with their recognition of the continued existence and
activity of two agents, the authors of all energy and all
life. Of this book there is now very little heard, although,
at the time of its appearance, it was regarded by many
as a most valuable addition to the Christian defences.
Within the past two years, another book has appeared,
from the pen of a highly esteemed professor in the Free
Church College, Glasgow, entitled Natural Law in the
Spiritual World. Like its predecessor of ten years
ago, this book is intended as a theological apologetic,
and, like it, also takes, as its regulative principle, " the
Principle of Continuity." In point of popularity, this
book has already outstripped The Unseen Universe,
having reached the sixteenth edition, and an issue of
forty-five thousand copies.*
The cause of this very unusual popularity is threefold.
It is due, in part, to the prevalence, among a certain
class of Christian people, of a vague impression that
science and theology have, through the progress of the
former, been brought into all but irreconcilable antag
onism. In the next place, there can be no doubt that
the author's success is owing very much to the grace
and beauty of his style, and the ingenuity displayed in
tracing, with apparent success, resemblances between
the natural and the spiritual, where his readers had
never imagined any resemblance at all, much less
identity, to exist. And, lastly, there can be little doubt
* At present, the editions number twenty-one, and the issue
amounts to seventy-two thousand.

320 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
that the elevated aim of the author, and the fine
Christian spirit in which he has prosecuted his task,
have been important factors in securing for him an
audience which few authors of the present day, who
have treated of the relation of Science to Religion, have
had the good fortune to reach.
The popularity of a book and the aims of its author,
however, are no proof of its inherent worth. Its merits
must be judged of, not only by its spirit, and style, and
aims, and general acceptance, but also by the principles
it propounds in seeking the attainment of its object.
Our author's object is excellent — the removal of the
alleged antagonism already mentioned; but the prin
ciples he avows in seeking it cannot be accepted without
surrendering truths which are as clearly essential to
Science as to Theology. A few sentences from the
preface will show how the author was led to the accept
ance of the fundamental conception of the book, and
may serve to prepare the way for a proper understanding
and estimate of it. On p. vi. of his preface, he says : —
" It has been my privilege for some years to address regu
larly two very different audiences on two very different
themes. On week days, I have lectured to students on the
natural sciences, and on Sundays, to an audience consisting
for the most part of working men, on subjects of a moral and
religious character. I cannot say that this collocation ever
appeared as a difficulty to myself, but to certain of my friends
it was more than a problem. It was solved to me, however,
at first, by what then seemed the necessities of the case — I
must keep the two departments entirely by themselves. They
lay at opposite poles of thought ; and for a time I succeeded

ACCOUNT OF THE GENESIS OF THE THEORY. 321
in keeping the science and the religion shut off from one
another in two separate compartments of my mind. But
gradually the wall of partition showed symptoms of giving
way. The two fountains of knowledge began to overflow,
and finally their waters met and mingled. The great change
was in the compartment which held the religion. It was not
that the well there was dried ; still less that the fermenting
waters were washed away by the flood of science. The actual
contents remained the same. But the crystals of former
doctrine were dissolved ; and as they precipitated themselves
once more in definite forms, I observed that the crystalline
system was changed. New channels also for outward expression
opened and some of the old closed up ; and I found the truth
running out to my audience on the Sundays by the week-day
outlets. In other words the subject-matter religion had
taken on the method of expression of science, and I discovered
myself enunciating spiritual law in the exact terms of biology
and physics '' (Preface, vi. and vii.).
Such is the author's account of the genesis of his
theory ; and of the consequences involved he seems to
have formed a pretty accurate estimate. He saw that the
result reached " was not simply a scientific colouring
given to religion, the mere freshening of the theo
logical air with natural facts and illustrations." On the
contrary, he discovered that " it was an entire recasting
of truth." He saw, or seemed to see, " that it meant
essentially the introduction of natural law into the
spiritual world" (p. viii.). Of such moment is this
discovery, that it is claimed by our author that it will
do for religion what the introduction of law among the
scattered phenomena of Nature has done for science.
The crystallising touch of law is needed in religion, for,

322 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
as yet (of course, up to the time of this discovery), the
phenomena of the spiritual world have been scattered
in wild confusion.
" Can we shut our eyes," he asks, " to the fact that the
religious opinions of mankind are in a state of flux ? And
when we regard the uncertainty of current beliefs, the war of
creeds, the havoc of inevitable as of idle doubt, the reluctant
abandonment of early faith by those who would cherish it
longer if they could, is it not plain that the one thing think
ing men are waiting for is the introduction of law among the
phenomena of the spiritual world 1 When that comes, we
shall offer to such men a truly scientific theology, and the
reign of law will transform the whole spiritual world as it
has already transformed the natural world " (p. ix.).
This discovery had a marvellous effect upon the
author's spiritual world. There seemed to come over
it the beauty of a transfiguration, which he likens to the
change wrought by Newton's discovery upon the chaotic
world of Pythagoras. His spiritual world, he tells us,
was before a chaos of facts; his Theology a Phytha-
gorean system trying to make the best of phenomena
apart from the ideal of law. Such was his own
Theology ; and as he is, and was then, a Professor in
a Free Church College, the Theology, which he tells us
underwent this transfiguration, must have been the
system set forth in the Westminster standards, which is
simply a systematic exhibition of the doctrines of sin
and grace, deduced in accordance with the laws of
thought from the facts of Revelation. It is of this
system of revealed truth, he says, that he saw it to be,

AVOWED RESULTS OF THE THEORY. 323
in many essential respects, centuries behind every
department of Science he knew. It was the one region
still unpossessed by law. He saw then why men of
Science distrust Theology ; why men who have learned
to look upon law as authority grow cold to it — it was
the great exception (Preface, p. x.), and Science can
hear of no great exception (Introduction, p. 18). This,
of course, is a grave conclusion for the Scripture
doctrines of Creation and Redemption. As Professor
Tyndall held, in his inaugural address before the British
Association at its meeting in Belfast, it rules out even
Mr. Darwin's primordial forms ; for, as he said on that
occasion, if you open the door for one interposition of
creative agency, you may throw it open for as many
as you may list. This alleged principle of continuity, as
stated in The Unseen Universe* and indorsed by our
author (Introduction, pp. 17, 18), will brook no pheno
mena " which have no physical relation to anything that
went before or that followed after." To this law there
is to be no exception, either great or small ; and theo
logians who reject this law are guilty of fashioning for
themselves " a universe within a universe, a portion cut
off by an insurmountable barrier from the domain of
scientific enquiry." This principle led the authors of
the book referred to, to reject the Scripture doctrine of
Creation and of the Resurrection of the dead, and to
accept, very largely, in the stead of the latter, the
ravings of Emanuel Swedenborg. It is to be hoped
that the regard which our esteemed author manifests
* Third Edition, p. 61.

324 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
for that erratic speculator will not lead him to
surrender to this materialistic principle of physical
continuity a doctrine which lies at the foundation of
our hope of the Resurrection to Life.
It is not to be wondered at that one holding this
principle as the regulative principle of all Science
should pronounce Theology unscientific and lawless.
A system of Theology based, or constructed, on this
principle would give us the Trinity of The Unseen
Universe, with the Absolute and Unconditioned, as a
substitute for God the Father, and two agents, who can
only reside in and act through matter, one of whom is
the author of energy and the other the author of life,
as substitutes for the Son and Spirit. At least, this is
a portion of the theology which the scientists referred
to, who are not one whit behind our esteemed author
in scientific attainments or logical acumen, have worked
out for us on the lines laid down by the Scientific
Principle of Continuity, which, be it remembered,
means always physical continuity.
It is scarcely necessary, formally, to refute the charge
here preferred against Theology. The principle on
which it proceeds is just as available for an attack
upon a system of mental philosophy, and must, if
courageously applied, reduce both mental philosophy
and Theology to a system of physics. Suffice it to say
that, so long as the laws of mind are not identical with
the laws of matter, the absence of physical laws in a
system of Theology cannot be adduced as evidence of
its unscientific character. The claim of theology to the

CLAIMS OF THEOLOGY TO SCIENTIFIC RANK. 325
rank of a science, and to the rank of the complement
and crown of all the Sciences, seems to be unquestion
able. There is nothing embraced in the conception of
a science that is wanting in theology. The essential
elements of a science are facts and principles, or laws.
The science of Astronomy treats of the masses and
motions of the heavenly bodies, and of their mutual
relations, and the laws according to which their move
ments are regulated. The science of chemistry deals
with the ultimate elements of Matter and with the laws
which govern their combinations. The knowledge of
the man of Science is a knowledge of facts, and their
relations and causes, and it is because such knowledge
embraces these latter elements that it is regarded as
scientific. When it is claimed that Theology is a
science, what is meant is, that the truths regarding God
and the universe, regarding Creation, Providence, and
Redemption, which are revealed in the Bible, are
correlated truths whose mutual relations as parts of
one system can be ascertained and delineated.
In conducting his investigations, the theologian has
the advantage over all other scientific investigators.
Within the domain of Nature the scientist finds very
little save the facts or phenomena, and from these, by
experiment, hypothesis, and verification, he must
deduce the laws by which they are regulated. Prior
to the invention of the telescope, the only hint of an
astronomical system was that given in the movements
of our own satellite, the moon. That instrument,
revealing as it does the lunar systems of other planets,

326 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
presents the astronomer with a system ready-made,
which, though on a limited scale, is a type and
specimen of the plan on which the heavens are built.
In the Bible, however, there are given, not merely
sectional specimens or hints of a plan, but an outline of
the entire system, exhibiting the unfolding of the
Divine purpose in Creation, Providence and Redemp
tion, together with the principles upon which the
Omniscient, Omnipotent, Sovereign Author of the
whole proceeds in the execution of it. As instances of
such outlines, it may suffice, to refer those who accept
the Scriptures as the Word of God, to Rom. viii. 28-30,
and Eph. i. 3-6.
When, therefore, the theologian enters upon the work
of a scientific exhibition of the truths presented in the
Bible, he has not, as the scientist, in dealing with the
facts of Nature, to frame hypotheses, or resort to experi
ments in order to test his d priori conjectures. He
finds, in the one authentic treasury of the truths with
which he has to deal, an authoritative outline of the
system of which these truths constitute the component
elements. This outline is a Divinely revealed outline,
and must, therefore, supersede all human hypotheses.
To this outline all the labours of the theologian must
have reference. To it, as to a Lydian stone, all his
expositions of individual doctrines, and all his attempts
at their harmonious arrangement and adjustment, must
be submitted for approval or rejection. This spirit-
inspired plan must be as truly dominant within its own
sphere as the Newtonian theory is within the domain

PHYSICAL CONTINUITY UNSCIENTIFIC. 327
of Astronomy. To pronounce a system constructed in
harmony with this God-given outline unscientific or
lawless, is certainly not to assume a very reverent
attitude toward the Author of the Economy of
Redemption. He who does so should have higher
credentials to present than those revealed in works
whose ultimate foundation is the so-called "scientific
principle of continuity," a principle which logically
involves the denial of the distinction between Matter
and Mind, of the doctrine of creation, ex nihilo, and of
the doctrine of the Resurrection of the dead. Such
science cannot face the analysis of the crucible, which
reveals the fact that the marks of design are engraven
upon the ultimate elements of matter. So long as the
qualities of the elements of matter, which are in
manifest correlation, are inseparable from their respec
tive essences, the science which denies that they imply
an antecedent, intelligent, omnipotent Author, must be
pronounced as unphilosophical and unscientific as it is
untheological. As this is the outcome of the so-called
scientific principle of continuity, advocated by the
authors of The Unseen Universe, and as this same
principle (not this particular fruit of it) is accepted by
the writer of this book, it is well that we should not be
too ready to accept the transfigured theology he offers as
a substitute for the historic faith of the Church of God.
But the chief corner-stone of the theory propounded
in this book, is its doctrine of the identity of the Laws of
the Natural and Spiritual worlds. What we have here
is not an Irenicum between science and religion, or

328 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
between the laws of the empires of matter and of spirit.
The author will admit of no such distinction as such an
Irenicum would imply. He will not be satisfied with
analogy, or with similarity of rule and administration,
in these two departments. Nothing short of identity
of laws will be accepted by him. The laws he contends
for, as operating in both realms, are one and the same
laws. " Analogous phenomena," he says, " are not the
fruit of parallel laws, but of the same laws — laws
which, at one end, as it were" (a rather indefinite
expression in a scientific discussion), " may be dealing
with matter, at the other with spirit " (Introduction,
p. 11). How the author can speak of laws, to which he
had denied causality, as dealing with either Matter or
Spirit, or as producing phenomenal fruit, is certainly
a mystery. Surely if laws be destitute of causality,
they can produce nothing ; and surely if they possess
causality, and be identical, their fruits of phenomena
must be identical, and not simply analogous.
As a matter of fact, however, our author does not
hold that law sustains any such thing as a causal
relation. On page 5 of his Introduction he repudiates
such relationship : —
"In its true sense," he says, "natural law predicates
nothing of causes. The natural laws originate nothing,
sustain nothing. . . . They are modes of operation, there
fore, not operators; processes, not powers. The law of
gravitation, for instance, speaks to science only of process.
It has no light to offer as to itself. Newton did not
discover gravity, — that is not discovered yet. He discovered

LAW THOUGH NOT CAUSAL IMPLIES A CAUSE. 329
its law, which is gravitation ; but that tells us nothing of its
origin, of its nature, or of its cause."
Now, it is respectfully submitted that there is here
.great confusion' of thought. It is perfectly true, as is
here alleged, that law does not possess any element of
•causality; but it does not follow that it predicates
nothing regarding the operation of a cause. On the
¦contrary, it reveals the existence and operation of a cause,
and informs us, as our author himself tells us, of its
mode of operation. Taking his own illustration — the
law of gravitation — is it not manifest that the law, as
•described by Newton himself, is not separated from the
ideas of cause and effect ? This marvellous generalisa
tion — the grandest ever reached by science — had never
been reached on the principle of such unphilosophic
.severance. His definition of the law carefully preserves
its relation to an operating cause. What else can he
mean when he says : " Every portion of matter in the
universe attracts every other with a force varying
directly as the mass, and inversely as the square of the
distance " ? Such is the law of gravitation as stated by
the discoverer of it ; and the terms in which it is
¦enunciated are such as prove that, in his conception of
it, the law of gravitation is not to be divorced from the
ideas of cause and effect. With Newton, the law of
.gravitation was simply an expression of the mode in
which the force designated by that term operates.
¦Our author alleges that the idea of law as order "is
often corrupted by having attached to it erroneous
views of cause and effect;" but, if we are to judge of

330 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Newton's idea of the law of gravitation from his
definition of it, he has subjected himself to this charge
•by placing the law in the most intimate relation to this
corrupting influence. As a philosopher, however, he
could not do otherwise. As a law of operation implies
an operator, as action implies an actor, the mode in
which the operator operates, or the actor acts, is simply
the mode in which causal efficiency is exerted ; and the
mode will always be determined by the nature of the
agent. The foundation of the law is to be found in the
qualities of the subject whose mode of action has its
expression in the law. In giving being to matter, the
Creator gave it qualities ; for without qualities there
can be no entity ; and the qualities with which it was
originally endowed, determined the laws of its activities,
whether molecular or obicular. It is because matter
possesses the qualities it does possess that the law of
gravitation is what it is. Change the qualities and
you change the law ; annihilate the qualities and you
annihilate the law. This dependence of mode of action
upon inherent subjective qualities is manifested in the
diversity of laws which govern the combinations of the
laboratory. The law that governs the action of oxygen
is diverse from that which governs the action of
hydrogen, &c. This diversity of law arises from the
diversity of the qualities of the ultimate elements of
matter, and points to the conclusion that identity of
law implies identity of substance, and diversity of law
diversity of substance.
This is a scientific truth, and its bearing upon our

