THE
APHORISMS
OF THE
NYAYA PHILOSOPHY,
BY
GAUTAMA,
WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY
BT
VISWANATHA.
IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.
PRINTED, FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE, BY ORDER OF GOVT. N. W. P.
oooo•
ALLAHABAD:
PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS. Rev. Jos. Warren, Superintendent.
1850.PREFACE.
-000—
The great body of the Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach \o them in the eyes of the un-instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.
For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.
J. R. B.
Benares College, ) 5th January, 1851. yTHE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
INTRODUCTION.
a.	[The Nyaya-sutra-vritti, or " Explication of the Aphorisms of the Nyaya," commences with the following exordium.]
b.	Salutation to the illustrious Ganes'a!
c.	May he, the splendour of whose gracefulness of person surpasses ten million of Cupids;—who made the joy—and O how delightful it was !—of the bevies of the dames of Vraja;—whose body is dark as the teeming rain-cloud, and who haunts no temple save the mind;—may he, the some one [whom, as the well known Krishna, I need not name], promote the felicity of the inhabitants of the three worlds.*
d.	In order to produce great good-luck, we meditate on the beauty of the toe-nails of Bhavanl, which [beauty], taking an exquisite aspect as it was associated with the ruddy lustre of the newly applied lac-dye, seemed a sort of lovely ornament of Siva's head— when his head was bowed down [at her feet] to deprecate her haughty displeasure—eclipsing [—as the beauty of the toe-nails
* 3ft	rnr: ii 3MHTHra^fsr^^^Tfet^T^
^^n^rrfTR^ ^rfa ^r^to*	I 3 ^rsfa imrni irere^
iT^wNT^cf^RT^t^TVRt TOl^pra^: || \ ||4
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
then did—] the resplendent beauty of the twilight Moon* [which is the usual ornament of Siva's head.]
e. I reverence him [—meaning Gautama—], the resplendent, who has eyes in his feet [as well as in his head—though how, or to serve what purpose, does not seem to be known—], by means of the rays of whose dialectics [—meaning thereby the body of doctrine which he bequeathed to the world—]the virtuous get over the whole darkness that was within them.f
/. "We reverence our father, YidyIniv^sa [the abode of learning], who is as it were a combination in one—of the two gods of wisdom and of justice, the ornament of the globe of the fair earth, a masculine form as it were of the goddess of eloquence, the producer of confident scholarship [in those enjoying the advantage of being his pupils], in liberality like another Kama incarnate, towards the wretched ingenious in his kindness, whose fair fame prevades the universe. J
g. I make the dust of my preceptor's feet my pilot [in the voyage on which I am going to adventure—for I am] seeking to promote skill, and resolved in mind that even the dull-witted shall [be supplied at all events with the means to] understand—
* ^wrt ^ai^rmfarnrftf^ dMrti+Kirniin w^srrfto^-
o	J
Hi^ixfH^Ncrixt ^liUifHfawr i TR^n^mH^fam-
s>.	Nj
^fs^iwmf^^i WTT	WITO WR^AT
Cs.
othtt: II * ii
t ^^irlrfexwxi'TR'^i'rTwfTf i ^Ttwfcr ^T^fmw-^mf* rm ii ^ ii
^few rTTrf ft^fwrft^I^^ f^ITfa^W TT: II # IIBOOK I. SECTION 1.
6
without much effort, and the intelligent as mere play,—the wide [and all-embracing] system of the Nyaya.*
h.	May this work of Viswan^tiia the son of YidyXnivasa conduce to the gratification of the sage the fine-witted and the un-envious.t
i.	Now the on-lookers do not engage [in any study offered to their attention] without having come to feel an interest in the motive [—i. e. in the end, to the attainment of which the study is calculated to lead]; therefore the end is to be mentioned first. J [The end proposed is the escaping from liability to transmigration, and the attainment of tranquil and eternally uninterrupted beatitude:—and, as the declaration of this end is re quisite in order to gain attention at the outset—] therefore, for the declaration thereof, the venerable one who has eyes in his feet [—see e.—] aphorises in the first place as follows.§
SECTION I. The end or the proposed enquiry.
JmnUWqTjST^TTTq-T^TT-g-T^rT fWHrTT^^
Enunciation of the
S^SLhto WT^rqrfongft«\«»^«*i fn
Beatitude.	rh^R	ll\li
* ^grrfrrcwW fawn src^T^i fkrferfwstmi
x	A
^TT frg: i if* firfaf^^rn: ini^r ^Nn^r Ji^^rcirT
>3
St ^^Tft^ft II 1 II
t ftsnfa^re^T: ^rfn^rr Q^hiw i f^riTfTT^^f-f^nrmTnwTTrt nfrrr 11 11
^R^-ft^T^t^RT II6
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
No. 1.—Proof [—i. e. the instrument of right notion— 3. <z.*—] ; that which [—as having a proof—] is the object of right notion; doubt; motive; familiar fact; scholastic tenet; confutation; ascertainment; disquisition; controversy; cavil; semblance of a reason; perversion; futility; and unfitness to be argued with;-from knowing the truth in regard to these [sixteen things], there is the attainment of the summum bonum (ni'sreyasa.)
a. But then [—there is no denying—] the knowledge of truth is not the immediate cause of Beatitude. Beatitude—to consider it apart—is of two kinds through the distinction of the ' higher' [attainable only on quitting the body], and thec lower/ Of these the f lower/ in the shape of ' emancipation while yet in life* (ji-vanmukti), takes place immediately on the attainment of the knowledge of truth [—the sign of a man's having attained to which is his exhibiting a perfect indifference to all that passes around him]. This, moreover, is attained by him who has ascertained the truth in regard to Soul, whose false notions have been removed by incessant application, and who is yet experiencing [—in appearance at least—for, though apparently exposed to hardships, he is generally supposed to feel nothing—the fruit of] past deeds;—but the 'higher' [is attained by him] by certain degrees. To explain the order thereof is the purpose of the following aphorism.f
___ ____r
The order of the	g V
gteps towards Beati-	_ __	c
tude.	TRT rT^fnT^aTrm^m: II ^ II
* imror: ^sr wnsm II	II
t ^ n-rcj-snct^ ^	i	th^t
firf^TTOTO^TPT I rHIM< ^Fufer^W HT^-SIHHTU-
UTT«Kf ^TTH^R^ I WK^ H^I | 7TW
^ftfd nBOOK I. SECTION 1.
7
No. 2.—Pain (du'kha), birth (janman), activity (pravritti), fault (dosha), false notions (mithyd-jnana),—since, on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next [before] it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of them] Beatitude (apavarga).
a.	[That is to say—] among Pain and the rest [in the foregoing list], whichever are subsequent in order [to others in the list], on the annihilation of these [subsequent ones], since there is the annihilation of the next one—i. e. of the one immediately next it and preceding it—, there is [—in the end—when Pain, the last in the list thus read backwards, has been annihilated,] Beatitude.*
b.	Although[—as some one may object—] Beatitude does not come from the absence of Pain, but is it—still [there is no fault in the form of expression employed in the aphorism, for] the sense of the 5th case here is that of indifferencef [—i. e. the absence of any difference between the what and the whence].
c.	So much—in the ' Explication of the Aphorisms'—for the topic denominated 'that relating to'the motive'% [for pursuing the enquiry proposed].
d.	[The remembering of the Order of the steps, in § 2., may be facilitated, to some readers, by availing one's self of the distribu-tively cumulative form of exposition employed in the nursery tale of " The House that Jack built." Thus—
1.	Du'kha.—This is the 'pain1 that the man had.
2.	Janman.-—1This is the 'birth! [again renewed] that gave room for the ' pain' that the man had.
*	sTfrr^n: Sfawnui ^HTK^J rp^fij-
tpq^reh iifl
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
Pravritti.—This is ' activity' (—requiring reward—) that led to the ' birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the ' pain' that the man had,
4. Dosha.—This is the 'fault' (—of ' desire' or ' dislike'— alike to be shunned—or ' stupidity'—) which (—in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all,—) begot the ' activity' (requiring reward) that led to the ' birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the f pain5 that the man had.
5.	Mithyd-jnana.—This means the' wrong-notions' (of that man unversed in the truth-teaching Nyaya Philosophy) which (—since the man knew no better—) gave rise to the ' fault' (of t desire' or ' dislike' or' stupidity') which (—in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all—) begot the ' activity' (requiring reward) that led to the ' birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the ' pain' that the man had.
