YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
HOWELL WRIGHT COLLECTION
of Rhodesiana and
South Africana
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS
Press Opinions
'' Such a work written in such a spirit clearly demands serious and
sober attention. . . . Mr. Hobson's book should help serious students
of politics to think matters out. . . . Let the reader study this book,
and then, if he will, return to Mr. Fitzpatrick's 'Transvaal from
Within.'"— Westminster Gazette.
"Precisely the book most needed at the present juncture . . . most
scrupulously cautious and temperate and intrinsically valuable."—Echo.
"It is possible to read with interest and with pleasure far into these
pages without ceasing to lose faith in the author's impartiality as well as
his ability."—Daily News.
" I have no space to give my readers any adequate idea of the fresh¬
ness, the simple and sober strain of argument, the force and intellectual
weight of Mr. Hobson's invaluable book."—H. W. Massingham in the
Morning Leader.
"We must confess to have found an unexpected and indeed absorbing
interest in the volume. ... It is likely to remain the finest and most
judicial statement of the case."—Ethical World.
"A book which deserves reading and consideration. . . . Mr. Hobson
shows himself to be an acute observer, and much that he has to tell in
his interesting volume is worth some thought."— Western Daily Press.
" The writer was an eye-witness to much that happened at a critical
moment, and at the very centre of political disturbance." — Daily
Chronicle.
"Mr. Hobson's book compels attention. In the first place, it is well
written ; in the second, it is the first book of importance which has
been published since the war broke out; again, it is as impartial an
investigation as it is perhaps possible to expect while the guns are still
firing. . . . Mr. Hobson is neither a Boer-champion nor a Boer-hater."—
Christian Commonwealth.
PREFACE
During the summer and autumn of 1899 I spent several
months in South Africa examining the political situation
in the Transvaal and Cape Colony. I was at Pretoria
during the most critical period of the negotiations, at
Bloemfontein when the Raad of the Free State decided
to stand by the Transvaal, and at Cape Town when the
war began, and I had the opportunity of personal inter¬
course with many men of political prominence in the
Republics and the Colony. The earlier chapters of this
book are chiefly revised and amplified impressions of
what I saw and heard, and include detailed studies of
" Outlander grievances " and of the feelings of Dutch and
British Afrikanders upon the eve of the present conflict.
Several of the chief issues I have detached for separate
treatment, fortifying personal experience and intercourse
by documentary evidence, some of which has not been
before published in this country.
The latter part of the volume is chiefly devoted to
an economic and political analysis of those factors in
the situation which throw light upon the possibilities of
a stable settlement upon the termination of the war, and
of a peaceful and prosperous future for South Africa.
V
vi PREFACE
There is no attempt to work out the details of a scheme
of settlement, but merely to point out some of the essen¬
tial facts and forces which demand most careful consi¬
deration.
A considerable part of the earlier chapters appeared
in the form of letters to the Manchester Guardian, and
some of the substance of the later chapters was published
in the Speaker. I am indebted to the proprietors of
these papers for their kind permission to reprint these
passages. T A TT
CONTENTS
PART I
THE BOER REPUBLICS IN 1899
CHAP. PAGE
I. POLITICAL POSITION IN CAPE COLONY 3
II. JOHANNESBURG IN THE SUMMER OF 1899 . . . . IO
III. PERSONAGES AND PARTIES IN THE TRANSVAAL . . . 15
IV. THE PERSONALITY OP PRESIDENT KRUGER . . . .22
V. OTHER FORCES IN TRANSVAAL POLITICS . . . .32
VI. THE WAR SPIRIT IN PRETORIA 40
VII. THE RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA . . . .46
VIII. THE HELOTS IN JOHANNESBURG 52
IX. THE DEMAND FOR THE FRANCHISE 63
X. OFFICIAL CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCY. . . -73
XI. THE NEED OF FINANCIAL REFORM 84
XII. THE DYNAMITE MONOPOLY 88
XIII. A GENERAL ESTIMATE OF GRIEVANCES . . . .96
XIV. THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 99
XV. THE DUTCH FEELING IN THE COLONY : AN INTERVIEW
WITH OLIVE SCHREINER II9
XVI. TRANSVAAL ARMAMENTS 126
XVII. THE CASE OF THE FREE STATE 136
XVIII. THE SUZERAINTY ISSUE 146
XIX. WHY DID THE BOERS ISSUE THE ULTIMATUM ? . . -155
XX. DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR l6l
vii
viii
CONTENTS
PART II
THE POLICY OF RAND CAPITALISTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. FOR WHOM ARE WE FIGHTING? 189
II. THE POLITICAL METHODS OF THE OUTLANDERS . . . 198
III. A CHARTERED PRESS 2o6
IV. FOR WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING 1 229
PART III
TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT
I. DUTCH AND BRITISH IN SOUTH AFRICA .... 243
II. THE AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 250
III. THE PROBABLE INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA . 257
IV. THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 279
V. FEDERATION OF STATES ....... 296
VI. THE TRUE LINE OF BRITISH POLICY 306
INDEX 317
PART I
THE BOER REPUBLICS IN 1899
THE
WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
CHAPTER I
POLITICAL POSITION IN CAPE COLONY
South Africa is proverbially a land of surprises, and for
a sojourner to express any confident judgment upon the
delicate relations between the Colonial Government and
the Imperial policy during the recent crisis of public
affairs would be the pinnacle of folly. But having
occupied myself at Cape Town chiefly in canvassing
opinion on this matter, and having got, in conversation
with different members of the Ministry and other political
leaders, clear and outspoken judgments, I venture to
present a fairly representative summary of a situation
which is not unlikely to mark the beginning of a serious
constitutional struggle. Whether the Colonial Secretary
and the High Commissioner were justified or not in their
espousal of the cause of the Outlander, and in the use
of him to urge upon the Transvaal a sort of suzerainty
neither set forth nor, in my judgment, implied in the Con¬
ventions, is not a point to be argued here. But it is of
urgent importance that Englishmen should understand
how sternly and strongly the policy of Downing Street
was resented by the elective Assembly of what has
3
4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
hitherto been held to be, and distinctly holds itself to be
by right, a substantially self-governing colony. The Home
Government and the High Commissioner are felt to
have ignored and overridden the judgment of a strong
Ministry, representing a people whose commercial and
political interests and experience entitle them to para¬
mount consideration in the settlement of this Transvaal
issue. The press and the voice of a British minority
must not be allowed to conceal the essential facts of
the situation. Here is a very strong Colonial Govern¬
ment, commanding a majority of twelve in an Assembly
of ninety - five (thus corresponding to a majority of
over eighty in the English House of Commons), and
likely to be returned with fresh reinforcements if, as is
rashly suggested in some quarters, the Governor dissolves
the Assembly and appeals to the country. Nor is this
likely to be a merely transient condition of affairs. A
clear race cleavage, such as the present Imperial policy
promotes, is likely to mean a permanent majority of
Dutch Afrikanders in the Assembly, for it is unlikely
that any new scheme of redistribution can be adopted
enabling the British Afrikanders to triumph over the
higher natural increase of the Dutch population and the
greater influence which their broader dispersion rightly
gives them in the country.
At the head of this majority, with seven exceptions
entirely Dutch, sits a Ministry of experienced politicians
(chiefly British and with but two Dutch Afrikanders), under
a Premier (Mr. Schreiner) whose ability and force of char¬
acter are admitted even by his adversaries. Men like Mr.
Merriman, Mr. Sauer, and Mr. Solomon are no raw carpet¬
baggers hoisted into power by some sudden swell in the
stream of party politics; they are men thoroughly conver-
POLITICAL POSITION IN CAPE COLONY 5
sant with the life and needs of the people and trained in
the arts of administration. Snch men feel that they know a
hundred times more about the really salient points of the
situation—the character of the Boer, the possible union of
South African States, the native question—than the Colonial
Office and a brand-new High Commissioner from Egypt.
Their general diagnosis of the Transvaal situation and its
bearing on the larger questions of South African politics
has been firm and consistent. They have been freely
accused by the Jingo press of inciting the Transvaal
Government to an obstinate refusal of British claims. So
far is this from being true, that, when history comes to
displace journalistic fabrication, it will be known that
friendly representations from Cape Colony have been far
more effectual to wring concessions and reforms from Mr.
Kruger than the threats of the British Government. Mr.
Schreiner and his Ministers were absolutely united in
recognising the reality of grievances and the necessity of
reforms along the lines proposed, but they regarded the
grievances as gravely exaggerated and the forceful methods
of reform adopted as foolish, unjust, and fraught with
dangerous reactions on the peace and progress of South
Africa. The concluding words of General Butler's speech
at Grahamstown a year ago, generally held to have occa¬
sioned his recall, concisely express their judgment: " What
South Africa needs is rest, and not a surgical operation."
Holding that the Outlanders were not seriously threatened
in life, liberty, or property, they deprecated alike the vio¬
lence and the precipitancy of the present policy. Though
progress in reform was slower than they would desire, there
had been progress. The economic and other influences of
the Rand had already acted as solvents of the old Boer
conservatism. A few more years and the death of Mr
6
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Kruger would, they argued, in all probability, work a fairly
rapid and peaceful transformation in the politics of the
Transvaal. One and all held that in the more distant
future England would and must, in the natural course
of events, control the Transvaal politically as well as
economically, and that to force the pace by abrupt and
artificial interference was injurious. Mr. Schreiner, Mr.
Merriman, and their colleagues, were as firmly convinced
as the most pronounced Jingo that England must in
effect control the destinies of the whole of South Africa,
but they deprecated the doctrine of force as the midwife
of progress, seeing—what the Imperial Government fails
to see—the moral and political reactions of menace and
war upon the race questions which underlie the political
future of the country.
Upon the immediate policy of the Transvaal I found
no absolute agreement. Several of the leading politicians
were convinced that the proposal of a joint inquiry was
deliberately conceived in order to force on Mr. Kruger an
admission of the suzerainty he has always denied. The
Premier thought otherwise, holding that no such implica¬
tion was involved, even if it were intended. His view was
that Mr. Kruger might accept the inquiry as a step in the
friendly intercourse entered upon at Bloemfontein, and
that, as a first result of the report of such inquiry, the
conference might be resumed between Sir A. Milner and
the President with a view to final settlement.
It was impossible to go far in such a political inquiry as
that which I undertook without perceiving that the most
serious obstacle to an amicable settlement was the profound
distrust of one another's motives entertained by the nego¬
tiating parties. Sir A. Milner did not hesitate to pronounce
duplicity to be the distinctive trait of the Boer Govern-
POLITICAL POSITION IN CAPE COLONY 7
ment. When I reached Pretoria, I found that the same
word contained the essence of Boer criticism upon British
diplomacy. How could a real and lasting understanding
be reached between such controversialists? The Cape
Ministers, divided in their estimate of Mr. Kruger's policy,
were united in denouncing the tactlessness of the Cham-
berlain-Milner method. Sir A. Milner, they held, utterly
failed to understand the Boer character, and could not get
at any point into sympathetic touch with it. This was
made manifest by the proceedings at Bloemfontein. " How
differently," one of them put it to me, "would Rhodes
have handled the business in the days before the Raid
had made him an impossible negotiator! Instead of
bombarding the old man with a display of officialism, and
seeking to wrest from him admissions by dint of academic
argument, Rhodes would have said to his attaches,' Now
all you fellows, clear out,' and then he would have sat
down by the fire, lighting cigarettes, while the old man
smoked his long pipe; and they would have talked over
things for a couple of days, so as to get to really under¬
stand one another before entering on any formal attempt
at settlement." Sir A. Milner's method was to treat
Kruger as a nineteenth - century up-to-date European
diplomatist, instead of a slow-thinking, suspicious, seven¬
teenth-century Puritan farmer, and a conference upon
these lines was foredoomed to failure. The Dutch Afri¬
kanders were, indeed, convinced that a peaceful conference
was not intended to succeed; that Mr. Rhodes had got a
clear understanding with Mr. Chamberlain after the Raid,
whereby the latter undertook to direct the next attack
upon the independence of the Republic; and that in
Sir A. Milner there had been found an apt and sympa¬
thetic agent of this plan of campaign.
8
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Although Cape Ministers did not in so many words
commit themselves to this interpretation, it indubitably
expressed their underlying conviction. The real aim, as
they saw it, was not redress of grievances on the Rand,
but the application of the new Imperialism to the affairs
of South Africa. The optimist notion that a few months
must see a final settlement; that, by the display or the
actual use of arms, we should drive the Boers to a recog¬
nition of our power, and that after this moral or physical
drubbing they would at once get to " know their place,"
was rejected by them as utterly fantastic. The dogs of
war, once let loose, could not be so easily leashed again;
force applied as a remedy to the stubborn Boers could not
be soon replaced by sympathetic and enlightened demo¬
cratic institutions; annexation would be inevitable, and
could only be sustained by permanent militarism and the
autocracy which pertains to it. What Cape Ministers
first and chiefly dreaded was the effect of this upon the
general governmental policy of South Africa. Govern¬
ment from Downing Street has ever been the bane of
colonial statesmen of every party. Intensely loyal to the
British flag, they constantly chafe against the bit of the
Colonial Office when employed to drive them along roads
which they know far better than Imperial Ministers can
know them. The real unity of South Africa—a mere
sounding phrase in the mouths of party politicians in
England—is brought home to them by concrete facts, and
gives them a clear right to exercise a prevailing voice in
affairs which so vitally affect their interests. The Trans¬
vaal is a plain case in point. The Imperial Government,
in the early stages of the controversy, treated the issue as
if it only affected Outlanders. But the Jameson Raid, and
the policy which was its sequel, had already exercised most
POLITICAL POSITION IN CAPE COLONY 9
disastrous influences upon colonial trade. The proposals
of taxation, which were hotly dividing parties in Cape
Colony last summer, were directly due to the necessities
arising from damage to commercial confidence and that
diversion of railway traffic from the Cape Colony lines
which has been a chief object of Transvaal endeavour
during recent years. The colony suffered more than it was
possible to compute from this policy of menace, and a
catastrophic solution of the problem, attended by a regime
of militarism and a close Imperial control over matters of
vital domestic import, was dreaded by all who understood
what it signified in the development of colonial life and
institutions.
CHAPTER II
johannesburg in the summer op 1899
After one lias travelled for a thousand miles through, a
bare and desolate country, in which no single human settle¬
ment, with the solitary exception of Bloemfontein, the
Free State capital, can even pretend to be a town, Johan¬
nesburg, the golden city of Africa, with its eighty miles of
streets and its hundred thousand inhabitants, makes a
powerful impression. It offers a weird mixture of civilisa¬
tion and savagedom. Laid out in leisurely fashion, with
broad and ample streets, where a handsome stone building
breaks occasionally the meagre and ugly effect of hastily
improvised shop fronts and boarding-houses, it has the
potentiality of a splendid modern city of the Paris or
Vienna order. There is plenty of room in Africa, and
no inducement to overcrowding. In fact, Johannesburg
covers an immense area, reaching out its tentacles on
every side, and wearing the large gold reef, the Witwaters-
rand, with its mining villages, as a sort of long double
flapping tail. The entire city is the product of thirteen
years' growth, and the amount of energy put into this
little stretch of forty miles of gold reef has been prodigious.
Even during the period of slackness and depression last
summer, when gloom and terror were hanging over the
place, when all business was suspended, and the gaiety
and social licence of the town were suffering a total eclipse,
the outward signs of multifarious enterprise could not fail
to strike a stranger. Here, seven thousand miles from
io
JOHANNESBURG IN SUMMER OF 1899 11
England, in the heart of a Republic of rude farmers of
Dutch descent, has grown up in a single decade a great
city, which, so far as the language and habits of the white
population is concerned, is almost absolutely English. In
Johannesburg the Boer population is a mere handful of
officials and their families, some five thousand of the
population; the rest is about evenly divided between
white settlers, mostly English-speaking, and the Kaffirs,
who are everywhere in White Man's Africa the hewers
of wood and drawers of water. The town is in some
respects dominantly, and even aggressively, British, but
British with a difference which it takes some little time to
understand. That difference is mostly due to the Jewish
factor. If one takes the recent figures of the census, there
appears to be less than seven thousand Jews in Johannes¬
burg, but the experience of the streets rapidly exposes this
fallacy of figures. The shop fronts and business houses,
the market-place, the saloons, the " stoeps " of the smart
suburban houses, are sufficient to convince one of the
large presence of the chosen people. If any doubt
remains, a walk outside the Exchange, where, in the
street " between the chains," the financial side of the
gold business is transacted, will dispel it. So far as
wealth and power, and even numbers are concerned,
Johannesburg is essentially a Jewish town. Most of these
Jews figure as British subjects, though many are, in fact,
German and Russian Jews who have come to Africa after
a brief sojourn in England. The rich, vigorous, and
energetic financial and commercial families are chiefly
German Jews. I lay stress upon this fact because,
while every one knows the Jews are strong, their real
strength here is much under-estimated. Though figures
are so misleading, it is worth while to mention that
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the directory of Johannesburg shows sixty-eight Cohens
against twenty-four Joneses and fifty-three Browns. The
Jews mostly took little active part in the Outlander
agitation; they let others do that sort of work. But
since half of the land and nine-tenths of the wealth of
the Transvaal claimed for the Outlander are chiefly theirs,
they will be chief gainers by any settlement advantageous
to the Outlander.
In ordinary times Johannesburg is a strong type of
modern cosmopolitan civilisation, with some of its good
and all its bad features. Of its extraordinary wealth and
reckless luxury signs exist everywhere. Saloons, gambling
hells, and other dens of vice abound, while only two years
ago the prize-ring of Johannesburg was the most famous in
the world and had a virtual monopoly of the best talent.
That the best society is very mixed it is needless to add
when one remembers that a very few years has drawn from
all quarters of the globe adventurous men and women in
search of gold. That there are many sound and solid
business men with their families, especially among the
engineering and professional classes, men of grit and force
of character as well as of business capacity, may well
be admitted. But the strange taint of gold lust—auri
sacra fames—everywhere pervades the atmosphere and
dominates the life even of the shopkeeping and pro¬
fessional classes. Gambling in mining shares is well-nigh
universal. I was assured that half the Cornish miners
were always dabbling in them, seeking to make their thrift
as profitable as they could by watching the market.
Lotteries, horse-racing, and gambling of every sort are
prevalent and absorbing pastimes. These, of course, are
statements applicable to many places; but there can be
no manner of doubt that the conditions under which this
JOHANNESBURG IN SUMMER OF 1899 13
golden city has arisen have made it one of the most
terrible haunts of greed, gambling, and every form of
depravity which the world has ever seen. There are, of
course, qualities which balance, screen, and in some eyes
perhaps redeem the character of such a place. Never
have I been so struck with the intellect and the audacious
enterprise and foresight of great business men as here.
Nor are these qualities confined to the Beits and Barnatos
and other great capitalists ; the town bristles and throbs
with industrial and commercial energy; the bracing phy¬
sical atmosphere (Johannesburg stands 6000 feet above
the sea) has marvellous tonic influences to evoke and
stimulate mental energy. Every one seems alert and tense,
eager to grasp the skirts of some happy chance and raise
himself, as he has seen some scores of others no better than
himself raised, to sudden affluence. The utter dependence
upon financial "booms" and " slumps," conjoined with the
strain and kaleidoscopic changes of the political situation,
has bred by selection and by education a type of man and
of society which is as different from that of Manchester as
the latter is from the life of Hankow or Buenos Ayres.
All this stands on an external basis of picturesque
barbarism. The essentially serf civilisation of South Africa
is represented by the prevalence of Kaffir servants; all
the hard manual labour is done by them, and strange
flashes of savagedom gave piquancy to the street life ; as,
for instance, the sight of Kaffirs, grotesquely painted
and decorated, dashing through the streets harnessed to
light rickshaws, carrying daintily-dressed English ladies
to evening parties. Ordinary street life is indeed a babel
of races and tongues; not only the European languages,
but the voices of Hindoos, Chinamen, Malays, chime in
with the various Kaffir dialects. The Boer, who is sup-
14 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
posed in some obscure way to be the proprietor of this
country, makes very little show. He is officially repre¬
sented by the policeman or Zarp (a word-composition of
the initial letters of the Dutch words for " South African
Republic Police"), an innocent lump of stolidity, who
stands at the street corner. If you want to see the real
Boer, you have to get up early and visit the market.
There you find him in propria persona, often with his
family, and always with his waggon and team of oxen,
with which he has brought his farm produce to market;
often travelling a hundred miles, and taking several days
and nights on his patient journey, sleeping by night in a
sort of upper loft of his waggon; by day tramping along
with his team, or smoking on the waggon-seat, while his
Kaffir boy leads the oxen. Many scores of these Boers
you can see any morning as the auctioneer is wheeled
round the market, and stops before each waggon to sell
the produce. There is no mistake about the physical
prowess of these men; almost to a man they are tall,
powerful-limbed, and vigorous, with strong, calm, enduring
faces—men difficult to dislodge from any position they
have taken in bargain or in battle. These are the sons of
the country; their fathers conquered and brought the
land under rude cultivation and control; yet almost their
only real connection with this treasure-centre of their coun¬
try is these brief early morning visits to the market, where
they sell their farm-produce to the horde of foreigners
who are living in luxury upon the natural wealth they
extract (through Kaffir labour) from the strip of land on
which they settle. They take no part whatever either as
capitalists, miners, professional men, or shopkeepers in
this curious scramble, but only pay these early morning
calls with their oxen and drive back again.
CHAPTER III
personages and parties in the transvaal
The common English notion that the Boers are a single,
solid, and compact body of obstinate and reactionary
farmers, dominated by the personality of one strong and
cunning man, who is incapable of education and spon¬
taneous progress, is largely a mischievous perversion of
history and of present conditions. It is put forward to
support the view that force is the only remedy, and
that reforms of government and administration can only
come by strong pressure from without, and by the subse¬
quent control of the Transvaal by Outlanders, with the
support of the British Empire. Now two undeniable facts
give a semblance of truth to this view. Paul Kruger, a
man of narrow, deep-set political convictions, who has
helped to make the entire history of his nation, is strongly
hostile to the threatened political dominance of Out¬
landers, and the entire people support him in his resist¬
ance to the menaces of British arms. But this uniformity
is but a momentary phase of patriotic feeling—that brief
cessation of intestine quarrels which always occurs in
facing a common enemy. It is part of the Jingo case to
say that progress from inside is impossible ; that the Boer
is wholly and hopelessly reactionary in his thoughts and
ways. Now this is not so, and a crude narration of
selected legal enactments of the last ten years does not
prove it. The franchise policy since 1890 may indeed be
regarded as reactionary and foolish, though not so foolish as
r5
16 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
at first sight it seems. The ultra-Liberal franchise before
1890 required modification in view of the tremendous
pace of the new immigration of mixed foreigners. That
this restrictive policy was being driven too far was
recognised from the beginning by a minority of the
more intelligent and enlightened burghers. Those
who represent the nation as a mass of stolid and
ignorant Conservatives are not aware that from 1890
right on to the present there has been conducted,
both among the people and in the Raad, a vigorous
campaign of education and reform by a progressive sec¬
tion of the burghers. Mr. Esselen, an Afrikander of
British education, formerly a Judge of the High Court,
headed a vigorous attack on the franchise law of 1890,
and, with a powerful body of young burghers, stoutly
opposed the policy of restriction which alarm rather than
definite reactionary principle led the Raad to sanction.
I have read speech after speech of Mr. Esselen, delivered
as far back as 1892, which present the legitimate claims
of the Outlander and the interests of the Republic in
assimilating the new population. If Mr. Kruger be taken
as the champion of reaction, history shows that he has
not exercised the complete and unquestioned sway that is
attributed to him. So far from this being so, the violent
cleavage of parties under Mr. Kruger and General Joubert
has more than once been carried to the verge of civil war.
In 1893 General Joubert's friends claim that he was actually
elected by a majority of votes in the election for President,
but that Mr. Kruger's friends manipulated the returns, and
that sooner than break the State by open strife General
Joubert resigned his claim. The support of the Liberals
was given at this time to the General, who was a man of
generous sympathies and open to many of the new ideas.
PERSONAGES AND PARTIES 17
It is only at moments of critical danger to the State that
the strong will of Mr. Kruger has been allowed to assume
a sort of dictatorial power; it is not because he normally
represents the entire views and feelings of the people.
The Dutch trekkers of the Transvaal differ in no real
respect from their brethren of the Orange Free State,
whose policy is admittedly most liberal and enlightened.
Why is it that the Transvaal policy has been so different,
and yet that the Free State burghers are standing to a
man shoulder to shoulder by the Transvaalers in their
fight against external compulsion? Mr. Fischer, of the
Free State Executive, one of the most far-sighted and
genuinely progressive men in South Africa, put the case
to me in the plainest and most uncompromising way.
He described how educative influences were at work under¬
mining the sullen suspicions of the British which had been
branded by experience upon the early Voortrekkers; how
the slow-moving forces received a check when the foreign
flood poured in after 1886 ; how at the very time that the
Raad, under President Kruger, was tightening the restric¬
tions, there was a new vigorous rising of internal progressive
forces working towards the assimilation of the new blood
and the new ideas in industry and politics. Even Mr.
Kruger has not been the stolid stumbling-block that he
has been represented. In 1895, before the Reform move¬
ment in Johannesburg took serious shape, he had plans
of franchise reform; he saw the necessity of doing some¬
thing, and his friends were urging changes in the franchise
law. The Jameson Raid not unnaturally hardened his
heart and drove him back on ancient prejudice. Recover¬
ing from this shock, he and his Conservative burghers
were soon confronted with a renewed agitation, conducted
in Johannesburg, not by friends of constitutional reform,
B
18 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
but by foreigners, strangers to Boer life and character,
who urged claims of an alarming kind, who assailed every
legislative and administrative act of the Government
which gave them shelter and enabled them to amass
wealth, and who called, in notes of ever-growing clearness,
for a British army of conquest and occupation to secure
for them a controlling voice in the State.
But though the Liberal party among the burghers had
its organisation broken and its political hopes dashed to
the ground by the Jameson Raid, it is distinctly incorrect
to assert that no concessions and no progress have been
made during the last three years. Much is made of the
alleged failure of the Government to carry out the re¬
commendations of the Industrial Commission appointed
by it in 1897 to examine burdens and grievances. Mr.
Fitzpatrick would have his readers believe that " nothing "
was done to carry out the liberal recommendations of
that body, and even many well-informed and well-dis¬
posed critics, like Mr. Bryce and Mr. Garrett Fisher,
have in effect endorsed this view. In point of fact,
while the Raad Committee, appointed to consider the
report of the Commission, rejected some of its recom¬
mendations, those which it approved and which were
carried out were not inconsiderable. Taking the chief
economic grievances, we find that a reduction of 10s. per
case in the price of dynamite was effected; the special
custom dues were taken off most of the staple foods, and
so far from this reduction being compensated, as is
alleged, by an increased tariff upon luxuries, a net re¬
duction, estimated last year to amount to about £700,000,
was achieved. The rates of the Netherland South African
Railway Company were likewise reduced to the extent
of some £200,000 per annum.
PERSONAGES AND PARTIES 19
The administration of the Liquor Pass, and Gold Thefts
Laws were made more stringent, and ample testimony-
exists to prove that the mine-owners themselves admit a
great improvement in the administration of these laws,
which were specially designed to secure the interests of
the mines. Much is made of the refusal of the Govern¬
ment to grant full self-government to Johannesburg and
the Rand, a proposal which Mr. Chamberlain urged in
1896. If the establishment of powers equivalent to those
possessed by an English municipality had been sought,
this proposal would have been eminently reasonable, but
no such powers were sought or would have been acceptable
to the mining industry. Good local government, though
a real, was a secondary object of this proposal, the first
object being to mark off the Rand, the treasure-house of
all South Africa, as a special preserve of the mining
magnates, to save it from bearing that burden of taxa¬
tion which rightly and reasonably is imposed upon the
natural resources of the country, and to give the control
of the laws affecting native labour to the mining managers.
It was utterly unreasonable to expect that the Govern¬
ment should quietly consent to such a scheme, which
virtually meant the alienation of the Rand, though the
scheme of municipal government they did devise was
far from commendable.
Those who fairly investigate the facts will acknowledge
that, even under the spell of reaction imposed by the
Jameson Raid and the threats which followed, some
substantial progress in better government was made.
The pace was certainly slow, far too slow to suit the
hasty ambitions of the gold-seeker, but it was all that
the circumstances rendered feasible. A little longer
time to wear down the suspicions and the ignorance
20 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
of the old Boer mind and the pace might have , been
quickened.
I found in Pretoria many men of most liberal mind,
not a few trained in the traditions of English Liberalism,
recognising fully the need and the gain of identifying
the new inhabitants with the old burgher population.
But their mouths have been absolutely shut since the
Jameson Raid and the appeals to English force which
ensued; they could not plead the cause of progress without
appearing traitors who were seeking to divide the people
by factions in face of an outside force. Had there been no
Jameson Raid, and no subsequent appeals to England, the
inner spirit of reform would have shown worthy fruits ere
this, the dangerous personal ascendency of Mr. Kruger
would have been checked, if it had not been overthrown, and
the peace of South Africa would not have been destroyed
as it has been. This, it may be said, is highly speculative,
but it is legitimate hypothesis based upon historic fact and
knowledge of human nature. There did exist a genuine
though slowly growing Liberal party in the Transvaal,
penetrated, moreover, by views and sentiments definitely
British, working towards an enlightened policy and seeking
a peaceable solution of racial and political problems. Ex¬
ternal force has displaced natural growth; revolutionary
methods with an appeal to arms have been preferred to the
evolutionary method which Nature imposes. Ignorant men
tell us that the Boer is unteachable, the permanent prey
of brutal prejudice and inveterate selfishness. But are
these the radical, unchangeable properties of the Frisian
blood which we have in common with these Boers ? If so,
shall we judge them ? If not, if these Dutchmen really
belong to a race shown by history in Europe, and even in
Africa, to be amply capable of economic, political, and
PERSONAGES AND PARTIES
21
social progress, is it not the part of true statesmanship to
give the educative forces of inward growth time to operate
upon their political forms rather than to hammer them by-
brute force into shapes of mechanical correctness? I do
not pretend that the Volksraad is a very enlightened body
of statesmen. The hopeless impasse of recent years has
kept out of it not a few of the best and finest men. Yet
this Raad came in with a majority of what may rightly be
called Moderate Progressives, men pledged to check those
concessions and corruptions which have been eating away
the honesty of the official class. At their opening they
elected a progressive chairman and vice-chairman; schemes
of political and economic reform were freely canvassed.
Many hopes were founded on this Raad. The common
charge of corruption requires closer analysis than can be
given here. I can only say that I find no reason whatever
to endorse those widespread and general charges of direct
dishonesty which have been freely made both in England
and South Africa. On the contrary, there is reason to believe
that this Raad contains many honest and fairly able men
determined to cleanse the corruption of the State and to
force the pace of progress. But this they would not do at
the dictate of England ; the disclosure of the policy of Mr.
Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner, the dictatorial assump¬
tion of suzerainty, the charges of duplicity brought by a
Power whose interference is in their view a flagrant breach
of the Convention, have made all these men set their teeth
and grip their guns as Englishmen themselves have always
done and always will do when a foreigner attempts to drive
them.
CHAPTER IV
THE PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER
To many people there is only one personality in the Trans¬
vaal, one all-powerful will. Hero or villain, Paul Kruger is
taken to be the embodiment of Boer nature, the man whose
force, experience, and craft dominate Boer policy. How far is
Mr. Kruger personally responsible for the present trouble ?
It is hardly possible for a casual visitor to get beneath the
outer husk of this grim old man, with the massive, fur¬
rowed face, who sits upon his stoep puffing a huge
meerschaum pipe and growling out disconnected sen¬
tences between the spits. You ask yourself as you sit
waiting for his Dutch to be put into English (Mr. Kruger
speaks no English), What manner of man is this? A
pious patriot, soldier, hunter, farmer, driven by sheer
circumstances into high politics and adapting some
natural bucolic cunning to the purposes of diplomacy in
the defence of his country, or a scheming old hypocrite,
who has richly feathered his nest by every art of political
corruption, and who employs every trick of evasion and
falsehood in defence of his monopoly of the public power
and purse, using for these purposes the single genuine
passion of his life—hatred of the English ? Even those
who have associated intimately with the old man for
many years differ widely in their estimate of his nature
and his political power; indeed, this inscrutability is itself
a strong factor in the situation. There are even those who,
22
PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 23
upholding Mr. Kruger's personal and political honesty, yet
think he is prepared to wreck his country by war, in order
to maintain the supremacy which might fall from his
hands under reform. A brief personal impression of such
a man is not worth much; even corrected and filled out
by the freely expressed opinions of many of his friends
and enemies, it only warrants some general conjecture.
To strangers Mr. Kruger is not often communicative; the
State Secretary, Mr. Reitz, who took me to him, told how
he had a few days before introduced a well-known member
of the British Parliament, but could extract nothing but
an occasional grunt and a "Yes" or "No" from the old
man, who buried himself behind a cloud of tobacco-smoke.
Sometimes, however, he dilates and opens out in free
narrative. Olive Schreiner told me of a talk she had with
him a short time ago, in which he warmed up with a
long, animated, and wonderfully picturesque account of
the hunting and fighting of his adventurous youth. Even
now his reserve of physical force is immense; by his
sheer power of voice and presence he cows the Opposi¬
tion in the Raad. In ordinary talk he exercises little self-
restraint ; if any point of controversy rises, he will bring
his big fist down upon the table with alarming force.
I was somewhat fortunate in my reception. After I
had been introduced to the old man, he himself expressed
the desire to make a statement to the English people
upon the matter of the broken promises imputed to him.
He evidently feels very keenly on this matter, for, if I
remember right, Captain Younghusband tells how he
harked back to this topic in the two interviews he had
with him. The allusion is to the promises of "equal
treatment" which he made in the negotiations pre¬
vious to the Convention of 1881. He passionately
24 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
insisted that he had given equal treatment so far as all
civil rights were concerned, and that, as regards the rights
of burghership, he had all along sought to practise the
same policy, but the foreigners who came in refused to
accept the duties of burghership while seeking to gain
its privileges. He cited to me several instances where,
instead of helping the burghers to defend the country,
settlers had preferred to register themselves as British
subjects or to make an appeal to the power of Great
Britain so as to escape the commando. "I have," he
said, "always striven to bring these people into the full
rights of citizenship by inviting them to help our citi¬
zens to bear the burdens, but they always refused; they
wanted the rights without the duties." He then went
on to tell how those who fought in the Malaboch cam¬
paign and in other Kaffir wars had burghership conferred
on them by an edict of the Raad. Historically there is
some substance in this defence, though it is far from
being logically complete, for when appeals have been
made to Outlanders to take up arms under commando
or as volunteers, they have never been promised burgher¬
ship as a reward. But the real interest lies in the light
it throws upon Kruger's conception of politics; fighting
has played so essential a part in the making of the
nation, that it] seems to him that such personal service
is the only basis of burgher rights. "How," he would
ask himself, " can these Johannesburg people become
true and worthy citizens ? Even were they well disposed,
they would be incapable of fulfilling the first duty of a
burgher, that of fighting against our foes." Animated
by such feelings, one can understand how he regards the
agitation of the speculators and tradesmen of the Rand,
who look on the burghership not as linking them with
PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 25
the destinies of a country for which they are prepared
at twelve hours' notice to mount their horse and fight
till death, but rather as a means of helping them to
develop the industrial resources of the country and make
a pile. I do not say this position is ultimately tenable,
but it is inevitably the position which such a man as
Mr. Kruger was bound to take.
Such a view expresses the whole dramatic antithesis
of the situation; the old seventeenth-century country¬
man, with his crude, belated politics and his stern Old
Testament direction, is brought all of a sudden face to
face with a culminating type of modern capitalist civilisa¬
tion in the luxurious, speculative, cosmopolitan life of
Johannesburg. If to a Londoner this golden city fairly
staggers the imagination with its dizzy artificialism and
the rapid transformation of its life, how must it appear
to Mr. Kruger and his following of inexperienced Boers ?
Is it any wonder that they have thought these brilliant,
tricky strangers intend to take from them the control
of their country, and that they view an extended franchise
as a political and moral cataclysm? "Yes," it may be
said; "but this assumes Paul Kruger to be the honest,
simple-minded peasant which he is not." It is idle to
shirk the accusations brought against the President;
they are not merely the vague whispers of agitators on
the Rand. Many Transvaalers not hostile to the general
policy of Mr. Kruger are evidently staggered and perplexed
by certain aspects of that policy and certain incidents in
his career. Enemies boldly cast in his teeth personal
corruption, insisting that he has taken large sums of
money, not merely for the dynamite, but for other con¬
cessions and dealings; that he has allowed some
members of his family and a little clique of personal
26 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
friends to enrich themselves by abuse of official power
and by lobbying. Upon this matter I have probed
many well-informed persons, and can get no sure conclu¬
sion. One thing is certain, that Kruger has not what we
should call a "nice sense of honour" in these matters.
The case of the Salati Railway is conclusive on this
point. It is admitted that on this occasion, in 1890,
when Mr. Oppenheim's agent was actively engaged in
pushing through the Raad this railway, connecting the
Rand with Portuguese territory, presents of "spiders"
were made to and accepted by a number of Raad members
who voted the concession. When the matter was after¬
wards brought up for criticism, Mr. Kruger defended the
innocence of their conduct, insisting that there was no
harm in accepting such " presents," which he regarded as
tokens of friendship, not as bribes. The most specific
charge, however, that has been made against him is in the
dynamite affair, when even in the Raad it was plainly
insinuated that certain shares entered in a fictitious name
were really owned by the President, who had received them
as a consideration for giving favourable terms to the con¬
cessionaire. The recent volte face of several members of
the Dynamite Commission who were previously committed
to cancellation is commonly attributed to the pressure of
the President, who is alleged to have threatened resigna¬
tion if any course was taken which would make public
the nature of a certain secret contract. A study of the
entire history of the dynamite concession indisputably
supports some prima facie suspicion.1 On the other hand,
high officers of State, whose honour no one impeaches,
and who alone have direct access to the documentary
evidence, assure me that there is absolutely no founda-
1 See Chapter XII.
PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 27
tion for this charge. They freely admit that when the
concession was first granted, the State, being urgently
in need of ammunition, made a bad bargain; that later
on it negligently allowed the Dynamite Company to
evade its obligations; that when the earlier concession
was cancelled and a new company formed in 1891, a
large batch of shares was given in compensation to
parties interested in the cancelled concession, and these
are the very shares Mr. Kruger has been charged with
holding. Such statements, however correct, of course do
not solve the dynamite mystery nor explain why mem¬
bers of the Commission turned round in the Raad. Still,
it must be allowed that the allegation of corruption
against the President is based on purely hypothetical evi¬
dence, and those who are aware of the reckless way in
which such imputations of fraud are launched by South
African politicians will be slow to accept this charge.
Other accusations of " feathering his nest" are lavishly
made—how he has zig-zagged a certain railway so as to
make it go through property he owned, and how otherwise
he has used politics to assist his business interests. But
though, as I shall show later, there is too much reason to
believe that corruption eats far into Transvaal officialism,
I can find no definite evidence in support of these direct
imputations against the honour of the President. In large
measure they seem to be based on the admitted fact that
Mr. Kruger has grown rich during these later years, and
enemies trace these riches to a foul source. Yet it is
certain that a perfectly sound explanation of his wealth
is afforded by the land operations by which, in common
with many leading citizens, he has made money. For
instance, not long ago he sold his Geduld estate for
;£ 120,000, which was at once disposed of to a company
28 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
for lialf a million, and was recently worth between
two and three millions. A shrewd business man owning
land in mining districts has these chances. General
Joubert, against whose honour no whisper has ever been
heard, is considerably richer than the President, and has
made his money by similar dealings. Mr. Kruger's lax
notions about " presents" and a disposition to screen cer¬
tain friends who have indisputably yielded to corruption,
coupled with a good deal of nepotism, have not unnatu¬
rally brought grave suspicions upon his personal honour.
But under cross-examination these charges are found to
rest upon mere conjecture.
The strongly religious character of Mr. Kruger spells
hypocrisy to those unaccustomed to analysis of character.
That religiosity is consistent with certain curious ethical
perversities is a commonplace of which perhaps Mr. Kruger
and the Boers furnish some instructive illustrations. But
the deep, passionate genuineness of his belief in the Bible
and an inner light derived from its study can only be
questioned by inveterate " malignants." Paul Kruger is a
fanatic, a narrow-minded bigot, if you will, but no hypo¬
crite. His obtrusively uncompromising attitude towards
other religions than his own is illustrated by several quaint
incidents. A few years ago he was induced to take part
in the opening ceremony at a Jewish synagogue. On
entering and taking his place, he removed his hat, and
paid no heed whatever to the suggestion of his secretary,
who explained the Jewish custom of covering the head.
When the time came for the President's address, he
ejaculated a few brief sentences, and amazed his congrega¬
tion by concluding thus, " I declare this synagogue open
in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ." On another
occasion, shortly after he had presented on behalf of the
PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 29
State a piece of land (an erf) for the building of a
Dutch Reform Church, he was approached by an in¬
fluential Jew who tendered a similar request on behalf
of a Jewish congregation. The President promised to
consider the request, and soon afterwards announced
that he had granted it. Shortly after, however, he was
waited on by his Jewish friend, who complained that the
piece of land they had received was only half the size
of that given for the Dutch Reform Church. "Well,"
retorted Kruger, "what fault have you to find? They
believe the whole Bible, so they get an erf; you only
believe half the Bible, and you get half an erf."
In politics, as in religion, Paul Kruger is governed by
a few simple, deeply-rooted notions. The notion that he
is a far-sighted, foxy politician seeking his own ends seems
to me quite unwarranted, and arises from the situation,
which often forces him to give reasons and arguments
for actions which are really based upon sentiment, intui¬
tive caution, or set prejudices. Mr. Kruger has continually
been fighting for the independence of his country, as he
conceives it, warding off the danger of an overwhelming
rush of alien influences. When called upon suddenly
for a set defence of his position, he has no ready dialectic,
but often blurts out reasons which are not the real
actuating forces. His evasions and dilatory bargaining
are not really a conscious statecraft so much as a rude
instinctive fence which has been successful against a
" politician" like Mr. Chamberlain, because the latter, by
a characteristic fallacy, supposes his antagonist to be the
same manner of a man as himself. At the same time, able
men that know him well tell me Mr. Kruger is a powerful
thinker, who drives right down to the bed-rock of an
issue, has a keen nose for fallacy in argument, and is
3o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
even willing to admit an error when it is clearly pointed
out to "him There is, however, one weakness in his
position which deserves notice. He reads nothing except
the Bible, neither books nor newspapers, though extracts
from the latter are read to him. The result is that he
has to depend upon the friends around him for all his
knowledge of the larger world. Even as regards the most
material facts which reach his mind, there is thus a
constant danger of unfair selection and misrepresentation.
Mr. Kruger is not the self-sufficing man he is sometimes
painted. Dominated by certain passions and experiences,
he is never shaken by threats or by violence, but he is
very amenable to the influence of friends. This, too, is
a characteristic of his race which England has foolishly
ignored. The concessions which seemed to them to have
been wrested by threats of force were really made under
the urgent pressure of friendly representations. Of Mr.
Kruger's actual power it is hard to judge. The Boer
is a suspicious man, and, until England's open menaces
closed all discussion and hushed all dissensions, he was
not prepared to give absolute discretion even to the
President. The dynamite vote and the proposed con¬
cession of a five-year franchise evoked a storm of indig¬
nation which by no means spared the President. Many
persons, indeed, insisted to me that Mr. Kruger and his
Government could in no case have forced the adoption
of a five-year franchise. But I am not convinced of this.
There is no strong man in or out of the Raad who could
really stand up against the President or could rally a
powerful party against him in a national emergency.
Boers do not like the notion of dictatorship, and are
strenuous in their insistence on extreme forms of de¬
mocracy. But my conviction is that Kruger's power in
PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 31
a grave emergency like that which the country has
entered is that of a virtual dictator; that his hold upon
the minds of the great majority is such that they would
have acquiesced in almost any decision, and have en¬
dorsed, however reluctantly, almost any concessions he
might have made. To this extent the Transvaal may be
regarded as a one-man State; but it must ever be kept in
mind that this power of Mr. Kruger is due to an abnormal
stress of circumstances, that it is not created by his sole
will and authority, but is the half-conscious recognition
by the people that he is the true repository of the ancient
Boer spirit and traditions, and that he will fight with all
his mind and all his might for the independence of his
country.
CHAPTER V
other forces in transvaal politics
That Mr. Kruger dwarfs the other public men of the
Transvaal is a commonplace. In studying the politics
of Pretoria, it must be remembered that we are not deal¬
ing with a capital which contains a large body of trained
diplomatists. The brains of the Transvaal are for the
most part applied to industry; higher education has
hardly made a start; the older men in politics and busi¬
ness have no culture. I am told, and I can well believe
it, that there is only one member of the First Raad who
would be termed highly educated according to Euro¬
pean standards. The Government of course has access to
better education and more talent in some of its higher
officers, but the inadequacy of its present resources for
the difficult functions of government, in a country where
new and complex problems are constantly appearing on
the political horizon, is manifest. Several of the leading
politicians are indisputably men of sound business ability
and of perfect honour, but they can hardly rank in in¬
tellectual calibre or training with the experts of a Euro¬
pean State. The result of this has been to throw upon
a few young men of brains and energy an amount of work
and responsibility in the conduct of high politics which
severely taxes their capacity.
Among the older men there is no one who can be
termed a statesman except Mr. Kruger. The Vice-Presi-
32
OTHER FORCES IN TRANSVAAL POLITICS 33
dent and Commander-in-Chief, Joubert, is a man who
has played a prominent part in making Transvaal history.
Of a softer, more plastic, and more liberal temperament
than Kruger, he has for many years been a keen op¬
ponent of the latter. There was, as I have shown, a time
when the younger and more enlightened Boers of Pretoria
thought General Joubert might lead them along a path of
victorious progress. But though a brave soldier, General
Joubert is by nature a man of peace, without the force or
stubbornness of Mr. Kruger for action in the political arena.
Moreover, while more liberal in feeling, he is distinctly
limited in his political outlook, and possesses few definite
constructive ideas of progress outside the realm of adminis¬
trative reforms, to which he is genuinely attached.
The evil genius of Transvaal politics has undoubtedly
been Dr. Leyds. The notion of an unqualified Dutch
political supremacy, with a complete dominance of Dutch
language and ideas, which this imported Hollander sought
to impress upon Transvaal politics and administration, has
been a chief source of such Outlander grievances as possess
a real foundation. His personal influence was persistently
used to harden the heart of Paul Kruger against conced¬
ing political power or any considerable measure of self-
government to the Outlander. Born in Java, and trained
in the atmosphere of Roman-Dutch law, which, though
in some respects an excellent administrative system, is
hostile to British notions of liberty, he strove to impose
this rigid Hollander character on the laws and public
institutions of the Transvaal, which for a time became
a perfect nest of Hollander officials, mostly men who
came for what they could get, and who, having got it,
drifted back to Holland. The language and education
grievances, which have some real substance, are largely
c
34 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Dr. Leyds' creations. His appointment of Dr. Mansvelt as
Director of Education is responsible for a certain amount
of genuine discontent, though., as the facts recorded in
the Appendix show, this grievance like others has been
gravely exaggerated.
The influence of this able but narrow-minded Hol¬
lander has been everywhere perceptible. It is, however,
weaker than it was; and if the land had only been allowed
the boon of rest, there are genuine reformers even in the
present Government. Mr. Reitz, who two years ago re¬
placed Dr. Leyds as State Secretary, is a man of courteous
manners and patient, thoughtful mind, a moderate re¬
former, willing to purchase peace by all reasonable con¬
cessions. He is a lover of literature and a keen student
of history and archaeology, more fitted for a leisurely in¬
tellectual career than for the " Sturm und Drang" of
South African politics. South Africa is constantly en¬
gaged in fitting square pegs into round holes. Mr. Reitz
resembles the better type of public man in an English
municipality of middling size; but no one would suppose
that he had been a President of the Orange Free State
and a Judge of the High Court. Most of the men manag¬
ing high affairs of State are young men, one or two
with an English training, like the State Attorney, Mr.
Smuts, a brilliant young lawyer.
Of the pressure of family influence in public life
there is, however, far too much. The President, in par¬
ticular, has been a most unblushing practitioner of ne¬
potism. His relations fill many of the most important
posts. Piet Grobler, a grandson, a man of great energy
but of no wide experience, occupies the important post
of Under-Secretary of State, and exercises no small in¬
fluence in high politics. Another grandson, Piet Kruger,
OTHER FORCES IN TRANSVAAL POLITICS 35
was appointed over the heads of many senior men to
the place of Master of the High Court, though pos¬
sessed of no legal training or experience whatever. One
of Mr. Kruger's younger sons, a notorious "wastrel," also
destitute of education and official experience, has been in
control of the Secret Service Fund; while a son-in-law,
Mr. Frickie Eloff, has notoriously been involved in shady
financial transactions. Another grandson, Mr. Hans Malan,
is Chief Inspector of Roads, and yet another is in com¬
mand of the fort at Johannesburg. The husband of one
of his grand-daughters is Assistant State Attorney. The
list might be greatly extended if notice were taken of
remoter family connections.
A little State like this, with some 30,000 burghers
needs to select and use its very best talent; but the
Executive Council, the most important body after the
President, has been quite inadequately furnished with men
of culture and experience in politics. This fact gives a
dangerous power into the hands of any man of determined
character. The Raads are almost wholly composed of
farmers, some of them possessed of wealth and trained in
the arts of business, but by no means well equipped with
ordinary knowledge of the world. This should be borne
in mind in reviewing the negotiations that have taken
place. It is most unfair to expect more ability or a
higher standard of efficiency and honesty from the Boer
Government than could be got out of the native popula¬
tion of similar size in an English provincial town. If one
of these boroughs were called upon to create and control
the entire government of a large new State, with a Rand
population thrown in, out of their native resources, would
they have succeeded so much better ? " Yes," it will be
retorted; "but precisely for that reason ought they to
36 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
have availed themselves of the superior ability of the Out-
lander." And there can be no question that the State
would have been immensely strengthened in its capacity for
legislation and administration by the enlargement of the
field from which State officials and politicians could be
drawn. A simple population of farmers could be governed
tolerably well by the rude methods that have hitherto
prevailed; but a complex industrial society, working the
largest goldfields of the world, demands wider and keener
business ability. Such ability exists and is accessible in
plenty, if only it can be found conjoined with common
honesty and some measure of public spirit.
APPENDIX
THE EDUCATION GRIEVANCE
The following is the statement given to me by an English Church
clergyman who has for several years had charge of a Church school
in Johannesburg. "The Mansvelt policy has been to get in
Hollanders as headmasters even to the exclusion of Cape Dutch.
His policy has always been restricted and illiberal, but the Volks-
raad partially kept him in order, and he has been unpopular with
the Dutch community. . . . The whole policy was largely influ¬
enced by what the Boers considered an improper and agitating
policy of Outlanders, not simply on educational, but on general
politics. The latest condition for grants was a diminishing
quantity of English and increasing quantity of Dutch, from the first
to the fourth Standard, when Dutch alone was used. Grants
were refused to Afrikanders with Dutch names {e.g. Auret), unless
they were in a Dutch school. In the best days it was difficult
to get grants without perpetual visits to Pretoria. Mansvelt
always had to be ' squared'—not bribed, but talked to. I think
it used to please him that we had to go across to Pretoria and see
him. When seen, he could usually be made to do anything."
My informant has a very bad opinion of the tactics of the
Educational Council which the Outlanders formed in order to
deal with the education of their children. "The Volksraad," he
writes, " generally was not illiberal, but the Educational Council
got their backs up badly. The Educational Council may be
abused ad lib. Practically it did nothing except pay Robinson
^"iooo a year, get him to write incorrect things to the Times, and
make things generally uncomfortable. They had no desire to
work with Government; they were unpopular with the Outlanders.
In Jeppestown they spent a lot of money on a school, and the
Jeppestown people gave them a cheque and cleared them out.
In Braamfontein the Wesleyans starved them out by co-operating
37
38 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
with Government and starting a school which cut out the others.
I tried to work with them, so did my predecessor—it was im¬
practicable. He and I commenced dealings with Government, and
were on the point of making our Church school a Government
school. This was partly because with Government we had free
entry to the school—with the Council we were excluded. Educa¬
tional policy was on a line with general policy—that is, it grew
more restrictive as time went on, as a response to more imperative
demands and increased agitation.
"In spite of all, the Government was preferable to the Council,
the exasperating part of the former rather being that one was
forced upon one's knees to get anything."
To the statement, commonly reported, that the Government
refused to make any provision for the needs of Outlander chil¬
dren, so far as instruction by the medium of the English language
is concerned, the following letter, stating facts which are unde¬
niable, is the best answer.
SPEECH AT PRESIDENT SCHOOL.
" The Rev. J. T. Lloyd also made a few remarks."—Transvaal
Leader, Aug. 22, 1899.
To the Editor of the Leader.
Sir,—I quote above your report of the Eev. Mr. Lloyd's speech
at the President School prize distribution. In view of the im¬
portance of the reverend gentleman's address, rightly appreciated
by your contemporaries, both of which supply their readers with
a very full report, it is extremely unfortunate that exigencies of
space (no doubt) forbade you from giving Mr. Lloyd's "remarks"
the publicity and prominence which they undoubtedly deserve.
It would be surprising if such statements as those made by Mr.
Lloyd yesterday should be thought unworthy not only of com¬
ment or criticism, but even of record.
Mr. Lloyd made four statements which distinctly call for
attention :—
1. That the Government of this Republic has established four
State schools in which the sole medium of education is English
2. That the Government of this Republic has established
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V
39
eight State schools in which the medium for English children is
English and for Dutch children Dutch.
3. That the Government of this Republic grants yearly sub¬
sidies to six other schools in this country, not State schools, in
which the sole medium is English.
4. That the Government of this Republic is at all times
willing, through the Education Department, to provide English
education on the proclaimed goldfields to any community that
makes application for it.
Having also, like Mr. Lloyd, made inquiries on this subject,
I beg leave to supplement the four statements recorded above
with the following details :—
1. The four State schools in which English is the sole medium
of instruction are (1) Barberton State School, opened in January
1897; (2) Union Grounds State School, opened in September
I^97; (3) President State School, opened in August 1898;
(4) Randfontein State School, opened in December 1898.
2. The eight State schools in which English is the medium
for English children, and Dutch for Dutch children, are (1)
Klerksdorp State School, opened in August 1897 ; (2) Maraisburg
State School, opened in January 1898; (3) Market Street State
School, opened in April 1899 ; (4) Vrededorp State School, opened
in May 1899; (5) Krugersdorp State School, opened in May
1899; (6) Kaapsche Hoop State School, English section, opened
in January 1899; (7) Pilgrimsrust State School, opened in
February 1899; (8) Nigel State School, opened in July 1899.
3. The six English schools which are not State schools, but
subsidised schools are: (1) Diocesan College, Pretoria; (2) St.
Mary's College, Jeppestown; (3) Wesley an Day School, Jeppes-
town ; (4) High School for Girls, Doornfontein ; (5) High School
for Girls, Langlaagte; (6) The City and Suburban School.
4. Applications for English, or English and Dutch, State
schools, have been received from the following places, and are
still under consideration : (1) Roodepoort; (2) Ophirton ; (3) City
and Suburban; (4) Lorentzville.
Hoping that you will be able to find room for this communica¬
tion.—I am, &c.,
HUGH J. EVANS.
August 22, 1899.