DIVERSITY OF LAWS IN THE SPHERE OF MATTER. 331
author's theory is obvious. While he contends for the
identity of the laws by which both the natural and the
spiritual worlds are governed, and teaches (Introduction
p. 52) "that the greatest among the theological laws
are the laws of nature in disguise," the testimony of
that science which treats of the ultimate elements of
Matter is that the laws by which Matter is governed
are as diverse as are these ultimate elements them
selves. Indeed, both our author himself and Mr.
Hutton, whose authority he has invoked, may be
adduced as witnesses against the doctrine of legal
identity within diverse departments of Matter. As
quoted (Introduction, pp. 21, 22), Mr. Hutton says : —
" Any attempt to merge the distinctive characteristic of a
higher science in a lower — of chemical changes in mechanical
—of physiological in chemical — above all, of mental changes
in physiological — is a neglect of the radical assumption of all
science, because it is an attempt to deduce representations —
or rather misrepresentations — of one kind of phenomena
from a conception of another kind which does not contain it,
and must have it implicitly and illicitly smuggled in before
it can be extracted out of it. Hence, instead of increasing
our means of representing the universe to ourselves without
the detailed examination of particulars, such a procedure
leads to misconstruction of fact on the basis of an imported
theory, and generally ends in forcibly perverting the least-
known science to the type of the better known."
With the greatest complacency, and with the utter
absence of all suspicion of its bearing upon this theory,
our author accepts this truly philosophic utterance of
Mr. Hutton 's : —

332 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
" What is wanted," he says, " is simply a unity of concep
tion, but not such a unity of conception as should be founded
on an absolute identity of phenomena. This latter might
indeed be a unity, but it would be a very tame one. The
perfection of unity is attained where there is infinite variety
of phenomena, infinite complexity of relation, but great sim
plicity of law. Science wiU be complete when all known
phenomena can be arranged in one vast circle in wliich a few
weU-known laws shall form the radii — these radii at once
separating and uniting, separating into particular groups, yet
uniting aU to a common centre. To show that the radii, for •
some of the most characteristic phenomena of the spiritual
world, are already drawn within that circle by science, is the
main object of the papers which follow" (Introduction,
pp. 22, 23).
A reference to the above quotation will satisfy any
competent mind that what is proposed in this popular
book is the very thing against which Mr, Hutton has
entered his vigorous scientific protest. While Mr.
Hutton will admit of no attempt to merge the distinc
tive characteristic of a higher science in a lower, of
chemical changes in mechanical, of physiological in
chemical, and, above all, repudiates the merging of
mental changes in physiological, as has been done by
Bain, Prof. Drummond cites him in support of a theory
that would merge the highest of all the sciences, —
the science of Theology, both Natural and Revealed, —
in the economy of nature, and would identify its laws
with the laws of the organic and inorganic worlds. It
is true, he does not contend for " an absolute identity of
phenomena." His theory seeks a unity where there is
infinite variety of phenomena, infinite complexity of

DIVERSITY OF PHENOMENA, DIVERSITY OF LAW. 333
relation, "but great simplicity of law." But, while he
seems to agree with Mr. Hutton regarding the dis
tinctions which must ever characterise different kinds
of phenomena, he will insist that, despite such diversity,
there must be identity of laws. With Mr. Hutton,
however, diversity of phenomena implies diversity of
science, and as science implies law, diverse phenomena
cannot be referred to the same law.
In a word, while our author would introduce the laws
of the natural world into the spiritual, science teaches
that no one law pertaining to any one department of
the natural can be introduced into any other. It is
just as true that all laws are not the same law, as it is
that " all flesh is not the same flesh," or that all kinds
of Matter are not the same kind. And it is only by
overlooking distinctions which are essential to a scien
tific investigation of phenomena, that one can bring
himself to look upon the phenomena of Matter and
Spirit as under the regimen of identical laws. If such
a generalisation has any meaning at all that can be
accepted as true, it must be that both Matter and Spirit
are under law.
Now, if, as has been already shown, identity of law
implies identity of substance, it must follow that if
there be but one set of laws in the universe, which are
all identical, there can be only one substance in the
universe. This conclusion cannot be evaded if the
premiss be admitted. That inexorable law which
governs thought will compel him who holds this premiss
to accept this conclusion ; and it is only by a process

334 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
of inaccurate thinking that any one can conclude, from
such a premiss, that this substance, with which the one
set of identical laws deals, consists of" matter at the one
end, and spirit at the other." If the law be the same
at both ends, the substance with which it deals must
be the same at both ends ; otherwise the causal relation
which obtains between law and the qualities of the
subject, whose mode of action it expresses, can have no
existence. It is only by overlooking, or by reversing,
this relation between the law and the nature of the
substance with which it deals, that one can hold that,
while its two ends are diverse, the laws of their
activities are identical. So long as the qualities or
attributes of any substance, whether material or spirit
ual, determine the law of its activities, so long must
genuine Science reject the doctrine that diverse
substances can be governed by one and the same law.
This one scientific principle is fatal to the entire
theory of this popular book, as it is subversive of the
theory of Evolution and the so-called Scientific Prin
ciple of Continuity, on which it proceeds. On no
principle known to science, or conceivable even by
" the scientific imagination," can there be evolved, out
of the same subject, the essentially diverse phenomena
of matter and spirit ; and on no principle known to
philosophy, or admissible by common sense, can there
be devised a law which shall give expression to the
modes in which these essentially diverse substances act.
It is just as true of the notion law as it is of any other
notion, that the greater its extension, the less its

MONISM OR NONENTITY THE SOLE ALTERNATIVE. 335
comprehension; and the greater its comprehension the
less its extension. By a negation or curtailment of
qualities or attributes, one may rise from the notion of
the individual to that of the class to which it belongs ;
and, prosecuting the process of disrobement, may
ascend from the class to a generalisation which shall
embrace all classes of being in the universe. He would
not, however, be entitled to rank very high as a
philosopher, who, having reached this ultimate goal of
abstraction, or negation of attributes, would turn round
and ascribe to this notion of being all the qualities or
attributes of which he had just divested the notions
embraced under its wide comprehension. Now, this is
exactly what our author has done in his treatment of
the notions of matter, spirit, and law. Losing sight of
the attributes and qualities by which matter and spirit
are distinguished from each other, he has placed them in
the one class, and made proclamation that they are under
the same law. But, as the two notions, Matter and
Spirit, with which he was dealing, embrace all classes
of being in the universe, the notion under which he has
grouped them can be no other than being conceived
as divested of everything save a nominalistic existence ;
and where pure being is the nomen, such existence
is simply nonentity. A concept which embraces "Matter
at the one end, and Spirit at the other," admits of no
other predicate, and, eschewing all qualities and attri
butes, rules itself out of the empire of all law, whether
natural or spiritual ; and a law which is equally
applicable to, and predicable of, the modes in which the

336 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
two ends of this universal concept act, must be as
destitute of all the attributes of law as the concept
itself is destitute of all the distinctive characteristics of
Matter or of Mind. How it was that such a law,
generalised out of all legal existence, managed to
transfigure our author's Theology is certainly " more
than a problem ; '' and how the introduction of this
shadowy unreality into the domain of Theology is
to revolutionise that Science, and recast all Creeds,
purging them of adulterations, and, as an umpire,
sitting in judgment on their respective claims, decide
all controversy, one is at a loss even to imagine. The
barrier in the way of the claim to such high preroga
tives is presented in the scientific truth that law is
correlative to qualities or attributes, and where, as in
the case in question, the notion has been divested of
all attributes, the law must have been divested of
all existence, and reduced to an absolute nonentity.
It is worthy of note that two of the scientists to
whose authority our author very often refers, repudiate
this doctrine of legal continuity. Mr. Herbert Spencer,
to whose speculations he would conform the most vital
truths of Christianity, will have none of it. The
following passage will show what he thinks of it : —
" While, under its objective aspect, psychology is to be
classed as one of the concrete sciences which successively
decrease in scope as they increase in speciality ; under its
subjective aspect psychology is a totally unique science,
independent of, and antithetically opposed to, all other
sciences whatever. The thoughts and feelings which

GULF UNBRIDGED BY SPENCER AND TYNDALL. 337
constitute a consciousness, and are absolutely inaccessible to
any but the possessor of that consciousness, form an exist
ence that has no place among the existences with which the
rest of the sciences deal. Though accumulated observations
and experiments have led us by a very indirect series of infer
ences (sec. 41) to the belief that mind and nervous action are
the subjective and objective faces of the same thing, we remain
utterly incapable of seeing, and even imagining, how the two
are related. Mind still continues, to us a something without any
kinship to other things ; and from the science which discovers
by introspection the laws of this something, there is no passage
by transitional steps to the sciences which discover the law of
these other things" (Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 140).
In this verdict Dr. Tyndall concurs : —
"Associated with this wonderful mechanism of the animal
body," he says, " we have phenomena no less certain than
those of physics, but between which and the mechanism
we discern no necessary connection. A man, for example,
can say, ' I feel,' ' I think,' ' I love ; ' but how does
consciousness infuse itself into the problem? . . . The
passage from the physics of the brain to the correspond
ing facts of consciousness is inconceivable as a result of
mechanics. Granted that a definite thought and a definite
molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously, we do
not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudi
ment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a
process of reasoning, from the one to the other. They appear
together, but we do not know why. Were our minds and
senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated as to
enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain ;
were we capable of following all their motions, all their
groupings, all their electric discharges, if such there be ; and
were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states
of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the
z

338 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
solution of the problem—' How are these physical processes
connected with the facts of consciousness?' The chasm
between the two classes of phenomena would still remain
inteUectually impassable " (Fragments of Science, ii. 85-87).
It is no wonder that the author of these Fragments,
when professing " to discern in matter the promise and
potency of every form and quality of life," felt con
strained to confess that it was only by prolonging his
vision backward across the boundary of the experi
mental evidence he had gained such insight into the
potency of matter. Returning to his own proper
sphere, this able experimentalist is of a different
mind, and takes his stand beside Mr. Spencer in
pronouncing the chasm which separates the phenomena
of Mind from the phenomena of Matter impassable by
any mechanical apparatus, or by any process of thought.
To these testimonies may be added the testimonies
of Huxley, Stirling, the Encyclopcedia Britannica,
Virchow, and the authors of The Unseen Universe,
quoted on pp. 69, 70.
Tried by his own scientific authorities, then, our
author's theory is condemned. Into the empire of mind
they will not allow him to project his lines of physical
law. However potent his law may be to deal with
both ends of that incongruous entity which exhibits
Matter at one pole and Mind at the other, it cannot, if
we are to credit these scientists, carry on its dualistic
¦operations on both sides of this impassable gulf. From
the theological adjustments he has attempted in this
book, it is manifest that Mr. Spencer is one of the

THEOLOGY SAID TO BE HITHERTO ANOMALOUS. 339
scientists whom it is his aim to conciliate ; but from
the foregoing deliverance, in which psychology is
pronounced an altogether unique science, with no kin
ship to any other, it must be obvious that Mr. Spencer
is not likely to acknowledge that our author has
obliterated a distinction so emphatically pronounced,
and succeeded in throwing lines of law across a chasm
impassable by thought. So far as science is concerned,
it is to be feared that our author has laboured in vain,
and spent his strength for nought.
But let us consider the author's allegation regarding
the present state of Theology. " The spiritual world,"
he says (Introduction, p. 17), "as it appears at this
moment, is outside natural law. Theology continues
to be considered, as it has always been, a thing apart.
It remains still a stupendous and splendid construction,
but on lines altogether its own." This he regards as in
harmony with the nature of the case; for, "as the
highest of the sciences, Theology in the order of
evolution should be the last to fall into rank."
Now it is perfectly true, as is here alleged, that up to
the present time natural law, in the sense of physical
law, has not been introduced into Theology, and that
this Science has been constructed on lines of its own,
and that it has never recognised the right of any one
to extend " the great lines of natural laws " into the
spiritual sphere. It does not follow, however, that
Theology is exposed to the charge of teaching, as our
author alleges, that the lines of law " stop with what we
call the natural sphere," or " that the Hand which ruled

340 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
them gave up the work where most of all they were
required," or that " that Hand divided the world into
two, a kosmos and a chaos, the higher being the chaos."
Had the " Hand " that ruled these lines of law within
the sphere of the physical proceeded, as our author and
the authors of The Unseen Universe would counsel, on
the Principle of Continuity, which will admit of no break
between the material and the spiritual, and carried out
the lines by which the former was rendered a kosmos
into the latter, there had been involved a chaos indeed.
Recognising the existence of a break — an impassable
gulf — between matter and spirit, which the Principle of
Continuity has not been able to bridge, Theology claims,
and claims scientifically, that there is a corresponding
break in the lines of law by which the two domains are
governed. It denies that moral agents can be ruled by
mere physical law, and remain free agents, and it pro
ceeds upon the assumption that the Hand which drew
within the realm of Matter the lines of physical law,
traced, within the sphere of the Spiritual, a law as
diverse from the physical as Spirit is from Matter. On
these lines all God's dealings with moral agents have been
conducted, whether under the covenant of Works or
the covenant of Redemption, and Theology is but the
scientific exhibition of what we know of these economies.
Both economies have as their ruling principle the Moral
law. Under that law man was created, under it he
sinned, and from its awful penalty he has been redeemed
by the adorable Surety, who, through the matchless grace
of God, was made of a woman and made under the law ;

ECONOMY OF GRACE REGULATED BY LAW. 341
and the proximate design of this redemption is, " that
the righteousness of this same law might be fulfilled in
us who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit."
This correlation of the economy of redemption to the
moral law is very beautifully symbolised in the typical
dispensation instituted under the hand of Moses, by
the place assigned to the tables of stone on which the
Ten Commandments were written. The Ark of the
covenant in which they were kept was placed in the
Holy of holies, and its lid, sprinkled with atoning blood,
furnished the mercy-seat from which their covenant
God held communion with Israel through a typical
mediator. It is unnecessary to say that the New Tes
tament revelation advances the claim that in Christ
and His work this typical representation has had its
fulfilment. Its central doctrine is that God has set Him
forth a mercy-seat (IXao-rrfpiov) through faith in His
blood, to declare His righteousness in the administration
of grace under both dispensations. The New Testament
declares that Christ is the end of the law for righteous
ness to every one that believeth, and it is careful to
guard against the inference that by such teaching it
makes void the law, and claims that thereby the law is
established. Such is the Theology of the Bible, and it is ethical
from beginning to end; and this fact is sufficient to
prove how unscientific is the apology set up by our
author for a certain class of scientists, on the ground
that they must have law, and not authority, before they
will accept the Gospel. If such an apology means any

342 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
thing, it means that such scientists will receive nothing,
save on the testimony of physical law, and that they
are justified in demanding such evidence on all moral
questions. It is a laudable thing to endeavour to
reconcile these men to Theology, but they are not
likely, as we have already seen, to be won from their
alienation by a theory which reduces Theology to a
physical science, and removes the boundary which
separates Mind from Matter. Success on such lines is
dire defeat, and yields the victory to the foe. It is the
Natal controversy over again, in which the Zulu con
verts the missionary.
But we come now to the experimentum crucis of
this theory. It purposes to carry natural law into the
spiritual world, and must, of course, be content to be
judged by its success. As the law of Biogenesis has
been put forward very prominently, as a specimen
instance of the identity of the laws which bear rule in
the two realms of Matter and Spirit, it may be most
satisfactory to begin with this law. The doctrine of
Biogenesis denies the doctrine of spontaneous genera
tion, and teaches that life springs from antecedent life
— our author says, " from the touch of life." This latter
statement of the case is not scientifically correct. The
life of every living organism originates, not in the touch
of another living organism, but in a living germ, or
life-cell, from which the future organism is developed
and sustained by a continuous process, in which other
similar germs or life-cells are produced. As stated in
Kirke's Handbook of Physiology (by Baker), " the life

THE DOCTRINE OF BIOGENESIS STATED. 343
of individual cells is probably very short, in comparison
with that of the organism they compose, and their con
stant decay and death necessitate constant reproduction.
The mode in which this takes place has long been the
subject of great controversy" (p. 35).
Such is the doctrine of Biogenesis, so far as it needs
to be stated in order to judge of the theory of Regenera
tion which our author has deduced from it ; and the
question is, ' does it express what takes place when a
soul dead in trespasses and sins is gifted with life ? '
It is respectfully submitted that it does not. The
phenomena are not analogous, and the laws are not
identical. The analogy requires the introduction of
a living spiritual germ into the soul of the spiritually
dead sinner, which germ, possessing in embryo all the
faculties and attributes of a distinct individual subsist
ence, shall develop, by continuous alternations of
reproduction and decay, an independent personality.
This organic spiritual germ, thus introduced and
developed into spiritual manhood, could not, however,
by any process of accurate thinking, be identified with
the moral agent into whose soul it was conveyed. All
that could be said would be, that it had its habitat
within him. The analogy, fairly carried out, would
represent the new spiritual germ, not as imparting to
the spiritually dead soul new spiritual life, but as appro
priating to itself the elements of its environment, and
promoting, by the processes of reproduction and decay
of similar germs, the growth and sustenance of a distinct
spiritual organism.