6.	Apavarga.—This last is ' beatitude'—promised as fruit of the truth-teaching Nydya Philosophy, which gives us right ones instead of the ' wrong notions,' which gave rise to what Gautama styles a 'fault/ inasmuch as it mischievously begot the f activity' carefully shunned by the wise—for ' activity/—shaping itself in acts that are good or bad, and require reward of a like description,—occasions a man to be born again,—and 'twas this same ' birth' that gave room for the ' pain' that the man had.] *
*Mr. Colebrooke, in his celebrated essay on the Nyaya, (see Essays, vol. 1) stating concisely the Nyaya view of the attainment of beatitude, describes (at p. 290) soul as " not earning fresh merit or demerit by deeds done with desire." Here he makes, as Gautama does, the ' desire' (which is one of the three meant by the technical word dosha ' fault'—see the Essay, p. 290. 1. 1.—and the present work §18. a.—) to be the producer of acts, from which acts, in turn, arise merit or demerit. But, at p. 289, when he says " From acts proceed faults (dosha); " including under this designation, passion or extreme desire; aversion or loath-" ing; and error or delusion (moha)," he adopts an order the reverse of that enjoined in §18.—see Note on §18. b. If the passage in the Essay be correctly edited, it would seem as if Mr. Colebrooke, when giving to his Essay a final revision after having laid it aside for a time, had been struck with the oddness of the expression that " from faults proceed acts," and had reversed it without ad • verting to the technical definition of ' faults,' in the same sentence, as the passions which give rise to action. Gautama, the votary of Quietism, gives toBOOK I. SECTION 2.
9
d. Now, since a definition will be looked for [of each of the things enunciated in the aphorism §1] in the order of enunciation, he defines, and divides, Proof—the first enounced.*
SECTION II.
The instruments available in prosecuting the enquiry.
, . Mrij^M^r^TWi^®^:	n 3 11
What are the in-	^	^
struments of right no- No. 3.—Proofs [—i. e.—see §1—instru-
ments of right notion—J are (1) the deliverances of sense; (2) the recognition of signs; (3) the recognition of likeness; and (4) words.
What is meant by 'right	There> hJ the root md 'to measure,t
notion' or knowledge	peculiarised by the emphatic prefix pra
KaT e%°Xr1v'	[—and thus giving the word prama—sci-
licet 'what takes the very measure of its object*—] there is signified a notion [—not dubious, or erroneous,—for notions may be both of these;—but the 1 right notion' denoted by prama is a knowledge] in the veriest manner determined [—or distinguished from the bare knowledge that c this is something'—] by the determinate nature of that which [— being the object of the knowledge—] possesses such and suchf [determinate nature.—It is,
the passions the name of ' faults' with a significance akin to that which the word bore in the remark of Talleyrand on the murder of the Due D'Enghien—" ce n'etait pas une crime—e'etait une faute—it was an absolute blunder. The wise man, according to Gautama, is he who avoids the three mistakes of having a liking for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of having a dislike for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of being stupidly indifferent, and thereupon acting; instead of being intelligently indifferent, and not acting at all.
* ^r ^^i^fewrf Jr^iff"? IRTO ii
inzn*^ II
B10
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
in short, the knowledge of a thing as it is,—or, in the words of Butler,
" To know what's what;—and that's as high " As metaphysic wit can fly ."J
b.	That—in virtue of which any thing is the instrument of such [right notion as has been just defined]—is what constitutes any thing a Proof* [or instrument of right notion.]
c.	And the knowledge intended to be spoken of here is notion other than memory;—so that this [definition of ' Proof' just given] does not extend [where it ought not] to the instrument of recollection^ [—which we may have to treat of hereafter.]
d.	At this point the Explication of the [first] three Aphorisms is completed. £
e.	Now he begins to define, in their order, the [several kinds of ' Proof' which, in the preceding Aphorism, were] divided.§
/. [The four kinds of ' Proof' are usually spoken of as 1 Perception,' ' Inference,' c Comparison,' and' Testimony.' "We may have occasion in the sequel to explain why we think proper to depart from the accustomed from of rendering].
mat is meant by	^HIHIK? W1*i|f«
a deliverance of sense.	^TOT^F?^	II » II
No. 4.—By a deliverance of sense is meant knowledge which has arisen from the contact of a sense with its object,— [and this
*	TOTTTOH II
t hm^hi'^i f^rfenS^^trfrrafiW ^nfa^iftf: 11
X Tfri	wm II
*	s)er
BOOK I. SECTION 2.
11
knowledge may be] indeterminate [—as when one in consequence perceives ' this is something'—we know not, or think not, what; —but] not erroneous [—for, if erroneous, it would be no ' instrument of right notion:'—or it may be] determinate [—such a degree of attention having been exerted as to determine that ' this is so and so* and not any thing else.]
a. [Now] he defines and divides the ' recognition of a sign.'*
What is meant by	rTf^S^ U ft	R M^^MKHV
the recognition of a	**
si8n-	JTT^TWT TS^ II II
No. 5.—Now the recognition of a sign, which is preceded thereby [—i. e. is preceded by a deliverance of sensef—§4— else the recognition of the sign were impossible—] is of three kinds—(1) having [as the sign] the priort or (2) having [as the sign] the posterior, or else (3) [consisting in] the perception of homogeneowness.
a.	[By 'prior'—as explained in our Lecture on the Sankhya Philosophy, §101, &c.—the author means a {cause/—from which, when recognised, its effect may be inferred as about to follow. So again, by ' posterior' he means an ' effect'—from which, when recognised, one can infer that such and such a cause has been at work. By the ' perception of homogeneousness' he means the recognition of the subject as being referable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be predicate of the class. The three ' signs' belong to the three arguments ' a priori,' * k posteriori,' and ' from analogy.']
b.	He [now] defines the f recognition of likeness.'J
* '^FpTR	||
t 7Tr<nN	II
Cs.	On	^12
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
What is meant by the ^^ W^R^^T^T || ||
recognition of like- No> 6.—The < recognition of likeness' is ness.	.	, °
the instrument [in the ascertaining] of that
which is to be ascertained through its similarity to something
[previously] well-known.
a.	[That is to say] the ' recognition of likeness' is the instrument [in the ascertaining]—or [—for the Sanskrit term, not strictly defined, stands for either—] it is the ascertainment itself of the signification, which we wish to determine, of a word, such as gavaya for example—through the perception of likeness or similarity to something perfectly well known, i. e. of which we have previously obtained a right notion,—as a cow for example.
b.	[A man is told that the gavaya, or ' bos gavaeus/ is an animal like a cow. Going to the forest, he sees an animal like a cow. By means of the instrumental knowledge above described, he arrives at the conviction that'Mis thing is what is meant by the word gavaya.']
c.	[The term ' recognition of likeness'—upamana—is to be employed throughout to denote the instrument; and the commentator notices two etymological views, either of which will justify that employment:—thus] it may denote the instrument, if we suppose an ellipsis, and that it stands for ' that from which the recognition of likeness' is obtained; or it will be the name of the instrument, if we suppose the word to be formed by the affix of instrumentality—viz. lyut [—Panini, III. 3, 117—*] which marks the instrument of something to be established or effected.f
__d. [Now] he defines a ' word.'t
What is meant by
a 'word.'	^mqr^w^ 11 ^ 11
* ii
t ^MftfdSrT ^jtstt^TT^ ^ ^W^T^TTJ | Wl ^TO-
^lyriftfd	i)BOOK I. SECTION 2.
13
No. 7!.—A ' word* \jcar e^o^nv] is the precept [or instructive assertion] of one worthy [to have his words implicitly accepted as an authority.]
a.	By saying ' A word'—he mentions what is to be defined. It means [—as used here by Gautama—not a mere sound, &c. but] a word which is an instrument of right notion. ' The precept of one worthy*—such is the definition.*
b.	Or the expression given as the definition may mean ' a right [or fitting] precept [or instructive assertion;]'—that from which [correct] knowledge ' verbally communicated' (sabda) arises.t
c.	He now divides this :—
^ f^ftvr ^iTC^nSfejTrr ii II
No. 8.—It is of two kinds, in respect that it may be that ' whereof the matter is seen/ or that ' whereof the matter is unseen/
a.	'It'—i. e. a word that is an instrument of right notion.J
b.	By ' that whereof the matter is seen' he means that [word] the thing declared by which is accessible to instruments of know? ledge other than words themselves or any instrument [—such as that spoken of under §6, a.—] dependent thereon§ [—i. e. dependent on words.]
c.	By'that whereof the matter is unseen' he means that [word] ^T^TrnFf II
t ^nm wht	i sjt^tot ^tttt ii
X ^ TTfuwu^: n14
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
the thing declared by which is accessible only to words or to instruments of investigation dependent thereon.*
d.	And thus, through the distinction of' the being that whereof the matter is seen' and ' the being that whereof the matter is unseen/ there is a twofold character of words that are instruments of right notion—such is the meaningf [which may be put into plain English thus;—Assertions are of two kinds—capable of verification, and incapable of verification.]
e.	Here the topic of the definition of the instruments of right notion is concluded.^
/. He next divides and defines the objects which are fitted to supply right notions. §
SECTION III. The objects about which the enquiry is concerned.
What things furnish WTOftXf^Tl^jff*^. Wfr^T^r^
the objccts of right no-
tion-	vrmr^.'wr^irw n < u
No. 9.—But soul, body, sense, sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude, are what are fitted to supply right notions.
a. [And it is not to be objected that this enumeration is not exhaustive]—for the expression e fitted to supply right notions/
* I^rl^M^W^UJUWr'sNl^l^^T sFsnS^: It
t rTSTl^rejig!l
t ^nf iwnuH-cjiuimiiuw ii § Wl fwSTTT	IIBOOK I. SECTION 3.