CHAPTER VI
THE WAR SPIRIT IN PRETORIA
Pretoria is a quiet, leisurely little city, laid out with,
wide streets and ample gardens, where, at the time
when I came there, the spring sun was bringing
out a wealth of blossoms on the fruit trees and
restoring the first tinge of verdure to the faded
grass. There is little of the formal State capital about
it; business is virtually contained within the limits of
the single large square which contains the post-office,
the branches of the large African banks, and the two
costly and really imposing piles of the Government
buildings and the Law Courts. Round this square the
lawyers and other professional men have their chambers
and radiating from it are half-a-dozen short roads con¬
taining the hotels and shops. The tram service carries
one in about three minutes to the suburbs or residential
parts, chiefly composed of middle-sized white bungalows,
with a very few large, handsome single or double storeyed
modern houses. Everywhere is a sense of incomplete¬
ness; the roads, if you follow them, soon leave you in
the open veldt. There is little attempt at elegance in
architecture; everything is new, and even the startling
fecundity of Nature does not enable the Pretorians to
raise noble and imposing gardens in a single decade.
Yet, crude though everything is, there is none of the
scurry and noise of the mushroom industrial town; a
40
THE WAR SPIRIT IN PRETORIA 41
spirit of ease and cheerfulness pervades the place. It
was difficult to realise that this bright, peaceful little
town was, during my visit last August, the theatre of a
terrible drama which threatened to play havoc with the
fortunes of all South Africa.
As I sat writing in the lobby of the Government
buildings, in an inner hall the First Raad was debating
the issue peace or war. That day would probably deter¬
mine whether this little State, with a burgher population
less than that of Nottingham, would by itself dare the
greatest and most populous empire the world has ever
known to do its worst. It is no easy matter to under¬
stand or to describe the many cross-currents of passion
and conviction which played through the heated atmos¬
phere. There was none of that loud, open expression
of excited views by public meetings, by street demonstra¬
tions, by eager groups of cafe frequenters with which we
are familiar in European crises. A stranger might wander
for hours through the town without finding the faintest
sign of any excitement, unless he entered the club or
bar and listened to the growl of the conversation there.
Even in these places there was a curious self-restraint
and absence of personal animosity. At night, when the
hostility of Boer and English might have been supposed
to break all amicable intercourse, I sat in the smoke-
room of the club amidst a group composed about equally
of Boers and Englishmen, both sides expressing them¬
selves with the utmost vigour and freedom, applauding
and denouncing the course of the President and his
Government, and yet there was not the slightest per¬
sonal resentment exhibited by Boer to Englishman, or
the faintest danger of such a fracas as in France or
Germany would have been quite inevitable. It cannot,
42 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
of course, be pretended tliat the political and racial con¬
flict was not straining social intercourse here, as indeed
throughout South Africa. It would be a miracle if this
were not so. For it must be kept in mind that these
political differences did not stand at merely verbal con¬
troversy; in not a few instances these club members
would shortly find themselves in arms against each
other. Not only from the Transvaal, but all over South
Africa young English Afrikanders were volunteering;
many were leaving Johannesburg with the intention of
re-entering with the British troops. While in Pretoria
I met a large handful of young Transvaalers who have
been to the English universities, or have been trained in
the medical and legal schools of London, whose dearest
associations outside those of their own country are
English, who have lived for many years in closest
habitual familiarity with English Outlanders. This is
less the case in Johannesburg, where society is entirely
Outlander; but here Boer and Briton were bound by
countless ties of friendship and of social interest. It
may be imagined what was the stress of political discus¬
sion under such conditions. And yet these men freely
and amicably bandied arguments likely within a few
weeks to be referred to the brutal arbitrament of the
Mauser and the Maxim. To listen to them talking, one
would never have realised what was at stake, never have
imagined that these very men at home were polishing
their new Government rifles.
The self-restraint of the ordinary Boer is marvellous.
It is not sheer ignorance or brutish callousness, as some
represent, but the mental aspect of that racial endurance
which has set them where they stand and made them what
they are. It is only by entering many houses and talking
THE WAR SPIRIT IN PRETORIA 43
to many men that the powerful pent-up or half-articulate
spirit of a people who believe they will be called on in the
near future to engage in a death-struggle for their inde¬
pendence becomes manifest. All the men and women
were keen politicians. They had followed as well as they
could the play of motives in diplomacy; but the game had
been too intricate for most, and they had fallen back
upon a sort of instinctive inspiration for their interpretation.
Underneath the claims and counter-claims, proposals and
counter-proposals, they seemed to discern one solid kernel
of lamentable truth, namely, that England was seeking to
destroy the independence of their country. They bitterly
remembered the treacherous Raid of Jameson and the
virtual whitewash by the British Government in the Com¬
mittee and its sequel. This present assault, masquerading
as a demand for a redress of grievances, they regarded as
the next act in the same drama—a political raid. " Eng¬
land wants our country "—the exact meaning of this con¬
stantly reiterated phrase was difficult to grasp; it varied
widely according to the intelligence of him who used it.
The most ignorant of the remoter farmers seemed to have
a notion that the English would take away their farms,
but the more prevalent idea was that England had deter¬
mined to make the Transvaal a colony or vassal State, or
else to fasten upon it the virtual supremacy of the Out-
lander population of the Rand. The majority of those
who had followed more closely the issues readily distin¬
guished between the British people and the British Govern¬
ment. It was for the Government that they reserved their
animosity, and naturally the Government was personified
in Mr. Chamberlain. Sir Alfred Milner was hardly named
excepting as a tool. Some of them had a clear-cut expla¬
nation of what had happened, to the following effect. Mr.
44 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Rhodes they knew to be a large holder of shares in the
Consolidated Goldfields; this man, their ancient enemy,
they said had gone to Mr. Chamberlain and handed over a
number of these shares, in return for which the Colonial
Secretary had undertaken his political raid. A curious
feature of Boer feeling was the respect and veneration with
which they spoke of the Queen. " The Queen, she is a
good and a pious woman, who means no evil to us; it is
only that verdomde Kimberlain " (the common pronuncia¬
tion of the Colonial Secretary's name)" that has led astray
the British people." So an old farmer, a pioneer and voor-
trekker, put it to me.
These people did not want to fight; the Boer is not by
nature a warlike animal; he wants to be left alone and to
lead a leisurely and somewhat lazy life upon his farm.
But he can and will fight for what he calls indepen¬
dence, and, rightly or wrongly, he was persuaded that
" Kimberlain " was goading him on by constant demands
for concessions which would in the near future mean
either British sovereignty or, what is worse to many of
them, the rule of the foreigner upon the Rand. These
notions had been slowly growing in their minds, and the
distrust and dismay with which many of them regarded
the rapid climb-down of their Government in conceding
nine years, then seven, then five as the qualifying term for
burghership was a really serious factor in the situation.
It is true that when President Kruger and the Raad went
to the burghers after the Bloemfontein Conference, they
received what might be termed " a free hand " to deal with
the franchise, but in the case of a stubborn and suspicious
people that does not mean what it sounds. Only a small
number of the young bloods, who had never tasted war,
clamoured for it; the older men would mount their horse,
THE WAR SPIRIT IN PRETORIA 45
with their Mauser and their slice of " biltong " hanging to
their saddle, when they were " commandeered," but they
would do it without enthusiasm or sanguine hope. The
notion that the mass of Boers imagined they could beat
the British nation is in the main a falsehood, fabricated to
feed the animosity of Englishmen and to revive memories
of Majuba. No doubt there was a certain contempt for
Tommy Atkins, with his red uniform, as they remembered
him. There was also among some of them a fanatical
religious spirit, an Old Testament Puritanic conviction
that the Lord, fighting with them, would cancel all advan¬
tages of science and numbers. But taken as a whole, the
people had no desire to fight with another white race
unless they were driven into it by a conviction of its
necessity for self-defence.
CHAPTER VII
the race conflict in south africa
The horrible meaning of the "domestic fury and fierce
civil strife" threatening South Africa was first brought
home to me in the fulness of its meaning by a week-end
visit to the little country town of Potchefstroom. This
place, large village rather than town, is illustrative of the
ups and downs of this rapidly eventful country. Before
Pretoria came into being it served as a sort of capital of
the Transvaal, and in the war of independence in 1881 lay
in the thick of the fighting, and was the scene of a
stubborn resistance by a small body of English troops
entrenched just outside the town, who were driven by star¬
vation to surrender after Majuba. When the gold fever
set in, Potchefstroom had some years of bright promise;
capital flowed in, and the population doubled and trebled.
But no large quantity of payable gold was found, and
when the entire energy of industry settled on the Wit-
watersrand, the promise of Potchefstroom fizzled out, its
population declined, and its trade languished. But, for all
that, Potchefstroom has merits which will assert themselves
when the country is settled on a firmer basis than that of
the single gold industry. Eighty miles from Johannes¬
burg, it lies in one of the richest and most fertile parts of
South Africa, and enjoys to a marvellous extent the boon,
which most of South Africa vainly craves, of abundance of
water. The elder and the oak flourish wonderfully, and
46
RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA 47
even now, before summer rains had begun to fall, the
country was bright and green. A great agricultural future
should lie before this little district; the soil is magnifi¬
cently rich, and shrubs and fruit trees grow at a wonderful
pace, while there is splendid grazing for cattle all round.
One great drawback (Africa is full of drawbacks) retards
its agriculture—the swarms of locusts which for the last
eight years have come every spring and devoured all the
greenness of the earth. There are other incidental evils
too—the rinderpest, which, however, has been got under,
and the storms of hail, which not infrequently ravage
whole districts, stripping every leaf from the trees and
battering stout shrubs to the earth. But, making all due
allowances, we have a district which in climate, soil, and,
I would add, in inhabitants, is beyond praise. The village
itself, already the centre of a considerable outlying farm
population, will probably become a fashionable pleasure
resort in time to come. At present it is a simple, easy¬
going, unpretentious village; its people live a quiet and, it
must be admitted, a somewhat idle life. But what struck
me most, and what bore most directly upon the issue of
to-day, was the intimate union or combination of Dutch
and English everywhere apparent. The terrible folly of
this violent upheaval came home when one perceived how
British influence had been quietly and quickly making
way by peaceful methods of industry and social inter¬
course all over the country. Did Great Britain seek to
thrust the English language at the sword's point on the
Boers ? What need ? The conveniences and the merits of
our tongue need no such championing. There in the
streets of Potchefstroom, though the vast majority are of
Dutch descent, one heard far more English than Dutch.
The shop fronts, with their advertisements of goods for
48 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
sale, are a continual education in English. There is an
English church, with a real live archdeacon resident in
the place; there are English schools, and every inoffensive
sign of English influence, and even dominance. Even now,
though racial feeling had been fanned to its intensest heat,
I saw no evidence of that personal incivility which is im¬
puted to the ruling race. Among themselves, doubtless,
these feelings find free vent in detestation of the "red¬
necked" Englishman, but there is wonderful self-restraint
in public.
But only by visiting the people in their homes is the
"civil" nature of this war made manifest. Dutch and
British are at each other's throats in Africa, but there is
scarcely a single family where the races do not in some
way meet. Everywhere men of British descent have mar¬
ried Boer girls, and many of them have taken burgher-
ship and have grown sons who are by upbringing and by
sympathy full Boers. Enter any of these farms, and you
would find that there are relatives living in the Colony
or in Natal, British subjects, divided in feeling between
loyalty to the Empire and affection for their Republican
kin. Remember that here it is no mere sympathy with
the success of a professional fighting class, the hired
defenders of their country. Well-to-do England supplies
a minute fraction of its manhood for such a combat. The
Transvaal is a nation in arms; every peaceable occupation
in the land is stripped of its workers and entirely stopped.
Each one of these farmhouses has sent its three or four
soldiers, some mere lads of fifteen, just strong enough to
handle a Mauser, some grey-headed old men of sixty, who
have already earned their rest after a good life's work.
Near Potchefstroom I saw an old man, one of the first
party to cross the Yaal nearly seventy years ago—then
RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA 49
a lad, now a man of over eighty-five—whose old eyes
blazed with excitement as he spoke of the coming fray.
"I have written to my son," he said (this son was an
officer in the Staats Artillerie at Pretoria), "to tell him
there must be no nonsense about my remaining here; I
shall demand to go to the front." The people of England
have little notion what it means to wake this demon of
war in an entire nation, every man of whom must fight
and risk his life. Out of the 30,000 burghers on the Field
Cornets' books, upwards of 25,000 certainly turned out—
probably a larger number. The President himself is said
to have put seven sons and over forty grandsons in the field
(these Boer families run large); the civil officers from
highest to lowest will fight; and almost all civil adminis¬
tration, with the exception of the postal and telegraph
system, has been entirely suspended. My host took me
to visit an old English officer, who had lived for a quarter
of a century a rough farming life, preferring it to the more
stately life of a country gentleman in Leicestershire, a
burgher who fully expected to be commandeered and to
be called to face in mortal conflict the British troops
from Natal, amongst whom one of his own sons is an
officer. Nor is this horrible contingency so exceptional
as it may be thought. I personally came across a dozen
families or more, the burgher sons of which are liable to
be confronted in combat by brothers or cousins volunteer¬
ing in Cape Colony or Natal.
The oneness of South Africa comes out most power¬
fully at such a time. Among the better educated classes,
particularly of the towns, there has been an immense
amount of intermarriage going on between British and
Dutch, with constant migration between the colonies and
the Republics. If, as seems quite possible, the area of
D
50 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
conflict spreads from the Republics to the whole of South
Africa, and a general race war ensues, the tragical horror
of the situation may be well imagined. It must be kept
in mind that a large proportion of the younger men risk
nothing but their lives in such a cause. Over a large
portion of the colony land is worked by a sort of patri¬
archal system, the father or head of the family being legal
owner of the land and allotting portions to his sons to
work. Large numbers of these sons of the soil have
quitted their land, taken to the saddle, and ridden over
the border. Months before the outbreak of hostilities it
was quite evident that when the British forces confronted
the Boers, many thousands of these young colonists would
be there, pointing their rifles, treason though it be, against
the soldiers of their Queen. Should the British troops
suffer a reverse at the outset, it was then fully recognised
that the number of these colonists would be doubled or
trebled, and every obstacle would be set against the march
of British troops through the colonies by the country
population. How far things might go in the direction of
civil strife over the continent it was unsafe to predict;
but it was impossible to watch the gathering wrath of
the phlegmatic Dutch farmers in the colony without a
feeling of the gravest apprehension lest the whole of South
Africa become a battlefield. These men had not generally
followed the finesse of the diplomatic sparring, but their
plain, shrewd sense had struck down to the bed-rock of
the situation, and they knew many of the sort of facts
which are hidden from London, and even from Cape Town.
They knew perfectly well that the Outlander of Johannes¬
burg was not grievously oppressed, but that, on the
contrary, he enjoyed a licence of practical freedom and
luxury, and, in an economic way, was " cock of the walk."
RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA 51
They remembered how the Free State was forced to
surrender the Diamond Fields, and they believed the same
game was being played for the goldfields of the Rand;
they had a good working comprehension of the ways of
Mr. Rhodes and of the ways in which Capitalism was
handling British Imperialism, though they saw the history
not in abstract "isms," but in hard, concrete deeds and
persons. Of the power and policy of Great Britain these
folk, of course, had little inkling, but the Dutch farmer in
South Africa has always had a strong grip of the facts and
forces on the spot, and what has taken place this winter
has probably surprised him far less than it has surprised
the British nation.
CHAPTER VIII
THE HELOTS IN JOHANNESBURG
I take it that the motive which has led the majority of
English people to approve, so far as they have approved,
the policy of their Government, is not their convictions
on the merits of the franchise or the suzerainty issues,
but a deep and genuine belief that British subjects were
grievously oppressed by the Boer Government, and were
without security of life, liberty, and property. A recent
issue of the Nineteenth Century contains a statement
from Sir Sidney Sheppard that "neither their persons
nor their property can be held safe during the present
regime." Those who are responsible for working public
opinion have been wisely aware that the most effective
means of rousing British anger against the Transvaal
was to reiterate the statement that English people in
Johannesburg were subject to brutal ill-treatment and
went about in fear of their lives. I found it very difficult
to persuade people upon the spot of the prevalence of
this English view of their grievances; and no wonder,
for the audacity of the misrepresentation is almost in¬
credible. "When I left England, filled with the atrocities
of Mr. Chamberlain's Blue-book and Canon Knox Little's
commentary upon Boer character, I looked forward to
my sojourn in Johannesburg with deep apprehension.
I pictured in my mind the oppressed helot of Sir Alfred
Milner's famous telegram, continually harried in the
52
THE HELOTS IN JOHANNESBURG 53
peaceful pursuit of his calling by extortionate officials,
subject to the personal violence of the brutal "Zarp"
in the public streets, and liable to have the privacy of
his domestic hearth invaded by blackmailing detectives.
The slightest breach of arbitrary and vexatious regulations
would, I was assured, be seized upon as a pretext for
arrest and fine, while an appeal to the justice of the courts
would only add insult to injury. The first doubts of the
accuracy of this picture were instilled into my mind on
the voyage out in the good ship the Carisbrook Castle,
by a fellow-passenger who had for some years played
an active part in the Outlander movement of Johannes¬
burg. On questioning him respecting the reign of terror
on the Rand, he smilingly explained to me that these
outrages and sensational grievances were only designed
for British consumption; that Britishers got what they
wanted and did as they liked in Johannesburg; that the
one real grievance which they suffered and resented was
the "cocky" and insolent tone of the Boers with whom
they came into contact. These people despised the
British, and lost no opportunity of showing that they
regarded them as inferiors and as cowards. This, in his
eyes, was intolerable, and was only to be cured by giving
the Boer a downright good thrashing, that he might
know his place.
After a month's close inquiry on the spot, I became con¬
vinced that this view correctly represented the feeling of
the great majority of Outlanders of British birth, or did so
before they had been lashed into a brief enthusiasm for
franchise and other reforms by a handful of politicians. I
am not condemning these demands for reform, many, if
not most, of which were both desirable and feasible ; but I
am convinced that, until the agitation of the last year, the
54 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
concrete grievances which, arouse the sympathy and indig¬
nation of the British public lay very lightly on the soul of
the average Outlander. When I began to examine upon
the spot, I found plenty of men at the Rand Club and else¬
where who told me startling tales of police brutality and
miscarriages of justice, and launched into wholesale de¬
nunciations of Boer misgovernment. But two things soon
struck me. My informants either confined themselves to
generalities unbacked by specific cases, or more commonly
narrated wrongs inflicted upon some friend of theirs.
When I asked a man to give me instances of injuries or
indignities which he himself had experienced, he generally
allowed that he had been fortunately immune. Again, I
soon observed the same stories coming up with insignificant
variations; the story of the detectives who, seeing a man
engaged in a harmless game of cards in his own house,
forced their way in and hauled him to the charge-house
under the Gambling Act; the police who came to the
manager of an insurance business, and informed him that
a building heavily insured was about to be attacked by
incendiaries, and that, unless they were well paid for pro¬
tecting it, it would certainly be destroyed. I soon became
aware that these tales of wrong formed a stage army, the
paucity of which was tricked out by continual reiteration.
Again, it was nearly always the politician, the member of
the League or the Outlander Council, who was so anxious
to impress upon me the perils of the streets, the brutality
of the " Zarp," the injustice of the courts. As I came more
freely into contact with all sorts and conditions of men
—the quiet professional man, the shop assistant, the
mining overseer—I found these things played no part
whatever in his life. Grumblers they were one and all, as
healthy Britishers always are; many of them hated the
THE HELOTS IN JOHANNESBURG 55
Boer, and believed him corrupt and incompetent; some of
them exhibited a certain fervour on the franchise issue;
but none of them had undergone any serious personal
trouble with police or other officers of State. Several
young men told me they had been for years in the habit
of knocking about Johannesburg at night and returning
home to the suburbs early in the morning, but that they
had never been subjected to any interference. This view
was certainly borne out by my personal experience. Dur¬
ing the weeks I spent there, public feeling ran high, and
then, if at any time, it would seem reasonable to expect
scenes of disorder and even riot. But never have I seen a
large English town more quiet or more orderly at night than
Johannesburg. Though a great deal of drinking goes on at
the bars, where the company (Outlanders almost to a man)
has often a most disreputable aspect, there was scarcely any
of the street-brawling which I saw in Cape Town. Where
occasionally a noisy tippler staggered by, the neighbouring
"Zarp," with orthodox official delicacy, generally looked
the other way, though the delinquent was in most instances
one of the Britishers who wanted his country. I have no
desire to whitewash Johannesburg or its administration;
there is much reason to suppose its police to be more
bribable than those of London, and more ignorant and in¬
capable ; but I saw literally no indication of the prevailing
terrorism and oppression, the insecurity of person and pro¬
perty, charged against it, nor did my cross-examination
of many Outlanders elicit any material support for such
accusations.
That the machinery for the detection and punishment
of crime has reached any high standard of excellence may
certainly be doubted. When the rapid growth of this
huge cosmopolitan city, with its environment of gold
56 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
mines, peopled by ten thousand white and nearly a hun¬
dred thousand black miners, is taken into consideration,
it will be recognised as most unfair to compare the order
and government of Johannesburg with those of Manchester
or Glasgow. On this matter the testimony of Sir William
Butler is more to the point, who compared the condition
of the Rand with that of the Californian and Australian
goldfields, which he knew well, and who considered the
former incomparably superior in all the elements of
orderly government. But what about the Edgar case,
the Appelbe case, the Cape "boy" cases, and the other
villanies ? The answer is a simple one. The very hubbub
created by these matters, and the monopoly of public in¬
terest they aroused, are sufficient to mark their exceptional
character. Is there any large town in Europe where one
could not cull from the police courts and the nightly
streets a crop of similar charges? Assuming all these
charges to be true, what did they prove ? Nothing, unless
they were shown to be indicative of a general condition
of misgovernment. No such thing has been shown of
Johannesburg. Sir Alfred Milner, prompted by his ad¬
visers from the Rand, has literally scooped together every
specious example of injustice or tyranny that could be
obtained. I make bold to say that he is quite unable to
show that these cases are indicative of any general con¬
ditions. Indeed, at least one of them may be turned
against him. If the Transvaal were really the semi-
barbarous country which it is sometimes described as
being, is it likely that a policeman shooting a criminal
caught red-handed and in violent resistance would be
promptly charged with manslaughter and brought to
trial? It is very doubtful whether a policeman in one
of the Western States of America shooting an Outlander
THE HELOTS IN JOHANNESBURG 57
under similar circumstances would even be put upon his
trial. I11 Johannesburg he was charged, tried, and, in the
judgment of any one who takes the trouble to read the
evidence, fairly acquitted.1 In the treatment of Cape
1 In his Birmingham speech Mr. Chamberlain spoke of "the murder of
Edgar," and in his despatch of May 10 he thus characterises the case :
"But perhaps the most striking instance of arbitrary action by officials,
and of the support of such action by the State, is the well-known Edgar
case. The effect of the verdict of the jury, warmly endorsed by the
judge, is that four policemen, breaking into a man's house at night,
without a warrant, on the mere statement of one person, which sub¬
sequently turned out to be untrue, that the man had committed a crime,
are justified in killing him there and then, because, according to their
own account, he hits one of them with a stick." Now when Mr. Chamber¬
lain wrote these lines he had in his possession a full report of the trial of
this case. Any one who reads that report will perceive that the above-
quoted account completely misrepresents the evidence. The proved facts
are briefly these./.Edgar, a British workman, addicted to drink, but not
drunk at the time, was coming home late at night to a yard where he
and other Outlanders lived. As he was coming down the yard another
Outlander, Forster, said something to his dog which Edgar took as an
insult addressed to him. Although the man explained that the word was
not applied to him, and a third Outlander, Sheppard, coming out, pointed
out that Forster was drunk, Edgar, a big powerful man, struck Forster a
violent blow, and left him senseless on the ground. Bystanders thought
him dead, and his friend called loudly for the police. Four policemen
came at once, saw Forster lying on the ground, and heard Sheppard say,
"The man that ran into that room killed him." They proceeded at once
to Edgar's window, and saw him standing with a weapon in his hand.
They then paused a little to consider whether without a warrant they
should break in the door. The Outlanders urged them to do so, and the
police then pushed in the door, one of them, Jones, entering first. The
police case is to the effect that Edgar stood just in the entrance with a
sort of life-preserver, a tough stick with an iron nut screwed on one end,
and a loop of cord to fit the hand upon the other, and that with this he
struck Jones twice. Thereupon Jones, expecting another blow and unable
to retire by pressure of the others from behind, drew his revolver and
fired, killing Edgar. The resistance of Edgar was disputed at the trial,
though the weapon described was produced in court, and two surgeons,
one an Outlander, who examined Jones on his return to the police office,
attested to the fresh wounds upon him. In reality the violent resistance
of Edgar is clearly proved, not merely by police testimony, but by the
sworn evidence of two Outlander witnesses.y^ven the Star in its report
admits that "Edgar actively resisted his Arrest." The policeman Jones
58 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
"boys" under the Pass Law and the commando there
was undoubtedly good ground for complaint. But even
here it must be remembered that the law of the country,
as also in the neighbouring British colonies, enjoins harsh
and often brutal interference with natives; and though
British subjects from the colony or from India are techni¬
cally exempt from some of these laws, the difficulty of
distinguishing these cases from those where the law is
applicable must necessarily lead to many mistakes. The
notion that Englishmen or white British subjects have
commonly been made the victims of oppression and
terrorism is grotesquely and utterly false. No Johannes-
burger, however militant, pretended seriously to defend
such an assertion upon the spot; he reserved such tales
for British audiences and British newspapers. On the
contrary, Johannesburg was a place where liberty prevailed
in its extremest form—with the single exception of the
franchise. So far as practical freedom of action, speech,
and publication are concerned, there was no place upon the
Continent of Europe which could for a moment compare
with it.
But what about the tyrannical laws against the free¬
dom of the press and the right of public meeting, which
bulk so big in the parade of grievances ? The Outlander
politician sometimes sought to persuade me that he had
been robbed by law of the very elements of liberty of
expression. But on examining these laws, I did not find
them differ in form or spirit from the laws which stand
upon the statute book of England and other European
was charged at first with murder; subsequently the State prosecutor
reduced the charge, on his own initiative, to culpable homicide. Upon
this charge he was tried ; the judge's charge, fully given, is scrupulously
non-committal, and the jury, after a long retirement, gave a verdict of
not guilty, which the judge approved.
THE HELOTS IN JOHANNESBURG 59
States. The Press Law of 1896, against which so loud
an outcry was raised when it was used for the temporary
suppression of the Critic and the Star, contains no more
oppressive powers than are contained and have been
enforced within the last few years in the English law.
In Ireland and in India during recent years many prose¬
cutions have been instituted for offences which were
venial as compared with those habitually committed by
the Johannesburg press. Day after day, in defiance of
the Press Law, the Leader and the Star continued to urge
the grossest charges against the President, the Executive,
and the Judiciary of the land, and to call on the hostile
arms of England to cleanse the Augean stable. One
cannot read the language of this press, some examples
of which I give in a later chapter, without wondering
at the apathy of a Government which could tolerate such
abuse.
The Law of Public Meeting (No. 6 of 1894) is a close
copy of the English law in its general regulations re¬
garding the limitations of the right of public meeting.
It acknowledges the general right of meeting, but limits
that right in the interest of public order, refusing it in
cases of meetings "which have for their object disobe¬
dience or breach of the law or any legal enactment, dis¬
turbance of the rights of any one, the use of forcible
means whereby public peace and safety are or may be
endangered, or whereby the authority of constituted
powers and officials is attacked, or whereby good morals
are assailed," &c. It differs from the English law, and
is assimilated to the special law for Ireland, in vesting
in the police the right to be present at every public
meeting, to decide whether it is illegal, and to disperse
illegal meetings.
6o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Until last autumn, upon the eve of war, no prosecu¬
tion under this law had taken place: it was then applied
in the case of a disorderly street meeting.
In the Transvaal, as in England, there are laws upon
the statute book which, when quoted, sound like terrible
restrictions upon liberty, but which as administered, or
rather not administered, are harmless. Let me mention
one or two crucial facts. Last summer you could stand
at any street corner in Johannesburg, within hearing of
the "Zarp," and hear Englishmen loudly and bitterly
lamenting the sluggishness of the British arms they
had invoked to invade the country which had given
them shelter and gold; in any bar or other public place
you might hear the most vehement denunciations of the
Boer Government, and meetings were freely held to
advocate the destruction of "the corrupt oligarchy at
Pretoria." In front of the stationers' shops of Com¬
missioner Street were displayed the most insulting cari¬
catures of President Kruger, accompanied by letterpress
which would not be tolerated by the officials or the public
of any European city.
This license was at last carried so far as to stir the
Government into active interference, and in September
the " freedom of the press " was violated by the arrest of
the editor of the Leader and the attempted arrest of
the editor of the Star, though even then the publication
of the papers was not stopped.
This interference, as also the earlier stoppage of the
Star and the Critic, was I think unnecessary and unwise.
I believe that the mendacity of the Outlander press,
balanced by similar propensities in the Hollander press,
would far better have been left to run its evil course
unchecked. But it is hardly possible to feel strong
THE HELOTS IN JOHANNESBURG 61
resentment against a Government when it makes tardy
attempts to regulate the press which, by its systematic
misrepresentation, had already brought the hostile forces
of England to the borders of the Transvaal.
As for general liberty and even license of conduct,
it existed nowhere if not in Johannesburg. Every luxury
of life, every extravagance of behaviour, every form of
private vice flourished unchecked; every man and woman
(except Kaffirs, who do the work and don't count) said
and did what seemed good in his or her own eyes. The
helot wore his golden chains with insolent composure
of demeanour, as he feasted in the sumptuous rooms of
the Rand and the New Clubs, or lolled in the rickshaw
which, drawn by the toiling Kaffir, bore him to his
luxurious home. The entire wealth of the country,
drawn from the bowels of the earth by Kaffir labour,
passed easily into his hands, with the exception of a
toll taken by the Government, which he resented as if
it were the fruits of the toil of his own hands; in a
land of simple-mannered, plain-living farmers he alone
had material luxury and the leisure to enjoy it.
As for the official insolence upon which my ship-
companion fell back as the solid grievance, nothing of
it was observable. People sometimes told me that the
•£ Zarp" answered Englishmen uncivilly, and that other
officials put impediments in the way of Englishmen
transacting business unless their palms were greased.
This may have been so; the country Boer drafted
into the police force was certainly ignorant, probably
rude in manner, and more than possibly corrupt;
but to suggest that out of such matters intolerable
grievances could be constituted is a bold defiance of
common sense. So far as the evidence of a visitor is
62 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
permissible, I may say that I experienced none of that
incivility of matter or manner in dealing with postal
and other civil officials which English people expect in
France or Germany. My sober judgment, formed upon
careful consideration of the kind of Englishman who
was working up these grievances, is that this insolence
imputed to the Boer simply consisted in his assumption
of equality and refusal of that deference or recognition
of superiority which the British have come to expect in
other parts of South Africa. Britishers coming from the
colonies had been accustomed to despise " the dirty
Boer," and to regard him as a social inferior; in the
Transvaal they found him in power and refusing to
accept the role of inferior; hence their indignation.
To this one ought to add the fact that the average
Johannesburger had virtually no contact with the Boers,
and that his assumed knowledge of the character and
feelings of the burgher population has no substantial
basis of personal experience.
CHAPTER IX
the demand for the franchise
Though the tempest has swept the franchise issue from
the land of live politics, and few any longer care to ask,
" Did the Outlanders want the franchise ? How many
would have taken it ?" a certain value still attaches to
these questions, for the future of the Transvaal is not so
entirely sundered from the past as the fevered imagination
of catastrophic politicians seems to think. It is still worth
while asking, " How many of the Outlanders in the year
1899 would have been willing to renounce their citizen¬
ship in some European State in order to become citizens
of the South African Republic ?" Now no safe answer
to such a question was possible without experiment. The
British Government, in insisting upon a franchise which
should give immediate and substantial representation,
placed itself in the predicament of proposing tests which
were impossible of application. It might be possible to
ascertain how many Outlanders would be competent to
take a franchise with a seven or five years' residence and
a given property qualification, but how many of them
would actually take it there could be no sure means
of ascertaining beforehand. How Sir Alfred Milner was
able to satisfy himself that the Seven Years' Franchise
Law, actually passed, did not satisfy the proposed tests,
is a mystery which still waits solution. Everything
turned upon the question, How far was the demand
63
64 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
for the franchise genuine ? There were no data for
a satisfactory answer. The political agitators of the
South African League, though admitting that prior to
1895 very few troubled their heads about political rights,
insisted that the great majority of Outlanders were now
alive to the importance of political rights, and were eager
and earnest in their desire to possess them. The con¬
servative Boer, backed by a large amount of Outlander
opinion, regarded the whole movement as of artificial
origin, the product of professional grievance-mongers,
and affirmed that very few Outlanders really wanted the
franchise and were prepared to renounce their British or
other nationality to get it.
Now it seems at first sight as if the genuineness of
the demand were a matter of present wish or desire—
distinctively subjective conditions. This no doubt has
a bearing on the issue, and many of my first inquiries
in Johannesburg were devoted to trying to gauge the
width and depth of this desire for the franchise. I came
to the conclusion that two sets of people were really keen
about the matter, both of them belonging to the well-to-
do professional and commercial middle classes. There
was first the Afrikander, chiefly of British origin, drawn
from the Cape or from Natal, accustomed in these
colonies to exercise the franchise and to regard himself
as in every way at least the equal of the Boer. Many
of these men, recognising the essential unity of South
Africa and the need of solidarity among the white races,
had long chafed against the political exclusiveness of
the Transvaal Dutch. Not a few of them had come to
stay, and though they would have sincerely preferred
to remain British subjects, they were not so quixotically
British as to be willing for this sentiment to forego all the
THE DEMAND FOR THE FRANCHISE 65
solid advantages of citizenship in the land of their
adoption. Even if they did not intend to bind them¬
selves to permanent settlement in the Transvaal, they
entertained the view that a white man should not any¬
where in Africa be placed in a position of inferiority in
face of the native population which it was his chief busi¬
ness to rule. The second class consisted of Englishmen,
Scotchmen (quite as many of the latter), and Jews of
mixed nationality, who had come to the Transvaal to
"hustle" in business, who were conscious of possessing
brains and energy, and were annoyed by the slow and
clumsy methods of the Government; they wanted to get
politics into their hands so as to impart speed and security
to industrial development. Many of these men, as I shall
show, were chiefly prompted by purely selfish motives,
which would ultimately lead them to use politics against
the common weal; but some were moved by a genuine
interest in the cause of good government, quickened by
the irritation which a sharp-witted business man feels
when he sees incompetent people round him muddling
things and wasting the public resources. When Sir A.
Milner and the South African League described the Reform
movement as distinctively belonging to the intelligent,
educated middle classes, it is these people that they meant,
and there is this amount of truth in the description.
How far the few big men known as the capitalists were
genuine politicians, and sought the franchise in order to
improve the government, I need not here inquire; it
suffices to say that they had never openly clamoured for
the franchise, preferring to press against the Government
those grievances relating to dynamite, liquor, and pass
laws, railway rates, &c., which bore directly upon the
mining industry.
E
66 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
The feelings of the working classes—miners, mecha¬
nics, clerks, shopmen—were most difficult to gauge. At
least half of those I talked with wished to have no
concern with politics, had been earning good money, and
objected to any political disturbance: most of the miners
held this view. But a good many, perhaps a large
minority, had been stirred by the League and other poli¬
ticians into a conviction that the franchise was a right,
and the absence of it a grievance. Few exhibited any
keen desire to get it, but many could be induced to shout
for it at a public meeting. When I put to them point-
blank the question, "Would you be willing to abandon
now your British rights and become a burgher of the
Transvaal, liable to be commandeered?" I seldom re¬
ceived a confident affirmative reply. Indeed, many of the
leading men in the Reform movement fenced with the
question, requiring all sorts of guarantees, and, in par¬
ticular, the right of reverting at any time to their aban¬
doned British status. Their hesitancy was curiously
illustrated at the preliminary meeting of prominent re¬
formers summoned to plan the formation of the Outlander
Council, when an earnest man got up and proposed that
those present should show their bona fides by each man
personally declaring his willingness to accept the fran¬
chise. This proposal was strongly opposed by various
members, who objected to pledge themselves, and the
division of opinion was so strong that the proposer of the
resolution was induced to withdraw it. My opinion is
that only a small minority of British Outlanders would
have been willing definitely to accept the franchise upon
the conditions indicated by Sir A. Milner at Bloemfontein,
and afterwards at Cape Town, that they should in the
future not look to the British Government to redress their
THE DEMAND FOR THE FRANCHISE 67
grievances, but to themselves and the burghership they
had acquired.
But in reality the issue did not chiefly hinge upon the
present intensity or extent of desire for the franchise.
The important matter was not how many earnestly desired
to become burghers in five or seven years' time, but how
many would, in fact, have taken and used the burgher
rights. This was far less a matter of desire and inclina¬
tion than of economic and social circumstances. Let me
put it thus. The vast majority of those who came to the
Transvaal, as business men or as manual workers, did not
come to stay, but to make money and take it away; they
had no intention of settling down for good in a new
country and of bringing up families. But some of these
men did actually stay (or, if they left, returned), some
because they had fared badly and could not leave, others
because they had done well, and wished to do better.
The capitalist who made his fortune and cleared with
it to Europe, scarcely counts numerically; it is to the
average business or working man that we must rightly
look. Those who took for their criterion the recent turn
of events and the current temper of the Outlander popu¬
lation, could make a strong prima facie case for the view
that the franchise was entirely a sham grievance. A large
proportion of the business men in Johannesburg were not
confined in their operations to the Transvaal, but had
interests in other parts of South Africa; the financial
and professional classes in South Africa are peculiarly
nomadic; the shopkeepers, whose local attachment is
somewhat closer, had not that firm confidence in the per¬
manent prospects of Johannesburg which would make
them eager to obtain a fixed political status in the
country. Extreme and unforeseen fluctuation is a law
68 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
of South African life; the example of Kimberley was ever
before the mind of the Johannesburger, and he feared
lest his city might fall into the same decadence and
decay. The white wage-earners of Johannesburg, shop-
assistant or mechanic, had certainly no firm grip upon
the place, and the recent crisis has probably shaken off
most of them.
The miners were the only large solid section of the
population who were distinctively English. The great
majority of these were single men, or married men with
families in England: no large proportion of them had
come to regard the Rand as their permanent abode.
The Jameson Raid and the recent crisis illustrate the
slender attachment which bound them to the country upon
whose citizenship they were supposed to set so high a
value that England must fight to win it for them. I do
not blame them or call them cowards for always " clearing "
at the first scare, but merely adduce the fact to show how
slight an actual hold the Transvaal had upon them. But
the best available evidence of the unsettled and transitory
character of the mining population is afforded by the
figures which Mr. C. S. Goldmann presented before the
Industrial Commission in 1897, which dealt with the white
miners of 53 companies employing 3620 men, or consider¬
ably more than one-third of the total number of miners
employed upon the Rand. Of these men, only 470, or 12.9
per cent., were married men with families on the property;
1195, or 33.1 per cent., were married men with families
abroad; while 1955, or 54 per cent., were single men. Still
more significant is the statement that, during the six weeks
preceding the inquiry, which was a period of normal
industrial and political condition, no fewer than 827
miners, or about 27 per cent, of the whole number, threw
THE DEMAND FOR THE FRANCHISE 69
up their employment at the mines. Of these 827, about
380, or 46 per cent., were ascertained to have left the
country, while 447, or 54 per cent., remained, finding pre¬
sumably some other work.
So far as the mining population is concerned, it is
evident that only a small number have hitherto looked
to the Transvaal as their settled home: most lived
there for a time, and, saving money out of their high
money wage of £25 to £30 per month, sent their savings
home, or stayed long enough to make sufficient to
set up in some little business elsewhere, and dis¬
appeared. If this was to be the normal condition of
affairs in the Transvaal, it seemed idle to clamour and
criminal to fight for the franchise and the rights of
burghership on behalf of a population which did not value
them and could not use them properly. This is the Boer
contention: " These gilded butterflies and their parasites
are here for a brief day to snatch what gain they can and
pass away: they have no solid footing in the country and
no desire to link their lives with its well-being; they have
no affection for it. How then can they make good citizens ?"
If the experience of the few years that have passed
since the discovery of gold be taken as final, there is no
sufficient answer to this plea. The theories about inherent
rights of the governed to participate in government, the
iniquity of taxation without representation, have no clearly
rightful application to a fluctuating population, however
large, of mere temporary sojourners. Even the fact that
they are already owners of the greater part of the land and
other property in the country is no sufficient argument
for giving them that citizenship which in every country
implies personal interests and obligations, and not mere
investments. If a property stake is in itself a right basis
70 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
of a claim to burghership, then all tlie European holders
of any considerable stock in Rand mines might have fairly-
claimed the franchise. No; the real and only solid ground
for securing the franchise for the present and prospective
Outlanders was a belief that the future would not be as the
past; that the industrial resources of the country afforded
a firm foundation for secure and progressive material pros¬
perity, and that the political and social problems which
had imparted so stormy a character to the past years
admitted of a tolerable settlement. If such economic and
political security could be obtained, a growing proportion
of Outlanders would, in fact, establish themselves per¬
manently in the Transvaal, making homes, rearing families,
and identifying themselves in human interests and sym¬
pathies with the nation.
Now, for economic reasons stated hereafter, I do not
believe in the permanent settlement of a large British
population in the Transvaal. But for the next few
decades, at any rate, a certain number of Britons will
make their home in this country, and a larger number
of non-British Outlanders, mostly Russian, Polish, and
German Jews, with roving propensities and no strongly
rooted attachment to an old country, will dwell in
Johannesburg and on the Rand. A prospect of success¬
ful business for a tolerably long future, with full personal,
civil, and political liberty, will keep the bulk of these
people in the country, and inspire them with such patriot¬
ism as they are capable of entertaining.
Among them will be a certain number—not nearly so
large as is supposed—of British miners, earning higher
wages than they can get elsewhere, and willing to settle
down in the Transvaal, instead of consuming a large pro¬
portion of their wages, as now, in flying visits to England.
THE DEMAND FOR THE FRANCHISE 71
Improved government and industrial confidence would
induce many of these classes to make a permanent settle¬
ment in the Transvaal.
Now it was most desirable that these people should be
attached to the country of their adoption as closely as
possible, and that they should have been encouraged, upon
reasonable terms, to take the rights and duties of citizen¬
ship. It was important not merely for these persons, but
for the State, that they should have the franchise and
should use it. This was the firm conviction not only of
the Dutch politicians of the Cape, but of all the educated
people in Pretoria. But for the disastrous consequences
of the Raid, and the consequent fear that a quick enfran¬
chisement of a large class might revolutionise the govern¬
ment and run the country entirely in the interests of the
Rand, a liberal franchise would have been voluntarily
accorded by the burghers. Even among the more con¬
servative and unenlightened classes there was a growing
disposition to accept the inevitable. This is well put by a
gold-mining expert who knows the people well, and whose
judgment I quote because he is no politician.1 " A few
more years will see the government of the country, and
that with the consent and co-operation of the Boers, pass
into the hands of more enlightened and progressive rulers."
The rooted reluctance of Kruger and his stalwarts would
certainly have given way before a tactful handling by
conciliatory diplomatists. If the demand for a reasonable
franchise had been dissociated from other demands, which
seemed to threaten the independence of the country as
defined by the London Convention, such franchise could
undoubtedly have been obtained. Even had the obstinacy
of Kruger not yielded to the importunities of the more
1 Curie, " Gold Mines of the World," p. 28.
72 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
liberal members of his Government, several of whom
notoriously favoured a liberal franchise, the representations
of the Free State politicians would have been effectual.
Many close conversations and inquiries at Pretoria and
Bloemfontein justify me in registering my firm conviction
that a clean and satisfactory five years' franchise, moulded,
if required, on the model of the English law, could have
been obtained without war or the menace of war, provided
that British diplomatists had genuinely sought a settle¬
ment upon this basis.
CHAPTER X
official corruption and incompetency
That certain grave faults existed in the administration
of government in the Transvaal cannot seriously be dis¬
puted. Most of these were not in any special sense
Outlander grievances, for they were injuries to the entire
body politic, but all the more on this account they de¬
manded recognition and remedy. First and chief among
these defects I should place the incompetency and cor¬
ruption of a considerable part of the officials and the
maladministration of the finances of the country.
The faults of officialism arose naturally from the cir¬
cumstances of the Boer Government, and were undoubtedly
enhanced by the policy of exclusion which prevailed.
There are probably not more than 29,000 adult male
Boers in the Transvaal, the vast majority bred on out¬
lying farms, with no education to speak of and no know¬
ledge of affairs. Even with the best process of selection,
it is evident that a full complement of capable officials
competent to deal with the social and industrial problems
of life in Johannesburg and the goldfields could not have
been obtained from such a source. The Government
offices at Pretoria, the Netherlands Railway, the regulation
of the natives, the administration of the Gold, Pass, and
Liquor Laws in the Rand, the provision of municipal
government for the quick-growing towns with their
heterogeneous population, could not be properly under-
73
74 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
taken by this small community of farmers. The o]d
semi-military system under commandants and field-
cornets could not be adapted to fit the new circumstances
of a large industrial population. There was no proper
means of training officials, or even for securing for them
a decent business education, since the Boers took no
direct part whatever in the development of the goldfields
and the subsidiary industrial life. Counting in the police
(no less than 800 are required for Johannesburg and
district) there were probably not fewer than 3000 men in
direct Government employ, an enormous proportion of
the entire burgher population. Even allowing that the
less skilled and routine work could be properly done,
it was evident that the more highly skilled work of the
Government must suffer. This to some extent the Boers
had recognised. Naturally enough, though most unfor¬
tunately, they looked to Holland to assist them, thus
introducing the Hollander factor, which has been the root-
cause of much serious mischief. For technical work in
Government offices the Hollander was doubtless a con¬
venience ; from Holland a readier supply of educated
lawyers and officials competent to handle the High
Dutch language was obtainable than from the Colony.
Unfortunately, the kind of Hollander who came, and
the temper and aspirations which he introduced and
fostered in the Boer, were most damaging influences.
/ To Dr. Leyds and the compatriots whom he set in
certain most important offices, particularly in the depart¬
ment of education, both the policy and the spirit of racial
antagonism are largely due. One might almost go as far
as to say that had there been no Dr. Leyds there would
have been no Transvaal crisis to-day. The Hollander
taught the Government of this country the art of red-tape
CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCY 75
qualified by corruption. Set in many of the most impor¬
tant and lucrative places, having no intention to live
permanently in the country, they acted as officials have
always acted in such circumstances—they sought at once
to satisfy a lust for power and to feather their nests.
There were of course exceptions, but such was notoriously
the rule. It is right, however, to remark that the Trans¬
vaal had of recent years discovered and done much to
rectify this evil: the number of Hollanders in high places
had greatly diminished, being replaced either by Afri¬
kanders from the Colony, or by Transvaalers themselves,
educated in the Colony and in Europe. Last year out of
1958 officials in the country no less than 1452, or about
three-fourths, were of South African birth, 478 of these
being Cape Afrikanders, as compared with 306 drawn from
Holland. Moreover, if we take the high posts in the
State, we scarcely find any Hollanders now in possession—
President, Vice-President, Commandant-General, Auditor-
General, Treasurer-General, State-Attorney, Commissioner
of Railways, nearly every head of department is a born
Afrikander. Even the judicial bench, once a monopoly of
the Hollander, has now been nearly purged of him, for at the
present time only one acting judge is a Hollander. With
this change, and the freer drawing upon Afrikander sources
during the last three years, a decided improvement both
in the intellectual calibre and the character of the higher
State officials Is admitted to have taken place. This is an
important reform for which due credit should be given.
For instance, the administration of justice has been greatly
benefited during the last two years by the appointment
of an English-trained lawyer, Mr. Smuts, to the post of State
Attorney, and by the presence of Dr. Krause as Public
Prosecutor in Johannesburg. Both these men belong to
76 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
a young progressive school which has other able repre¬
sentatives in various State departments. Nepotism has
certainly to some extent retarded these reforms, a recent
notorious case being the appointment to a judgeship of
a young barrister, Mr. Kock, son of a member of the
Executive Council, a young man of no known ability and
no experience. Such cases, however, occasionally happen
elsewhere. Regarding the higher officials, the opinion of
all, save the blind Boer-hater, is that they are a fairly
competent and fairly honest body of men. There were
many who told me that the whole of Boer officialism from
the ordinary Zarp in the street to the President, and in¬
cluding the judges of the High Court, were corrupt almost
to a man, habitually taking money bribes and abusing
their offices. Now I took much trouble to sift these
charges of corruption, not of course by detailed investi¬
gation of instances, obviously impossible, but by a careful
comparison of testimony of various kinds of witnesses.
There is, I think, some prima facie ground for suspecting
that certain high officers of State have indulged in " shady
practices" relating to concessions and land speculation,
using their public powers to assist their private purses,
though none of these charges have been proven. I found
no reason for accepting the charges of common bribery
freely brought against the President and high officers of
State, which were almost universally received as facts by
Englishmen in the Transvaal.
Mr. Winston Churchill's description of South Africa
as " a land of lies " is not quite the reckless generalisation
it sounds. Whether it be a subtle psychical reaction of
certain deceptive qualities of the country, its illusive
distances, mirages, the incalculable tricks of nature in
this " land of surprises," or contact with " the treacherous
CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCY 77
Kaffirs," or whether it be a "natural selection" leading
to the survival of mendacity for use in speculative
business, I am unable to decide.
But about the fact there can be no doubt. There
are liars and credulous folk in every land; but for minute
detailed mendacity and the wanton acceptance of the
same, South Africa stands pre-eminent. It took me
some time to adjust my inexperienced mind to this focus.
For some time I was disposed to accept readily the
circumstantial statements made, apparently in all good
faith, by sober intelligent business and professional men.
But I soon learned the need of severe scepticism. In
the art of which I speak it is scarcely necessary to
add that politicians were the greatest adepts; and when
the business man becomes politician, he brings his busi¬
ness talent for detail into his politics, with marvellous
results.
The case of the Selati Railway will serve as an ex¬
ample of what I mean. Baron Oppenheim, wishing to
obtain a profitable concession, alleges that he employed
an agent to pay bribes to Transvaal officials and Raad
members, and in a plea filed in a case against the Govern¬
ment for unjustly depriving them of their rights and
seeking to cancel the contract, he placed certain sums
of money against the names of these officials and mem¬
bers, alleging they had received them. Upon the strength
of this ex parte statement, made by a man guilty upon
his own confession of gross corruption, Mr. Fitzpatrick
evidently considers the charge has been proved, and
speaks of " the indisputable fact of bribes having been
taken wholesale,"1 though he has just before admitted
that the charge is denied by all of those incriminated
1 "The Transvaal from Within," p. 321.
78 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
who have condescended to answer it, and that no im¬
partial investigation has taken place.
What is still more curious is the fact that many
English readers of Mr. Fitzpatrick's book are convinced
that the case of money bribery is proved in the matter
of the Selati Railway. They have seen the exact sums
of money which the Vice-President, and various speci¬
fied members of the Executive and the Yolksraad are
stated to have received, and when Mr. Fitzpatrick auda¬
ciously assumes that this ex parte evidence from incrimi¬
nated witnesses is proof, they are taken off their guard
and swallow it.
Similar charges were sometimes launched against the
judiciary; but, except in one case, there has been no attempt
to substantiate such charges, which it is fair to say were
never made by those brought into professional contact
with the judiciary. I am convinced that whatever may
be thought of the competence of some of the judges,
these insinuations of dishonesty were the mere inventions
of reckless malice.
But that a widespread practice, and even system of
corruption, largely by direct money bribes and blackmail,
prevailed among minor officials could not be questioned.
The difficulty was to discover how widespread it is. On
this head the evidence I got was not vague but perfectly
definite, and given in many instances by men whose
statements I did not doubt. I am inclined to believe
that among the officials on the Rand, the secretaries
and clerks in offices concerned with legal documents, the
inspectors connected with mining and other industries,
the police and detective services, and others, there was
a wide prevalence of corruption. A good deal of this
was of a comparatively venial character. For instance,
CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCY 79
a business man often told me that lie could not get a
matter of legal form pushed through without bribing
at every turn; but on closer examination it appeared
that the payment of money was to induce celerity, or,
in most instances, priority of attention, not to procure
such official assistance or assent as ought not to be given
at all. The Johannesburg business man was in a hurry,
had plenty of money, and was wont to spend it freely
in getting what he wanted; the Boer official was naturally,
and, after due education, purposely slow; hence a practice
grew up of quickening the pace of official business by
private presents.
There is reason to believe that this form of habitual
corruption was confined to the mining businesses of the
Rand. To those who indict in general terms the officialism
of the Transvaal I would oppose the testimony of a lawyer
of strong Outlander sympathies with a large conveyancing
and general practice in Pretoria. This man had for nine
years done business which had constantly obliged him to
seek the service of officials in the Mining Commissioner's
office, and in various other departments. In no single
instance had he ever paid a sou, nor had he been asked
for payment. He did not consider that his business had
suffered from this policy, and he did not personally know
any case in which irregular payment was made to officials
in Pretoria and Krugersdorp offices, where most of his
business lay.
Such douceurs for encouragement of despatch are
not, however, the worst form of corruption on the Rand.
There was a wide prevalence of pernicious bribery which
consisted in paying inspectors to neglect their duty or to
wink at breaches of the law. Here is an instance given
me first hand by a mine manager. When the boiler
8o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
inspector comes round this man says he hands him a ;£io
note in order to save trouble. The inspector takes it, and
does not stay to examine the boilers. " But why do you
pay him this money?" said I; "surely your boilers will
stand inspection?" "Yes, the boilers are all right," he
replied, " but if he didn't get the money he would quite
unnecessarily have every fire out for the day in order to
inspect, and that would cost us nearer ;£iooo than £10"
The same informant told me he also bribed the "Pass
inspectors," whose business it was to see natives had proper
passes. This also he did to avoid trouble. There is little
doubt that this is a common practice in the mines. The
mine managers and other business men of the Rand
coming into contact with ignorant, greedy, and not well-
paid officials, set to administer a complex machinery of
State restrictions, have had no scruple in easing matters
for themselves by bribery, which as soon as it has become
custom they denounce as blackmail. That these very
men who have caused the corruption should assume a
tone of moral denunciation, and should place it in the
front of the catalogue of grievances, is a piece of humorous
effrontery. From the standpoint of individual ethics it
may be a nice point to distribute the blame between the
briber and the receiver, but for the former to appeal to a
third party to put down a practice which he has caused,
and he can stop, is surely the height of impudence.
Johannesburg was the seat of all the corruption: its
capitalists had undoubtedly debauched the morals of a
large section of the official world, just as its liquor-sellers
and its bawdy-house keepers had debauched the morals
of the police. I learned on good authority that until
lately a system of bribery or blackmail (the concave and
convex of the same fact) was practised by the Johannes-
CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCY 81
burg police in dealing with illicit bars and disorderly
houses, resembling that which the Tammany police estab¬
lished in New York, and that which even now prevails in
some parts of the West End of London. It is, however,
admitted that since the deposition of a notorious Chief of
Police and the restriction of police power brought about
by Messrs. Smuts and Krause, many of the evils had
diminished. In particular, the drastic Liquor Law of
1896 prohibiting the sale of liquor to natives, the syste¬
matic breaches of which had been a constant complaint
of mine owners, was recently admitted to be so well
administered as to have virtually suppressed the illicit
liquor trade over a large portion of the Rand.
So far as the police grievance is genuine, the worst scan¬
dals were chiefly due to an imperfection of the system
which gave excessive power to the common uneducated
Zarp. Until 1896 a policeman charging a man with a
breach of the law brought his charge before another police¬
man, who had the power to take the accused into custody,
and he had virtually no chance of escape until such time as
he was placed on trial. This power is now taken from the
police, who make their charge before justices of the peace,
one of whom is continually present at the charge office.