344 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
This is no strained reductio. In justification of it,
appeal may be made to both realms of organic nature.
Nature furnishes no instance of a germ, or life-cell,
introduced into any organism, of any order, for the
purpose of imparting life to it. In every instance the
organism to which the germ, or life-cell, gives birth,
maintains its distinct individuality, and develops by
drawing upon the resources of its temporary abode.
If then, as our author teaches, the Christian, as dis
tinguished from the Moralist, " is an organism in the
centre of which is planted by the living God a living
germ " (p. 128) — •" a germ of the Christ-life, which must
unfold into a Christ" (p. 129) — it must follow, on the
lines of this spiritual Biogenesis, that what takes place
is not the vitalisation of the old dead organism, but the
development, or, as our author puts it, the unfolding of
the new Christ-germ into " a Christ." This is certainly
a " putting off of the old man " with an emphasis. It is
a process whereby the man himself, in his own proper
personality, is put off, and another personal entity takes
his place — a process in which the sinner is not saved,
but superseded.
If any one seeks further argument, let him open Dr.
Lionel Beale's truly scientific work on Bioplasm, and
study those graphic plates whereon he has portrayed
the growth of the life-cells which constitute a living
organism, as they spring into existence, reproduce
kindred cells, wax old, and then vanish awaj'. A
careful study of that invaluable work will teach him
that the natural Biogenesis knows nothing of life origin-

THEORY IMPLIES IMPARTATION OF DIVINE ESSENCE. 345
ating in what Professor Drummond describes as " the
touch of life." He will find there a demonstration,
worked out by the aid of the microscope, of the fact
that every living organism originates in a cell filled
with living " germinal matter ;" and he will have
delineated before his eyes the processes of reproduction
and decay by which the organism is developed and
sustained. He will be satisfied that the law, which has
its expression in the phrase, " omnis cellula e cellula,"
is fundamental in physiology- — that every cell springs
from some pre-existing mother-cell, and that it proceeds
from its predecessor, not simply "by the touch of life,"
but by a process which, according to the nature of the
organism, is described by the terms " gemmation," or
" fission," or " segmentation." In every case the new
cell is originated by the communication of living
"germinal matter" from its immediate parental cell.
Does it require any formal argumentation to prove that
such vital processes bear no analogy to the vitalisation
of an immortal spirit by the life-giving energy of the
Holy Ghost ?
Reverence for the august Agent, by whose " touch "
omnipotent the spiritually dead soul is gifted with life,
who cannot impart to any finite being a portion of His
own ineffable essence, and regard for the science of
Mind, which proceeds upon the assumption that the
soul is not an organic structure, built up out of groups
of spiritual germs, but an indivisible spiritual essence,
incapable of " gemmation," or " fission," or " segmenta
tion," forbid any attempt to enter upon a detailed

346 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
refutation. The law which bears sway within the
sphere of the natural Biogenesis, as described by those
who are entitled to speak with authority upon the sub
ject, cannot, with any proper regard either to Science
or Theology, be represented as identical with the law
which reigns over the genesis and development of
spiritual life in the soul of man.
The next illustrative instance adduced in support of
this theory is the law of " degeneration," or " the prin
ciple of reversion to type." According to this law, a
flock of tame pigeons, distinguished by all the infinite
ornamentations of the race, with every shade of colour,
and adorned with every variety of marking, if allowed
to fly off wild into the woods of an uninhabited island,
will, after the lapse of many years, be succeeded by
descendants which have all become changed into the
same colour — a dark slaty-blue : —
" All the beautiful colours, all the graces of form, it may
be, have disappeared. These improvements were the result
of care and nurture, of domestication, of civiHsation ; and now
that these influences are removed, the birds themselves undo
the past, and lose what they had gained. The attempt to
elevate the race has been mysteriously thwarted. It is as if
the original bird, the far remote ancestor of all doves, had
been blue, and these had been compeUed by some strange
law to discard the badges of their civilisation and conform to
the ruder image of the first. The natural law by which such
a change occurs is called ' The Principle of Reversion to
Type'" (pp. 97, 98).
" This law,'' we are informed, " holds sway throughout the
realms of vegetable and animal life, including Man. Nature

INSTANCE OF DEGENERATION BY REVERSION TO TYPE. 347
knows him simply as an animal. . . . Three possibilities,
according to science, are open to all living organisms —
Balance, Evolution, Degeneration. . . . The life of Balance
is difficult. It lies on the verge of continual temptation, its
perpetual adjustments become fatiguing, its measured virtue
is monotonous and uninspiring. More difficult still appar
ently is the life of ever upward growth. Degeneration is
easy, and because of an innate degenerate principle, the
majority of men adopt it, and are thus impelled, with irresist
ible force, toward a lower type" (pp. 100, 101).
Referring to the chief instance cited above — the
reversion of cultured pigeons to the original type — we
must, of course, regard the cultured pigeons as repre
senting Man in this estate of Balance, or as somewhat
advanced by Evolution, and must consider " the original
bird, the far remote ancestor of all doves," as represent
ing the first man, Adam, the father of us all. The
result of this complimentary analogy is not far to seek-
As it is only by a process of degeneration that the doves
can " undo the past, lose what they have gained," and
revert to the type of their rude, dark slaty-blue ancestor,
so must it be, if the analogy be valid, with Man.
Reversion to the type of the first man is degeneration !
In this case, as in the former, both the Science and
the Theology of our author are at fault. Reversion in
the case of the pigeons is not degeneration. The
original dark, slaty-blue ancestor of all doves, to the
type of which the speckled, spotted, and streaked
children of domestication revert, would, in every quality
which enters into the make of a bird of vigour and

348 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
power of flight, compare most favourably with any
specimen which the pigeon-fancier can produce. No
variety originated in the dove-cotes of the most skilful
manipulator will compare, in power of pinion, with the
untutored offspring of the forests of America, or our
own native wood-pigeons, which have maintained, with
irrepressible persistency, their adherence to the original
type. And as it has been in this instance, so, if we are
to credit the testimony of the rocks, has it been in every
other instance throughout the wide domain of earth's
fauna. The noblest specimens of the species are to be
found in the vanguard of the host as it announces its
entrance upon the theatre of life. The record reveals
degeneracy, but it is not of the reversionary type. It
is a degeneration such as our author himself describes
(p. 99), where, through neglect of the body, the man
" deteriorates into a wild and bestial savage, like the
dehumanised men who are sometimes discovered upon
desert islands." Of no other species of "degeneration ''
is there one jot or tittle of evidence among either the
living or the entombed fauna of our world. In a word,
the only degeneration known to science consists, not in
" reversion to type," but in deviation from it. It is this
species of degeneration, and not degeneration by " rever
sion to type," that is illustrated by the case of the blind
inhabitants of the waters of the Mammoth Cave, Ken
tucky, instanced by our author (pp. 113-115). Neither
the blind Crustacea of that Cave, nor the blind perch
found therein, are degenerating by " reversion to type."
The type is on exhibition in the rivers of the neighbour-

THEORY TESTED BY MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE. 349
hood in full possession of eyes, and as keen of vision, as
any individuals of the species.
But passing from the Science on which this theory
is built, let us examine the claims of its Theology.
What does the Bible say of this scheme of "Balance,
Evolution, Degeneration " ? Is this estate of Balance
the estate of the human race as men, individually,
enter now upon their earthly history ? or is it the
estate in which the first Man began his momentous
career ? It cannot be the former if we are to accept
the testimony of Scripture, which represents men as
being by nature children of wrath — a representation in
perfect accordance with the facts of the case as revealed
in the history of the race, and implying, not balance,
but degeneration, at the outset. Nor can this estate of
balance be regarded as the estate in which Adam was
created, for Man was not created in a state of moral
equilibrium, without any bias toward good or evil, but
in the image of God, in knowledge, righteousness, and
holiness. An estate of moral balance in a moral agent
is a moral impossibility. Nq one, save a Pelagian,
could accept this balance theory. It is neither in
accordance with the teaching of Scripture, nor with the
principles of sound moral philosophy.
In fact, our author himself (p. 101), completely
subverts this moral balance element of his theory, for
in accounting for the adoption of the pathway of
" degeneration " by " the majority of men," he ascribes
the choice to the fact that already in each man's
nature this principle is supreme. He feels within his

350 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
soul a silent drifting motion impelling him downward
with irresistible force. Instead of aspiring to a higher
type, he submits by a law of his nature to reversion to
a lower. As such is the law of "each man's nature,"
all men, and not simply the majority, must be in this
estate as they enter upon their earthly course. If so,
how can it be said (p. 100), that either balance, or
evolution to a higher type, is among " the possibilities
of life " open to the human race. If moral character
attaches to subjective estates and principles, a moral
agent under the "supremacy" of this principle is already,
prior to his adopting the third possibility sketched
by our author, a degraded, degenerate moral being, and
nothing but the grace of God can open up to him the
possibility of a life of either balance or evolution.
Moreover, as this estate of degradation is an estate of
spiritual death, it must be the wages of sin (Rom. v.
21), and, as it is antecedent to any transgression on the
part of the individual subjects of it, being "a law of
each man's nature," the sin of which it is the penalty,
must have been committed by some one else, who
sustained to all the relation of a federal head and legal
representative, whose offence has thereby become the
judicial ground of this dread penal infliction.
In brief, it is impossible to reconcile the Theology of
this chapter on degeneration with the Scriptural
account of the original estate and subsequent fall of
Man. Only on the assumption that Man was not
created in a state of moral perfection, can reversion to
the original type of humanity be pronounced degenera-

THE THEORY UNSUPPORTED BY FACTS. 351
tion ; and only on the assumption that man has not
fallen can it be said that men now enter upon life in a
state of moral balance.
Our author's theory, therefore, has no analogue in
nature, and no warrant in the Word of God. It would
not be degeneration for the varieties of pigeons
produced by domestication (for instance, the yellow-pied
pouter cock, who cannot see over his abnormally
developed craw) to revert to the type of all doves
exhibited in the wood-pigeon; it would not be
degradation for the blind Crustacea or the blind perch
of the Mammoth Cave, to revert to the keen-eyed
types found in the neighbouring rivers ; nor would it
be degeneration for the human race, as we now find it
under the " supremacy " of an evil principle, to revert
to the type of humanity produced by the fiat of the
Almighty when He said, " Let us make man in our
image, after our likeness." The sole basis of this most
unscriptural theory is the unproved hypothesis of
Mr. Darwin, which assumes, without proof, that the
original type of Man was an anthropoid ape, descended,
or ascended, from a primordial form through a series of
transformations worked out on the principle of natural
selection and survival of the fittest. We beg leave to
decline putting Christianity on trial at the bar of an
unproved degrading hypothesis.
The chapter on Growth merits but little attention.
From the parable of the lilies in the Sermon on the
Mount, the inference is drawn that Christians grow as
the lilies grow, " automatically, spontaneously, without

352 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
fretting, without thinking." Such is the law, not only
for the vegetable kingdom, but for the bodies and souls
of men. " One would never think of telling a boy to
grow." Physicians have no prescriptions for bodily
growth, and spiritual physicians, who understand their
vocation, have no prescriptions for spiritual growth. "To
try to make a thing grow is as absurd as to help the
tide to come in or the sun to rise." Those "who attempt
sanctification by struggle, instead of sanctification by
faith, might be spared much humiliation by learning
the botany of the Sermon on the Mount" (pp. 123-26).
This is a specimen of our author's transfigured
Theology ; and certainly if his former views were of the
Calvinistic type, the term transfiguration is not inap
propriate as a designation of the change. The old
Theology represented man as passive in regeneration,
but actively co-operating in sanctification ; but according
to this theory he is passive in sanctification as well.
To this conclusion he has been brought by transforming
figure into literality, and analogy into identity. A little
reflection might have shown him that neither the lily
nor the boy furnishes, in all points, a parallel to the
growth of the Christian. Of this he has given a very
striking proof where he speaks of " sanctification by
faith, instead of sanctification by struggle." The analogy
of the lilies will not admit of faith as a factor, for it is
just as true of the lilies that they grow without faith,
as that they grow without fret or struggle. There is,
besides, this fatal objection to the application of the
parable, as eked out by the case of the boy, to spiritual

SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF SPIRITUAL GROWTH. 353
growth, that neither the lily nor the boy is conscious of
a conflict between a principle of growth and a principle
of decay. Every Christian, however, who is really
growing, is sadly and painfully conscious of such anta
gonism. The experience implied in this theory is very
different from that described in the Word of God. Even
an Apostle found another law in his members warring
against the law of his mind, and bringing him into
captivity to the law of sin, which was in his members
(Rom. vii. 23). The doctrine of Scripture on this sub
ject is, that " the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and
the spirit against the flesh," and that " these are con
trary the one to the other," and so contrary " that we
may not do the things that we would " (Gal. v. 17).
The doctrine which leaves effort and struggle out of the
process of Christian growth, is widely diverse from the
doctrine and the experience described in the Epistle to
the Philippians (chap. iii. 13, 14), where the Apostle
speaks of himself as " forgetting the things which are
behind, and stretching forward to the things which are
before," and as pressing on toward the goal unto " the
prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." This
was Paul's method of growing up toward the goal of
conformity to the image of Christ, and he lays it down
in the very next verse as the rule even for those who
had made the greatest progress toward perfection.
Indeed, one feels inclined to apologise for attempting
a formal refutation of a theory which, if it means any
thing intelligible, involves the denial of all that the
Scriptures teach, and all that Christian experience
r 2a