15
•—like the word ' disquisition' or the like, [see §1—which is employed in this work with a sense technically limited—] is specially appropriated, as a kind of technical term, to these twelve* [things enumerated in the aphorism.]
b.	Among these [twelve things enumerated in the aphorism,] having named,—as these take the precedence,—the set of six which are in the shape of causes; the set of six, ( fitted to supply right notion/ which are in the shape of effects, are mentioned [after these.] On this point [—viz. the order of arrangement to be observed in enunciation—] they tell us that " the enunciation first of each one foremost [in respect of those that follow it] is regulated by its superior dignityt [in comparison with those that follow it."]
c.	Among these [enounced in §9] he defines the one first enounced—viz. Soul.
Soul defined. I^T^WT^^f	fk^J \ o ||
No. 10.—Desire, Aversion, Volition (prayatna), Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge, are the sign of the Soul.
a. Here [—some one may object—] your saying the 'sign* (linga) is incongruous, because the soul [is not inferredhy means of a 'sign*—but] is intuitively recognised.£ [This objection would be a sound one if the word 'sign' were here employed in its technical sense, of Tetcfj,r)piov,—the ' reason' in a syllogism;—
*

t ^nr
fnf^ rf i	m^rr^rF	srfr s^rr u1G
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
but it is not so]—for the word ' sign* (lingaj here means [nothing more than] a ' characteristic'* (lakshana.)
b. He next defines ' body' [—the topic, among those enunciated in §9—] which presents itself next in order.f
No. 11.—The body is the site of [muscular] action fchesh{aj, of the organs of sensation (indriya), and of the sentiments [of pain or pleasure experienced by the soul.]
a.	And the nature of the [muscular] action (cheshtd) is this— that it is a peculiar species [of action] the constitutive peculiarity of which is its being the result of volition fprayatnaj.%
b.	The word artha [which has been rendered by ' sentiment'] in the expression " the site of the sentiments of pain or pleasure/' is not intended [—as it is in §9—] to denote colours and the like [objects of sense], for then the fact of being the site thereof [—instead of its being what we intend to speak of—viz. a distinctive characteristic of the body—] would extend, beyond where it ought, to jars, &c.;—but it is intended to denote pleasure or pain alternatively. Therefore the Bhashya [or commentary by Vat-syayana] tells us " In what tabernacle there prevails the consciousness of pleasure and of pain, that is [what we mean by] the site of these—and that is the body."§
Body defined. ^tf^mS'T^	II	U
*	^Ull'dtoM II
t nrfpmf irftr ^rwfr n
§ ^psraf^SfTzmwu^'r
■ftduTi: fej W^^l^d^TC I ^rr treT VfT^ I

iiBOOK I. SECTION 3.
17
c. He divides and defines the organs of sensation (indri-yaj.*
What are the	J
organs of sense. No ^.—The organs of sensation [originating,
or not differing,] from the Elements [§13], are Smell, Taste,
Sight, Touch, and Hearing.
a.	Although the Mind also certainly is [as declared by the Sankhyas—see Tattwa-samdsa §29—] an ' organ* (indriya), yet, since we employ the term not as being exclusively applicable to the Smell, &c., there is no fault [to be found with our employment of the term.] But, in reality, by ' organs' [in this place] we mean [exclusively] the external organs; and hence there is no incon-gruousness in [the addition of] the expression "from the Elements,[—which would be incongruous if we intended to include Mind].
b.	Do the Smell, &c., originate [as held by the Sankhyas—see Tattwa-samdsa §26 and §27—] from one of the ' producers' ? As there may be an expectation [that this question should be resolved,] he says—" from the ElementsHence it is not to be held that the organs of sensation originate in that productive agency termed ' self-consciousness' [—see Tattwa-samdsa §54—]. And this will be explained in the 3rd Lecture.J
c.	What are the Elements ? As there will naturally be an expectation [that he should explain what he means by the expres-
*	^MpN II
t	tfftf^rm^ifa mnfq" wrw^T^^rawni-
bt T/zrer	ii
t WTWT^Yfa fis wft^ftaT^^rsTFn^ sfir I
fi^ i m i«< ^iwf^^i^ 5ft if*T^r i
c18	APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
sion in question—employed as it is in the definition laid down in* the aphorism §12,—therefore] he says—*
What are the
ii ii
Elements.	No. 13.—Earth, Water, Light ftejasj, Air,
Ether,—these are the Elements (bhutaj.
a. He next divides and defines ' sense-object' [—the topic, among those enunciated in §9,—] which presents itself next in order.f
What are the ob-jects of the senses, ^.j, |j y jj
No. 14.—Their 'objects' (artha) are the qualities of Earth, &c. [see §13,] viz., odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and sound.
a.	By the word ' their,' the external organs of sensation [§12,] arc referred to .J
b.	To define ' understanding* (buddhij, he says—§
Understanding or	« II
knowledge.	No. 15.—Understanding (buddhi), appre-
hension (upalabdhij, knowledge (jnana)—these are not different in meaning.
a.	'Not different in meaning'—i. e. synonymous. ||
b.	He next defines the Mind—
* httrt^	11
t sfOTTTTC-tf	II
t rr^^r	ii
§ ^ftrtHlTS II
sj	si
_C_.	C_
II ^M^Mi ^ITWT IIBOOK I. SECTION 3.
19
What is the	» M »
Min(L	No. 16—The sign [—conf. §10, a.—] of the
Mind fmanas) is [that habit in virtue of which] it does not give rise simultaneously to notions [more than one].
a.	' Simultaneously5—i. e. at one time. [Of course] you must supply "in a single soul"* [—if you speak of the mind generical-ly, and not of an individual mind].
b.	The meaning [of the aphorism] is—that the sign—meaning the characteristic—of Mind is that property, viz., the atomic nature of the intellectual organ, from which it happens that there do not arise notionsf [more than one at once in one and the same soul].
c.	He next defines and divides Activity! fpravritti).
wfatri^srfkTT^: ii \ >8 II
Energy No. 17.—Activity is that which originates the [ut-defined. terances of the] voice (vakJ, the [cognitions of the] understanding, and the [gestures of the] body.
a. Since the expression c which originates/—heard [in the aphorism] immediately after the Dwandwa compound,—is in construction with each term severally [in the compound], Activity is of three descriptions, according to the division into ' that originating the [utterances of the] voice/ &c.§
* TOTfT i	i ^T^iftft	II
t ^MMUTg^f^qir: ^ ^ ^mmi^ jt^t ^r^nftfzHh ii
t ireft ^rw^fTT fwnN ii
fonirefa: 1120
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
b.	By the word ' understanding' (buddhi) here, the Mind (tnanas) is meant;—and the word 'body' (sqrira) is common to the hands and other members [as indicative of each and all of these] in so far as these have the power of muscular action* [—see §11, a.].
c.	Thus [—to explain—] an effort tending to utterance is [what we mean by] ' that which originates the voice':—an effort the site of which is the body, or [more properly] which tends to gesture [or bodily movement] is [what we mean by] ' that which originates the (gesture of the] body*an effort distinct from both of these is [what we mean by] 1 that which originates the [cognitions of the] understanding.' And this [last one], tending to [the act of] vision, &c., is accomplished in the mere dawning of attention-}- [—attention alone being required in order that the revelations of the external world may flow into the understanding through the appropriate channels of the senses].
d.	He now defines [the failings or weaknesses to which he gives the name of ] Fault (dosha).%
w^n^^srr ^im: 11 11
The passions No. 18.—Faults [or failings] have the charapter-what-	istic that they cause Activity.
a. The employment of the plural, in the expression c Faults,' is intended to make one aware of [not a single species, but of ] a
* jf^'SKHU sft?^Tfafo i	^otiJT
vl IN	^
sR*rainrwftrrw i im^rfttr ^T Jjprir: i * } ^rtf wBOOK I. SECTION 3.