These justices are trained and educated officials, entirely
removed from police influence. The charge made before
them is next investigated by one of the four assistant-
prosecutors under Dr. Krause, who conducts a preliminary
inquiry similar to that made before a stipendiary magis¬
trate in England, and upon his order the matter is referred
to judge and jury. The machinery of justice in Johannes¬
burg is excellent in principle, and, so far as I could dis¬
cover, works well in practice. I attended the Criminal
Court, whose proceedings were conducted with complete
F
82 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
dignity and order upon lines having the closest resem¬
blance to an English court. I happened upon a case
where, under strongly suspicious circumstances, two Eng¬
lishmen were charged with attempting burglary; the chief
evidence was that of the police, and the men charged
could, in addition to their own sworn evidence, only call
witnesses to character. The Boer jury, however, without
retiring, gave an acquittal which the judge approved.
This was, of course, a single instance, and could not justify
any general judgment, but it served to show that the Boer
is not the consistent monster of oppression he is sometimes
made out to be.
I have, however, deviated somewhat from my main
topic—that of corruption. Apart from official corrup¬
tion, the gravest charges are frequently made against
the legislators. Mr. Lionel Phillips, it will be remem¬
bered, wrote in one of the letters disclosed in the inquiry
on the Jameson Raid, that he had set aside a large
sum to "improve" the Raad. Many men told me that
the Raad was purchasable almost to a man. Whilst
at Pretoria 1 talked with an official of the Chamber of
Mines, who came there to resist certain proposed changes
in the Liquor Law. He pointed out a group of men in the
hotel who, he said, represented the Illicit Liquor Syndi¬
cate, and who had brought with them ;£ 12,000 to buy
votes in the Raad. I heard other similar stories from men
claiming to be well informed; but when sifted these stories
were never conclusive. That money was paid out by
capitalists seeking concessions, by the Liquor Syndicate
and other parties, with the object of influencing legislation,
there is little doubt. That some members of the Raad
have taken money, though not proved, is highly probable,
and three or four members of the present Raad are sus-
CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCY 83
pected by well-informed Boers of being bribable. But that
the entire Raad or any considerable proportion have been
prepared to sell themselves is a quite unfounded calumny.
Indeed, it may be reasonably urged that if corruption were
so generally prevalent as is alleged the capitalists would
have found it cheaper and safer to buy the Boer Govern¬
ment than to enter a troublesome political campaign for
its reformation or its overthrow.
There does, however, exist a " corrupt gang at Pretoria,"
not chiefly officials or Raad members, to whom payments
have been made to influence legislation. These men are
often called in mockery " the third Raad "; they consist of
some half-dozen hangers-on of Kruger and his Government,
lobbyists or legislative middlemen, who have acquired a
reputation for being able to influence the President or the
Raad. Several of these were freely named, though the per¬
sonnel of the " third Raad " naturally shifts with circum¬
stances. Money was certainly given to these men, who
alleged that they could use it to get votes; but the best-
informed persons told me that this money, though sup¬
posed to be disbursed, remained mostly in the hands of
these middlemen. But truth is difficult to get in such
matters. This third Raad constituted, however, a real and
a grave scandal, though the actual amount of bribery and
the influence it exercised was probably exaggerated.
CHAPTER XI
THE NEED OF FINANCIAL REFORM
The maladministration of finance has been a great and
a growing evil, because the funds capable of malad¬
ministration have increased with the industrial develop¬
ment of the country. In 1885 the total revenue of the
State was £177,876, and in twelve years later it had
reached £4,480,217, the expenditure keeping pace with
this increase of revenue.
The following statement of revenue and expenditure
after 1889, when the Rand industries were fairly estab¬
lished, indicates the rapid progress that has been made:—
Y ear.
Revenue.
Expenditure.
893
894
895
896
897
£I,577,445
1,229,060
967,191
1,255,829
1,702,684
2,247,728
3,539,955
4,807,513
4,480,217
£1,201,135
1,386,461
i,35o,o73
1,188,765
1,302,054
1,734,728
2,679,095
4,671,393
4,394,066
There is no shadow of a doubt that much of this
expenditure was wasteful. It is with a State as with
an individual—easily got, badly spent. Exactly how
much was ill-spent, and in what ways, we have no means
of ascertaining: secrecy and defective auditing of public
84
THE NEED OF FINANCIAL REFORM 85
accounts were among the most serious vices of the
financial disorder. Mr. Loveday, the only Englishman
at present sitting on the first Raad, told me that a few
years ago, being appointed a member of the finance
committee, he tried to challenge various accounts in
order to get the vouchers for the expenditure, but that
he was unable to carry the committee, and that he had
never been put on that committee since. It is indeed
admitted that the heads of the treasury and the audit¬
ing departments were incompetent to undertake the
elaborate finance of the State, and the Raad had ac¬
cepted the proposal that an expert financier should be
appointed to undertake full control. The most casual
examination of the figures of the Budget statements for
recent years shows the necessity of such a step. Since
1891 the Special Expenditure (commonly styled Secret
Service Fund) rose by leaps and bounds from a little
over £50,000 to £682,000 in 1896, while another equally
vague fund, entitled Sundry Services Account, grew from
£76,000 to £129,000. War expenditure is of necessity a
highly fluctuating quantity, especially when no large
money payment is made for a standing army, but an
advance from £87,000 in 1885 to £496,000 in 1896, how¬
ever justifiable as a defensive operation, certainly de¬
manded careful financial management.
The hasty assumption that such an income and
expenditure are in themselves excessive, however, has
no warrant in fact. When Mr. Conynghame Greene main¬
tained that there were two really substantial grievances,
over-taxation and maladministration, he confused his
issue. His language is characteristic of the slipshod
thought which pervades the whole statement of griev¬
ances. " It is unnatural that a State whose white popu-
86 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
lation consists, according to official statistics, of 250,000
people, should have an annual expenditure of from four
to five millions sterling, more especially when the newer
population have to pay nearly the whole of it" (C. 9345,
p. 28). Why it is unnatural that the Transvaal should
spend as much per white head as Cape Colony or Natal
(the expenditure being in fact considerably less than in
either colony) Mr. Greene does not explain, nor, assum¬
ing the expenditure justified, does he explain why it is
unnatural that the bulk of the taxation should be
defrayed by those who own the bulk of the property
and income of the country. Personally I am a strong
advocate of direct taxation, and condemn the indirect
and protective system which prevails in the Transvaal;
but whatever system be adopted, it is eminently " natural"
that those who have the means to pay should pay rather
than those who have not the means. There is the gravest
reason to believe that much of the income of the State
was wastefully used; there is no reason to suppose that
the sum raised was in excess of what the State could
profitably expend in sound public services, or of what
the great Rand industry could well afford to pay.
The incidence of certain indirect taxes was certainly
vexatious, as, for instance, the price of dynamite and rail¬
way rates; but no fault can be reasonably found with the
general design that the gold-reef, in which the natural
wealth of the country consists, should, through the agency
of those who work it, defray the bulk of the expenses of
government and public works.
A radical financial reformer with a free hand would cer¬
tainly have abolished the dynamite and other concessions,
or, if the State chose itself to work them, would have
charged more reasonable terms; he would probably have
THE NEED OF FINANCIAL REFORM 87
lowered many of the railway rates. On the other hand,
he would have greatly raised the taxation imposed directly
upon the gold industry and the incomes made from it,
well aware, from the profitable nature of this industry,
how much it could bear without an excessive check upon
development. The Gold Law of the Transvaal is the most
liberal in the world, taking no more than 5 per cent, out
of the admitted profits of mining, or, if we look at the out¬
put of 1898, taking TV of the total value of the gold got in
the year. Compare this with the Gold Law of Rhodesia,
where the Chartered Company has been accorded the right
of taking as much as 50 per cent, of the net profit of any
prospector who finds a purchaser for his claim. In
Rhodesia the shareholders of a company thus wield a
taxing power for their private benefit vastly in excess of
the power which the Transvaal Government exercises for
the public good. Sound finance requires that this defect
should be rectified, and that a substantial tax upon the
profits of Rand gold-mining should be substituted for the
foolish and wasteful methods of indirect taxation employed
at present.
Bearing in mind the exigencies of a growing State, and
the general prevalence of high prices for all goods and
services, there was no just reason to denounce the over¬
taxation of the Transvaal. But there was every reason
for the burghers of that country to insist that its methods
of taxation and its methods of expenditure shall be sub¬
jected to rigid scrutiny and radical reform.
CHAPTER XII
THE DYNAMITE MONOPOLY
How far the dynamite affair falls under corruption, how
far under financial maladministration, it is difficult to
determine. In either case it constitutes a grave scandal.
Into the intricacies of this purposely involved affair it is
impossible to penetrate; it is not even easy to piece
together a completely intelligible outline history. The
main facts, however, appear to be as follows. In 1888,
when the mining industry was yet an infant, the sole
right to make and sell explosives in the Transvaal was
granted to one Lippert, who made over the concession to a
French company. This form of " monopoly " was, in fact,
a breach of the London Convention, but no serious excep¬
tion was taken to it on this ground. An agitation, how¬
ever, was directed against the mode of conducting the
business, which, instead of building up a local industry, as
was intended, imported explosives and sold them at an
enormous profit. An official investigation was followed by
cancelment of this monopoly in 1893.
Shortly afterwards a new monopoly was established.
In form this was a Government monopoly, an agent being-
appointed by the Government to purchase and, as far as
necessary, to import materials and to form a business
which should " produce dynamite and other explosive
materials in such quantities as the needs and demands
within the South African Republic require." The agent
88
THE DYNAMITE MONOPOLY 89
appointed was one Vorstman, a partner of Lippert in the
expropriated company, and the new company he formed
absorbed Lippert's former company, assigning as com¬
pensation for the cancelment of the concession a large
number of shares in the new company, registered in June
1894 as the South African Explosives Company. This new
company was formed with a nominal capital of £450,000
in £1 shares: of this sum 220,000 shares were subscribed
and fully paid up by Nobel's Dynamite Trust, a European
company, who floated the concern; 25,000 shares were
granted to Lippert in terms of a prior contract; 182,000
shares were granted to the French company as indemnifi¬
cation for the cancellation of its contract; and 22,500
shares were granted to Dr. Gobert, a German lawyer,
"for services rendered."
Mr. Phillip, managing director of the Company, when
examined before the Industrial Commission, refused all
information as to the disposal of other shares than those
held by Nobel, but the above-named allotment is given
by the State Attorney. I understand that the large
compensation given to the expropriated company was
forced upon the Government by threats from the French
and German Governments, whose subjects were share¬
holders of the old concession. Those who accuse the
President of being actuated by personal interest in de¬
fending the dynamite monopoly have asserted that the
shares standing in the name of Dr. Gobert, an unknown,
are really owned by the President. There seems, however,
no direct evidence to support such an allegation, which
is floated upon an a priori supposition that there must be
some corrupt motive for the President's attitude.
The real suspicion attaching to the Government arises
from the fact that a so-called Government monopoly has
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
operated so as to give to a private firm a far larger share
of the gain of the monopoly than accrued to the State.
Although exact computation of the profits of the Com¬
pany was rendered almost impossible by the reluctance
of its directors to answer questions, a Volksraad Dynamite
Commission agreed with the report of the Industrial
Commission (itself appointed by the Transvaal Govern¬
ment) that a profit of quite 40s. per case was made by
the Company, only 5s. of which went to the State as its
share. The total profits of the Company were estimated
by the Volksraad Commission at £ 5 80,000 for the years
1897 and 1898.
The sum taken by the State had been 10s. before 1897,
but as a concession to the mining industry, upon the ad¬
vice of the Industrial Commission, a reduction of 10s. was
imposed upon the prices of the Company, the Government
consenting to bear half of this reduction by taking 5s. per
case instead of 10s. Why the Government thus reduced
the public income from the State monopoly, instead of
taking the whole 10s. from the admittedly exorbitant
profits of the Company, is one of the several mysteries in
this dark business.
The closer the matter is investigated, the more unsatis¬
factory does it seem. In the first place, it is absolutely
clear that the so-called agent of the Government, the
Nobel Trust, from whom all the "materials" are bought,
and the South African Explosives Company, are the same
persons.
The directors of the South African Explosives Company
at Pretoria were Mr. Wolmarans (a member of the State Exe¬
cutive), Mr. Vorstman the agent, Mr. Wolff, Mr. Phillip,
senior, and Mr. Phillip, junior. The elder Mr. Phillip,
being chairman of the Pretoria Company, was a director of
THE DYNAMITE MONOPOLY 91
Nobel's at Hamburg, and Mr. Phillip, junior, is also a
director of the European company. The personnel of the
Board of the Company in Europe is virtually identical
with that of Nobel's Trust,1 the general manager of the
latter serving likewise as secretary of the former.
The evidence makes it clear that the "monopoly,"
though nominally a " State " affair, is really in the main a
private business. The Government agent is not an inde¬
pendent official to guard the interest of the State, but a
private profit-monger buying'and selling in the interests of
two related companies, each of which makes a huge profit
out of the affair. Mr. Albu's concise statement admits of
no dispute. " Nobel's sells dynamite to the Government,
the Government sells it to the dynamite factory, selling it
back again to Nobel's ; so that Nobel's sells it to Nobel's,
and they try to make a profit on both sides."2
It is true that the Government has not left the dyna¬
mite monopoly wholly uncontrolled. In 1895-96 enormous
profits were made by simply importing ready-made dyna¬
mite instead of manufacturing it according to the conces¬
sion. This was stopped, and an expensive factory for con¬
verting the material into dynamite suitable for mining
purposes has been established. So likewise the illegal
writing off of capital, by which the Company hocussed
its accounts, has been stopped.
On the face of it sufficient reasons seem to exist for
cancelling this concession, and this course was strongly
urged not only by the mining industry, but by the In¬
dustrial Commission and a Committee of the Yolksraad.
The concession has been long unpopular among the
body of Transvaal burghers, and strong representations in
1 Cf. " Report of Industrial Commission," p. 409.
2 Industrial Commission, p. 391.
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
favour of cancelment have been made. So far as legal
authorities are concerned, the preponderance of advice
has favoured the legality of such a course, the present
legal adviser of the Government standing almost unsup¬
ported in his contrary opinion. When this pressure,
strongly backed by the representatives of the Free State,
was applied in vain, and President Kruger and Mr.
Wolmarans were believed to have used all their personal
influence to save the concession, a strong and pretty
general indignation was aroused, which seemed likely to
force the hands of the Government, had not the men¬
aces of the British Government saved the monopoly by
enabling its friends to represent the proposed cancel¬
ment as a concession to a British interference, which
all burghers were united in resenting.
This statement of the dynamite matter justifies grave
suspicions of corrupt administration, but it cannot be
said that any of the charges made are supported by
direct evidence. So far, moreover, as the complaints of
the mining industry are concerned, it is not clear that
their grievance is so intolerable as they make out. They
undoubtedly paid a heavy price for dynamite, and the
Company made a handsome profit. But apart from State
support, Nobel's Trust would occupy a very strong position
in dealing with the mining companies. Although Nobel's
has competitors, they are comparatively small producers,
and the Transvaal, which takes half the world's supply
of dynamite, could not obtain what it needs from other
sources without great delay. It would take years for
other firms to raise their output to the required extent,
or, as has been proposed, for the mining companies
themselves to produce the dynamite they use. If the
dynamite monopoly were cancelled, it is by no means
THE DYNAMITE MONOPOLY 93
evident that the mines would get their dynamite much
cheaper. Mr. Fitzpatrick boasts, indeed, that the gold
industry would be strong enough " to break the greatest
monopoly in the world." But a well-informed critic
casts doubt upon this confident statement. " As a
matter of fact it might be that the Dynamite Trust
could break the combination of the heads of the gold
industry for the reason that, pending the erection or
equipment of any factory or factories which the latter
might undertake, Nobel, otherwise the Dynamite Trust,
could refuse to supply the African market unless under
the conditions of a contract extending over a number
of years." No doubt it is a delicate question how far
the economic monopoly of Nobel can stand without State
aid, but it is by no means certain that the mines can
get rid of it so easily as they assume.
Moreover, if the concession were abolished, there
is good reason to believe that the mining industry as a
whole would not be gainers, but that a ring would be
formed for working the dynamite and charging prices
to the mines which would not be materially lower than
those now paid. This is no idle surmise, for the De
Beers Company had formed a definite plan for the
establishment of a dynamite factory which would have
enabled them to further the consolidation which has been
taking place by the close co-operation of Wernher Beit
and Co. with the Consolidated Goldfields. With the dyna¬
mite business in their hands, De Beers would have taken
one further step towards the establishment in Johannes¬
burg of that supremacy which they have long held at
Kimberley, squeezing out refractory competitors, or com¬
pelling them to "come in" upon terms dictated to them
by a " higher power."
94 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
That the high price of dynamite is to be regarded as
an intolerable burden on the mining industry cannot
be maintained. In his evidence before the Industrial
Commission, and again in his book, Mr. Fitzpatrick
admits that the Chamber of Mines was ready in 1893
to enter into a contract for no less a period than sixteen
years with Nobel for the delivery of No. 1 dynamite
at 90s. per case.1 Now since 1897 the price of this
dynamite has been 75s. per case, and this year an offer
was made which, had it proved acceptable to the mining
interest and the British Government, would have secured
dynamite for the mines at the price of 70s. per case.
The State Attorney's argument against the legality
of cancellation2 in view of the current obligations of the
Government is undoubtedly a powerful one. But its
validity implies a recognition of gross negligence of its
own plain interests by the Government in its past
relations with the Dynamite Company.
The grievance of the dynamite monopoly from the
standpoint of the Outlanders is one of no serious magni¬
tude. But the whole history of the matter shows a
culpable mismanagement from the public standpoint.
Whether corruption has been used or not, the bargains
between the State and the Dynamite Company have
exhibited an incapacity in the former to safeguard and
advance the public interest which merits the severest
criticism.
The fact is that finance is always the weakest point
of a Government like that of the Transvaal, suddenly
called upon to tackle the intricacies of industrial politics.
1 Report Industrial Commission, p. 50, and " The Transvaal from Within,"
P- 3°9-
2 Quoted in full, C. 9317» P- IO-
THE DYNAMITE MONOPOLY 95
Less educated and prepared than any other nation in the
world for such a task, the bucolic statesmen have been
ignominiously worsted in their dealings with the race
of astute financiers which has obtained the economic
mastery in their country. This public bargaining has
been so bad that, on looking back on it, one finds it
easiest to assume that some base forces of direct cor¬
ruption are responsible. But though there is certainly
no reason to claim for the Transvaal immunity from
the vices which are prevalent in the oldest and best
established Governments of the world, it is quite un¬
warrantable to assume that every failure to safeguard the
public interest is attributable to official bribery. Mal¬
administration, with some considerable measure of cor¬
ruption, are genuine grievances of the Transvaal. But
they are not specifically or chiefly Outlander grievances;
they are rather to be looked upon as diseases of the
entire body politic, and impartial inquiries will disclose
the fact of a growing disposition among the burghers and
in the official ranks to recognise this grave evil and to
seek means of genuine redress.
CHAPTER XIII
a general estimate of grievances
In the last few chapters I have given a detailed ex¬
amination of some of the leading "grievances" whicli
led to British pressure being brought to bear upon
the Transvaal Government. Those who consider that
England was justified in carrying this pressure as far
as war, generally maintain three connected positions—
first, that the misgovernment of the Outlander population
was so oppressive that armed interference with the
internal affairs of the Transvaal, though expressly ex¬
cluded by Convention, was justified as a last resort;
secondly, that no adequate redress could have been
obtained either by voluntary concessions, or by the
moral influence of diplomatic representations; thirdly,
that a successful war will be followed by a peaceful
settlement, which will speedily restore political and social
tranquillity to the Transvaal and to the rest of South
Africa.
Leaving for future consideration this third position,
we are now in a position to form a judgment on the
other two.
The examination of specific grievances, while disclosing
a misgovernment which is serious in some of its aspects,
does not indicate a condition of affairs so grave or so in¬
tolerable as to justify England in transgressing her obli¬
gations under the Convention to leave to the Transvaal
A GENERAL ESTIMATE OF GRIEVANCES 97
independence in the management of her internal affairs.
Some of the alleged grievances I have found quite unsub¬
stantial, as, for example, the dangers to person, liberty,
and property upon the Rand, and the charge of excessive
as distinct from unwise taxation. Other grievances
though substantial, had neither the bulk nor the aggra¬
vated character imputed to them. To this class belong
the charges of official corruptness and of maladministra¬
tion, especially of laws affecting the labour in the mines,
the abuse of coloured British subjects, and the education
issue. A third class is attributable to the conservatism
or slow adaptability of the Boer character, and is repre¬
sented by defects of the political constitution and of
finance, and by a reluctance to face the inevitable progress
of the British race and language. The accumulation of
these grievances did not weigh heavily upon the Outlander
population. Certain classes of individuals were annoyed,
but not oppressed; the average dweller on the Rand
was not subjected to any serious inconvenience through
Government action or inaction from one year's end to the
other. That serious scandals did exist in the Government
was evident, but taken neither individually nor collectively
did they constitute the intolerable burden which has been
pretended.
The Outlander grievances did not rightly furnish any
casus belli by warranting armed interference in accord¬
ance with international usage, where the subjects of one
State are denied ordinary security of life and property in
a foreign State. They did warrant peaceable and tactful
negotiations on the part of the British Government, with
the view of obtaining for these Outlanders the opportunity
which they claimed to become burghers of the State upon
reasonable conditions of residence. The main position
G
98 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
assumed by Sir A. Milner in his earlier negotiations, which
sought a franchise upon terms enabling the Outlanders to
effect a redress of specific grievances by ordinary consti¬
tutional means, was a sound one, and could have been
carried, if the negotiations had been conducted in an
amicable spirit. Instead of this, unfortunately, a tone of
menace, an abrupt refusal of the " give and take" which
is the essence of diplomacy, and a denial of any finality to
future demands, were allowed to appear in the negotiations
which Mr. Chamberlain and Sir A. Milner were conducting
nominally with a view to a reform in the franchise.
No one carefully and fairly examining the details of
this part of the negotiations, an analysis of which I have
presented in a later chapter, can arrive at any other con¬
clusion than that the redress of Outlanders' grievances
by the means deliberately suggested by Sir A. Milner,
namely, by a reform of the franchise, was not very seri¬
ously pursued. The conclusion imposed by a perusal
of despatches is that the franchise was a pretext, an
object so little desired that, when offered in a form to
which no further exception could be taken, it had to be
accepted in a fashion which could only be understood as
a refusal. The unreality of the demand for redress of
Outlanders' grievances, and of the demand for a franchise
as the means of this redress, stands out in strong relief
as we follow the course of events from early summer
into autumn, and watch the deposition of the Outlanders'
grievances in favour of the larger real issue which was
all the time assuming shape and vigour in the back¬
ground—the issue of a British empire over South Africa
south of the Zambesi—and north too, as soon and as
far as is desired.
CHAPTER XIV
the alleged dutch conspiracy
The condition of feeling among the Afrikanders of the
Colony on the eve of war could I think be fairly gauged.
Promiscuous charges of disloyalty and treason were of
course freely launched by part of the British press, im¬
plicating the entire Dutch population, their representa¬
tives in the Assembly, and the " Bond " Ministry in some
big vague conspiracy for the overthrow of British power
in the Colony, and the establishment of Dutch domination
over South Africa. But better-informed persons confined
their attack upon the Ministry (who are in fact chiefly
British in race and sympathies) to charges of passive
resistance to the Transvaal policy of the British Govern¬
ment, and of a wilful and mischievous resolve to blink
the danger of invasion and rebellion within the Colony.
Mr. Schreiner and his colleagues were violently assailed
for forwarding arms to the Free State, for not calling out
the volunteers, for refusing leave to Civil servants at
Kimberley to take arms, for delay in issuing a proclama¬
tion against treason, and, more broadly, for neglecting to
defend the Colony at a time when Natal and most other
British colonies had expressed active sympathy with the
war policy of Great Britain against the Republics. It was
not, however, pretended by the hottest-headed politicians
that men like Mr. Schreiner, Mr. Merriman, or Mr. Sauer
would carry this "treason" beyond the point of placing
99
ioo THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
obstacles in the path of the Imperial policy and maintain¬
ing the strict neutrality of the Colony. They were dis¬
trusted because they were known to condemn the war
policy of the Imperial Government, and were the visible
heads of the political power which the Dutch party won
at the polls last year. Against the body of their followers
in the House open charges of more positive disloyalty were
often made. Not a few of them, it was more than hinted,
were prepared for open rebellion when the time came.
But these sinister suggestions bore no probing. Even the
boldest organ of the South African press seldom accused
the Dutch members of recent inflammatory speeches or
of other incitements to join hands with the Republics.
It was, indeed, admitted that their present attitude was
one of extreme caution, and that they were doing their
utmost to keep the discontent among their constituents
from coming to a head, The strongest supporters of the
Imperial policy, men like Captain Brabant and Mr. R. P.
Fuller, chief organisers of the South African League, in¬
formed me that they did not impute directly rebellious
designs to the Bond members in the House; these were
mostly men of substance, and knew what they had to
lose by treason. Such was the generous interpretation
put upon their abstinence. But I talked long and closely
with many of those Dutchmen, and I am convinced that
their loyalty to the Imperial Government was genuine
and substantial. They simply deplored the fatal policy
of coercion upon which her Majesty's Government had
embarked, with its terrible legacy of race hatred and
domestic tragedy. It is hardly too much to say that
this war has come home to each one of these men in his
own family; there can hardly be one of them without a
son or other close relative, in the Transvaal or the Free
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 101
State, fighting for his country against British troops;
every one of them has innumerable ties of friendship
with his Dutch kindred there. Not one of these men is
a blind supporter of the Transvaal. All admit and deplore
its faults of misgovernment, but every one of them is con¬
vinced that these faults have been made the cloak of
aggression, and sympathises deeply, passionately, with the
Republics in their struggle to defend the rights of self-
government. Of any other " disloyalty " I found no trace;
the language and the conduct of these men were a con¬
tinual refutation of such a charge. Take the recent be¬
haviour of the Afrikander Bond, denounced as the special
instrument of this " Pan-Afrikander conspiracy," and its
leaders. Were men like Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Theron
going about the country uttering inflammatory speeches,
inciting the public to take up arms for the defence of the
Republics, or in any way utilising the heat of this crisis for
revolutionary energy ? Not at all. • It was allowed even
by their enemies that their self-restraint was exemplary,
that they exerted all their influence to prevent public
meetings from being held in disaffected regions, and that
they and their powerful organ, Ons Land, strained every
nerve to keep the public quiet. " Yes," sneers the Jingo;
" they were afraid to move just now; the time was not yet
ripe for the disclosure and fulfilment of their real designs."
The value of this sneer I need not here investigate; it is
sufficient at this stage to record the general admission
that the Bond leaders not merely were not inciting their
followers, but that they were persistently occupied in
checking attempts at organisation or demonstration.
"Yes, these people speak fairly with their lips, but they
harbour evil thoughts," is the answer I received a score
of times when I asked for some concrete evidence of
102 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the treason imputed to these men. Such an accusation
merits no reply, and, in the nature of the case, admits
of none.
But possibly I may be allowed to quote a recent inci¬
dent. At a meeting of the Dutch members specially con¬
vened to consider the petition for a peaceful settlement
presented to and rejected by the British Government, the
chairman, Mr. Theron, began by reading, with tears in his
eyes, a letter he had just received from his son, a young
burgher of the Transvaal, to whom he had written asking
what he proposed to do. "You ask me what I intend to
do. I intend to do my duty as a burgher towards the
country of my adoption, and leave to God the care of my
wife and child." Reading this letter, the chairman turned
to his fellow-members: "This teaches us a true lesson.
As my boy rightly determines to be loyal to his country,
so shall we be loyal to ours"—a remark which was
received with loud murmurs of assent and sympathy. I
am told that Mr. Theron forwarded this letter to the High
Commissioner, with the brief pathetic comment, "This
is my only son." This is no single instance. I hardly
entered any house occupied by one of the older Colonial
families which was not shadowed by some such impending
tragedy: here a daughter recently came down whose hus¬
band had left his office to do his duty as a Transvaal or
Free State burgher; there the father, a strong British
Jingo, lamented the infatuation of his sons who had cast
in their lot with the Republic under whose protection they
had lived and worked, while the mother tearfully tried to
check the fierce war-talk which was ever harrowing her
heart. These people harboured no treason against the
British Government. They were simply grieved, astonished,
and indignant at the almost incredible success of a policy
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 103
which, by persistent misrepresentation and concealment of
essential facts, had brought about a catastrophe the fatal
effects of which are swiftly coming home to the hearts and
lives of every one of them.
But is there no substance at all in the charges of active
disaffection that are brought ? A certain considerable
section of the Colony was seething with anger against the
attack on the Republics, and, if the Afrikander Bond were
the treasonable body it is represented as being, it could
have evoked a most dangerous rebellion. It was well
known that, whereas in the western and southern districts,
which are generally more settled, where there is a larger
admixture of British farmers, and where there is less sport
and less scope for roving and adventure, the Dutch could
not be roused to any active co-operation with the defiant
Republics, the condition of the northern border districts
was very dangerous. The districts where large definite
disaffection existed were those bordering on the southern
boundary of the Free State and portions of counties, such
as Middleburg and Craddock, which adjoin these. Long
before the outbreak of hostilities fears of disturbance in
this part of the Colony were entertained by responsible
Ministers and members of Assembly. Many of the latter
expressly left their post at Cape Town before the session
was over, in order to exert their personal influence among
their constituents in preventing popular meetings from
being held, and other demonstrations which might give
colour to the charges of treason. The South African
League and the Progressives openly charged these districts
with long-planned rebellion. For years, it was said, they
had been arming, and during the last year emissaries from
the Transvaal had brought large quantities of Mausers,
some of which had been freely and openly distributed
io4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
among the farmers, while others had been sold by dealers
below cost price. Organised recruiting of volunteers to
fight with the Republics was alleged to have been going
on as part of a general propaganda of sedition. How
much, if any, truth exists in these charges it is not easy
to ascertain. They are denied outright and in toto by
most of the Bond members and by Messrs. Schreiner and
Hofmeyr. Both the latter gentlemen told me that they
had repeatedly challenged these statements, and asked for
any single concrete case to be proved, and that their
challenge had never been met. Bond members for these
very counties in question most positively asserted that
they had made close inquiries, and found no tittle of
evidence for these statements. The kind of evidence I
could get from the officials of the South African League
and other Progressive politicians was certainly not what
lawyers would consider as "good evidence." I am dis¬
posed to think they would have great difficulty in bringing
home any single case to support their general charges.
Indeed, many of those who strongly held this doctrine
of the Dutch conspiracy in the Colony, frankly admitted
that specific charges were difficult or impossible of proof,
appearing to think that a large quantity of inferior and
dubious evidence was equivalent to a smaller quantity
of superior and certain evidence. What they did not
sufficiently consider was the common interested source
of this accumulation of hearsay evidence, which completely
annuls the value of mere quantity.
But while this sort of evidence entirely failed to
sustain the allegation of a set conspiracy, there is no
reason to doubt that attempts have recently been made,
successful in some measure, to stir parts of the Colony.
Dutch members admitted that a circulation of seditious
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 105
leaflets, probably issuing from the Transvaal, had taken
place. Moreover, there can be no question but that a
canvass had been made by Transvaalers to ascertain the
probability of assistance from the Colony, and, on the eve
of war, attempts were made to enlist actual support and
to furnish arms to those who appeared willing to render
aid. Though I do not believe, as is often suggested, that
this has been an integral part of a long conscious policy
of the Transvaal Government, I think it quite probable
that individual energetic agents of that Government, en¬
dowed with a fairly free hand, and possibly with money,
may have done these things. But whether these specific
charges be true or not, it is certain that a deep, wide-spread
resentment existed among the Dutch of these districts,
which has already led to a considerable defection of the
younger colonial frontiersmen, and which in certain events
will lead to a wide-spread and dangerous rebellion. The
forces which hitherto have held these people within bounds
are the Ministry, the Afrikander Bond, the personal and
extraordinary influence of Mr. Hofmeyr, and the powerful
paper Ons Land.
The soothing doctrine that this war was inevitable
is explicitly adopted by some of our leading statesmen.
When challenged, it takes its stand upon the idea con¬
veyed in the striking sentence attributed to Sir A. Milner,
the necessity of crushing "the dominion of Afrikander-
dom." The great majority of the British colonists of the
towns have firmly persuaded themselves that the perverse
and defiant attitude of the Republics, which has now
blossomed into war, is the first open expression of a
general revolutionary movement which has for a long
time been gathering force among the Dutch inhabitants
of South Africa. Even those who think war might have
io6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
been averted by diplomacy, and who are not enthusiastic
admirers of the Johannesburgers, defend the drastic policy
of Great Britain on the ground that a present settlement
could have had no permanency, and would have merely
given time for the Dutch conspiracy to have attained
more formidable dimensions. It is not easy to gather any
very definite idea of the nature and growth of this " con¬
spiracy." The Progressive politicians are, however, fairly
agreed in dating the definite formulation of the notion
of an independent Dutch South Africa, as an object of
political agitation, back to 1881, when the Transvaal was
given back, or to 1883, when Mr. Hofmeyr organised the
Afrikander Bond. Ever since then, I was informed, the
idea of overthrowing the British power and of establishing
Dutch supremacy has been secretly growing in the minds
of the Dutch. The Afrikander Bond, as an insignificant
revolutionary faction, came into being in 1880, under the
leadership of Mr. Du Toit; it professed to aim at the
establishment of a political union of the South African
States under an independent flag. Mr. Du Toit, however,
was a man of small account, and when Mr. J. H. Hof¬
meyr, already recognised as the leading Dutch politician,
effected a fusion between this body and the Farmers'
Protection Association, the "independent flag" was ex¬
pressly knocked out of the constitution of the Bond,
which henceforth avowed its object to be " the formation
of a South African nationality by means of union and
co-operation, as a preparation for the ultimate object, a
United South Africa." The notion, sedulously fostered by
those who seek to prove the disloyalty of the majority
of Cape colonists, that something treasonable lurks in this
pronouncement of South African nationality, is most mis¬
chievously false. The true consistency between British
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 107
Imperial control and South African nationality is excel¬
lently stated by Dr. Beck, one of the ablest members of
the Bond party in the Cape Assembly: "The British
notion of the broad and true Imperialist of to-day is some¬
thing far wider than a mere English empire; it is in the
widest sense an empire made up of a group of nations
which have been evolving through the wise statesmanship
that has hitherto mainly guided the Imperial destinies.
These notions, developing each along its lines of least
resistance, have been gradually reaching a point where
they could demonstrate to the world that, although they
were individually distinct and far apart as the poles, col¬
lectively they stood together, constituting through com¬
munity of interests and aspirations one compact body.
Gradually these notions were reaching a condition to show
to the world that 'John Bull & Co.' was an unlimited
liability concern, with John Bull as senior partner, and all
manner of nationalities as junior partners. But is all
this to be changed now ? The Canadian Prime Minister,
speaking in England at the time of the Jubilee celebra¬
tion, said, and he prided himself on the loyalty of his
sentiments, that he was proud to remind England that
Canada was no longer a colony; it was a strong, self-
reliant nation.
' Daughter am I in my mother's house,
But mistress in my own.'
Only to poor distracted South Africa is this natural
aspiration, this desire to be ' mistress in her own house,'
to be denied; only the Dutch-descended South African,
who, because Nature wills it so, cannot be English, and
who is not allowed to be an Afrikander, is to be relegated
to a position where he has no corner of the world to call
io8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
his own, no place to call home; and all this is proposed to
be done in the name of Imperialism."
There is surely no Imperial gain in checking this
legitimate and wholesome growth of an Afrikander nation,
which comprises, as it was always intended to comprise, all
those racial factors of South African life which make their
permanent home in that country.
It is difficult for any one who follows the part played
by the Bond in politics to recognise it as the revolutionary
instrument it is charged with being. After its early and
successful efforts to get the Dutch language released from
the embargo placed upon it, and to obtain equal treatment
for the Dutch and English tongues, most of its political
work has been directed to questions relating to the agri¬
cultural and native labour questions, which chiefly affect
the Dutch farmers. The tactics of their leaders have
always been plainly constitutional; they have worked
mostly with English statesmen — recently with Mr.
Rhodes, now with the Schreiner Ministry—for an open-
handed, concrete policy, often narrowly conservative or
even retrogressive, but with no tincture of revolution in
it. The larger purpose of its programme, the establish¬
ment of a South African nationality, has certainly never
obtruded itself on the political arena. Neither in Parlia¬
ment nor outside has the Bond ever devoted itself to the
formation of a great Dutch nationalist party seeking to
throw off' British control and to establish an independent
Dutch South Africa.
Those who depict the Afrikander Bond as a vast party
or race organisation like the Irish National League, to
which every Dutch politician belongs as a matter of
course, and which by a great network of propagandism is
constantly stimulating the people to the active realisation
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 109
of separatist aspirations, completely miss the truth. The
members of the Bond, counting branches all over South
Africa, have never amounted to more than a few thou¬
sand; among these are a considerable minority of colo¬
nists of British or other non-Dutch descent. The great
secret fanatical associations with which we are familiar in
Italy, Russia, France, and Ireland are utterly alien from
the character and circumstances of the scattered Dutch
colonists, who are essentially individualistic in feelings
and in methods of action, and who neither for social,
industrial, nor political purposes have shown any real
capacity of powerful close co-operation. The Bond is a
substantial and effective organisation of small groups of
farmers and professional men in the small towns and
country districts, for the purpose of urging practical
schemes of reform upon the Legislature, and of protect¬
ing the local interests of the inhabitants. There is
nothing whatever in the constitution of the Bond about
Dutch nationality or about a union which shall exclude
British control or supremacy.
Those who charge the Bond with harbouring and
propagating these designs have been challenged repeat¬
edly to make good their charges from speeches of Mr.
Hofmeyr and the leading Dutch politicians, and they
have never taken up the challenge. It is likely enough
that the idea of South Africa for the Dutch has been
entertained by some speculators on the future destiny
of the country, men who realise the more tenacious
grip upon the country which agriculture gives the
Dutch as compared with those gold and diamond in¬
dustries which, outside the Cape Peninsula, are the chief
British interests in the country. Here and there an
agitating spirit may have sought personal influence
no THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
among his fellow-Dutch by foolish appeals to race feeling
as a basis of political, or even of revolutionary activity;
but though this is an issue upon which documentary
evidence might be expected to be available, there is a
singular dearth of it. In the press the paper which for
circulation and influence holds a unique position in the
colony is Ons Land, but no one accuses it of preaching
sedition or of advocating revolutionary methods. When
Sir A. Milner can find no popular press from which to
illustrate his charges of disloyalty against the people whom
he is set to govern, and is driven to quotations from papers
so insignificant as the Rand Post and the Stellalander,
he surely gives away his case. Here, according to Sir
Alfred and his British Imperialists, is an organised revolu¬
tionary movement, with ample means at its disposal, con¬
fronted by a powerful omnipresent Rhodesian press, which
nevertheless has utterly neglected to use the most potent
engine of sedition which our century has produced.
Again, we should expect to find in the reports of Bond
meetings ample testimony of the Dutch conspiracy. Do
we find this ? No such thing. When I consulted pro¬
minent Progressive politicians, they referred me with con¬
fidence to a branch meeting of the Bond held last May at
Burgersdorp, a place spoken of to-day with bated breath
as a hotbed of rebellion. A careful perusal of the report
of this meeting, as given by the Cape Times, yielded
but a single sentence which could be twisted into trea¬
son. A certain Mr. Van der Walt "prayed the Almighty
that the day would yet come when the whole of
Afrikanderdom would be freed from the foreign yoke."
But Mr. Van der Walt was a Transvaal burgher, and
this imprecation of his, however regretable, could hardly
justify the wholesale charge of treason brought against
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY in
the meeting. The only really important personage at
this gathering was Professor J. C. Cachet, head of the
Reformed Church of South Africa, whose speech con¬
sisted of a powerful appeal against the methods adopted
by the Rand agitators and their press to prejudice the
mind of the Imperial Government and to fan the flame
of race hostility. There was indignation, even invective,
in his address, but no single word which carried a sug¬
gestion of disloyalty. Instead of being an incentive to
revolution, it was a powerful plea for peace, and the
following passage, received with great applause, points
a most important lesson which Sir A. Milner and some
of the more inflammatory journalists who support him
might digest with advantage :—" There were the English¬
men born and resident in the country. He knew that
if the majority of them were asked, ' Do you wish to
make an end of the Boer?' they would say, 'No; we
live here and are quite satisfied. We have no grievances.'
The Englishmen in their midst were not the mischief-
makers ; it was the new-comers, who knew nothing about
the country, except to be continually making an uproar
and keeping the fire of race hatred alight."
But suppose that here and there there were dreamers
of a Dutch South African Republic, and loose-tongued
orators who gave voice to the notion, what of that ? Surely
between this feeble sporadic speculation or agitation, and
the organised conspiracy charged against the Dutch by
Progressive politicians, and endorsed by Sir A. Milner,
the widest possible difference exists. The one belongs to
those innumerable little currents of thought and feeling
which abound everywhere in every country where race
factors are in slow progress of fusion, and where differences
of economic function are conterminous with race; the
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
other is the offspring only of persistent personal oppres¬
sion or of grievously oppressed sentiments of nationality.
Why should the Dutch in Cape Colony conspire ? For
many years they have exercised a preponderating influ¬
ence in practical politics, even out of proportion to their
numbers, and every important British politician has
sought to ingratiate himself with them. If they seriously
desired to realise the larger object of the Bond, there
has been, except perhaps in Natal, where the British
are relatively stronger, nothing to prevent them from
working in a regular constitutional way towards rendering
effective the idea of South African nationality by achiev¬
ing a growing union between the colonies and the
Republics. Indeed, in spite of "set-backs" incident on
ill-advised and premature attempts at mechanical union,
the feeling and fact of African nationality has been
growing apace both among British and Dutch inhabitants,
and were it not for recent unhappy appeals to race hatred,
most satisfactory progress towards an end in itself highly
desirable might have been attained.
There never has existed in Cape Colony any desire to
expel British control, or any conspiracy to achieve such an
object. All the direct evidence goes to prove the contrary.
As for Mr. Hofmeyr and the Dutch Afrikander leaders of
the Colony, they have constantly and strongly delivered
themselves in favour of the maintenance of the British
flag and the control which it implies. I have had long
conversations with Mr. Hofmeyr and with leading Bond
members of Assembly, and I am firmly convinced of the
sincerity of the feeling with which they deplore and
denounce the imputations of disloyalty. If any man
voices the true inwardness of Dutch sentiment and Bond
politics, it is Mr. Hofmeyr. Yet it was this man, not many
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 113
years ago, who strongly urged in England a scheme of
Imperial federation, by which England's colonies might be
more closely bound to her and to one another. Subsequent
experience may have modified his views as to the feasibility
of such a project, but Mr. Hofmeyr is as far as ever from
desiring to weaken the bond which unites to England the
destinies of South Africa.
But suppose it were otherwise, as it is with some. It
may well be admitted that there are thoughtful Dutch,
and not a few British Afrikanders, who look forward to
a diminution of direct Imperial control over the domestic
affairs of South Africa, who distrust government from
Downing Street, and even contemplate a time when they
may elect freely their own Governor, and England's control
may be confined to a general protective influence and a
control over foreign affairs. I am convinced that there is
no organised movement in the direction of such a change.
But suppose there were, and that an active educational
propaganda were on foot with such an aim. If it were
sought to promote such an object by education and by
peaceful representation to England, and not by an appeal
to arms, would that be treason, would that justify the adop¬
tion of brutal measures of coercion ? I ask these questions
because, from what I have seen and heard in South Africa,
I feel confident that, sooner or later (if, indeed, British
South Africa survives the present conflict), the time will
come when some such requests, hardening into demands,
will actually be made for complete internal self-government,
and that these requests or demands will proceed at least
as largely from the British colonists as from the Dutch.
But if a few thoughtful men entertain this notion (I heard
it oftener from British than from Dutch), it belongs at
present to the region of speculation or remote aspiration,
H
II4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
and has certainly no place in current politics, though the
new turn of events may well ripen it more rapidly towards
fulfilment. I am convinced that not the closest Commis¬
sion of Inquiry could fasten on the Bond or upon their
British associates the charge of aiming at any political
changes of such a magnitude; still less could it bring
home the charges of treason which malicious slander asso¬
ciates with their name. Numerous utterances of these
men are extant showing them to be supporters of the
British Imperial power. Would the leaders of a party
pledged to rapidly ripening revolutionary action have
voted with enthusiastic unanimity the sum of ,£30,000
towards the Imperial navy last year, and have handed
over Simonstown to the possession of Great Britain for a
coaling station ? These are in themselves perhaps slight
incidents, but to any one acquainted with politics they are
of conclusive significance.
In the face of such facts, how is the idea of an organised
conspiracy to found a Dutch Republic defended ? By an
argument of dazzling impudence. " Yes," it is said," these
men speak fair with their lips; their conduct is also beyond
reproach ; but then we must remember that among con¬
spirators, the arts of simulation and concealment are neces¬
sary to the success of their cause." So, too, with the lack
of convincing evidence regarding revolutionary action;
" such a movement is essentially secret and does not admit
that sort of proof which is accessible and is required for
the acceptance of ordinary statements of fact." So the
hypothesis built in the air is sustained by imputed motives
and suggestions equally aerial in origin. " Your speech and
action are substantially loyal; but then we know you are
disloyal. So you must be meaning something different from
what you say and do." Let me give one or two samples
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 115
of the sort of evidence I got. Take the case of the
Mausers said to be distributed among the Colonial people
on the Free State frontier. There was no real evidence
that large numbers of these men possessed either Mausers
or other non-sporting arms; but let that pass. Sup¬
pose they had, how did they obtain them ? The stories
about waggons full of guns coming across from the Free
State crumbled to pieces directly one examined them; the
name of the informant was withheld, place and date were
invariably absent, there were generally several links be¬
tween the narrator and the avowed eye-witness, who had
never presented himself for cross-examination, and who
never seemed to have taken the ordinary precaution to
inform the local magistracy of the proceedings in time to
get a thorough investigation. But generally it was ad¬
mitted that the guns were bought, and the charge simply
amounted to a statement that many men too poor to have
paid the full price for a Mauser were found to be possessed
of one. These guns, it was alleged, were bought in large
numbers at small shops in the towns by Dutchmen, but
an Englishman who wished to buy one could never find
one nearer than Port Elizabeth; and so on. The Rhodes
organs in the Colonial press adopted the same method,
poisoning the public mind by utterly unsubstantiated
imputations. Take for instance an unsigned letter in the
Cape Argus of October 7, published on the eve of war, in
which the anonymous writer asserts that an unnamed
Dutch member of Assembly had recently said to an un¬
named business man of Cape Town, " The time has come
when we must have our own flag and be a separate
nation."
I am almost ashamed to repeat such trashy evidence,
but it was the only sort of support for the allegation of a
n6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
preconcerted Dutch conspiracy. Stay! One other evi¬
dential gem, fallen from the lips of a leading official of the
South African League, comes to my recollection. I asked
him how he knew the guns were supplied by the Transvaal
Government. " Why," replied he, " in what other way can
you account for the enormous secret service expenditure
that has been going on ?" There is no substantial evidence
and no inherent probability in the treasonable relations
with the Republican Governments charged against Dutch
colonists. A handful of rabid utterances, vaguely reported,
and a vast amount of thought-reading, form an utterly
inadequate warranty for such a charge. The notion that
Cape Colonists have deliberately conspired to purge Africa
of British influence and to set up a separate Dutch domi¬
nation, in which the Transvaal, by virtue of its wealth and
growing population, would impose Krugerism upon South
Africa, is too preposterous for serious discussion. Is such
a policy even plausible in the case of a country where
every important family has British connections and British
sympathies ? Is it likely that a faction with such an end
in view would have put in power a Ministry in which there
are only two members of pure Dutch blood, and where
British race and avowed Imperial sympathies preponde¬
rate ? No one acquainted with the views and feelings of
such men as Mr. Schreiner, Mr. Merriman, and Mr. Solo¬
mon can suppose for a single moment that Dutch conspi¬
rators could hope either to win their connivance or to
cajole them into becoming the unconscious instruments of
a conspiracy. It is idle to disguise the fact that a strong,
widespread sympathy exists among the Dutch of the
colonies with their kinsmen of the Republics, whom
they believe to be the victims of unjust aggression,
the nature, object, and instruments of which they believe
THE ALLEGED DUTCH CONSPIRACY 117
they clearly understand. This sympathy implies a
passionate detestation of the present Imperial policy,
and beyond question must be understood to verify the
warning uttered months ago by the petition of the
Colonial Dutch Reformed Church, which stated that in
case of war upon the Transvaal " the allegiance of your
Majesty's loyal Dutch subjects would sustain the most
formidable shock which it has ever received." But let it
be clearly understood that this is an ebullition of feeling
and not a development of policy. Many of the politicians
and publicists, who have by constant reiteration forced
upon the public mind a belief in the great Dutch con¬
spiracy, must be fully aware of the emptiness of the charge.
They must know that the Dutch colonists have no desire
to disestablish the representative institutions under which
they have lived, and which have given them a controlling
voice in the government, in order to set in its place that
Krugerism which all their leaders have reprobated in the
strongest terms, and against whose manifestations they
have more than once been upon the point of taking up
arms. I am compelled to charge the Progressive party
and politicians of the Colony with a reckless use of these
charges of disloyalty. I further charge them with con¬
spiring, in the heat of their patriotism, by press, public,
and private utterances, to produce disloyalty by suggestion.
These Dutch Afrikanders have never been disloyal; they
have merely been grieved and indignant, as they have
every right to be. But call them traitors in a thousand
insulting ways, fabricate charges of incipient rebellion in
every issue of the press, set spies among them and threaten
them with troops, and you take the most effective way
to turn honest opposition into treason. Then, when this
persistent goading has attained its natural result and some
n8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
open exhibition of disloyalty occurs, the " agents provo¬
cateurs" of this malign policy gleefully rub their hands
and say, "We told you it was there, and out it comes."
The armed co-operation which has already taken place
in certain districts with the Boer forces may indeed be
regarded as a direct product of the consistent policy of
the Progressive party, who last year, fairly defeated at
the polls, chose this disastrous and contemptible method
of avenging their party failure. This language may sound
strong, but it is feeble to express a policy which at
the present time seems likely to shatter the foundations
of political and social order throughout South Africa,
and to cost Great Britain, in blood, money, and empire,
a price the magnitude of which is not even yet within
the focus of her vision.
CHAPTER XV
the dutch feeling in the colony : an
interview with oliye schreiner
Mr. and Mrs. Cronwriglit Schreiner had been spending
a couple of months on a farm among the most primitive
Boers of the colonial frontier near Hopetown when the
war broke out, and they were among the last to find their
way down to Cape Town. Knowing that Mrs. Cronwright
Schreiner had for many years lived as teacher and as
friend among these Dutch farmers, most of whom have
kinsmen fighting in the Free State or the Transvaal,
and who are accused of hating England and harbouring
treasonous designs, I asked her if I might question her
about the feelings of these people. I found her in the
pleasant unpretentious house which her brother, the
Premier, has just built for himself in Newlands, a de¬
lightful suburb lying under the shelter of Table Mountain,
the only bit of South Africa which combines sea and
mountain and rich old English oaks, pines, and beech
trees, with a perceptible but not overpowering blend of
the sub-tropical, giving it a novel piquancy to English
eyes. Needless to say, Mrs. Schreiner suffers terribly from
the pain and shame of the catastrophe which has come
upon the South Africa she loves so passionately. " Some
mornings I wake up here," she said, "in the brilliant
sunshine and hear the birds singing in the trees, and I
have forgotten what has happened; and then suddenly
119
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the appalling fact breaks in upon my heart, this torn
and bleeding condition of my country." And then we
talked of the war, and Mrs. Schreiner told me of the
Boer farms round Orange River which she had been
visiting during the last few weeks, where the real old
primitive life is still lived in a farmhouse little more
than a mud hut of two rooms, with a few miles of veldt
round it on which to graze scant herds of sheep and cattle,
by which the farmer wins his hard livelihood. These are
the people suspected of disloyalty, of wishing to join hands
with the Republics and to break away from the British
flag. I asked Mrs. Schreiner what state of feeling she
found among them.
" Ah," she said, " Sir A. Milner and this malicious press
do not understand (or is it even possible they do under¬
stand ?) what they have done in separating Dutch and
British and in sowing these charges of disloyalty at such
a time. These men and women are suffering a terrible
strain. All of them have sons and relatives in the
commandos of the Transvaal or Free State, and they
learn that the soldiers of the Queen, the great English¬
woman whose portrait is nailed up on their wall, are
marching to shoot them down. And on the top of all
this they are being goaded to disloyalty by those suspi¬
cions and accusations."
"But is it true that these Boers have any genuine
feeling for the Colony and the British Government ?"
"Most certainly. Great Britain is the only country
to which they have ever looked. They are proud of
their Government; they have loved the Colony as a
part of the British Empire, just as in America an in¬
habitant of Virginia or Ohio loves and backs his State
as against the other States. Now they feel pain and
DUTCH FEELING IN THE COLONY 121
bitter resentment that their fidelity should suddenly be
questioned."
" How did they first come to this suspicion ?"
" Well, it was perhaps the forts and the soldiers that
were placed amongst them. They felt this deeply. ' Why
are they building these forts at De Aar and other places ?
Why are these soldiers brought here ? When have we
been disloyal ?' These are the questions they kept asking."
" But are these people not really anti-English ?"
"You would not ask this if you had been among them.
I could drive you to farm after farm where you would
have found all the younger generation proud of learning
to speak English and of dressing in English fashion and
learning English ways. In most of these small Dutch
cottages you would find a harmonium and a book of
English songs, which the daughters spent their leisure
time in practising—songs mostly glorifying the British
army and navy! The girls would make a sort of apology
for their mother, saying, ' My mother, she can really
understand some English, though she does not speak
it.' All of them have been anxious to be as English
as possible."
" But I suppose this will not continue now ?" I said.
" Why, naturally not. This is the very worst thing we
are doing; we are killing the love of these people. Eng¬
land in her Imperial policy is losing her empire over
their hearts. In twenty-five years there would have been
no more Dutch and English in this colony, but a fused
Afrikander people owning allegiance to Great Britain as
their mother. But this hope is gone."
"But what are their thoughts on the present situa¬
tion ? Do they bring political analysis to bear on it ?"
"Yes; they are tremendous politicians, most of them.
122 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Whenever they meet at markets, fairs, or church gather¬
ings they will lay out the whole of politics as they see
it. Their bitterest feeling is that they are being kept
from the Queen, for whom they have intense love and
reverence. It seems strange to English people, but these
primitive folk think the Queen must be accessible, like
Paul Kruger, and they have a personal pride and belief
in her."
" Is there any truth in what is said—that this sort of
regard for the Queen does not prevent them from enter¬
taining treason against the British Government ?"
"No; that is sheer misunderstanding. They largely
see the Government personified in the Queen and in
the British Ministers of the Colony. They feel, 'This is
our Government, our Queen;' and their charge against
Chamberlain and Milner is that they have come between
the people and their Queen. An old farmer a few weeks
ago put the matter quaintly: ' There are two people we
don't want to see dead; it is a pity they are old—one
is the Queen, the other Paul Kruger: the young will
never take their place.' I fear more than anything for
the shock which will be felt when they come to realise
that they cannot get to the Queen. 'Why don't you
go to the Queen and speak for us?' more than one has
said to me. Up to the last they often said to me,' Our
Queen won't allow our friends to be killed.'"
'And how do they account for what has happened?
Whom do they blame ?"
"First let me tell you a curious thing about them.
They seem to have no vindictive feelings whatever
against the English soldiers sent to fight their friends
and relatives. Most commonly they speak of them with
a certain pity. 'Die arme Rooibaatjes, poor chaps; what
DUTCH FEELING IN THE COLONY 123
have tliey done that they should be shot ?' I verily
believe there is not a Boer woman amongst them that
would not open her heart to a wounded soldier, turn
out of her bed to give it to him, and nurse him as
tenderly as her own son."
" Whom, then, do they hold responsible for the
trouble ?"