354 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
reveals, regarding the Christian conflict. The conditions
under which this warfare is waged, and during the
progress of which, and by the instrumentality of which,
the believer grows in grace, are such as to imply a
constant struggle with foes within and foes without.
The old man with his deeds is not to be put off so
easily; nor are Satan and the powers of darkness,
against whom the believer has to wrestle, to be foiled
without a struggle, into which there enter the entire
¦energies of the new nature. The theory may represent
sanctification by faith as the antithesis of sanctification
by struggle, but the rule of the conflict recognises no
such antagonism. Faith and struggle are inseparable
in the experience of the Christian warrior. It is because
of the relationship of this grace to the effort that faith
is represented as a part of the Christian's armour, as a
shield whereby he is " to quench all the fiery darts of the
wicked" (Eph. vi. 16). The faith which the believer
is to take up and use as an instrument of defence, will
not permit him who employs it to sit at ease, while the
adversary is hurling against him his " fiery darts." The
antithesis, therefore, is not between faith and struggle,
but between the Apostle's account of the Christian
warfare and our author's theory of an estate of mystical,
spiritual, lily-like quiescence, in which he is simply "to
allow grace to play over him" (p. 139); and in which
he has no more to do with his growth than he has with
the flow of the tide, or the rising of the sun (p. 1 27).
But our author ekes out the " botany of the Sermon
on the Mount" by a contribution from physiological

INFERENCE FROM GOD'S WORKING IN US. 355
development. " One," he says (p. 126), " would never
think of telling a boy to grow," from which we are to
infer that it is wrong to tell Christians to grow. Per
haps it was owing to Peter's ignorance of " the botany
of the Sermon on the Mount," or the law of physiological
development, that he issued a command to Christians
" to grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord
and Saviour Jesus Christ " (2 Pet. iii. 18). At any
rate, his instruction to those who had obtained like
precious faith with himself, is very different from the
lesson drawn from that sermon in this chapter on
" Growth." In a word, it is only by overlooking the current and
constant representations of Scripture, and its explicit
statements on the point at issue, that any case can, with
any appearance of plausibility, be made out for this
theory of " growth." There is one attempt to find a
foothold for it in Scripture, which must not be passed
over without remark. The writer claims support for it
from Philippians ii. 12, 13, singling out that part of the
passage which speaks of God working in us both to will
and to do of His good pleasure, and leaving out alto
gether the clause in which the Apostle calls upon
Christians to work out (Karepyd^ecrOe, work out thor
oughly) their own salvation with fear and trembling.
The difference between the Apostle's teaching and the
author's inference is, that the Apostle finds in God's
work within us a reason for our working, whilst our
author finds in it a reason for our not working at all,
but sitting still (pp. 135-137).

356 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
In this same chapter there is one of the very best
refutations of the whole theory of the book that can
well be imagined. Pointing out the difference " between
a native growth of Christian principle and the moral
copy of it," the author says "the one is natural, the
other mechanical. The one is a growth, the other an
accretion. Now this," he tells us, " according to modern
Biology, is the fundamental distinction between the
living and the not-living, between an organism and a
crystal. The living organism grows, the dead crystal
increases. The first grows vitally from within, the last
adds new particles from without. The whole difference
between the Christian and the moralist," he informs us,
" lies here. The Christian works from the centre, the
moralist from the circumference. The one is an
organism, in the centre of which is planted by the
living God a living germ. The other is a crystal, very
beautiful it may be, but only a crystal ; it wants the
vital principle of growth " (p. 128).
Regarding this illustration, so often introduced by
our author, suffice it to say, that neither here nor else
where does it help his theory of " natural law in the
spiritual world." On the contrary, instead of helping,
it subverts it ; for it furnishes a scientific demonstration
of the fact, that the law which governs the process of
crystallisation is essentially different from the law which
governs the process of growth in a living organism ;
which is simply saying, in opposition tc the theory, that
the laws in the two cases are not identical. And surely
if the " natural law " which governs the construction of

THEORY REJECTED BY SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY. 357
a crystal cannot extend its sceptre over the humblest
form of organic life, it requires no process of formal
argumentation to satisfy any reasonable mind that it
cannot have any dominion within the sphere of the
spiritual world.
It would seem to be unnecessary to enter at greater
length upon an examination of this book. It cannot
be accepted either by scientists or theologians. No
scientist who recognises the inseparable connection
which obtains between the laws of nature and the
qualities of the substances with which they deal, can
indorse its Science. Nor can it be accepted by either
of the great classes of theologians who represent, re
spectively, the Augustinian, or the semi-Pelagian theory
of the way of salvation. No Calvinist can hold its
spiritual " Biogenesis," which teaches that in the new
birth there is introduced into the soul of the sinner a
living germ, "a Christ-germ, which unfolds into a
Christ." Calvinists are not Plymouthists, and they do
not exalt the new nature into a distinct personality;
nor do they hold that " reversion to the type " of our
first father and federal head would be " degeneration,"
or that he was created, as Pelagians vainly talk, in a
state of "balance," or moral equilibrium, or that his
posterity began life in any such negative moral or
spiritual estate. Nor will they accept the doctrine of
" growth " advocated by the author, believing, as they
do, that while the soul is passive in Regeneration, it is
active in Sanctification. Equally unacceptable must it
be to theologians of the Arminian school, for it leaves

358 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
nothing at all for man to do either before regeneration
or after it. Both Arminians and Calvinists will agree
in rejecting its doctrine of " Conditional Immortality"
—(see on " Eternal Life," pp. 225-231)— a doctrine
held by no Church, and which must be repudiated
by all who have just views of the demerit of sin,
and the great Atonement required for its expiation.
The sole merit of the book is to be found, neither
in its science nor in its " transfigured theology," but in
the stress it lays upon the sinner's misery and utter
helplessness, and his absolute dependence upon the
sovereign grace of God, and the life-giving energy of
the Holy Ghost. The author, in preaching, has
endeavoured to state these truths, as he tells us, in the
language of science, but the great Apostle of the Gen
tiles, in defending his method of preaching (1 Cor. ii.),
expressly declines to give the doctrines of grace a
scientific cast, and will not consent, as the Corinthians
wished, to proclaim the truths of Revelation in "the
words which man's wisdom teacheth." Such was Paul's
homiletics, and the nearer the heralds of redemption
keep to this rule, the less likely are they to be found
" transfiguring " the Pauline Theology.

CHAPTER XI.
UTILITARIANISM.
THE questions connected with the subject here
proposed for discussion, are intimately related to
theology. They are questions which have regard to
the ethical nature of man, and, consequently, to all the
relations founded upon that nature. I am aware that
this reference of the ethical to the theological is
repudiated by some of the ablest of our opponents.
They distinguish between the ethical and the theo
logical, and exclude from the former everything which
savours of the latter. Thus Mr. Bain, in his work on
the Emotions and the Will, commenting on the doctrine
"that the utmost that even a perfect human being
could do is strictly duty, and that, consequently, there
is no such thing as merit," remarks " that such a tenet
is not ethical, but theological. It springs not out of
the relations between man and man, but out of the
relations between man and God " (p. 293).
Against this limitation of the sphere of ethics — this
attempt to divorce ethics from theology — it behoves
the friends both of morality and philosophy to protest.
359

360 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
If it be not in his ethical nature that man wears the
image of God, wherein does that image consist? A
system of ethics moving in the lower sphere of the
relation between man and man, must leave out the
principal ethical phenomena of human nature, and will
be found deficient in the chief motives and sanctions
which influence human conduct. It is only when the
duties which we owe one another are performed as
duties which we owe also to God, that they are rightly
performed. Besides, the views we hold in regard to man's ethical
nature, even as it is manifested in the lower sphere of
the merely human relationship, must determine our
views in regard to some of the fundamental truths of
theology. As a man's views of virtue are, so will his
theology be. He who holds, with the Utilitarians, that
the sole end of human action is happiness, and that the
tendency to promote happiness is the sole and single
test of virtue, will be found, when he passes to the
consideration of the purely theological, to reject the
doctrine of the Atonement as it is revealed in the
Bible, and as it has been held by the Church from the
beginning. If the right and the just be simply correl
ative to happiness, the atonement made by Christ was
simply a revelation of the benevolence of God, and had
no necessary connection with justice and righteousness.
As a matter of fact, it is found that the views which
men entertain in regard to virtue, affect radically their
views on this great vital doctrine of Christianity. A
man might be a Utilitarian of the Paley school, and

THEOLOGICAL BEARING OF ETHICAL THEORIES. 361
hold the Socinian, or the Governmental theory of the
atonement, but he could not be a Utilitarian, and
hold the doctrine of the atonement as held by
Augustinians. I may add that a consistent Utilitarian
of the school of Bain and Mill, who holds that man's
moral nature is really not a nature, but a thing of
acquisition, must reject all true theology, whether
natural or revealed ; for as the theological is correlative
to the moral, there can be no such thing as an objective
theological reality inferred from the nature of man, if
that nature be not essentially ethical. If that by
which man is distinguished as a moral being is a thing
of acquisition, then he is possessed of all that is
essential to his nature prior to the acquisition of that
thing, call it conscience or what we may. In arguing
for the being and attributes of God from the nature of
man, we have no philosophical warrant for arguing
from anything which is not essential to that nature.
We, of course, must take into account the phenomena
of that nature as revealed in the history of the race,
but only as indices of elements radical and essential to
man's nature. If, then, those elements usually termed
moral or ethical, are not essential elements of man's
nature, that nature furnishes no argument for the being
and attributes of our God. It is true there would still
remain, so far as Utilitarianism is concerned, data from
which we might rise to the conception of an infinite
Beinc, possessing intelligence and will ; but as Dr.
M'Cosh has demonstrated in his able Examination of
Mill's Philosophy, this school of philosophers, by reject-

362 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
ing the doctrine of telic causal efficiency, renders the
proof of the existence, even of such a cold unethical,
abstraction, an impossibility. If man's nature is not
essentially moral, it furnishes no warrant for clothing
the great First Cause with those attributes which make
up our conception of infinite moral excellence, and
constitute our God the object of supreme moral
admiration. I refer to this feature of the subject at the outset,
simply to indicate the interests which are at stake, the
issues which are involved in the discussion of the
questions raised by Utilitarianism ; and with this
preliminary statement, I shall, in the first place,
proceed to consider, as against Utilitarianism, the
origin of our moral sentiments.
On this, as on the correlative subject of our idea of
God, there are two theories. 1. That the idea of a
moral law is innate. 2. The Utilitarian theory, that it
is acquired. For the sake of perspicuity, I shall state
what is not meant, as well as what is meant, by the
term innate. When it is said that our idea of moral law
is innate, we do not mean that men are born with the
idea of right and wrong, or with a clear and definite
idea of moral law. Neither is it meant that men are
so constituted that, if left to themselves, they would
invariably arrive at a perfect knowledge .of the one all-
perfect moral standard. By the term innate in this con
nection, we mean to express the idea that man's nature
is a moral nature. More expressly, we mean that the
nature of man is such, that instead of becoming moral,

PALEY S TEST OF THE INTUITIVE THEORY. 363
it reveals itself as a moral nature, invariably developing
a moral standard more or less perfect, and that it is
such that men always recognise the true moral standard
as soon as it is announced in intelligible language.
As a matter of fact, the objections and arguments
of Utilitarians against the ¦doctrine of an innate
moral law, are of no force except when the term
is employed in one or other of the two senses just
repudiated. Paley may serve as an instance of this
proneness of Utilitarians, to misapprehend what is meant
by an innate moral sense. After citing the case of
Caius Toranius, who betrayed his own fond father into
the hands of officers who had been sent to take his life,
Paley remarks, "Now the question is, whether, if this
story were related to the wild boy caught some years
ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without
experience, and without instruction, cut off in his
infancy from all intercourse with his species, and
consequently under no possible influence of example,
authority, education, sympathy or habit, — whether,
I say, such a one would feel, upon the relation, any
degree of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's
conduct which we feel, or not ? They who maintain
the existence of a moral sense, of innate maxims, of a
natural conscience ; that the love of virtue and hatred
of vice are instinctive, or the perceptions of right and
wrong intuitive — all of which are only different ways of
expressing the same opinion— affirm that he would.
They who deny the existence of a moral sense, &c,
affirm that he would not. And upon this issue is joined."

364 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
Upon this, I beg leave to say, issue is not joined. It
would be about as wise to join issue on the case, as
presented by Paley in this story of the wild boy, as it
was for the sagacious members of the Royal Society to
discuss the problem about the living and the dead fish,
propounded to them by the facetious Charles. In the
first place, it is manifestly impossible that an infant
which, as the story goes, was cut off from all intercourse
with its species, should have reached the years of boy
hood. And, in the next place, if it had, it would not
be a fitting subject for the experiment which our
Utilitarian friends propose. The case might be some
what in point, if our doctrine were, that men are born
with a stock of " moral maxims ; '' but it is utterly
pointless as against the doctrine that men are born
with a moral nature ; for a nature reveals itself only
when it is placed in circumstances suitable for its
development. If one of our fruit trees were placed
where it is alleged this unethical youth was found, it is
questionable whether it would bear any fruit ; and yet
we would not regard ourselves as warranted in
concluding, from such an instance, that the habit of
fruit-bearing is not natural to such trees, but a mere
thing of acquisition. Mr. Mill, in his representation of
the point at issue, is equally at fault. It is with him a
question of laws systematised, a discussion about moral
maxims, a controversy about a priori principles which
are to serve as the premises of the science. On page 4
of his tractate on Utilitarianism, he says, " They (both
the intuitive and inductive schools) seldom attempt to

CAUSAL ACTIVITY PRECEDES FORMULA. 365
make out a list of the a priori principles, which are to
serve as the premises of the science ; still more rarely
do they make any effort to reduce those various
principles to one first principle, or common ground of
obligation. . . . Yet, to support their pretensions, there
ought either to be some one fundamental principle or law
at the root of all morality, or, if there be several, there
should be a determinate order of precedence among
them ; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding
between the various principles when they conflict,
ought to be self-evident."
Now, I would object to this importation of a false
issue. Does this alleged conflict between the inductive
and the intuitive schools, in regard to the principles on
which a moral science is to be constructed, prove that
these schools are not agreed in regard to the phenomena
which they profess to interpret ? Can phenomena not
exist until they are classified, and their laws and
principles ascertained? More of this hereafter. At
present, it may be sufficient to say, that the first,
principles of a science may not have been agreed on,
and yet these principles, all unknown and undetermined
by an actual analysis, may have been performing their
office. Of the truth of this remark, I know of no better
illustration than that furnished by Mr. Mill, himself,
Util., p. 2. " The truths which are ultimately accepted
as the first principles of a science, are really the last
results of metaphysical analysis, practised on the
elementary notions with which the science is con
versant ¦ and their relation to the science is not that of