21
triad of things to be defined [as faults or failings] —in the shape of Affection (raga), Aversion (dweshaJ, and Stolidity (moha)*— [each of which is regarded as a fault or defect, inasmuch as—see §20—it leads to actions, the recompense of which, whether good or evil, must be received in some birth or state of mundane existence—to the postponement of the great end of entire emancipation— see §2].
b.	The word pravarttand means the being a producer of Activity. Those of which just this is the characteristicf [are what we mean by Faults].
c.	He now defines [our mortal life or the state of] transmigration:}: (pretyabhava).
vzmre: 11 11
n»
Mortal No. 19.—Transmigration means the being produced life- again [and again].
a. The word pretyabhava is formed out of pretya ' having died' and bhava 'the becoming [born into the world again*]. As, by the expression " again/' here habitualness is meant to be implied—there is first a birth, then death, then a birth—thus [the state of] transmigration, commencing with [one's first] birth,
* Xfh STsFT^ TT^t^^7*^^^ I I'
t TRWT	I rT^cT ^raw ifapT II
Mr. Colebrooke appears to have viewed the term here rendered ' the being a producer of Activity' as signifying ' the being a product of Activity/—for, with reference to this, Gautama's definition of ' fault' (dosha), he says (—see Essays, vol. I. p. 289.—) " From acts proceed faults (dosha) : including under this designation, passion," &c. The word 'fault' (dosha), as technically employed by Gautama in the sense assigned to it in §18. a., is not to be confounded with adharmma ' demerit' which latter does proceed from acts. See farther in our note on §2. d.
t ll?IJWr ^ra^frT II22
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
ends [only] with [final] emancipation. And this knowledge is conducive to the (relinquishment of all passions' (vairagyaj,— therefore it was not needless [—as some persons may think, on reading the aphorism and reflecting that the condition called pretyabhava is just the condition of us men, and might as well have been called bhava ' condition' simplyit was not needless, we say,] to add the word pretya' having died'* [—a word suggestive of the fleeting character of this mortal life, and which, combined with the word bhava, ' state/ gives the compound term pretyabhava to denote our mundane existence].
b. He next defines Fruits (phala)f—
ugjRr^r^^lHriT^: n ^ ° n
Retri-	No. UO.—Fruit is that thing which is produced by
bution. Activity and by [the originaters of Activity—viz. our constitutional faults or] Failings—[see §18].
a. And amongst these [fruits] the fruit that is denoted by the word primarily is the fruition of pleasure or of pain; and so the Bhashya tells us " Fruit is the consciousness of pleasure or of pain." And sines one's [unwise] Activity in engaging either in duties or offences is the causer thereof, and the Failing again £—whether of passion or mere folly—see §18—] is the cause of that, therefore he says " produced by Activity and by [the origi-
* T17JT "H1TT 5J7R IJrZPTR: I r^" T^fW^T^T^-tftViHM WjrqfrTO^T	rHT	^VTRT
^•nf^Wtprr: i ^R^ ^q^rssra flsjfH ^r ii
Hence Mr. Colebrooke's definition of pretyabhdva as " the condition of the soul after death" (—see Essays, vol. I. p. 290—) while it is literally correct, may mislead the reader if he does not bear it in mind that this, according to Hindu notions, is the condition of every man now alive—for, as we are all supposed to have lived and died no one knows how often, we are each of us always in the condition " after death"
t w ^^rft IIBOOK I. SECTION 3,
23
naters of Activity—viz. our] Failings." But the definition, [—if we regard the nature instead of the origin of Fruits] is ' the experiencing of pleasure or pain—one or other.1 But by ' fruit* in a secondary application of the term, we mean every thing [mundane] beginning with the body.*
b. He next defines Pain (du'khaj\—
M \ 11
Pain No. 21.—Pain is that which is in the shape ofVexa-defined. tion.
a.	The word' pain/ in the' secondary application* J of the term, is employed to denote the body, the senses, and their objects, since these are the instruments of pain, and to denote pleasure, because of its being ever closely connected with pain. And only therefore [i. e. since the one term ' pain* implies the whole of these] is f pain' referred to, in the aphorism following, by the term ' that.'§
b.	He now defines emancipation|| (apavargaJ.
*	w^W^NT: I r^rs vref i w-
■o	-»	v»
^ i "qwrwTr^: ^T^^TTTT^
^f	TTlfh^IWf^m^W I ^JUW
Tfh \ fhw ^^ Srffalf^fi II
t y iir ^r^rfrii
JThis is what is to be understood by the varieties of evil which Mr. Cole-brooke (Essays vol. 1. p. 290) mentions as "primary or secondary." It is not degrees of evil that axe to be understood as thus referred to; but, the author, we are told, chooses to employ the word ' pain' technically—in a f transferred sense'—to denote the causes of pain also, as well as pain itself.
apr^TTT TfTTU cfrf | ^RT ^ififfi^i rT7<^T f^TO* : ii
II wrfi' ^^rfrf II24
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
■d^nifafUit S^fft- II ^ II
Beatitude	—Absolute deliverance from tliat is Eman-
what.	cipation.
a.	' That'—i. e. pain [—as understood in its widest acceptation—see §21. a.]
b.	' Absolute deliverance'—i. e. the annihilation of the pain which has the same locus as one's self, [i. e. one's own pain], and [an annihilation thereof] not synchronous [with the pain that belongs to each moment of our mundane state;—'for each moment, as it passess, sees the extinction of its own quantum of pain; but what is so " devoutly to be wished" is the absolute annihilation of one's troubles once for all].*
c.	Here is completed the topic of the Definition of the things that furnish the objects of right notionf [§9].
d.	He now defines ' doubt' fsansayaj which presents itself next in order| [in the list given in §1].
SECTION IV.
Completing the topic of the pre-requisites of reasoning.
ipTT^ih fwrrit'. 11 ^ 11
Doubt No. 23.—Doubt is a conflicting judgment [in regard to defined. 0ne and the same object] respecting its distinction [or precise character;—this conflicting judgment arising] from unsteadiness in the recognition [of some mark which, if we could
* s^rrf^Tw: wm^ifV^ur^i^M^^^T"wfa: II X jfFnmi	nBOOK I. SECTION 4.
25
make sure of it, would determine the object to be so and so] or [from unsteadiness] in the non-recognition [of some mark which, were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be not so and so ;—this state of things, moreover, resulting] from the recognition [in the object] of [only such] properties [as are] common [to a variety of things, and therefore not distinctive,] or of several properties [such as cannot really belong to one and the same thing,] or from conflicting testimony.
a.	" Doubt—here is the statement of what is to be defined.*
b.	" A conflicting judgment"—fvimarshaj :—here the prefix vi signifies ' confliction/ and the root mris signifies ' knowing.' "In regard to a single object"—is to be supplied. So that Doubt means, in regard to any single object, Knowledge distinguished, contradictoriwise, by the [simultaneous] presence and the absencef [of some given nature].
c.	[The commentators are not unanimous in their interpretation of this aphorism, some holding that there are five kinds of doubt referred to, and others that there are only three. We have preferred the latter view. Of the first kind of doubt an example is furnished by the case of an object, in the twilight, of which we can discern nothing more than that its size is that of a man, —a property which may belong to a post as well as to a man.f We have an example of the second kind in the dubious and disputed question whether Sound is a substance or a quality or an action. § It cannot be more than one of these, yet it presents
* wn^ ^ ^jjfaf ii
t -forer T^pr firai^r fr^nrreh I ^fii't^rre}: i fiipr ^rM^ftfr i bt i	fa^rw
vrerorsrw^fi ^R ^aisr: 11 t writ *^rr sn II
Vl
§ sj^r ¥jm: ^ II26
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
characters which furnish plausible grounds for contending that it is each of the three. The third kind of doubt is, of course, such as arises when, of two witnesses (presumed equally trust-worthy) the one asserts what the other denies.]
d. He now defines [the fourth in the list §1—viz.] 'Motive' fprayojanaj, which next presents itself.*
^m^fwzr wn^ TTrjfin^RT n 11
No. 24.—What thing having set before one, one proceeds to act—that [thing] is the c Motive' [of the action.]
a.	' Having set before one/—i. e. having proposed [to one's self —as something to be gained or avoided.] And so what constitutes any thing a Motive is its being the object of desire, which [desire either of attaining or escaping] is the cause of one's ac-ting.f
b.	He now defines [the fifth in the list §1.—viz.] 'familiar case of a fact' fdrishtantaj which next presents itself.f
IhfwrCt^&mt jffwtf ^ tvT^T: it ^ 11
No. 25.—In regard to [some fact respecting] what thing both the ordinary man and the acute investigator entertain a sameness of opinion, that [thing] is called a ' familiar case' [of the fact in question.]
a. The ' Ordinary man/—i. e. one to be informed—who has not attained that superiority of intellect which is the result of conver-sancy with books;—such is the sense of the term [—among the
* spnrnr	n w
SRf^H I
X WHTf TVl«TT	ItBOOK I. SECTION 5.	27
various senses that might be given to it—] that will be found of use.*
b.	The f acute investigator'—i. e. the informer [of the ordinary man §25. a.]—one who has attained superiority of intellect through conversancy with books;—such is the sense of the term that will be found of use.f
c.	Here closes the topic of the pre-requisites of Reasoning. J
d.	He now defines [the sixth in the list §1—viz.] 'Tenet* (sid-dhantaj, which next presents itself. §
SECTION V.
Of positions, not familiar, that mat be employed in reasoning* without requiring to be each time demonstrated.
II ^ II
No. 26.—A ' Tenet' (siddhanta) is that, the steadfastness of the acceptance of which rests on a treatise [of weight and authority.]
a. He next divides || [the ' tenets' thus characterised generally.]