" It is not Mr. Chamberlain, nor Sir A. Milner, though
they say, 'He has blackened us.' Their anger is re¬
served for one man, whom they regard as the root of
the evil. The whole face will harden at the name
Rhodes—'the traitor,' as they always term him. Before
the matter had fully ripened into war I was talking
with an old Boer farmer, a man of substance and of
great influence in his district. He put it in this way:
'When I think over the matter, it seems to me Rhodes
and those men won't be able to make war; for "our old
Lady" has always been good to us and loved justice,
and she won't let it be.'"
"Was it altogether Rhodes they blamed ?"
" Well, chiefly Rhodes; sometimes the capitalists.
They would sum up the discussion thus: ' And the root of
the matter is Naboth's vineyard—the gold, and the capi¬
talists that want it.' They have very clearly grasped the
kernel—the determination of the capitalists to control
the whole country; not only the mines and the towns'
wealth, but the land. And when they have got the land,
where is our freedom ? But ' the capitalists' is no vague
Socialist catchword. These people always mean those
who buy up land, buy up votes, and so try to get away
their freedom."
"And tell me, what do you think will be the effect
when these people realise fully the blow ?"
124 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
" I "would rather not answer; I cannot tell. Much
depends upon the discretion of the Imperial Government.
One touch upon the principle of responsible government
in the Colony would rouse in them that fine free instinct
for representative institutions brought from Holland and
born and bred in the bones of these colonists. Then,
again, press and politicians have a terrible responsibility.
Let me read you a passage from a letter received this
morning from an Englishman, a wealthy merchant, who
has lived many years up-country: ' The people of this
district are remaining quiet, although the papers are
eagerly read. If they could only stop those lying, peace-
disturbing upstarts who are spreading reports about, I
should have no fear of disturbance. For instance, on
Saturday a man told me he had been informed by
Mr. that if the Transvaal Boers lost we should all
become slaves, our Parliament would be taken from us,
and Cape Colony taxed to pay the expenses of the
war.' Lies of this sort are intentionally circulated over
the country and have a very disturbing effect. The
Rhodesites are impressing on them that they will lose
their Government, so goading them to rise."
" How do these Dutch feel towards Sir A. Milner ?"
"They simply feel that they have no relation at all
to him; that he has never taken the trouble to com¬
prehend them. ' Ah,' they would say to me, ' if we
only had one of our old Governors back, the good old
Governors we used to have, they would put everything
right; they understood us. If Sir George Grey were
still alive we could go to him.'"
"Then the common view that they hate Englishmen
is false ?"
"It is an utter misapprehension of Dutch feeling.
DUTCH FEELING IN THE COLONY 125
Much of the apparent hostility is wounded feeling. Treat
the Dutchman kindly, win his affection and trust, and
there is no limit to his confidence in you. It is false
to say he has a natural antipathy towards Englishmen.
I would rather say he waits with open arms, and if you
stand off from him, as so many English do, he feels
bitterly about it. 'You are my fellow-countryman and
you won't be my brother.' The English new-comer starts
too often with the notion that a Boer is a sort of inferior
strange animal. The Boers themselves often laugh over
these stories, but they feel them all the same. They
were telling me a lot of anecdotes about Tommy Atkins.
At Orange Kiver one of the newly-arrived English soldiers
went into a store and asked the Dutchman who kept
it, 'Are there any Boers about, because I want to see
what they look like?' 'Well, I'm a Boer.' 'What!
You a Boer? Nonsense!' 'Well, but I am a Boer.
'Why, you look just like any other man!' It is a terrible
mistake that is being made, the alienation of the hearts
of these people. How easy they are to be governed by
affection! There is nothing they won't do for a man
who is true to them. As things go now, we are crush¬
ing and destroying this great true power of government.
More than that, we are even causing them to lose their
faith in God. They are religious folk of the old sort.
'God is still reigning He will see to the right.' That
has been their confidence. What will be their feeling
after England's destruction of their fellow-Boers in South
Africa ?"
CHAPTER XVI
transvaal armaments
Many who reject the notion of a Pan-Afrikander con¬
spiracy against Great Britain in which the Bond and the
entire Dutch-Afrikander population of the colonies are
implicated, are yet disposed to accept a narrower view of
this same conspiracy which accredits the Republics with
aggressive designs. Ever since the Transvaal was retro-
ceded, we are told, it has cherished designs of South
African empire; the amiable weakness of the British was
mistaken for cowardice; the great resources which the
discovery of gold placed at the disposal of the Transvaal
Government made an aggressive policy possible; intrigues
with Continental Governments were set on foot; a pro¬
pagandist movement was actively conducted throughout
South Africa; large sums of money were expended upon
modern armaments, with which Kruger and Steyn in¬
tended, when a convenient occasion came, to invade
British territory, to drive the British into the sea, and to
establish a Boer dynasty over South Africa. Now, of
propagandism in the colonies I have already spoken.
There is no evidence of any organised attempt to shake
the allegiance of Dutch colonists until the present war
was imminent. The foreign intrigues with Germany and
Holland imputed to Dr. Leyds and his Hollanders it is
idle to discuss. No definite intelligible allegations are
made, no tittle of evidence is adduced to show that the
125
TRANSVAAL ARMAMENTS 127
Boer Republics have ever dreamed of ousting Great
Britain from her paramountcy in South Africa in order to
put Germany or any other power in her place. Such
approaches, if any have been made, are of quite recent
date, and are explicable as part of a legitimate defensive
policy conceived when the Transvaal became convinced
that an attack upon her independence was intended by
the mining capitalists and would be extorted by them
from the British Government.
Apart from the surprising strength which the Boers
have shown in the field, the only piece of evidence ad¬
duced is the expenditure on armaments: all the rest is
vague insinuation and unsupported conjecture.
Not only the man in the street, but responsible poli¬
ticians have defended the inevitability of this war by
asserting that the vast expenditure upon armaments of
the Transvaal was proof of their aggressive intention.
" Sooner or later they intended to attack: they would have
chosen a time when we were in some other difficulty: we
should have been fools to have waited for this emergency."
Now, this position is at least intelligible: it throws
overboard the pretence that we are fighting about Out-
landers' grievances, or for the empty word suzerainty, or
because the Boers have actually invaded British territory:
the real cause of war is the aggressive preparations of
the Boers and the necessity of taking invasion by the fore¬
lock.
All that the advocates of this view are required to
show is that the evidence of Boer expenditure on arma¬
ments is such as to make this aggressive intention
manifest.
Do they show this ? How many of those who flaunt
this argument on public platforms or in the press have
128 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
taken the ordinary trouble to ascertain what the Boer
expenditure has been or when their warlike preparations
were begun ?
It is commonly believed that the Boers concealed from
our eyes the war preparations which they have been en¬
gaged these many years in making, and it is this secrecy
and the sudden discovery of these "vast armaments"
which have persuaded many persons that war was in¬
evitable. But what are the facts ?
The following are the statistics of expenditure in the
Transvaal upon the services in which portions of war
expense may conceivably be included, dating from 1887,
the year when mining development first made its impres¬
sion on public finance, and the first year when a complete
year's budget is obtainable:—
Military.
Public
Works.
Special Ex¬
penditure.
Sundry
Services.
Total.
1887
£44,232
£i94,"6
£26,239
£86,786
£351,373
1888
53.5o8
165,906
48,201
58,737
9',923
359,538
1889
75.523
300,071
171,088
605,419
1890
42,999
507,579
58,160
133,701
742,439
1891
117,927
492,094
52,486
76,494
739,001
1892
29,739
361,670
40,276
93,4io
525>095
1893
1894
19,340
200,106
148,981
132,132
500,559
28,158
260,962
75,859
163,547
528,526
IS95
87,708
353,724
205,335
838,877
1,485,244
1896
495,618
701,022
682,008
128,724
2,007,372
1897
396,384
1,012,866
383,033
248,684
135,345
i,793,279
1I89 8
163,451
157,519
100,874
804,877
Now, in the first place, there has been no secret as
to the main items of expenditure. The budget state¬
ments, containing this information, have been always
published in the ordinary official way. Every one whose
business it was to know, knew quite well the increasing
1 First nine months only.
TRANSVAAL ARMAMENTS 129
expenditure of the Transvaal Republic upon military and
other services. The Outlanders' manifesto in the autumn
of 1895 called express attention to the intentions of the
Government to furnish increased armaments. A full
statistical statement, dating as far back as 1882, was
put in evidence before the Industrial Commission held
early in 1897, and is printed in the Report. A despatch
from Lord Rosmead to the Colonial Secretary, dated
February 18, 1897, gives a full statement of the estimates
for the current year.
No concealment was attempted, nor was there reason
for concealment. Investigation of the statistics gives
dramatic prominence to one single fact, viz., that military
expenditure, which was kept within most moderate bounds
until 1895, increased perceptibly in that year, but that
the enormous expenditure on military preparation dates
from 1896. A similar law of growth is manifested in
the department of Public Works, which probably contains
some expenditure on forts, barracks, &c., and in the depart¬
ment of Special Expenditure. Sundry Services, upon which
fell a large expenditure on account of the Raid, showed a
quite abnormal swelling in the year 1895. The total of
this order of expenditure, which, of course, includes many
other besides military items, marks 1895 as the year of
financial change and increase of military expenditure.
It is said that the Boers began to arm long before
1895. And that is true. Why should they not? What
is more reasonable than that this Republic, which from
its beginning had been engaged in incessant warfare with
bordering native tribes, which had, if you will, been en¬
gaged in frequent invasions of their territory, should use
a portion of the increasing public income which it drew
from the natural treasure of the country to improve its
13o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
military strength ? It is not, however, necessary to assume
that the increased military expense, moderate enough
before 1895, was incurred with exclusive regard to Kaffir
warfare. The Boers, with the past experience of the
continual encroachments of Great Britain to the north,
the seizure of Natal, where they had first sought to settle,
the annexation of the Kimberley diamond fields, the sub¬
sequent seizure of Bechuanaland, knew quite well that
the independence of their country was endangered by
the discovery of the Rand gold-mines. Their country,
even when quite poor, had been annexed upon pretences
afterwards admitted to be false by Great Britain. If it
had been known to possess rich treasures of gold, would
it have been given back in 1881 ? The Transvaal had
every reason to suspect, from 1886 onwards, that some
powerful attack would be made upon the Government,
in order to secure the political control of the country for
Great Britain or for the mining capitalists. Against this
real danger they did prepare: they spent some share of
their growing income upon weapons and ammunition.
In 1895 the threats and revolutionary agitation of the
Outlanders and their outside friends took shape in the
forcible assault of the Jameson Raid. It is not necessary
to discuss the details of this miserable business, which
made it evident to the Boer mind that this was only one
attempt upon their Government, and that it would be
followed by other more formidable attacks. The official
position of Mr. Rhodes; the contemptible hush policy of
the South African Committee, followed by the public
whitewashing of Mr. Rhodes by Mr. Chamberlain; the
appointment of Sir A. Milner, already regarded by many
people as a somewhat aggressive Imperialist, to his post
of High Commissioner; the incessant bickering with the
TRANSVAAL ARMAMENTS 131
British Government, which, rightly or wrongly, they looked
on as part of a provocative policy—consideration of these
things surely obliges us to hold it reasonable for the Trans¬
vaal to expect some further attack and to make adequate
provision against it. I am not arguing that the suspicions
of the Transvaal were well grounded, but merely that,
under the circumstances, they were natural, and afford a
reasonable explanation of the largely increased expenditure
on armaments which occurred. The Transvaal had some
reason to suspect that her enemies, the resources and un¬
scrupulous character of whom she well knew, would suc¬
ceed in embroiling her in war with Great Britain. What
has taken place now is what she feared, and against which
she made this preparation.
The increased expenditure on arms before the Raid
was substantial, but not in the least immoderate; it was
not, in fact, so fast as the increase in other plainly peace¬
able services, as the following statistics of expenditure on
Justice, Education, Police, and Hospitals will serve to
show:—
Justice.
Education.
Hospitals.
Police.
1887 ....
j£6,2II
,£H,78I
,£2,551
^13,263
1888 ....
9,745
14,715
10,562
25,590
1889 ....
17,152
24,987
20,647
33,602
1890 ....
22,867
35,546
21,790
55,587
1891 ....
22,822
43,823
19,174
53,697
1892 ....
23>79i
38,768
20,415
45,038
1893 ....
25,968
34,145
34,089
57,645
1894 ....
3°) 5 44
41,575
39,33°
64,286
1895 • . • .
37,774
56,800
55.466
59,092
1896 ....
49,637
58,720
63,149
57,8o2
Both the increase of expenditure, and the new charac¬
ter of the armaments adopted, date from the year of the
Raid, and are directly attributable to the alarm evoked
132 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
by that enterprise. They constitute a defensive, not an
offensive preparation. An overwhelming weight of posi¬
tive testimony, from sources not favourable to the Boers,
attests the fact that, prior to the Raid, none of the forts,
artillery, and other armaments taken to indicate offensive
policy existed. An article published in the Times in
November 1890,1 from a writer who had just completed
a thorough investigation, says that the "standing army"
consisted of " a single battery " of obsolete guns, and that
"the military inefficiency in every detail was in 1889
beneath contempt." In 1895 Major Robert White made
a similar investigation on behalf of the Chartered Com¬
pany, and the record of his inquiry was picked up on
the field at Krugersdorp, containing the following in¬
ventory of guns found in Pretoria: (1) Half-a-dozen
very old pieces of ordnance, mortars, &c.; (2) one bronze
gun of the date of the Second Empire; (3) a small
Maxim-Nordenfelt; (4) a small muzzle-loader, in bad
condition; and he sums up what he found thus: "None
of the guns I saw were fit for much work." It may be
suggested that Major White was deceived, but we can
hardly be justified in believing that a large supply of
modern guns were there because Major White did not
see them. No one did see them; the assertion that
they were there stands upon no evidence at all.
But this is not all. Positive evidence exists that it
was in the year 1895, when the Raid was in visible
preparation, that the Boer Government made up its
mind to erect forts and to order modern guns. The
language of the Manifesto issued by the Transvaal
National Union at the end of 1895 cuts the entire
ground from under the theory that the Transvaal had
1 "Natal and the Transvaal in 1890" (Times, November 7, 1890).
TRANSVAAL ARMAMENTS 133
been secretly arming itself for aggressive purposes years
before the Raid. It states that "^250,000 is to be spent
upon the completing of a fort at Pretoria; £100,000 is
to be spent upon a fort to terrorise the inhabitants of
Johannesburg; large orders are sent to Krupp's for big
guns; Maxims have been ordered, and we are told that
German officers are coming out to drill the burghers."1
So far were they from having adopted an aggressive
military policy, that they were notoriously deficient in
ordinary means of defence, and the Outlanders were so
well aware of this, that they planned to seize the fort
and magazines at Pretoria with a handful of armed men.
This fort is thus described by Mr. Fitzpatrick, who
certainly knew what he was talking about: "The sur¬
rounding wall of the fort, a mere barrack, had been
removed on one side in order to effect some additions;
there were only about a hundred men stationed there,
and all except half-a-dozen could be counted on as
being asleep after 9 p.m. There never was a simpler
sensational task in the world than that of seizing the
Pretoria fort—fifty men could have done it."2
Mr. Selous, who knows South Africa as well as any
living Englishman, roundly affirms that " there were no
forts in the Transvaal before 1895, and, except that
most of the burghers possessed a rifle of some kind, very
little in the way of armaments."
At the time when the Raid took place, the Govern¬
ment was just awakening to the danger of their situa¬
tion: the revolutionary movement in Johannesburg, aided
and abetted by powerful outsiders, was beginning to alarm
Mr. Kruger, and the building of the fort, together with
the orders for machine-guns, were the first-fruits of the
1 "The Transvaal from Within," p. 430. s Ibid,
134 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
very natural alarm. Mr. Fitzpatrick and his Union
rightly insisted that these measures were adopted to over¬
awe the population of Johannesburg—in other words, to
secure order by a display of force; but having adopted
this explanation, it is not open to him to regard these
same armaments as part of an aggressive policy to possess
South Africa.
The Boers very rightly determined to strengthen
themselves against the turbulent Outlanders, who, for
some time past, openly threatened force, and were sus¬
pected of intriguing with British Ministers. The pre¬
cautionary measures which they took are not to be
twisted into evidence of Mr. Fitzpatrick's statement,
that "many years before the Raid, Mr. Kruger had a
well-defined policy to republicanise South Africa."
The most convincing testimony alike of the openness
of the Boer preparations and of their cause is, however,
furnished by Captain Younghusband, who, visiting Pretoria
early in 1896 for the Times, thus stated what he found:—
" Orders for batteries of field-guns, quick-firing guns,
and Maxims, and for sufficient rifles to arm every
Dutchman in South Africa were being sent to Europe;
European drill instructors and artillerymen were being
imported, and forts were being constructed round Pretoria
on the most approved designs. One attempt had been
made to take their country from them; they were
thoroughly convinced that the attempt would be renewed
at some future date; so the Boers were determined to be
thoroughly on their guard the second time."1
The gist of the entire matter is contained in his
pregnant sentences, "The Boers had very nearly been
caught napping at the beginning of the year; they were
1 " South Africa of To-Day," p. 101.
TRANSVAAL ARMAMENTS 135
thoroughly convinced that the attempt would be renewed
at some future date; so the Boers were determined to be
thoroughly on their guard the second time."
Finally, we have the testimony of Lord Rosmead him¬
self, the High Commissioner, who, when Mr. Chamberlain
wrote complaining of the arming of Pretoria in 1896,
expressed his conviction that the armaments were "de¬
fensive, not offensive."
This is surely a sufficient exposure of the theory of
a Krugerite conspiracy. This theory rests entirely on the
assertion that the Boers had been arming themselves for
aggressive purposes. It has been proved that the great
increase of military expenditure followed the Raid, and
the fortifications and orders for big guns are attributed
by hostile witnesses to this period and this cause. The
Boers armed themselves in consequence of the Raid, to
meet an attack upon their country which they anticipated
would take place, and which is now taking place.
CHAPTER XVII
THE CASE OF THE FREE STATE
"But England has no quarrel with the Free State; why
need you interfere when we are going to give our lesson
to the Transvaal? Sir Alfred Milner has just wired to
tell you that if you keep quiet, and guarantee that none of
your people lend a hand to the Transvaalers, you shall not
be touched. Why not take him at his word, keep quiet,
and avoid trouble ? As for your treaty with the sister
Republic—well, surely there is some way out of that.
Treaties and conventions are not now-a-days like the
laws of the Medes and Persians." Such was the purport
of the questions I put to the President, to Mr. Fischer, the
energetic man of the Executive Council, who has played
the chief role of peacemaker, and to other men of leading
at Bloemfontein. The answer I got from all was identical
in substance, and was the most convincing testimony to
the mala fides of the British Government which I had yet
received. Here is a little State, extolled as " a model
Republic" by the very writers and politicians who are
most unsparing in their condemnation of the Transvaal,
with a franchise whose liberality verges upon license,
whose treatment of foreigners is unimpeachable, against
whose purity of justice and civil administration there is
no breath of scandal, and which yet chooses to expose
herself to the perils of war in support of her sister
Republic. Can the sins of the latter have been so heinous
136
THE CASE OF THE FREE STATE 137
as they have been represented ? At any rate, they were
not such as to cut her off from the enthusiastic support of
the entire body of citizens in the Free State. This was
not due to blind sentimental sympathy, based upon com¬
munity of blood and adherence to a common form of
government. There is no foundation for the view which
represents the Free State as heroically sacrificing herself
to a foolish, ill-considered treaty entered into with the
Transvaal. That treaty, as well as the unanimous deter¬
mination to abide by it, was the result of a clear percep¬
tion by the shrewd statesmen of the Free State that the
essential interests of the two Republics are identical, and
that the danger and destruction of the one implies the
danger and destruction of the other.
President Steyn put the matter forcibly before me in
language of which the following is a close paraphrase:—
" Does England suppose that lightly and without good
reason we contemplate breaking the friendly relations that
have subsisted between us and Great Britain for the last
twenty years ? It is only because we are firmly convinced
of the injustice of England's treatment of the Transvaal
that we take our stand and link our fate with hers. Do
not suppose that we are blind to her faults and short¬
comings. Our friends at the Cape have been continually
urging us to bring pressure on the Transvaal to give a
more generous franchise and to rectify other grievances,
and we have tried for years to do our best. Mr. Fischer
and I have urged Mr. Kruger and his Government to
make concessions, and they have made them, and would
have made more if the British Government had not de¬
feated our peaceful negotiations by threats of coercion. To
these demands the Transvaal has given way even further
than we had anticipated. We now agree that they cannot
138 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
safely go further, as we are convinced that no concessions
will avail to secure the independence of their country.
When Sir Alfred Milner was here, he declared, both pub¬
licly and privately to me, that his policy was to secure a
reasonable franchise, and that the enfranchised burghers
should afterwards settle the other issues for themselves;
but this position is now abandoned, other issues are put
forward for immediate settlement, and just those issues
are selected which he is convinced the Transvaal must
refuse. Again, an inquiry into the seven-year franchise is
proposed, but no sooner has the Transvaal accepted than
the proposal is withdrawn. I have no option but to con¬
clude that Mr. Kruger is right in thinking the English
are aiming at his country."
Such was the substance of President Steyn's state¬
ment, and it was endorsed by the action of the Raad
and the whole body of citizens. These men have shown
themselves no blind sympathisers with the neighbouring
State; they have been, and are still, outspoken in their
condemnation of such evils as the dynamite monopoly and
the corruption which prevails in certain State depart¬
ments. They have had their quarrels with their neigh¬
bour time after time, but all these ill-feelings are now
swallowed up by the sense of solidarity between the two
Republics. It is said that England has no quarrel with
the Free State, and we exhibit a mild surprise that the
latter should choose to link her fate with that of the
Transvaal and risk a common castigation. But those
who say this are ignorant of past history and blind to
the inevitable future. I asked President Steyn what he
really feared, even if the Transvaal fell under British
control. His reply, incomplete as it may seem, was full
of significance. " Suppose," he said, " a valuable goldfield
THE CASE OF THE FREE STATE 139
were discovered in the Free State, how long should we
keep our independence ?" In common with all the
thoughtful men of the Free State, brushing aside the
minor temporary circumstances, he evidently interpreted
our political raid as the endeavour of the gold-seekers
to get the complete control of the gold-bearing country.
Both he and Mr. Fischer spoke of the gold discoveries
as the curse of the Transvaal, and no one who compares
the two Republics can doubt the rightness of this judg¬
ment. All the maladies of Transvaal misgovernment,
and all the dangers they have produced, have their origin
in this fatal gift, which has corrupted all parties in the
State and fed race hatred, now broken out into blood-
guiltiness. Those who extol the Free State to the
detriment of the Transvaal often forget that the nature
of the two peoples and their history are identical. It
may be that the Free State has been more fortunate in
its leaders, particularly in the possession of the great and
good President Brand, who moulded the character of its
early institutions and wielded a personal influence which
yet moves in the hearts of the Free State citizens. But
the only substantial difference between the Free State
and the Transvaal, the radical source of all recent
divergences in character and history, is to be found in
the one word " gold." Let a rich goldfield be discovered
in the Free State, and the same corrupting influences
would set in, with the same results. So long as the two
Republics stand side by side, some resistance could be
made to the political absorption, the destruction of in¬
dependence, which is a mere incident of the march of
modern Capitalism. But remove from the Free State
the support of the Transvaal Republic, and resistance
became impossible. It may be said that this was an
i4o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
idle fear. England had expressly repudiated the notion
of destroying the independence of the Republics, and
even were the Transvaal to be conquered the Free State
had nothing to fear. But the statesmen of the Free State
have longer memories and a firmer grip upon the situation
than those who use this optimist language. When the
President spoke of a possible goldfield and its consequences,
he was not speaking in the air. He remembered the loss
of the Diamond Fields, and the methods by which it was
secured by the British Government from the Free State.
Those who attempt to condemn this conduct by adducing
the fact that £90,000 was paid to the Free State do not
better their case, for this money was expressly paid, " not
as recompense for any admitted wrong, but in considera¬
tion of the injury which the President and the people of
the State represented they had sustained." Surely the
palpable disingenuousness of this language convicts those
who framed it. Did we, or did we not admit the injury
done the Free State ? If not, why did we pay money to
them ? A lawyer with a large conveyancing practice near
Kimberley told me that even now the transfer of the most
valuable lands shows that their ownership rests upon
Free State titles—an absolutely convincing proof of Free
State priority of claim. This " most discreditable transac¬
tion" was doubtless becoming dimmer in the national
memory. But the Jameson Raid and its sequelae have
revived it, along with other instances of British fraud and
force in South Africa.
Those who think this language vaguely strong are
referred to the plain history told by the Chief-Justice
of the Free State in the issue of the Nineteenth Century
of March 1897, where they will find an unvarnished tale
of British treachery and violence which will make their
THE CASE OF THE FREE STATE 141
ears tingle with shame. They will then understand how
the Free State regards England's indignant charges against
the Transvaal of breaking Conventions. Chief-Justice de
Villiers shows that the whole of England's northern con¬
quests are founded upon deliberate breaches of Conven¬
tions, in particular of the Sand River Convention, which
provides "that no encroachments shall be made by the
said (British) Government on the territory beyond the
north of the Yaal River," and that " all trade in ammuni¬
tion with the native tribes is prohibited, both by the
British Government and the emigrant farmers, on both
sides of the Yaal River." His declaration that the an¬
nexation of Basutoland was a plain breach of definite
pledges given by Great Britain, and that " every inch of
ground subsequently acquired by her in that region was
acquired in violation of solemn engagements," is proved
up to the hilt.
The entire policy adopted by Sir P. Wodehouse as early
as 1862 was a chronic manifold violation of our obliga¬
tions. Sir Philip not merely intrigued to get Moshesh and
the Basutos under British rule, but he directly contravened
the Conventions by stopping a supply of ammunition coming-
through the colony to the Free State when the latter was
at war with the Basutos, while on another occasion he
went so far as to send Moshesh a present of gunpowder.
These incidents, however, are now of old date, nor did
they deeply rankle in the breast of Free Staters. It was
only the British demeanour of to-day, and her self-righteous
trumpeting about respect for treaty obligations, which re¬
called this former misconduct.
The Free State feared not alone for the Transvaal, but
for herself, and she saw certain facts which are at present
kept conveniently in the background. She asked herself,
i42 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
" If England assails the internal independence of tlie
Transvaal by virtue of suzerainty or paramountcy, what is
to prevent her from applying the same arguments to us if
we have anything she wants?" England's demands are
no longer made under the Conventions, and outside these
the " paramountcy " of England is as applicable to the one
Republic as to the other. New documentary evidence
had recently been found by the Free State which makes
even closer the analogy of her position to that of the
Transvaal. On the signing of the 1884 Convention with
the Transvaal in London, a telegram from the Secretary of
State, communicated to the Transvaal and the Free State
Governments, contains a summary of the essence of the
Convention in the following terms:—" Same internal inde¬
pendence in Transvaal as in Orange Free State. Conduct
and control diplomatic intercourse foreign Governments
conceded. Queen's final approval treaties reserved." Read¬
ing such a statement alongside of the recent assertion by
Mr. Chamberlain of British paramountcy over " the two
Republics," it was not unnatural that Free Staters should
regard their position as precarious. They had seen Great
Britain, in plain contravention of her pledges, gradually
absorbing the country to the north and east, so that the
enclave of the two Republics became an eyesore to the
ardent advocates of one British South Africa. They re¬
membered the talk of Rhodes in 1893 about " the abolition
of the two Republics," and Lord Salisbury's sneer about
" nebulous Republics " had not been lost on them. Once
let the Transvaal pass definitely under the unsympathetic
sway of England, and the Free State lay at her mercy, not
merely in a military, but also in an economic sense. The
owners of the Transvaal could at any time ruin the Free
State. The latter, a poor struggling agricultural commu-
THE CASE OF THE FREE STATE 143
nity, is absolutely dependent on the market which the
Transvaal furnishes, sending nearly a million pounds'
worth of goods per annum. Her public revenue, again,
is chiefly dependent upon the railway and the trade it
brings. In either of these two ways, by stopping the
market for agriculture, or by diverting railway traffic on to
the eastern lines, a hostile Government in the Transvaal
might coerce the Free State. It is not, then, idly and
without due consideration that the Free State decided to
risk everything and stand by the Transvaal. She had
watched the game of the last four years at close quarters,
and understood how the British Government and people
had been " worked " by the capitalists and speculators of
the Rand. She understood the well-intentioned but
futile pledges which English politicians continued to offer
regarding the "independence" of the Republic. These
soft words she compared with hard facts, and rated them
accordingly.
The Free Staters knew what they were doing and
what they wished. They are proud of their country,
and have good reason for their pride. On a poor soil,
unable to support its population except by assiduous
toil, they have built up one of the most successful little
nations the world has ever seen. The political and social
structure of the State is admirable; its institutions are
liberal and plastic; one-third of its little public income is
spent on education, the rest upon public works, which form
a valuable national asset. Bloemfontein, at great expense,
has just secured an adequate water supply, and is estab¬
lishing a municipal system of electric lighting. Its public
offices are administered with that genuine combination of
economy and efficiency which, even in England, figures
only upon electoral addresses. I talked with many of
144 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
their public men, and found them filled with a patriotic
pride in the progress they had made. These people are
lovers of their country, and they have a country worthy of
their love. This is the secret of their willingness to fight
and die for it. The more thoughtful among them ad¬
mitted that in many ways they might gain by being
absorbed into a British South Africa; but they believed
that their independence, and the constant struggle it re¬
quires, were worth more to their national character than
the security of British rule, and they will fight to the
death to preserve this independence. English settlers, as a
rule, thought and felt nothing of all this. Here in Bloem-
fontein I heard my countrymen, many of whom had
lived and thriven for years as tradesmen under the hos¬
pitable protection of this State, expressing their glee¬
ful confidence that British troops were coming to thrash
the Boers of the Republics, and to set the flag of Eng¬
land in the place now occupied by the Free State flag.
Whatever grievances the British had in the Transvaal, they
neither had nor pretended to have any here, where the full
civil and political status was freely given, and where they
enjoyed the purest and, I am convinced, one of the most
efficient governments in the world. And yet, obsessed by
British Jingoism, they wished to see British troops at
Bloemfontein. What was the reason ? Legitimate motive
there could be none. I can find no other explanation save
the sheer lust of domination, which resents the claims of
other people to freedom and equality with Englishmen.
In the Transvaal this feeling is screened, for there are
grievances, though much exaggerated, which seem to
justify resentment. Here there are none, and yet the
British population cherished the same resentment, the
same desire to conquer the Boer.
THE CASE OF THE FREE STATE 145
But was not this spirit of hostility, this desire to
domineer, common to Dutch as to English ? Bitter
hostility undoubtedly there was of late among the Free
State Dutch. It would be strange were it otherwise.
But I found no denial of equality, no desire to domineer
among the Free Staters. The present English policy they
hated and mistrusted, but against the English people
and the English Empire there existed no strong or abid¬
ing hostility. I am convinced these people would have
been serviceable friends if we had let them. An able
young judge put this point most impressively to me.
" Are these Republics really a thorn in the side of the
British power in Africa ? Surely not. We recognise the
superiority of English rule to that of other Powers, and
we value the security that Power can afford us. If we
were left in our full present independence, and the time
ever came when British supremacy were seriously threat¬
ened by Germany or any other nation, she would find
her sturdiest and strongest defenders in these Republics,
sturdier and stronger because of our independence and
the sr'xit it maintains. But conquered and humbled by
Great Britain, our respect will turn to rancour; we shall
submit only because we must, and so long as we must;
the spirit of freedom will not die, and the Republics, which
might have been in friendly alliance with Great Britain,
will remain permanent centres of disaffection, waiting an
opportunity to strike a blow."
K
CHAPTER XVIII
the suzerainty issue
It is unprofitable to discuss the detailed niceties of the
word or thing " suzerainty " and its application to the rela¬
tions between Great Britain and the Transvaal, but two or
three plain points still require to be enforced.
Why was the claim of suzerainty, never raised since
the Pretoria Convention of 1884, reasserted by Mr. Cham¬
berlain in 1897 ?
It is often said and supposed that this step was taken
because Great Britain perceived a growing design in the
Transvaal to wriggle itself out of the control retained by
Great Britain under the Convention, and to issue forth as
a completely independent State. Now whether the Trans¬
vaal entertained such an idea or not matters little here,
for there is every reason to assign another motive for our
revival of the claim to suzerainty.
Those who are still under the belief that England has
all along desired and sought a peaceful settlement of our
disputes with the Transvaal may be surprised to learn
that the one and only object of the revival of a claim to
suzerainty was the desire of our Government to avoid
submitting her case to an impartial court of arbitration.
This shameful fact is made manifest by the history of the
way in which suzerainty came to be reaffirmed.
After the Jameson Raid the Transvaal had passed cer¬
tain laws enabling dangerous individuals to be expelled
146
THE SUZERAINTY ISSUE 147
from the country, and enabling paupers and persons suffer¬
ing from contagious diseases to be prohibited from entering
—laws which not only independent countries, but our own
colonies, have passed in their self-protection, and which are
perhaps more needed by the Transvaal than by any other
State. Great Britain complained that those laws contra¬
vened certain articles of the Convention. The Transvaal
refused to admit that the laws were in contravention of
the Convention, and urging their case, made an appeal
to arbitration as the most suitable mode of settling the
dispute.
I may here remind readers that at the recent Hague
Conference, England, in common with all the other Powers,
assented to the doctrine that the interpretation of treaties,
conventions, and other written documents expressing in¬
ternational relations, are the proper subjects for a court of
arbitration. But what did Mr. Chamberlain reply when
invited to peaceful arbitration upon the interpretation of
the London Convention ? He raised from the grave, in
which it had reposed since Lord Derby buried it in 1884,
the doctrine of suzerainty; if not with the express object,
at any rate with the inevitable result of rendering a peace¬
ful mode of settlement impossible. This is so serious a
charge that it is best to substantiate it by quoting in full
the words of Mr. Chamberlain's despatch :—
"Finally, the Government of the South African Re¬
public proposes that all points in dispute between Her
Majesty's Government and themselves relating to the
Convention should be referred to arbitration, the arbit¬
rator to be nominated by the President of the Swiss Re¬
public. In making this proposal the Government of
the South African Republic appear to have overlooked
the distinction between the Conventions of 1881 and
148 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
1884 and an ordinary treaty between two independent
Powers, questions arising upon which may properly be
the subject of arbitration. By the Pretoria Convention
of 1881 Her Majesty, as sovereign of the Transvaal
Territory, accorded to the inhabitants of that territory
complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of
Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, upon certain
terms and conditions, and subject to certain reservations
and limitations set forth in thirty-three articles; and
by the London Convention of 1884, Her Majesty, while
maintaining the preamble of the earlier instrument,
directed and declared that certain other articles em¬
bodied therein should be substituted for the article em¬
bodied in the Convention of 1881. The articles of the
Convention of 1881 were accepted by the Yolksraad of
the Transvaal State, and those of the Convention of 1884
by the Yolksraad of the South African Republic. Under
these Conventions, therefore, Her Majesty holds towards
the South African Republic the relation of a suzerain
who has accorded to the people of that Republic self-
government upon certain conditions, and it would be
incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration
the construction of the conditions on which she accorded
self-government to the Republic1
Some people, whose attention was first drawn to South
African affairs when the controversy took on a dangerous
appearance last spring, expressed their astonishment that
so much should be made of the suzerainty issue. It
seemed to be a mere weapon of irritation—nothing more.
No single demand, just or unjust, which England made
or could make upon the Transvaal required the cover
or support of suzerainty.
1 Bluebook, 0. 8721, No. 7 (October 1897).
THE SUZERAINTY ISSUE 149
England had the London Convention, the indisputable
fact of paramountcy, and the general right of protecting
her subjects accorded by international usage. Suzerainty
added naught to this sphere of influence or interference
It is true that the shifty term was sometimes applied in
other historic instances so as to enable the suzerain power
to levy taxes, control the army, determine peace or war,
and regulate all external relations of the "subject" power.
But these powers are neither de facto nor de jure appli¬
cable in the present case. On the contrary, the very articles
of the Convention which, according to Mr. Chamberlain,
contained or implied an assertion of suzerainty, expli¬
citly assign to the Transvaal the free direction of all her
internal affairs. Nor does this Convention impose any
general control over her foreign relations. Article 4, the
only one in which any concrete application of suzerain
power can be pretended, merely provides a British right
of veto in the case of treaties made by the Transvaal
which are " in conflict with the interests of Great
Britain, or of any of Her Majesty's possessions in South
Africa."
If there is need of further witness, it is sufficient to
quote the interpretation of " suzerainty " as set forth in the
despatch of Lord Kimberley in March 1881: "Entire free¬
dom of action will be accorded to the Transvaal Govern¬
ment so far as is not inconsistent with the rights expressly
reserved to the suzerain power. The term ' suzerainty
been chosen as most conveniently describing superiority
over a State possessing independent rights of government,
subject to reservations with reference to certain specified
matters." These "specified matters" are laid down in
articles of the 1881 Convention, and, granting for the
nonce the absurd contention that the preamble of this
150 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Convention is carried over to the 1884 Convention, articles
of that Convention limit suzerainty.
Why this trouble about a name which neither gives
nor refuses any actual power ?
The wisdom of the Transvaal Government in attaching
to its offer of a five years' franchise an express condition
that the further "assertion of the suzerainty" should be
" dropped," is highly disputable; but those who say that
this condition was inserted in order to ensure a refusal of
a franchise never seriously intended, or that the Transvaal
was actuated by merely sentimental considerations of
dignity, do not understand the issue.
It was absolutely essential to the peace and security
of the Transvaal that disputes which, quite apart from
intentional offence, were bound to arise from time to time
between her and Great Britain, should be capable of
amicable settlement by reference to an impartial arbiter.
Otherwise, she saw herself destined to be the victim of
incessant new demands pressed upon her by force majeure,
the merits of which were to be determined by the mere
ipse dixit of Great Britain, or, in many instances, of in¬
fluential British subjects in the Transvaal.
The continued assertion of suzerainty meant the con¬
tinued refusal of a court of justice, the continued assertion
of a reign of force.
For Mr. Chamberlain the assertion of suzerainty meant
the " right" to make any demands he chose, in defiance
of the London Convention or of the ordinary usages of
nations, and to refuse to submit these demands to im¬
partial arbitration. Under this condition of affairs the
Transvaal rightly recognised that her " independence " was
in constant danger.
That she was right in raising again a controversy which
THE SUZERAINTY ISSUE 151
Mr. Chamberlain himself had previously allowed to drop,
is very doubtful, but that it was essential to her to re¬
pudiate the doctrine of suzerainty must be obvious to
any one. So strongly did she realise this necessity, that in
one despatch she took the much reprobated step of insist¬
ing upon her position as that of " a sovereign international
State." To most Englishmen this seemed an utterly
unwarranted and somewhat impudent assertion, but the
circumstances under which that assertion was made and
the real meaning of it ought not to be ignored. Mr.
Chamberlain had said that if the "preamble" of the
Pretoria Convention, containing the assertion of suzerainty,
was not carried forward into the London Convention,
then the independence guaranteed to the Transvaal in
domestic government, which was contained in the same
preamble, also lapsed. To this statement the Transvaal
replied that the form of the Convention of London
implied that the South African Republic was "a sove¬
reign international State," and that " it was therefore
superfluous in that Convention to specify or define its
rights."
By this statement the Transvaal did not intend to repu¬
diate any control secured to Great Britain by the London
Convention, but merely to assert that the limitations upon
her independence there contained were not such as to dis¬
qualify her from being a sovereign State. Mr. Reitz in a
recent pamphlet puts the matter thus : " It would have been
more correct to have said, that owing to the lapse of suzer¬
ainty, the South African Republic no longer fell under the
head of a semi-suzerain State, but that it had become a free,
independent, sovereign international State, the sovereignty
of which was only limited by the restriction contained in
Article 4 of the Convention, Sovereignty need not of
152 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
necessity be absolute. Belgium is a sovereign interna¬
tional State, although it is bound to observe a condition of
permanent neutrality. The South African Republic falls
undoubtedly under the category of States the sovereignty
of which is limited in one or other defined directions."1
But though the importance of securing a cessation of
this assertion of suzerainty for the future peace of ths
Transvaal may be admitted, the correctness of her state¬
ment that such suzerainty had actually lapsed may te
denied by those who have not followed the evidence.
It is therefore necessary briefly to review the absolutely
conclusive evidence in favour of the contention of tie
Transvaal upon this particular point. To point out how
the Transvaal deputation to Lord Derby in 1884 expressly
sought abrogation of suzerainty and departed confident in
having obtained it; how Mr. Kruger in his address to the
Raad on his return announced the cancellation of suzerainty
as the chief fruit of their mission; how the British Govern¬
ment abstained from all mention of suzerainty in corre¬
spondence with the Transvaal until Mr. Chamberlain's
despatches of 1897—such evidence, however strong, may
be considered circumstantial and inadequate. After all, it
might be said, the fact of suzerainty remained, and the
right of asserting it, though suspended in its exercise,
was there. The absolutely crushing refutation of suze¬
rainty consists in the direct evidence which exists of the
intention of Lord Derby and the British Government to
cancel it. A despatch of the Transvaal Government last
year thus succinctly states this proof:—
"This Government has the written evidence in its
archives that Lord Derby himself proposed that the pre¬
amble of the Convention of 1881 should be abolished.
* " A Century of Wrong," p. 24.
THE SUZERAINTY ISSUE 153
In Lord Derby's letter of the 15th February 1884 (Blue-
book C. 3947, p. 43), bis Lordsliip sends to tbe deputa¬
tion a draft of tbe new Convention which Her Majesty's
Government propose in substitution for tbe Convention of
Pretoria. This draft was not published in the Blue-book,
but the original is still in the possession of this Govern¬
ment. A true copy of the first page is affixed as an
annexion to this letter. It is so clear in itself that it
seems unnecessary to add one word thereto. Indeed, this
page gives in printed form, in succession, first the pre¬
amble of 188r, and then the preamble of 1884. At the
head is to be read the note:—' The words and paragraphs
bracketed or printed in italics are proposed to be inserted;
those within a black line are proposed to be omitted.'
Now the preamble of 1881 is 'within a black line,' and is
thus omitted. No conclusion can be clearer. There is
still more. The last page of the draft sent by Lord Derby
shows most distinctly that his Lordship meant to have
suzerainty abolished. A true copy of this last page also
accompanies this letter. That page, already referred to,
indicates the concluding portion of the Convention of
1881, and the following words therein appearing, viz.,
'subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and
successors,' have been crossed out by Lord Derby."
It is seldom that such convincing proof of intention can
be supplied. Does Mr. Chamberlain now deny that it
was the intention of Lord Derby and the Government of
which he was Colonial Secretary to cancel suzerainty,
or that that intention was fulfilled ? Not merely the
Transvaal Government, but all lawyers in Europe and in
South Africa to whom the case has been submitted, unani¬
mously hold that no suzerainty has in fact existed since
1884. From this fact it would seem to be clear that Mr.
154 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Chamberlain raised the suzerainty issue in order to avoid
the necessity of arbitration, which was, in fact, the best
chance of a pacific mode of settlement, and to enable
Great Britain, a stronger Power, to enforce her will in a
high-handed manner upon a smaller and a weaker State.
It is equally clear that the suzerainty which he bases upon
the Convention of Pretoria has no existence.
CHAPTER, XIX
why did the boers issue the ultimatum?
If neither the Government nor the people of the South
African Republics desired to fight, how then did it come
to pass that an ultimatum, amounting to a declaration
of war, proceeded from them ? To find an answer to this
question we must first assume that there was a firm con¬
viction in both Republics that war was intended by Great
Britain. I had the opportunity of testing this conviction
at Pretoria and at Bloemfontein within a month of the
outbreak of hostilities. Not only the President and those
who share most largely his stubborn and intolerant spirit,
men like Messrs. Burger and Wolmarans, but milder and
more enlightened officers of State like General J oubert,
Mr. Reitz, and Mr. Smuts, were firmly persuaded that
Great Britain did not genuinely desire a peaceful settle¬
ment, and was not really conducting her negotiations
to that end. This conviction they supported by appeal
to a series of crucial events dating from the Jameson
Raid. The unsatisfactory inquiry of the Commission,
with its perfunctory condemnation of Mr. Rhodes, fol¬
lowed by the eulogistic exculpation rendered by the
Colonial Minister, and endorsed by nearly all the Eng¬
lish public opinion which reaches South Africa, de¬
stroyed the belief of the Republics in the British sense of
juF^'ce, and suggested suspicions of collusion or conni¬
vance on the part of Mr. Chamberlain, which, however
*55
156 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
groundless, was only a natural interpretation of events
by a people unaccustomed to the niceties—(is that quite
the word ?)—of English politics and finance. Rightly or
wrongly, these people are great believers in the personality
of Mr. Rhodes, and when that gentleman, failing to get
his end by private force, announced his intention to com¬
pass it by " constitutional means," they took him at his
word. They soon seemed to see the operation of these
constitutional means. A High Commissioner of pro¬
nounced Imperialist proclivities, chosen—so they believed
—upon the express recommendation of Mr. Rhodes, was
sent out, who soon signalised his reign by a policy, in
their view, of diplomatic provocation. Making but little
attempt to ingratiate himself with the Dutch, who form
the white majority, or to win their confidence and affec¬
tion, as other High Commissioners had done, Sir Alfred
Milner chose for his chief advisers men whom the Trans¬
vaal had excellent reasons to believe their deadly enemies,
and opened his mind to the stream of biassed evidence
which flowed from a press and a party organisation
financed and controlled by those very men who had con¬
spired against the Transvaal three years ago. When the
High Commissioner, who had never set foot in the Trans¬
vaal, was visibly captured by these hostile influences, and
was induced to throw the full weight of his authority
upon the British Cabinet, the constitutional raid defi¬
nitely began. Knowing that the condition of the Out-
lander was not one of intolerable oppression, and that the
demand for the franchise was not in a large sense genuine,
they naturally disbelieved that a settlement of the osten¬
sible grievances was the real end sought. In this convic¬
tion they were supported by the Outlander press, which,
whenever signs of a peaceful settlement appeared, de-
WHY THE ULTIMATUM WAS ISSUED 157
nounced the proposed arrangement as unsatisfactory, and,
as negotiations proceeded, threw off the mask and declared
that nothing less than a complete and ignominious climb¬
ing down of the Boer Government ought to be accepted.
Indeed, it was soon made obvious that even this climbing
down was not really desired: the Rhodesite press and the
average British Jingo in South Africa never concealed their
distrust of any Boer concessions and promises which were
not preceded by a thorough drubbing. So, while tedious
and tortuous negotiations were proceeding between the
Governments, a British press and people in South Africa
were calling for war. Is it strange that the Transvaal
should have believed that Sir Alfred Milner and Mr.
Chamberlain also meant war? Not once or twice within
the last few years the Transvaal had proposed a general
submission to arbitration of all disputed issues, and Mr.
Chamberlain refused. Throughout the whole course of
the negotiations no bona fide proposal of arbitration was
proposed or accepted by Great Britain; for the proposal to
arbitrate, while refusing to name the issues reserved from
arbitration, cannot be regarded as an offer. Add to this
the strenuous and successful endeavour made by Great
Britain's representatives at the Hague Conference to limit
the use of arbitration so as to exclude the Transvaal.
Did this look as if England desired a peaceful settlement ?
But what weighed heaviest of all with the statesmen
at Pretoria and Bloemfontein was the fact that the diplo¬
matic demands of Great Britain all seemed expressly
formulated so as to exclude finality. When the joint
inquiry proposed by England, and accepted without un¬
necessary delay by the Transvaal, was withdrawn, when
other issues kept until the last moment in the background
were then thrust forward for immediate settlement, in-
158 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
eluding the very coolie question which had already been
decided by arbitration adversely to England, the Govern¬
ment of the Free State felt reluctantly compelled to admit
that England meant war. The determinate motive of this
unhappy war on the side of the Republics was the convic¬
tion that England, persistently refusing to formulate the
clear limits of her demands, was not a bona fide negotiator.
This brings me close to the question, Why did the
Republics issue the ultimatum ? At first sight the ques¬
tion seems a curious one to ask. Believing that war was
inevitable, it would be more natural to ask, " Why should
the Republics wait for Great Britain to mass her troops
upon their borders and to choose her time?" Yet,
strange as it may seem, I am convinced it was the firm
intention of both Governments to stay inside their country
and abide the shock of invasion. President Kruger is
credibly reported to have clung with superstitious persis¬
tence to the notion that the help of the Lord, to which he
looked, was good for a defensive but not for an offen¬
sive attitude. But the policy of Mr. Chamberlain was to
tempt him to the technical position of aggressor. This
game was played skilfully and with success. The British
despatch formulating de novo demands which would con¬
stitute an ultimatum was promised at an early date.
Great Britain had all along complained of the dilatory
method of Boer diplomacy. But what does Great Britain
do ? For weeks before the first Boer commandoes moved
she had been moving troops into the country and towards
the border, professedly for the defence of her colonies,
though she had no reason to expect attack. It is of
course now said that this action was justified by the fact
that an attack was actually made. But such an argument
is a plain inversion of the order of causation, for few
WHY THE ULTIMATUM WAS ISSUED 159
people would seriously contend that, had not British
troops been moved towards the frontiers, the Boer forces
would have crossed.
Formally the Boers were the aggressors, actually the
landing of British troops and the movement of them
towards the frontiers, under a false pretext of self-defence,
were the first acts of hostility. This indeed is virtually
admitted in the reply made by Mr. Chamberlain and Sir
A. Milner when they explained that the troops were there
not only for defence but for " eventualities." The veiled
menace of that phrase was substantially a declaration of
war, and was gleefully welcomed as such by the Jingo
press of the Transvaal and the colonies. Now mark what
occurred with regard to the promised statement of final
proposals. As a counter-move to the British massing of
troops, the Bepublics took a number of their farmers from
their homes and set them on the frontiers, awaiting the
final proposals of Great Britain. Those proposals did not
come. Days and weeks passed, still they did not come.
Meanwhile they heard from England that the Privy
Council meets, that Parliament was summoned to vote
supplies, that the reserves were being called out, that
British colonies, including Natal, were eagerly preparing
to send volunteers; more troops were landed, and others
were leaving England, while those already in South Africa
were taking up threatening positions near their frontiers.
The burghers, lying idle on the veldt, enduring days and
nights of heavy rain, mostly without the shelter of a tent,
began to grow restive; they thought of their neglected
farms, where the sowing and ploughing season was be¬
ginning, of their wives and children. Capable of great
physical endurance, these men are not trained to the im¬
plicit obedience of the professional soldier; individual will
160 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
and the right of free judgment have not been ground out
of them by military routine. Low grumbles gathered into
open discontent. "We are here to fight, not to lie here
as long as England chooses to keep us waiting while she
strengthens her position and brings up her horse and
artillery." This was the feeling which doubtless found ex¬
pression upon every side. It is likely enough that many
of these farmers threatened to leave and return to their
homes unless their commandants took action. Could any
one blame them for not waiting for the full forces of the
greatest Empire in the world to enter their borders before
they struck a blow ? England maintains that she did not
wish for war or intend it even to the last, that her final
proposals were such as would have rendered an honourable
peace possible. But that is not the point. The Republics
could only judge British intentions from British speech
and actions, and these, read as the Boers were bound to
read them, carried no other meaning than that which they
placed upon them.
CHAPTER XX
diplomacy leading up to war
In the close of the year 1898, Sir A. Milner paid a brief
visit to England. His return to South Africa in Febru¬
ary 1899 was followed by a rapid and remarkable growth
of the Outlander agitation. A series of alleged outrages
upon persons and property, the most notorious of which
were the killing of Edgar, the Amphitheatre incident,
and the Appelbe murder, were communicated to Sir A.
Milner, who, after making them the subject of hot pro¬
test and recrimination in his communications with the
Transvaal Government, gave them large prominence in
his despatches to the Colonial Office.
Concurrently with these events sprang up a fresh
political activity in the press and on the platforms of
the Rand. The South African League leapt from insig¬
nificance into an important political position, a new and
violent political newspaper was founded in Johannesburg,
the Outlander Council came into being, and a petition
of grievances, purporting to be signed by 21,684 Out-
landers, was presented to the Queen. This petition was
followed by a number of political meetings organised by
the South African League upon the mines, the resolutions
and reports of which were fully transmitted by Sir A.
Milner in order to fortify the petition. Reports and
articles from the columns of the Cape Times and the
Johannesburg Star, papers owned by great mining capi-
162 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
talists, are given as authoritative statements and largely
figure in the Blue-book, "Complaints of British Subjects."
The growing pace of this agitation, and the close
intercourse and strongly avowed sympathy disclosed in
the relations between the High Commissioner and the
leaders of the Outlander movement, cannot fail to impress
readers with the certain feeling that an organised and
critical attack was in preparation.
In pursuance of this design, Sir A. Milner transmitted
to Mr. Chamberlain the long sensational telegram of
May 5 th, in which he supports the Outlanders' petition
with the full weight of his authority, attesting "the
absolute bona fides of its promoters," and the strength
and genuineness of the political agitation which it
expresses. In the most vigorous language he endorses
the grievances, and urges the franchise as the proper
remedy. The following are the most salient passages:—
"The right of Great Britain to intervene to secure fair
treatment of the Outlanders is fully equal to her
supreme interest in securing it. The majority of them
are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect; but the
enormous number of British subjects, the endless series
of their grievances, and the nature of those grievances,
which are not less serious because they are not indi¬
vidually sensational, makes protection by the ordinary
diplomatic means impossible."
" The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these
injuries—the political influence of the injured. What
diplomatic protests will never accomplish, a fair measure
of Outlander representation would gradually but surely
bring about. It seems a paradox, but it is true that the
only effective way of protecting our subjects is to help
them to cease to be our subjects."
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 163
" The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept per¬
manently in the position of helots, constantly chafing under
undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's
Government for redress, does steadily undermine the influ¬
ence and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for
the British Government within the Queen's dominions. A
certain section of the press, not in the Transvaal only,
preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a republic
embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing
references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance
with the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy
which, in case of war, it would receive from a section of
Her Majesty's subjects. I regret to say that this doctrine,
supported as it is by a ceaseless stream of malignant lies
about the intention of the British Government, is pro¬
ducing a great effect upon a large number of our Dutch
fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used which
seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right,
even in this colony, to their fellow-subjects of British
birth. Thousands of men peaceably disposed, and, if
left alone, perfectly satisfied with their position as British
subjects, are being drawn into disaffection, and there is
a corresponding exasperation on the side of the British. I
can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous
propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of
Her Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its posi¬
tion in South Africa; and the best proof alike of its power
and its justice would be to obtain for the Outlanders
in the Transvaal a fair share in the government of the
country which owes everything to their exertions."
The amazing indiscretion of these vague general
charges of disloyalty, launched against the people who
form the majority of the British subjects he is set to
164 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
govern, upon evidence which, so far as it has ever been
disclosed, is of the flimsiest character, need not detain us.
The significance of this telegram as a diplomatic docu¬
ment lies in three points. First, it puts forward the
franchise as the sole and sufficient object of present
pressure, as a "radical" remedy. Secondly, it insists
that we must exact this franchise from the Transvaal
Government in such a manner as to make the concession
a "striking proof" of our power. Thirdly, it assigns as
the reason for this dramatic exhibition of power the
existence of a Dutch conspiracy, involving "a section of
Her Majesty's subjects." So early there is prepared the
doctrine of the Dutch conspiracy as a second defence
for our aggressive policy, when the first, viz., the intoler¬
able nature of Outlander grievances, should break down.
At present, however, the franchise was to be the sole
objective. If, in the early representations to the Transvaal
Government, this had been clearly stated, some hope of
settlement upon this basis might have been probable.