366 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which
may perform their office equally well, although they be
never dug down to and exposed to light." It is true,
Mr. Mill does not admit the application of the prin
ciple, here so beautifully illustrated, to what he calls
" the practical arts of morals and legislation ; " but he has
assigned no satisfactory reason for such limitation of its
operation. Indeed it would seem to be far more
appropriate in the cases from which he has excluded it,
than in those to which he would apply it. In the
latter, no truth can actually operate until it is known ;
whilst in the case of morals, the principles, dispositions,
&c, which determine our whole character and manner
of life, are not only in existence, but actually shaping
and giving cast and character to our activities, in a
word, acting with causal efficiency, prior to any distinct
definition, apprehension, or acknowledgment of them.
It is not one whit more manifest that the roots are
actively engaged in the sustenance and support of the
tree, prior to and independent of their exposure to the
light, than it is that there are within man's constitu
tion, dispositions and principles which antedate and
determine the specific character of all moral activity.
In their attempts to ascertain and define these
principles, men may exhibit all the diversities of
opinion which Utilitarians charge upon their oppo
nents ; but what has this to do with the chief question
in dispute between Utilitarians and all other schools of
moralists ? Does it disprove the existence and oper
ation of those dispositions and principles of whose

MILL RESTRICTS MORALITY TO OVERT ACTS. 367
operation and character all men are conscious ?
This the alleged diversity does not establish, and, there
fore, cannot serve the cause of Utilitarianism. I
repeat it, the science excluded by Mr. Mill, is the one to
which the principle pre-eminently applies.
Besides, there is here a manifest begging of the
chief question in dispute. The assumption that morals
is merely a " practical art," and that it does not come
under the category of systems in which principles
operate prior to their distinct apprehension and
definition, is obviously all one with the assumption,
that man is not possessed of a moral nature; for a
moral nature is neither more nor less than a nature
endowed with moral dispositions, which reveal them
selves by determining the specific activities of the
moral agent.
Mr. Mill is too explicit on this point to be mis
understood. With him it is a fundamental, that
morality pre-supposes a clear and precise appre
hension of moral law. " When we engage in a pursuit,"
he says, " a clear and precise conception of what we are
pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need,
instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of
right and wrong must be the means, one would think,
of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a
consequence of having already ascertained it" (Util,
pp. 2, 3).
It is manifest from this statement of the case, that
Mr. Mill's theory is simply a theory in regard to the
overt acts of moral agents, and that it takes no

368 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
cognisance of those dispositions, &c, which precede and
determine the character of these overt acts. Right and
wrong are, with him, descriptive of actions, performed
with reference to an end, and in accordance with rules,
of whose Tightness or wrongness that end is the sole
test. Of course this theory stands or falls with the
principle here so quietly a-sumed. If there is in man
no such thing as a nature endowed with principles and
dispositions possessing a moral character antecedent
to, and independent of, their forth-putting into action,
Mr. Mill may be .right. In that case, morality may be
represented as a mere affair of overt acts, performed in
accordance with clearly defined, and clearly appre
hended, rules of action. But, on the other hand, if man
possesses a nature endowed with principles which in
and of themselves possess a moral character, Utili
tarianism is manifestly both superficial and false —
superficial, as it does not take into account these
primary and all-determining principles ; and false, as it
is irreconcilable with their existence. If there be such
dispositions as envy, malice, &c, and if these disposi
tions have a moral character prior to any overt act, and
independent of the application of the test furnished by
such experiments as Mr. Mill hypothecates, his theory
is, of course, invalidated.
Guarding, then, against all such Utilitarian mis
apprehensions, I shall at the outset, endeavour to prove,
as against the Utilitarian doctrine, which makes
morality a thing of acquisition, that mankind possess a
moral nature. So far as the origin of morality is

NATURE THE DETERMINING CAUSAL FACTOR. 369
concerned, it must be manifest, that if man possesses a
moral nature, Utilitarianism must be false. Until this
question is settled, then, all other questions must be
postponed. Now, it may be fairly assumed, in accordance with
the law of causality, that if men possess a moral nature,
that nature will reveal itself, and that, too, with
proximate uniformity. I say proximate, and not
absolute uniformity, for there is no instance of any
nature, of anything revealing itself in all the individuals
of the species, in all climates, and in all ages, with
absolute uniformity. All that can be fairly demanded
— and all that any philosopher will demand in this case,
or in any other case where the existence of a nature is
under investigation — is a proximate uniformity, in those
characteristics, attributes, qualities, dispositions, &c,
through which the nature makes revelation of itself.
As every nature reveals itself according to its own
native law, and as the nature in question is a moral
nature, it will, if it exist, reveal itself according to a
moral law, and this law will be the offspring and not
the cause of the constitution of man. This statement
covers the case and indicates the conditions of the
argument. The advocates of an innate moral law,
which is the offspring of a moral nature, can be fairly
called on to prove, 1. That all men are possessed of
some standard of right and wrong. 2. That the moral
standards which have prevailed among mankind have
been proximately uniform, or fundamentally harmoni
ous. If these points can be established, the conditions
2b

370 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
of the proof of the existence of a moral nature are met,
and the fundamental principle of Utilitarianism is
disproved. 1. According to this arrangement, then, we are to
prove that all men are possessed of some standard of
right and wrong. The point here to be established is not
that all men have a perfect standard of right and wrong,
or that all men have precisely the same standard ; but
simply this, that, as a matter of fact, all men have some
standard by which they judge of themselves and others.
Our position is, that there is no evidence of any human
being having existed, who did not regard some things
as right, and some things as wrong. The fact is, that
this point is conceded by all parties. No one has ever
attempted to show that there are now, or that there
ever have been, men who repudiated and ignored such
a distinction. The utmost that has ever been attempted
by any party to this controversy, has been to prove a
diversity of opinion in regard to what things belong to
the one class, and what things belong to the other.
All parties are agreed on this point, that however
diverse the moral codes of nations, communities, or
individuals, of Athenians, or Spartans, Utilitarians or
Brigands, there is no race, or nation, or sect, or brother
hood under the whole heaven, destitute of a standard of
right and wrong. It will be time enough, then, to
enter formally upon the proof of the existence of such a
standard when its existence shall have been called in
question. I shall, therefore, content myself with
stating this point as one of the phenomena to be taken

ALLEGED DIVERSITY OF CODES MYTHICAL. 371
into account in the solution of this question. It will
be admitted that it is an important element — an
element which no one who enters upon the investiga
tion in the spirit of a genuine philosophy will wish to
ignore. 2. The second point to be established is, that the
moral standards which have prevailed among man
kind have been proximately uniform, or fundamentally
harmonious. The alleged diversity of moral codes is
purely mythical. The fact is exactly the reverse of
what our opponents allege. The following fundamental
moral principles — which are the fundamental principles
of the Decalogue — are recognised by all the inhabitants
of the earth: — (1.) That God is to be worshipped; (2.)
That parents are to be honoured ; (3.) That men ought
to live virtuously ; (4.) That we ought to do unto others
as we would that others should do unto us. Within
the sphere of these primary principles, there is, in fact,
no diversity among men. It is only within the sphere
of rules of conduct towards God and men, deduced
from these primary principles, that there is any
diversity of moral codes. When men exercise their
reason on the premises furnished in these primary
truths, they are found to reach different conclusions;
and the more remote the inferences, the greater the
diversity. This is natural. It would certainly be
strange if the weakness of man's logical faculty should
not reveal itself in dealing with premises consisting of
moral truths, as readily as when exercised within any
other department of truth. And if the confessed

372 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
weakness of the logical faculty be sufficient to account
for the existing diversity, it is certainly unphiloso
phical to ascribe it to another and a less obvious cause.
The justness of this view of the matter is confirmed by
the fact that the actual diversities of code are confined
exclusively to the 'sphere of the inferential, this fact is
sufficient to raise the inquiry, May not the diversity in
question be traced to an error in the process of
reasoning ?
Now it is found to be a fact that those who differ in
matters of inference, more or less remote, do agree on
the primary truth from which they profess to draw
their diverse conclusions. The Hindoo mother who
casts her child into the Ganges, and the Christian
mother who dedicates her child to God in baptism, are
both agreed in regard to the primary precept, that God
is to be worshipped and obeyed. The diversity of
conduct in the two cases is owing to a diversity of
inference from this common primary truth. I wish
particular attention to what each has in common
with the other. Our modern philosophical oppon
ents would admit that both pass moral judgments;
that each has in common with the other a certain
feeling, emotion, or sentiment-conscience, belief, &c.
" Each man," says Mr. Bain, " has a feeling that some
actions are right, other actions wrong; he approves
the first, he disapproves the last. He has a feeling of
belief that some propositions are true, and a feeling of
disbelief that others are false. But though two men
have each the same feeling of approbation and disappro-

bain's illustration of diversity OF CODES. 373
bation, it does not follow, nor is it the fact, that the
same actions that raise the feeling in the one, will also
raise it in the other. And if a dispute arise upon this
latter point, it cannot be decided by appeal to the
feeling common to both. The feeling of each is
infallible for him. When an Abolitionist from
Massachussetts denounces the institution of slavery, and
a clergyman from Carolina defends it, both of them
have in common the same sentiment of justice and
injustice. But the sentiment is raised by totally
different objects. In the Abolitionist, the sentiment
leading him to apply the term unjust is raised
by the spectacle of a negro under coercion : in
the other disputant, it is not so raised. But the
sentiment of justice, in both minds, is the same"
(p. 268).
The doctrine here taught is that the agreement of
men in regard to the true and the false, the right and
the wrong, is restricted to the mere sentiment, feeling,
or belief that some propositions are true, and others
false; that some actions are right and others wrong,
It is denied by those who take this ground, that there
is any such thing as a universal accord in regard to
what is true or false, or in regard to what actions are
right and what actions are wrong. The avowed elements
of this theory are as follow : —
1. There is no such thing as an absolute standard of
truth or justice. "There neither is, nor can be, any
universal standard of truths, or matters which ought to
be believed. Every man is in this case a standard to

374 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
himself." What is true of reason is true of conscience.
As there is no absolute standard of truth, so also is
there no absolute standard of right. See Bain on the
Emotions and the Will, pp. 265, 266.
2. The second element of this system is, that the only
thing that each man has in*common with every other
man, is the belief, sentiment, or feeling that there is
such a thing as the true, and such a thing as the
right. Now, with regard to this system I would remark : —
1. That it is either true or false. I think that no
advocate of Utilitarianism could call in question the
fairness of this statement of the case. But it must be
manifest that, on either horn of the dilemma, a
Utilitarian must be fatally impaled. If the System be
true, then there must be such a thing as truth, irre
spective of the individual opinion of this or that man —
truth in regard to this subject, whether men will
believe it or not. Mr. Bain has not written a chapter
to prove that this system is true for him. His doctrine
is, that the system here advocated is absolutely true —
true for the writer, and true for all men, and for all ages
— universally true. It is a truth for the first man, and
for the last of the race — for Kepler, and Newton, and
Bain, that there is really no such thing as truth.
There is what each of those illustrious men felt or feel
that they should believe to be truth ; but behind and
apart from the feeling in each individual case, there
was, and is, no objective reality. This is what Mr.
. Bain has undertaken to prove. Has he succeeded ? If

A UNIFORM EFFECT INFERS A UNIFORM CAUSE. 375
he has, he has established what he wrote his book to
disprove ; for he has proved that, whatever may be true
of other systems, his system, which denies that there is
such a thing as truth, is true !
2. I would observe, in the next place, that the two
elements of the system are mutually destructive. The
first doctrine of the system is, that there is no such
thing as the true, or the right ; and the second doctrine
is, that the feeling or belief in the existence of the true
and the right, is universal to man ! That is, the
system teaches that the only thing which men univer
sally believe, has no real existence. We are called
upon, by the advocates of this monstrous system, to
believe that a sentiment which, by its universality,
proves itself to be the offspring of man's constitution,
(for uniform effect implies a uniform cause) is correl
ative to a lie ! May we not rather say that Utilita
rianism, which requires men to ignore a phenomenon
which is universal to the species, is itself an outrage
upon philosophy, as it is an outrage on this the noblest
sentiment of man !
3. But this is not all : the illustrations adduced
do not sustain the position of our opponents. Mr. Bain
refers to the diversity of sentiment excited in the minds
of an Abolitionist and a pro-slavery man, by the
spectacle of a negro under coercion, as proof of a
diversity of moral standard. Well, I can testify from
actual observation that, whatever else the case proves,
it does not establish a diversity of moral code. The
Abolitionist and the ideal Carolinian clergyman are.

376 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
perfectly agreed in regard to the moral standard.
They both believe that we should do unto others as we
would that others should do unto us. They differ in
their interpretation of this law. The Abolitionist says
this law requires us to treat others as we would wish
to be treated, were we in their place. The pro-slavery
man says, this law requires us to treat others as we,
with our knowledge of the case, believe the highest
interest of the parties demands. It is true there have
been, and doubtless are still, both in America and out
of it, men who would justify slavery at all hazards, and
who would sacrifice the interests of their fellow-men at
the shrine of Mammon ; but these abnormal instances
are not to furnish data for a philosopher when the
subject under investigation is, the moral sentiments of
man. The ground taken by the South on the subject
of slavery was, that it is, all things considered, the best
system for the coloured race. In this I believe they
were wrong ; but, in taking this ground, they differed
from the Abolitionist, not in. regard to the standard of
duty, but in regard to the means by which their duty
towards the negro should be discharged. In a word,
it is just as true in this case as in the case of the
Hindoo and the Christian mother, that the diversity of
the rules whereby they respectively regulate their
conduct arises, not from any diversity of opinion in
regard to the primary truth, but from a diversity of
inference from that truth, in which men are influenced
by considerations as various as the ever chanoino-
circumstances by which they are encompassed. When

RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE TO ' DEFINITION. 377
both the cases cited are carefully examined, we find,
that in regard to the primary truths, that God should
be worshipped and obeyed, and that men should do
unto others as they would that others should do unto
them, there is, the wide world over, except among the
moral monsters of the race, really no diversity of
opinion. That is, the cases cited prove what Mr. Bain
denies — viz., that the agreement of mankind reaches
beyond a mere moral sentiment, and extends to the
fundamental truths of an actual moral code.
It is true, men may differ in their definitions of
moral excellence, for it is only persons of cultured minds
who can define anything. I have met sensible people
who could not give a definition of a hen's nest ; and we
know how difficult even philosophers have found it to
define man. We are not, however, to infer absolute
ignorance of the thing from incapacity to define it, nor
are we to infer diversity of idea in regard to virtue,
from the actually diverse definitions of it which pre
vail among men. As Butler remarks in his sermon on
the character of Baalam : —
"As much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists,
or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars,
yet, in general, there is in reality an universally acknowledged
standard. It is that which all ages and countries have made
profession of in public ; it is that which every man you meet
puts on the show of ; it is that which the primary and funda
mental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the
earth make it their business, and endeavour to enforce the
practice of upon mankind — viz., justice, veracity, and regard
to common good."