*	SlHTTOWlX^fteRSRT^tf IT^S: iTfrTOTg ^frT
qrf^rrS: 11
t qft^: J&iwft^HuiHjffJT^: ufam^ftf* tfifenTro: a
X ^UTT ^TRR^T^^T^I'T II
§ URnrrrf fafFff	11
II	II28	APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
SffiTH ^11
No. 27.—['Tenets' axe divided into the species that are described in the succeeding aphorisms] through the difference between a ' Dogma of all the schools/ a ' Dogma peculiar to some school/ a < Hypothetical Dogma/ and a^D^umt^orol^^^^
a.	It is of four kinds—such is the remainder [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism]. The meaning is this that it is so through the difference of its owing its steadfastness to all the schools [or to only one,] &c.*
b.	He now defines a ' Dogma of all the schools' (sarvvatantra-siddhdnta.]-\
^^fiQ^f sfVsr <T: ^H^r^iTi: ii ^^ ii
No. 28.—That [position or tenet] which is not in opposition to any of the schools, and which is claimed [as a tenet] by [at least] some one school, is [what we mean by] a ' Dogma of all the schools/
a. He next defines a ' Dogma peculiar to some school' (prati-tantra-siddhantaJX
^Hd^ffa*?: ^njT^fe^: ufrtd^ifa^M: h n
No. 29.—That [position] which is [held] established in the same school, and which in another school is [regarded as] not established, is [what we mean by] a 'Dogma peculiar to some school.'
* W	3:f?T Sfa: I d^lf^' r^m^pfTWlTTrT I
^Tf^src: II
t ^^rT^ftf Prf ^T^rfrT II
t vfTTTf^f^prf	IIBOOK I. SECTION 5.
29
a.	The word ' same' [in the expression ' established in the same school'] means ' one.' So the sense is ' established in one school.' The complete sense is 'established in its own school.' So the sense in which we shall find it useful to employ the term [—since, in a controversy, we may imagine each school to be represented by a single partisan—] is this, that whatever is assented to by only one or other of two disputants is the peculiar dogma of that one of the two,—as, for example, the eternity of sound is [a peculiar dogma] of the followers of the Mimdnsa school.*
b.	[Thus the pratUantra-siddhanta is what supplies the material for the argumentum ad hominem in the disputations of the schools.]
c.	He next defines a 1 Hypothetical Dogma' (adhikarana-sid-dhdnta.Jf
msqimnrfaff: sftpfiwfafTO 11 \o \\
No. 30.—That, if which be [held] established, there is the establishing of another point, is [what we mean by] a * Hypothetical Dogma.'
a. The meaning is this—that, that position [—for which no evidence is offered in the first instance—] is a hypothetical dogma [or a hypothesis] only on the establishment of which taking place [—by being conceded—] does the establishment take place of another proposition under consideration .J
* wnq^ xr^TwfsinTg'fa'f i w^wf^f rfa
rKW irffTTf^faSM ^fern^: I TOT ^WrTO^t "fartjc^ II
t	^-sjqfd ii
t tn&rerw faip *rnr*rRTsn±MMHi ww^ wttw faffJW* rf^nfWfTnT
STzHh II30	APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
b. He next defines a^Dogmafcio ooi'ollnrjr.
si	^
No. 31.—^/Dogmatic corollary' is tlie mention of a particular fact in regarchfeqany thing, not expressly declared in an aphorism, [our knowledgeVrf the fact coming so immediately] from what is recognised, [by tn^maker of the aphorisms, as to render a demonstration superfluous—^he fact being thus entitled to rank not as a deduction but as a dogmV]
a.	"Not expressly declared in an aphorism"—such is here the meaning of the term aparikshita.*
b.	" The mention of a particular fact"—such is here the meaning of the expression visesha-parikshana.j-
c.	And thus a ' Dogmatic corollary' [or an implied dogma] is what is received as a tenet [or first principle] without being expressly laid down in an aphorism,—as, for example, [the tenet] that the Mind is an organj [of the Soul,—which is recognised as one of the tenets of the Ny£ya, although nowhere expressly asserted by Gautama.]
Here ends the topic of the definition of the scholastic tenets that take their place in argumentation^
He next divides, with a view to defining, the members [of a demonstration] which present themselves next in order|| [among the topics—see §1—]-
t f^^m^Tn faifawN^R* 11 X wn ^Txj ^f^rn^q^mT	I wr
II
§ to ^i^^fa^i'ri^Tsm^sm 11BOOK I. SECTION 6,	31
SECTION VI.
The method of argumentative exposition*
No. 32.—The members [of a demonstration] are (1) the Proposition, (2) the Reason, (3) the Sample, (4) the Application, and (5) the Conclusion.	/
o. He defines the Proposition* [to be proved.]
No. 33.—The Proposition is the declaration of what is to be established.
a.	Of what is to be established—the declaration—this is the Proposition:—and " what is to be established" is this, that such a thing as a hill is possessed, for instance, of^re.f
b.	He defines, and tke% b^two subsequent Aphorisms divides, the Reason, which presents itself next in orderj [—-of those enumerated in § 32].
isrerfcR rrerr ?hrT*§Trr n ^ « w
No. 34.—The Reason is the means for the establishing of what is to be established; Tand this it is] through the Example's having the nitm, or m like manner through its having-the. re
^	a
ircrT of IhT ii ilmrrj [implird in the Tlrmon • in nllin imimlu
* ufa^T v-r^rfrT 11
t ^^ftawraw in ftf 35: ^ irf^fi 1 ^Rfa^ srftr* irwrf^rT mf^: 11 t Hpnmf %rT	fetf^liN ^TO H32
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
through the Reason's being distributed, affirmatively or negatively, in the Major Premiss],
a.	Here the generic definition is this—that " The Reason is the means for the establishing of what is to be established." By " the means for [the establishing of] what is to be established/1 is meant [not exclusively the assigned Reason itself but] that [second member out of the five—see §3.2—] which informs us [by its use of the 5th case-affix] that such and such has the power of giving information leading to the establishing of what is to be established.* [For example, when we say, ' The hill is fiery— because there is smoke',—the 'smoke' is the Reason of our knowing that the hill is fiery, but the whole clause ' because there is smoke' is also technically called the Reason].
b.	He declares that it is of two sorts when he says " through the example's having the nature, or in like manner through its having the reverse of the nature [implied in the Reason]." By the possession of the same nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of as] r agreement* (anwayaJ, and by the possession of the reverse of the nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of as] ' contrariety' fvyatireka). The meaning that will prove serviceable [when we speak of this agreement and contrariety] is that of ' invariable attendedness' (vyapti) of the one or the other description-t [Thus when we speak of the 'agreement' of fire with smoke—the smoke being adduced as the Reason for holding that there is fire, we mean to speak of the invariableness of smoke's being attended by fire :—and when we speak of the contrariety oifire and a lake—the lake being adduced as the Reason for holding that the vapour rising from the place is not smoke, we
BOOK I. SECTION 6.
33
mean to speak of the invariableness of a lake's being devoid of fire.]
c. He now defines the Example, which presents itself next in order* [—of those enumerated in §32—].
iTlf'QftTTft rSflnf	II ^ II
No. 35.—The Example is some ' familiar casp o£ the feet'— [see §25—], which, througnf^e; [suggestion of thei^soirsjmya-riable attendedness by what is to^be established, causes that nature [or property] to be [admitted to Bfeicmg to the subject] which' is to be established [as belonging to the subject].
a.	The definition [—expressed generally—] is this—viz. " The Example is some familiar case of the fact." Here the [elliptical] expression (familiar case of the fact' means that Member [of the five-membered exposition—see §32—] which is appropriated to the mention of the familiar case of the fact:—hence there is no
V
harm if, seeing that some familiar case of a fact is only temporarily so [—i. e. employed as an Example—], it is not invariably sot [—the terms not being co-extensive in their application, for a fact remains a fact even when not cited as an Example—].
b.	[But the Example is of two kinds—see §34 b.—so,] to complete this [definition in §35] we must add that it is the Example where we have a case of invariable attendedness* [that we are here speaking of].
* sfifpnm^T^cTjr ^rwfa 11
t	^Tswfafrf ^raw I ^"gT^rT^t ^TnT'^^-
^ ^frr: ii
t	^ ii
E34
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
c. He next defines the Example where we have a case of invariable abandonedness.*
rTf^^m^T rf Sff^^^OT II \\
No. 3G.—Or inversely [—as regards the 'invariable attended-
a.	[As when we argue—see §34, b.—that the vapour seen rising from a lake is not smoke, because a lake is invariably devoid of fire.]
b.	He next defines the Application, which presents itself next in orderf [—of those enumerated in §32—.]
^TTCnjT^^rw^tr^ qTXT «T ri5fn 3T ^TOwr*^: || ^sS l|
No. 37.—The Application is the odllecting [or bringing under simultaneous view] with respect tar the Example, what is to be established as being so, or not so.
a. And the Application is of two kinds, through the distinction of (1) that where we have [in the Example—] a case of invariable attendedness, and (2) that where wc have a case of invariable abandonedness. " So" [—or " in like manner"—] such is the expression when the Application involves a case of invariable attendedness. " Not so" is the expression when the Application involves a case of invariable abandonedness. J [In other words— " and so is this" (tatha-clidyamJ is the form of expression when
t fff^TRTH^W^ ^rwfr || ,^^T^T	I ^ TT^fTT	ST^^f'T-BOOK I. SECTION 7.