But Mr. Chamberlain, in suggesting the conference between
Sir A. Milner and Mr. Kruger, did not give the latter to
understand that the franchise was to be the one, or even
the chief, matter of discussion. His language in the
despatch of May 10 was studiously vague, and suggested
" that a meeting should be arranged between his Honour
and yourself for the purpose of discussing the situation
in a conciliatory spirit, and in the hope that you may
arrive, in concert with the President, at such an arrange¬
ment as Her Majesty's Government could accept and
recommend to the Outlander population as a reasonable
concession to their just demands."
No clear definite understanding was ever sought by
Sir A. Milner prior to the conference as a basis of dis-
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 165
cussion, and this utter disregard of the most ordinary
business precaution ensured beforehand the futility of
the debate. If Sir Alfred had desired the conference to
be fruitless, he would have set about it and conducted
it in precisely the way he did. President Kruger is blamed
as a shifty politician for trying to evade " the issue," and
to draw our astute representative into irrelevant side-
issues, and Sir Alfred has been praised for his stubborn
pertinacity in refusing to discuss the Swaziland question,
the indemnity for the Raid, arbitration, and other points
which Mr. Kruger introduced with the view of carrying
out the object of Mr. Chamberlain by "discussing the
situation in a conciliatory spirit."
Mr. Kruger, in his counter-proposals of June 2, stated
that "his object in the conference was to remove existing
grounds of difference, and to provide for friendly settle¬
ment of future difficulties by arbitration."
It was natural enough that, in default of any prior
agreement, Mr. Kruger should have sought to settle other
questions than the franchise, and that Sir A. Milner's
hard declaration, " That I cannot agree to the basis which
appears to have been laid down, that I should buy with
something else the just settlement of the franchise ques¬
tion," should have caused surprise and given offence.
It was, of course, quite in keeping with Sir Alfred's
intention of giving " a signal pooof " of British power that
he should refuse to give anything, however reasonable,
that might possibly have been represented as a quid pro
quo. The franchise must be openly wrested from un¬
willing hands without conditions, to afford the "signal
proof" desired. His attitude towards his opponent well
illustrated this resolve. Instead of exhibiting the " con¬
ciliatory spirit" recommended by Mr. Chamberlain, he
166 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
bombarded the President with dialectical artillery, bowling
over in summary fashion his arguments, making debating
scores off him, and eventually driving the old man to an
attitude of obstinate despair.
The franchise issue did get discussed, but the temper
of the two disputants was by this time such as to prohibit
any possibility of close approach, or of that friendly atti¬
tude of "give-and-take" essential to a conference. The
position and tone of Sir Alfred Milner were that of the
man who came having plainly made up his mind to get
all he asked and to give nothing. He presented his five
years' scheme like a revolver at the head of Mr. Kruger.
His request may have been perfectly reasonable, and Mr.
Kruger would doubtless have acted discreetly in accepting
it; but if Sir A. Milner has any of the ordinary knowledge
of human nature required for a diplomatic post, and of
Boer nature in particular, required by the special post
he occupied, he must have known that the way he chose
was the way how not to get it, and we must suppose him
to have planned and contemplated failure.
The man who announces that he will not bargain, that
he must have all he wants and will give nothing, is out of
place in any conference designed " to discuss the situation
in a conciliatory spirit."
The franchise offered by Mr. Kruger at Bloemfontein
was not, as it stood, a satisfactory one. In the case of
new-comers it required (i) six months' notice of intention
to apply for naturalisation; (2) two years' continuous regis¬
tration to qualify for naturalisation; (3) five years' con¬
tinuous registration after naturalisation, in order to fulfil
the time conditions for obtaining burghership. Other
conditions relating to good conduct and property qualifi¬
cations were also laid down.
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 167
This proposal has been ridiculed as preposterous by
those unacquainted with the restrictions with which most
European States hedge the franchise. Some of the par¬
ticular restrictions proposed were undoubtedly vexatious,
and must have been removed in order to make the
measure one of practical relief. But, inadequate as it
was, it marked a distinct concession, and Sir A. Milner
admitted that it was "a considerable advance on the
existing franchise law."
Instead, however, of treating this " considerable ad¬
vance " as a first step in a diplomatic descent, Sir Alfred
flaunted his whole demand, and, because it was not at
once conceded, broke off the conference. " The result of
your memorandum is, that you and I have failed to come
to an agreement in the most important points of the sub¬
jects discussed by us, and we are at present in the same
position as we were previous to the conference; therefore
this conference is altogether at an end, and there is no
obligation on either side as an outcome thereof."
Is it possible to conceive a ruder banging of the door
of conciliation than this ?
In considering the Bloemfontein Conference two salient
facts present themselves. First, that the franchise is re¬
cognised as the one and only object of diplomatic pressure.
Secondly, that Great Britain definitely refuses to submit
her differences to arbitration. It is true that Sir A. Milner
admitted that "there is a class of questions regarding
which Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to
arbitrate," but he stated in the same breath "there are
subjects about which Her Majesty's Government most
clearly cannot arbitrate;" and when Mr. Kruger proposed
arbitration " regarding disputes with reference to the
manner of interpreting documents" (the proper sphere
168 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
for a court of arbitration, according to the Hague Con¬
ference), he shirked the issue, saying, " I have no authority
to speak on this matter."
That the British policy at this time was expressly
directed and confined to the franchise is still more strik¬
ingly proved by Sir A. Milner's speech at Cape Town on
June 12th, in which he said, "To have pressed for the
redress of the Outlander grievances one by one, to say
nothing of the other subjects of difference, would have
been to engage in an irritating controversy and to spoil the
chance of an amicable compromise on broad lines going to
the root of the differences. ... It seemed best to strike
straight at the root of the evil by giving the people whose
interests Her Majesty's Government is bound to defend
such a share of political power as would enable them
gradually to redress their grievances themselves, and to
strengthen, not to weaken, the country of their adoption
in the process."
Had the policy thus outlined, of a settlement upon a
franchise basis, been adhered to, there is every reason to
believe that the peace could have been kept. Had Great
Britain been willing to submit all other outstanding differ¬
ences to arbitration, the peace could have been kept. But
the subsequent course of British diplomacy shows, first, a
progressive departure from the Bloemfontein position;
secondly, a stubborn refusal to submit the rest of the case
to an impartial arbitration.
It is of urgent importance to understand that Great
Britain steadfastly set her face against arbitration as a full
mode of settlement.
In the earliest despatch to the Transvaal Government
following the conference (that of August 2), it was stated
that " His Excellency the High Commissioner is prepared
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 169
to discuss anything which the Government of the South
African Republic wishes to bring forward, including
arbitration, without the interference of foreign Powers."
But that Sir A. Milner was not prepared to adopt such
arbitration as a means of settlement appears from the
language of his despatch to our Government dated June
14th, in which he says, " I was quite prepared to advocate
the settlement of differences between the two Governments
—or some of them—by an impartial tribunal, if such could
be found, involving no foreign interference whatever."
This reservation of an unknown and unstated quantity
of subjects from arbitration is observable in all cases
where we handled the subject, and completely destroys
the bona fides of our proposal or acceptance of this mode
of settlement.
After the Bloemfontein Conference was over a Reform
Bill was submitted by Mr. Kruger to the Raad, granting
the suffrage after seven years' residence upon certain con¬
ditions of registration, &c. This bill, which was passed by
the Raad, marked one more distinct concession on the
part of the Transvaal Government; it abated some of the
time conditions of the President's proposal at Bloemfon¬
tein, and it removed certain other limitations. Though still
cumbrous, and not wholly satisfactory as a working instru¬
ment, it was welcomed by the Cape Ministry as a measure
of substantial justice capable of improvement in detail.
That this was at first the view adopted by the British
Government is proved by the fact that their next step took
the form of a proposal of a joint-commission of inquiry
into the operation of the new franchise law (contained in
a despatch of July 27), the substance of which was com¬
municated to the Transvaal on August 2.1
1 The British proposal was not formally communicated until August 23.
170 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Now this proposal of a joint-inquiry the Transvaal
was at first evidently reluctant to accept, having a not
unreasonable fear that it would become a precedent for
further infringement upon that liberty of internal govern¬
ment acknowledged in the Conventions.
The State Attorney first sounded the British Agent at
Pretoria, to ascertain whether a simplified franchise law,
with a clear seven years' franchise, and a further increase
of seats in Outlander districts, would be accepted as an
alternative to the proposal of the joint-inquiry. Failing
to get a satisfactory answer, the State Attorney induced
the Transvaal Government to make another signal step,
which virtually conceded all that Sir A. Milner had asked
at Bloemfontein, and more, upon certain conditions. This
proposal of a five years' franchise on conditions was made
under the following circumstances. In the first place, it
was arranged that, in order to avoid a formal rejection, the
terms should first be submitted informally to the Colonial
Minister, and then, if a favourable answer was received,
the formal communication should be made. In the second
place, it was expressly understood that this offer, if made,
should not be taken as an answer to the proposal of a
joint-inquiry into the seven years' law, and should not
prejudice the right of the Transvaal to adopt that pro¬
posal.
After the terms of the informal communication had
been agreed upon by Mr. Smuts and Mr. Greene, the
British Agent, they were cabled to Mr. Chamberlain, and
the following answer was received:—" If the South African
Republic should reply to the invitation to a joint-inquiry
put forward by Her Majesty's Government by formally
making the proposals described in your telegram, such a
course would not be regarded by Her Majesty's Govern-
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 171
ment as a refusal of their offer, but they would be pre¬
pared to consider the reply of the South African Republic
on its merits." Now Mr. Smuts felt in considerable doubt,
as he well might, about the interpretation of this telegram,
and asked Mr. Greene how he understood it. Mr. Greene
replied, "You can see they are inviting your proposal,
and they would never have done this unless they were
prepared to accept it." When the proposal was, as
they held, rejected, the Transvaal Government alleged
that it had been " induced by suggestions given by the
British Agent to the State Attorney," and charged the
British Government with " breach of faith." This charge
was not, as sometimes represented, made against Mr.
Greene, who was always well regarded by the Trans¬
vaal Government, but against Mr. Chamberlain, who was
charged with wording his telegram so as to evoke an offer
of a five years' franchise, with which he intended to make
play afterwards, upon conditions which he had no real
intention of considering " on their merits." The only
charge made against Mr. Greene was that he, quite hon¬
estly, misunderstood it. Of course, if it were a fact that
the Transvaal offer was virtually accepted, as Mr. Cham¬
berlain afterwards declared, the charge of ill-faith falls
altogether to the ground.
But what was the offer, and was it accepted ?
The substance of the offer (August 12) was: (1) "A
five years' retrospective franchise, as proposed by his
Excellency the High Commissioner on June 1, 1899." (2)
Eight new seats in the First Yolksraad, and, if necessary,
also in the Second Yolksraad, for the population of the
Witwatersrand, accompanied by a guarantee that the re¬
presentation of the goldfields should not in future fall
below the proportion of one-fourth of the whole. (3) The
172 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
new burghers were to have equal rights with the old
burghers ; and (4) Friendly suggestions on all details from
the British Government would be considered.
The following conditions I quote verbatim.
" In putting forward the above proposals, the Govern¬
ment of the South African Republic assumes: (a) That
Her Majesty's Government will agree that the present
intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar
action, and that in the future no interference in the in¬
ternal affairs of the Republic will take place: (b) That
Her Majesty's Government will not further insist on the
assertion of the suzerainty, the controversy on the subject
being allowed tacitly to drop: (c) That arbitration (from
which foreign elements, other than the Orange Free State,
is to be excluded) will be conceded as soon as the fran¬
chise scheme has become law."
This was followed by a brief telegram explaining that
the words " assuming that" must be understood to mark
express " conditions " of the five years' offer.
Now to this offer Mr. Chamberlain sent a reply (August
28), which he described as " a qualified acceptance." The
crucial passages are these:—
" With regard to the conditions of the Government of
the South African Republic—first, as regards intervention,
Her Majesty's Government hope that the fulfilment of the
promises made, and the just treatment of the Outlanders
in future, will render unnecessary any further intervention
on their behalf; but Her Majesty's Government cannot, of
course, debar themselves from their rights under the Con¬
ventions, nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations
of a civilised Power to protect its subjects in a foreign
country from inj ustice. Secondly, with regard to suzerainty,
Her Majesty's Government would refer the Government of
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 173
the South African Republic to the second paragraph of
my despatch of July 13. Thirdly, Her Majesty's Govern¬
ment agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a
tribunal of arbitration from which foreigners and foreign
influence are excluded."
Now, is this " a qualified acceptance "—an acceptance
of " nine-tenths " of the Transvaal conditions, as Mr. Cham¬
berlain asserted in the House of Commons ? In form
it is, in substance it is not. Take the three conditions;
first, the two which Mr. Chamberlain says he fully and
at once accepted, suzerainty and arbitration. Asked " not
further to insist on the assertion of the suzerainty," he
refers to a statement in a former despatch, addressed
not to the Transvaal but to Sir Alfred Milner, in which
he stated that the British Government "have no inten¬
tion of continuing to discuss this question with the
Government of the Republic, whose contention that the
South African Republic is a sovereign international State
is not, in their opinion, warranted either by law or his¬
tory, and is wholly inadmissible." That is to say, his
formal acceptance of the Transvaal condition is couched
in an oblique reference to a passage which reasserts in the
strongest way the very doctrine whose further assertion
is supposed to be renounced.
So much for suzerainty; now for arbitration. "We
accepted it," said Mr. Chamberlain. But what was the
proposal of arbitration that they accepted ? The Trans¬
vaal had throughout consistently urged that "all other
outstanding differences," and in particular the interpre¬
tation of Convention or Conventions, should be sub¬
mitted to arbitration. This was the arbitration they
proposed. Was this accepted ? That it was not is
proved by the very words of Mr. Chamberlain which
174 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
follow his statement, "We accepted it;" for he continues,
"We had been negotiating on that basis. We proposed
it at Bloemfontein." Now the arbitration for which Enc-
©
land negotiated, and which Sir Alfred Milner proposed at
Bloemfontein, was one which expressly excluded a num¬
ber of subjects, unnamed, from the sphere of arbitration.
Indeed, the very telegram1 in which Mr. Chamberlain ex¬
presses his " qualified acceptance " concludes with a para¬
graph which denies arbitration as a basis of negotiation.
"Her Majesty's Government also desire to remind the
Government of the South African Republic that there are
other matters of difference between the two Governments
which will not be settled by the grant of political re¬
presentation to the Outlanders, and which are not proper
subjects for reference to arbitration." This was in effect,
not merely a refusal of the condition of arbitration, in
the meaning consistently given to that term by the Trans¬
vaal, but it served to destroy all possibility of a proper
settlement on the basis of the Transvaal offer, by drag¬
ging into the field new unnamed issues.
The third condition, that of non-intervention in the
future in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, Mr. Chamber¬
lain did not claim to have accepted, but only to have
evaded by his answer. In form, however, his answer might
be taken as a part acceptance, for the Transvaal always
expressly admitted the right of Great Britain to interference
under the 1884 Convention or under ordinary international
usages. It is, however, in complete accordance with the
provocative character of Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy that
he uses the term "Conventions " instead of Convention, thus
reasserting by direct implication the doctrine of suzerainty
in the very despatch in which he alleges he has dropped
? August 28.
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 175
it. Moreover, he studiously abstains from directly pledg¬
ing Great Britain to abstain from interference in matters
which neither fall within the Conventions nor under
ordinary rights of nations. But since Mr. Chamberlain
admits he would not give the pledge required by this
condition of the Transvaal, his statement must rank as
a refusal.
Though every acceptance was indirect, qualified, and
offensively worded, while finality was directly denied and
the denial deeply emphasised, it is just possible that the
Transvaal Government, like a few politicians in this
country, might have been led to consider the answer
as a favourable one. But here enters rightly a con¬
sideration of the circumstances at Pretoria. Two days
before this despatch of "qualified acceptance" reached
the Transvaal, Mr. Chamberlain made his Highbury
speech. I am able to bear direct testimony to the
fatally injurious effect which it produced upon the
Government and the burghers of the Transvaal. That
speech was not cabled in extenso; only the denuncia¬
tory and provocative sentences, including the "squeezed
sponge" metaphor, reached Pretoria. It is not possible
to exaggerate the effect it produced. Up to that time
several members of the Government and many of the
better informed citizens believed in the probability of
some peaceful settlement, knowing that the Government,
if pressed, was prepared to give a liberal and genuine
franchise and representation, and to submit all other
outstanding issues to conference or arbitration. The
Highbury speech shattered these hopes; the men who
had held them felt and said, "This means war, for it is
a direct refusal of all finality to British demands." When
Mr. Chamberlain, a couple of days later, issued that
176 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
despatch which he asserts to have been a "qualified
acceptance," adopting nine-tenths of the Transvaal pro¬
posals, he must have known that these carefully culled
passages of his Highbury speech, interpreted in hostile
fashion by the British press of South Africa, had just
fallen upon the minds of the people at Pretoria. The
tone and wording of that speech undoubtedly influenced,
and even dominated, their interpretation of the carefully
involved despatch which followed so closely on its heels.
Not only the Government, but every one I met in Pretoria,
and all the British newspapers I saw, regarded the de¬
spatch as a qualified refusal. This certainly was my own
impression upon reading it with the words of the High¬
bury speech still ringing in my ears. The South African
League and the Outlander Council, fearful lest a settle¬
ment upon a five-year basis should be made, had already
made vigorous representations, pushing forward nearly a
dozen new issues for immediate settlement. They and
their organs certainly did not read Mr. Chamberlain's
despatch as a qualified acceptance.
That Mr. Chamberlain did not really at the time
intend his despatch to be understood as an acceptance
is indicated by his subsequent telegram of September 8
(C. 9521, p. 64), in which he says: " Her Majesty's Govern¬
ment understand the note of the South African Republic
Government of the 2nd September to mean that their
proposals made in their note of the 19th August are
now withdrawn, because the reply of Her Majesty's Govern¬
ment contained in their note of the 30th August, with
regard to future intervention and suzerainty, is not accept¬
able." Now if, as he subsequently asserted, the pledge
asked for with reference to further assertions of suze¬
rainty was actually given in the despatch, this was
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 177
evidently the time to point out that the non-acceptability
was based upon a misreading of that despatch. But
instead of taking this obvious and natural course, Mr.
Chamberlain proceeds in the very next paragraph to give
reasons for the refusal of the very proposition regarding
suzerainty which in Parliament he said he had not refused.
" Her Majesty's Government have absolutely repudiated
the view of the political status of the South African
Republic taken by the Government of the South African
Republic in their note of the 16th April 1898, and also
in their note of the 9th May 1899, in which they claim
the status of a sovereign international State, and they
are therefore unable to consider any proposal which is
made conditional on the acceptance by Her Majesty's
Government of these views." As a matter of fact, the
Transvaal condition that the subject of suzerainty should
be dropped was in no sense a reiteration of their former
claims made in the notes he mentions, but Mr. Chamber¬
lain on September 8 still evidently regards them as being
such, and upon this understanding actually defends the
refusal he afterwards declared he did not make.
The live years' proposal having been made by the
Transvaal on the express understanding that it should
not be taken as a refusal of the proposal of joint-inquiry
into the seven years' franchise law, and having been
according to their reading of the British despatch, refused,
the Transvaal Government, without delay, reverted to the
proposal of the joint-inquiry and accepted it in a de¬
spatch received September 2. This despatch is badly
worded, and opens with a repetition of the objections origi¬
nally made to the utility of either a bilateral or a unila¬
teral inquiry; but it does not press these objections so far
as to refuse the inquiry. On the contrary, section 10 con-
M
178 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
tains an acceptance of the joint-inquiry in the following
terms:—"Assuming that it is not intended thereby to
interfere in the internal affairs of this Republic, or to estab¬
lish precedent, but simply to gain information and elucida¬
tion whether the measures already taken are effectual or not,
and if not, to show this Government where such is the
case, this Government would be glad to learn from Her
Majesty's Government how they propose that the Com¬
mission should be constituted, and what place and time
for meeting is suggested." Lest there should be any
doubt that acceptance was here intended, the Govern¬
ment of Pretoria and Bloemfontein cabled to the British
Government stating that the despatch was an acceptance.
In spite of Mr. Chamberlain's declaration in the House and
elsewhere that the Transvaal refused the joint-inquiry,
his own despatch of September 8th shows that he read it
as an acceptance, for it declares: "Her Majesty's Govern¬
ment cannot now consent to go back to the proposals for
which those in the note of 19th August (i.e. the five years'
proposals) are intended as a substitute;" words which are
meaningless save on the assumption that the Transvaal's
despatch was understood as an acceptance of the joint-
inquiry.
This despatch of September 8, in which Mr. Chamber¬
lain withdraws the offer of a joint-inquiry into the seven
years' franchise law, which he had himself proposed, and
which (allowing for the interlude of the Transvaal proposal
in substitution) was accepted without delay, precipitated
the crisis. It was regarded both by the Transvaal and the
Free State Governments as a signal evidence of the mala
fides of British diplomacy. Following the Highbury speech
and the refusal (as they understood it) of the five years'
franchise proposal, elicited by promise of " favourable con-
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 179
sideration," this withdrawal may be considered as ren¬
dering war inevitable. If any doubt about the object of
this withdrawal existed, it disappears as we read the full
paragraph of the despatch announcing it: "Her Majesty's
Government cannot now consent to go back to the pro¬
posals for which those in the note of 19th August are
intended as a substitute, especially as they are satisfied
that the law of 1899, in which these proposals were finally
embodied, is insufficient to secure the immediate and sub¬
stantial representation which Her Majesty's Government
have always had in view, and which they gather from the
reply of the Government of the South African Republic
that the latter admit to be reasonable. Moreover, the
presentation of the proposals of the note of the 19th
of August indicates that the Government of the South
African Republic have themselves recognised that their
previous offer might be with advantage enlarged, and
that the independence of the South African Republic
would be thereby in no way impaired." The despatch
proceeds to say that the British Government will accept
the five years' franchise without the conditions attached
thereto.
Consider how this despatch must have presented itself
to the Republican Governments.
The Transvaal had objected to a joint-inquiry at the
outset as an infringement on their rights of internal govern¬
ment. But a joint-inquiry has the form of a fair, impartial
tribunal. Now, when it has been accepted, they are in¬
formed for the first time that it is withdrawn, because a
one-sided ex parte inquiry had already been made and had
reported unfavourably. They knew quite well that no
proper or sufficient inquiry had or could have been held.
The British Government had no facilities for holding any
180 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
adequate inquiry. They knew quite well that certain
representations had been made by the heads of the Out-
lander Council and the South African League to Sir A.
Milner, and that the only evidence available to the British
Government proceeded from this quarter. If Sir A. Milner
is pressed to disclose the nature of the inquiry alleged to
have been held, this will be manifest.
The feelings aroused by the bad faith of the with¬
drawal upon these flimsy grounds were further embittered
by the debating point which Mr. Chamberlain made in
the second of the italicised portions of this paragraph.
Having elicited by misrepresentation, as has been shown
above, a carefully-conditioned offer, he now affects to
regard the offer as an unconditioned offer, admitted by the
Transvaal to be safe and reasonable. Of course the Trans¬
vaal Government regarded the conditions as an integral
part of the offer, and as necessary not only to induce the
Raad to endorse the offer, but to safeguard their country
against further external interference on behalf of a poli¬
tical party consisting of new burghers. Is it really credi¬
ble that Mr. Chamberlain, after having, according to his
own account, virtually accepted the five years' offer with
conditions, should now seemingly propose to get this
same offer, with some new further demands, uncondi¬
tionally ? At the close of this despatch occur the words,
" If, however, as they most anxiously hope will not be the
case, the reply of the South African Republic Govern¬
ment is negative or inconclusive, Her Majesty's Govern¬
ment must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider
the situation de novo, and to formulate their own pro-
: posals for a final settlement." These words were described
both by the British and the South African press as an
ultimatum. It was felt that the proposals were tendered
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 181
formally, with no chance of acceptance, and simultaneously
with the issue of this despatch large drafts of troops were
ordered from England, in addition to those previously
ordered from India.
The Transvaal despatch of September 16th, in reply
to Mr. Chamberlain, renews the expression of surprise at
the withdrawal of the joint-inquiry; denies that a suffi¬
cient inquiry can have been made " before the law has
been tested in its operation;" " cannot understand on
what ground of justice" it should be expected to grant
the five years' franchise without the conditions; and
finally, deprecating the idea of formulating new propo¬
sals, urges the British Government to keep its word " to
abide by its own proposal of a Joint-Commission."
The British Government did not now proceed to
formulate its new proposals, for it was not ready with
the necessary forces to support them. Time was required.
Some of this requisite was obtained by means of an
interim despatch, September 22nd, which simply re¬
iterated in other words the demands of the despatch
of September 8th. On September 30th the Transvaal
Government expressed a desire to know by October 2nd
what decision the British Government had taken, and
received a reply that the despatch would " not be ready
for some days." Meanwhile Parliament had been sum¬
moned, the reserves called out, troops brought into the
country and moved towards the borders. Another full
week passed and no despatch from Mr. Chamberlain.
On October 9th the Transvaal issued what is regarded
as an ultimatum, a despatch which, after an appeal to
its status under the Convention of London and a refer¬
ence to the spirit of conciliation and concession which
had induced it to consent to discuss matters that were
182 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
clearly within the competence of its Government, con¬
cluded by a request that all points of mutual difference
should be regulated by the friendly course of arbitration;
and that Great Britain should withdraw her troops from
the borders and cease to land and push forward other
troops. The conditions of this despatch are described
in the brief answer of the British Government dated
October ioth as being " such as Her Majesty's Govern¬
ment deem it impossible to discuss."
The diplomatic intercourse between Sir A. Milner and
President Steyn of the Free State, which took place on
the very eve of the conflict, is not in itself of supreme
importance, but two points deserve attention. The first
is the strange lack of accurate intelligence respecting
the feelings and intentions of the Free State Government
and burghers manifested by Sir A. Milner in the despatch
of September 19th, in which he " looks to the Govern-
" ment of the Orange Free State to preserve strict neutrality
and to prevent any military intervention by any of its
citizens." This is no mere diplomatic feint of ignor¬
ance : it denotes the generally prevalent belief, even in
the best-informed circles of our Government, that the
burghers of the Free State were divided in their sym¬
pathies, and that a powerful party, opposed to common
action with the Transvaal, existed. This delusion was
maintained up to the very eve of hostilities, and is one
more illustration of the false information upon which
our policy has relied throughout.
The other point is of even more serious import, re¬
flecting as it does directly upon the common honesty of
our diplomatic methods. During the month of September
the President of the Free State, in repeated despatches,
sought to intervene with a view to pacific settlement, and
DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO WAR 183
at the last moment addressed a long and weighty appeal
to the British Government through Sir A. Milner. This
critical document Sir A. Milner, alleging its "enormous
length," refused to transmit in its entirety. For this
course there might have been some justification, but for
the deliberate mutilation of that part of the despatch
which he professed to transmit there could be none. In
his communication to the British Government1 Sir Alfred
thus describes the despatch from President Steyn :—
" After recapitulating the history of the negotiations
from their point of view, he (i.e. President Steyn) con¬
tinues"—then follows what purports to be the ipsissima
verba of the President. In point of fact, a number of
important passages laying stress upon the feasibility of
a pacific settlement, even at this critical juncture, are
omitted from the despatch without the slightest indication
of such omission. I print as an appendix to this chapter
the portion of the despatch which the High Com¬
missioner professed to transmit in its entirety, italicis¬
ing the passages which he deliberately omitted. The
despatch is, as any reader will perceive, of great im¬
portance, as indicating the strenuous efforts for peace
maintained up to the last by the Government of the
Free State, and the thorough conviction of that Govern¬
ment that the Transvaal Government was prepared to
make most liberal concessions, if the British Govern¬
ment would once for all formulate its definite and final
demands. The mutilation of President Steyn's despatch
throws a most sinister light upon the pacific professions
of the High Commissioner and the British Government.
1 c- 953°. P- 36-
APPENDIX
MUTILATED DESPATCH OF PRESIDENT STEYN
{The portions printed in Italics were omitted by Sir A. Milner.)
This Government are still prepared and tender their services
to further the interests of peace, and to continue in their en¬
deavours to procure a satisfactory solution of existing difficulties
on fair and reasonable lines. They feel themselves, however,
hampered now as in the past (a) by a want of knowledge as to
the definite object and extent of the desires and demands of the
British Government, compliance with which that Government con¬
sider themselves entitled to insist on, and as to the grounds on
which such insistance is based; (b) by the fact, notwithstanding
the repeated assurances of the British Government that it does
not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the government of
the South African Republic nor to disturb its independence, it has
pursued a policy which seems to justify a contrary conclusion. To
give but one instance, which could not be otherwise than calculated
to be a most disturbing element in the conduct of negotiations, I
may mention the enormous and ever-increasing military prepa¬
rations on the part of the British Government, indicating a policy
of force and coercion, during the whole course of negotiations
which were stated to be of a f riendly and conciliatory nature ; those
preparations, in the absence of any apparent cause justifying the
same, being not unnaturally looked upon as a direct menace to the
South African Republic, after all that has been done by the South
African Republic to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government
for a Joint-Commission to inquire into the scope and effect of those
measures, and whether immediate and substantial representation
woidd thereby be assured to the Outlanders willing to avail them¬
selves of the provisions thereof.
This Government cannot conceive it possible that the points
184
APPENDIX
185
of difference that may exist on this subject justify those extensive
and ever-increasing military preparations being carried out on this
border, not only of the South African Republic, but also of the
Orange Free State, and they are therefore reluctantly compelled
to conclude that they must be intended to secure other objects at
present unknown to the Government of this State, and the know¬
ledge whereof, if they prove to be fair and reasonable, might induce
this Government to make necessary representations to secure their
attainment, and enable them to continue their efforts to secure a
speedy, peaceful, and satisfactory settlement of the difficulties and
differences existing between Her Majesty's Government and the
Government of the South African Republic. I beg to add that I
am firmly convinced and feel sure that any reasonable assurance
could be obtained. We are firmly convinced—(the repetition is
due to an alteration of Sir Alfred Milner's)—that the Government
of the South African Republic has been sincerely desirous to
maintain in its integrity the Convention of London 1884, both
as regards its letter and its spirit, and that they do not contemplate
or assert a claim to any absolute political status without the quali¬
fication arising out of Article IV. of that Convention. And
accordingly it does not appear to me that there is any misunder¬
standing hereon that could not promptly and without difficulty be
settled. I feel assured that there is no difference between their
contention on that point and the communication made on behalf
of Her Majesty's Government by Her Majesty's High Commis¬
sioner to the Governments both of the South African Republic
and of this State on February 27, 1884, as to the import of that
Convention; that communication was as follows : " Same complete
internal independence in Transvaal as in Orange Free State; con¬
duct and control intercourse with foreign Governments conceded;
Queen's final approval treaties reserved."
In the expectation that Her Majesty's Government will share
my views that no effort should be spared to effect a peaceable
settlement if possible of the points in difference between them and
the South African Republic, and that consequently all causes of irrita¬
tion likely to delay or prevent such settlement should be removed, or
at least not be aggravated, I trust that Her Majesty's Govern¬
ment may see their way clear, pending arrival of the further de¬
spatch intimated as about to be sent to the Government of the
186 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
South African Republic, and pending further negotiations, to stop
any further movements or increase of troops on or near the borders
of the South African Republic and of this State, and further to
give an assurance to that effect to allay the great excitement and
irritation naturally aroused and increased thereby; and if Her
Majesty's Government should be pleased to accede to this request,
this Government would be glad to be favoured with the views of
Her Majesty's Government on the points raised herein, and more
particularly as to the precise nature and scope of the concessions
or measures the adoption whereof Her Majesty's Government con¬
sider themselves entitled to claim, or which they suggest as being
necessary or sufficient to ensure a satisfactory and permanent solu¬
tion of existing differences between them and the South African
Republic, whilst at the same time providing a means for settle¬
ment [of] any other that may arise in the future.—M. T. Steyn,
States-President.
PART II
THE POLICY OF RAND CAPITALISTS
CHAPTER I
for whom are we fighting?
It is difficult to state the truth about our doings in
South Africa without seeming to appeal to the ignomini¬
ous passion of Judenhetze. Nevertheless a plain account
of the personal and economic forces operative in the
Transvaal is essential to an understanding of the issue,
and must not be shirked. A few of the financial pioneers
in South Africa have been Englishmen, like Messrs.
Rhodes and Rudd; but recent developments of Trans¬
vaal gold-mining have thrown the economic resources of
the country more and more into the hands of a small
group of international financiers, chiefly German in origin
and Jewish in race. By superior ability, enterprise, and
organisation these men, out-competing the slower-witted
Briton, have attained a practical supremacy which no one
who has visited Johannesburg is likely to question.
It should be distinctly understood that the stress
which my analysis lays upon the Jew has reference to
the class of financial capitalists of which the foreign Jew
must be taken as the leading type.
Before I went there, the names of Beit, Eckstein,
Barnato, &c., were of course not unknown to me; the
very ship in which I crossed bore many scores of Jewish
women and children. But until I came to examine
closely the structure of industry and society upon the
Rand I had no conception of their number or their power.
189
190 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
I thus discovered that not Hamburg, not Vienna, not
Frankfort, but Johannesburg is the New Jerusalem.
Although their strength does not really consist in
numbers, the size of this Hebrew population is very con¬
siderable. Public statistics are most deceptive in this
matter; many of these persons rank as British subjects
by virtue of a brief temporary sojourn in some English-
speaking land, and as for names, Smith, Newman, Phillips,
Gordon, Bruce are just as good as Marks or Cohen, and
are often preferred. So the census of Johannesburg,
taken in July 1896, only recognises 6253 Jews. But
while the total population of Johannesburg has probably
not increased since that date, it is generally agreed that
the Jewish population is very much larger. A well-
informed Jew, drawing his conclusion from synagogic and
other private sources, told me there must be at least
15,000 Jews in Johannesburg and the district. The
evidence of the directory, borne out by the casual testi¬
mony of the streets, would lead me to believe this an
under, rather than an over, estimate. The great majority
are undoubtedly Russian, Polish, and German Jews (com¬
monly classed under the generic title of " Peruvians "), who
ply the business of small shopkeepers, market salesmen,
pedlars, liquor dealers, and a few rude handicrafts. These
are everywhere to be seen, actively occupied in small
dealings, a rude and ignorant people, mostly fled from
despotic European rule, and contrasting sharply with their
highly intelligent, showy, prosperous brethren, who form
the upper crust of Johannesburg society. It is with the
latter we are directly concerned if we would understand
the economic and political import of the present move¬
ments.
It is not too much to say that this little ring of inter-
FOR WHOM ARE WE FIGHTING? 191
national financiers already controls the most valuable
economic resources of the Transvaal.
The first and incomparably the most important in¬
dustry, the gold-mines of the Rand, are almost entirely
in their hands. The following brief enumeration of the
leading companies, which represent the recent consoli¬
dation of many mining interests, will serve to show the
extent of their power. First comes Wernher, Beit & Co.,
more commonly known by the name of the managing
director as the "Eckstein Group." This comprises twenty-
nine mines and three other financial businesses. The
nominal capital is £18,384,567, but the market value
at the beginning of August 1899 was 0Yer £76,000,000.
This Eckstein Group is the leading member of a larger,
effective combination, which includes, for most practical
purposes, the Consolidated Goldfields, S. Neumann & Co.,
G. Farrar and A. Bailey. Of these, the largest is the Gold-
fields (virtually Beit, Rudd, and Rhodes), with nineteen
mines, and a nominal capital of £18,120,000. Next in
size comes Neumann, with a capital of .£8,806,500. In
more separate working, but virtually under the same ulti¬
mate control, are two other important groups of mines,
largely repositories of German capital, Goetz & Co. and
Albu & Co. The financial connection, according to my
information, consists in the fact that Brassey, represent¬
ing Rothschild, has a controlling interest in Goetz &
Co., while Albu & Co. have behind them the Dresdener
Bank. Now Rothschild stands for the Exploration Com¬
pany, which is in effect Wernher, Beit, and Rothschild,
while Wernher and Beit are believed to be large owners
of the Dresdener Bank. These statements are made to
me on evidence which I am naturally unable to check,
but I believe them to be correct, and even if only ap-
192 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
proximately true, they indicate a close consolidation of
the greater part of the Rand mining industry. Outside
of them, the chief businesses are J. B. Robinson, with
nineteen mines, and other estates at a nominal capital of
£14,3 17,500, and the less important Barnatofirm. It is
also well to bear in mind that Wernher, Beit, Rudd,
and Rhodes, Barnato, and Rothschild are associated as
chief owners and life governors of De Beers.
The last few years have seen large steps towards a
consolidation of the entire industry under the supremacy
of Eckstein, the chief instrument of which is the Chamber
of Mines. The primary object of the Chamber, started
by Eckstein in 1889, was to secure returns of output,
wages, &c., from the various companies, and soon most of
the leading companies, with the exception of Robinson,
joined it. Robinson, followed by the now rising French
and German companies, formed in 1895 the Association
of Mines, which was in effect a rival combination. Hos¬
tilities were maintained until 1898, whenGoetz and Albu
were forced back into the Chamber, which has since
attained a paramountcy that extends not only to the
mining industry, but widely controls the industrial and
indirectly the political life of Johannesburg, forming the
nucleus of a monopoly which may become to the Rand
what De Beers has been for some years to Kimberley.
This, however, is not the place to discuss the present and
probable future of the power possessed by the Chamber,
and Messrs. Eckstein, who actually wield it. This brief
sketch is only designed to indicate the dominance of
international finance over the vast industry whose capital
had recently a normal value of some £150,000,000, and
which is and will remain the great source of wealth in
the Transvaal. It is, I think, correct to say that the
FOR WHOM ARE WE FIGHTING? 193
destiny of almost all these leading companies is con¬
trolled by foreign financiers. There is, moreover, no
reason to believe that the capital thus wielded is chiefly
owned by English shareholders. Though no means of
close calculation exists, there is good reason to suppose
that the French and German holdings, taken together,
largely outweigh the English interest in Rand mines.
But while the power of this capitalism is based on
gold, it is by no means confined to it. Whatever large
or profitable interest we approach, we find the same
control. The interests are often entirely severed from,
and even hostile to, the mining industry, but they are
in the hands of the same class. This is the case with
the dynamite monopoly. Every name connected with
the present and past of this scandalous economic epi¬
sode is significant: Lippert, Lewis and Marks, Vorst-
mann, Phillip, Nobel. The rich and powerful liquor
trade, licit and illicit, is entirely in the hands of Jews,
from the supreme control of the liquor kings, Messrs.
Lewis and Marks, down to the running of the meanest
Kaffir bar. That greatest of gambling instruments, the
Stock Exchange, is, needless to say, mostly Jewish. The
large commercial businesses are in the same hands, in
particular the important trade in horses, and other
highly speculative businesses. The press of Johannes¬
burg is chiefly their property: they control the organs
of Outlander agitation on the one hand, the Star and
the Leader, while the Government organ, the Standard
and Diggers News, is under similar control. Nor has
the Jew been backward in developing those forms of
loan and mortgage business which have made his fame
the world over. A rich and ably organised syndicate
exists which operates through branches in all the little
N
194 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
towns, lending sums of money or furnishing credit
through retail shops, which they control, to the neigh¬
bouring Boers, and thus obtaining mortgages upon their
farms. I am informed that a very large proportion of
the Transvaal farmers are as entirely in the hands of
Jewish money-lenders as is the Russian moujik or the
Austrian peasant. No one who knows the fluctuating
and precarious character of Transvaal agriculture will
feel surprised that the Boer should succumb to this
common temptation set so carefully in his path.
It thus appears that the industrial and agricul¬
tural future of the Transvaal is already hypothecated
to this small ring of financial foreigners, who not merely
own or control the present values, but have, by buying
up mining properties and claims of a contingent future
value, secured an even more complete supremacy over
the economic future.
The Transvaal is a country especially adapted to the
money-lender and the stock-jobber, a land of hazards
and surprises, booms and slumps, where the keen-sighted
speculator and the planner of bold complex combina¬
tions has unrivalled opportunities.
Dull and depressed as was Johannesburg when I
visited it, the savour of gambling was in the air.
Though talk of stocks and shares was in abeyance, not
so the gambling side of sport. One final testimony to
the supreme genius of the European speculator stood
plastered upon every wall. Sweepstakes upon races are
in Johannesburg not a casual caprice of a sporting few,
but an important, well-organised, and enduring trade,
supported apparently by a very large proportion of the
men, and even the women, of the place. A "sweep"
upon a single race meeting often amounts to £120,000
FOR WHOM ARE WE FIGHTING? 195
or .£150,000, a sufficient evidence of the popularity of
the demand, which extends to every class of the com¬
munity. This novel industry owes its local origin to
a Jew known by the name of Phillips, who kept a bar
in Johannesburg. Phillips runs four big " sweeps" every
year and a score of little " sweeps," which are adver¬
tised on every wall and by copious handbills. The busi¬
ness basis of the " sweep " is that prizes shall cover 90
per cent, of the money subscribed, the other 10 per
cent, going to cover expenses of management and profits.
The " industry," I am told, is a most remunerative one.
Phillips has now a good handful of competitors: the
names of Moss, Legate, Hess, and Herff stare upon you
from the back of every newspaper. It is needless to
dwell on the demoralising influence of this great and
growing gambling trade. Its success is alike indicative
of the place and of the people that control it.
The practical paramountcy exercised by financiers,
the recognised leaders of whom are foreign Jews, over
the economic interests of the Transvaal, extends also to
the social and the recreative side of Johannesburg life.
Many of the recognised leaders of society are Jewish. The
newspapers of September 13 th contained the announce¬
ment: "There will be no performance at the Empire (music-
hall) to-day by reason of the Jewish Day of Atonement."
The Stock Exchange was also closed upon that day.
When the British arms have established firm order,
this foreign host will return with enhanced numbers and
increased power. During the distress of last autumn they
bought up, often for a song, most of the property and
businesses that were worth buying, and as soon as a
settlement takes place, they will start upon a greatly
strengthened basis of possession
196 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
It may be said, granting this story of a Jewish
monopoly of the economic power is true, it does not
justify the suggestion that the political power will pass
into their hands, and that there will be established an
oligarchy of German Jews at Pretoria.
But a little reflection shows that while this class
of financiers has commonly abstained in other countries
from active participation in politics, they will use poli¬
tics in the Transvaal. They have found the need for
controlling politics and legislation by bribery and other
persuasive arts hitherto: the same need and use will
exist in the future. Politics to them will not merely
mean free trade and good administration of just laws.
Transvaal industry, particularly the mining industry,
requires the constant and important aid of the State.
The control of a large, cheap, regular, submissive supply
of labour, the chief corner-stone of profitable business,
will be a constant incentive to acquire political control:
railway rates, customs' laws, and the all - important
issues relating to mineral rights, will force them into
politics, and they will apply to these the same qualities
which have made them so successful in speculative
industry. In a word, they will simply and inevitably
add to their other businesses the business of politics.
The particular form of government which may be
adopted will not matter very much. Government from
Downing Street may perhaps hamper them a little
more than the forms of popular representative govern¬
ment; but the judicious control of the press and the
assistance of financial friends in high places will enable
them to establish and maintain a tolerably complete form
of boss-rule in South Africa.
A consideration of these points throws a clear light
FOR WHOM ARE WE FIGHTING? 197
upon the nature of the conflict in South Africa. We
are fighting in order to place a small international
oligarchy of mine - owners and speculators in power
at Pretoria. Englishmen will surely do well to re¬
cognise that the economic and political destinies of
South Africa are, and seem likely to remain, in the
hands of men most of whom are foreigners by origin,
whose trade is finance, and whose trade interests are not
chiefly British. If all I say be true, it gives no ground
for any final judgment on the merits of the war. This
international oligarchy may be better for the country and
for the world than the present or any other rule; and
England may be performing a meritorious world-service
in establishing it. But it is right for us to understand
quite clearly what we are doing.
CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL METHODS OF THE OUTLANDERS
What are the instruments and methods by which Great
Britain has been forced into war with the Republics of
South Africa ? Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Chamberlain
have indignantly repudiated the suggestions of a capi¬
talist agitation. They see a genuine and earnest move¬
ment of the intelligent middle classes of the Outlander
population, the professional and commercial classes, fol¬
lowed in their demands by a large body of respectable
mechanics and miners, filled by a natural disgust at bad
government, and eagerly bent upon political reforms. It
has been shown that many of " the grievances" were
unsubstantial, and that some which were real directly
touched only the interests of a few; but a certain resi¬
duum remained which might seem to afford a basis for
a true popular agitation. What were the forces actually
at work, and what their modus operandi ? The most visi¬
ble instrument of agitation has been the South African
League, to which much notoriety has been given in Blue-
books and elsewhere. It has been the chief function of
this League to impose upon the public mind this notion
of a spontaneous liberative movement.
The League appears to have been originally formed
early in 1896 by a little group of men who distinguished
themselves by an outrage committed upon a Transvaal
burgher named Edwards, who had fought with the Boers
198
POLITICAL METHODS OF OUTLANDERS 19c)
against Jameson at Dornkop, and whose action was so
bitterly resented by these sympathisers with the Raid
that they seized him at a railway station as he was
travelling to the Colony, tore him away from his children,
and tarred him. This clique of men shortly afterwards
started an organisation entitled the Anglo-African League,
an avowed anti-Dutch society. Its name was soon after¬
wards changed into the South African League. The
prime mover and first president was Dr. Darley Hartley,
a virulent Jingo, who toured South Africa, working up
the League by his inflammatory speeches. After the
first congress Dr. Hartley was replaced by Captain Bra¬
bant, member of the Legislative Assembly, a gentleman
whose attitude of mind may be gauged by his saying
that he " wished he had two thousand men to walk over
the Transvaal." Captain Brabant was succeeded at the
annual congress at Kimberley last April by Mr. Rhodes.
The general principles of the League are thus stated
in its constitution :—
" (a) An unalterable resolve to support the existing
supremacy of Great Britain in South Africa, and a strenu¬
ous opposition to any attempts that may be made to
weaken or destroy that supremacy.
" (b) The promotion of good government within and
amicable relations between the various States and colonies
in South Africa."
It might be argued that (a) is realised by setting up
the bogey of a Dutch conspiracy in order to display valour
in combating it, and that (b) is realised by becoming the
chief instrument of electoral corruption in the Colony, and
by fanning the flames of race hatred in South Africa.
As an influence in the Transvaal agitation, however,
the League has been unduly magnified. Neither in
2oo THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
'personnel nor in activity does it merit the prominence
attached to it. The only visible connection of the
Transvaal Province of the League with mining capitalists
is found in the fact that several of its leading men—
Messrs. Wybergh, Webb, and Ogilvie—have been, accord¬
ing to my information, employed by the Mining Journal,
an organ of Eckstein's. The officials of the League in
the Transvaal state that their income and expenditure
have only amounted to a few hundreds a year, and
though their opponents talk much about a large secret
service fund, I could find no signs of work requiring any
large expenditure of money in the Transvaal, corre¬
sponding to the large outlay made by the Colonial
Province of the League in procuring the election of
Progressive candidates at the recent elections. Until
this year the League had little influence in Johannes¬
burg. Few men of wealth or position were among its
members, and, so far as I could ascertain, it was re¬
garded by solid business men in Johannesburg with
no sympathy and with some contempt as a futile instru¬
ment of agitation. It was never in any sense representa¬
tive either of the respectable middle-class or of any other
class of the community, but was the name of an insig¬
nificant clique. The monster meeting which it held
after the killing of Edgar first floated the League
into wide notoriety, and stimulated it to redouble its
efforts by means of public meetings on the Rand and
the Outlanders' petition for the redress of grievances.
Although I found it impossible to get any authentic
documents describing the work and expenditure of the
League, and the sources of their income, I am disposed
to regard the Transvaal branch of it as, in the main,
a genuine middle-class society, managed, and perhaps
POLITICAL METHODS OF OUTLANDERS 201
financed, by men earnestly devoted to a struggle for
rights, though I cannot acquit them of gross exaggera¬
tion in the presentation of grievances and of reckless
audacity in the means by which they sought to press
their case on the Imperial Government. Large numbers
of signatures to the petition were obtained from persons
in complete ignorance of the nature of the document
they signed, not a few signatures were actually forged,
while many were obtained from black and coloured per¬
sons, to whom it was never proposed to grant the fran¬
chise, the demand for which stood at the head of the list
of grievances.
As for the meetings held last spring in the mining
centres of the Rand, by which a certain semblance of
popularity was given to the Outlander political move¬
ment, Mr. Wybergh and the League leaders assert that
not merely were they not instigated by the capitalists,
but that they were held in the teeth of the declared
hostility of the mining magnates. Their opponents
utterly deny the accuracy of this statement, alleging
that, if the mine managers had been really opposed, as
was pretended, to political agitation, they could without
the least difficulty have prohibited the men from attend¬
ing the meetings, and would have done so without
scruple. A point in favour of the League's contention
is made out of the undoubted fact that Mr. Wybergh
himself was dismissed from a lucrative post in the
Consolidated Goldfields for taking part in the political
movement. Though it is maintained by some that the
dismissal of Mr. Wybergh was designed to throw dust in
the eyes of the Government, and that his martyrdom was
merely nominal, this sinister conjecture is not warranted
by the necessities of the case. It seems far more reason-
202 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
able to suppose that the " Goldfieldsimplicated more
than others in the Jameson Raid and the Reform move¬
ment of Johannesburg in 1895, was genuinely averse to
any prominent part being taken by its staff in another
movement, which, before it was taken over by the
Imperial Government, appeared doomed to futility, and
that its London directors insisted upon a policy of
abstinence. Mr. Wybergh informed me, and I believe
his word, that when he approached Mr. Rhodes upon the
subject of the League last November, the latter threw cold
water upon the entire project, advising him to lie low
and wait for the development of Rhodesia. This indeed
may have been only a word of characteristic cunning
from one who knew that he had secured a far more
competent tool to work his will than the League. I see
no reason to deny that the League has represented in
Johannesburg a certain small quantity of genuine reform
energy, and that some of its most active members have
been disinterested workers for reform. But so long as
the League depended on these persons its influence was
nil: only when the mining capitalists took it up last
spring as a convenient tool did it exert any power or
claim any public consideration. What money was then
required was found for it, though the limited scheme of
its operations made no large demand upon the purse of
the political mine-owners. The Cape Colony Province of
the League, which has conducted an elaborate and ex¬
pensive agitation, and which was an instrument of the
wholesale corruption practised by the Progressive party
at the polls last year, has doubtless been heavily financed
by the political capitalists, but there is no reason to sup¬
pose that the Transvaal Province of the League received
large subsidies from this quarter.
POLITICAL METHODS OF OUTLANDERS 203
The capitalist influence is, however, more obvious in
the formation and direction of the Outlander Council,
which came into existence last June, when the willing¬
ness of the Imperial Government to proceed to extreme
measures on behalf of the Johannesburgers was clearly
manifest, and when the gold magnates had made up their
minds once more to enter the lists, not this time as
secret conspirators, but as Imperialists. The opportunity
evolved naturally enough from certain semi-official nego¬
tiations, which had been going on early in the year,
between the State Secretary with two other high Trans¬
vaal officials and a half-dozen mining capitalists, through
the mediation of Mr. Lippert. At their meetings a
number of issues, having a direct and important bearing
on the mining industry, were discussed, such as dyna¬
mite, bewaar-plaatsen, finance, and auditing. But it was
natural, and indeed necessary, that certain questions of
political grievances should arise, and chief among them
that of franchise and representation. In dealing with
these last-named matters the mining representatives con¬
sistently adopted the position that they were in no way
qualified to speak for the Outlander population, which in
its entirety was entitled to be consulted. This view was
endorsed by the State Secretary, who even suggested that
the body of the Outlanders should be invited to express
their opinion. In order, as I understand, expressly to
achieve this object, a committee of Outlanders was formed
early in May, under the chairmanship of Mr. H. S. Calde-
cott, a well-known solicitor, and a public meeting was
convened to test the opinion of the Outlander popula¬
tion. But though nominally summoned for an impartial
consideration of the issue, the management of the meet¬
ing was actually in the hands of members of the South
204 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
African League, and of certain ex-Reformers who were at
this juncture finally released from their obligation to take
no part in politics. There was nothing strange or repre¬
hensible in this fact. The conduct and results of a great
public meeting are almost always manipulated by a few
interested persons, who impose their will upon the meet¬
ing under the guise of popular votes. The large and
enthusiastic gathering of June ioth, which passed resolu¬
tions to stiffen the back of Sir A. Milner, and which
ended by appointing by a vote en bloc a number of gentle¬
men to form the nucleus of an Outlander Council, did
its work admirably, and at its close a number of strongly
committed and violent Jingoes stood as the accredited
agents of the Outlanders of Johannesburg. Nearly half
of those elected had taken part as members of the
Reform Committee of 1895 in the conspiracy to upset
the Government with the aid of Jameson. These men
afterwards associated with them on the Council an equal
number of so-called representative working-men, chiefly
miners. A study of the composition of this Council shows
that almost all the really active members are closely
connected with the mining industry: mine-owners, such
as Messrs. Pullinger, Evans, and Dalrymple; dealers in
mining machinery, like Mr. Hosken; legal advisers of
mining companies, such as Messrs. Hull, Mullins, and
Solomon; or mining engineers, like Mr. Wybergh; or
mining journalists, like Mr. Webb. Very few, no doubt,
of these men rank as great capitalists. Most are pro¬
fessional men, but they are distinctly to be regarded as
the mouthpieces of the great capitalist groups whose
financial heads have used a handful of genuine political
enthusiasts to bring about a bouleversement of the exist¬
ing political order, which should enable them to handle,
POLITICAL METHODS OF OUTLANDERS 205
either in their persons or through their nominees, the
reins of government. Those who predict so confidently
that the strong hand of the Imperial Government will
, render such manipulation of politics impossible know
very little of South African conditions, or of the inge¬
nuity which the " capitalists " are there exhibiting.
I have perhaps dealt with these political organisations
at greater length than they deserve. They have not
exerted any great influence upon the movement in South
Africa, except in so far as they have served as instru¬
ments to mould public opinion in England by represent¬
ing the Outlander movement as the passionate appeal of
an oppressed and outraged multitude of our fellow-sub¬
jects against the tyranny of a Boer oligarchy.
CHAPTER III
a chartered press
This war is often described as press-made, but few of
those who use this expression understand the all-impor¬
tant part which the great factory of public opinion has
been made to play. Everywhere the less reputable
organs of the press are rightly regarded as disturbers of
the public peace, living upon strong sensations; unwill¬
ing, and often unable, to check the accuracy of the wild
rumours which they promulgate. The "Yellow Press"
is a danger in every " civilised" country to-day. It is
not, however, necessary to assume that this Yellow Press
is engineered by outside interests making for war; its
own trade interests may often suffice. South Africa pre¬
sents a unique example of a large press, owned, controlled,
and operated in recent times by a small body of men with
the direct aim of bringing about a conflict which shall
serve their business interests.
When Mr. Rhodes, failing to obtain forcible control
of the Rand by the clumsiness of Dr. Jameson and the
vacillation of his confederates in Johannesburg, spoke
of an appeal to " constitutional means" for gaming his
ends, he well knew what he meant to do. He de¬
signed to use the armed forces of the British Crown
and the money of the British taxpayer to obtain for him¬
self and his fellow-capitalists that political control of
the Transvaal which was essential to his economical and
206
A CHARTERED PRESS 207
political ambitions. To do this, it was above all things
necessary to apply an adequate motive-power to the
minds of the British Government and the British people.
For this work he found the press by far the aptest in¬
strument. Some considerable time ago he had acquired,
with Messrs. Eckstein and Barnato, a leading interest in
the Cape Argus, the evening paper at Cape Town. The
Argus Company has now so far expanded its field of
operations as to own also the Johannesburg Star, the
Bulawayo Chronicle, the Rhodesia Herald, and the African
Review. The Cape Times, the most influential paper in
South Africa, has come under the control of the same
body of capitalists, half its shares having been bought
by Mr. Rutherfoord Harris, the well-known director of
the Chartered Company, and the active coadjutor of Mr.