378 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
This summary of Butler's is, itself, equivalent to a
definition of virtue as it manifests itself in the sphere
of human relationships ; and being, as it is, a summary
of facts, it, at the same time, proves conclusively that
the moral excellence which men have found it so
difficult to define, is a thing which all men have a
conception of, and which they demand both from them
selves and others. Men may not be able to give a
definition of beauty, and yet recognise it, and kindle
with enthusiasm when it is exhibited to them in the
concrete ; and they may not be able to define exactly
the idea covered by the term " man.", and yet never
hesitate to distinguish between a man and all other
forms of physical or metaphysical existences. And just
so is it in regard to virtue. Men may have difficulty
about the definition, but they have none about the
thing. Society at large is not wont to err in regard to
moral excellence, or its opposite, when it is presented
in the concrete. A good man, or a bad man, would be
esteemed as such the world over.
Although it is by no means necessary to our argu
ment, we would be perfectly warranted in advancing
the following as an additional proposition — viz., That
all men recognise the essential elements of the true
standard as soon as they are announced to them in
intelligible language. By the true standard is meant
that summary of the moral law contained in the
Decalogue ; and the ground taken is, that the great
fundamental truths of this imperishable code are
acknowledged by all men as obligatory, as soon as they

ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES UNIVERSALLY OWNED. 379
are understood. This is, of course, simply a question of
fact, and must be decided by an appeal to facts.
Now, on this point we have most reliable testimony
in the affirmative. We have the testimony of men
who have had interest enough in the heathen to go
forth to proclaim to them all the words of this law,
with the correlative tidings of a Saviour who has met
all its claims, and their testimony is, that the heart of
heathendom responds to this truth as the heliotrope
responds to the orb of day. It is found, as a matter of
fact, that the moral law, as expounded by our Saviour,
is recognised and approved by all men of every tribe
and tongue under the whole heaven. The exceptions
taken to this code are not based on the ground of its
justice and righteousness, or its suitableness to the
nature and relations of man. The single, objection
urged by the heathen on the first announcement of this
law, is based on their felt inability to render the
obedience it demands. They acknowledge its excellence
and propriety, and authority, as the rule of man's
obedience, and as such, approve of it, but confess their
inability to come up to the high standard of its require
ments. The third point embraced in our position is, that this
universal prevalence of a moral standard, more or less
perfect, and the universal recognition of the primary
truths of the perfect moral code, arise from the con
stitution of man's nature.
With regard to this position I take very high
ground. If the facts be as it is alleged they are, then

380 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
I hold that the position is impregnable. If it be true
that all men, in all ages, and under all circumstances,
have regarded some things as right and other things as
wrong ; and if it be true that men are fundamentally
agreed in regard to the classes of things which are
right or wrong ; and if, in addition to their agreement
on these two points, it is found that they recognise the
supreme obligation of the great truths enunciated in
the Decalogue, then it must be true that this moral
law is innate — i.e., that it arises from the constitution
of man's nature. And this is all one. with saying that
man is by nature a moral being, just as he is by nature
a rational being.
I mean no disrespect to our opponents when I say
that there is no room for discussion here. What is
there, which men universally do, that we do not ascribe
to a permanent, uniformly operating cause in human
nature itself ? Men universally reason, and we deem it
reasonable to infer that men- are by nature rational.
Men universally seek society, and we deem it not an
unwarrantable conclusion, that men are by virtue of
their nature social. In philosophising on this feature
of our humanity, we never tarry to inspect, or allow
ourselves to be turned aside by, the singularities of a
bachelor or a misanthropist. Now, if we are warranted
in ascribing these universal characteristics to a cause
found in the very nature of mankind, are we not
equally warranted in ascribing this moral characteristic,
which is as unquestionably universal to the species, to
the original constitution of human nature ? If the fact

CAUSALITY A ROOT- PRINCIPLE IN ALL SCIENCE. 381
that all men reason, proves that man is by nature
rational, and the fact that all men seek society, proves
that man is by nature social, surely the fact that all
men make moral distinctions — regard some things as
right and other things as wrong — must prove that man
is by nature moral. The fact is, that every argument
employed to prove that our moral sentiments are
acquired, is equally potent to prove that every other
characteristic by which man is distinguished, not only
from brutes, but from brute-matter itself, is also
acquired. Once reject the principle, that a character
istic common to our species implies a cause in the
nature of the species, and there is an end, not only to
. moral philosophy, but to all philosophy. The principle
of Causality lies at the root of all science, whether of
matter or of mind.
I now pass over the boundary to inspect more closely
that system entitled Utilitarianism, which stands
opposed to all forms of the doctrine of an innate moral
law. ' The question between Utilitarians and the advocates
of an innate moral law, has not reference to the actual
existence of a moral sentiment. Both parties are
agreed that this sentiment exists, and that it is
universal. The question in debate has regard to the
origin and nature of this sentiment. We account for
the existence and universality of this sentiment by a
reference to the constitution of man. Utilitarians
account for it by a reference to the training or
discipline to which the race is universally subjected ; a

382 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
method which, if fairly applied, would account, not for
the existence of the moral sentiment, but for the
diversity of actual moral codes.
I shall allow Mr. Mill to give the Utilitarian account
of the origin of virtue : —
" The sole end of human action is happiness. . . . Life
would be a poor thing, very iU provided with sources of
happiness, if there . were not this provision of nature, by
which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or
otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive
desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more
valuable than the primitive pleasures themselves, both in
permanency, in the space of human existence that they are
capable of covering, and even in intensity.
"Virtue, according to the Utilitarian conception, is a good
of this description. There was no original desire of it, or
motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especi-
aHy to protection from pain. But through the association
thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as
such with as great intensity as any other good ; and with
this difference between it and the love of money, of power,
or of fame, that all of these may, and often do, render the
individual noxious to the other members of the society to
which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes
him so much a blessing to them, as the cultivation of
Virtue." The account of this matter given by Paley, who is
entirely in harmony with Hume on the point, is as
follows : —
" Having experienced, in some instances, a particular
conduct to be beneficial to ourselves, or observed that it
would be so, a sentiment of approbation rises up in our

UTILITARIAN ACCOUNT OF CODAL AGREEMENT. 383
minds; which sentiment afterwards accompanies the idea
or mention of the same conduct, although the private
advantage which first excited it no longer exists. ... By
such means the custom of approving certain actions com
menced ; and when once such a custom had got footing in
the world, it is no difficult thing to explain how it is
transmitted and continued, for then the greatest part of
those who approve of virtue approve of it from authority, by
imitation, and from a habit of approving such and such
actions inculcated from early youth, and receiving, as men
grow up, continued accessions of strength and vigour, from
censure and encouragement, from the books they read,
&c, &e."
This is the way in which Paley accounts for the
unquestionably proximate uniformity of the moral
sentiments of mankind; and it is the way in which
Hume, and Bain, and Mill, and all Utilitarians
endeavour to account for the remarkable fact, that
amidst the actual and seeming diversities of the
historic and extant moral codes, there is a fundamental
harmony. With all these writers the grand solvent,
wherewith this untoward fact of a radical agreement is
¦ to be dissipated, is a compound of authority,- imitation,
and habit. Bain, who ascribes the origin of all virtue
to the rod, differs from his brethren only in plainness
of speech, whilst he bears the birch aloft, they cover up
this important ethical implement under the garment of
authority, or beneath the transparent vesture of pain.
Both are agreed in this, that had earth's flora furnished
no birch, mankind had exhibited no virtue. According
to Utilitarianism the birch, real, or metaphorical, with

384 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
its antagonistic sugar-cane, lies at the foundation of all
virtue. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether
there be such virtue in birch as our Utilitarian friends
ascribe to it. An argument from such sources is, with
some natures, much more potential than anything in
the shape of moral suas.on ; but still there are some
things which it cannot achieve. All that the men of
this school should ask, is a sufficient stock of birch and
candy, and a judicious administrator. Of course they
require another factor to produce -the result ; but I see
no reason, so far as the system is concerned, for that
factor being a boy or a girl, or a human being at all.
Does the question not very naturally arise, How comes
it to pass that the rod will produce this peculiar result,
which even Utilitarians call moral, only in the case of
beings possessing human nature ? Why does not this
birch-and-candy discipline (the candy being substituted
by more appropriate pabulum) make dogs and horses
and sheep virtuous ? Such discipline on such subjects,
cannot be said to fail for lack of the fundamental
condition of virtue demanded by Utilitarianism ; for no
sentient thing is destitute of the desire of happiness.
I put the question again, Why is it that the only
appliances for producing virtue, recognised by Utilitar
ians, will produce it only when man is the subject?
Will any man accept, as a Utilitarian answer to this
question, the answer given by Mr. Mill, when he says,
that "it is because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy
a human being's conceptions of happiness"? (p. 11).
This is our answer, but it is not one which a Utilitarian

DIVERSITY DUE TO MISINTERPRETATION OF FACTS, 385
has the right to give. Why, I ask, is a human
being's conceptions of happiness different from those
of a beast ? Does this diversity of conception not
arise from a diversity of nature ? and if so, does it not
follow, that a being whose nature is such that it cannot
be happy without virtue, is by nature a moral being ?
If this be admitted, then man's moral conceptions — his
ideas of right and wrong— are not emanations of the
rod, but are at once the offspring and evidence of an
original moral constitution.
It is no reply to this argument, to allege that other
conceptions entertained by the entire race have turned
out to be false, as, for example, the opinion that the
sun revolves around the earth once every twenty-four
hours; for, 1. The phenomena in question are diverse; the
one class being external and objective, whilst the other
are subjective, phenomena of the soul itself. Men may
err in regard to motions in the heavens, and yet not err
in regard to emotions which thrill their own bosoms.
2. The mistake, into which it is alleged the entire race
fell respecting the apparent motion of the sun, was not
a mistake in regard to a fact, but a mistake in regard
to the interpretation of a fact. The phenomenon was
exactly as it was reported by the human race, in all
lands and in all ages. Rude were the instruments of
investigation employed; but there were watchers of
Mazzaroth, and Pleiades, and Arcturus with his suns,
long before the days of Copernicus, or Tycho, or
Galileo, or Kepler, or Newton ; yes, and watchers, too,
whose observations, however erroneously interpreted by
2c

386 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the observers themselves, have been employed by the
giant intellects of modern astronomy, as data which
they have honoured with a place in those marvellous
processes, by wliich they have climbed to those mighty
generalisations which have shed imperishable lustre on
our common humanity, and have rendered astronomy
at once the most exact, and the most fascinating of all
the sciences.
These facts certainly prove that the error in question
was not an error in regard to the existence of the
phenomenon respecting which the race have agreed in
testifying, but an error of interpretation. This being
manifest, we turn upon our opponents with the inquiry,
does this diversity of interpretation between the
ancient and the modern astronomers warrant the
conclusion that the phenomena, with which the two
classes of interpreters have dealt, do not exist ? This,
however, is exactly the conclusion which Utilitarians
draw from the existing diversity in regard to the
interpretation of the innate moral law. Men differ in
their interpretations of this law, and therefore, it is
alleged, no such law exists ! This is admirable logic,
and profound philosophy ! Why not go through with
the principle ? Lawyers differ in their interpretations
of laws, and therefore, the laws in question do not
exist ! Christians differ in their interpretations of the
Bible, and therefore, there is no Bible ! Why should
not diversity of interpretation be as conclusive against
the existence of the things interpreted in these cases as
in the case of an innate moral law ? The argument is

RELATION OF PRINCIPLE TO ACTION. 387
as potent to prove the non-existence of the Bible, or of
the stars, or of the statutes over which lawyers are
wont to contend, as it is to prove the non-existence of
a universal moral law.
But Utilitarianism not only denies the philosophical
principle that a characteristic, quality, or attribute,
common to all the individuals of a species, must have
its foundation in the nature of the species; it also,
most unwarrantably, assumes that moral character can
have no existence prior to the activities of the moral
agent. If virtue, as Mr. Mill tells us, is a thing of
acquisition, of course men must perform virtuous acts
before they become subjectively virtuous. Now the
thing here assumed, is contrary to the universal
judgment of men. Mr. Mill recognises mankind as
the proper judges in this matter, and to this tribunal
we appeal. Do men hold that moral principles are the
product of moral action ? or do they hold that moral
actions flow from moral principles ? We aver that the
response of the entire race on this point is against the
Utilitarians. Mankind instinctively refer the act to a
previously existing principle, or disposition, as its cause,
and never refer the moral principle, or disposition, to an
act as its originating cause. It is not the judgment of
mankind that a man becomes malicious by doing
malicious deeds; that he becomes a murderer by
multiplied deeds of human butchery ; or, on the other
hand, that a man becomes benevolent by the perform
ance of deeds of beneficence. In a word, it is the
universal verdict of mankind, that vicious acts reveal

388 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
a previously existing vicious character, and that virtuous
acts are but the revelation of inward and antecedent
virtuous principles. In both cases, the principles from
which the actions proceed are confirmed and strength
ened by their forth-putting into activity ; but in
neither case does the act originate the principle, for
this were neither more nor less than an effect origin
ating its own cause ; which would be too manifest a
violation of the scientific principle of causality to gain
currency in scientific circles.
Of course this Utilitarian theory of the origin of virtue
is irreconcilable with what the sacred Scriptures teach
in regard to the original estate of man. If virtue
be a thing of acquisition, our first parents could not
have been created in knowledge, righteousness, and
holiness. It must have been by experience that
the race found out that virtue was right, and vice wrong.
I do not stop here to discuss this point with Utili
tarians. I merely wish to show that the Utilitarian
theory of the origin of our moral sentiments is at war
with the Bible account of the origin of our race. Of
course we have all the authority for rejecting such a
system, that we have for accepting the Bible as a
revelation from God. Nor does the system simply
collide with the teaching of sacred Scripture in regard
to original righteousness ; it is also in conflict with the
Scripture doctrine of original sin, or innate moral
corruption. The fundamental principle of the system
applies as well to vice as to virtue. In the one case,
as well as in the other, moral chracter must be the

APPEAL TO SCRIPTURE AND EXPERIENCE. 389
offspring of moral activity. Before a human being can
be possessed of. unholy dispositions, he must, according
to the fundamental principle of Utilitarianism, perform
unholy acts. On this point we can appeal, not only to
the Bible, but also to the experience of mankind, and to
the principle that a uniform effect implies the exist
ence and operation of a permanent cause. A philos
opher who professes to solve the great problems
furnished by human nature, cannot fairly ignore the
existence of sin. We thank no man for admitting that
the human race universally manifest a proneness to sin ;
nor do we thank any man for admitting, that this
universal proneness to sin implies the existence of an
unholy principle or disposition. He who admits this,
however, admits what is fatal to Utilitarianism ; for the
thing admitted is the very thing which Utilitarianism
denies — viz., that moral character precedes moral
activity, and antedates moral discipline.
From the consideration of the Utilitarian theory of
the origin of morality, we pass to the consideration of
the Utilitarian theory of its nature. Mr. Mill thus
states the Utilitarian doctrine on this point :• —
"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals,
utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions
are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain ; by
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a
clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much
more requires to be said ; in particular, what things it

390 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what
extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary
' explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this
theory of morality is grounded — namely, that pleasure, and
freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends ;
and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the
Utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for
the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain '' (Util., pp.
9, 10). On page 17, Mr. Mill adds : " This (happiness) being,
according to the Utilitarian opinion, the end of human
action, is necessarily also the standard of morality, which
may accordingly be defined the rules and precepts for human
conduct, by the observance of which, an existence such as
has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible,
secured to aU mankind ; and not to them only, but, so far as
the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation."
There can be no doubt, then, as to the radical
principle of this system as here expounded. The ground
taken is, that enjoyment, happiness, is the only
intrinsic good which is to be chosen for its own sake.
Happiness, as Mr. Mill expressly states, is the sole end
of human action, and the sole standard of morality.
Happiness is the only ultimate good, and other things
are only relatively good as means to this end. Under
this latter head, Mr. Mill includes virtue. On page 55
he states that "virtue, according to the Utilitarian
doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end,
but it is capable of becoming so, and in those who
have it disinterestedly, it has become so, and is desired
and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as
a part of their happiness.'' .