35
the Minor Premiss is affirmative; while " and not so is this" (na-chayan tathaj is the form of expression when the Minor Premiss is negative.]
No. 38.—-The conclusion: is the-restating-of-the- Proposition because of the mention of the Reason [whi^h now authorizes us to prefix the illative ' Therefore'].
a.	Here concludes the topic of the form of demonstration^
b.	He now defines Confutation, which presents itself next in order.}:
SECTION VII. Concluding the topic of demonstration.
^fir^T rp$ $ ^r^wq-ffTrf^Tf^T^nwwIi: 11 ^<$.11
not accurately apprehended—is reasoning from the supposition of [the cessation of] the cause [to the cessation of the effect— for, on the admitted cessation of the cause, the observed resulting phenomenon ought of course to cease also].
a. [In other words, confutation consists in our directing a person, who does not apprehend the force of the argument as first
b. He next defines the conclusion.*
The conclusion defined.
Confutation, or reductio ad absurdum.
No. 39.—Confutation—[which is intended] for the assertaining of the truth in regard to a question, the truth in regard to which is
* fa^mH ^T^frT II t wnf ^"rtww^v^kttt^ h X ™ ^^rfr II36
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
presented to him, to look at it from an opposite point of view. For example—to take a simple case, which, simple as it is, correctly represents the generic form to which all the logical errors of man are reducible—suppose a person admits that there is smoke in the hill, but denies that there is fire,—having previously granted that where there is smoke there is fire, we confute him—and put him in the way of coming to a ' right notion'—by remarking of the hill that] if it were without fire, it would be without smoke.*
b. He now defines Ascertainment, which presents itself next in order.t
„ ^ . • , . No. 40.—Ascertainment is the determina-Certainty arrived at
by hearing both sides, tion of a question by [hearing] both what is to be said for and against it, after having been in doubt.
a.	Here closes the topic [—see § 25. c.—] of the latter division of Reasoning. J
b.	So much for the first diurnal portion of the first Lecture of the commentary composed on the Aphorisms of the Nyaya, by the venerable Viswanatha Bhattachj£ryya.§
* ftffir. ^rfw^K Wtf^TT II t jfRTinTr fwfo« t ^smf ^TWTTRJ^Tf^T^ II
§ rfr ^ fw^TWfT^T^^ffWr JSTTJWeW ^WHIT-
vm	iiBOOK I. SECTION 8.
37
THE SECOND DIURNAL POETION.
SECTION VIII.
THE TOPIC OP CONTROVERSY.
<?» He now defines Discussion.*
^ „ „ , imrarTO^iTOw: ftfprrif^f: TOT-
Dennihon of a	^	n
fair discussion. c^W^^^fd M	|| « \ ||
No. 41. Discussion is the undertaking [—by two parties respectively—] of the one side and the other in regard to what [conclusion] has been arrived at by means of the five-membered [process of demonstration already explained—see §32—; this procedure] consisting in the defending [of the proposition] by proofs [on the part of the one disputant] and the assailing it by objections [on the part of the other,—the discussion being conducted on both sides] without discordance in respect of the tenets [or principles on which the conclusion is to depend].
a. [Such is the discussion that takes place between a preceptor and his pupil, when the latter brings forward objections, which the other, having a clearer view of the matter, is able to remove —there being no dispute between the two in regard to the data\.
b. The persons competent for [this honest
The prime requisite , . ... .. .	,	,,
..	style of 1 discussion are those who are really
in an honest disputant. .	.
desirous to get at the truth ;t—and it is not
necessary that there should be a Moderator in such a discussion, because the debate is here conducted without passionj [or shabby ambition of victory].
* rnr ^ tswffa 11 t m^rftp&rfkw^r Tn^jw^r: 1138
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
c. He defines -wrangling.*
^^irrtfau^Twr^TT^T ^r: 11 « ^ 11
D fi 'ti f	—consisting in the defence or
wrangling a^ack [of a proposition] by means of frauds [see §50], futilities [see §58], and what procedures deserve [nothing but an indignant] rebuke [see §59], is what takes place after the procedure aforesaid [—that is to say, after a fair course of argumentation,—supposing this to have failed to bring the disputants to an agreement].
a. By the expression " frauds," &c. it is inti-^^	mated that this kind of talk [viz. wrangling] is
that of the person who is desirous of victory, for it is the man desirous of victory [instead of being desirous of truth], that makes use of frauds, &c. And so the meaning is this, that Wrangling is the discourse of him who aims only at victory, [he being quite indifferent] whether this [discourse of his] establishes either side of the questiont [provided only he can make out a pretext for bragging that he has said something to the point].
b. He now defines Cavilling, which next presents itself4
Definition of No- 43.—That [—viz. Wrangling, §42,—], when Cavilling, devoid of [any attempt made for] the establishing of the opposite side of the question, is Cavilling.
a. [The man shabbily eager for the semblance of a victory, sometimes, see §42, a., attempts to prove something by disinge-
* ^T^^^TfrT II
t ^itoTf^n f^rf^ftowtr^ frf^fW^^^if^ % fCrT^T jfiWTri Wmfft IIBOOK I. SECTION 9.
39
nuous artifices. He is then said to wrangle. If he attempts to establish nothing, but confines himself to carping disingenuously at the arguments of the other party, he is said to cavil].
b.	Here the topic of controversy is concluded.*
c.	He now defines and divides the Semblances of a reason, which next present themselves.f
SECTION IX. Of fallacies, or what only look like reasons, by means
of which a man may deceive himself or another.
wfa^Kf^fJT^w^^w^r^^T^i %c3"Twrr: 11 »» n
Enumeration of the	44.—The Semblances of a reason are (1)
Fallacies. the Erratic, (2) the Contradictory, (3) the Equally available on both sides, (4) that which is In the same case with what is to be proved, and (5) the Mistimed.
a. He now defines the Erratic^ [semblance of a reason.]
^arfiHjrc: II 11
The argument that No- 45.—That [semblance of a reason] is proves too much. Erratic which arrives at more ends than the one [required.]
a. For example [suppose one were to argue that] Sound is eternal, for it is not the object of touch§—[—the reason alleged would bring us to more conclusions than we want; because the
* WTT	II
t ^Txnm^T	fwsr^T II
t	^W^frT II
§	i	1140
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
quality of Conjunction or of Disjunction for example, is not the object of touch, yet no one argues for its eternity.]
b. He now defines the Contradictory [semblance of a reason] which presents itself next in order.*
ftf T*fTlT«J^ZT ifa^ivft f^f: II 8 i II
The argument that No- 46.—That [semblance of a reason] is proves the reverse. the Contradictory which is repugnant to what is proposed as that which is to be established.
a.	f Which is to be established,'—such is the meaning here of the term siddhanta.t
b.	And so the meaning, as it may be most profitably regarded, is this, viz.—after having proposed, or stated, that which is to be established, [a Contradictory reason is] one employed which is opposed thereto, or invariably attended by the negation of what is to be established; as, for instance, [if one were to argue], ' This is fiery, because it is a body of water/J
c.	He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is Equally available on both sides—this next presenting itself. §
^ifH^iUiR-rfi ^	it a o n
No. 47. That from which a question may
e argument t at gj^gg as to whether the case stands this tells equally both ways.	.
way or the other way, if employed with the
view of determining the state of the case, is [a mere semblance
* SPnTTTT ft^f" ^^frf || t fofTWT ^r^m II
ift Tf[1%7TT§: I WT	^T^f^frT ||
§ nFnrrrr w^^w^f iiBOOK I. SECTION 9.
41
of a reason—being] equally available for both sides [of the dispute] .
a.	[According to the commentator]—That reason employed, or adduced, for the ascertainment of one's own proposition or the negation of the other's proposition, is called ' the same for both sides:'—but which reason ?—with regard to this he says—' from which a question'; i. e. from which two opposite views may arise; —such is the account given in the Bhashya.*
b.	[For example—suppose a man argues that Sound is eternal because it is audible, the reason here alleged will just provoke the question whether audibleness is any proof of eternity, and the opponent may with equal propriety argue that Sound, because it is audible, is not eternal].
c.	He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is in the same case with what is to be proved,—this presenting itself next in order.f
^rcnfafiii^	11 n
The argument that stands No- 48.—And it [the alleged reason] itself in need of proof.	is in the same case with what is to be
proved, if, in standing itself in need of proof, it does not differ from that which is to be proved.
a. [As the commentator remarks]—for if the reason stands in need of being proved too, just as the proposition stands in need of being proved, then it is said to be ' in the same case with what is to be provedand therefore the expression f unestablished'
* ^ WPTO K^'isitotto f^qrSfrrof^:
t	f ^TCPPT ^r^rfrf H
F42
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
(asiddha) is employed [in speaking of such a reason]; and this [' unestablishedness' or unreality] is of three sorts, through the distinction of the unreality of the locality [or subject of the alleged property], the unreality of the character [as regards the subject whereof it is assumed to be predicable], and the unreality of the universality* [assumed in the major premiss. Examples of these are given in our Lecture on the Tarka-sangraha\.
b. He now defines the Mistimed [semblance of a reason] which next presents itsslf.f
WrmzrqTqf^: ^Mirfirr: u 11
The argument that is op- No. 49.—That [semblance of a reason]
Senses^ ^ 6VidenCe °f ^ is Mistimed which is adduced when the
time is not [that when it might have availed.]
a.	[For example,—suppose one argues that] Fire does not contain heat, because it is factitious, J [his argument is mistimed if we have already ascertained, by the superior evidence of the senses, that fire does contain heat].
b.	Here concludes the topic of the Semblance of a reason.§
c.	He now defines Fraud [or unfairness] which next presents itself. ||
* wrf^	ttot %rrrfa ^T^TCT^T I
r^ff^Tf^fr*: II
t sMUlH^dlrl+M ^TW^frT
t	WrT^rf^frT \\
§ wrrf	u
II spnmr ^wfo 11BOOK I. SECTION 10.