Rhodes in many financial exploits. Last year the Diamond
Fields Advertiser, of Kimberley, passed into the same con¬
trol, under significant circumstances. Its owner had
previously rejected two offers to surreptitiously purchase
the property. The first offer, made several years ago,
sought to buy a half interest for ^8000, and a guaranteed
salary of £2000 a year for the editor, provided he were
willing to keep quiet the fact that the paper had changed
owners. A couple of years later, another offer was made
to the proprietor of ,£20,000 and £1000 compensation
for the acting editor, who was to be replaced by a man
with " proper" views, the condition of this sale being
that the paper should still continue to bear the imprint
of being owned and managed by its former proprietor.
Eventually the proprietor was compelled to retire for
reasons quite independent of these negotiations, and the
paper was actually sold to the general manager of the
Cape Times (a brother-in-law of Mr. Harris), who pur-
208 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
chased it outright for £12,500, professedly upon his own
account. Several other papers at Port Elizabeth, Durban,
and other popular centres are credibly stated to be
subject to the same control, and unsuccessful attempts
have been made upon others. In particular, the Mid¬
land News, an able and honest journal, circulating widely
among the farmers of the entire Colony, and taking
a strong independent attitude upon political issues, has
been several times solicited from the same capitalist
quarters, but in vain. Since the Jameson Raid the entire
weight of the capitalist press has been thrown into the
scale of a drastic Imperialist policy, the " constitutional
means " which Mr. Rhodes, with or without the express
assent of Mr. Chamberlain, had devised. So far as the
Colony was concerned, this engine of education was
directed to sow aspersions of disloyalty against the Bond
and their British supporters, and to drill into the public
mind by constant droppings the notion of a Dutch con¬
spiracy throughout South Africa. Defeated at the colo¬
nial elections, the chief part of this press energy was
then directed to exasperate the British colonists of South
Africa and the British nation against the Transvaal,
working up every misdeed or mistake of the Govern¬
ment, and inventing others as they were required.
When the capitalists of the Rand had determined
upon a coup, and possessed the full assurance that the
British Government was behind them, they redoubled
their efforts to precipitate a crisis. For this purpose
notable changes were made in the press of Johannes¬
burg. The directors of the Star imported from England
a young and vigorous journalist, Mr. Monypenny, to aid
in bringing matters to a crisis, the post having been
offered to three well-known London journalists, one of
A CHARTERED PRESS 209
whom, asking as a condition of acceptance that he should
have a three years' engagement, received the significant
answer that six months only would be given. Although
several morning dailies, sprung up within the last few
years, had proved notorious failures, an addition to the
militant press was made in the establishment of the
Transvaal Leader. The circumstances attending the pro¬
duction of the Leader are peculiarly instructive. The
company was registered on April 18 with a capital of
£15,000 in £1 shares. The first two directors were
Mr. W. Hosken (chairman of the Chamber of Commerce,
virtually an appanage of the Chamber of Mines) and
Mr. J. J. Hoyle, a local solicitor. The great bulk of
the shares, no less than 14,878, stood in the name of
Mr. Pakeman, a former sub-editor of the Star, who had
been brought at a most liberal salary to edit the new
paper, and whom no one believed to be capable of
venturing so large a sum of money upon so precarious
an investment. The other shares, with the exception
of two allotments of fifty each to the two above-named
directors, were registered in the names of twenty-two
persons holding one share each, the majority of whom
are known to have been in the employ of a firm of
solicitors who act for Messrs. Beit and Eckstein.
The immediate capital outlay considerably exceeded
the total capital of the company, for £10,000 was paid
at once for the plant of the defunct Johannesburg Times,
and £7000 to Mr. J. B. Robinson for the property on
which the offices stand. Moreover, the expenses of the
new paper were utterly disproportionate to its nominal
resources, and indicated a free supply from some large
external source, generally believed to have been Eckstein's.
It is, I am informed, admitted that the cable service
o
210 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
alone cost the Leader, during its short tenure of life, no
less than £3000 per month—a sum which considerably
exceeds the ordinary expenditure of any London penny
paper. The actual loss of running such a paper in
Johannesburg must have been enormous, but the end
doubtless justified the outlay in the eyes of those who
bore it. The single aim of the Star and the Leader during
the six months preceding October was to inflame the
passions of the Outlander by harping upon the Cape
" Boy," the Edgar, the Appelbe outrages, and to harden
the hearts of the Government by a constant tirade of
abuse and insult directed against them.
There is something distinctly humorous in these
papers parading among the Outlander grievances the
Press Law, at a time when, day after day, they were per¬
mitted to use language which, even in times of ordi¬
nary tranquillity, would have ensured the arrest and prose¬
cution of editors and publishers in any other country of
the world except England and the United States, and
which in either of these last-named countries would have
evoked popular reprisals at least as formidable from patrio¬
tic citizens.
The arrest of Mr. Pakeman and the attempted arrest
of Mr. Monypenny of the Star in September last were
represented in England as a terrible outrage upon liberty
of publication. I do not seek to defend the policy of
the Transvaal Government at this crisis, but it is right
to remember that the two laws under which action took
place were regular and not unreasonable statutes, and
such as exist and are enforced in England as well as in
Continental States. The language of the Leader clearly
brought it under the law of High Treason of 1877, one
of the last laws passed before the British Annexation,
A CHARTERED PRESS
211
and expressly endorsed by the subsequent proclamation
of the British Government. In order that no semblance
of undue harshness might attach to this arrest, the
Public Prosecutor did not even press the charge of
high treason, but brought the matter under the Press
Law of 1896, in order that Mr. Pakeman might be let
out upon the bail which he presently caused to be
estreated by his non-appearance to take his trial.
I will ask readers to consider a few samples of the
language by which this Capitalist press was allowed to
stir up rebellion in the Transvaal, and to provoke the
armed intervention of an outside nation for many months,
before any step was taken to stop them.
Take first the following paragraph from a leading
article entitled " Justice in the Transvaal," on July 17th:—
" But nothing is easier than to rig justice in the
Transvaal if only the interested parties are of the beloved
Burgher flock. The wily Koetser, doubtless backed in
influential quarters, appealed to that excellent institution
the High Court, with a result that his term of imprison¬
ment was reduced from six months to one. The Executive
has also reduced the penalty in the case of the other
offenders. It is this sort of thing that breeds contempt
for the very name of justice as administered in the
Transvaal. It will soon become impossible to get a Boer
punished, no matter what his crime. We venture to
think that there would have been precious little clemency
had the offenders not been burghers of the State. It is
doubtful whether in such a case the distinguished Chief
Justice would have suspended the operation of the High
Court. But the woman's name was O'Neill, and the
offender's name was Abraham Koetser, and that makes
all the difference."
212 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Would such a flagrant contempt of court be permitted
to an English newspaper ? How much less reason to
permit it where it is made a part of an organised attempt
to overthrow, not merely the respect for justice, but the
entire Government ?
As weeks went on the language of the two Johannes¬
burg papers, particularly of the Leader, became still more
inflammatory. From a considerable number of articles
advocating internal rebellion or external coercion, I select
the following, which were among those read in court at
the preliminary examination in the Pakeman case:—
" Even yet there is time for some strong and just
man to arise and lead the burghers to Pretoria and sweep
the gang from power, to annul the decree of the Raad by
a coup dJttat and eject the dynamitards from the State.
We fear it will not be done, and the misled and abused
burghers will be led to battle to defend a national crime.
Prayers and humiliation are of no avail in such an issue
as this, nor can a reverent man feel that Heaven will
uphold him in the struggle. The die is cast, the siege is
finished; yet those who have risked their lives and have
seen their fellows die around them will remember the
vanity of attempting to conceal guilt by guilt, and will
visit the black crime upon those who have cheated them
to their fate."
In the same issue there appears an article headed,
" The End of Patience," which concludes as follows:—
"We will have no half settlements, and if we can't
win a full and honourable citizen rank as British subjects,
we shall win it in another way."
In an issue of the Leader of August 29th appeared
the following:—
" The abolition of the Republic is not the end that
A CHARTERED PRESS 213
we anticipated and hoped for; yet we fully recognise the
necessity for the step in view of the hopeless attitude
of this Government. We had hoped that the burghers
themselves would have found a strong leader and have
put their house in order, boldly purging the country of
the robbery and shame that have brought the State to
such a ruinous pass. Although some have talked of the
necessity for reform and many have bewailed the disgrace
brought upon the country by the tactics of the junta at
Pretoria, nothing effective has been done, and it remains
for the Paramount Power to effect what the people have
shrunk from."
I will only refer to an article entitled " Fundamental
Savagery," which appeared in the Leader on August 1 oth.
It is couched in the following terms:—" In this pastoral
and pious community, or, if you prefer it, in this common
(or garden) department of the British Empire, crime
succeeds crime and outrage grows upon outrage with a
fecundity that stupefies the most romantic imagination.
Yet this last outrage—the climax in a series of financial
jobberies, hocus conspiracies, detective corruptions, con¬
stabulary violence and national treason—cannot be allowed
to pass with the usual protest of a single article, or be
suffered to remain in brutal potentiality upon the Statute
Book till the moment shall arrive when protest is fruit¬
less and murder is done upon a defenceless population in
the pre-sanctified name of the pious and pastoral Boer.
The ratification by the Raad of Article 74 of the Con¬
cept Grondwet is in the opinion of the Leader, and, we
believe, of every thinking man, a deliberate proclamation
of a state of Constitutional Savagery in this Republic.
There is not another country in the white man's world
where a Minister dare propose such a measure. This
2I4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
article, empowering an experienced diplomatist like Mr.
President Kruger, by and with the consent of another
quaintly conditional person like Mr. Cronje, of a puppet
like Mr. Schalk Burger, of an influence like Mr. Executive
Judge-begetting Kock, of a strange-mannered nonentity
like Mr. Reitz, to proclaim ' martial law,' and oblige every
inhabitant to undertake military service against each and
all-comers, be they his friends or his foes, is the most
infernal depth that the Republic has reached in its effort
to touch an independent bottom. . .
Consider the circumstances of the country where
these passages are published. The Outlanders, dwelling
undisturbed in the very heart of the country, are actually
negotiating with the enemy of that country, a far more
powerful State with possessions bordering on the Republic,
to induce an invasion. The same Outlanders, a little
more than three years before, had actually conspired and
instigated a secret attack, endorsed, assisted, and con¬
doned by important officials of the British Government.
Yet in a case of such grave extremity, after they have
permitted the full virulence of these dangerous attacks
to flow unchecked for many months, a howl of virtuous
indignation is raised because the author of this printed
matter is at length laid by the heels, and his fellow-
editor is driven out of the State. How long would the
British Government allow such matter to be published
by an influential journal in Ireland, in India, or.even in
London ?
But so far I have only presented the first link in the
chain of this press conspiracy. Those who understand
the modus operandi of a party press will know that the
combined power of these chartered libertines of print
vastly exceeds the mere sum of the units. The financial
A CHARTERED PRESS 215
relations between the newspapers which I have named
found constant and vigorous expression in their columns.
A common line of policy imposed upon, or sympathetically
adopted by, the editors of papers at Johannesburg, Kim-
berley, Cape Town, and Bulawayo gave a powerful lead
to the other members of the English press throughout
South Africa, whose natural proclivities were Imperialist
and anti-Dutch, and who were eager for a masterful policy.
A new piece of tactics, or a sensational anti-Boer tale,
first issuing from the Johannesburg Star or the Kimberley
Advertiser, was immediately communicated to the Cape
Times or the Argus, and ran the round of the Rhodes
press, gathering an accumulation of authority in the
process, until, by combination and reiteration, it had fas¬
tened a misjudgment, an exaggeration, or too frequently
a falsehood, upon the public mind. The opinion of the
British in South Africa has been the plaything of a press
which, working in closest union, has practised the most
unscrupulous ingenuity in driving the fooled public along
the road designed for it to go.
But the inflammation of the credulous mind of
South Africa was a task comparatively simple and of
subsidiary importance. The chief object of this press
conspiracy, to attain which every nerve was strained,
was the conquest of the Government and the conscience
of Great Britain. I have no hesitation in saying that
a large proportion of the outrages and other sensations
emanating from the press of Johannesburg and Cape
Town were designed chiefly, if not exclusively, for the
British market. Over and over again I have heard
strong Outlander politicians of Johannesburg express
their astonishment and indignation that their press,
having so good a cause, should damage it by gross
216 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
exaggeration and positive falsehoods. The stories of
Zarp atrocities and Boer assaults upon women did not
even obtain wide credence at the Cape. But faithfully
reproduced, and duly endorsed by the most reputable
colonial papers, they passed by wire and mail to the
great newspapers of London, and were there received
with an implicit confidence which must have brought
a grim smile into the face of the colonial inventor.
What I am describing is nothing else than an elabo¬
rate factory of misrepresentations for the purpose of
stimulating British action. To those unacquainted with
the mechanism it may seem incredible that with modern
means of communication it has been possible to poison
the conscience and intelligence of England. But when
it is understood that the great London press receives
its information almost exclusively from the offices of
the kept press of South Africa, the mystery is solved.
Until just before the outbreak of hostilities the three
most important London Unionist journals were served
directly from the office of the Star with their cable news
from the Transvaal, Mr. Monypenny himself serving the
Times. That at so critical a juncture the Times should
subject its policy to the inspiration and direction of a
young journalist of the Rhodes press, just arrived in
South Africa and completely unfamiliar with its life
and politics, is matter for serious reflection.
Another London Conservative paper was instructed
from the Leader office; one of the chief general cable
services, widely used by most important English news¬
papers, was fed from Johannesburg by a prominent
member of the Executive of the South African League.
The London " Liberal" paper, whose perversion from the
true path of Liberalism has inflicted the heaviest blow
A CHARTERED PRESS 217
upon the cause of truth and honesty in England, was fully
and constantly inspired by the editor of the Cape Times,
upon which office, I am informed, no fewer than three
other important London dailies relied for their Cape Town
intelligence. The Cape Times and the Argus offices also
supplied two great general channels of cable information
to the English press.
When it is borne in mind that this great confedera¬
tion of press interests is financially cemented by the fact
that Rand mining magnates are chief owners of at least
two important London daily papers and of several con¬
siderable weekly papers, while the wider and ever-growing
Jewish control of other organs of the press warrants a
suspicion that the direct economic nexus between the
English press and Rand finance is far stronger than is
actually known, we shall have a clear comprehension of
the press conspiracy which has successfully exploited the
stupid Jingoism of the British public for its clearly con¬
ceived economic ends.
One of the humorous reliefs of the tragic movement
of events has been the righteous indignation displayed by
this Rhodesian Press-gang against the papers subsidised,
or reported to be subsidised, by the Transvaal Govern¬
ment. The insolent provocation and the malignant false¬
hoods of certain members of the Hollander press, such as
the Band Post and the VolJcstemm, and of two English
papers at Pretoria and Johannesburg reported to be in
Government pay, certainly played into the hands of the
Imperialist war party, on the one hand, by rousing the
passions and feeding the overweening confidence of the
ignorant Boers, on the other hand, by furnishing printed
matter which their enemies interpreted as representative
of the general Boer sentiments and ambitions.
218 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
In speaking of this war as press-made, it is right to
mete out a fair share of reprobation to this Krugerite
press, though neither in circulation nor in real influence
can it compare for one moment with the power of its
antagonists.
On the whole, the press of South Africa has during
the last year, for skilful and detailed misrepresentation,
directed to a single end, attained a record in the annals
of journalism. I cannot here fully prove or illustrate the
accuracy of this judgment; to do so would require an
accumulation of minute evidence, with an elaborate run¬
ning commentary, such as would weary the most indus¬
trious reader. But I will indicate a few of the chief
features of the campaign as I watched it during the
summer and autumn months. " Filling up the cup " was
the first phase which came within my view. Day after
day the corruption of officials and of judges, narratives of
crime winked at by the police, maladministration of the
Liquor and the Press Laws, the dynamite scandal, the
education grievance, were pressed home with an extrava¬
gance of unproved assertion and an absolute ignoring of
all extenuating circumstances, which were clearly designed
for no other purpose than to preserve an open sore
between the Transvaal and the British Governments.
This was the time when a Seven-Year Franchise Law
was passed, and a genuine panic seized the moving spirits
of the agitation lest a peaceful settlement upon a basis of
fair representation should be attained. To keep all the
other outstanding grievances well to the front, so as to
prevent a settlement upon the basis of Sir Alfred Milner's
Cape Town speech and the subsequent concessions of the
Transvaal, was then the single object of this procession.
It laboured to stiffen the back of the High Commissioner
A CHARTERED PRESS 219
and the Cabinet, while feeding the slow-rising Jingoism of
the English public, which in the early summer was noto¬
riously averse from the coercive policy required of it.
As soon as diplomatic intercourse had taken on a tone
of increased acerbity, the game of the Johannesburg press
was to breed panic among the Outlanders, and to pre¬
cipitate a business crisis which should create throughout
South Africa, and by reaction in England, a forcible con¬
viction that a conflict of armed forces was inevitable,
though in truth the state of diplomatic intercourse at
that time warranted no such assurance. With this object
the Johannesburg press filled its columns day by day
with tit-bits, carefully culled from the most rabid Dutch
newspapers, and seasoned with preposterous surmises of
the coming Boer atrocities, the ill-treatment of Outlanders
who should be found in Johannesburg at the outbreak of
hostilities; and, in particular, the danger to which miners
would be subjected. If any hot-headed Boer in his cups,
such as Ben Yiljoen, made, or was said to make, some
brutal speech about Englishmen, struck on the sounding-
board of the Johannesburg press, it reverberated through
South Africa; every idle word of the most insignificant
official was treated as if it were the avowed policy of the
Government. All this in order to create and sustain a
scare which should drive the citizens of Johannesburg
first to send away their families into Natal or Cape
Colony, and then to follow them. One result of this
policy has been that many people of moderate means and
timid temperament, who " cleared " early in the summer,
have almost ruined themselves already by the needless
expenses of their premature flight and long protracted
absence. As the strain between the Governments be¬
came more serious and war became really imminent, the
220 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
rumours of coming atrocities, the "commandeering" of
British subjects, the starvation and ill-treatment of those
who stayed, became more startling; and long before war was
actually declared the bulk of the inhabitants had taken
to flight. Having got them out of Johannesburg, the
press followed the refugees down the line, and the Cape press
took up the running with tales of Boer insults and assaults
at the stations, told with a wealth of circumstance that
carried conviction to nine persons out of ten. How Boers
struck English women with clubbed rifle or sjambok, spat in
the faces of passengers, dragged them out of their car¬
riages and forced them to shout for Kruger, refused them
the right to purchase food, and in general behaved like
savages—all this sort of thing occupied the Cape papers
for some ten days. Exactly how large the grain of truth
might be in this vast conglomerate of falsehood it was
not possible to ascertain, because, although the tales of
outrage were otherwise lavishly equipped with detailed
circumstance, the names of the sufferers were for good
reason almost invariably withheld. Two exposures at
last killed this particular class of lies. In one instance
a prominent political Outlander, whose brutal maltreat¬
ment by Boers and subsequent death in prison furnished
a leading case for several days, turned up alive and free.
The other case, where a number of armed Boers were
stated to have flogged with sjamboks unarmed pas¬
sengers who were peaceably entering a village near a
station to purchase food, was still more discreditable in its
recoil. It was proved, and reluctantly admitted by the
press, that a number of rowdy Outlanders, coming by an
earlier train that day, had outraged a girl in the very
station grounds, and that, to prevent any recurrence of
such conduct and to keep the public peace, police had
A CHARTERED PRESS
221
been put at the station barriers to prevent passengers
from leaving the station. Some men in a later train,
disregarding these orders and forcing their way past the
guards, were driven back by armed Boers in the neigh¬
bourhood.
In another case, where a free fight took place at a
station, it turned out that a number of miners insisted
upon standing on the platform and singing " Rule
Britannia," a proceeding which was not unnaturally
resented by young Boers in the station. Under the
circumstances of this helter-skelter flight many hard¬
ships were inevitable, and it is likely enough that
insults and threats were flung at the passengers by
coarse and ignorant yokels inflamed by the war fever
and hatred of Englishmen. The " commandeering" of
money in excess of a certain sum practised upon pas¬
sengers in some of the last trains was bitterly resented
by them and their friends; but war had then been
declared, and I venture to think that under similar
circumstances in any European country some similar
restrictions would have been placed upon the amount
of property which expelled subjects of the hostile State
could carry away.
So far as could be ascertained, very few cases of
personal injury or insult took place, and in most of
these direct provocation was given. The outrages to
women and children I believe to be entire fabrications.
Danger to " women and children" had figured in the
historic letter which was taken to justify Jameson's
raid; it was now used again with brazen-faced effrontery
to fan the flames of revenge. Those who know the Boer
character are aware that such outrages are not within
the sphere of vice; but knowing well the methods of
222 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the Jingo press and the gullibility of the English mind,
I have not the slightest doubt that these railway out¬
rages were played for all they were worth. When
cable intelligence indicated that these lies had done
their work, they disappeared almost at once from the
columns of the Cape press, though congested trains full
of the poorest and most belated refugees continued to
pass down the lines. The hose of mendacity was now
switched on to a different theme; war was now begin¬
ning, and every art of false imagination was enlisted in
the work of defaming the honour and courage of the
enemy. A conscientious reader of the Cape Times and
the Argus during the opening days of hostilities would
have come to the conclusion that the Boers divided
their time pretty equally between firing upon the white
flag and upon the red cross. Another class of irritant
is best described by an illustration from the Cape Times
of October 18th:—
MURDER THE ENGLISH.
An Appeal in the Taal.
Natives Incited to Murder.
Maritzburg, October 18.—[From our own Correspondent.]—
A lady who arrived here with her family from Barberton last night
gives a piteous account of things in that neighbourhood.
She says that renegade Englishmen are rampant in the out¬
lying districts, and are threatening and bullying all whites.
A circular emanating from the office of a Dutch newspaper,
printed in the Taal, calls upon all Boers, as a sacred and religious
duty in the event of a reverse, to use their utmost endeavours to
incite the natives to outrage and murder all English women and
children.
The alarm in the isolated places is intense, and a repetition
of the massacres of the Indian Mutiny is feared.
A CHARTERED PRESS 223
Though the Cape Times was appealed to for the
name of the Dutch newspaper, and for a more satisfac¬
tory account of the circular, no more was heard of this
incident: it had performed its part and passed away.
This method was systematically applied: vague words
full of sound and fury from anonymous mouths, un¬
verified and impossible of contradiction! Another class
of stories was engaged in showing that the Boers were
stirring up rebellion among the Basutos, tampering with
certain of their chiefs, and in dwelling upon the ill-
treatment sustained by Basutos leaving the mines at
the hands of the Boers, The drift and purpose of this
" news " was to furnish beforehand a sort of justification
for a Basuto inroad on the Free State, should such an
event take place, and to stimulate such an event by
suggestion. I do not deny, nor do I doubt, that there
have been many cases where Boers have robbed the
travelling Basutos on leaving the mines; but the in¬
cessant harping on these incidents is only to be under¬
stood as part of a general scheme for turning native
feeling against the Dutch, a project the infernal malig¬
nity of which is only understood by those familiar with
the great, dark shadow in the background of South
African life, the fear of a native rising. A peculiarly
infamous variant of this appeal to colour hatred is
supplied by statements in the Cape press that black
combatants were seen in the Boer commandos. It is
hard to believe that the correspondent responsible for
this lie was unaware of the fact that under no circum¬
stances would Dutchmen employ armed Kaffirs, while
they commonly took them in their campaigns to look
after their horses.
The " outrage " manufacture of the Yellow Press was
224 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
accompanied by a never-ceasing tirade of imputations of
treason against the Cape Dutch, which was calculated to
expand the field of hostilities from the Republics to the
whole of South Africa. It may appear reckless to im¬
pute so terrible a motive, but no one in Cape Colony
could converse freely with British colonists without
evoking over and over again expressions of a keen de¬
sire to open up the whole issue between Dutch and
English, to force into the light of day the " hidden con¬
spiracy " of the Bond, and once for all to establish by a
signal, overwhelming blow the supremacy of the British
over the whole of South Africa. A victory over the
Republics, however complete, would not satisfy these
people, who form, I think, a large majority of the Bri¬
tish. They had persuaded themselves that the snake
of Afrikanderism would then be only scotched and not
killed, and that the larger task would remain to be done
afterwards.
Numbers of men told me, when I pointed out
the efforts made by the Ministry and Mr. Hofmeyr to
preserve quiet in the Colony, that they regretted the
success of these efforts, and that they would sooner have
the matter fought out once for all.
I do not charge the more responsible organs of the
Colonial press with a deliberate pursuance and a con¬
sistent advocacy of this reckless policy, but their treat¬
ment of the natural sympathy which the Colonial Dutch
feel with the Republicans as evidence of treasonable con¬
spiracy has been one of the most effective means to
implicate the Colony in a race war.
After the outbreak of hostilities, a still more insidious
mode of provocation was introduced by articles and
letters suggesting that a satisfactory settlement required
A CHARTERED PRESS
225
such interference with representative government in Cape
Colony as would ensure the domination of the British.
These open menaces of the press were so dangerous as
to evoke at last from Sir A. Milner the proclamation
denying that any such interference with elective institu¬
tions was designed.
No opportunity has been neglected by the Cape press
of seeking, by misrepresentation of facts or perversion of
language, to support the charges against the Cape Dutch.
Let me quote a typical example. The Gape Times of
October 2 5 contained the following paragraph:—
" Mr. M. J. du Plessis, M.L.A. for Cradock, addresses
a letter to his constituents through the medium of the
local Dutch paper, in which he tells them: ' The Trans¬
vaal people are our kith and kin, and it is only natural
that we should sympathise with them. There is no
honest man, no matter of what nationality, who will not
admire us for doing that.'"
Mr. du Plessis is a prominent member of the Bond
party in the Assembly, and this paragraph is calculated
to fasten on him a charge of stimulating co-operation of
the Republican forces. Now compare this sentence with
a literal translation of the entire letter which Mr. du
Plessis addressed to his constituents, and which may be
taken as a fair example of the tone generally adopted by
the Dutch members :—
"Ckadock, October 14, 1899.
"To my Fellow-citi/ens,—
"Beloved fellow-citizens, the times in which we live are
serious, and as I shall not have the opportunity of meeting you
at present to address you, and to inform you of what is in my
mind, I use the columns of The Afrikander, as the matter brooks
no delay. The inhabitants of the Transvaal and the Free State
are one in blood with us, and it is impossible for us not to sympa-
P
226 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
thise with them. There is, moreover, no right-thinking person,
of whatever nationality, who will not approve this sentiment.
However, I desire to say to all my fellow-citizens, ' Men, sympa¬
thise and feel with and for our relatives and friends as much as
you please, but do not forget that we are subjects of her Majesty,
our revered Queen Victoria, and let us not commit any excess to
mar the last years of her reign. Let us stay still and leave the
issue which is so momentous for the whole of South Africa in the
hands of Him who judgeth justly, and who will make all things
end in the best way.—Your fellow-citizen,
"M. J. du Plessis, M.L.A."
Can any language be more loyal, more dignified, more
appropriate, and more remote from the meaning borne by
the garbled sentence of the Cape Times ?
Nowhere in the world at the present time has the
press an unsullied reputation. But for carefully con¬
ceived and brilliantly executed mendacity, directed by
widely diverse paths towards a single goal, the recent
conduct of the capitalistic press of South Africa holds
the record.
Unfortunately, as the copy-book instructs us, perfect
success is seldom attainable. Put into more vulgar
language, some one generally gives away the game. I
have pointed out that it has not been necessary for Mr.
Rhodes and his friends to buy and control directly the
whole press of South Africa, because many organs of
British African opinion were already in devoted sympathy
with the Jew-Imperialist design that is in course of
execution. The bulk of the Natal press is in this case.
It did not need buying. But it would have been better
to buy it. For if the Times of Natal, one of the oldest
and most influential organs of South Africa, had been
subject to the careful manipulation of the master hand
A CHARTERED PRESS 227
it would never have set forth the following interesting
theory of press ethics :—
" Franchise, paramountcy, and so forth, have been all
very useful in the evolutionary process of education. But
before we shall have finished we have to reach that point
when home opinion shall have come into line with opinion
in Natal, as to the necessity for a clean sweep of the
present order of things in the Transvaal and Orange Free
State, and of the Bond in Cape Colony. To do this there
is but little cause now to harp upon old well-worn
grievances. Those have already become fairly well under¬
stood at home. The best object lessons we can now
employ are those atrocities to our women and children.
If we are to disarm those who are now against us at
home, and who will endeavour in the day of our triumph
to restore as much of the Boer power as possible, out of
a misplaced sentiment for a weak foe, and who could go
frantic over atrocities in Bulgaria, then, if they require
atrocities to assist their comprehension of facts, and to
disarm their opposition, so be it. It should not now be
difficult to supply the necessary chapter of horrors to
strike the imagination even of these good people."
The powerful English press of South Africa, thus
owned and controlled by a handful of rich men bound
together by closest financial bonds, succeeded first in
inflaming the public of South Africa and afterwards in
communicating the passion to the mind of the British
public.
One last link in the chain deserves notice. It was
necessary not only to deceive the British public as to the
true position in South Africa, but also to deceive South
Africa as to the state of feeling in Great Britain. I need
not describe in detail how this was done; how intelli-
228 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
gence from Europe was selected, distorted, heightened or
suppressed, in order to support the agitation among the
British Colonists and Outlanders, and to goad on the
Governments of the Republics towards the precipice of
war. The virtual unanimity of all parties in England,
with the exception of a mere despicable handful of " Little
Englanders," the support of the entire British press, the
endorsement of a drastic policy by European Govern¬
ments—these points were enforced by every art of the
suppressio veri and the suggestio falsi. The chief intention
and the sure result was to breed despair of any amicable
settlement among the Republican politicians. The torpor
of this despair I witnessed gathering in the minds of the
leading men at Pretoria and Bloemfontein, and the latest
intercourse between Sir A. Milner and President Steyn
bears striking testimony to the diabolical success of the
press policy.
That the burden of the Outlanders was so intolerable
and so urgent that immediate redress was essential, that
such redress could not be won by ordinary peaceful
diplomacy, that the Boer Governments would yield
before a sufficient display of armed force—these were
the central falsehoods which the capitalist wreckers
through their press drove into the British mind. That
England was one-minded in her aggressive policy towards
the Transvaal Government, that she had no intention to
accept a fair franchise and representation as a basis of
genuine and final settlement, but that she designed to
enforce her suzerainty and supremacy by an interminable
series of subsequent demands which implied a total loss
of "independence"—these were the representations of
the policy and feeling of England by which the same
press goaded the Republics into defiance and despair.
CHAPTEK IV
for what ahe we fighting ?
In former chapters I have shown who the persons are that
have brought about this war and the methods they have
employed—a small confederacy of international financiers
working through a kept press. It remains to describe the
nature and the size of the gain which is their object.
There is no secret about the matter. This war is a
terrible disaster for every one else in England and South
Africa, but for the mine owners it means a large increase
of profits from a more economical working of the mines,
and from speculative operations. Mr. Fitzpatrick puts
into the mouth of " leading men of the Rand " the follow¬
ing statement of grievances in 1896. "If you want the
chief economic grievances they are: The Netherlands
Railway Concession, the dynamite monopoly, the liquor
traffic, and native labour, which together constitute an
unwarrantable burden of indirect taxation on the industry
of over two and a half millions sterling annually." In
other words, the mining capitalists stood to gain an in¬
come of two millions and a half by a successful political
or military coup. Mr. Hays Hammond, of the Consoli¬
dated Goldfields, " would regard the sum of 6s. per ton
as a conservative estimate of the direct and indirect
benefits of good government," while Mr. J. B. Robinson
takes 6s. as a minimum statement of the gain. Now,
Mr. Hammond shows that a saving of 6s. per ton works
out at " an increase of amiual dividends by £2,413,268,
229
230 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
based on last year's tonnage of ore crushed "—an inde¬
pendent corroboration of Mr. Fitzpatrick's former estimate.
Here is something worth spilling the blood of other
people for. How is this prize to be won ? Mr. Ham¬
mond's report contains an ingenuous admission that " in
the Transvaal economics and politics are so closely con¬
nected," which throws light upon the ways and means of
mining economy. Each one of the " savings " he specifies
depends upon politics being managed in the interest of
the mines. Into the details of these politics I cannot enter.
It must suffice to say that dynamite, railway rates, gold
thefts, and other matters which figure prominently here
and elsewhere are of quite subordinate importance.
The abolition of the dynamite monopoly, for instance,
cannot possibly account for more than a quarter of a
million increased profits, while a most generous reduction
of railway rates, and the best possible administration of
the gold theft law would not furnish another tithe of the
anticipated gain.
The one all-important object is to secure a full, cheap,
regular, submissive supply of Kaffir and white labour.
Wages form about 5 5 per cent, of the working expenses of
the mines, and of the 6s. per ton in which Mr. Hammond
expresses the advantages of "good government," another
expert, Mr. Curie, estimates that 5 s. would accrue from a
full supply of labour, with proper administration of the Pass
and Liquor Laws, which keep the Kaffirs from deserting
their employment, and prevent them from obtaining drink.
The attitude of the mining industry towards the
Transvaal Government in respect of the labour question
is instructive. Witnesses before the Industrial Com¬
mission at Johannesburg were unanimous in maintaining
that it was the duty of the Government to procure
FOR WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING? 231
a steady and sufficient supply of Kaffirs for the mines.
The Government was called upon to accredit and assist
agents of the mining industry to obtain native labour, to
" Pay premiums to Kaffir chiefs," to furnish extra pay to
native Commissioners for the same object, to convey this
labour " under supervision " to the mines, erecting " com¬
pounds " along the road, reducing railway fares to one-
third of the existing rate, and in a dozen other ways
spending public money to serve the private interests of
the mines. Why " politics and economics are so closely
connected " that the public purse should be used to keep
down the wages-bill of the mines is not intelligible to
English people. But it is perfectly clear that under a
" reformed " Government the mine owners will take every
care to press these claims.
Put in a concise form, it may be said that this war
is being waged in order to secure for the mines a cheap
adequate supply of labour. This need has been a press¬
ing and a growing one. The last report of the Chamber
of Mines puts the matter thus : " Under the permanent
condition of shortage of supply which has prevailed, it is
clear that under stress of competition the tendency would
have been to gradually increase wages." Last June this
"shortage" was estimated at 12,000, in spite of every
effort of the Native Labour Association, which scoured
Africa to procure Kaffir workers. Sierra Leone, the
Gold Coast, and Liberia have been approached by the
mine owners, and serious proposals have been entertained
to import Hindoo or even Italian labour.
If the output of gold is to be enlarged, on terms
which will yield a maximum of profits, a large expansion
of the labour-market is essential. It is this issue which
beyond all others has driven the capitalists into politics,
232 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
marking out for them, on the one hand, an imperialist,
on the other, a domestic policy. The sources of native
labour in the Republics and the Colonies are quite inade¬
quate. The natives of Zululand, Basutoland, Swaziland,
and Natal are fine workers, but can seldom be persuaded
to go underground, while the Bechuanas and Cape Kaffirs
are capricious, and form a very small proportion of the
supply. A larger but very unreliable supply comes from
the extreme north of the Transvaal: it is significant that
no natives from the neighbourhood can be induced to
enter the mines. By far the most important supply comes
from the Portuguese territories on the east coast, and it is
to this quarter and to the lands north of the Zambezi that
the mine owners are looking for this increased supply.1
It is thus manifest that the pressure of the powerful
mining interests will continually be used to drive us into
political interference with countries which lie outside our
present possession and control. By persuasion or coercion,
labour must be got from Mozambique and from the north.
1 The following schedule of the Native Labour Association gives the
numbers obtained from these several sources during the period November
1896 to December 1898 :—
Mozambique 32,271
North Transvaal ........ 12,535
Zulu and Swaziland 511
Basutoland and Cape Colony 5,963
Bechuanaland and Marico 2,068
Rhodesia 263
53.6II
A careful investigation conducted along the entire main reef by the
Rev. C. Baumgarten in June 1899 gives the following results :—
Percentages.
Zulus 8,402 9
Up country, N. Transvaal, andj l8
Bechuanas, &c. J '
Colonial and Basuto . . . 8,740 9
East Coast .... 56)830 64
Total .... 92,168 100
FOR WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING? 233
For this reason our international capitalists are expanders
of the British Empire.
The difficulty of raising, at a sufficient pace, the
required supply from these distant regions will, however,
prove very great, and these sources must be supplemented
by bringing more pressure to bear upon the reluctant
natives of South Africa, among whom underground work
is unpopular.
" They should," as Mr. Rudd recently urged, " try
some cogent form of inducement or practically compel
the native, through taxation or in some other way, to
contribute his quota to the good of the community, and
to a certain extent he would then have to work." Not
only would he have to work, but he would have to work
cheap, for, as Mr. Hays Hammond said, " With good
government there will be an abundance of labour, and
with an abundance of labour there will be no difficulty
in cutting down wages."
The thin edge of the wedge of " forced labour" has
been introduced in several directions outside of Rhodesia,
where, under a thin disguise, it is still in practice; even
in Cape Colony Mr. Rhodes, by his Glen Grey Act, has
essayed to teach " the dignity of labour" to reluctant
natives who prefer to work or idle for themselves, while
the forced indenturing of captive Bechuanas charged
with, but not convicted of, rebellion, is a line which may
be profitably followed in the future, when the present
conflict of white races has borne its certain fruit of
native disturbances. The Boer treatment of natives in
the Transvaal has never been enlightened or humane,
and a form of indenture not widely differing from slavery
has always prevailed. The fact that some philanthropic
persons believe the present war justified by the need of
234 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
redressing native grievances will not deter our economic
lords from adapting the temper and the forms of Boer
institutions to their profitable use.
An interesting passage in a recent speech of Earl
Grey, referring primarily to Rhodesia, has a likely bear¬
ing on the Transvaal mines:—
" They must dismiss from their minds the idea of
developing their mines with white labour. Means had to
be sought to induce the natives to seek, spontaneously,
employment at the mines, and to work willingly for long
terms of more or less continuous service. In time, he
believed, the education of the natives would cause them
to seek work to gratify those growing wants which were
the certain result of increasing contact with civilisation.
Meanwhile, an incentive to labour must be provided by
the imposition of a hut-tax of at least £i, in conformity
to the practice of Basutoland, and also by the establish¬
ment of a small labour-tax, which those able-bodied
natives should be required to pay who are unable to
show a certificate for four months' work.".
There is a humorous impudence in the suggestion
that " spontaneous" and " willing" work is to be in¬
duced by hut and labour taxes. This is the spirit of
South African capitalism all over: the Rand differs from
Rhodesia only in being a little less free-spoken—the men
are the same, the motives and the economic needs are
the same, the conduct will be the same.
There is in reality but one idea of handling the
labour problem throughout South Africa, that of " forced
labour," thinly disguised under the cloak of taxation,
voluntary contract, indenture, or imprisonment. Mr.
Rhodes has frequently and openly avowed the economic
principle, and has practised it unblushingly in Rhodesia,
as the official report of Sir R. Martin testifies.
FOR WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING? 235
Mr. Rudd recently maintained with some real show
of d fortiori reasoning the following interesting thesis:—
" If under the cry of civilisation we in Egypt lately
mowed down 10,000 or 20,000 Dervishes with Maxims,
surely it cannot be considered a hardship to compel the
natives in South Africa to give three months in the
year to do a little honest work."
The only obstacle Mr. Rudd sees is the fact that
" there is a morbid sentimentality among a large section
of the community on the question of the natives"; in
other words, the moral feelings which according to Mr.
Hugh Price Hughes and his friends are the chief justi¬
fication of this war. In his examination before the
Industrial Commission Mr. Albu gave the following in¬
teresting evidence upon the wage question:—
" The native at the present time receives a wage
which is far in excess of the exigencies of his existence.
The native earns between 50s. and 60s. per month, and
then he pays nothing for food or lodging, in fact he can
save almost the whole amount he receives. ... If the
native can save £20 a year, it is almost sufficient for
him to go home and live on the fat of his land. In
five or six years' time the native population will have
saved enough money to make it unnecessary for them
to work any more. The consequences of this will be
most disastrous for the industry and the State. This ques¬
tion applies to any class of labour, and in any country,
whether it be in Africa, Europe, or America. I think if
the native gets enough pay to save ^5 a year, that sum
is quite enough for his requirements, and will prevent
natives from becoming rich in a short space of time."
" You say the native does not require luxuries, and
if he has worked for a year he has saved enough to go
back to his kraal and remain idle ?"
236 THE WAR IN SO CJTH AFRICA
" Yes."
" Can you suggest any remedy for this ?"
" The only remedy I can suggest is that we pay the
native a wage which, whilst enabling him to save money,
will hinder him from becoming exceptionally rich. . .
" Is it in the control of the mining industry to regu¬
late the wages of Kaffirs ?"
" To a great extent it is, provided that the Govern¬
ment assists us in bringing labour to this market."
So much of Kaffir wages, now of white:—
" Are you of opinion that the wages paid to (white)
miners at the present moment are abnormal ?"
" In some instances they are abnormal."
" Is there any chance of getting these abnormal
wages reduced now that there are so many out of work ?"
" Certainly there is: I think the white labourers are
prepared to accept the lesser of two evils. If we close
down the mines a lot of white labourers will be thrown
out of employment."
This is a perfectly straightforward policy and would
be endorsed by almost all South African capitalists, ex¬
cepting that most of them would be sufficiently discreet
to keep silence about their intention of reducing white
wages, content to carry out the plan when they have got
the power into their hands.
The instrument for complete control of the native
and white labour market will be the Chamber of Mines.
That body, which represents the gradual concentration
of the entire industry for fighting purposes in politics
and economics, has long concerned itself with this ques¬
tion ; forcing a common rate of wages on the trade and
inspecting the books of the companies to see they keep
the rule, it has already once effected a reduction of wages,
FOE WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING? 237
and has only been prevented from further action by the
disorganised state of the country. Through its annex,
the Native Labour Association, it has already gone far to
crush the private enterprise of unauthorised labour touts
and to get into its own hand the available supply of
labour. With the political machinery of the Transvaal
in its hands or under its control, it will be greatly
strengthened in its efforts to compel " voluntary " labour
and to bring it safely and cheaply to the mines at the
expense of Government.
This drawing of labour from a distance, assisted by
hut and labour taxes, will be reinforced by a policy of
maintaining close at hand a large, safe, well-regulated
supply. The Chamber of Mines indignantly repudiates
the intention of establishing the Kimberley " compound "
system which converts a labour contract into a period
of imprisonment with hard labour and a truck system of
wages; mine owners and managers examined by the
Industrial Commission explained that the " compound"
system was inexpedient, because it would " injure the
industrial community." But none the less a widely
prevalent belief has existed in Johannesburg that the
" compound " would be adopted when the time was ripe.
" Why," it is asked, " should the mine owners be deterred
from an obvious economy by consideration of the com¬
mercial classes in Johannesburg ? When the system was
adopted at Kimberley there was no consideration of the
ruined shopkeepers there; the interests of the Rand
capitalists in the town values of Johannesburg are in¬
significant when compared with their interests in the
mines, and will not stand in the way of any really profit¬
able reform." On the whole, however, it seems more
likely that another solution of the native labour question
238 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
will be found, and that, instead of the Kimberley " com¬
pound," a system of native locations along the Rand will
be adopted. While the " compound" system gives the
companies a full control of the labour during the period
contracted for, it does not secure a permanent supply
upon the spot, which is the thing most desired. If, on
the other hand, a large number of able-bodied natives can
be induced to break up their tribal agricultural life in
distant parts and plant themselves with their families
in a dense population upon lands belonging to the com¬
panies and adjoining the mines, a really more effective
control will be obtained. Once there, their old tribal
life abandoned, prevented from wandering by the rigorous
administration of the Pass Law, deprived of the oppor¬
tunity of getting land enough to earn a living, they
can only keep themselves and their families by regular
employment on the mines for a wage determined by the
Chamber. Such a system of native locations, assisted
by Pass and Liquor Laws, a Hut and Labour Tax, will
furnish a serf population, ascripti glebae, who, nominally
free, will be virtually compelled to devote themselves
and their families to the service of the mines. This
course will have many advantages; it will save the cost
of bringing labour from longer and ever longer distances,
it will keep the labour when it has been got, and furnish
a regular, reliable, cheap and experienced body of workers,
some of whom may be taught to do skilled work which
will displace white labour : their presence will raise the
value of surrounding lands and will, by forcing the wages
to be spent upon the spot, enable the mining capitalists to
take another profit out of shops owned by the companies
or built upon their land.
Another advantage of this method of " locationsM is
FOR WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING? 239
that it is adaptable, without the name, to the case of
white labour. The white miners at Kenilworth, the
suburb of Kimberley, are absolutely under the control of
De Beers Company: drawing their wages from De Beers,
living in houses owned by De Beers, trading with shops
controlled by De Beers, they are the political and social
serfs of the company; if they object to any terms imposed
upon them by the company, they must quit not only
their employment but their homes, and must leave
Kimberley to find a means of living outside the clutches
of the diamond monopoly. The same will be the posi¬
tion of the white miners who may be induced to bring
their families and settle down upon the Rand. The
mining companies do not even now genuinely compete
for labour; white wages as well as black are fixed by
central authority, and workers dismissed from one mine
cannot easily get employment in another. The rapid con¬
solidation of mining interests, and the virtual supremacy
of Eckstein's in the Chamber of Mines, will speedily perfect
the control over white labour. The " independence " of
the Cornish miner has hitherto consisted in the fact
that, being single, he could save a large proportion of
his wage, and could leave for home if he were ill-used or
dissatisfied. If he can be placed, with a family to keep,
in a house belonging to the mines, with no option of any
other work, and with no power of saving enough to
break up his home, and remove his family, his " inde¬
pendence" will be gone, and his wages can and will be
reduced as often and as far as the convenience of the
companies requires.
Though less has been said, for obvious reasons, about
reducing white wages, miners are well aware of the in¬
tention of the managers, and Mr. Albu's sentiments are
24o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
known to be widely entertained. The matter is well put
in a recent article by " An Outlander" published in
the Mining World :1—
" White wages have not been reduced in the past,
because the Outlanders desired to work together for poli¬
tical salvation, and any attack upon the white labourers' pay
would have caused a split in the ranks. However, when
new conditions prevail, white wages must come down."
Indeed, the saving to be effected out of white wages
is greater than out of black, for the aggregate of the
wages paid to white miners has hitherto been larger than
that paid to black, though the numbers of the latter are
eight times as large.
If this war can be successfully accomplished, and a
" settlement" satisfactory to the mine owners can be
reached, the first fruits of victory will be represented in
a large, cheap, submissive supply of black and white
labour, attended by such other economies of " costs" as
will add millions per annum to the profits of the mines.
It is no extravagance to argue that the blood and the
money of the people of Great Britain are being spent for
this purpose; that at present no other definite tangible
result of the conflict can be shown. The men who,
owning the South African press and political organi¬
sations, engineered the agitation which has issued in this
war, are the same men whose pockets will swell with this
increase; open-eyed and persistent they have pursued
their course, plunging South Africa into a temporary ruin
in order that they may emerge victorious, a small con¬
federacy of international mine-owners and speculators
holding the treasures of South Africa in the hollow ot
their hands.
1 December 16, 1899.
PART III
TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT
Q
CHAPTER I
dutch and british in south africa
Before any proposals of settlement can be usefully con¬
sidered certain important issues, relating to the economic
and political present and probable future of South Africa,
require discussion. What are the present number and
distribution of Dutch and British colonists in South
Africa, and how far is it likely that the near future will
change these factors of race supremacy? What is the
mining future of South Africa, in particular of the Trans¬
vaal, and how long will it last ? Is a great agricultural
development possible, and, if so, what part will British
colonists play in it ? Are large manufacturing industries
likely to rise in the Transvaal ? How will the " native
question" open out (a) as regards the labour market,
(6) as regards education and the franchise, (c) as a possible
military danger ? How can the disturbing factors of the
Cape " boys," the Indians, and the " mean whites" be
dealt with ? Some of these really fundamental questions
lie beyond the scope of this volume, to others at least
a tentative answer can be given by consideration of certain
large unassailable facts.
As is usual, the first difficulty is to get certain
common necessary measures. In seeking to discover
the respective numerical strength of British and Dutch
colonists and dwellers in the two Republics we are met
243
244 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
by serious obstacles. No racial record is attempted in
either colonies or Republics, and in default of this we
are obliged to rely upon imperfect records either of church
membership or of burghership. Turning first to Cape
Colony, the religious record in 1891 classed the whites
as follows:—
Protestants 356,960
Catholics 14,853
J ews 3,007
Mahometans 31
374,851
Of the Protestants 228,627, or 60.65 per cent., belonged
to the Dutch churches. If we suppose all the other
Protestants to be of British descent, and even include
as British the entire body of the Jews and Roman
Catholics, though many Germans and other foreigners
are present amongst them, the result will be 228,627
Dutch against 146,224 British. In Natal we are destitute
even of this religious census, and no reliable statistics
from other sources take its place enabling us to distin¬
guish British and Dutch. It is, however, admitted that
of the 61,000 whites estimated to be living in Natal in
1898 the vast majority were British. A rough estimate
assigning 10,000 as the number of the Dutch would pro¬
bably be near the mark. In the Transvaal the best
available basis of computation is the latest estimate of
the Staats Almanak, which gives the white population
as 288,750, together with the burgher list, comprising
males over the age of sixteen, which contains 29,279
names. A more recent burgher census, taken last summer,
is said to contain about 35,000 names, but, since there is
no means of comparing this with a census of the whole
white population, it is safer to take the earlier list in
DUTCH AND BRITISH IN SOUTH AFRICA 245
comparing Dutch with British. These figures by no means
bear out the popular notion that the Outlanders are
three-quarters of the population. If we suppose the pro¬
portion of ages and sexes to be the same in the Transvaal
as in this country, 29,279 as the male population over
sixteen will represent a total Boer population of about
125,OCX), leaving an Outlander population of 163,750.
Recent events certainly indicate that the Boer population
is at least as large as the figure above named—125,000.
What proportion of the computed Outlander population,
163,750, is to be called British in race, in language, or
in sympathy, once more we have no means of calcula¬
tion, but it certainly includes very many thousands of
Hollanders, Continental Jews, Germans, and Americans.
Personally I do not believe it is likely that as many as
100,000 of these Outlanders are of British descent, but
the general opinion would probably assign a larger number,
say 120,000, and this may be provisionally accepted.
When we come to the Free State, with its population
of 77,716 in 1891, we are again thrown upon church
membership for our estimate of Dutch and British. Of
this number 68,940 belonged to the Dutch Reformed
Church, and if we add half of those, 3970, who gave no
statement of church membership, and class the rest,
including even a few Lutherans and Jews, as British, we
reach the following result: Dutch, 70,925; British, 6791.
It is highly probable that the number of British colonists
in the Free State has since 1891 increased somewhat
faster than the growth of the Dutch colonists, but how
large this increase may be we have no means of knowing,
and in any case the numbers are too small materially
to affect the total balance either for the Republics or
for South Africa.
246 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Now, assuming these figures to be approximately accu¬
rate, we reach the following distribution of British and
Dutch colonists over South Africa, omitting Bechuanaland,
Basutoland, and Rhodesia:—
British.
Dutch.
Cape Colony
Natal
Transvaal
Free State
146,224
51,000
120,000
6,791
228,627
10,000
125,000
70,925
324,015
434,552
If Bechuanaland and Rhodesia were thrown in there would
be a gain of a few thousands to the British as compared
with the Dutch total, but from our existing means of
information it is evident that the Dutch Afrikanders are
numerically far stronger than the British over South
Africa, and it is highly probable that there is a consider¬
able Dutch majority over the genuinely British population
in the two Republics taken together.
Supposing this calculation to be approximately true, it
has important political implications. One inevitable effect
of the present war will be to accentuate the race cleavage
as a political division throughout South Africa. In so far,
therefore, as representative government prevails in any
federation of these States, the Dutch will exercise in virtue
of their numbers a practical dominance. In Cape Colony,
even under a reformed distribution giving increased repre¬
sentation to the towns, the solidarity of race which the
present trouble has established will give the Dutch an easy
superiority. In the Free State, and even in the Trans¬
vaal, if any reasonable time qualification for the franchise
is retained, they will at present retain the supremacy at
DUTCH AND BRITISH IN SOUTH AFRICA 247
the polls. In Natal alone is the British power really
dominant. If any system of federal government in South
Africa is established upon the basis of a popular franchise,
it is pretty evident that the Dutch Afrikanders will con¬
trol that government.
But, it is maintained, the firm establishment of British
paramountcy throughout South Africa, and in particular
a state of good settled government in the Transvaal, will
induce so large and rapid an immigration of British settlers
as to turn the scale of racial superiority in a few years.
Setting aside for the present the highly hazardous specula¬
tions as to the future of Rhodesia, it is upon the growth
of a distinctly British population in the Transvaal that
everything depends. It is popularly believed that this
growth will be so great as soon to give the British
colonists an absolute superiority of numbers not merely
in the Transvaal but in South Africa as a whole. In
considering this assumption it must not be forgotten that
the tendency, apart from immigration, has been for the
Dutch settlers to increase at a considerably faster pace
than the British. No exact measurement of the relative
rate of growth is obtainable, but common knowledge
attests the statement that almost all the Dutch farmers
throughout South Africa marry young, have large fami¬
lies, and, though infant mortality is considerable, rear
successfully a large number of children. In most
countries the birth-rate and the growth of population is
larger in the country than in the towns, when the
natural rate of growth alone is taken into consideration.
And this brings up a most important factor in the
situation—the coincidence of an economic with a racial
cleavage throughout South Africa. The British are
townsmen, the Dutch are countrymen. This local and
248 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
industrial division is of prime importance in any calcula¬
tion as to the future. So far the division of occupations
has gone very closely upon racial lines, a fact fraught with
most important economic consequences. The modes of
rural industry chiefly in vogue, cattle and ostrich farming,
have had little attraction for British settlers, and although
certain considerable districts of the Eastern Province,
where soil and conditions favour arable farms, are largely
peopled by men of British descent, while even in the most
distinctively Dutch regions a sprinkling of English blood
is found, no general tendency is seen for Englishmen to
take to country life and work in Cape Colony or the
Republics. Hitherto the real " settlement" of South
Africa has been Dutch; the British comers have not
for the most part been "settlers," but rovers, not even
attaching themselves very strongly to any single town
or any single industry, but moving to and fro, with the
economic and political changes of this most eventful
country, from Cape Town to Kimberley, and thence to
Johannesburg or to Bulawayo, as the spirit of speculative
industry might lead them. Not merely in the Transvaal,
but all over South Africa, there is this radical difference
between Dutch and British Afrikanders, that the former
have definitely severed themselves in fact and feeling
from Europe, and regard South Africa as their country
and their only home, while the British Afrikander, though
his family may have been for three generations living in
South Africa, not only continues to speak of England as
" home," but continually contemplates a return to it. This
is a fact of prime political significance; those who really
regard South Africa as home, and are in thought and in
interests firmly rooted there, both must and ought to have
a greater influence in determining its destinies than those
DUTCH AND BRITISH IN SOUTH AFRICA 249
who are mere sojourners or hold their occupation of the
land more lightly. It is not right or good for any country
that birds of passage, mere temporary gain-seekers, should
by force of numbers dominate the policy of that country,
nor will it, in fact, be easy for them to do so. The
superior political strength of the Dutch Afrikander is
derived not merely from his numbers but from that
greater solidarity of interests associated with the more
fixed settlement he has effected. If the British are to
be really paramount as a race in South Africa by other
means than Imperial tyranny from Downing Street, it
can only be by a substantial immigration into South
Africa of British people who will settle down to the per¬
manent agricultural and industrial development of the
country, with the fixed intentions of making their homes
in the country and of building up a distinctively British
Afrikander society. Whether this is desirable, and how
far it is possible and likely to occur, are speculative
questions which should find some sort of answer before
terms of settlement can be discussed.