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE THEORY. 391
Utilitarianism, therefore, as already intimated, rests
on two principles. 1. That happiness is the only
intrinsic good. 2. That all other things, virtue or
moral excellence included, are only relatively good,
having no value except as a means to the attainment
of happiness.
On this system I would remark — 1. That it owes its
plausibility to what it holds in common with the true
theory of morals. It is true that happiness is a good,
It is consequently true that it is obligatory on all moral
agents to endeavour to promote it. It is true that it is
obligatory on all moral agents to endeavour to promote
the highest happiness of the entire moral and sentient
creation. All this is true, unquestionably true. But
these truths are not a discovery of Utilitarianism.
They are truths known and advocated by those
who reject with instinctive moral loathing all that
is truly characteristic of that system.
2. I would remark, in the next place, that the
principles which give character to the system are
erroneous and subversive of morality, as they are
irreconcilable with the central doctrine of Christianity,
as well as with the Scripture account of the nature of
both sin and grace.
The ground I take in opposition to this system is,
that, in every one of its characteristics, it is in conflict
with the moral judgments of men. 1. In the first
place, it contradicts the conscience and consciousness
of mankind in regard to the ground of moral obligation.
¦ All men possess an ideal standard of moral excellence

392 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
to which they feel that they ought to be conformed,
both in their subjective estate and in their outward
actions. What account does Utilitarianism give of
these facts of consciousness — the fact that there is such
a standard in the bosoms of all men, and the fact that
there is, in every bosom, a sense of obligation to be
conformed to it, both in outward act and inner estate ?
Utilitarianism attempts to account for the phenomena
by denying them all save one. It denies the existence
of the ideal standard as a standard arising out of man's
nature ; it denies that this standard is a standard for
measuring the subjective estate of the moral agent,
except indirectly, as that subjective estate may consist
of dispositions which may be hurtful, or useful to men ;
and, lastly, after restricting the sphere of judgment to the
overt acts of moral agents, it determines their moral
character by their tendency to promote happiness or
the contrary. It is manifest that on all these points
the system contradicts the consciousness of the race.
No man, who will but inspect the phenomena of his
own moral nature, can accept such a reduction of the
facts, or such an interpretation of those that remain.
The sense of moral obligation is not a felt conviction
that we ought to be happy, and ought to endeavour to
promote the happiness of others. The reason why men
condemn themselves for not attaining to the ideal
standard of moral excellence, is not that the attainment
of it would make them happier than they are in their
present low moral estate, but that they feel they ought
to be conformed to this standard, and that their want

VIRTUE VIEWED IN THE CONCRETE. 393
of conformity to it is sinful. The judgment of man
kind respecting a vicious man, is not simply that he is
unwise, as he seeks happiness by the use of unsuitable
means, but their judgment is that he is wicked. And
when men pronounce a man virtuous, they do not
simply mean to say that he is a wise man — a man who
has sought happiness by the use of suitable means.
By a virtuous man is meant, in the estimation of all
men whose judgments have not been perverted by
inordinate speculation, a man whose principles and
dispositions are in conformity with the standard of
moral excellence, and whose dispositions and principles
are such, and so strong, that he turns from vice with
instinctive abhorrence, as a thing to be shunned
because of its inherent vileness, and cleaves to virtue
because of its inherent moral loveliness.
The experience of holy men is confirmatory of all
this. When they allow themselves to forget God, and
to be engrossed with earthly things, they do not, on
their recovery, simply chide themselves for having
acted injudiciously, but abhor themselves for having
acted sinfully. So is it universally : men never con
found virtue with mere prudence, or with that practical
wisdom which enables its possessor to select the
appropriate means for the attainment of an end ; nor
do they confound vice with a lack of such discrimination
in the use of means. In the estimation of all men,
"sinners and sentimentalists," as Mr. Mill would
distinguish them, the difference between a good man
and a bad man, is a difference of inherent moral estate,

S94 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
an estate which is judged of by reference to a standard
of moral excellence, to which it is felt all men ought
to be conformed both in their subjective condition
and in their outward conduct. Whence comes this
standard? Whence the obligation to be conformed to
it ? We answer : the standard is established by the
Author of our being, and the obligation to be conformed
to it has its foundation, ultimately, in His own moral
excellence. Moral excellence is, from its nature, felt to
be obligatory by every moral agent. This is simply a
fact, and if any man question it we have no further
controversy with him. If any man allege that it is not
a fact of his consciousness, if he affirm that he does not
feel that moral excellence is, by virtue of its nature,
obligatory on him, he is, by his own confession, unfit to
judge in such matters.
This fact, however, is not the ultimate fact of
consciousness. When we say that moral excellence is,
by virtue of its very nature, obligatory on all moral
agents, we do not refer to a standard of excellence in
the abstract, or, " in the nature of things." Attributes
infer essence. Moral excellence is the excellence of a
moral being, and, apart from such a being, has no
existence. The standard of all moral excellence, there
fore, must be a being of absolute moral perfection.
The feeling of obligation to be morally perfect, is one
which is correlative to this self-conscious, living,
omniscient, omnipresent, all-perfect moral Being ; and
no system which ignores or rejects, or fails to account
for this fact of our consciousness, can be accepted as

MILL'S IDEA OF THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVE. 395
rendering a satisfactory account of the phenomena of
our nature.
Whilst Mr. Mill rejects this doctrine, he claims for
Utilitarianism " all the sanctions which belong to it or
any other system of morals." These sanctions he divides
into external and internal. Under the external he
includes the religious motive, and affirms that Utili
tarianism can avail itself of this motive as it can of all
others. When, however, he comes to state what the
religious motive embraces, he is forced to reveal the
unwarrantableness of the claim he is endeavouring to
establish. According to his account of it, the religious
motive embraces nothing beyond a God of goodness.
" With regard to the religious motive," he says (p. 41),
" if men believe, as most profess to do, in the goodness
of God, those who think that conduciveness to the
general happiness is the essence, or even only the
criterion, of good, must necessarily believe that it is
also that which God approves." This is certainly an
easy method of reconciling Utilitarianism with its
uncompromising antagonist. It is perfectly true, if the
religious motive embrace nothing beyond what Mr.
Mill alleges, that it is, " available to enforce the Utili
tarian morality." If it embrace nothing beyond a God
who is invested with the one attribute .of goodness, or
benevolence — a God whose sole end and aim is the
promotion of the general happiness; a God who,
instead of being the end of -His own universe, the end
for which all things have been created, and for which all
thino-s exist, is Himself subordinate to the work of His

396 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
own hands, and exists for the promotion of its interests
— if the religious motive embrace nothing beyond such
a Being, there, can be no doubt that Utilitarianism has
the right to claim all the force of its sanction. The
thing here assumed, however, is not granted. The
Utilitarian God, here described, is not our God. He
has not the attributes of the glorious, the morally
august Being, whose character, as revealed in the
history of His dealings with angels and men, and as
disclosed in the moral constitution of man, demands the
religious homage of all moral intelligences. Men may
be Utilitarians, and believe in the God sketched by
Mr. Mill, but Utilitarians they cannot be, and believe
that God is a God of holiness, justice, and truth.
The fallacy here perpetrated is too transparent to
demand any formal unmasking. Mr. Mill claims for
Utilitarianism all the sanctional force of the religious
motive ; but when he gives an exegesis of this motive,
he divests it of all the elements which characterise
it as interpreted by his opponents.
With regard to the " internal sanctions," Mr. Mill is
equally at fault. He claims that the internal sanction
of the Utilitarian standard is " the same as of all other
standards — the conscientious feelings of mankind"
( Util., p. 42). " No reason," he alleges, " has ever been
shown why they (these conscientious feelings) may not
be cultivated to as great intensity in connection with
the Utilitarian, as with any other rule of morals." But
these conscientious feelings, as expounded by Mr. Mill
turn out to be simply correlative to the individual him-

mill's view of the ultimate MORAL SANCTION. 397
self, and to society at large. "The deeply-rooted
conception," he says " which every individual man now
has of himself as a social being, tends to make him
feel it one of his natural wants that there should be
harmony between his feelings and aims and those of
his fellow-creatures." . . . "This conviction is the
ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality "
(Util, p. 50).
On this doctrine of " the internal sanctions," it may
be remarked — (1.) That it is an abuse of language to
designate the feelings here described as " conscientious
feelings." Conscience does take cognisance of our
thoughts, and feelings, and acts, in reference to our-'
selves and others ; but it is, nevertheless, not ultimately
and finally correlative to ourselves, or the human race,
or the sentient creation. The judicial and imperative
functions of conscience are exercised in reference to a
standard of supreme moral excellence, which is regarded
as the law of our being, and the exponent of the will
of our Creator. " Conscientious feelings," therefore, are
not simply correlative to the human race. They are
feelings which, whatever regard they have to men,
terminate on, and are correlative to God, as the supreme
Lawgiver and rightful Sovereign of ourselves and others.
(2.) Utilitarianism will not, as Mr. Mill would have
us believe, bear a favourable comparison "with any
other rule of morals," in regard to the appliances it
affords for the cultivation of these subjective feelings.
It is true, as he states, that both systems are ultimately
dependent upon a subjective feeling; but it is also true

398 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
that the subjective feelings here in question are
correlative to external objects. If so, is not the
question reduced to this: Are subjective feelings
influenced, in regard to their intensity, by the char
acter of the objects by which they are awakened ?
This question, of course, admits of no discussion. We
are not wont to feel alike in regard to all the objects we
contemplate in nature or in art. The feelings evoked by
the contemplation of a mill-race, or a mole-hill, are very
different, both in character and intensity, from those
enkindled by a gaze at Niagara, or Mont Blanc.
Mankind mean something when they distinguish
between the beautiful, and the grand, and the sublime.
These distinctions have their origin in a felt diversity
in the emotions to which the objects, characterised by
these terms, respectively give rise. Now, I would ask,
what would be thought of the intelligence of a man
who would ignore those distinctions, and, despite the
testimony of the race, hold that the several classes
of objects referred to, were equally potent, not only to
awaken the subjective feelings, but to cultivate them ?
This were simply to allege that a mill-race or a mole
hill is as capable of enkindling, in the highest degree,
the emotions of the soul as the grandest of earth's
cataracts, or the most majestic of earth's mountains.
This principle in regard to the relation which subsists
between the subjective feeling and the object con
templated, is not to be excluded from the sphere of
morals. The relation between the cognitions, feelings,
and conations of the soul, in both cases is the same.

MILL'S EXTERNAL SANCTIONS INADEQUATE. 399
The cognitions determine the character and intensity
of the feelings, as these, in turn, determine the desires
and will. The laws by which the faculties of the soul
are regulated, do not change and vary with the ever-
changing classes of objects contemplated. In all cases
this great law by which the cognitive powers, and
feelings, and conative powers, are linked together,
abides unchangeably the same. The changeless
uniformity of this law, however, is that which insures
diversity in the subjective feelings, both in regard to
kind and intensity. Other things being equal, the
subjective feeling will differ in both these respects,
according to the character of the object contemplated.
It must therefore follow, that the subjective feelings,
awakened by such external sanctions as are comprised
under the interests of the individual, or of society at
large, or of the sentient creation, or such as are com
prehended under the general idea of a God invested
with the one attribute of goodness, must ever be
inferior, both in kind and degree, to those evoked by
the contemplation of infinite moral excellence. It is,
therefore, not true that the sanctions of Utilitarianism
are equal, in their educational power, to " the sanctions
of any other system ; " for they do not embrace, and, to
be consistent, must exclude, the idea of a self-obligatory,
inherent, moral excellence, which is the most powerful
of all the sanctions which influence the feelings and
conduct of man. A system which refuses to recognise
the doctrine that infinite moral excellence — the excel
lence of an infinite and all-perfect moral Being, whose

400 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
creatures and subjects we are — is the ultimate ground
of moral obligation, is destitute of the great essential
elements of moral power. In a word, Utilitarianism
recognises but one of the external sanctions of the moral
law — viz., goodness. According to this system, the law
is to be obeyed because it is " good." According to the
system of morals revealed in the Scriptures, and in our
own moral nature, the law is to be obeyed, not only
because it is "good," but because it is "just" and
" holy." Utilitarianism, therefore, as an instrument of
moral discipline, is as far beneath the morality of the
Bible, as mere benevolence is beneath benevolence,
justice, and holiness.
2. It is manifest, as already intimated, that this
system does not attach moral character to subjective
estates. It appreciates the importance of those sub
jective qualities which are generally regarded as enter
ing into the idea of virtue, but it does not admit that
these qualities are in and of themselves moral. They
are only relatively moral, because of their relation to
happiness. Now here, again, there is but one tribunal to which
our opponents can appeal, and to this tribunal, with
Mr. Mill's consent, we turn. What, we ask, is the
judgment of mankind in regard to this subject? Have
those qualities, dispositions, &c, from which good or
bad actions proceed, no moral character in and of them
selves ? In reply to this question, there are two things
to which consciousness bears testimony — 1. That the
dispositions in question have a moral character. 2. That

ULTIMATE BASIS OF MORAL CHARACTER. 401
this moral character is not derived, but inherent. In
the estimation of all men there are certain dispositions
which are regarded as virtuous, and certain dispositions
which are regarded as vicious. This is one of the facts
of consciousness, about whose existence there can be no
dispute. Equally patent and indisputable is the fact,
that in the estimation of all men, these dispositions are
in and of themselves virtuous or vicious, good or evil.
Utilitarianism alleges that our estimate of these
dispositions is based upon their tendency. We allege,
and in this we are sustained by the consciousness of all
men with the exception of Utilitarian theorists, that
our estimate springs from the nature of the dispositions
themselves. We condemn such and such dispositions,
and we approve of their opposites, because they
constitute a holy or an unholy, a right or a wrong
moral estate. The question in such judgments is not
one of profit or loss to the individual, or to society, or
to " the sentient creation ; " nor does the decision
involve any discursive process at all. It is as the
unfolding of the beautiful, or of the contrary, to the
faculty of taste. The apprehension of the quality
is immediate, and the judgment instantaneous and
instinctive. The subjective quality, revealed in what
ever way, enkindles in our minds a feeling of moral
admiration, or the contrary, according as it is in
accordance with our ideal of moral excellence, or the
contrary. The consciousness of the race, in regard to
this point, is in perfect harmony with the doctrine of
Scripture. According to both, moral character pertains
2 D

402 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
to the inner man of the heart. A man, by a course of
Utilitarian training, may have his moral perceptions
vitiated ; but it is very questionable whether even a
Utilitarian can bring himself to believe that the moral
status of a moral agent is not determined by the moral
estate of his heart. It is the verdict both of Nature
and of Revelation, that " as a man thinketh in his
heart, so is he." Mr. Mill endeavours to meet this
objection in this way : —
" If the assertion means that Utilitarians do not allow
their judgment respecting the Tightness or wrongness of an
action to be influenced by their opinion of the qualities of
the person who does it, this is a complaint, not against
Utilitarianism, but against having any standard of morality
at all ; for certainly no known ethical standard decides an
action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or a
bad man, stiU less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a
benevolent man, or the contrary. These considerations are
relevant, not to the estimation of actions, but of persons ;
and there is nothing in the Utilitarian theory inconsistent
with the fact that there are other things which interest us
(mark the term employed) in persons besides the Tightness
and wrongness of their actions " (p. 29).
On this reply, I would remark that it is simply an
admission of the charge of which it complains. The
charge preferred is, that, in estimating the actions of
moral agents, Utilitarians do not take into account the
subjective qualities of the agent. Mr. Mill's reply is,
that these considerations — viz., the qualities of the
agent, are relevant, not to the estimation of actions, but
of persons. It is clear, therefore, that the subjective