SECTION X.
Of the tricks employed by the dishonest disputant
to thwart the other party.
^f^^mw^*; ii h^o ii
Wilfully unfair No. 50.—Unfairness [in disputation] is the objections. opposing of what is propounded by means of assuming a different sense [from that which the objector well knows the propounder intended his terms to convey].
a.	For example—in such	of argument as this, that ' The man has come from Nepaul, because he has a new (nava) blanket [such as the country of Nepaul supplies]/—the declaring that this is not established, on the assumption that the meaning was nine* [blankets, instead of a new blanket,—the word nava meaning both new and nine,—is unfair].
b.	He now divides Fraud, which he has just defined.f
No. 51.—It is of three kinds, (1) Fraud in respect of a term, (2) Fraud in respect of a genus, and (3) Fraud in respect of a trope.
a. Of these he now defines the ' Fraud in respect of a term/J
* ^Rrr^TTmi & ^nr^^r^rfi^zT^r ^rw^rm^-
ifa fWFTO II t ^rferf fw^ II X rTW	^wzfrt II44
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
II II
The fraudulent No. 52.—f Fraud in respect of a term' is the misunderstanding assuming a meaning other than [the objector of a term.	^^ knows] was intended by the speaker when
he named the thing by a term that happened to be ambiguous.
a.	[An example of this has been given under §30. a.].
b.	He next defines ' Fraud in respect of a genus/*
II
The fraudulent over- No- 53-—'Fraud in respect of a genus' is
straining of an assertion the assuming that something is spoken of in
which was obviously not	.	_
meant of the whole ge- respect whereoi the thing asserted is lmpos-
nus-	sible, because [forsooth] this happens to be
the same in kind with that of which the thing asserted is possible.
a. For example, on some one's saying, 'This is a Brahman,— he must be possessed of learning and conduct';—the other, assuming that he here deduces the possession of learning and conduct from the fact of being a Brahman, says—e How can that "be ?—for, the possession of learning and conduct, if deducible from the fact of being a Brahman, would be found, where it cannot, in his childhood' + [The other, of course, meant, as the objector very well knows, to speak of a Brahman who has lived
* ^to^t^T	11
t wn sJTfpnT & ft^nwHj?!	sTT^nr^ feu-
^Ui^HI^' ^TO^mtfTT ^rftr^T	^^frf ^T f^T^TTTW^l^ SjfvrrrRTfT IIBOOK I. SECTION 10.	45
long enough in the world to render it possible for him to study, in which case the probability is that he will have studied].
b. He now defines ' Fraud in respect of a trope.'*
^iRJTfrre^r ^^TV^R II ^ 8 II
The fraudulent ac	Fraud in respect of a trope' is
ceptance of the meta- the denial of the truth of the matter, when
phorical literally, and the assertion was made in one or other of the vice versa.
modes, [viz. literal or metaphorical,—which it suits the purpose of the objector to invert].
a.	For example, in the case of such an assertion as ' The scaffolds cry out* [—somewhat analogous to the English phraseology f The pit and gallery applauded'—] ; or ' The jar is blue'; [a dishonest opponent will say,] ' It is only those standing on the scaffolds that cry out, but not the scaffolds';—and, in like manner, [he will say,] ' How can a jar be the same thing as blue—which is [not a substance but] a colour V\ [In these cases the objector knows perfectly well that the assertion was not meant literally of the scaffolds, and that the jar was not asserted to be the colour blue, but a blue substance].
b.	So too [conversely] it is a fraud in respect of a trope, when the assertion f I am eternal' has been employed literally, to object ' How canst thou be eternal that was born of so and so ?'J
* ^iK^' "STwrfrl II
t w jt^t: ifinrfrr ^ ST^fi ^ Jisjfa rax: I ^t^T ^r ^r^rro^: 11
si
irfmraT WT^TT^^T II46
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
[Here the objector is supposed to know very well that the speaker employed the term ' I' to denote, what is regarded as the direct object of its denotation, the eternal spirit within him, and not his body, which he can only metaphorically call himself, and which, as the temporary prison-house of his soul, very possibly was born of so and so].
c.	[If you ask why it is exactly that] a Fraud [such as has been described in §51, &c.] is not a valid reply, [it is] because it does not assail what the speaker meant to say.* [In the phraseology of European logic, it is a wilful ignoratio elenchi or misconception of what it is that is to be opposed].
d.	And it must not be said that it is the speaker who is to blame for employing terms with a double meaning or with a metaphorical application; becausc the speaker is not to blame in employing a term that is notoriously understood as expressive of this or that meaning; else there would be an end put to every thing like reasoning by such objections as the following—viz., when a man says ' The mountain is fiery/ [the opponent, choosing to suppose that the term employed was not vahniman ' fiery,' but a-vahniman ' not fiery'—the form, by the rules of euphonic combination in Sanskrit, being here the same in either case, might say] ' How is it that [you say] this mountain is not fiery ?'t
e.	He next takes a prima facie or incorrect view of Fraud
* ^sifttrnw^Trif^r w^r^rw^Trwr. it t ^	TT^TJU^iQh UcULHIV*: ^rrf^frT TP^t
^n?r 11BOOK I. SECTION 10.	47
[—as it is one that is likely to occur to some readers, and one that may as well be disposed of] whilst we are on the subject.*
^TR^K^^'	II ||
The varieties of Fraud N°' 55-F™ld aspect of a trope [§54 not to be confounded —some one may fancy at first sight—] is because they partially just Fraud in respect of term ^^ for {t
does not differ therefrom.
a.	The meaning of this doubt is, that Fraud is only of two kinds, but not of three kinds; for Fraud in respect of a trope is just Fraud in respect of a term, seeing that these do not differ in being the assumption of a word's being used in another sensef [than that in which it was well enough known that the speaker did use it],
b.	[This doubt] he clears up J [as follows].
^	n »
Things, though par- N°* 56—Xt is not 80 [-« opposed in tially agreeing, may §55—] because they do differ [although, it may yet differ.	^ agreeing in the respect just mentioned].
a. Since they may agree in some respect or other, even while they differ through the characters abovementioned [in §52—54] which have led to their being treated as separate, there would be no distinction anywhere [if we were to adopt the principle which would remove the distinction here], because there is everywhere
-j
J	H48
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
no difference so far as regards a character common to the things severally* [—a man and a monkey, for example, or a jar and a web, being alike in so far as regards their being substances, but still requiring to be distinguished in respect of that in which they differ].
b. So, with the intention of showing that the opposite view involves an absurdity [such as has been noticed in §56. a.\ he saysf [as follows].
<sqfcrijif en	u M^II
No. 57.—Or if there were no distinction where there is any similarity of character, we should have but one kind of Fraud.
a.	That is to say—if no distinction is to result from any property whatever provided there be some similarity of nature, then Fraud, inasmuch as each variety thereof has a common character so far forth as each is a Fraud &c., would not be even of two sorts as you imagine [—see §55 a.], but of only one.%
b.	Here concludes the topic of Fraud [in disputation.] §
c.	He now defines Futility, which next presents itself. ||
t fir^ ^^ftfiraTr^ 11
^TO rT f^^fWri ftr^ftfrT WTI || II jMnini *rrf7T ~r^rf?r»BOOK I. SECTION 11.
4.9
SECTION XI.
Of futile objections and hopeless stupidity.