CHAPTER II
the agricultural outlook
We have seen that, however great may be the formal
paramountcy of Great Britain in South Africa, the reality
of her ascendency, her power to mould the future policy
either of a federation or of separate states, must depend
upon the increase of the proportion of British Afrikanders,
as compared with Dutch, more than upon any other
condition. Hitherto there is reason to believe that the
Dutch stock has been more prolific than the British, and
that the latter has not made good its deficit by immigra¬
tion. If a secure and efficient government, upon the
basis of equal rights for civilised races, is established after
the conclusion of the war, will a stream of immigration
be maintained into South Africa from Great Britain ?
This is a crucial question. For some time the issue
may be shirked by keeping military or other coercive
control over parts of South Africa where "disloyalty"
is suspected. But ultimately, and not remotely, the
self-government of the white races must be frankly and
fully conceded under such nominal control as we exercise
over Canada and Australia. Will free representative
institutions give the upper hand to Dutch or British
stock ? But for recent events, the fusion of blood, and
of economic and social interests, which had long been
taking place, might have gained such acceleration as
to have made this question of little import. It may,
250
THE AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 251
however, be taken for granted that for many years to
come this wholesome fusion is entirely stopped, and that
politics will run upon strictly racial lines. Therefore, un¬
less there is so large and rapid an influx of new British
population as to out-number and out-vote the Dutch
Afrikanders, the essential object of British policy, viz., to
secure a practical British ascendency, will be frustrated.
Primarily, our question is an economic one, and
depends for its answer upon the probable industrial
development of South Africa. In treating this matter
we may discard the remote future, nowhere more in¬
calculable than in Africa, and restrict ourselves to
more immediate probabilities. How far are agriculture,
mining and manufacturing industries likely to develop
fast enough to find profitable employment for large
numbers of British immigrants within the next few
decades ? Those who see immense areas of land marked
on a map, and are informed that the population for the
Colonies and Republics is less than one and a half
persons per square mile, and that the climate and soil
are favourable to white colonists, may entertain the
notion of some great scheme of settling British agri¬
cultural labourers or small farmers in South Africa. But
the least reflection and investigation of the country will
serve to check such wild optimism. In the first place,
no really substantial migration of agricultural population
from this country is taking place, or is likely to take
place, even to the United States. A small number of
men with the requisite skill and capital take to colonial
farming upon a large scale. The Eastern Province of
Cape Colony has drawn some of these who have done
fairly well, a sprinkling is to be found in Natal, in the
Free State, Bechuanaland, and Rhodesia. But this migra-
252 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
tion all told is insignificant, nor is there any reason to
believe that a " settlement," which shall fasten the formal
ascendency of Great Britain upon all South Africa, will
furnish the requisite conditions to tempt any large
migration from the dwindling agricultural population
of these isles. Even if there were the men to go, why
should they choose South Africa ? The most valuable
lands in the Colonies and the Free State are already
occupied, those in Rhodesia are owned by syndicates
with whom hard bargains must be driven.
Moreover, the proportion of really serviceable land, even
for grazing, is extremely small, while arable farming and
other kinds of cultivation are attended by dangers and
difficulties which probably exceed those experienced in
any other country. Rinderpest, the tsetse-fly, and horse
fever have periodically swept off the live stock; droughts,
hail-storms, locusts destroy the crops of whole districts.
Preventive and curative measures for dealing with
some of these afflictions are doubtless available; rinder¬
pest has been successfully repressed over large areas,
and a gallant attempt to combat the plague of locusts
by fungus poison is being made. But Africa is a land
of surprises, and its agriculture is painfully prolific in
new dangers which take the heart out of progressive
agriculture. To the low fertility of most of the soil, and
the constant recurrence of these destructive pests, must
be attributed the poor and conservative farming of the
Boers. Land where a sheep requires six acres to furnish
it a bare subsistence, as is the case on the Karoo, or where
a farm of 5000 morgen (10,000 acres) often proves in¬
adequate to support a family, as is the case over large
parts of the Free State, will scarcely tempt the enterpris¬
ing British yeoman. He would have to adapt himself
THE AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 253
to a life and a mode of agriculture entirely foreign to his
habits and his inclinations, and would, at the best, earn the
scant and precarious livelihood which seems to satisfy the
rude Boer frontiersman. No doubt there are vast areas
available for ranching, provided the pressure of agri¬
cultural population in Great Britain made large migration
essential, and governmental or other grants of land and
capital were available so as to plant them securely on
South African soil. But does any one seriously suppose
that this will be done? The overwhelming majority
of British who go to South Africa have settled down
to mining or town life and will continue to do so. The
character of the country, and the kind of life imposed,
do not suit the British agriculturist. It is a country
of vast grazing farms, where the farmer leads a dull,
solitary, monotonous life, and hires or coerces Kaffir
labour to do the hard manual work for him. Each
farmer is, to all intents and purposes, a little serf-holder,
and generally suffers, as is natural in these circumstances,
a descent into a torpid unprogressive life. Such ranch¬
ing spread over large tracts of country can never absorb
any large quantity of British labour. Mr. Bryce has
excellent grounds for his statement: " On a large grazing
farm the proportion of whitf men to black servants
is usually about three to twenty-five; and though the
proportion of whites is of course much larger in the
small towns which supply the wants of the surrounding
country, still any one can see with how few whites a
ranching country may get along."1
Even when there is a great show of fertility, as is
evinced by the astonishingly rapid growth of trees, the
soil is not rich to any depth and has very little staying
1 " Impressions of South Africa," p. 437.
254 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
power. The Free State is the only South African State
which really keeps itself in food and has to spare, ex¬
porting to the market of the sister Republic food stuffs
for man and beast amounting to a value of nearly
£ i ,000,000 per annum in recent years. But even there
the wheat-growing area is comparatively small, and con¬
sists almost entirely of the rich lands bordering on the
west frontier of Basutoland. As for the prospect of the
Transvaal" finding itself" in bread, Captain Younghusband
presents the serious climatic obstacle: "It is said that
wheat cannot be grown in summer because the rain falls
in that season and causes rust, and in winter there is all
sun and no rain, so that to grow wheat irrigation must
be resorted to."1
The enormous size of these farms renders impossible
any true social life; the family sometimes keeps to¬
gether until it forms a little clan, but for the most part
economic necessity scatters families at such wide intervals,
that anything in the way of regular society, even of a few
neighbours, becomes impossible. To Englishmen such
a life is intolerable: even if the men could bear it, it is
not endurable for women and children to be cut off from
all society and means of education. It may be said that
the conditions here described are not eternal. New crops
may be introduced and developed. Creditable qualities
of tea and sugar are already produced in Natal. Trans¬
vaal tobacco has peculiar merits which are recognised
throughout South Africa. Cotton, coffee, and rice have a
possible future. But there is no evidence to show that
South Africa presents any peculiar advantages for these and
any other agricultural products which will induce a large
application of capital and labour.
1 " South Africa of To-day," p. 17.
THE AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 255
It is often said that the low fertility of the soil may¬
be overcome by irrigation and by other arts of scientific
agriculture. No doubt this may be possible, though
the low rainfall of many otherwise desirable districts,
the absence of rivers, and the hazard attending the sinking
of wells, are serious obstacles; but the expense of any
effective considerable system of irrigation would be so
great that we may place it out of serious consideration
in dealing with the near future. Unless a very large,
near, regular, and high-priced market for agricultural
produce existed in South Africa, it would be quite im¬
possible to induce any considerable number of British
agriculturists to settle on the soil. Even where the land
is British territory, as in Bechuanaland and Rhodesia,
it is pretty evident that in a few years Dutch trekkers
from the Republics and colonies will largely outnumber
colonists of British descent.
There can be no spontaneous independent British
agriculture in South Africa which shall produce a new
class of British yeomen comparable in numbers or char¬
acter to the Boer, who, by the process of several centuries'
use and selection, has become assimilated to his hard and
changeful environment, chiefly by accustoming himself
to bear the hardships, and by adopting so simple and con¬
servative a mode of farming that the changes and caprices
though they cripple enterprise do not destroy him.
Any large development of progressive profitable farm¬
ing which shall tempt British agricultural settlers can
only follow in the wake of a great industrial and mining
development. The notion of an agricultural community of
British settlers living a substantially self-sufficing life, and
taking their manufactured goods as imports from England,
while giving in exchange the fruits of the soil raised under
256 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the pressure of ordinary motives, is entirely chimerical.
If there is to be any considerable and rapid increase of
agricultural population in South Africa, it must presuppose
a large increase of mining and town population, and even
then the increased farming would almost certainly be
done by Dutch rather than by British Afrikanders. These
conclusions relating to the early future will, I think, be
pretty generally admitted by those who have considered
the conditions.
CHAPTER III
the probable industrial future of
south africa
When confident predictions are made of a large and rapid
growth of British population in South Africa, they are
based upon the belief that the country possesses a great
mining and manufacturing future. There are many who
look forward to the swift development of the rich and
varied mineral resources, which the country is known or
believed to possess, as the sure guarantee of British
supremacy, maintained by the numerical superiority of
members of the British race.
In order to test the value of such predictions, it is
best to start from known facts. Gold and diamonds are
the two solid assets of this order in South Africa.
Diamonds, first discovered in quantity in 1869-70, brought
a considerable growth of population into the neighbour¬
hood of Kimberley during the next fifteen years, while the
mining claims remained in many hands, and competi¬
tion ruled the output and the price. The growth of
this mining population was attended by a corresponding
growth of traders and of general town population in
Kimberley. This tendency, however, received a signal,
sudden, and final check by the amalgamation of mining
interests in one great company, De Beers, achieved by
Mr. Rhodes in 1885. Since that time the quantity of
the output has been virtually stationary, though a slow
257 R
258 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
rise in the value per carat, under the stress of an almost
complete monopoly, gave a certain inconsiderable rise
in the aggregate annual value prior to 1890. Since 1890,
after De Beers had secured almost perfect control of other
small mining properties, output, value, and, what is more
important for our present consideration, number of white
employees remained stationary. The following short table
will serve to make this clear. The weight and value
given refer to diamonds exported from and imported into
the district of the Kimberley mines, the imports repre¬
senting diamonds taken in the River Diggings:—
Year.
Carats.
Value.
Labour.
1891 ....
3.255,545
,£4,174,208
1592
1892 ....
3,039,062
3,906,992
1709
1893 ....
2,758,827
3,821,443
1793
1894 ....
2,507,409
3,013,578
1553
1895 ....
3,355,863
4,323,308
1593
1896 ....
3,283,439
4,195,651
1740
1897 ....
3,220,367
4,024,040
1696
1898 ....
3,232,057
4,124,170
1653
These figures will suffice to make it evident that the
economic conditions of the great De Beers monopoly are
such as to render it impossible to anticipate any in¬
crease of employment for British labour in this important
industry, the importance of which may be measured by the
fact that it provides about one quarter of the total ex¬
port trade from Cape Colony.
It is evidently upon gold, not upon diamonds, that we
must rely if we anticipate a large and rapid demand for
British labour. Now gold is known to exist and has
been worked in various places in Africa south of the
Zambesi. In Natal, Zululand, Swaziland, in Northern
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 259
Bechuanaland, and in Cape Colony quartz reefs contain¬
ing gold have been found and worked to some slight
extent. But the fairly unanimous judgment of experts
indicates that none of these known reefs is likely to
contribute anything considerable to the gold output. Al¬
though great hopes have been entertained of the secondary
goldfields of the Transvaal, and one or two of them are
sedulously boomed for speculative purposes, they do not
make any large or increasing contribution to the aggre¬
gate output, nor is there any reason to expect any con¬
siderable development in the future. Twelve years ago
the Potchefstroom district was believed to have a profit¬
able future, but only one or two mines of any importance
remained open in 1899. The reputation of the Heidel¬
berg district during the last ten years has lived upon
the success of a single mine, the Nigel, upon the strength
of which some dozens of worthless mines have been
floated.
Barberton, the first of the goldfields to be discovered,
is now ranked as "a failure" by Mr. Curie, the author
of "Goldfields of the World," who thus summarises the
condition of the De Kaap district: " Of about forty mines
in existence, or recently in existence, at De Kaap, there is
only one, the Sheba, which has ever attained the position
of a permanent mining enterprise,"
Of Lydenburg, which has generally been considered
the most promising district next to the Witwaters-
rand, the same authority says: " The reefs are usually
narrow, and frequently irregular in value; they are
difficult to mine, and, on the whole, have proved dis¬
appointing."
The following table of the quantity and value of the
gold output for 1896 and 1897 will serve to indicate the
260 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
comparative insignificance of the subsidiary goldfields of
South Africa:—
1896.
1897.
Quantity.
Value.
Quantity.
Value.
Witwatersrand .
De Kaap . . .
Lydenburg . .
Klerksdorp . .
Zoutspansberg .
Swaziland . .
Other districts .
Oz.
2,280,892
121,390
50.387
38,818
5,602
"857
£
7, 864,341
439,685
148,778
125,109
15,807
3,293
Oz.
3,034,678
113,972
5o,942
84,781
225
4,979
141
I
10,583,616
398,902
178,296
296,733
791
17,427
2,497,946
8,597,oi3
3,289,718
n,475,765
Of the future of Rhodesia it is of course unsafe to
speculate. The same expert who condemns the future of
the secondary Transvaal goldfields believes that Rhodesia
" is about to become a prominent and permanent gold-pro¬
ducer," and that within the next few years some thirty
payable mines will be either at work or in process of
development. No one, however, believes that any gold-
field comparable, either in richness or in reliableness, to the
Rand is likely to be established in Rhodesia or elsewhere.
I believe that a general consensus of opinion among men
who are not definitely interested in optimistic judgments
endorses the conclusion thus stated by Mr. Bryce:—
" It seems probable, though not certain, that in many
districts a mining industry will be developed which will
give employment to thousands, perhaps many thousands,
of natives, and to hundreds, perhaps many hundreds, of
white engineers and foremen. Should this happen, markets
will be created in these districts, land will be cultivated,
railways will be made, and the local trades which a thriv¬
ing population requires will spring up. But the life of
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 261
these gold reefs will not be a long one. As the gold is
found in quartz rock, and only to a small extent in gravel
or other alluvial deposits, the mining requires capital, and
will be carried on by companies. It will be carried on
quickly, and so quickly, with the aid of the enormously
improved scientific appliances we now possess, as to ex¬
haust at no distant period the minerals which the rocks
contain."1
Present probabilities thus do not indicate that any great
development of gold-mining outside the Rand is likely
to afford employment for such a large amount of British
labour as will materially strengthen the proportion of
British colonists to Dutch. If we turn from vague specu¬
lations of interested "boomers" to the evidence of sober
facts, the Witwatersrand remains the one large solid fait
accompli, and it is to the further development and life
of this goldfield that we must look for the required
stimulus to British immigration.
The political future of the Transvaal and of South
Africa evidently depends, more than upon any other
economic factor, upon the growth of the gold output of
the Rand, the demand for white labour attendant on this
growth, and the duration of the large profitable working
of these mines. It must be remembered that the gold
of the Rand is now believed to have been thoroughly
explored, and although there is no precise agreement as
to the depth at which gold can be profitably worked, the
aggregate value of the gold which it was estimated in
round numbers, some three years ago, could be taken from
these mines was put down at £700,000,000. The evidence
of several American experts, apparently accepted by the
Chamber of Mines, and placed in evidence before the
1 Page 439.
262 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Industrial Commission in 1897, supports this computation,
though Mr. Hays Hammond and some other engineers,
having regard to the development of more favourable con¬
ditions enabling lower-grade ores to be profitably worked,
consider this figure too low. But let us take as the basis
of our calculation a higher estimate of the wealth of
the Rand, and placing it at £800,000,000 instead of
£700,000,000, deduct from that total £50,000,000, as
approximately representing the actual output of the last
few years since these estimates were formed. On this
computation there will remain £750,000,000 of future out¬
put. Now, in considering the political and social influence
of this industrial asset, it is convenient to begin by con¬
sidering the probable duration of this industry. How
long will the Rand last ? Fifty or sixty years, with a
probable extension, is the general answer that is given.
Captain Younghusband, who went pretty thoroughly into
the matter, thinks "it is a safe forecast to say that fifty
years hence the gold resources of the Transvaal will not
have been exhausted," and evidently looks forward to a
considerably longer life than this; while Mr. Bryce holds
that "it is practically certain that this production and
population will go on increasing during the next few
years, and that the mines will not be worked out before
the middle of next century at earliest." But this opinion
of Mr. Bryce, and the general opinion with which it
coincides, is evidently based upon the supposition that
the output of 1898, amounting to some £15,000,000,
was a sort of maximum. Now can we accept such a
limit ? It is to the economic interest of the mining financiers
to suggest a long life to the mines, but it is to their interest
as mine owners to get out of the mines in any given time
the maximum output which can be profitably got. The
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 263
actual figures, indicative of the growth of the Rand output
since its discovery, do not justify the belief that £ 15,000,000,
or any such limit, can be set upon the annual output;
indeed, they make it tolerably certain that under a more
secure Government, favourable to the mining industry,
the next few years will see a very large increase of out¬
put. The following table of the yield since 1887 makes
this quite evident:—
Year.
Value.
Output.
Oz.
1887
,£81,022
726,821
23,125
1888
208,121
1889
1,300,509
369,557
1890
i.73S,49i
494,817
1891
2,556,328
729,268
1892
4,297,610
5,187,206
1,210,868
1,478,477
1893
1894
6,963,100
2,024,163
1895
7,840,779
2,277,640
1896
7,864,341
2,280,892
1897
10,583,616
3,034,678
1898
15,141,376
4,295,608
Seeing that the gold production of the first eight
months of 1899, in spite of the disturbed political and
economic state of the country, exceeded that of the
corresponding eight months of 1898 by nearly 30 per
cent., it is pretty certain that the value of this year's
output would have reached nearly £20,000,000.
Following these figures, we see a continuous rapid
growth, checked only by the effects of the Raid, and even
then but for a single year. There is no reason whatever
to suppose that £20,000,000 or any other limit can be
set upon the annual output. Indeed, it is made manifest
by recent speeches of mining magnates that a large
increase, not only of proportion of profits to expenses, but
264 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
of output is expected to follow a settlement of tlie Trans¬
vaal under British supremacy. It is precisely upon this
expectation that the prospect of a large British immigra¬
tion, which shall give British settlers an unquestioned
predominance of power, depends. There will, it is main¬
tained, be a large demand for British labour in the mines
and for the subsidiary industries upon the Rand, while
Johannesburg will exhibit a great and rapid increase of
British population.
Now, if we base our expectations of a large British
population in South Africa upon the gold industry of
the Rand, we seem to be confronted by the following
dilemma. The belief in any considerable increase of the
mining and subsidiary population rests upon the assumption
that the output will proceed by leaps and bounds, as has
been the case since 1886. But if this occurs, it results
that the prospective treasure will be exhausted in far
less than half a century. Our provisional estimate of
£y 50,000,000 would last only twenty-five years if we sup¬
pose the average output to be -£30,000,000 per annum,
which output would be attained in about two years' time
at the rate of growth manifested during recent years.
Indeed, it is evident that those who talk confidently of
the need of at least 150,000 Kaffirs for the mines con¬
template at least so large an increase of output, for the
maximum number of Kaffirs employed in 1899 in mining
processes was less than 100,000 all told.
If a settlement, bringing improved railway communi¬
cation with the north, better relations with the Portu¬
guese, and safer transit to and from the mines, provide an
indefinitely expanding supply of native labour at a price
as cheap as or cheaper than the present, there is every
probability that the growth of output may be far larger
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 265
than that which I have named. As the richer mines
are rapidly worked out, the output would of course decline,
and some amount of gold-mining might linger for a
considerable time. But the probabilities seem all against
the maintenance of a large, tolerably regular industry,
giving employment to great quantities of British labour.
The remarkable regularity of the gold deposits, which
distinguishes this from all other goldfields of the world,
is no guarantee of a corresponding regularity of out¬
put or of employment. The tendency will not be that
which we found in the diamond mines, to maintain a
steady output. Even if the economic structure of the
Rand should lend itself to an amalgamation as complete
as that of Kimberley, no corresponding regularity of
output would ensue. In the case of diamonds, restriction
of output is due to the fact that any increase beyond
the calculated limit would, by its effect on market prices,
reduce the aggregate profit ; no such results would
follow in the case of gold. The tendency of the Rand
mine-owners, whether they form a working combination
or compete, will be to increase the present output to
the utmost, restrained only by the difficulty of obtaining
a sufficiently large, cheap, and efficient supply of labour.
The only direct economic check upon such increase
of output would be the fall in the general purchasing
power of gold (i.e. a general rise of prices), and a fall
in the rate of interest for money loans, which would
ensue were vast quantities of gold forced on to the
mints of the world. But the diminishing part which
the gold supply plays in determining prices, and the
increased demand for gold currency which is taking
place in modern times, would so far mitigate such
tendency as to make it an inconsiderable check upon
266 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the general tendency to get the gold out of the ground
as fast as possible.
From the evidence tendered to the Industrial Com¬
mission it is clear that business men with a wide outlook
contemplate a very rapid expansion of the mining industry
beyond the present limits. One of the ablest of the
American engineers upon the Rand, Mr. W. Hall, ex¬
pressed the following opinion:—
"Aside from the city of Johannesburg, under the
most favourable conditions, there is a possibility for em¬
ploying, say, 30,000 whites and 250,000 blacks on the
Rand. It is not, for purposes of my point, necessary to
assume the full figures. We might accept 25,000 whites
and 200,000 blacks outside of the city population as a
not unreasonable probability, if very substantial reliefs are
granted, and this within ten years; always provided that
the black population can be made to come, stay, and work
faithfully at the lower wage necessary for the development
of this state of things."1
Mr. J. G. Hamilton, another well-known mining capi¬
talist, recently calculated that in eight years' time the
number of stamps used in the mines would be trebled.2
Now it is obvious that if such a forecast is even
approximately true, it contemplates an output per annum
nearly three times as large as that of last year, and the
gold of the Rand, got out at such a pace, would not,
according to the most liberal estimates, last twenty years.
It is doubtless true that, if any such expansion of the
mining industry took place, it would furnish employment
for a considerably larger number of white miners than
are at present there, and that a corresponding expansion
1 Industrial Commission Report, p. 428.
2 Report, Chamber of Mines, p. 463.
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 267
of the white trading population of the Rand might be
anticipated. So far as this accession to the mining popu¬
lation was concerned, it would be predominantly British.
Not so, however, the trading classes: foreigners, in parti¬
cular German and Polish Jews, have for the last few years
been taking an ever-increasing portion of the trade, and
the trading future of the Rand belongs to them. A
temporary boom in the building and related industries
may draw into the country some British artisans, but
most of the manual labour which lies beyond the present
skill of Kaffirs is already in the hands of foreigners,
and Johannesburg cannot be expected to furnish steady
employment to any large number of British working-men.
It is distinctively to the growth of the white mining
population that we must look for the numerical increase
of British influence. If our power stands ultimately upon
voting strength, it must reside in the persons of British
miners who have settled down and made their home in
the Transvaal. Now does present evidence indicate that
any such large permanent settlement is probable? The
dilemma which confronts us may be briefly stated thus.
If so big and rapid an expansion of the Rand mining takes
place as will double or treble the employment of white
miners, the mines cannot last out a single generation, and
no reasonable motive is furnished for Englishmen to make
a settled home and to identify themselves with a country
which can provide no permanent economic basis for their
maintenance. If, on the other hand, an output is main¬
tained which enables the mines to hold out for fifty years
or more, no considerable increased demand for white
labour is provided. So far as the past affords any clue
to the future in South Africa, one would be driven to
deny that any regularity of output and employment was
268
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
probable. Taking into consideration the certainty of
political disorders and financial fluctuations, it is unrea¬
sonable to believe that any considerable number of British
miners will be provided with a steady permanent liveli¬
hood in the Transvaal. That a great burst of mining
activity will follow any specious " settlement," I make no
doubt. Probably within the next few years great quanti¬
ties of gold will be got out; but that a few years of such
prosperity will be followed by a signal collapse is quite
as certain. The likelihood is that neither an enormous
output over a small number of years, nor a smaller
output over a large number of years will be maintained,
but an irregular, incalculable blending of the two ten¬
dencies,—a condition of affairs peculiarly adverse to a safe
permanent settlement of British citizens in the Transvaal.
Even if regularity and duration could be safely pre¬
dicted of the Rand mining, it would not afford the re¬
quired basis of British population in the Transvaal, for
mining is not distinctively a white man's industry. Apart
from certain skilled work in construction, the white man's
part is chiefly that of overseer, and one of the chief
"economies" of a progressive industry is the reduction
of this class of labour. White labourers have hitherto been
reckoned as about one to eight or ten of Kaffir labourers.
There is, however, reason to believe that the proportion of
white labour has been considerably reduced of late years,
and that in the future the reduction will be far greater.
Whereas the number of native labourers in regular em¬
ployment on the Rand grew from 47,000 in 1896 to 67,000
in 1899, the number of white labourers during the same
time increased from 7430 to 9476, a distinctly lower
rate of increase. These numbers are considerably lower
than the maximum employed at the close of 1898, when,
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 269
according to the Chamber of Mines, there were upwards of
88,000 Kaffirs in employment. About the middle of last
year the figures of black and white labour were approxi¬
mately 95,000 and 11,000 respectively. Now the extremely
high wages paid to white labour, an average of some £28
per month, furnish a more than usually powerful incentive
to reduce the proportion of white workers. Though nine
times as many blacks as whites were employed in 1895, a
most careful analysis of expenses proves that white wages
absorbed 34.3 per cent, of the working expenses of the
mines, as compared with 28.6 per cent, wages of Kaffir
labour. To reduce the wages of both white and black
miners is, we observe, a fixed policy of the mining com¬
panies, but almost equally important is it for them to
reduce to a minimum the employment of expensive
British miners. How far it may be possible to displace
white miners' labour, for skilled mechanical work and for
superintendence, is doubtful; but if Zulus and Basutos can
be got upon terms which oblige them to stay and undergo
the necessary training, it is believed that some economy
of this sort can be effected. But, quite apart from this,
the progress of the mining industry on the Rand favours
a reduction of white labour. Hitherto an enormous pro¬
portion of the labour has been in the work of construction
and development, especially since the discovery of the deep
levels. Now the statistics indicate that it is precisely for
this work of construction and development that the largest
proportion of white labour is required.1 Though much
work of this order must remain to be done, it will bear an
ever diminishing importance as compared with the actual
processes of getting gold. Thus the natural order of events
favours an economy of British labour in the mines.
i CJ. Mr. Seymour's tables, Report, Indust. Com., p. 171.
270 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
If, therefore, we suppose the annual output raised for a
certain number of years from ^20,000,000 to £30,000,000,
we cannot anticipate an increased population of more than
5000 British and other white miners, together with a much
less than proportionate addition to the British portion of
the trading and artisan classes of Johannesburg and other
mining centres.
But, it may be said, what about the other great mineral
resources, the coal and iron, the silver, copper, tin, and
other undeveloped treasures ? Have we not here the
guarantees of a great industrial future, with large manu¬
facturing towns furnishing a market for agricultural pro¬
duce, which will likewise yield employment for a great
farming population ? The answer to these questions is
that most of these treasures are at present mere paper
assets, whose existence depends upon the assertions of
interested " boomers " ; they may or may not have a sub¬
stantial basis, but at present they must be regarded as
merely hypothetical resources. Of the reality of coal we
do indeed possess assurance; it exists in large quantities,
and is worked in the proximity of the Witwatersrand
mines, in the Boksburg and Heidelberg districts, and also
in the Middelburg, Lydenburg, and Pretoria neighbour¬
hoods. But though a certain market for such coal is
furnished by the mining industry, we have yet no assur¬
ance that its quality will make it pay either for steamship
coaling or for ordinary manufacturing purposes. According
to a recent official report, " the testimony of a prominent
South African steamship owner is to the effect that Trans¬
vaal coal is not suitable for marine purposes;"1 though it
is only fair to add that the mining companies claim that
their best coal, some of which is " little inferior to Cardiff
2 G. 9073, p. 17.
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 271
coal," cannot be put upon the market until railway com¬
munications are extended. There is no doubt that plenty
of coal of low and medium qualities has been found, and
that, if there were already in the country a dense, accessible
industrial population, a big coal-mining industry could
be established; but whether the existence of this coal can
call into existence the requisite economic conditions for its
working is quite another question. Those who talk of a
speedy growth of manufactures and manufacturing towns
add to the speculative optimism regarding coal a still more
speculative optimism regarding iron. Captain Younghus-
band has some highly interesting suggestions about a great
iron industry which he thinks possible. Since one of the
most obvious external features in South Africa is the vast
consumption of iron, it is only natural that the possibility of
manufacturing it upon the spot should occur to the specu¬
lative economist. " Johannesburg is, one might almost say,
built of corrugated iron, and among all the thousands of
houses there I have seen only one which had not a corru¬
gated iron roof. Even the houses of the Boers are now being
roofed with this material instead of thatch. Might not all
the corrugated iron required in the little townships, now
everywhere springing up in the vicinity of the coal and
gold mines, be manufactured here ? Might not iron
sleepers, rails, iron telegraph posts, lamp-posts, and many
other things of simple manufacture, and requiring little
more than casting or rolling, be turned out in this coun¬
try ?"1 Possibly they may. It may even be that the
day will come when steam-engines and complex mining
machinery are produced along the Rand. But all this is
purely hypothetical. There is nothing in the shape of
solid achievements upon which we can rely for these
1 " South Africa of To-day," p. 15.
272 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
sanguine hopes. Iron has been tested in various places;
we hear of " a reef of magnetite, from 20 to 40 feet wide,
extending for several miles alongside the coal, and of such
quality as to yield 70 per cent, of metallic iron." We have
little doubt that, within the next few years, the European
investor will be invited to put his money into iron-mining
companies in the Transvaal; but as yet the hard fact
remains—iron has not been worked. Several things are
needed to establish an iron industry which shall even
furnish the simpler forms of manufactured goods. The
first of these is the existence of abundance of good iron
ore near to good and abundant coking coal; the second is
a sufficient, a reliable, and a cheap supply of skilled white,
and unskilled but trained, native labour. Even if the first
requisite exists, which is, pace Captain Younghusband,
still very doubtful, the second is conspicuously lacking,
and must continue to be lacking for a long time to come,
if for no other reason, for this, that the demand of the
gold-mines, and their superior ability of enforcing their
demands, will enable them to have the first pull upon
every new labour market which may be opened in the
north and along the east coast.
Although the existence of iron ore has been known for
some years, no serious attempt has been made to utilise it;
nor will the magical words " British supremacy " wield any
spell to draw pig iron from the soil and put it into steel
rails or corrugated sheets. The essential natural conditions
for a successful iron industry are not yet shown to exist,
and the economic conditions for working it are known to
be wanting.
At present there is no solid basis of a manufacturing
development in the near future: iron and coal are not
worked or workable in any quantity. Indeed, the safest
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 273
criticism upon the reckless language which, interested
entrepreneurs and their journalistic victims employ in
painting the swift industrial emergence of the Transvaal
is furnished by the sober figures indicating the small
dimensions and slow growth of coal-mining1:—
Year.
Tonnage.
Value.
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
548,534
791,358
1,133,466
1,437,297
1,600,212
1,683,004
£257,454
359,694
516,215
612,561
612,668
A study of known facts and probabilities does not
warrant any belief that South Africa has before it a bright
immediate future, which, by the simultaneous develop¬
ment of mineral, manufacturing, and agricultural resources,
shall implant a large British population with a practical
political control of the country. An agricultural develop¬
ment presupposes a large industrial population; industrial
development presupposes large mining and agricultural
classes, whose needs it will supply by home manufactures;
the profitable working of minerals implies the existence
of large industrial centres. Each resource requires the
prior development of the others for an effective stimulus.
There does not exist such legitimate confidence as will
evoke the simultaneous development of the related and
dependent factors. The entire structure is aerial and
unsubstantial. It is indeed possible, perhaps reasonable,
to expect that, besides an addition to the unstable British
population of the Rand, there will be some immigration
into other industries in South Africa. Such an accession
1 From C. 7093, and Report, Chamber of Mines, p. 40 r.
3
274 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
to the British Afrikander population might be a valuable
political and social factor, if these new comers settled down,
married, made homes, and reared families in South Africa.
An examination of mining statistics shows how small a
percentage of them have hitherto done this.
There are, however, those who confidently predict that
a settled government under the British flag, with proper
control of import duties and railway rates, will fix large num¬
bers of these men as permanent colonists. They are probably
mistaken. In the first place, as has already been indicated,
the new Government is hardly likely to become cheaper
than the old, even if it be somewhat more efficient. The
taxation of the Transvaal, though accused of being exces¬
sive, has not been so much per head of the white popula¬
tion as the taxation of either of the British colonies. It
is indeed complained that an undue proportion of this
burden has fallen upon the Outlander population, but
it is admitted that this same population owns the vast
majority of the valuable property, both real and personal,
in the country, and no system of taxation can be devised
which can shift the incidence of taxes from the shoulders
of the " haves " on to those of the " have-nots." It is quite
likely that the proportion of the war expenses which the
Transvaal will be called upon to pay, together with the
expense of maintaining a large military force in the
country, will more than balance any economy arising
from more capable and less corrupt finance. Bearing
in mind the low financial morality of the economic
masters of the State, in whose hands the chief political
power will actually be placed (attested by a long admitted
practice of corruption), we cannot expect the future of
the Transvaal to be distinguished by pure and dis¬
interested administration and finance. Again, does any
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 275
one acquainted with South African affairs believe that the
disestablishment of the dynamite, the Netherland Railway,
and other public concessions or monopolies will not by
accompanied by a growth and extension of all sorts of
private economic monopolies organised by Jewish rings ?
Nor is there reason to expect any considerable re¬
duction of import duties. The reckless charges made
against the Transvaal Government of extortionate duties
upon necessaries of life are groundless since the change
of tariff in 1897, which shifted the chief strain of taxation
from necessaries on to luxuries. A comparison of the
duties on prime food-stuffs in the Transvaal and Cape
Colony shows that the colonial taxation is considerably
higher. I am assured by careful housekeepers who
have lived in Johannesburg and Cape Town, that for
articles of ordinary consumption the prices in the former
are not appreciably higher. Many luxuries are somewhat
more expensive; house rents in Johannesburg are con¬
siderably higher than in Cape Town, though not much,
if any higher, than in Kimberley. Some fall in expenses
of living may perhaps be likely to occur within the next
few years, but there is no reason to anticipate any great
reduction in the cost of maintaining family life along the
Rand. When we bear in mind that the mining com¬
panies are counting on any reduction in expense of
living, which may be effected, to enable them to make
corresponding reductions of money wages, we perceive
that no motive is provided which will induce white
miners or other workers on the Rand to make a permanent
settlement with their families. It will still continue to
be cheaper and more desirable for them to live as single
men, sojourners in a foreign land, saving money, sending
it home and returning home themselves when they have
276 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
made enough, or are tired of the arid life in a new and
essentially uninteresting country.
It is impossible to converse freely with all sorts and con¬
ditions of men upon the Rand without being struck by the
fact that very few regard it as containing the possibility of
a satisfactory home. Underneath a certain superficial effer¬
vescent enthusiasm, partly the glamour of gold and specula¬
tion, partly the riotous zest of a free licentious life in a
stimulating atmosphere, a profound dissatisfaction lurks.
No number of Britons will cast their lot permanently in
this bare land and build homes for posterity; they will
go there and live in luxury (though not in comfort) for
a term of years, if they are paid to do so, but they will
not stay. What is particularly true of the Transvaal
applies with considerable force to South Africa in general.
People go to South Africa to make money, whether as
capitalists or as workmen, when they have made it they
intend to come away and generally do so. It is a common
grievance, seriously impairing the economic prospects of
the country, that almost every African millionaire deserts
the land where he has made his wealth, settles in Europe
and drains Africa from a distance. The same is true of a
large proportion of the professional men and traders in
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban. The
men who have succeeded in making money in these places
generally return to England with their families. The
exceptions largely consist of men who have taken longer
than they thought to make their pile, or have failed to
make it; some of these, marrying out in the Colony, are
tied by the needs and expenses of a family, who can be
better launched in life out there than in the old country,
which all British South Africans speak of and regard as
" home." There are, of course, a certain number of well-
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 277
established British colonial families, but there is no
tendency for the number greatly to increase: the peculiar
enthusiasm for South Africa which is the staple factor
in Afrikander nationalism belongs chiefly to the Dutch
country folk and seldom to the English townsman, nor
is it likely that any new political condition or speedy
economic change will graft it upon any number of new¬
comers. Least of all is the British working-man who
migrates under the temptation of high wages likely to
make his abiding-place in a country where the econ¬
omic conditions are such as to give the virtual control of
his life and work into the hands of a small number of
international capitalists, in whose grip he will be helpless.
Even if there should be an industrial boom in South
Africa which will draw a large number of British workers,
they will not play the part required of them as a political
factor: they will be a fluctuating population, following the
changes of this most incalculable country, not fitting them¬
selves by residence or other fixed status for the duties and
privileges of sound citizenship, and possessing neither the
political capacity nor the moral right to rule the destinies
of a country which is not in any true sense " their own."
If we are guided in our judgment of the probable
economic development of South Africa by the known
and measurable facts of the past and present, instead
of lending an ear to the unfounded generalities and
the enticing speculations of financial or political pro¬
moters, we shall find no ground to suppose that a great
British immigration, either into the Transvaal or into
other regions of South Africa, is about to set in, which
will enable "British supremacy" to be achieved and
maintained by the process of giving equal rights and
privileges to all civilised men south of the Zambezi.
On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that
278 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the Dutch Afrikanders "will continue to outnumber the
British in any confederation of South African States,
and in the several States, with the exception of Natal
and the Transvaal, while in this last State the small
British majority which, though not hitherto existing,
may come into existence, will by its fluctuating character
and conflicting interests be unable to muster a steady
elective power which will meet the dogged and closely-
welded political organisation of the Boers.
APPENDIX
TAXATION ON NECESSARIES OF LIFE
The following table shows the comparative taxation of chief neces¬
saries of life in the South African Republic and Cape Colony.
The otherwise free list of the former is qualified by an ad valorem
duty of per cent., while a similar duty of 3 per cent, must be
added to the Cape Colony import duties. The result of this com¬
parison is to show a far more liberal tariff in the South African
Republic than in Cape Colony.
Cape Colony.
S. A. R.
a
s.
d.
£ s. d.
Tea, 100 lbs
2
10
0
050
Chicory, 100 lbs
0
16
8
076
Butter, per lb.
0
0
3
0 0 £
Cattle for slaughter (each)
1
10
0
Free.
Sheep and goats, ditto ....
0
S
0
Free.
Meats (preserved in any form, including )
Free.
ham, bacon, beef, and mutton), per lb. J
Meats (tinned and potted), per lb. .
0
0
2
Free.
Meat (frozen), per lb
0
0
2
Free.
Vegetables (preserved), per lb.
0
0
2
Free.
Lard, per lb. .....
0
0
2
Free.
Coffee beans, raw, 100 lbs.
Coffee beans, roasted, 100 lbs.
0
6
3
Free.
0
16
8
Free.
Cbeese, per lb..
0
0
3
Free.
Kaffir corn, 100 lbs
0
2
0
Free.
Wheat, 100 lbs. .....
0
2
0
Free.
Mealies, 100 lbs
0
2
0
Free.
Mealie meal, 100 lbs
0
4
6
Free.
Meal, wheaten, 100 lbs
0
4
6
Free.
Flour, 100 lbs.
0
4
6
Free.
CHAPTER IV
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA
In all parts of South Africa the native races, roughly
grouped under the generic title Kaffir, comprise the over¬
whelming majority of the population, and if the principle
of the greatest good of the greatest number is to prevail in
South Africa, their claims should be paramount. Though
no exact figures are available, except in the Colonies, the
natives seem to be about three times as numerous as
the whites in Cape Colony and the Transvaal, twice as
numerous in the Free State, ten times as numerous
in Natal, while in Rhodesia, Portuguese territory, and
other British and German protectorates, the propor¬
tion is much larger. While the total white population
south of the Zambezi cannot much exceed 800,000, the
blacks probably muster nearly 8,000,000. Probably three-
quarters of these live in tribes under the direct rule of
chiefs, many of them untouched by European influence,
though others, like the Zulus, Basutos, and Bechuanas,
are subjected to some slight control through white
magistrates and native commissioners. Even in the
Colonies hundreds of thousands live the old tribal life
in locations especially assigned to them.
Not only is this Bantu population very large, it is grow¬
ing more rapidly than the white population, owing to the
restraints put upon tribal wars, execution for witchcraft,
and the decimating influence of famines. Dr, Theal gives
279
280 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
a large amount of evidence to show that the birth-rate is
far higher among the natives than among the whites, and
that in health and duration of life the superiority also lies
with the native, and his general judgment is thus sum¬
marised : " A comparison between the number of people
of that (the Bantu) race south of the Limpopo half-a-
century ago and to-day is somewhat startling, for it reveals
the fact that the increase by natural means is without
parallel elsewhere." 1
Some of these races are redoubtable warriors, armed
like the Basuto, and to some extent the Zulu, with " civi¬
lised " weapons; others, like the Matabili and the Tongas,
are still in a condition of crudest savagery. All of them
are ignorant of the real power of their white neighbours,
and few, if any, are reconciled to the restraints placed
upon them and the invasions their territories have under¬
gone. The native mind is dimly explored even by
Europeans brought into the closest contact with it; the
fiercer tribes are notoriously capricious, and subject to
incalculable suspicions and gusts of passion. The dread
of some large instinctively-concerted native rising, which
should even comprise many of the tame industrial Kaffirs,
is no idle fear, but one which every thoughtful statesman
or soldier in South Africa has always had to keep before
him. Whatever other issue of the present war there be,
it is certain to leave behind it a highly dangerous dis¬
turbance of the native mind. Those best acquainted with
peoples like the Zulus, Basutos, or Matabili, are aware
that fear, not love or reverence, has been the chief factor
in their submission, and the sight of their white masters
fallen out and massacring one another is a most serious
strain upon their nature. If the present conflict is con-
1 Theal, "History of South Africa," vol. iv. p. 403.
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 281
eluded without a native rising the danger will still con¬
tinue, for no one save an ignoramus believes that any
other than a surface settlement is possible between Dutch
and British for at least a generation. The prospect is
indeed a dark one. Hitherto the two white races, however
they might bicker among themselves, readily united to
present a single front against the Kaffirs, and the moral
influence of this race-harmony was even more potent in
repressing native agitation than actual co-operation. The
sudden, complete break-up of this harmony into a fierce,
palpable, and lasting discord is nothing less than an up¬
heaval of the very foundations of white civilisation in
South Africa. If all the grievances of Transvaal mis-
government had been what they were described as being,
nay, had the great pan-Dutch conspiracy itself been a
reality, a policy entailing such grave consequences upon
the fortunes of South Africa as this present war would
have been too expensive and too hazardous.
But, it may be said, the establishment once for all of
the British supremacy throughout South Africa will place
the native question on a new and a safer footing. " The
unrest, suspicions, and hostility of the natives have arisen
chiefly from the oppressive and cruel treatment by the
Boers, who have continually harried them by invasions,
stolen their land, maltreated them as slaves or servants,
denied them religious education and the rights of citizens.
British rule will alter all this, and will secure them justice
and protection for their lives and property, together with
educational and other means of attaining civilisation."
This is the theory widely accepted in England just
now, and there are many who are genuinely persuaded
that one motive which justifies and purifies this war is
that it will afford protection and benefit to the native
282 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
races. Bold comparisons have been set forth by mission¬
aries and politicians of the different treatment accorded
respectively by English and Dutch colonists, and of the
feelings entertained in return by the natives.
Now in the first place the truth has always been
obscured by a long-standing feud between English
missionaries and Dutch farmers. From the early decades
of this century the missionaries, who were the only
Englishmen closely concerning themselves with the affairs
of natives, set themselves to denounce to the British
Government and the British public the treatment accorded
the natives by the Dutch. Many of the tales they told
were true and merited the reprobation they received; the
back-country farmer, usually a Dutchman, has sometimes
displayed gross injustice and brutality towards the Kaffirs
on his farm, groups of frontier farmers not infrequently
planned raids upon desirable Kaffir lands, and both col¬
lectively and individually manifested a total disregard
for black men's rights. But, as more discreet historians
admit, the sympathy and the credulity of missionaries often
outran their judgment, and many of the charges which
they brought were unfounded or grossly exaggerated.1
What chiefly fanned the feud, however, was the political
uses made of this humanitarian crusade to prevent the
Dutch farmers from defending themselves against Kaffir
incursions, and to restrain them from the encroachments
which they wished to make upon the lands of savages.
The emancipation of slaves, which was one of the im¬
mediate causes of the Great Trek, helped to fasten this
policy upon the Imperial Government, and in all treaties
with the Republics and enactments for government of
1 Upon this point compare the eminently impartial work of Mr. Oloete,
"The Great Boer Trek,"
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 283
Protectorates the provision of protection for natives has
figured conspicuously.
All this, it may be said, surely proves that we are
animated by praiseworthy sentiments of freedom and
justice, and that the Imperial paramountcy in South
Africa will win the gratitude and affection of the native
races. And it may fairly be admitted that so far as
governmental power in the administration of native affairs
actually emanates from Downing Street, and from the
representatives of the Imperial power in South Africa,
consideration and humanity characterise the policy.
But what is not sufficiently understood in England
is the fact that this humane policy, commonly styled
" Exeter Hall," is denounced and repudiated quite as
vehemently by the great majority of British colonists
as by the Dutch. The " missionary," I might add the
essentially Christian, view of the native, as a man and
a brother with a soul and body of his own and a right
to determine his own destiny, is no more popular among
the British than among the Dutch of South Africa. I
do not say there is no difference between the Dutch and
British view. The former for the most part frankly
regard the natives as animals which they have a right
to use for their benefit as they use a horse or cow: if they
are kindly persons they treat them well, if brutal they
treat them ill. It hardly occurs to them that they are
concerned with persons who have a right of freedom or
of property: the traditions of slavery drawn from their
ancestors still survive in various ways, and the notion
that a Kaffir has a right to demand wages finds reluctant
harbourage in many of their breasts. The British, for the
most part new-comers, accustomed to social grades but not
to slavery, simply look upon the Kaffir as a low type of
284 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
humanity: they have no more reluctance than the Dutch
in setting him to labour for their benefit, but they dis¬
tinguish him a little from the rest of the animal kingdom.
So far as actual treatment is concerned, there can be little
doubt that the average Briton is less given to cheating
and physically maltreating Kaffirs whom he employs than
the average Dutchman. But that cannot altogether be
accounted unto him for righteousness. Britons are chiefly
dwellers in towns, where public opinion has some restrain¬
ing influence and where the practical liberty of blacks is
necessarily greater; the life of the Boer farmer from its
isolation makes for brutality, and his power over his
black servants is well nigh absolute. If we are to make
a fair comparison, it must take British and Dutch in the
same environment, and such comparison is very difficult.
I have been often told that Kaffirs would sooner work
for English than for Dutch farmers, because the former
O J
treated them more kindly and they were surer of their
wages; but my informants were always British, and Dutch¬
men told me quite another story, insisting that the Dutch¬
man got on better with the Kaffir because he understood
more of his ways from long experience, and could handle
him more intelligently.
Again, a comparison is often made between the
position of Kaffirs in Cape Colony, where they can own
land, move about freely, enjoy some opportunities of
education, and hold a franchise on equal terms with
whites, and the Transvaal, where they may not own land,
cannot move without a permit, cannot buy liquor, and are
destitute of political rights. But nothing can be more
fallacious than such comparison as a test of race feeling.
No one acquainted with the views of the Outlanders will
suggest that, if the political power in the Transvaal passes
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 285
into their hands, they will use it to liberate the Kaffirs
from the restrictions imposed upon them now. On the
contrary, we have heard from the mouths of representative
men their real intentions, viz., to tighten the lax adminis¬
tration of those very laws which discriminate blacks from
whites, and to introduce a new system of taxation which
shall have the effect of " forcing labour."
I have tried to compare the Dutch and the British
treatment in general terms. But if we are to assess the
claims of our present crusade for the liberation and eleva¬
tion of the Kaffirs, we must rather compare with the old
tyranny of the Boer farmer the new tyranny of the mining
capitalist. I will not call him British, for he is generally
not. What this new tyranny is like to be has been
sufficiently expounded on its economic side in a recent
chapter: the Kaffir with his family is to be placed in a
position in which he cannot refuse his labour, and that
of his family, for whatever wages the mines choose to offer.
This is the very core of the native question from the
standpoint of the South African capitalist. Mr. Fitz-
patrick's position on the matter is thoroughly representa¬
tive. " It is one upon which there is a great divergence
of views between the people of Europe and the people of
South Africa. South Africans believe that they view
it from the rational standpoint, they believe also that
Europeans, as a rule, view it more from the sentimental.
The people who form their opinions from the writings and
reports of missionaries only, or who have in their mind's
eye the picturesque savage in his war apparel as seen
at Earl's Court, or the idealised savage of the novelist,
cannot possibly understand the real native. The writer
holds South African views upon the native question, that
is to say, that the natives are, to all intents and purposes,
286 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
a race of children, and should be treated as such, with
strict justice and absolute fidelity to promises, whether
it be of punishment or reward; a simple consistent policy
which the native mind can grasp and will consequently
respect." 1
We know what this talk about "children" means.
One of our own minor poets, writing of the Boers, says
they are "little children," and amiably suggests that
" Some little children must be whipped with fire." The
South African notion is that a race of children should
be set to toil for the profit of their parents, instead of
being educated for an independent manhood. This notion
is to be found sometimes in England too. It is the view
of some Lancashire parents, who are satisfied to send their
offspring to the mills, instead of keeping them at school,
that they may live in idleness on the wages of the young
half-timers.
Let the friends of humanity who approve this war
take due note of this " rational standpoint" and this
" simple consistent policy."
" Dreams of empire," the whole mission of civilisation,
when submitted to the practical test, shrivel up into this
very meagre sordid reality. "We have all got to think
over the proposition why the English labourer works at
the rate of twelve shillings a week, why the Indian works
at twopence a day, and why we pay, including food, £4 a
month. . . . And if you ask me for a big foreign policy,
it is the question whether we can bring these natives to
understand the dignity of labour, and whether we can
make arrangements with neighbouring States to co-operate
in bringing that about."2
1 "The Transvaal from Within," p. 328.
2 Mr. Rhodes at Cape Town, as reported by the Cape Times, 29th
October 1894.
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 287
Friends of humanity who favour this war because it
will release the native from the tyranny of the Dutch
farmer and make him a cheap miner, may be invited to
reflect upon the working life of these black miners,
huddled together in compounds, without their women-
kind, and either subjected to despotic and degrading re¬
strictions on their liberty, or else exposed to the full
temptations of all the vices of European civilisation.
Apart from the floggings and other brutal ill-treatment
in the mines, of which we have official evidence,11 have
found a virtual unanimity among missionaries and native
commissioners as to the demoralising influence which life
at the mines, particularly in the Transvaal, is exercising
upon native life. The habit of strong drink, which few,
if any, Kaffirs can resist, is first contracted at the mines,
and is then introduced into the tribal and domestic life.
It is true that the mines are generally in favour of a
prohibition policy, and are strong opponents of the de¬
moralising liquor traffic which robs them of twenty per
cent, of the working time of the " boys." But it is prac¬
tically impossible to keep down a trade so profitable as
the liquor trade, over an area so large as that of the Rand.
In spite of well-attested endeavours to enforce the law
prohibiting the sale of liquor to Kaffirs, drunkenness
has been widely prevalent, and will continue. There is
something almost humorous in the anxiety betrayed by
mine owners for the " morals" of the boys. Listening to
their language one might sometimes imagine that philan¬
thropy was a branch of the mining industry, until one is
rudely recalled to sober fact by some such remark as that
made by Mr. Way, a mine manager, at a recent meeting
1 See Annual Report, Chamber of Mines, 1899, pp. 92, 94; also Blue-
book of Native Affairs (Cape Colony), 1899, p. 34.
288 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
of the Chamber, who "mentioned as a striking instance"
(of the evil of the liquor traffic) " that last Sunday, out of
950 boys, he had only 250 at work." Even worse are the
effects of sexual vice. In the Cape Blue-books we find
sandwiched in pages of dry statistics such statements
as this: "Many cases of syphilis are introduced from
Johannesburg and Kimberley."1
The following testimony to our attempts to civilise
the native and teach him the dignity of labour deserves
attention, coming, as it does, from a resident magistrate
who has devoted many years to a sympathetic study of
native questions. In reporting the condition of the
natives in the district of Nqamakwe, Mr. Scully writes:
" On the one hand, we are able to record a satisfactory
advance in the direction of education and church build¬
ing ; on the other, a deplorable demoralisation on the
part of the young men, who go out to work in large
numbers, and return from the mines 'brutish in their
knowledge.'" " The state of health of the natives cannot
be looked on as satisfactory. Phthisis is steadily in¬
creasing among them. There can be no doubt whatever
that this is largely due to the adoption of European
clothing, which is eminently unsuited to people living in
structures such as the native hut; brandy-drinking; the
contrast between life as lived by the men at home and
at the mines when they go to work — all these are
having their inevitable effect upon the native physique.
Rheumatism is becoming more and more prevalent.
Among children pulmonary diseases carry off a large
number, and leave many permanently weakened. I regret
having to report, having reason to believe that syphilis
has taken hold of the people, and that it is gradually
1 Blue-book, G. 31, 1899, p. 76.
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 289
increasing. It is estimated that probably three per cent,
of tlie local natives are syphilitic in some form."1
Those who are persuaded that in breaking up the
natural Kaffir life, in teaching them regular habits of
labour, and in instilling into them new wants and habits
which British trade can profitably satisfy, we are carrying
on a crusade of humanity and civilisation, may be invited
to ponder this evidence.
But it may be said, " All this is no doubt deplorable,
but the evils you describe are chiefly due to abuses of
capitalist power, which the Imperial control will set itself
to check. Neither the mine owner nor the ordinary
coarse-minded colonist is going to have his way with the
native. England is going to be the protector and the
elevator of these lower races; she is going to secure for
them the benefits of religion and education, and to give
them in good time that full measure of civil and political
rights which is essential to the civilisation of every
people."
This is a sound and generous theory; but, unfor¬
tunately, it cannot be embodied in practice. No amiable
regulation from Downing Street can secure the practice
of a policy opposed to the inclinations and convictions of
the overwhelming majority of the British and Dutch
Afrikander populations.
Both white races are strongly opposed to the libera¬
tion and elevation of the native, and the British are no
more likely to lend their aid to carry out an Exeter Hall
policy than the Dutch. It is true that a vigorous educa¬
tional movement has been permitted among the Cape
Kaffirs, that Christian missions have been encouraged,
and that an increasing number of Kaffirs have been
1 Blue-book, G. 42, 1848, p. 82.
T
29o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
allowed to acquire and exercise the franchise. Here and
there I have found a man who believed in the intelligence
and educability of the Kaffir races, and who believed
that they ought to have free scope in the future of South
Africa. Among this small minority are some men of
high distinction in the Colony, such as Mr. Rose Innes
and Mr. Solomon. But the vast majority set aside as
utterly abnormal the instance of the Fingo statesman
Jabavo and the handful of other natives educated at
Loveday College, and deny alike the right and the capa¬
city of Kaffirs to place themselves on a footing of equality
with whites.
There is a virtual unanimity among white South
Africans that the natives must be kept down; nine-tenths
of the British colonists with whom I conversed regarded
the Kaffir franchise as an anomaly which would have
to be removed if it became a really potent factor at
elections and Kaffirs showed any capacity for political
organisation on a race basis.