RELATION OF ACTS TO PERSONAL QUALITIES. 403
quality from which an action proceeds has, in Mr. Mill's
system, nothing to do with our estimate of the moral
character of the act. Here, again, the system is in
conflict with the moral judgments of mankind. Will
any'jury pronounce the act of killing a fellow-being
right or wrong before they have ascertained the moral
¦animus from which the act proceeded ? Mr. Mill is
right when he says that an action is not to be regarded
as good because it is done by a good man. This, how
ever, is aside from the question. No one says that the
goodness of the agent can make a bad action good. In
estimating the rightness or the wrongness of an act,
our inquiry extends both to the matter of the act, or
the thing done, and to the subjective qualities of the
agent in which the act originates. Two men may give
£100 each for the relief of the poor. So far as the
matter of the act is concerned, the two acts are precisely
alike ; but our estimate of the morality of these acts
will be very different if we discover that the one is the
offspring of benevolence, whilst the other owes its
origin to vanity or self-interest. Of the acts, per se, or
considered simply in relation to the poor, we can
merely say that they are useful and profitable to men ;
but touching their moral character, we affirm nothing
until we connect them with the subjective principles,
dispositions,. &c, from which we regard them as
proceeding. Men never apply terms expressive of
moral qualities to acts except as they regard those acts
as revealing qualities of the agents who performed them.
A virtuous or a vicious deed is one which is regarded

404 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
as revealing a virtuous or a vicious character. In both
cases the quality is regarded as resident in the agent,
and not in the act itself, as a thing separated from him
who performed it. Who would think of characterising
the act of a St. Bernard's dog, when he saves the life of
some belated Alpine wanderer, as a moral act, or the
conduct of the ravens which fed Elijah, as virtuous V
Yet, on Utilitarian principles, I do not see why these
acts should not be morally good. They will unquestion
ably stand the test which that system proclaims as the
sole criterion of virtue — viz., that the act done be
conducive to the happiness of the sentient creation.
To what a moral elevation have dogs and ravens been
raised by this ennobling philosophy ! Away with such
trifling on moral questions ! Morality is the attribute,
not of a thing, but of a moral being ; and it is
ascribed to actions only because they reveal the
subjective qualities of moral agents.
3. This system is also in conflict with the moral
judgment of men in regard to the relation between
happiness and virtue. According to Utilitarianism,
happiness is a greater good than virtue ; according to
the moral judgment of mankind, the reverse of this is
true. Virtue is, in the estimation of all good men, and,
indeed, in the estimation of all men, good and bad, the
highest of all ends, and the greatest good. According
to Utilitarianism, happiness is the highest end of man,
and virtue is the means for attaining it ; according to
the moral judgment of the race, virtue, moral excel
lence, is the highest end, and happiness is the reward

RELATION OF HOLINESS TO HAPPINESS. 405
of virtue. A reward cannot be considered as the
ultimate end aimed at by him who has offered it. A
bursary is a good thing, and it is a lawful thing for a
student to go in for it ; but the sole end of its institu
tion, or the sole end of any right-minded student in the
intellectual struggle upon which it is conditioned, is
not the enjoyment of so much cash. The end aimed at
by all concerned, is not the reward, but the high
culture to which the reward stimulated. The man or
boy who subordinates the mental culture to the
bursary, is but acting out the principle of Utilitarianism,
which subordinates virtue to happiness. The Creator
of this moral universe is a benevolent Being, and
willed the happiness of His moral intelligences; but
He is more than benevolent : He is righteous and holy,
and, therefore, ordained that happiness should be the
reward of holiness. He is Himself infinitely happy,
because He is infinitely holy, and this is the order of
the moral universe on which He has stamped His own
image. Happiness, in either case, is the offspring, and
not the rule, or standard, or criterion, of holiness. No
moral being can be truly happy who is not truly holy ;
but it does not follow that holiness is morally good
because it makes its possessor happy. This were
nothing but a reversal of the relation of cause and
effect. It is not because holiness makes men happy
that it is morally good, but it is because it is morally
good that it makes men happy. Holiness is moral
excellence, and moral excellence is essential to the
perfection of moral beings, and it is because of this that

406 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the possession of holiness renders moral beings happy.
And this is simply saying that holiness, or moral
excellence, like other things, derives its character, not
from its effects, but from its nature. Utilitarianism
reverses all this, and is therefore in conflict both with
the moral judgments of men and with sound philosophy,
which seeks the foundation of the character of any
thing possessing a character, in the nature of the thing
itself. Here, again, the theory is in conflict with the
Principle of Causality.
4. Lastly, Utilitarianism makes the morality of an
action depend entirely upon the intention of the agent.
Mr. Mill in replying to one of his critics, lays down
this principle as a fundamental of Utilitarianism :
" There is," he says, " no point which Utilitarian
thinkers (and Bentham pre-eminently) have taken
more pains to illustrate than this. The morality of the
action depends entirely upon the intention — that is,
upon what the agent wills to do. But the motive, that
is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, if it
makes no difference in the act, makes none in the
morality." The motive, he admits, " makes a great
difference in our moral estimation of the agent,
especially if it indicates a good or bad habitual disposi
tion." By a good or a bad disposition, however, he is
careful to explain he does not mean something in the
agent inherently morally good or bad, but " a bent of
character from which useful, or from which hurtful
actions are likely to flow " (p. 27).
The doctrine propounded on this point, therefore, is,

THE THEORY RESOLVABLE INTO JESUITISM. 407
as already charged, that whatever our opinion of the
agent may be, the morality of an action depends
entirely upon the intention of the agent — that is, upon
what the agent wills to do. If the intention is right,
all is right. Right and wrong have respect to the
ultimate good — viz., happiness. Acts, therefore, are
right or wrong as they are or are not done with
reference to this end. In addition to this, moral
character pertains to the intention alone ; and all other
things are right or wrong as they proceed from a right
or wrong intention. Now, I think we may very fairly
raise the question, Wherein does this doctrine differ
from that propounded by the Jesuit Fathers ? Whether
I am justified in raising this question, the reader may
judge after I have given a sketch of the "new morality"
— as given by Pascal in his Provincial Letters.
Pascal's imaginary instructor, at whose lips he repre
sents himself as receiving an exposition of the mysteries
of the New Morality, thus proceeds : —
" Understand, then, that this wonderful principle consists
in directing the intention, the importance of which, in our
system of morality, is such that I should almost venture to
compare it with the doctrine of probability. You have
already seen some features of it; for when I showed you
how servants might, with a safe conscience, manage certain
troublesome messages, did you not observe that it was by
simply taking off the attention from the sin itself, and fixing
it upon the advantage to be gained 1 This is what we call
directing t/ie intention. You saw, at the same time, that
those who gave money to obtain benefices, would be really
guilty of simony, without giving some such turn to the

408 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
transaction. But that you may judge of other cases, let me
now exhibit this grand expedient in aU its glory, in reference
to the subject of murder, which it justifies in a thousand
cases." " I already perceive," replied Pascal, " that in this
way, one may do anything without exception ! " " You
always go from one extreme to another," returned the father;
" pray stop your impetuosity. To convince you that we do
not permit everything, take this proof, that we never suffer
the formal intention of sinning for the sake of sinning, and
whoever persists in having no other design in his wickedness
than wickedness itself, we instantly discard. . . . When we
cannot prevent the action, we at least aim to purify the
intention. . . . Do you understand me now 1 " " Oh yes,
perfectly well," says Pascal, " you aUow men the external,
material action, and give to God the internal spiritual inten
tion ; and by this equitable division, you aim to harmonise
divine and human laws."
From this colloquy, it is manifest that the doctrine
of the Jesuit Fathers is, that moral character pertains
to the intention alone. It was this principle that
raised against them the moral indignation of the
civilised world, and made their very name a synonym
for deceitfulness itself. But will any man point out
wherein this system, described by Pascal, differs from
the system proposed by Mr. Mill ? According to the
doctrine of the Jesuits, the end sanctifies the means ;
according to the doctrine of the Utilitarians, as stated
by Mr. Mill, p. 2, " all action is for the sake of some
end ; and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose,
must take their whole character and colour from the
end to which they are subservient." The only differ
ence between the two systems is, that the end proposed

INTENTION SAID TO DETERMINE MORALITY. 409
in the one case is the good of the Church, and in the
other the good of mankind, and of the whole sentient
creation. This, however, is only a seeming difference,
for the Jesuits would say that, in intending the good
of the Church, they intend the highest good of the
universe. The principle is the same in both cases;
the means employed are right or wrong, according as
they do, or do not, secure the end proposed as the
ultimate good. This is the doctrine of the Jesuit
Fathers, and it is the doctrine of their successors, the
Utilitarians.* Again : as we have seen, it is a principle of Jesuitism
that the morality of an act depends on the intention of
the agent. This, as we have also seen, is a funda
mental, which, as Mr. Mill states, Utilitarians have
taken such pains to illustrate. " The morality of the
action depends," he says, " entirely upon the intention
— that is, what the agent wills to do." If the thing
willed, or intended by the agent, be the good, or happi
ness of himself or others, the act is right, if not, it is
wrong. Let the working men of England adopt this
principle of their avowed champion, and England may,
ere long, reap in forms still more appalling than the
Sheffield outrages, the fruits of the doctrine that the end
and intention alone determine the morality of the deed.
Principles, avowed by one who sustains the relations
in which Mr. Mill once stood to the working men
of the United Kingdom, will soon work their way into
* On the identity of the two systems, see Hodge's Review of
Finney's Lectures on Theology.

410 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
the heart of the masses, and if they do not lead to the
re-enactment of the horrors of Sheffield, on a scale of
imperial magnitude, it will not be owing to any lack of
adaptation, or tendency in the principles themselves.
Let the guardians of a Trades-Union, who are set for
the promotion of the interests of the particular trade,
get into their heads, and hearts, and hands, the funda
mental principles of Utilitarianism, and what can
prevent the enactment of such scenes ? Let them
grasp the principles — 1: That the end gives character
and colour to the rules to be observed in attaining it,
and, 2. That the morality of the act depends entirely
upon the intention of the agent; and if the moral
instincts of our common humanity forbid it not, they
will sacrifice to the interests of the trade, all other
interests, whether of property, or of life itself.
Nor need we limit our test of the new morality to
those organisations whose interests are watched over by
unscrupulous and bloody men — men whose deeds of
darkness, when exposed to the gaze of the kingdom,
have awakened the moral indignation of all ranks and
conditions of men. Let Britain's legislators beware
how they dally with this insidious philosophy. Let
them remember that the legitimacy of the end, and the
righteousness of the intention, will not vindicate before
the Governor of the nations, the adoption of measures
which are in, and of themselves unrighteous. To allay
party animosities, to heal the wounds of a bleeding,
sensitive nation, and to cement in one imperial brother
hood, the Norman, the Saxon, and the Celt, are ends

CONDITIONS OF RIGHTEOUS LEGISLATION. 411
worthy of the combined wisdom of the Parliament of
Britain; but it is not enough that the Lords and
Commons address themselves to the achievement of
these righteous ends, with the right, and honourable,
and laudable intention of promoting the happiness of
our land, and the stability of the Empire. In addition
to all these essential conditions of righteous legislation,
there is still another essential with which neither the
nation nor her Parliament may dispense, and that
essential is, that the means wherewith it is proposed
to cicatrise the nation's wounds, and silence the clamours
of her insatiate foes, be not the offspring of a temporis
ing expediency, but enactments founded in righteous
ness — enactments which, whilst they unshackle the
limbs of all the people of the land, will not invigorate
and perpetuate a spiritual despotism, whose enthrone
ment would be but the formal inauguration of Anti-
Christ himself.
But, to conclude : judged by the principles whereby
mankind are wont to test their own acts, and the acts
of others ; and tried on any theatre of human action,
Utilitarianism is found not only philosophically
unsound, but morally pernicious. Ignoring, as it does,
the inherent morality of the means employed, and
estimating, as it does, the morality of the act solely by
the end contemplated, and the intention entertained by
the agent, its tendency is to vitiate the moral percep
tions of those who embrace it, and make them reckless
of the means by which they seek the achievement of
what they may regard as legitimate ends. Those who

412 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
have adopted this scheme of morals, have simply
adopted, in another form, the system whose maxim is,
" Let us do evil that good may come." In the language
of Utilitarianism, which denies that morality attaches
to means, this maxim would read " Let us do jjood — i.e.,
promote happiness, by whatever means this only good
can be secured." The means cannot be evil, for being
subservient to the one sole end of human action, they
are thereby raised to the rank of the relatively good.
The adoption of such a system, whether by an
individual or by a society, is at once the sign and the
measure of demoralisation. The adoption of such a
system can only occur where the law written on the
heart has been obscured by the inordinate exercise of
the speculative understanding, in a state of divorce
from the moral elements of man's nature, or where it
has been obliterated by a continuous career of iniquity.
By an individual, or by a society, as in the case of the
Jesuits, the system may be adopted, but on a scale of
national magnitude, it never has been adopted, and,
blessed be the Author of our humanity, it never can.
Against Utilitarianism, He has placed, in the bosom of
every man, a witness which cannot be bribed into
silence. In the law written in the heart, He has set to
that system a bound which it may not pass. This is
that "lex non scripta, seel nata," of which Cicero
speaks ; that law " ad quam non docti, sedfacti; non
instituti, seel imbuti sumus." Pro Milone, cap. iv.
It is that law on which that orator elsewhere expatiates
with such power, " Nee vero aut per Senatum, aut per

CICERO, CHATHAM, AND LINCOLN. 413
propulum solvi hac lege possumus ; neque est quce-
rendus explanator aut imterpres ejus alius : nee erit
alia lex Romce, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac,
sed et omnes gentes, omni tempore, una lex et
sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit
communis quasi magister et imperator omnium
Deus; ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator ;
cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac, naturam
hominis aspernatus, hoc ipso luet maximas pcenas,
etiam si ccetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit."
De Republica, Lib. III., cap. xxii. I cannot doubt that
Chatham had this passage in his mind when he uttered,
with such power, in the ears of England's Parliament,
those words which, reiterated by the Wilberforces and
Clarksons of our common humanity, never ceased to
reverberate until, seconded by America's martyred
President, they were at length swallowed up in the
triumphal shout of four millions of men unshackled
from a hard and cruel bondage : " There is a law above
all the enactments of human codes ; the same at all
times, and in all circumstances. ... It is the law
written by the finger of God on the heart of man ; and
by that law, unchangeable and eternal, whilst men
despise fraud, loathe rapine, and hate blood, they will
reject, with indignation, the wild and guilty phantasy
that man can hold property in man." On the platform
of this law we take our stand against Utilitarianism.
Standing on the fundamental and palpable truth that
man is possessed of a moral nature, we can, with equal
authority, say, that whilst men "do by nature the

414 THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY.
things contained in the law ; " whilst they by nature
approve of virtue and condemn vice, they will reject
the wild and guilty phantasy, that the end and
intention alone determine the morality of the means,
and the no less wild, and the no less guilty, phantasy,
that happiness is a nobler thing than holiness — that it
is the sole end of human action, and the sole test and
standard of virtue.

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and the Key to the Apocalypse.
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