^^wtwwt wr^n^' n11
No. 58.—Futility consists in the offering of
Futility, in an , .	„ ,	. .
objection, what. objections founded on [some mere] similarity
or difference of character [—without regard to the question whether the fact asserted bears any invariable relation to that character].
a.	The expression ' founded on similarity or difference of character' is a definite one [—intended to convey just so much, and to exclude everything beyond—] ; therefore the meaning is this, that Futility consists in objecting, or taking exception, on the ground of a similarity or difference of character without respect to invariableness of association or dissociation* [between the character and that whereof it is taken as a sign of the presence or the absence. For example, if it were propounded that ' The man is unfit to travel, because he has a fever/ it would be futile to object that ' The man is fit to travel, because he is a soldier*— there being no invariableness of connection between the being a soldier and the being fit to travel].
b.	[As a syllogism with the Major premiss not universal but particular has no force at all]—so, [in consideration of the want of universality referred to in §58. a.,] it is implied that the futile reply—differing from a Fraud [§50]—is one that is powerless as an objection, [—whereas the objection, in the case of ignoratio elenchi, has power against the ' man of straw* which is fraudulent-
* ^mltnth«rrfaf?r wtoikwt f^fw^r ^Tfirfa^-
inz^^i-i gwTfwTit srifrrf^fzrsr: n
G50
APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.
ly substituted for the argument of the opposite party—], or it is a reply that is self-destructive.*
c. He now defines Unfitness to be argued with—the topic which presents itself next in order.f
firfffjTq fri <u TH M prl^f	II 4 < II
The limit at which it be- No- 59.—Unfitness to be argued with comes useless to argue fur- consists in one's [stupidly] misunderstanding, or not understanding at all.
a.	The term here rendered ' Unfitness to be argued with* signifies literally the place, i. e. the suggester, of censure or rebuke [—for if a man stupidly misunderstands you or does not understand you at all, and yet still persists in trying to make a show of opposition, then the matter has come to that point where there is nothing left for it but to rebuke him as a blockhead, and to turn him out or quit his company].
b.	In order to prevent the mistake, [into which some might fall, of supposing] that there is no subdivision of Futility and Unfitness to be reasoned with, [—the subdivisions of which will be stated in their proper place—] he says,§ [as follows],
rrf%;^i^ifd fcir^n^s H 4 0 11
No. 60.—Since they are of various kinds, there are many
* rf^fa^WT	t ^T^T^^tR: TT onfrTfxfrT
^farTH II
t iFTCTTf ftlTWl^ ^^frT II X few^Ri WR^nr^fwf^rRJrii § ^rrfrrf^irwTiT^Tt^TiiT ^roWrr *TTBOOK I. SECTION 11.	51
sorts of Futility and Unfitness to be reasoned with [—see §59. A.].
a.	[But as other questions are more pressing] their subdivision is not made at present;—such is the import * [of the aphorism].
b.	[Here ends the First Book of the commented Aphorisms of the Nyaya.]
* ^r^f rrf^*n*r: "fcpT vnnr: i|52
APPENDIX TO THE
APPENDIX
TO THE
FIRST LECTURE.
a. Before going further, let us bestow a re-Review of Gau-	.	.	.
, , T	strospective glance on this Lecture in which
tam&'s 1st Lccturc*
Gautama lays down the plan of the whole Ny£-ya system ; and let us enquire whether Gautama's exposition is obnoxious to such a charge as is brought against it, for example, by Dr. Ritter, who says, (at p. 366, Yol. IY. of thjNvSfubelled tlie English version of his History of Philoso-in Europe.	phy); " In its exposition the Nyaya is tedious,
loose, and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of this Philosophy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into the intrinsic development of ideas, whatever knowledge they may have possessed of the external laws of composition." Setting aside the latter of these sentences, which has possibly been mistranslated, we venture to say that the Nyaya—up to the point that we have here reached in Gautama's exposition of it—can be tedious only to him who does not understand
Reasons why it ^ Qr wj1Q nQ taste for philosophical enqui-is libelled.	,
ries; that it can appear loose to any one only
as the chain cable heaped upon the deck of a man of war appears
loose in the eyes of the landsman who never saw it stretched;
and that it can appear unmethodical only to him who has failed
to discern its method. We blame no one for having failed to
discern its method, but we do blame those, including Dr. Bitter,FIRST LECTURE.	53
who, having failed to discern it, take upon them to deny its existence. The method in Gautama's exposition
Attempt to show .... why it ought not is, one might think, sufficiently clear. Let us
to be so libelled. try tQ mak(J it ^ possible ciearer. Aiming at this, we shall now give our Synopsis of Gautama's method, noting, as we go along, the Aphorism to which our statements have reference.
Estimate of Gau	Gautama starts with the grand question
tama's order of pro- of all questions—the enquiry as to how we cedure.	shall attain the summum bonum,—the ' chief
end of man/ as the Westminster Catechism literally represents the Sanskrit paramapurushartha. The general answer to this he states in his first aphorism—where he lays down further the position that deliverance from evil can be reached only through knowledge of the truth, [see §1].
c.	Few are likely to dispute this first position [—those few being such as are to be remitted to the category noticed under §59], and the next question is,—have we instruments adapted to the acquisition of a knowledge of the truth ? According to Gautama we are furnished with four instruments adapted to this purpose. [These he enumerates in §3, and describes severally in §4—8].
d.	But, if we have instruments, let us know what are the objects, in regard to which it is worth while obtaining a correct knowledge by means of the appropriate instruments. [These he enumerates in §9, and he defines them severally in §10—22].
e.	But the bare enunciation and definiton of these Objects does not ensure a correct and believing knowledge of them. [The state intermediate between hearing and believing, viz. Doubt, he defines in §23].
/. But how is a man to get out of doubt ? He will be content to remain in doubt if there be no motive for enquiring further.54
APPENDIX TO THE
[Here—§.24—he takes occasion to explain what constitutes a Motive].
g.	But, in every enquiry, to reach the unknown we must start from the known;—there must be data. The knowledge which, in any enquiry, we may treat as requiring no demonstration, is either popular—being that on which the unlearned and the learned are at one—the only ground available in dealing with the unlearned, [see §25]; or it is scientific—belonging to the schools, [see §26]. This latter, again, is divisible into four—viz., tenets received in every school [§ 27]; tenets peculiar to particular schools, and furnishing the grounds of argumenta ad hominem only [§29]; tenets postulated, and available only where the hypothesis is conceded [§30]; and tenets which, though not expressly laid down by the founders of the schools, are yet so clearly implied as to require no special demonstration, being inevitable Corollaries [§31].
h.	The data being determined, it is proper to determine the order of procedure in demonstrating thereby something not granted. [This order of procedure is intimated in §32 and explicated in §33—38].
i.	But, thus far, we have been shown an arrangement for hearing only one side of the question,* and how can we be sure that the opposite side is not the right one ? [Before making up our minds we must hear both sides—§39—40].
j. But an honest enquirer may have heard both sides and still be in perplexity. Is he to be turned adrift ? Not at all. Honest discussion, with one who holds the same first principles, is open to him [§41].
k. There are yet others, besides honest enquirers, that are not utterly to be rejected. A person, not hopelessly irreclaimable,
* Prov. XVIII, 17.FIRST LECTURE.
55
may shabbily wrangle for the sake of a seeming victory. [Here, therefore, he defines wrangling, §42].
I. A person, not perhaps hopelessly irreclaimable, may descend to even a lower depth of shabbiness than the wrangler, and may carp at others without undertaking to settle any thing himself. [Here, therefore, he defines cavilling, §43].
m. Wranglers and cavillers, in default of good reasons, must take up with bad ones—with what look like reasons; and even an honest enquirer may mislead himself by taking the semblance of a reason for a real one. [The various possible semblances of a reason he, therefore, defines and divides §44—49].
n. But, whilst there are fallacies by which a man may deceive himself as well as others, there are other frauds which are employed only dishonestly for the deception of others. [These frauds he defines and divides, §50—57].
o. Descending a stage lower, an opponent may employ objections so futile as to be capable of deceiving no one. It is well to know in what consists the futility of such objections. [This he shows—§ 58.]
p. Finally, an opponent, sinking even below the former one, (who knew what he was opposing though he could make none but a futile opposition), may be unable to understand the proposition [§59—60]. Here Gautama's patience is exhausted, but not before. Against everything but that invincible combination of the spirit of contradiction with stupidity, he seeks to arm himself at all points. An objection the most frivolous—or even futile—provided it be tendered by one who understands the proposition—he
. ,	, does not refuse to deal with. The objection
How it happens that	.
very frivolous objec- might perplex some honest enquirer, and
tions are gravely treat- therefore Gautama, or the follower who has ed in the JNyaya.	.
imbibed his spirit, does not consider himself
entitled to consult his own ease by scouting it, though he himself56	APPENDIX TO THE FIRST LECTURE.
may see its futility plainly enough. It is fair to remember this when we meet with ludicrously frivolous objections gravely treated in a Nyaya work. The author is not to be supposed to have invented the objection. It was offered to him—offered very possibly for the purpose of vexatiously puzzling and perplexing,—and the Naiyayika will not allow himself to be puzzled and perplexed. The most cavilling opponent is not to be allowed the semblance of a victory; he shall not be allowed to boast even of having put the philosopher out of temper. This single triumph—such as it is—is reserved for the absolute blockhead.
q. Now, we should like to learn from the undervaluers of the method of the Nyaya, how could that method be much improved ?
You are not to imagine that you have answered this question when you have shown that there are some important matters not here noticed by Gautama. You must be able to show either that there are important matters for which his system provides no place, or that he misarranges the order of procedure. We have explained his order of procedure, according to our own view of it. The enquiry whether there is any thing within the range of conception, for which his system does not furnish its appropriate place, we reserve for a separate essay.
The undervaluers of the Nyaya invited to state where the order of procedure is mis-arranged, or what important matter there is for which the system provides no place.