Even the bestowal of elementary education is con¬
sidered dangerous by most, and Christianisation is only
favoured or condoned so long as the management of
native churches is entirely in European hands. The grow¬
ing determination of the natives to manage their own con¬
gregation, and the establishment of a vigorous Ethiopian
Church, is regarded by most colonists as a dangerous
symptom of rebellion. Let me quote upon this point
the testimony of Mr. Rhodes, given so long as five years
ago: " When he was travelling in the Transkei he found
some excellent schools, but they were teaching the people
Latin and Greek, and turning out a peculiar class of
human being, the Kaffir parson—(laughter). Now the
Kaffir parson was a most excellent type of individual, but
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 291
he belonged to a class that was overdone. They were
being turned out by the dozen, were wearing the black
coat and white tie, and the consequence was that, in the
absence of suitable openings for them, they were be¬
coming agitators, beginning to say the Government was
wrong and that the people were oppressed, and, in a
word, bade fair to become a dangerous class."1
Educated niggers are no more popular with the
British in South Africa than they are with the British
in India; there is not, either among the British or the
Dutch, any real growth of liberal feeling upon native
questions. The existence of a Kaffir vote in Cape
Colony is likely to prove a serious obstacle in any scheme
of federal government based on elective institutions. The
British majority in Natal will no more dream of allow¬
ing political power to niggers than the Dutch majority in
the Transvaal or the Free State.
Let no one deceive himself. This strong deep-rooted
general sentiment of inequality cannot be over-ridden
by Imperial edict. Any attempt to secure real sub¬
stantial equality of rights for the natives of South
Africa will involve us in hostility with British and
Dutch alike, and indeed furnishes the not improbable
bond of future union of the now disrupted races which
will eventually sever South Africa from the control of
Great Britain.
This opposition to the education and elevation of the
natives is based only in part upon fears lest a power,
either constitutional or political, should be formed, which
would threaten the political supremacy and endanger
the persons of the whites. It stands chiefly upon a
solid economic sentiment which, though seldom expressed,
1 Cape Times, July 27, 1894.
292 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
is everywhere operative. The white races form a per¬
manent economic aristocracy; no hard manual work is
done by whites. Not that the climate disables white
men from manual work: excepting in parts of Natal,
white men can stand field work even in the summer
and can labour at other manual employment without
injuring themselves, though there is reason to believe
they cannot work so hard or so long as in Europe. The
presence of large supplies of available Kaffirs has simply
converted the entire white population into a parasitic
class living upon black labour by methods which resolve
themselves, when properly considered, into " force."
This statement will only appear exaggerated to those
unversed in the interplay between the political and
economic arts whereby the operation of rudimentary
physical compulsion is concealed. Some of the crude
forms of this interplay have occasionally emerged in the
shape of labour taxes, indenture, Glen Grey Acts. But
the entire system of South African society stands upon
various modes of coercing Kaffirs into working for the
benefit of whites, by invading their territories, goading
them to reprisals, depriving them of their land and
cattle, breaking down their tribal system, tempting them
by strong drink and guns, and in one way or another
placing them in such a position of political and econ¬
omic weakness that they are unable to refuse wage work
upon terms offered by white masters.
Hardly any white South African seriously believes
that any essential change in these economic relations
between white and black races is possible or desirable.
Virtually all, British and Dutch alike, acquiesce in what
is to all intents and purposes a serf-civilisation. The
aspirations of justice and liberty for lower races which
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 293
genuinely inspire many Englishmen, have no echo among
white South Africans. The genuine believers in the
progressive future of the Kaffir races in South Africa
are a mere handful of men looked upon as " faddists,"
not dangerous because they are so few and so impotent
for serious action. Do not mistake me. Large numbers
of South Africans believe in what they call a just and
humane treatment of the natives, but what they mean
is the kindly treatment of permanent inferiors, children
who can never grow up, and with whom a firm considerate
coercion takes the place of genuine education.
We must look forward to a continuance of the pre¬
sent absolute social cleavage between blacks and whites,
and to the maintenance of existing divisions of economic
functions. Manual work has become a badge of shame
for white men, because it puts them on a level with
the Kaffir: wherever working conditions are such that
white must co-operate with black, the former is soon
seen to have shifted what is arduous, monotonous, or
disagreeable on to the back of the latter, and to have
made a "servant" of him. Some skilled manual labour
in mining, building, or manufacturing trades is done by
whites, but all told it amounts to very little, and most
of it which lies outside the range of Zulus, Fingoes, and
other more educable Kaffirs, is shifted on to Cape boys
and other " coloured" or half-breed men. Mr. Bryce
well summarises what he found : " The artisans who
to-day come from Europe adopt the habits of the
country in a few weeks or months. The English car¬
penter hires a native £ boy' to carry his bag of tools
for him; the English bricklayer has a native hodman
to hand the bricks to him which he proceeds to set;
the Cornish or Australian miner directs the excavation
294 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
of the seam and fixes the fuse which explodes the
dynamite, but the work with the pick-axe is done by
the Kaffir. The herdsmen who drive the cattle or tend
the sheep are Kaffirs, acting under the orders of a
white." 1
The fact is, that South Africa is not in any
true sense a white man's country, for though white
men live they do not work there save in the capacity
of overseers of serf-labour. No satisfactory civilisation
can possibly arise where two races live together without
blending, one superior in cerebral development and using
this superiority to impose all the burden of directly
productive labour upon the other, while it despises this
inferiority. This essentially parasitic life visibly impairs
the moral fibre of thejwhite peoples, and inevitably tends to
the mental and even physical degeneracy which develops
in all slave-owning communities.
Neither in mental attitude nor in practice does much
real difference exist between British and Dutch in the
treatment of the native: if the vicious habits I have
described seem more crudely prominent among the Dutch,
it is because they are from longer residence more firmly
rooted in these oppressive habits, and by incessant and
more dangerous collision with native tribes have taken
on more of their savagery. The recent history of Rho¬
desia is enough to show, if such new testimony be wanted,
that Englishmen are only too liable to the same tempta¬
tions. Let those who think this war will issue in benefit
to African natives remember that its first and most tan¬
gible result will be to place large new tracts of Africa
north of the Zambezi and along the East Coast under the
exploitation for purposes of " cheap labour " of the very
1 "Impressions of South Africa," chap. xxi.
THE NATIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA 295
men who have so plainly violated the sacred trust of civili¬
sation in Rhodesia.
Let us get rid at all hazards of the cant about a
righteous war for redress of native grievances. This war
may procure for us more gold and more cheap labour, but
there is not much likelihood that it will issue even inci¬
dentally in any gain to natives. No betterment of native
treatment can in the nature of the case be imposed upon
South Africa from Downing Street: a matter of such
intimate detailed internal policy must always remain in
the hands of South Africans. Dutch and British South
Africans do not widely differ in the view of native ques¬
tions, and if they did the British could not practically
control the Dutch, whose social and economic relations
with the natives over most parts of the country are far
closer. In so far as the future of the British in South
Africa is linked with the exploitation of mines, there is,
unfortunately, at present little reason to believe that the
kind of man who will control this industry, and the profit¬
able ends he has in view, will in any way contribute
to that elevation of the native races which we profess to
have at heart.
CHAPTER V
FEDERATION OF STATES
If Great Britain succeeds in breaking the military power
of the Boer Republics, two related questions will arise, one
having reference to the treatment of the conquered terri¬
tories, the other to the federation of States in South Africa.
Upon the latter and larger matter history has something
to say, for " federation " is no new term in South African
affairs.
In 1859 the greatest of our proconsuls in South Africa,
Sir George Grey, proposed to the Home Government a
scheme whereby the legislatures of Cape Colony, Natal,
and the Orange Free State should be empowered to form
" a federal union embracing Kaffraria within their limits,
and with authority to adopt into the Union, then or there¬
after, all States which might wish to join them, including
Native States, with large powers of self-government."1
In a series of despatches he opened up the subject fully,
and suggested the inclusion in such a Union not only of
the Free State but of the Transvaal. So far. as the Free
State was concerned there was no slight reason to believe
that she might acquiesce in such a scheme. The burghers
were divided at this time, some in favour of federation
with the Colony, others in favour of federation with the
South African Republic. If a scheme could have been
devised acceptable to the latter State, no difficulty with the
1 " Life and Times of Sir George Grey," p. 281.
296
FEDERATION OF STATES 297
Free State was to be anticipated. Even apart from any
general scheme of union, President Bishof and a powerful
section of the Free Staters openly advocated a federation
with the Colony.
The broad statesmanlike principles which animated
Sir George Grey's proposals are thus stated in the
address made by him at the meeting of the Colonial
Parliament in 1859: "You would, in my belief, confer
a lasting benefit upon Great Britain, and upon the in¬
habitants of this country, if you could succeed in devising
a form of federal union under which the several pro¬
vinces composing it should have full and free scope of
action left to them, through their own local governments
and legislatures, upon all subjects relating to their indi¬
vidual prosperity or happiness; whilst they should act
under a general federal government in relation to all
points which concern the general safety or weal."
Although Sir George believed that he was acting in
accordance with the wishes of the Imperial Government,
he was rebuked for bringing the matter before the Cape
Parliament, and was recalled from his post. Sir George
Grey was the first great federationist in the British
Empire, and it is desirable to mark clearly the two great
principles upon which he proceeded.
The first may be thus stated in the language of his
biographer: "His ideas concerning federation were not
exactly similar to those expressed by many of the leading
statesmen of Australasia. He did not believe in a hard
and fast union, regulated by law, between States dissimilar
in character, separated by great distances, and existing
under different climates and conditions. He rather
favoured a loose federation, wliich should leave each
portion of the federated States free to work out its
298 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
own destiny, and should yet enable all to join together
for any great purpose; and so, in any crisis or sudden
exigence, give to the whole that strength and solidity
which springs from union."1 In other words, it was a
scheme of federal home rule which Sir George Grey
proposed, that would easily admit widest diversity of
forms of government in the several federated States. The
other vital principle is illustrated by the language of his
address to the Cape Parliament. Federation must come
on the initiative, or, at all events, with the free con¬
sent and goodwill of the federating units. He does not
ask the Imperial Government to devise a scheme, and
then attempt to impose it on the Parliaments and Raads
of South Africa, but he takes the favourable resolutions
of the Free State Raad, and bringing them before the
notice of the Colonial Parliament, invites the latter to
"devise a scheme of federal union." Sir George Grey,
though both an imperialist and a federationist, was far
too wise to attempt to bring about federation by imperial
pressure. Home Rule, not Imperialism, was to be the
directing force in the affairs of South Africa. This was
likewise the view of Lord Rosmead, so vigorously ex¬
pressed in the speech in which he took leave of South
Africa in 1889: "There are three competing influences at
work in South Africa. They are Colonialism, Republi¬
canism, and Imperialism. As to the last, it is a diminish¬
ing quantity, there being now no longer any permanent
place in the future of South Africa for direct, imperial
rule on any large scale. With responsible government in
the Cape, with Natal soon likely to attain that status, with
the independent Republics of the Orange Free State and
the Transvaal, and with Germany on the west coast and
1 " Life and Times of Sir George Grey," p. 327.
FEDERATION OF STATES 299
Portugal on the east, the idea of the permanent presence
of the imperial factor in the interior—of a South African
India in the Kalahari—is simply an absurdity."
It is in complete accordance with the unfortunate
history of the relations between Downing Street and
South Africa that, some years after, having refused federa¬
tion when it was proposed by the right man, with the right
method, and at a specially favourable conjuncture of cir¬
cumstances, the Imperial Government should have at¬
tempted to enforce it in South Africa by the wrong men,
the wrong methods, in the teeth of circumstances. Yet
such was the case. When Lord Carnarvon, in 1875,
devised a new scheme of confederation on his own
account, and sent Mr. J. A. Froude to urge it on the
Governments and people of South Africa, he had little
reason to anticipate a favourable reception.
Not merely the chief sufferer, the Orange Free State,
but the entire Boer population had been recently ex¬
asperated by the injustice of the annexation of the
Diamond Fields of Griqualand West: the Transvaal,
though severely pressed by native hostility and financial
straits, was in no mood to seek a British alliance, and
the Cape Colonists were affronted at the suggestion of
foisting upon them a cut-and-dried scheme of federation.
Resolutions were carried in the Cape Parliament con¬
demning the Colonial Secretary and his despatch, and
the presence of Mr. Froude with his personal explana¬
tions entirely failed to win over the recalcitrant people.
The opposition was not a distinctively Dutch one, for
large numbers of British Afrikanders were quite as out¬
spoken in their opposition to the scheme.
Mr. Froude, learning from experience the folly of
endeavouring to force on such a measure, reported to
3oo THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the Home Government in favour of patience and con¬
ciliation, and advised the calling of a conference, which
was held in London in August 1876, attended by repre¬
sentatives from the South African States, under the presi¬
dency of Sir Garnet Wolseley. Two courses were open
to Lord Carnarvon: one was to adopt the conciliatory
course urged by Mr. Froude, and to use the unrivalled
gifts and experience of Sir George Grey to get it carried
out; the other, to take personal charge, to appoint a
governor and other officers imbued with a strong coer¬
cive spirit, and to force confederation at all hazards
upon the States of South Africa. Unfortunately native
perversity and ill advice impelled him to choose the
latter course. Sir Bartle Frere was sent out in 1877
to school the Cape Colonists into submission, while Mr.
Shepstone had been despatched in the previous year with
a Special Commission, giving him power and authority
to annex any territories adjoining the British Colonies,
provided he were "satisfied that a sufficient number of
the inhabitants desired to become our subjects." The
extraordinary character of this Commission has never
been fully realised. It meant simply this, that not only
the Transvaal, but the Free State, the Portuguese terri¬
tory, and any neighbouring native territories might be
annexed at the absolute discretion of Mr. Shepstone.
Add to this that the Commission was a secret one, and
the climax of impolicy is reached.
The entire career of Sir Bartle Frere is a lesson
in the folly of attempting to force an Imperial policy
upon South Africa. Sent out as an avowed Imperialist
to drive the Colony along a course it did not choose
to take, Sir Bartle Frere soon found himself in open
hostility to his Cape Ministry. The Ministry, strongly
FEDERATION OF STATES 301
opposed to federation, naturally resented all attempts to
assert the Imperial authority, and were dismissed by the
Governor in consequence of their objection to assign the
supreme control of the troops engaged in border warfare
to the Imperial military authorities. One member of
the Molteno Ministry thus dismissed, Mr. J. X. Merriman,
is a member of the present Cape Ministry. The im¬
mediate appeal of Sir Bartle Frere to the voice of the
colonists was successful upon the point in issue, and a
substantial majority of the new House approved the
action of the Governor. But this triumph was short¬
lived and entirely fruitless. The discreditable and dis¬
astrous Zulu War, culminating in the catastrophe of
Isandhlwana, and involving the early supersession of Sir
Bartle Frere, was one source of failure, not merely by
discrediting in England the whole policy of Lord Car¬
narvon and his nominee, but by impressing upon British
colonists, as well as Dutch, the grave dangers of the
pushful Imperialism. But the collapse of the federation
design was chiefly and directly due to the treacherous
annexation of the Transvaal, which was intended as a
signal step in the consummation of the policy. The
visible injustice and oppression of this act destroyed
altogether the amicable basis upon which Sir George
Grey relied, and substituted one of naked force. The
appeal made by the Transvaal burghers to their kins¬
men of the Colony soon broke the popularity of Sir
Gordon Sprigg's Ministry, and in the Parliamentary
Session of 1880 the proposal of confederation was defi¬
nitely rejected by the House, and thus disappeared
from the stage of practical politics in South Africa. As
a plank in the platform of the new Imperialism of Lord
Beaconsfield's Government, it was swept away in the
302 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
flood of unpopularity which overwhelmed the Conserva¬
tive party in the elections of 1880.
Although no formal step towards political federation
of the States of South Africa has taken place since 1880,
there have been definite advances towards a business
co-operation for certain specific purposes. The most
important of these is the Customs Union. The Union
Tariff was brought into force in Cape Colony by Act of
Parliament in 1889, and was adopted later in the same
year by the Free State. Any civilised State of South
Africa may be admitted to the Union at six months'
notice after a formal request made to the Governor of the
Colony. British Bechuanaland thus became a member in
January 1891, Basutoland in July of the same year, and
the Bechuanaland Protectorate in July 1893. In 1898
Natal, hitherto recalcitrant and preferring to run a lower
tariff of her own, entered the Union, which now only
required the adhesion of the Transvaal to give it com¬
pleteness.
Co-operation in the establishment and working of
railway communication, though far less advanced and
attended by much friction and dissension, must never¬
theless be looked upon as a practical piece of federation.
Though there is no common ownership of lines and rolling
stock and no common management, since the Free State
withdrew the control of its railways from the Colony
after the Raid, there is such amicable co-operation
between the different systems' as is represented by the
use of one another's rolling stock and arrangements for
booking through. That we can buy a ticket for Johannes¬
burg at Cape Town, or at Pretoria for Durban or Delagoa
Bay, and can travel without changing carriages, is a very
real and serviceable piece of federation.
FEDERATION OF STATES 303
It is along these lines of practical economic and social
convenience, based upon felt union of interests, that sound
spontaneous federation naturally moves. The folly of
endeavouring to cast the forms of political federation
before these natural bonds of common interest have be¬
come sufficiently numerous and closely set, ought to be
one of the most obvious lessons of history.
Outside the community of interests represented by
a Customs Union, a federal system of railways, and a
common postal and telegraphic system, there are doubtless
many other forces making for federation of States in
South Africa. Too much, perhaps, is made of the uni¬
formity of physical conditions and the absence of strongly
marked natural boundaries of States. So also the present
identity of economic interests, as indicated by the common
dependency of all the States upon the resources and the
requirements of the Rand, cannot be regarded as a factor
of such permanent importance as to control an Imperial
policy of federation. But the community of race and
language, the fluidity not merely of the industrial but of
the agricultural population in South Africa, their wide
severance from other civilised white communities and
their common liability to certain contingencies of internal
disturbances or external attacks, certainly supply a basis
of effective political co-operation.
It seems an idle platitude to point out that federal
constitutions cannot be manufactured, but must grow by
voluntary action based upon a recognition of common
interests. That the community of real interests will in
the long run prove adequate to furnish a federal con¬
stitution in South Africa seems certain: that the time
is yet ripe is far from certain. What has hitherto im¬
peded this natural growth ? Chiefly political jealousies
3o4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
and suspicions between States and races. Has the current
of recent events served to increase or to abate these
jealousies and suspicions ? There can unfortunately be
no hesitation in answering this question. The tenor of
events from 1895 to the present moment has been a
constant stream of separatist influence among States and
races.
The formal antagonism between the Republics and the
British territories in South Africa has been visibly growing
during the last four years; the Free State in particular
has been alienated from her close Colonial relations and
has been driven into a hostile camp. The Governments
and the peoples of Cape Colony and Natal are farther
out of sympathy than they have ever been. Underneath
these divisions, and worse than them, is the fatal growth
of a race antagonism exasperated by the present bloody
conflict which, under the most favourable conditions of
" settlement," will render any sincere co-operation impos¬
sible for generations between those parts of South Africa
which are dominated by a Dutch Afrikander population
and those which are of British race and sympathy. As
a sequel of successful war a scheme of formal federation
may be forced upon South Africa, but the forcing process
in itself must nullify all possibility of successful operation.
I do not merely allude to the feelings of the population
of the conquered provinces. But I would put to those
who look to federation of South Africa as a worthy and
profitable result of our present enterprise these ques¬
tions : " Does the past history of Cape Colony justify us
in believing that her population, the majority of whom
resent bitterly the policy of the present war, will consent
at the present juncture to abrogate their rights as a
self-governing colony and to receive from the hands of
FEDERATION OF STATES 305
Mr. Chamberlain at Downing Street a scheme of federa¬
tion which is avowedly designed to establish a British
Imperial control over South Africa by diminishing the
independent action of the majority of the electors of Cape
Colony? Will the Cape Colonists, with the last twenty
years' experience in mind, and goaded almost to frenzy
by the injury and insults of this strife, consent in 1900
to adopt a scheme of federation which they refused in
1880?" Such a scheme can only be forced upon South
Africa by some signal abrogation of the rights of free
self-government in Cape Colony, an abrogation which
would be received with present applause by the party
defeated at the polls last year, but which would, by
loosening the very foundation of confidence in British
rule, introduce as a permanent factor in colonial politics
that racial disloyalty which, in spite of false accusations,
has never existed in the past, and which would by its
disintegrating influence destroy the reality of any fede¬
ration.
Federation of States in South Africa, as elsewhere,
must be of spontaneous internal origin, and must be based
upon the clear recognition of a community of interests
and feelings, what is called a " union of hearts." Where
and when this condition is lacking, no real federation is
possible. A scheme of federation imposed as a result of
military conquest cannot endure; coming into being by
the sword, it will either perish by the sword or collapse
from internal impotence.
U
CHAPTER VI
the true line of british policy
The large space given in this volume to tlie causes and
antecedent circumstances of the war is due to the neces¬
sity of breaking down a most dangerous fallacy which
has obsessed the public mind, that once embarked upon
the struggle it is idle to consider causes, and that even
when the time comes for settlement, justice and expedi¬
ency can be projected upon a future policy which need
not closely scrutinise the past. The intellectual anarchy
implied in this catastrophic view is one of the most
signally injurious results of popular passion blinding a
nation.
Hardly less instructive, however, are the crude notions
about the future of South Africa expressed by not a few
of our responsible political leaders. I may for convenience
paraphrase their view as follows: " After the war has been
brought to a successful close by the capture of Pretoria
and Bloemfontein, British supremacy will be firmly estab¬
lished in the Transvaal and the Free State; the Boers,
recognising they are fairly beaten, will respect the power
of Great Britain, and, after the first soreness has passed
away, will settle down in amicable relations with the Out-
landers and the British officials, acknowledging the superior
justice, purity, and efficiency of British rule; after a
brief interregnum of military control, equal rights will be
accorded to all whites, the proportion of the British popu-
306
THE TRUE LINE OF BRITISH POLICY 307
lation enabling them to exercise effective control over tlie
internal policy of the States; while a federation of South
African States will establish once for all the absolute
supremacy of Great Britain south of the Zambezi, impose
a uniform and superior government over the whole
country, and secure humane treatment for the native
races, educating them to take a proper place in the future
civilisation of South Africa."
Now, if the facts recorded in the chapters of this
volume are substantially correct, this view of a coming
settlement is dangerously and manifoldly false.
I will not dwell upon the military aspects of the case
except to remind readers that Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and
the other towns of the Republics are not great centres of
wealth and population, like the capitals and chief cities of
European States, but little places with small populations
almost entirely of Outlanders who own most of the
property.
Although to take and hold the centre of government
is doubtless an important step towards obtaining the
practical control of a country, it is far less important in
the Republics of South Africa than elsewhere, because it
gives little direct hold upon the persons or the property
of the burgher population.
The easy, amiable talk about the Boers taking their
beating gracefully, and settling down quietly under an
Outlanders' rule supported by British force, or even under
a directly British rule, is contradicted by the entire tenor
of the history of the Republics, as well as by the common
knowledge of human nature. The crude psychology of
the pugnacious schoolboys, who hammer respect and
affection into one another by a bout of fisticuffs, is void
of truth; it is, in fact, nothing but a paradoxical exten-
308 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
sion of the mischievous maxim, Si pacem velis para
helium. Boys who have fought generally hate one an¬
other, nations always do. As for respect, it is possible
that individual Boers may have some increased respect
for the courage of individual Britons, but that will not
mitigate their hatred and abhorrence of the British power,
which has used its superior weight and numbers to crush
a smaller people. Why should it ? What basis for legiti¬
mate respect are we offering, by bearing down through
sheer numerical superiority a people who will rightly
boast that we tried to meet them man for man and
ignominiously failed ? Should we, their not remote blood
kinsmen, settle down meekly under a beating from an
immensely bigger nation than ourselves ?
Those who utter this preposterous surmise are possibly
misled by their conviction that our just interference
implies a sort of feeling among the Boers that they are
in the wrong, and that a fuller conviction of this truth,
following punishment, will help to teach them resignation.
Whereas the exact contrary is the case. The Boers to a
man believe, with a long-settled passionate conviction, that
theirs is a holy war, fought to preserve the independence
of their country from the assaults of greedy foreigners in
their midst who have cajoled the British Government to
take part in a conspiracy for territorial plunder.
No one who has witnessed the uprising of this national
spirit in the Republics on the eve of war is likely to enter¬
tain for a single moment this notion of a speedy acquies¬
cence of beaten Boer nations; no one who has read their
history, and knows the root-factors of their race character,
will endorse such a notion.
Will all the disillusionments we have sustained serve to
teach us nothing ? Shall we still fondly cling to the belief
THE TRUE LINE OF BRITISH POLICY 309
that the Boers will recognise themselves beaten, and lie
down beneath the heel of a conqueror ?
They will do no such thing. They will fight to the
end; beaten in set battles, their chief towns taken, they
may disperse to their farms, and defend them with the
help of their women, or many of them may take to the
open hilly country of the North, and carry on a trouble¬
some guerilla warfare for an indefinite number of years.
The Johannesburger or the town British colonist, who
before the war declared the Transvaal Boer would not fight,
o >
and that in no case would the Free State enter the conflict,
now declares that the beaten Boers will settle down on
amicable terms with the men who got in foreign troops to
crush them and to hold them down. False in their former
judgment, are these people to be trusted now? These
British townsmen do not know the country Dutch; those
who have lived among the latter upon terms of sympathetic
intimacy ridicule the notion. The selective process of
several treks has made the Boers of the Republics a race
in whom detestation of British rule is the most distinctive
trait; is the present tribulation of their country likely to
eradicate this trait ?
The attempt to enforce British rule upon the Republics
is likely to turn out a longer and a costlier process than we
reck—costlier in blood and money, and futile in the end.
It is doubtful if we can spare the strength which will be
needed for keeping the Boers of the Republics as a sub¬
ject race.
It may be said that this is not our policy or our inten¬
tion ; when a firm settlement is once effected, we shall give
equal rights to all under the British flag. But will this
prove a satisfactory settlement ? It will evidently work
out in one of two ways. Either the Outlanders will be
3io THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
dominant as a political party, in which case the mining
magnates, who have organised this attack, will rule the
Transvaal as De Beers rules Kimberley, controlling the
Outlander vote by economic force; or, if the old burgher
party should remain more numerous, or should detach
enough of the non-British Outlanders, then the British,
whose flag floats at Pretoria, will find themselves outvoted
at the polls, and subjected to the practical control of their
enemies, embittered by the memories of the war, and bent
on every sort of constitutional reprisal. Such is one of
the dilemmas which will be the legacy of this disastrous
war: the choice between an oligarchy of financial Jews,
and a restoration of Boer domination.
A similar dilemma besets our government of South
Africa as a whole. A long protracted period of coercion,
during which the self-government of the colonies is over¬
ridden or superseded by military despotism and Downing
Street, while some mechanical scheme of federation is
similarly administered or controlled, would not only fatally
retard the natural political development of South Africa,
but would, if historic precedents have any weight, sap the
loyalty even of the most loyal British colonists, and at no
distant date sever South Africa from the British Empire.
On the other hand, if we early and honestly fulfil our loudly
expressed purpose of securing a real equality of political
rights for the white races south of the Zambezi, we shall
be handing over, not only in the Republics but in Cape
Colony, the real legislative and administrative power
to the Dutch, closely constituted as a party, and bitterly
antagonistic to the British townsmen; while a federation,
which shall keep the power in British hands, can only be
achieved by a new partition of African territory, directed
by the crudest art of jerrymandering.
THE TRUE LINE OF BRITISH POLICY 311
If my estimate of the relative numerical strength of
Dutch and British races, and of their probable increase, is
approximately true, it will be impossible to make a federa¬
tion of existing States upon a representative basis which will
not hand the federal government to the Dutch. The spe¬
cious method of punishing " disloyal" subjects or " disloyal"
districts by disenfranchisement might provide a temporary
and a purely formal solution of the difficulty, but it would
entail the heavy price of a further education in disloyalty,
and an exasperation of race feeling. Not merely would it
afford no settlement; it would make settlement more diffi¬
cult. The same result would ensue from the jerrymander¬
ing policy already plainly advocated in the press of the
two colonies. To break up South Africa into six or seven
States, so arranged as to give to the British colonists a
permanent majority of federal representatives, would in¬
volve not merely an arbitrary and injurious redistribution
of territory, but a visible and flagrant violation of that very
principle of " equal rights for all white men " which we are
affecting to establish. The proposal to give Mashonaland
or even Natal an equal voice with Cape Colony and the
Transvaal in guiding the destinies of federated South
Africa would be patently unjust, and would soon be re¬
sented bitterly by the British as well as by the Dutch
settlers. That the exorbitant claims now preferred by
Natal, on grounds of her conspicuous loyalty, will re¬
ceive the welcome assent or even the acquiescence of
Cape Colony, no one who has followed the past relations
of the two colonies will be inclined to believe. A policy
plainly and avowedly adopted in order to secure the
immediate political supremacy for the British by contort¬
ing the forms of election so as to achieve this end, far
from aiding a settlement, would lay a permanent legitimate
312 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
basis of discontent, and effectually retard the processes
of rapprochement and fusion, without which peace and
security of government are impossible.
Those who seek to consummate their recent impolicy
of accentuating the separation of the Dutch and British
races, by securing the permanent and visible supremacy
of the latter, are engaged on a futile task. The true merit
of the so-called British race has ever consisted in its
power to assimilate the elements of alien white races
with which by emigration or by immigration it has been
brought into contact. It dominates and holds down by
force many coloured races; it has never succeeded in
practising such rule over white races. A South Africa
in which the British, as a race or as a party, shall assert
supremacy over the Dutch is a practical impossibility.
Even were it possible it would be plainly detrimental to
all known processes of civilisation and good government.
Equally crude and fallacious is the notion of those
who defend the present conflict by the application of a
" scientific" law, according to whose operation the higher
civilisation, represented by the British race, must replace
the lower civilisation of the Dutch. This process of com¬
petition and of conquest by the higher race they assert
to be a natural law of progress, which enables them to
set aside all special moral considerations or particular
expediencies, and to regard the present conflict as in¬
evitable, a painful duty undertaken in the sacred cause
of the civilising mission of Great Britain.
Full discussion of this farrago of false assumptions
masquerading under scientific terminology is here im¬
possible. It must suffice to say that it has never been
proved that only one type of civilisation exists, or that
the type represented by the life of modern industrial
THE TRUE LINE OF BRITISH POLICY 313
peoples is higher than, as well as different from, the type
of the agricultural races in such countries as Burmah,
China, or the Transvaal. To say that there exists one
goal of civilisation for all the races of the world, one road
along which progress lies equally for all, and that the
Anglo-Saxon peoples are the possessors of this goal, and
therefore the sole judges of the progress of other peoples,
is at least a gratuitous assumption.
Turning from the region of nebulous theory to the
concrete facts of life, and to the case most in evidence,
it is at any rate open to serious question whether the
civilisation of Johannesburg, the typical British product
in South Africa, is higher, better, or more desirable than
the simpler, ruder civilisation of the burgher population
of the land. An impartial student of human societies,
making a thorough investigation of social life in South
Africa, would surely hesitate to pronounce the life of the
towns—Johannesburg, Kimberley, Cape Town, Durban—
and the characters and ideals of their inhabitants, to be
intrinsically finer and worthier than the life, character,
and ideals of the Dutch farming population.
One last [and largest assumption in our opening hypo¬
thesis requires a word. Even if the firm abiding dominion
of the British race could be established throughout South
Africa, it would not secure the liberties and the progres¬
sive civilisation of our "black brothers." With a very
few individual exceptions, the British Afrikanders have
no more belief in the education and equal political rights
of the Kaffirs than have the Dutch. Loyal Natal is
quite as unlikely as the Transvaal to defer to the influence
of the Imperial Government, should it ever be exerted
in order to procure for black or coloured folk iequal
political and civil power with that conferred on whites.
3i4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
Both races are agreed in accepting a serf-civilisation
concealed under different thin disguises ; both races regard
the inferiority of the Kaffirs as permanent, and living on
the manual labour of these inferiors, they develop of
necessity the vices of a parasitic caste. These vices take
different forms in town and country life, in agricultural
and industrial societies, but their essential character re¬
mains one and the same. Whenever we speak of settle¬
ment, this abiding factor of racial cleavage and oppression
must be kept in mind. It presents a permanent barrier
to the attainment even of that distinctively British civilisa¬
tion which some contend that we are justified in fighting
for. This dark background of the South African problem
can never be ignored.
If, however, we confine our attention to the white
races and ask what is the best basis of settlement, the
immediate answer is scarcely more satisfactory. There
is no settlement, only different kinds and degrees of un-
settlement. The really practical question, which I will
ask but will not attempt to answer, is, "What issue
of the war will least disturb the moral and social
elements in South African life which were making
towards amicable co-operation and fusion in the past?"
The status quo ante, we are told, is impossible. That
may be so, but a calm view of the situation, with a true
understanding of the origin and nature of this war,
suggests that the best "settlement" will be that which
approaches nearest to this status quo ante.
In following the lines of such a settlement it is
essential to renounce one conspicuous error of our
recent policy, which more than any other has contri¬
buted to this catastrophe.
The Dutch Afrikander population and their leaders
THE TRUE LINE OF BRITISH POLICY 315
must be heard with respect and sympathy, not as a conces¬
sion but as a right. The fatuous folly which has, by charges
of disloyalty, sought to evoke the very spirit which it exor¬
cises must be abandoned. The Cape Ministry, chosen by
the majority of the people, and the experienced leaders of
that part of the population which recognises South Africa
as " home" and has lived in it for generations, must no
longer be set aside, ignored, and openly flouted in favour
of a clique of councillors, mostly new-comers, and all
with interests opposed to the interests of the people at
large.
A policy of least disturbance of anterior conditions,
involving the adherence to our earlier pledges to respect
the " independence " of the Republics, I would urge not
so much as a counsel of obvious expediency, though it
is that, but as conformable to the commonly accepted
standard of morality. Whether this war be accounted
a crime or a blunder matters not: it is a sound and
certain rule that any apparent gain which comes to the
criminal or the blunderer out of his crime or blunder is
no true gain but an injury. The nation has been told
that it is seeking neither gold nor territory by this war:
let it be clearly seen that she gets neither, and let us
equally make sure, if we can, that those who are re¬
sponsible as direct causes of this evil business, make
no personal gain. The wages of sin is death, and, hard
as it may seem, it is in the long run best this should
be so. To seek to dodge the Nemesis of misconduct is
as idle for a nation as for an individual. If the facts
recorded here are substantially true, and the judgments
substantially sound, the British people has been led
into a crime, and no juggling with territorial boundaries
or political institutions will enable her wholly to escape
316 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
the penalty. Pay in the present she must in reputation,
blood, and material resources: her best lovers, the truest
patriots, will desire that, as she comes to a gradual re¬
cognition of her error, she may have the courage to
proclaim her fault, and if, as is unhappily the case, ful]
reparation is impossible, she may at least renounce the
ill-gotten fruits of such a victory as she may win.
INDEX
African Review, the capitalist owner¬
ship of, 207
Afrikander Bond, The, formation,
policy, and scope, 106, 108 ;
charges against, refutation of,
100, 101-102, 113—114; account
of meeting at Burghersdorp,
IIO-III
Agricultural outlook of South
Africa, 251-256
Albu & Co., 191, 192
Albu, Mr., statement on native
and white wage question,
235, 236
Appelbe case, The, 56
Arbitration question, 146-149, 167—
169, 172-174
" Association of Mines," formation
and object of, 192
Barnato interest in Eand mines,
192
Basutoland, annexation of, by
England, 141
Beck, Dr., speech on Imperialism,
107
Beit (see Wernher, Beit & Co.)
Blackmail (see Bribery)
Bloemfontein Conference, 6-8, 98,
164-169
British and Dutch population in
South Africa, proportion, 244,
246; Dutch increase far greater,
247 ; racial and economic
cleavage coincide, 247, 249;
future proportion of, 278
British policy after the war, diffi¬
culties to be encountered, 306-
314 ; errors to be avoided, 314
316
Boers, The (see under Transvaal)
Brabant, Oapt., and South African
League, 199
Bribery and corruption of Trans¬
vaal officials, 73-83
Bryce, Mr., farming in South
Africa, 253 ; gold-mining in
South Africa, 260, 261, 262 ;
on native and white labour, 293
Bulawayo Chronicle, ownership of,
207
Burghership (see Franchise griev¬
ance)
Butler, Sir William, comparison of
Johannesburg and Australian
goldfields by, 56 ; on British
policy in South Africa, 5
Cachet, Prof. J. C., speech against
Rand agitators, 111
Cape Argus, the ownership of,
207
Cape " Boys " (see Native labour)
Cape Colony—
Afrikander Bond (see that title)
Afrikander press in, 110
Afrikanders, attitude of, on eve
of war, 99-105
British and Dutch population,
proportion, 244, 246
British press, attitude of, 99, 100,
157 ; capitalist owners of, 206-
228
Disaffected districts, The, 103-105
Dutch attitude towards English,
124, 125 ; dangers of a rising,
50; Dutch conspiracy (see that
title)
Expenditure compared with that
of Transvaal, 86
Jameson Raid, effect upon trade,
8, 9
Money voted for Imperial Navy
by Afrikander Bond, 114
Mauser rifles distribution, refu¬
tation of the story, 115
INDEX
Cape Colony (continued)
Newlands, suburb, 119
Parliament, attitude towards
Transvaal situation, 3-9; Down¬
ing Street government dreaded
by, 8
Progressive party, action of the,
105-118
Religious census for 1891, 244
South African League (see that
title)
Taxation and import duties com¬
pared with those of Transvaal,
86, 274, 275
Cape" Times, ownership of, 207 ; ex¬
tracts from, 222, 225'
" Chamber of Mines," the formation
and object of, 192, 236
Capitalists. See Press, Gold-mines,
Jewish factor
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J.—
Animosity of Boers to, 43, 44
Bloemfontein Conference, de¬
spatch concerning, 164
Diplomatic negotiations with
Transvaal immediately preced¬
ing the war, 164, 170-183
Edgar case, speech on, 57
Famous Highbury speech, effect
in Pretoria, 175, 176
Suzerainty, despatches concern¬
ing, 146-154, 172-173
Coal-mining in South Africa, slow
growth of the industry, 270,
271, 273
Colonial Dutch Reformed Church,
strong protest against war by,
117
Consolidated Goldfield Co.,The, 191
Conventions of 1881 and 1884 (see
Suzerainty)
Customs Union, The, 302
De Beers Co.—
Absolute control over white em¬
ployees, 239
Check to industrial growth at
Kimberley by, 257
Plans for dynamite monopoly, 93
De Kaap gold-mines a failure, 259
Derby, Lord, intention regarding
suzerainty question in Conven¬
tion of 1884, 152-153
Diamond Field Advertiser, owner¬
ship of, 207
Diamond fields,discreditable method
ot acquisition by England, 140
Diamond mines (Kimberley)—
Exports one-quarter of total ex¬
ports of Cape Colony, 258
History of, and exports table
(1891-1898), 257-258
Diplomatic negotiations concerning
franchise reform and suzerainty
preceding the war, 146-154,
161-183
Du Plessis, M. J., letter to The Afri¬
kander, wilful misrepresenta¬
tion of, 225
Du Toit, Mr., 106
Dutch and British population in
South Africa, proportions, 245,
246; increase of Dutch the
greater, 247 ; racial and econ¬
omic cleavage coincide, 247-
249 ; future proportions, 278
Dutch conspiracy, the alleged, 105-
118, 224-225
Dynamite, half the world's supply
absorbed by Transvaal, 92
Dynamite Concession, The—
Grievance not a real one, 92-94
History of, 26, 27, 88—95
Jewish control of, 193
Reduction of cost in dynamite in
1897, 18
Result in mining profits which
would follow abolition of mo¬
nopoly, 230
Total profits for 1897-1898, 90
eckstein group of financiers, wide¬
spread influence of, 191, 192
Edgar murder, The, 56, 57, 161
Education grievance, The, 33, 34,
37> 38
Educational Council, bad tactics of
the, 37, 38
Edwards outrage, 198
Eloff, Mr. Frickie, 35
Emigration in the future, obstacles
to, agricultural, 250-256; min¬
ing, 266-278
Esselen, Mr., progressive policy of, 16
Farming (see Agricultural outlook)
Eederation question, The, Sir G.
Grey's scheme, 296-299; Lord
Carnarvon's scheme a failure,
299 ; Sir Bartle Frere and Mr.
Shepstone sent out, 300-301;
natural bond of common inte¬
rest necessary to, 302 - 304;
INDEX
3i9
effect of the war upon, 304-
305
Fischer, Mr.—
On progressive influences and
action in the Transvaal, 17
On curse of gold-mines, 139
Fitzpatrick, Mr.—
On native labour, 285
On Selati Railway scandal, 77,
78
Pretoria forts in 1887 described
by-133
Franchise grievance—
Bloemfontein Conference (see
that title)
Malaboch campaign, franchise
conferred by edict of Raad
after, 24
Outlanders wish for privileges
without the duties, 24
Reform law of 1899 and diplo¬
matic negotiations preceding
war, 169-183
Sir A. Milner's despatches on,
162-164
Various attitudes towards, 63-72
Frere, Sir Bartle, career in South
Africa, 300-301
Froude, Mr. J. A., mission to South
Africa, 299
Gambling trade in hands of Jews,
194, 195
Glen Grey Act, The, 233
Goetz & Co., 191, 192
Gold law of Transvaal and Rhodesia
compared, 87
Gold-mines—
Association of Mines (see that
title)
Chamber of Mines (see that title)
English holdings in the minority,
193
German and French holdings
largely outweigh English, 193
Heavy taxation reasonable, 86
Jewish owners predominate, 191-
193
Native labour (see that title)
Survey of gold districts, 259;
table of outputs (1896-97), 260,
263; future of mining, 260-269;
reasons for increasing output,
265; economics of black v.
white labour, 268-269
Gold Thefts law enforced, 19
Greene, Mr. Conynghame, state¬
ments concerning Transvaal
expenditure, 85, 86
Greene, Mr., and franchise reform
law of 1899 170-171
Grey, Earl, speech on native labour
in the mines, 234
Grey, Sir George, federation scheme
drawn up by, 296-298
Grobler, Piet, 34
Hague Peace Conference, British
representative works to exclude
Transvaal from area of arbitra¬
tion, 157
Hall, Mr. W., on future of gold-
mining, 266
Hamilton, Mr. W. G., on future of
gold-mining, 266
Hartley, Dr. Darley, 199
Hofmeyr, Mr., loyalty and influ¬
ence of, 104, 105, 112
Hollander factor, the evil effect and
diminishing influence of, 74, 75
Hollander press, The, 217, 218
Horse trade in Jewish hands, 193
Illicit Liquor Syndicate, The,
bribery by, 82
Imperialism, quotation from Dr.
Beck, 107
" Imperialism, The New," effect of
in South Africa, 8
Industrial Commission, The, 90
Industrial future, 257-278 (for de¬
tails, see various titles)
Iron-mining in South Africa hypo¬
thetical only, 271, 272
Jameson Raid—
Deterring effect on franchise re¬
form of the, 17, 18, 20, 71
Effect upon trade of the, 8, 9
Engenders disbelief in British
sense of justice, 155
Expenditure on Transvaal arma¬
ments increased after, 129, 130,
132, 134
Jewish factor, The—
Advantage of obtaining political
power in Transvaal to, 196
Financial, industrial, and eco¬
nomic predominance in Trans¬
vaal, 189-197
Johannesburg, predominant in,
11, 190-195
320
INDEX
Johannesburg—
Administration of justice in, 81
Bribery and corruption in, 80, 81
Demand for full self-government,
real reasons of, 19
Description of the city, 10 ; lust
of gold, 12 ; industrial and
commercial energy, 13 ; ab¬
sence of Boer element, 13, 14
Gambling, trade in, 194, 195
Jewish element enormously pre¬
dominant in, 11, 190-195
Luxury, liberty, and license in,
61
Outlanders in position of, 55, 56
Press in Jewish hands, 193
Reform agitation by foreigners,
17, 18
Johannesburg Star, the ownership
and aggressive policy of, 207,
208, 219
Joubert, General—
Character of, 33
Election campaign, 1893, Liberal
views and sympathies of, 16
Wealth of, 28
Kaffiks (see native labour)
Karoo, the unproductiveness of,
252
Kimberley, Lord, despatch concern¬
ing suzerainty (1881), 149
Kock, Mr., 76
Krause, Dr., 73
Kruger, Piet, 35
Kruger, President—
Bloemfontein Conference (see
that title)
Character and personality of, 7,
IS, 22-31
Charges of corruption against,
26, 28
Dynamite monopoly scandal, 89,
92
Conception of politics, 24
Opening of a Jewish synagogue
by, 28
Position as President, 15, 17
Public appointments filled by
members of the family, 34, 35
Religious views of the war, 158
labour question (see Native labour
question, and White labour)
Language grievance, 33, 34, 37 ;
speech by Rev. J. T. Lloyd, 3S
Leyds, Dr., racial antagonism fos¬
tered by, 33, 74
Lippert dynamite monopoly, 88, 89
Liquor law, The, 19, 81 230, 287 ;
bribery used to resist changes
in, 82, 83
Liquor trade, Jewish control of,
193
Lloyd, Rev. J. T., statements con¬
cerning the language grievance,
38
Locust plague, efforts to combat,
252
London Convention (see Suzerainty
issue)
Loveday, Mr., statement concern¬
ing finance of Transvaal, 85
Lydenburg gold-mines disappoint¬
ing, 259
Mansvelt, Dr., educational policy
of, 34, 37
Merriman, Mr., 4, 116
Midland News, The, attitude of, 208
Milner, Sir A.—
Bloemfontein Conference, 6-8,
98, 164-169
Boer view of, 156
Diplomacy and despatches before
the war, 161-183
Distrust of Boer Government by
6, 7
Ignorance concerning intentions
of Orange Free State, 182
Mutilation of President Steyn's
despatch, 183-186
Mines—
Coal-mines (see that title)
Gold-mines (see that title)
Iron-mining (see that title)
Labour question (see Native
labour question, and White
labour)
" Pass Inspectors," bribery of, 80
Profits after the war, immense
increase of, 229
Miners—
Attitude towards franchise ques¬
tion, 66
Native labour question (see that
title)
Transitory character of popula¬
tion, statistics proving, 68, 69
Mining World, The, extract on
white miners' wages, 240
Missionaries, feud with Dutch over
treatment of natives, 282
INDEX
321
Money - lending business in the
hands of Jews, 193-194
Monypenny, Mr., 209, 210, 216
Mortgage business in hands of Jews,
193. 194
Natal—
British and Dutch population,
244, 246
Expenditure compared with that
of Transvaal, 86, 274, 275
Native Element, The—
Condition and rights of natives
in Cape Colony and Transvaal
compared, 284, 285
Difficulties following upon con¬
clusion of war, 313, 314
Proportion of natives to whites
in South Africa, 279 ; increase
of natives the greater, 279, 280;
disturbing effect of the white
war upon, 280, 281; British and
Dutch treatment of natives,
281-295; future outlook, 295;
vice among, 287-288
Native Labour question, 230-240;
" compound " and " location "
systems, 237, 238 ; number em¬
ployed in mining, 264
*' Native Labour Association," The,
237, 268-270, 279-295
Neumann & Co., 191
Newspapers (see Press)
Nobel Trust (see Dynamite mono¬
poly grievance)
Oris Land, loyal policy of, 105,
110
Oppenheim, Baron (see Selati Rail¬
way scandal)
Orange Free State, The—
British and Dutch population in,
proportions, 245, 246; Dutch
increase the greater, 247; racial
and economic cleavage coin¬
cide, 247-249
British civil and political status
in, 144
Conventions violated by England,
141
Dependent on Transvaal for mar¬
kets, 143, 254
Diamond fields (see that title)
Ignorance of Sir A. Milner con¬
cerning intentions of, 182
Model government of, 136, 143,
144
Orange Free State, The (continued)—
Reasons for joining the Transvaal
in the war, 17, 136-145
Steyn, President (.see that title)
Telegram from Downing Street
on signing of 1884 Convention,
142
Outlanders, The—
Bribery of Transvaal officers by,
78-80
Grievances—
Attitude of Cape Parliament
towards, 5
Commonly received and erro¬
neous views of, 52, 53
Dynamite monopoly (see that
title)
Educational grievance (see that
title)
Franchise grievances (see that
title)
Summary of, 96, 97
Proportions to total population
of South Africa, 244-246
Transitory character of popula¬
tion, 69, 70
Outlander Council, the formation
of, and manipulation by capi¬
talists, 66, 203-205
Outlander press, attitude of, 156
Pakenham, Mr., 209, 210
Pass Law, the, 19, 58, 230, 238
Peace Conference (see Hague Con¬
ference)
" Peruvians "—
Definition of term, 190
Large amount of trade in hands
of, 267
Phillip, Mr., and South African
Explosives Co., 90
Phillips, runner of sweepstakes in
Johannesburg, 195
Press, The—
Capitalist ownership of South
African press, inflammatory
policy of, 206-228
London press inspired by
capitalist press in South Africa,
215, 216, 217
Press Law grievances, 58-61
Pretoria Convention (see Suzerainty
issue)
Policeman (see " Zarp ")
Population (White), raceproportions,
244-246 ; Dutch increase the
greater, 247; racial and eco¬
nomic cleavage coincide, 247-
X
322
INDEX
249 (see also Native element
and Native labour)
Potchefstroom, 46
Public meeting, the law of, 59, 60
Queen Victoria, Boer veneration
for, 44, 122, 123
Race question, The—
British and Dutch, proportions,
244-246 ; Dutch increase the
greater, 247 ; racial and eco¬
nomic cleavage coincide, 247-
249 ; effect of the war upon,
145.
Native element (see that title)
Raid, The {see Jameson Raid)
Railways—
Co-operation of South African
States, 302
Netherland South Africa Co.,
reduction of rates, 18
Selati Railway scandal, 26
Transvaal endeavours to divert
traffic from Cape lines, 9
Rand, The (see Gold-mining and
Johannesburg)
Refugees, stories of insults, &c., to,
grossly exaggerated, 220-222
Reitz, Mr.—
Personality of, 34
Statement concerning position of
Transvaal as a sovereign State,
151-152
Story of Kruger told by, 23
Rhodes, Cecil—
Boer hatred of, 123
" Constitutional means," term
used by, 156, 206
" Kaffir Parson," extract from
speech, 290
Knowledge of Boer character, 7
Mining interests on the Rand,
191, 192
Native labour, extract from
speech, 286
Press, ownership of and influence
over, 206-207
Rhodesia—
Gold laws compared with those
of Transvaal, 87
Gold-mining prospects in, 260
Rhodesia Herald, ownership of,
207
Rhodesia press, aggressive attitude
of, 157
Robinson, T. B., Rand mining
interests of, 192
Rosmead, Lord, on Home Rule in
South Africa, 298
Rothschild interest in the Rand, 101
Rudd, Mr.—
On labour question, 233-235
Rand mining interests, 191-192
Sauer, Mr., 4
Schreiner, Mr., loyal attitude of, 4,
104, 116
Schreiner, Olive-
Interview concerning Dutch feel¬
ing in the Colony, 119-125
Story of Kruger by, 23
Secret service money in Transvaal,
85
Selati Railway scandal, 77
Selous, Mr., on Transvaal arma¬
ments in 1895, I33
Settlement of South Africa after the
war {see under War)
Smuts, Mr., 75
Soil {see Agriculture)
Solomon, Mr., 4, 116
South African Explosives Co., allot¬
ment of shares, 89
South African League, The—
Aggressive policy of, 64, 100, 103,
161, 176
Formation, policy, and methods
of, 198-202
Steyn, President—
Pacific despatch mutilated by Sir
A. Milner, 182-186
Reasons for aiding Transvaal in
the war, 137, 138
Stock Exchange in South Africa,
Jewish element predominant,
193
Sundry Services Account of Trans¬
vaal, 85
Suzerainty, the question of—
Cape Colony Parliament, attitude
towards, 3-4
Despatches and negotiations con¬
cerning, 146-160, 172-173
Interpretation of term, 149
Revival of the claim, 146, 148
Theron, Mr., on "civil" nature of
the war, 102
Times, The (London), selection of
South African correspondent
unwise, 216
Times, The (Natal), striking extract
from, 226, 227
INDEX
323
Transvaal, The—
Arbitration question, 146-149,
167-169, 172-174
Armaments, expenditure statis¬
tics, 85, 128; inefficiency pre¬
vious to Raid, and increased
expenditure following upon,
132-135
Bloemfontein Conference (see that
title)
Boers, The—
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J., dis¬
liked by, 43, 44
Character, 14, 20, 21, 44
Commonly accepted and mis¬
taken view of, 15
Detachment from foreign popu¬
lation, 14, 62
Distrust of British diplomacy,
6, 43, 44, 155
Educational and progressive
campaign among, 16, 17
Enormous proportion in Gov¬
ernment employ, 73, 74
Family influence in politics,
34, 35
Farms, large proportion mort¬
gaged to Jews, 194
Hatred of British rule funda¬
mental and abiding, 307-309
Intermarriage with British, 48,
49, 100-102, 121
Life and outlook of, interview
with Olive Sclireiner, 120-
125
Natives, treatment of, by, 233
Patriotism of, 48, 49
Political education, want of,
32, 35, 95
Rhodes, Cecil, hated by, 123
Self-restraint of, 40, 41, 48
Bribery and corruption of offi¬
cials, 73-83
British and Dutch population,
244-246
Diplomatic negotiations (see that
title)
Economic grievances, abatement
of, in 1897, 18
Financial reform, direction in
which it is needed, 84-87
Franchise policy since 1890
Gold Law the most liberal in the
world, 87
Gold-mines (see that title)
Hague Peace Conference, Trans¬
vaal excluded from area of
arbitration, 157
Transvaal, The (continued)
Industrial Commission of 1897, 18
Intrigue with Germany, want of
evidence, 126
Jameson Raid (see that title)
Johannesburg (see that title)
Joint - inquiry, the proposal of
a, 6
Justice, education, hospitals,
police, expenditure statistics,
131
Outlanders (see that title); griev¬
ances (see the various titles)
Official incompetence and corrup¬
tion, 73-83
Political parties, violent cleavage
of, 16
Pretoria, city, 40; forts useless
in 1889, 133
Progressive movement and forces
in, 20, 71
Raad, corruption of, 82, 83 ; "the
third Raad," 83 ; the present
Raad, 21
Revenue and expenditure tables
(1889-97), 84
Secret service expenditure, 85
South African League in, 199-202
Taxation and import duties com¬
pared with those of Cape
Colony and Natal, 86, 274, 275
Ultimatum, reason for sending
the, 155-160
War expenditure (see Armaments
above)
Working-classes, attitude towards
franchise question, 66
Transvaal Leader, the capitalist
organ, production and objects
of, 209; extracts from, 2x1-214
Villiers, Chief-Justice De, charges
England with violating Con¬
ventions, 141
Vorstman, 89
War, The—
Boer attitude towards, 44, 45,
307-309
" Civil " nature, owing to inter¬
marriage, 48, 49, 100-102, 121
Gains following the war, mining
interests, cheap labour, 229-
240
Guerilla warfare of long duration
probable, 309
Justification by war party of, 96,
127
324
INDEX
War, The (continued)—
Settlement following the war—
statement of difficulties, 250,
306-314; errors to be avoided,
314-316
Wernher, Beit & Co., 191, 192
Wheat-growing in South Africa,
serious obstacle to, 254
White labour in the mines, decrease
of, 268, 269 ; probable decrease
of wages, 236; "location"
system applied and absence of
competition, 239-240 (see also
Native labour question)
White, Major R., report on Trans¬
vaal armaments in 18S9, 132
Wodehouse, Sir P., attitude towards
Orange Free State, 141
Wybergh, Mr., and South African
League, 200, 201
Younghusband, Captain—
Boer armament expenditure, re¬
port on,134
Gold-mining in South Africa, re¬
port on, 262
Wheat-growing in South Africa,
254
" Zarp," 14, 53, 55, 61; powersof, 81
Zulu war, effect upon Cape Colony
of the, 301
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4
Date Due